Die Philosophie der Wahrnehmung und der Beobachtung
The Philosophy of Perception and Observation

Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau
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Hrsg.

Beiträge
Contributions

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Verstehen und Gedanke im Vorwort zur *Logisch-philosophischen Abhandlung*

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Abstract

In einem bekannten Brief an Ludwig von Ficker empfiehlt Wittgenstein, erahnend dass dieser sein Buch nicht verstehen wird, „das Vorwort und den Schluß zu lesen, da diese den Sinn am Unmittelbarsten zum Ausdruck bringen. –" (Wittgenstein 2004; datiert nach 20.10.1919). Man kann sich diesbezüglich als Erstes fragen, was hier mit dem „Sinn" der *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung* (LPA) gemeint sein kann – da Wittgenstein eigentlich im Vorwort nur vom „Zweck" des Buches redet – und wie das Vorwort ihn ausdrückt. Welche Leseschlüssel sind dann im Vorwort zu finden und wie können die Aussagen darin innerhalb der tractarianischen Philosophie eingeordnet werden? Der vorliegende Beitrag beabsichtigt die ersten Worte des Vorworts zu diskutieren und konzentriert sich auf zwei darin enthaltene Aspekte, nämlich die Idee, dass man die Gedanken des Buches bereits gedacht haben soll, um es zu verstehen, und den Gebrauch des Begriffs „Gedanke" in einer von seiner tractarianischen Definition abweichenden Bedeutung.

1. Eine merkwürdige Bedingung zum Verstehen eines Buches

Die LPA, gewiss ein Buch, das in mehr als einer Hinsicht schwer zu lesen und zu verstehen ist, enthält jedoch ganz am Anfang eine explizite Bedingung, die das Verständnis des Buches erleichtert bzw. ermöglicht – vorausgesehen sie wird erfüllt. Im Vorwort heißt es:

> Dieses Buch wird vielleicht nur der verstehen, der die Gedanken, die darin ausgedrückt sind – oder doch ähnliche Gedanken – schon selbst einmal gedacht hat.

Mit diesen Worten fällt es nicht schwer zu sehen, dass Wittgenstein selbst sein Werk für eine für den Leser schwierige Angelegenheit hält: Die Anmerkung zu Beginn des Vorworts in der LPA drückt eine pessimistische Ansicht aus, ja sogar eine Unmöglichkeit, was die Verständlichkeit des Buches betrifft. Dieser Pessimismus ist aber kein grundlegender, sondern er ist vielmehr eine Konsequenz, und zwar eine, die sich sicherlich größtenteils daraus ergibt, dass weder Frege noch Russell – also diejenigen, die mit der LPA schon seit ihrer Entstehung gut vertraut waren – die Arbeit Wittgensteins weder in ihren Vorstufen noch in ihrer endgütigen Form verstanden haben. Dies lässt sich in mehreren Briefen aus der Entstehungszeit der *Abhandlung* sehen (z. B. von Wittgenstein an Russell: 22.5.1915, 12.6.1919, 13.13.1919; und von Frege an Wittgenstein: 28.6.1919, 16.9.1919; Wittgenstein 2004). Frege ist, vielleicht mehr als Russell, derjenige, der noch weiter von Wittgensteins Arbeit entfernt zu sein scheint. In einem Brief vom 30.9.1919 äußert sich Frege sehr kritisch sogar zum Vorwort der LPA. Er schreibt:

> Nachdem man Ihr Vorwort gelesen hat, weiss man nicht recht, was man mit Ihren ersten Sätzen anfangen soll. Man erwartet eine Frage, ein Problem gestellt zu sehen und nun liest man etwas, was den Eindruck von Behauptungen macht, die ohne Begründungen gegeben werden, deren sie doch dringend bedürftig erscheinen. Wie kommen Sie zu diesen Behauptungen? Mit welchem Probleme hängen sie zusammen? (Wittgenstein 2004)

Der Ton, in dem das Vorwort der LPA geschrieben ist, weist offenbar einen anderen Charakter auf als der Rest des Buches. Frege bemerkt diesen Unterschied bzw. diesen Wechsel und reagiert kritisch. Er reagiert in der Tat auf das gesamte Buch kritisch, denn im selben Brief behauptet er, Bedenken zum Inhalt und zum Wortgebrauch im Buch zu haben. Es wäre jedoch nicht korrekt, anzunehmen – wie etwa im Brief Freges suggeriert wird –, dass das Vorwort gegenüber dem restlichen Buch fremd sein sollte: in der Tat stimmt das Vorwort sehr mit dem Charakter der letzten Bemerkungen des Buches überein. Insofern ist es nicht schwierig zu sehen, mit welchen Problemen die „Behauptungen" Wittgensteins im Vorwort zusammenhängen können, nämlich mit der Feststellung der Grenzen und der Unsinnigkeit der (traditionellen) Philosophie und der LPA selbst, Themen die gegen Ende des Buches einen Ausdruck finden.

Dass das Vorwort mit den letzten Themen der LPA in Verbindung steht, ist zu erwarten; denn ein Vorwort, obwohl es eine der ersten Sachen ist, die man in einem Buch liest, ist in der Regel auch das Letzte, was geschrieben wird, und insofern kann man sagen, dass das Vorwort der LPA aus der Perspektive desjenigen geschrieben ist, der die „Leiter" schon weggeworfen hat. Das gerade scheint Frege zu irritieren, nämlich eine Sprache, die nicht mehr mit dem Charakter einer Abhandlung, d. h. einer wissenschaftlichen Leistung in Übereinstimmung steht; im Grunde: eine Sprache, die nicht mehr aus Definitionen, Prämissen und Schlussfolgerungen besteht.

Aufgrund der Rezeption seiner Arbeit durch Russell und Frege ist Wittgenstein schließlich der Meinung, dass niemand sein Buch verstehen wird.[1] Und das heißt, dass kein „gewöhnlicher" Leser es verstehen wird, außer „vielleicht nur der", der die merkwürdige Bedingung erfüllt, seine Gedanken schon selbst einmal gedacht zu haben. Damit setzt Wittgenstein eigentlich kein Verständnis mehr voraus, zumindest keines, das mit irgendeiner Form von intellektueller Anstrengung zu tun hat, sondern setzt auf eine Identifizierung des Lesers mit dem Autor. Diese so gestellte Bedingung enthält zwei Elemente, die hier kurz diskutiert werden, nämlich die Idee, dass man dieselben oder ähnliche Gedanken eines Buches haben kann, sowie die Verwendung des Begriffs „Gedanke" im Vorwort. Dadurch sollte die Intention des Vorworts der LPA sowie seine Stellung innerhalb der tractarianischen Philosophie besser verstanden werden.

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[1] Siehe z. B. Brief von Wittgenstein an B. Russell vom 12.6.1919 und an L. von Ficker vom 7.10.1919 (Wittgenstein 2004).

2. Die gleichen Gedanken schon selbst einmal gedacht haben

In einem Brief an seine Mutter vom 20. September 1923 aus Puchberg gibt Frank Ramsey eine gute Erklärung von der hier diskutierten Stelle des Vorworts zur LPA. Ramsey war damals in einer guten Position, um die Ideen Wittgensteins zu verstehen, denn sie haben das Buch zusammen und im Detail diskutiert. In seinem Brief schreibt Ramsey:

> His idea of his book is not that anyone by reading it will understand his ideas, but that someday someone will think them out again for himself, and will derive great pleasure from finding in this book their exact expressions.[2]

Im Gegensatz zum Vorwort der LPA, in dem viel stärker behauptet wird, dass „vielleicht nur der", der die Gedanken des Buches schon selbst einmal gedacht hat, es verstehen könne, ist in dieser Erklärung Ramseys nicht ausgeschlossen, dass das Buch durch das alleinige Lesen verstanden werden kann; nur, wie man auch aus dieser Textstelle entnehmen kann, ist es nicht die Absicht Wittgensteins *so* verstanden zu werden. Eigentlich ist hier vom Verstandenwerden gar nicht mehr die Rede, sondern nur und viel deutlicher als in der LPA von der Identifizierung des Lesers mit dem Autor, die Wittgenstein für das Erreichen des Zwecks seines Buches voraussetzt.

Wie lässt sich diese Idee nun verstehen? Kann man sinnvoll erwarten, dass jemand die in einem Buch enthaltenen Gedanken schon selbst einmal gedacht haben wird? Und das von einem so komplizierten Buch wie die LPA? Kann man das überhaupt von irgendeinem philosophischen Buch erwarten? In der Praxis scheint es unwahrscheinlich, dass ein solch komplexes System wie ein philosophisches Buch einmal ganz unabhängig in den Gedanken von jemand anderem wiederholt werden kann. Ganz ausschließen kann man das allerdings auch nicht, denn es ist ja in dieser Idee keine logische Unmöglichkeit involviert. Wir können also für einen Moment annehmen, dass so etwas auch in der Praxis möglich ist und fragen: Wie würde diese Identifizierung von Leser und Autor im Fall der LPA aussehen? Bzw. welche Gedanken sind in der LPA ausgedrückt, die man selbst denken sollte, um das Buch zu verstehen? Ist jede Bemerkung des Buches ein Gedanke im Sinne des Vorworts? Eine Textstelle aus dem Jahre 1916 würde im Prinzip gegen diese letzte Idee sprechen. Wittgenstein schreibt hier nach einer Bemerkung folgende Erläuterung, die auf eine Unterscheidung zwischen Gedanken und Bemerkung hinweist: „[…] [Diese Bemerkung ist nur Material für einen Gedanken]". Die Stelle lautet folgendermaßen:

> Es ~~giebt~~ „kann" nicht eine ordentliche oder eine unordentliche Welt geben so daß man sagen könnte unsere Welt ist ordentlich. Sondern in jeder möglichen Welt ist eine, wenn auch komplizierte Ordnung „gerade so" wie es ~~auf~~ im ~~ein~~ Raume auch nicht unordentliche und ordentliche Punktverteilungen giebt sondern jede Punktverteilung ist ordentlich.
> [Diese Bemerkung ist nur Material für einen Gedanken] (MS 103 53f; D.: 19.9.1916)

Die betreffende Bemerkung weist keine Randmarkierungen auf und wurde dementsprechend in der LPA nicht übernommen. Sind nun die tatsächlich übernommenen Bemerkungen in der LPA alle Gedanken? Wenn ja, wie viele solcher Gedanken sollte jemand schon selbst einmal gedacht haben, um das Buch zu verstehen? Alle?

Angenommen jede Bemerkung des Buches gilt als ein Gedanke im Sinne des Vorworts, scheint es plausibel zu behaupten, dass nur, wenn man alle Bemerkungen des Buches schon einmal gedacht hat, man das Buch verstehen könne; andernfalls könnte hier nur von einem Teilverständnis die Rede sein. Angesichts der singulären Struktur des Textes, könnte man jedoch auch behaupten, dass es genug wäre, bereits die *zentralen* Gedanken des Buches gedacht zu haben, nämlich die sieben kardinal nummerierten Bemerkungen, um das Buch zu verstehen. Diese so verstandene Bedingung ist gewiss genügsamer, jedoch nicht unbedingt einfacher zu erfüllen.

Ein weiteres Problem bezüglich der Interpretation dieser Stelle ergibt sich aus der Anordnung der Bemerkungen (bzw. Gedanken) durch das Dezimalsystem des Buches. Dieses Systems stellt in der Tat einen Versuch dar, dem Leser die LPA zugänglicher zu machen. In einem weiteren Brief an Ludwig von Ficker vom 06.12.1919 betont Wittgenstein die Notwendigkeit des Dezimalsystems für das Verständnis des Buches, da die Dezimalzahlen „allein dem Buch Übersichtlichkeit und Klarheit geben und es ohne diese Nummerierung ein unverständlicher Wust wäre." (Wittgenstein 2004). Dieses System stellt jedoch trotz Wittgensteins Streben nach Klarheit eine weitere Anforderung an denjenigen Leser, der die LPA verstehen sollte. Denn dieser Leser müsste dann nicht nur die gleichen – oder ähnliche – Gedanken selbst schon einmal gedacht haben; er müsste sie auch in einer gewissen Art und Weise, d. h. in einer gewissen Anordnung gedacht haben.

Die hier skizzierten Schwierigkeiten sprechen für die These, dass das Vorwort der LPA aus der Perspektive einer Überwindung der Philosophie der LPA geschrieben ist; und das heißt hier aus der Perspektive der Überwindung einer gewissen Form von Rationalität. Es ist insofern nicht auszuschließen, dass diese merkwürdige Bedingung absichtlich *so* geschrieben wurde, dass die Erwartung einer bestimmten Form von Rationalität gleich von vornherein annulliert wird. Was vorausgesetzt wird, um das Buch zu verstehen, ist nicht ein rationelles bzw. intellektuelles Verstehen, sondern vielmehr eine gewisse Perspektive, die ausschließt, dass die LPA mithilfe einer auf dem Lesen des Textes basierten intellektuellen Tätigkeit zugänglich gemacht werden kann. Und das wäre eigentlich nichts Neues bei Wittgenstein, denn dies erinnert in der Tat an eine seiner späten Ideen, nach welcher die Philosophie nicht mit Schwierigkeiten intellektueller Natur zu tun hat, sondern mit einer Perspektivänderung.[3]

3. Die „Gedanken" der *Logisch-Philosophischen Abhandlung*

Das Vorwort zur *Logisch-philosophischen Abhandlung* ist also aus der Perspektive einer Überwindung der Philosophie der LPA geschrieben. Diese Perspektive erklärt nun eine weitere Besonderheit im Vorwort, nämlich dass sich Wittgenstein darin nicht mehr an die Terminologie der geschriebenen Abhandlung hält und Wörter in einem *anderen* Sinne verwendet als dem von ihm selbst im Buch defi-

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[2] Zitiert nach dem Kommentar zum Brief von Ramsey an Wittgenstein vom 15.10.1923 in Wittgenstein 2004.

[3] Siehe z. B. das sog. „Philosophie"-Kapitel im TS 213, S. 406ff. Hier nicht exakt in dieser Form ausgedrückt, obwohl die Idee einer Umstellung dabei enthalten ist: „Schwierigkeit der Philosophie, nicht die intelektuelle Schwierigkeit der Wissenschaften, sondern die Schwierigkeit einer Umstellung. Widerstände des W i l l e n s sind zu überwinden." (TS 213, S. 406, §86).

nierten. Das ist der Fall des Begriffs „Gedanke".[4] Wir haben oben gesagt, dass das Vorwort mit dem letzten Teil des Buches in Verbindung steht. Diesen Zusammenhang sieht man gut im Fall der abweichenden Verwendung des Wortes „Gedanke" im Vorwort, die bereits in der Bemerkung 6.422 zu finden ist:

> Der erste Gedanke bei der Aufstellung eines ethischen Gesetzes von der Form „du sollst..." ist: Und was dann, wenn ich es nicht tue? Es ist aber klar, daß die Ethik nichts mit Strafe und Lohn im gewöhnlichen Sinne zu tun hat.

Zu bemerken ist hier, dass diese nicht logisch-figurative Bedeutung von „Gedanke" erstmals im Kontext der Aufstellung eines ethischen Gesetzes vorkommt, was an sich für eine Abweichung vom Kontext des abbildenden Gedankens spricht. Neben der hier diskutierten Textstelle kommt im Vorwort das Wort „Gedanke" noch an fünf weiteren Stellen vor, nämlich: i) das Buch will dem Ausdruck der Gedanken eine Grenze ziehen, ii) den Werken Freges und Russells schuldet Wittgenstein die Anregung zu seinen Gedanken, iii) im Buch sind Gedanken ausgedrückt, iv) die Wahrheit der mitgeteilten Gedanken ist unantastbar und definitiv, und in indirekter Form v) „weil es mir gleichgültig ist, ob das, was ich gedacht habe, vor mir schon ein anderer gedacht hat." Bekanntlich wird der Gedanke in der LPA als das logische Bild der Tatsachen (TLP 3) und als der sinnvolle Satz (LPA 4) definiert und in dieser Bedeutung wird das Wort „Gedanke" nur im ersten Fall des Vorworts verwendet. Wozu dann diese hartnäckige Betonung, dass die LPA Gedanken im nicht logisch-figurativen Sinne enthält? Die vier weiteren Fälle tun nichts anderes als die Unterscheidung zu dem logisch-figurativ definierten „Gedanken" hervorzuheben, so als ob der Autor sich im Vorwort in einer seiner Grunddefinitionen selbst negiert. Denn aus der tractarianischen Perspektive wäre es eigentlich nicht korrekt zu sagen, in der LPA seien Gedanken ausgedrückt, wie Wittgenstein hier eben eindringlich betont. Denn tractarianische Gedanken stehen für Bilder der Wirklichkeit, d. h. Sätze mit denen die Beschreibung der Welt möglich ist, alles wofür philosophische Gedanken nicht stehen können.

Eine weitere Möglichkeit ist, dass diese Betonung praktische Gründe haben kann, die auf einen Unterschied zwischen dem Werk Wittgensteins und „nichtssagenden", „geschwefelten" Texten, wie solche die in einigen Briefen an Ludwig von Ficker (von ca. 7.10.1919 und nach 20.10.1919; Wittgenstein 2004) sehr stark kritisiert werden, hinweisen.

4. Schlussbemerkung

Wittgenstein ist in der LPA der Meinung, dass sein Buch (vielleicht) nur durch eine gewisse Identifizierung von Leser und Autor verstanden werden kann. Unabhängig davon, ob das in der Art und Weise, wie er sich das vorstellt, möglich ist oder nicht, offenbart diese Idee, dass ein intellektuelles Verstehen des Buches nicht erwünscht bzw. sogar nicht möglich ist. Diese Reaktion gegen einen intellektuellen Zugang zu seinem eigenen Werk ist in Übereinstimmung mit der Kritik zur Philosophie und zur LPA selbst, die gegen Ende des Buches geübt wird. Man könnte dann vom ganzen Vorwort sagen, dass es aus der Perspektive desjenigen geschrieben ist, der die Philosophie, konkret die der LPA, bereits überwunden hat. Dies könnte auch erklären, warum Wittgenstein sich im Vorwort nicht mehr an seine eigene Terminologie hält und den Begriff des „Gedanken" in einer von seiner tractarianischen Definition abweichenden Bedeutung verwendet.

Danksagung

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[4] Dieselbe Abweichung mit der Terminologie der LPA sieht man auch im Gebrauch des Wortes „Wahrheit" im Vorwort, das genauso wie „Gedanke" in einem andren Sinne verwendet wird als in der LPA selbst. Vgl.: „Dagegen scheint mir die Wahrheit der hier mitgeteilten Gedanken unantastbar und definitiv."

An Analysis of the Shift in Wittgenstein's Philosophy?
A Momentary Revolution or a Dialectical Result?

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Abstract

The philosophy of Wittgenstein is generally discussed in two periods: The early and the later period in Wittgenstein´s philosophy. And in this sense, one of the most important points that distinguishes him from his contemporaries is that he has two mainly opposed philosophical manners during the development of his thought. Although in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, he has a theory of meaning called Picture Theory of Meaning, which is based on his picture conception; however, in his later period, he emphasized mainly the conception of "language games" which is an eventual conception that is figured out from various metaphors related with language and which has a completely different meaning than the philosophy of his early period. Therefore, we see a shift in Wittgenstein's philosophy. At this very point, I think we can ask this question: If we can't speak of a conception such as a momentary revolution or a conversion during this intellectual development, then how can we understand this shift that takes place in Wittgenstein's philosophy? In the literature, this shift is generally taken as a philosophical metamorphosis that results from many momentary inspirations or conversions. But in this paper, the thing that we want to put forward is that this shift is the result of a dialectical process, not a momentary revolution. Thus, our aim is to discuss for which reasons this philosophical shift took place and what are the problematic conditions that did arise under the roof of the theory itself that was put forward in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. And in this regard, we want to deal with the critical contributions made by Piero Sraffa and Frank P. Ramsey to Wittgenstein, and with the problematic conditions that caused him to move away from his thoughts in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. In conclusion, we try to express that the shift in Wittgenstein's philosophy is not a momentary revolution, but the result of a dialectical process, in the meaning of a progress of contrary thoughts confronting each other.

When we generally look at the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, one of the most distinct claims is that the most fundamental way to tackle with the philosophical matters is possible by gaining an accurate comprehension about the nature of language or about how language is becoming meaningful. In this regard, we see that Wittgenstein has developed two mainly opposite thoughts during all of his philosophical life concerning the nature of language. His early thought is mainly put forward in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. In this work Wittgenstein has a theory of meaning called Picture Theory of Meaning, which is based on the conception of picture. Here, Wittgenstein states that language/propositions is/are only meaningful as long as they depict reality. However, in the philosophy of his later period Wittgenstein rejects this view on language. His later thought concerning the nature of language is centered around the conception of "language games" which is totally contrary to what the picture conception says. Although he previously thought that language is meaningful as long as it is a picture of facts; in the philosophy of his later period, he starts to think in a new way and states that the thing that gives meaning the language isn't the state of affairs it corresponds to, but the uses of our words in – as he calls it – "language games". To emphasize his new thought, he says in *Philosophical Investigations* that: "The meaning of a word is its use in the language" (PI: 25).

Therefore, we see that there is a clear philosophical shift between his early and later philosophy. So, the question is this: how did this shift happen? In this context, we think that the general opinion of this shift can be represented in the following statements: "No unbroken line leads from the *Tractatus* to the *Philosophical Investigations*; there is no logical sequence between the two books, but rather a logical gap" (Hartnack 2006: 49). However, contrary to his thought, when we look at the critical contributions that Wittgenstein is confronted with during the philosophy of his transitional period and try to understand the problematic

conditions that arised under the theoretical roof of the *Tractatus* itself, the logical gap will be completed by itself.

When we try to understand the paradigmatic change in Wittgenstein's philosophy, there is a general impression that in 1929 and after there was a momentary and radical conversion in his thought. But as Pears indicated, Wittgenstein had a chequered intellectual life. And this situation paved the way for making such an impression on his intellectual development. But contrary to this impression, the shift in his philosophical career isn't a conversion that takes place as a result of many inspiring events but rather a result of gradually facing problematic conditions that comes to light under the roof of the theory itself (Pears 1988: 225).

In the *Philosophical Investigations*, even though Wittgenstein criticized his Picture Theory of Meaning in many respects, we can say that these criticisms are general ones that don't concentrate on the internal problems of his theory itself. In this regard the works of Wittgenstein´s transitional period particularly become more of an issue in that they show what kind of problems arised under the roof of the theory and how they were overcome. Concerning how such a paradigmatic change took place, (apart from a few exceptional works) only two or three quotations are cited from the biography written by Norman Malcolm who was one of the closest friends of Wittgenstein. One of the famous quotation is this:

> One day (they were riding I think on a train) when Wittgenstein was insisting that a proposition and that which it describes must have the same 'logical form', the same 'logical multiplicity', Sraffa made a gesture familiar to Neapolitans as meaning something like disgust or contempt, of brushing the underneath of his chin with an outward sweep of the finger-tips of one hand. And he asked: 'What is the logical form of that?'. Sraffa's example produced in Wittgenstein the feeling that there was an absurdity in the insistence that a proposition

and what it describes must have the same 'form'. This broke the hold on him of the conception that a proposition must literally be the 'picture' of the reality it describes. (Malcolm 2001: 57-58).

In the other famous quotation, the event is taking place as such: "One day when Wittgenstein was passing a field where a football game was in progress, the thought first struck him that in language we play *games* with *words*" (Malcolm 2001: 55).

As Fann indicated, the mimic that Sraffa made can't be even a counter-example to the requirements of Wittgenstein's theory of meaning. Because this mimic according to the *Tractatus* isn't even a proposition. Wittgenstein's trouble was with propositions. But here with this mimic, what is possible is that before a range of different concrete samples, Wittgenstein started to question his main idea that language only functions in one way (Fann 1971: 48-49). In this regard, I share the opinion that these anecdotes aren't important in that they explain why and how Wittgenstein moved away from the Picture Theory of Meaning (because he didn't); but they are only good examples of the way Sraffa helped Wittgenstein to look at something in different perspectives (Monk 2005: 377).

When we put aside these inspiring anecdotes and try to analyze for which reasons the philosophical shift in Wittgenstein's philosophy took place, first of all we encounter Wittgenstein's own statements in the foreword of the *Philosophical Investigations*: "For since I began to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I could not but recognize grave mistakes in what I set out in that first book. I was helped to realize these mistakes – to a degree which I myself am hardly able to estimate – by the criticism which my ideas encountered from Frank Ramsey, with whom I discussed them in innumerable conversations during the last two years of his life. Even more than to this – always powerful and assured – criticism, I am indebted to that which a teacher of this university, Mr P. Sraffa, for many years unceasingly applied to my thoughts. It is to this stimulus that I owe the most fruitful ideas of this book" (PI: 4). Thus, understanding the critical contributions of Frank P. Ramsey and Pierro Sraffa is essential to comprehend the paradigmatic change in Wittgenstein's philosophy.

1. The Critical Contributions of Piero Sraffa: Language Games and the Door of the Imagination

Wittgenstein says to one of his closest friend that the most important contributions he took from Sraffa was that he gained an anthrophological point of view to upon philosophical matters. Thanks to this point of view, Wittgenstein started to pay attention to the possibility of different social practices and their sense-making roles in language. And what he realized was that a 'language game' can't be understood without understanding the rules of that game and without understanding the form of life on which that game depends (Monk 2005: 377-78).

Here we need to ask this question: what is the role of the anthrophological point of view in his later thought? I think that we can discuss its place with the conception of imagination. To begin with, the anthrophological point of view principally targets at exhibiting different sociological and cultural conditions. But to realize what is different we need one thing: the door of the imagination should be open. In this sense, starting to imagine how something is understood in different or foreign conditions – which is at the core of anthrophological point of view – is the constituent

element of Wittgenstein's conception of language games. We can say that the mainstay of this conception is this point. Because with this conception Wittgenstein tells us so to say: The imagination will always surprise the ones who think that they determined exactly all the reality; so, when dealing with something, we need always to imagine what is different or foreign not to be trapped in the present picture. In this way, we can even say that the conception of language games is possible as long as the door of the imagination is open. We can especially trace back this emphasis on imagination tp one of his later period works: *Remarks on Colour*.

According to Wittgenstein, the thing that made him close the door of imagination in his philosophy of the early period was the strict limitations of logic. However, this time we can surpass the limitations that restrict human thought by *imagination*. He says: "When dealing with logic, 'One cannot imagine that' means: one doesn't know what one should imagine here" (ROC: 6). In this work again he insistently calls us to realize what is different via imagination: "Imagine a *tribe* of colour-blind people, and this could easily be one. They would not have the same colour concepts as we do. For even assuming they speak, e.g. English, and thus have all the English colour words, they would still use them differently than we do and would *learn* their use differently" (ROC: 4). Or he says as such: "Couldn't we imagine a tribe of blind people? Couldn't it be capable of sustaining life under certain circumstances? And might not sighted people occur as exceptions?" (ROC: 63).

Thus the place of the anthrophological point of view in Wittgenstein's later philosophy and why we need to understand this via the conception of imagination is partly clarified. If we remember one of the main criticisms that he made himself: "A picture held us captive and we couldn't get outside of it" (PI: 53), the main critical contribution of Sraffa was that he was able to show him why we shouldn't be trapped in the present picture via concrete anthrophological conditions. And this critical contribution wasn't a momentary reaction to a momentary mimic, as Amartya Sen – one of the pupils of Sraffa – indicates, but was a result of perpetual discussions (Sen 2003: 1242). To say in one sentence: While the doors of imagination, which is essentially a faculty of our mind, were closed in Wittgenstein's mind, Sraffa seems to have struggled to open these doors. And it seems he managed to do so!

2. The Critical Contributions of Frank Plumpton Ramsey

The other people that helped Wittgenstein to criticize the thoughts of his early period concerning the triangle of language-thought-reality and thereby helped him to move away from his thoughts in the *Tractatus* is Frank P. Ramsey (1903-1930). Compared with Sraffa, the critical contributions of Ramsey is more tracable and explicit. Even though they didn't always cite their names while discussing a matter, we can trace his critical contributions via biographical data and the criticism in their writings. In this context, the criticisms of Ramsey can be handled in two parts. One of these are the criticisms in his posthumous work, *The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays* (FM). Most of the criticisims here consist of his critics made in 1929, which is the year when Wittgenstein came to Cambridge, most probaby to discuss philosophy with Ramsey. The other writing is the review article of the *Tractatus*: "The Critical Notices of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*".

The criticisms in Ramsey's last mentioned paper are particularly formidable in that they showed Wittgenstein some difficulties of his theory of meaning in the *Tractatus*. And we clearly see that most of the discussions that are made in MS 105 which is known as the first post-*Tractatus* writing of Wittgenstein clearly deals with the criticisms made in this paper. Again in MS 105 Wittgenstein says that he benefited from the discussions about logic and Ramsey gives him courage to thinking (McGuinnes 2008: 7).

2.1. Frank Ramsey and his Criticisms to the Conceptual Distinction of Sayable and Showable in the *Tractatus*

Some of the criticisms of Ramsey in FM are related to the main conceptual distinction of the Picture Theory of Meaning: the distinction between sayable and showable. In the *Tractatus*, since ethical, esthetical, religious statements don't correspond to state of affairs, Wittgenstein thinks that the propositions belonging to these areas of discourse can not be said but can only be shown. Wittgenstein characterised the propositions belonging to these areas of discourse as nonsense (unsinnig). He clearly explains his aim in the letter he sent to the Publisher of the *Tractatus*: "My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the *only* rigorous way of drawing those limits" (Monk 2005: 265).

Ramsey's first criticism concerning this conceptual distinction is about both Wittgenstein's seeing these areas of discourse as being important and seeing them still as nonsense. Ramsey's criticism is that: "Philosophy must be of some use and we must take it seriously; it must clear our thoughts and our actions. Or else it is a disposition we need to check, an inquiry to see that this is so: i.e. the chief proposition of philosophy is that philosophy is nonsense. And again we must then take seriously that it is nonsense, and not pretend, as Wittgenstein does, that it is an important nonsense" (Ramsey 1950: 263).

Ramsey's second criticism concerning the conceptual distinction of sayable / showable is related to the paradoxical situation. Wittgenstein points out in the *Tractatus* that philosophical discourse or what is sayable must only be the picturable facts and so he says whereof one can not speak thereof one must be silent. However, most of the statements in the *Tractatus* aren't picturable facts and this is the paradoxical situation of the *Tractatus*. In fact Wittgenstein has a solution to this problem: "My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly" (TLP: 90). But since this answer isn't a satisfactory one, it brought many criticisms with it. Ramsey's most clear criticism concerning this problem is that: "What we can't say we can't say, and we can't whistle it either" (Ramsey 1950: 238). In this context, we believe that Ramsey's criticisms concerning the sayable / showable distinction are particularly important in that they were written in 1929 when Wittgenstein returned to philosophy. Also Ramsey's critical contributions as Glock indicated (Glock 2005: 64) are important for Wittgenstein's moving away from this conceptual distinction and for his seeing of the problematic sides of his thoughts.

2.2. Frank Ramsey's Criticism of "Scholasticisim": The Lack of Self-Consciousness

Ramsey's other criticism in FM is related with the scholasticism (as he says) of Wittgenstein. He states that: "The chief danger to our philosophy, apart from laziness and woollines, is scholasticism, the essence of which is treating what is vague as if it were precise and trying to fit it into an exact logical category. A typical piece of scholasticism is Wittgenstein's view that all our everyday propositions are completely in order and that it is impossible to think illogically" (Ramsey 1950: 269). As Fann indicates the source of this scholasticism results from the method that is prevalent in philosophy (Fann 1971: 46). Ramsey's conclusion about this matter is that: "We construct a logic and do all our philosophical analyses entirely unself-consciously, thinking all the time of the facts and not about our thinking about them, deciding what we mean without any reference to the nature of meanings. This is one method and it may be the right one; but I think it is wrong and leads to an impasse" (Ramsey 1950: 267).

According to Ramsey, the most appropriate and simple way of getting self-conscious about our thoughts is to think ourselves and ask "What do I mean by that?", "What are the seperate notions involved in this term?", "Does this really follow from that?" etc (Ramsey 1950: 267). And he concludes that: "I find this self-consciousness inevitable in philosophy except in a very limited field. We are driven to philosophy because we dont know clearly what we mean: the question is always 'What do I mean by x'... It is doubtless an essential clue to the truth. If we neglect it, I feel we may get into the absurd position of the child in the following dialogue: 'Say breakfast.' 'Can't.' 'What can't you say?' 'Can't say breakfast.' (Ramsey 1950: 268).

At this very point, I mean in his transitional period in which he had numerous discussions with Ramsey, it is really interesting to see that one of the main questioning of Wittgenstein is about what he means by one of the foremost conceptions of the *Tractatus*, which is the "elementary propositions" (Elementarsatz). Here I think the question is this; is this conception a product of a self-conscious agent in the *Tractatus*? As far as we can see, the answer is no. Concerning the conception of "elementary propositions" of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein didn't explain clearly what he meant by this concept and it is clear that he had a lack of self-consciousness related with his theory of meaning. And this led him – as Wittgenstein says – into dogmatism:

> One fault you can find with a dogmatic account is first, that it is, as it were, arrogant. But that is not the worst thing about it. There is another mistake, which is much more dangerous and also pervades my whole book (*Tractatus*), and that is the conception that there are questions that the answer to which will be found at a later date. It is held that, although a result is not known, there is a way of finding it. "Thus I used to believe, for example, that it is the task of logical analysis to discover the elementary propositions. I wrote, We are unable to specify the form of elementary propositions, and that was quite correct too... Yet I did think that the elementary propositions could be specified later on. Only in recent years have I broken away from that mistake (Waismann 2003: 182).

Consequently, even if Wittgenstein didn't explain what he means by "basic propositions" in *Tractatus*, he put forth his analyses based on this conception as absolute truths. And this can be considered as an example of scholasticism as Ramsey calls it. Thus, we think that another critical contri-

bution of Ramsey is gaining him self-consciousness concerning certain philosophical matters.

2.3. The Crack Ramsey Finds out in *Tractatus*: The Colour Incompatibility Problem

Since Wittgenstein thought that he solved the problems of philosophy definitively with his theory of meaning in the *Tractatus* (TLP: 24), we know that he left philosophy and all scientific works behind. And that he was decisive not to come back again. He tells the reason why he decided to get away from any kind of scientific work to Keynes: "You ask in your letter whether you could do anything to make it possible for me to return to scientific work. The answer is, no: there's nothing that can be done in that way, because I myself no longer have any strong inner drive towards that sort of activity. Everything that I really had to say, I have said, and so the spring has run dry. That sounds queer, but it's how things are" (McGuinnes 2008: 153). Then I think we should ask this question: *what revived the spring that run dry*? We think that the thing that revived it was the critical contributions that showed to Wittgenstein the problematic sides of the *Tractatus*.

We all know that criticism leaks through the cracks. In this regard, Ramsey's main criticism leaks through the main crack of the *Tractatus*. Ramsey states his criticisims in his writing called "The Critical Notices of *Tractatus* Logico-Philosophicus". The problematic conditions that started Wittgenstein to move away from his thoughts of the *Tractatus* – as many commentator states – is the Colour Incompatibility Problem, i.e the problem related with the propositions of colors. And we can say that the thing that brought Wittgenstein back to philosophy is this problem. Sluga also indicates this:

> When Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge in 1929, he did so initially with the limited objective of fixing up certain remaining difficulties in the *Tractatus*. The problem that concerned him at this point stemmed from the central thesis of the book according to which all logical relations between propositions are explicable in terms of their truth-functional composition out of simpler ones. Wittgenstein had discussed a number of apparent counterexamples to that thesis in the *Tractatus*, but by 1929 he had concluded that he had failed to resolve the difficulty. How was one to account for the fact that the propositions "This surface is red" and "This surface is green" are incompatible when they are taken to refer to the same whole surface at a given moment? They certainly did not seem to be truth-functionally complex. The "color exclusion" problem thus presented a potentially damaging problem for a central element of the *Tractatus* philosophy and it was this problem that Wittgenstein was determined to solve when he returned to Cambridge (Sluga 1996: 15-16).

The main criticism of Ramsey is in fact related with passage 6.3751 of *Tractatus*, which states that the whole necessity is only logical. Wittgenstein states that:

> As there is only a logical necessity, so there is only a logical impossibility. For two colours, e.g. to be at one place in the visual field, is impossible, logically impossible, for it is excluded by the logical structure of colour. Let us consider how this contradiction presents itself in physics. Somewhat as follows: That a particle cannot at the same time have two velocities, i.e. that at the same time it cannot be in two places, i.e. that particles in different places at the same time cannot be identical. (It is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction. The

assertion that a point in the visual field has two different colours at the same time, is a contradiction.) (TLP: 87).

According to Ramsey – in the context of this passage – there is an important problem concerning the propositional theory of Wittgenstein. Because Wittgenstein states that a point in the visual field can't be both red and blue at the same time. Thus for Wittgenstein, the statement that "This is both blue and red" is a logical necessity, namely a contradiction.

But if this is so, as Ramsey indicates, when we take into account the requirements of Wittgenstein's theory of proposition, it seems that the the concepts of red and blue which are simple apparently must be in fact complex (further analyzable) and be incompatible with one another (Ramsey 1923: 473). But for Ramsey, that the propositions of colors are incompatible with one another is a problematic condition concerning Wittgenstein's theory of propositions. Because as we know Wittgenstein divides propositions in three general groups: i) contingent propositions of facts, ii) the necessary propositions of logic, iii) non-sense propositions. Contingent propositions of facts consist of elementary propositions which are independent from each other and which aren't further analyzable and their truth is not necessary (TLP: 49, 57). In this context, as Ramsey indicates, if it is a logical necessity that the propositions of colors are incompatible with one another, then these staments mustn't involve elementary propositions that state possible conditions. Because tautologies and contradictions which are the propositions of logic don't involve elementary propositions that state possible conditions. At this very point, if these propositions don't involve elementary propositions, then apparently the concepts of red and blue must be further analyzable (Ramsey 1923: 473). But these propositions aren't independent from each other and also aren't further analyzable. Because "this is red" isn't independent from "this is blue". In this situation since these propositions aren't further analyzable, they are elementary propositions. But this is a contradictory example to the thought of the *Tractatus* that all elementary propositions are independent from one another. (TLP: 49)

Even though Wittgenstein thought in the *Tractatus* that these elementary propositions are independent from one other, here as it is seen clearly, such color statements aren't independent from each other and they aren't further analyzable; there is an internal relationship with one another. The result of this problematic situation concerning the propositional theory of Wittgenstein is that he started to understand that all propositions aren't analyzable into an atomic level and that they aren't independent from one another. And the second result was that the idea of analyzing the propositions into an atomic level is wrong. Wittgenstein approves the first result in his essay of the transitional period called "Some Remarks on Logical Form", which was written as an answer to Ramsey's criticisms: "The mutual exclusion of unanalyzable statements of degree contradicts an opinion which was published by me several years ago and which necessitated that atomic propositions could not exclude one another" (SRLF: 168). Concerning the second result: in his work of the transitional period *Philosophical Grammar*, he states that the idea of analyzing propositions into an atomic level misled himf (PG: 211).

In the *Tractatus*, even though Wittgenstein thought in an a priori way that all propositions are analyzable into a level where they are independent from each other, together with understanding that specifically the color propositions and generally the statements of degree (as he call them) aren't analyzable into an atomic level of elementary propositions, we see that he starts gradually to move away from his

thoughts in the *Tractatus*. And as Moore says, when he returned to philosophy, the matter about which Wittgenstein had to change his ideas most were elementary propositions (Elementarsätze) (Moore 1955: 1). Thus, the main critical contribution of Ramsey concerning color propositions is to show to Wittgenstein that his absolute a priori analyses about language in the *Tractatus* involve insufficient and wrong results. Thereby, another critical contribution of Ramsey is that even though Wittgenstein states in the preface of the *Tractatus* that "Truth of the thoughts communicated here seems to me unassailable and definitive. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the problems have in essentials been finally solved", by referring to some problematic sides of his ideas, he broke the absolute certainty of his thoughts in the *Tractatus*.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we think that the paradigmatic breakup between Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy is a result of a dialectical process, meaning a progress of opposed thoughts confronting each other. And it is understood that this philosophical shift is a gradual development which starts by Sraffa and especially by Ramseys criticisms to the problematic conditions that came to light under the roof of the theory itself. And we tried to state that understanding this philosophical shift through some anecdotes, as is done mostly in the literature, or seeing this shift as a momentary reaction to some momentary events does no contribute to an understanding of this shift. Hintikka also indicates that, the collapse of the building in the *Tractatus* will show us what really this building was and how he had to change it in order to go further (Hintikka 2015: 43). And our conclusion from the collapse of *Tractatus* is that this was a building based on solid a priori analysis. Thus the critical contributions of Sraffa and Ramsey seem to rescue him from his dogmatism intertwined into these analyses. Finally we think that as in the philosophy of his later period, this criticisms are really effective in bringing Wittgenstein gradually to observe different uses of language and to focus on the diversity of "language games" (as he calls them). Also these criticisms seem to let him start to walk on a somewhat 'a posteriori' path. In this sense, the warning that Wittgenstein insistently makes in his new path is that: "Don't think!, look!" (PI: 36).

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From Perception to Intentionality: Husserl's *Noema* as a Meinongian Object beyond Being

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that Husserl's theory of perception and intentionality, as developed in his major work *Ideen I*, may be interpreted as involving Meinongian objects beyond being: to perceive and, more generally, to think is to be directed toward an object which may be existent or non-existent. In section One, I address the account of perception developed by Husserl in *Ideen I* and how it may lead to a Fregean or to a Meinongian interpretation. In section Two, I turn to a development of the Meinongian interpretation: not only the object of perception but the object of every kind of thought, i.e. the noema, may be interpreted as an object beyond being. Finally, in section Three I provide a Meinongian interpretation of Husserl's discussion of *a posteriori* identities and their role in assessing the existence of objects of perception.

1. Perception in the Natural and Phenomenological Attitude

In §§87–91 of *Ideen I*, Husserl sets himself the task of clarifying what does it mean to see, remember, imagine, judging, etc., something. If we take the notion of thinking in the very broad, Cartesian sense, which covers every kind of intentional state, and if we engage in some Quinean semantic ascent, we might say that Husserl is looks for the right semantic interpretation of expressions of the form '*x* thinks *y*'. More precisely, since Husserl reasons from a strict first person perspective, he is after the right interpretation of a statement of the form 'I think *x*'.

As a starting point for his investigation, Husserl considers the example of perceiving a blooming apple tree in the garden. A first possible interpretation of this intentional state is labeled by him as the "natural attitude." From this perspective, my perception of the blooming apple tree in the garden is a relation between myself and an existing blooming apple tree in the garden such that I perceive it. Formally, this may be expressed as follows:

(1) $\exists x(Pax \wedge Ax \wedge Bx \wedge Gx)$

In this case, '*P*' should be read as the intentional relation of perceiving, which holds between two existing objects, namely I ('*a*')[1] and an object which is a blooming ('*B*') apple tree ('*A*') in the garden ('*G*'). Thus, (1) is true if and only if we have an object *o* which is the reference of '*a*' and an object *o´* which falls within the extension of the predicates '*A*', '*B*' and '*G*', and, finally, *o* and *o´* fall within the extension of the (non-symmetric) relation '*P*'.

Husserl is keen to stress a crucial consequence of the natural attitude: if I were to be hallucinating and the tree did not really exist, it would not be the case that I perceive a tree (Husserl 1950: 204). Clearly, if we do not have the object *o´* within our domain, or any other object that satisfies the required extensions, (1) would turn out to be false. Furthermore, we should notice that, according to the natural attitude, our perception is a perception of an object which is not only *de facto* existing, but rather, an object which *has* to be existing; it is what Husserl calls a '*Daseiendes*' (Husserl 1950: 220)–an expression which may be translated as 'entity'. This can be seen from the contradictory character of (2), whereby *E!* should be read

as the universal predicate of existence proper to classical logic:

(2) $\exists x(Pax \wedge Ax \wedge Bx \wedge Gx \wedge \sim E!x)$

A non-existent entity is a contradiction in terms.

Now, according to Husserl a radically different attitude to perception is not only possible but mandated: the "phenomenological attitude." I am not interested here in providing a detailed account of what the phenomenological attitude really amounts to. Rather, for present purposes, only two, strictly related elements are of relevance. First, within the phenomenological attitude, even if I were to be hallucinating and the tree did not really exist, it would still be the case that I perceive a tree. Second, perception–phenomenologically understood–involves a relation between myself and something different from the tree as an entity (also referred to as "the tree *simpliciter*," i.e. *der Baum schlechthin*), namely what Husserl labels as the "perceived tree as such" (*das Baumwahrgenommene als solches*).[2]

How should we understand the difference between the perceived tree as such and the tree as an entity? According to Føllesdal (1969) and Smith and McIntyre (1982), the perceived tree as such is an abstract entity by means of which we present (perceptually) the tree as a concrete entity. Formally, relying on the logic of encoding developed by Zalta (1988: 111), this may be expressed as follows:

(3) $\exists x(Zax \wedge xA \wedge xB \wedge xG)$

What (3) says is that I (*a*) am in a non-symmetrical relation '*Z*' with an abstract (i.e., non-spatio-temporal) entity which encodes the properties of being a blooming ('*B*') apple tree ('*A*') in the garden ('*G*'), whereby the relation of encoding is represented by writing the predicate to the right and not to the left of the variable or individual constant. What does it mean to say that an abstract entity encodes a given property? Answer: it is an abstract object in virtue of which we present (perceptively) an object that instantiates the properties in question.

Two elements of this interpretation should be stressed. First, we are still working with an ontology of entities, i.e. objects that must exist. Indeed, we have simply introduced

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[1] For simplicity's sake, I consider the pronoun 'I' as a proper name.

[2] The phenomenological attitude also involves a shift from the empirical subject of perception to what Husserl labels as the "transcendental" subject. I leave this element aside for simplicity's sake.

entities of an essentially different kind from trees: namely, abstract ones. Second, this interpretation implies that the relation to the abstract object is not a relation of perceiving: obviously, no abstract object can be seen or perceived. More generally, this interpretation also implies that the relation in question is not an intentional one, for my intention (i.e., my thinking) is clearly directed to the object I perceive and not to the abstract object. To the contrary, the relation to the abstract object is something more primitive that should explain the intentional relation of perceiving.

Why is this new relation particularly apt to capture the phenomenological attitude? Clearly, because the truth of (3) no longer depends upon an entity which instantiates the relevant properties, as the non-contradictory character of (4) shows:

(4) $\exists x(Zax \wedge xA \wedge xB \wedge xG) \wedge \sim \exists y(Ay \wedge By \wedge Gy)$

Now, from within the orthodoxy of analytic philosophy, it seems that no alternative reading of the phenomenological account of perception is available to us. However, the resurrection of Alexius Meinong – i.e. the other most famous pupil of Franz Brentano – at the hands of Routley (1980) and Parsons (1980) opens the possibility for a second, heterodox interpretation of the passage in question. What Husserl may be moving towards is the interpretation of perception as a relation between myself and the apple tree as a Meinongian object beyond being, i.e. not an entity, but rather, an object which must not exist.

Formally, the intentional statement 'I see a blossoming apple tree in the garden' may now be expressed as follows:

(5) $Px(Pax \wedge Ax \wedge Bx \wedge Gx)$

In this rendition, we are switching from the classical existential quantifier '$\exists x\_x$'–read as 'there is an x, such that x is so and so'–to the ontological neutral quantifier 'Px_x'–to be read as 'for some x, x is so and so' (Routley 1980: 176). Accordingly, (5) may be true no matter whether a blooming apple tree in the garden exists or not. Indeed, existence is now simply understood as a property which may or may not be instantiated by the blooming apple tree in the garden. Formally, (6) may very well be true (read 'E' as the non-universal, Meinongian, predicate of existence):

(6) $Px(Pax \wedge Ax \wedge Bx \wedge Gx \wedge \sim Ex)$

What we need for (6) to be true is just a relevant object o which is the reference of 'a', and an object o´ which falls within the required extensions of the predicates 'A', 'B', 'G', but not of 'E', and the binary, non-symmetrical intentional relation of perceiving ('P') holding between o and o´.[3] This I take to be a genuine possible interpretation of Husserl's wording. In addition, this interpretation has the following advantage: the perceived tree as such remains something that we see, or, more generally, something towards which we are intentionally directed–as it seems to be implied by the very expression employed by Husserl "the perceived tree as such."

We are thus confronted with an interpretational dilemma: either Husserl is telling us that we should interpret statements reporting the intentional relation of perceiving as in (1), or as in (5). In the present context, I am not interested

in arguing which horn of the dilemma is the right one. Rather, in what follows, I would simply like to spell out the consequences of the Meinongian interpretation of Husserl's account of perception.

2. Intentionality and Noema

As addressed above, Husserl is not interested in perception *per se*, but rather, in developing an account of thought or intentionality. Hence, the analysis of perception plays the role of a springboard. Now, if perceiving something is an intentional relation to an object beyond being (i.e., the Meinongian interpretation) the claim that all intentional states are intentional relations to objects beyond being becomes unproblematic. In this context, 'noema' would be nothing other than the technical term introduced by Husserl to label the outcome of this generalization. No matter what kind of thought (perceiving, remembering, imagining, etc.) is at stake, the noema is the object beyond being of our thought, i.e. an object that must not exist. From a semantic perspective, we may say that a noema or, alternatively, an object of thought beyond being is the meaning of 'x' in every statement of the form 'I think x'.[4]

The introduction of the noema as a generalization of the notion of the perceived object as such leads to the following distinction. Husserl notices that the noema may vary in two different ways: either with respect to what he labels its core (*Kern*) or with respect to what he refers as its character (*Charakter*). If I see, remember, imagine something as having exactly the same properties, as, for instance, the usual blossoming apple tree, the character of the noemata changes while the core remains the same. By contrast, if I do not only see a tree in blossom but also a table, a chair, etc., I have noemata with the same intentional character but different cores (Husserl 1950: 210-11).

Notice, however, that on Husserl's account we should not conflate the character of the noema with the intentional relation: albeit essentially related, they should be carefully distinguished. The character of the noema is a property that is acquired by the noema in virtue of being in a specific intentional relation. For instance, the noema of perception has the character of reality in person (*leibhafte Wirklichkeit*), whereas the object of imagination has the character of a fiction (*Fiktion*).

Once again, the formalism may be helpful. The sentences (7), (8) and (9) express the intentional relation of, respectively, perceiving, imagining and remembering an object beyond being (i.e., a noema) with the same noematic core but different characters:

(7) $Px(Sax \wedge S'x \wedge Ax \wedge Bx \wedge Gx)$

(8) $Px(Rax \wedge R'x \wedge Ax \wedge Bx \wedge Gx)$

(9) $Px(Iax \wedge I'x \wedge Ax \wedge Bx \wedge Gx)$

Here, we should read P as the intentional relation of perception and 'P'' as the character of reality in person, 'R' as the intentional relation of remembering and 'R'' as the character of past reality, 'I' as the intentional relation of imagining and 'I'' as the character of fiction. The relation between the kind of intentional relation and the kind of character of the noema is obviously a necessary one, or what Husserl refers to as a law of essence.

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[3] If the object of perception is non-existent, we should apply the Neo-Meinongian Characterization Principle (see Routley 1980: 46) to it: no other (nuclear) properties are instantiated by it other than the ones we rely upon to present the object.

[4] Husserl will generalize this account to propositions and to state of affairs (Husserl 1950: 227–231; 305–6). These generalizations lie beyond the scope of the present paper.

3. *A Posteriori* Identities and the Existence of Objects of Perception

So far, we have focused on the rather unproblematic notion of sameness of noematic cores: two noemata may have the same core because the noemata exemplify exactly the same (non-characterial) properties. However, in §§128–132, Husserl turns to a more problematic kind of notion, namely the relation of *a posteriori* identity between noemata of perception and memory (Husserl 1950: 295–305). Indeed, it is an undeniable phenomenological fact that we may establish *a posteriori* cross-noema identities. For instance–going back to our example–it is possible that I identify the apple tree in fruit that I perceive with a previously perceived apple tree in blossom. This leads to the introduction of a further distinction between the noematic core and "the pure X" (*das pure X*).

In order to provide a formal interpretation, this further step would require the introduction of tense-operators and an appropriate semantics with numerically identical objects in different contexts à la Kripke. However, since the idea is a rather intuitive and thoroughly discussed one, there is no need to spell out the details. For present purposes, suffice it to say that the pure X is nothing other than the object we identify as persisting through time and might instantiate different properties at different time-moments or contexts.

To conclude, let me briefly address the following question: how do we know that our perception is veridical, i.e. that we stand in relation with an existing object? On Husserl's account, the answer needs to be that *x* exists if the perception of *x* is part of a harmonious system of perceptions in which *x* is re-identified. This system of perceptions, however, may always come to an end–which means that *x*, after all, does not exist (see Husserl 1950: 372–374). Hence, whether an object of perception exists or not is epistemically revisable: every series of harmonious perceptions may come to an end–at least as long as the process of perceiving itself does not come to an end, too. Hereby, Husserl seems thus to rule out *a priori* the possibility of a never ending illusion or hallucination.

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Vom Wissen zum Denken – Wittgensteins dialektische Methode am Beispiel der Seminarnotizen G. E. Moores

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Abstract

In den Arbeiten zu Wittgenstein wird regelmäßig versucht, an den philosophischen Gegenständen und Argumenten, die Wittgenstein diskutiert, festzumachen, worin dessen *Philosophie* besteht. Durch die Untersuchung der konkreten Umstände seines Denkens und deren Genese in den Institutionen der *Cambridge Apostel*, im *Moral Science Club* und in den persönlichen Gesprächen mit Russell, Moore und anderen wird deutlich, wie diese philosophischen Inhalte Wittgensteins Denken erreichten. Damit eröffnet sich die Möglichkeit, umgekehrt einmal zu versuchen, nicht mehr die philosophischen Gegenstände als Inhalte zu betrachten, sondern die besondere Form, die Wittgenstein diesen Inhalten gibt oder in der er die philosophischen Gegenstände aufeinander bezieht, als das Genuine und Eigentümliche seines Denkens zu verstehen.
Mit Hilfe der Seminarnotizen G. E. Moores aus den frühen 1930er Jahren werden im Folgenden historische und systematische Verbindungen von den auf Aristoteles zurückgehenden scholastischen Disputationen bis zu Wittgensteins eigenen Diskussionsseminaren aufgezeigt und es wird dafür argumentiert, die *dialektische* Form dieser Disputationen in einer ebenso *dialektischen* Form des Wittgenstein'schen Denkens wiederzuerkennen.

I.

1929 kehrt Wittgenstein nach 15 bewegten Jahren zurück an die Cambridger Universität. Hier wird er im April (26.) 40 Jahre alt, im Juni (18.) wird er von Bertrand Russell und G. E. Moore mit dem *Traktat* promoviert und im November (17.) hält er hier seinen ersten und einzigen öffentlichen philosophischen Vortrag.[1]

Wittgenstein hatte nach Kriegsende das gesamte ererbte Vermögen verschenkt, ist gerade arbeitslos und sucht einen Job. Immerhin hat er bereits einige Erfahrungen als Grundschullehrer sammeln können und diese Erfahrungen zusammen mit dem frischen Doktortitel legen den Gedanken nahe, für seinen Lebensunterhalt an der Universität in Cambridge zu unterrichten. Auf seinen Antrag gewährt ihm die Fakultätsleitung die Führung eines *Course of Lectures.*

Für Wittgenstein ergibt sich damit ein Problem: Einerseits hatte er zwar bereits Lehrerfahrungen an verschiedenen Grundschulen Niederösterreichs sammeln können, so dass er in Bezug auf die Führung des Unterrichts hinreichend qualifiziert sein dürfte, aber andererseits hat er bisher selbst nie Philosophie studiert, so dass er eigentlich nicht dazu ausgebildet ist, die historisch vielfältigen philosophischen Inhalte zu vermitteln, die ein Philosophiestudent am Trinity College erwarten konnte. Für eine angemessene Vorstellung um die Schwierigkeit, vor der Wittgenstein 1930 steht, kann man sich zusätzlich in Erinnerung rufen, dass er für das gerade abgeschlossene Promotionsverfahren im Wesentlichen tatsächlich nur zwei philosophische Bücher gelesen hatte; dass sind Freges *Begriffsschrift* und Russells *Principles of Mathematics* (vgl. TLP: Vorwort*)*

Als Richard Braithwaite die frohe Botschaft von der Fakultät überbringt, verbindet er dieses mit der Frage, unter welchem Titel die Lehrveranstaltung im Vorlesungsverzeichnis – d. i. dem Cambridge *University Reporter* – angezeigt werden solle. Wittgenstein muss länger überlegen, antwortet dann aber bestimmt: „The subject of the lectures would be philosophy. What else can be the title of the lectures but philosophy."[2]

Und so wurden auch alle Vorlesungen Wittgensteins bis zur Niederlegung seiner Professur zum Ersten des Jahres 1948 unter dem einzigen Titel *Philosophie* angekündigt (vgl. Monk 1990: 289).

Ab dem Frühjahrssemester 1930 betraut die Fakultätsleitung also Wittgenstein mit der Führung eines *Course of Lectures*. Dieses Veranstaltungsformat besteht traditionell in einer *Lecture*, d. h. einer Vorlesung, die in Wittgensteins Fall jeweils montags stattfinden wird, und in einer *Discussion Class*, die jeweils donnerstags folgt.

Es ist bemerkenswert, dass die besondere Verbindung von *Lecture* und *Discussion Class* an der Cambridger Universität auf den Einfluss des Aristoteles in der Mitte des 12. Jh. zurückgeht (Wöhler, 2006 129). In dieser Zeit findet an den Universitäten Europas und so auch in Cambridge die scholastische *Lectio* durch die *Disputatio* ihre besondere Ergänzung (Warichez 1932, bes. XLIII–LII; Landgraf, A. M. 1950: 173–188). Angestoßen wird diese Neuerung durch die damals gerade zugänglich gewordenen Texte des Aristoteles, insbesondere durch das 8. Buch der *Topica* und die *Sophistici elenchi* (Grabmann 1940: 15). Beide zusammengenommen werden an den europäischen Universitäten zum *Regelbuch* der *Quaestio Disputata*.[3]

Diese Ergänzung der *Lectio* durch die *Disputatio* – d. i. in Cambridge der *Lecture* durch die *Discussion Class* – reagierte auf eine gewisse Vereinseitigung der scholastisch-mittelalterlichen Lehrpraxis, welche sich vom ursprünglich freien (disputierenden) Diskurs, so wie er noch zu Aristoteles' Zeiten in Platos Akademie üblich war, hin zu einem vorlesenden, die Tradition überliefernden und bewahrenden Stil entwickelt hatte (vgl. (Wöhler 2006: 53f.)

Wenn man sich nun dieses *Regelbuch der Disputatio* (d. h. Aristoteles' 8. Buch der *Topica* und die *Sophistici elenchi*) genauer ansieht, beschreibt es erstaunlich genau diejenige Form der Disputationen, wie sie auch charakteristisch für Wittgensteins eigene *Discussion Class*

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[1] Veröffentlicht als *Lecture on Ethics* (Wittgenstein 1965). Andere öffentliche Reden Wittgensteins haben eher den Charakter von Diskussionsbeiträgen (vgl. Monk 1990: 277).

[2] S. K. Bose in einem Brief an John King vom 05. April 1978.
[3] Vor allem Johannes von Salisbury argumentierte für die Einführung der Disputatio als gleichwertige Lehrform neben der Lectio: „Nam sine eo [= Topik VIII] disputatur non arte, sed casu", vgl. (von Salisbury 1855: 911).

wird. Entscheidend ist dabei die Form, bei der – wie im sokratischen Dialog – einem Dialogpartner (Proponent) vom Diskussionsleiter (Opponent) eine Frage (Quaestio) vorgelegt wird, bspw. die Frage: *Was ist Philosophie?* Die Antwort des Dialogpartners ergibt die Ausgangsthese (Propositio) für die anschließende Diskussion, bei der diese These von Wittgenstein (als Diskussionsleiter) auf Widersprüche geprüft bzw. mit Gegenthesen konfrontiert wird und der Dialogpartner über die gesamte Sitzung Frage und Antwort zu stehen hat.

In Wittgensteins Disputationen kommen die philosophischen Inhalte regelmäßig von philosophisch vorgebildeten Dialogpartnern, die für die Kohärenz ihrer Thesen eintreten, während Wittgenstein selbst in der Rolle des sokratisch-nichtwissenden Diskussionsleiters, eher die disputatorische Form einer Polyphonie der vielfältigen, sich z. T. widersprechenden Inhalte vertritt. Und genauso wie die sokratischen Dialoge regelmäßig in die Aporie führen, führen auch Wittgensteins Disputationen weniger zu belastbaren Antworten als zu weiteren philosophischen Fragen, die dann regelmäßig die Ausgangsthesen für nachfolgende Sitzungen ergeben. Das Zentrum einer Disputatio ist somit nicht das in den Lectures vorgelesene *Wissen*, sondern das diskursiv-dialektische *Durch-Denken* und Aufeinander-Beziehen zunächst gegeneinander widersprüchlichen philosophischen Wissens.

Wittgenstein füllt das Format des von der Cambridger Universität zur Verfügung gestellten *Cours of Lectures* sogar ausschließlich mit *Disputationen* und gibt in diesem formalen Sinne gar keine *Vorlesungen*. Die Praxis Wittgensteins, in den eigenen Seminaren ausschließlich zu *disputieren* und nicht *vorzulesen*, ist auf diese sokratisch-ironische Weise auch ursächlich mit der bereits erwähnten besonderen philosophischen *Un*-Belesenheit Wittgensteins verbunden.

Wenn also Wittgenstein die eigenen Veranstaltungen grundsätzlich immer unter dem Titel *Philosophie* ankündigen lässt und zusätzlich wesentliche Teile dieser Veranstaltungen der Frage *Was ist Philosophie?* (vgl. MWN 5: 4 u. 49)[4] widmet, dann ist dieses auch eine besondere Folge der eigentümlichen Bildungsbiographie Wittgensteins, für den sich diese Frage nach dem *Wesen der Philosophie* sehr anders und eindringlicher stellt als für die Kollegen an der *Moral Science Faculty* (wie bspw. C. D. Broad), die durch ihr eigenes Studium daran gewöhnt sind, diese Frage mit einer Aufzählung von Philosophen oder klassischen philosophischen Texten zu beantworten, d. h. mit den Inhalten der von ihnen im Philosophiestudium besuchten Vorlesungen.

Bevor wir nun tiefer untersuchen, wie diese Form mit dem Inhalt der Philosophie Wittgensteins verbunden ist, wollen wir noch fragen, in welcher Weise diese besondere Form der Disputatio von Wittgenstein aufgenommen werden konnte.

II.

Um also zu verstehen, wie Wittgenstein sein philosophisches Denken in Cambridge ausbilden konnte, ist es entscheidend, sich zu verdeutlichen, dass das akademisch-philosophische Leben in einer alten englischen Universitätsstadt wie Cambridge sein Zentrum nicht im gemeinsamen Besuch öffentlicher Vorlesungen findet, und auch nicht im Zusammenhang mit stiller Lektüre in den halböffentlichen Bibliotheken und Archiven, sondern in den exklusiven Zusammenkünften der traditionellen Debattierklubs Cambriges, allwöchentlich abgehalten in den Privaträumen ihrer ausgesuchten Mitglieder.

Zwei Beispiele dieser besonderen Institutionen, in die Wittgenstein schon während seiner ersten Cambridger Zeit (1911–13) eingeführt wird, sind die *Cambridge Converzatione Society* auch genannt *die Apostel*, und der *Moral Science Club.* Beiden Institutionen ist einerseits gemeinsam, dass sie jeweils eigentümliche Praxen und exklusive Rituale ausgebildet haben und schon damals auf eine lange Vorgeschichte prominenter Mitglieder zurückblicken können, andererseits unterscheiden sie sich in Bezug auf die inhaltlichen Schwerpunkte und auf das konkrete soziale Netzwerk, das sie vertreten.

So pflegt man in den Disputationen der *Apostel* kulturell-gesellschaftliche Themen, während man im *Moral Science Club* eher über inner-philosophische Fragen debattiert. Gerade der direkte Umkreis Wittgensteins stellt dabei mit Russell, Moore und John Maynard Keynes eine Schnittmenge beider Netzwerke dar. Praktisch wird hier schon unter der Woche ein dichter informeller Kontakt gehalten, der seinen allwöchentlichen Höhepunkt mit den rituellen Zusammenkünften des Moral Science Club am Freitagabend und denjenigen der Apostel am Samstagabend findet.

Das Zentrum der Klubabende ist wiederum eine *aristotelische Disputatio*, für die traditionell eines der Mitglieder eine freie These in Form eines Kurzvortrags aufstellt, über welche im Anschluss vom Kreis der Anwesenden ausgiebig debattiert wird.

Die erste Teilnahme Wittgensteins an diesen besonderen Zusammenkünften ist in Bezug auf die Apostel für den Samstagabend am 16. November 1912 dokumentiert. Moore hält an diesem Abend einen Vortrag über *die religiöse Konversion* und gleich an diesem ersten Abend zeigt sich auch schon Wittgensteins eigenes disputatorisches Talent.

Im angeregten Schlagabtausch der Diskussion entwickelt Wittgenstein Moores Gedanken dahingehend weiter, dass diese Konversion in einer religiösen Erfahrung wurzelt, welche eine Umwendung des Einzelnen in der Einstellung zur Welt und ein Abstreifen der existenzialen Sorge um das Weltliche ermöglicht. Vorausgegangen waren dieser Einsicht bei Wittgenstein das Erlebnis der *Kreuzelschreiber*, ein Theaterstück des österreichischen Schriftstellers Ludwig Anzengruber in Wien und die Lektüre von William James' *Variaties of religious experience*.

Sofort mit der Einführung bei den Aposteln ist Wittgenstein umgeben von etablierten geistigen Größen seiner Zeit. Er selbst ist dagegen noch ein akademischer Nobody, der bisher nichts publiziert hat und auch sonst vorerst keine philosophisch-akademischen Qualifikationen vorweisen konnte. Um sich in dieser hochkarätigen Atmosphäre bei den Aposteln zuhause zu fühlen, mag Wittgenstein seine eigene Herkunft und das Aufwachsen umgeben von der ökonomischen und intellektuellen Elite in Wien zustattengekommen sein.

Die nachhaltige Anerkennung, die ihm in Cambridge zuteil wird, hat aber noch eine andere Quelle, und diese besteht in einem an ihm allseits bestaunten Charisma. Dieses Charisma lebt durch eine außerordentliche Präsenz in den konkreten persönlichen Konversationen – und gerade bei den thematisch so breit angelegten Disputationen der Apostel kann Wittgenstein nicht punkten mit einem enzyklopädischen Weltwissen, wie Keynes, oder sich auf eigene umfangreiche Forschungsergebnisse berufen, wie

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[4] Dieses ist auch die Grundfrage des gesamten Michaelmas Term 1930 (Moore 2016).

Russell und Moore, oder mit humorvoll kritisch-literarischer Spitzfindigkeit brillieren, wie der damalige Sekretär der Apostel, Lytton Strachey. Dagegen besteht Wittgensteins eigene Gabe zuerst in einer raschen Auffassungskraft gegen die neuen Inhalte, verbunden mit einer an diese Auffassung anschließende nachdrückliche Tiefe und Ernsthaftigkeit der Analyse, und weiter in einem besonderen Hang zur Disputation.

Mit diesem disputatorischen Charisma unternimmt Wittgenstein in der gleichen Zeit auch schon den ersten Schritt in die Richtung seiner späteren Dominanz der Freitagabende des *Moral Science Club*. Auf seine Initiative hin hatte Moore als Sekretär des Klubs inzwischen eine Reihe neuer Regeln durchgesetzt. So wurde ein Chairman für die Disputationen berufen und die berühmte 7-Minuten-Regel eingeführt; eine Regel, die festlegt, dass Vorträge auf die Dauer von 7 Minuten zu beschränken sind.

Noch heute hält Wittgenstein (meines Wissens) mit seinem ersten *Kurz*vortrag am Freitag, dem 29. November 1912, und dessen Dauer von nur 4 Minuten den uneingeholten Rekord dieses Wettbewerbs um philosophische Kürze und Klarheit. Der Titel dieser Veranstaltung *What is Philosophy?* folgte Wittgensteins eigener Frage nach dem Wesen der Philosophie und entwickelt seine damaligen Überlegungen zur Fundierung der Logik in den Elementarsätzen. Dieser Inhalt als die Rückfrage der Philosophie auf ihren eigenen Status traf sich auf ideale Weise mit der inner-philosophischen Ausrichtung des Clubs.

Wittgensteins Einfluss im Moral Science Club war also schon in dieser frühen Zeit darauf gerichtet, für die Zusammenkünfte den Anteil der Vorträge zeitlich zu verkürzen, um der Disputation noch mehr Zeit und Gewicht zu geben und durch das Eingreifen eines Chairman die Qualität und Regelhaftigkeit der Diskussion zu erhöhen.

Mit seiner besonderen Begabung, den freien Gedanken im Moment der konkreten Disputation zu entwickeln, trifft Wittgenstein den eigentlichen Nerv der Institution eines Debattierclubs und erfährt deshalb hier trotz der genannten Hindernisse eine so unmittelbare und hohe Anerkennung. In dieser Begabung und ihrer frühen Anerkennung zusammen mit dem angesprochenen Fehlen einer eigenen philosophischen Ausbildung, liegt also der wesentliche Grund dafür, dass Wittgenstein auch die ihm ab 1930 von der Fakultät zur Verfügung gestellten *Lectures* und *Discussion Classes* nach dem Paradigma der aristotelischen Disputationen in den Debattierclubs führt.

III.

An den erst kürzlich veröffentlichten Seminarmitschriften G. E. Moores aus den frühen 1930er Jahren (Moore 2016, hier MNW) lässt sich eindrücklich die aristotelisch-disputatorische Struktur der Veranstaltungen herausarbeiten; und zugleich zeigt sich hier, wie die Form dieser Disputationen als eigene Methode den Inhalt von Wittgensteins Denken bestimmt.

Darüber hinaus können wir in den Seminarmitschriften Moores aber auch lesen, dass Wittgenstein sich seiner besonderen philosophisch-disputatorischen Praxis durchaus selbst bewusst ist, und wie er diese mit den Diskussi-

onen im eigenen Seminar identifiziert. Zur ersten Veranstaltung des Herbst-Trimesters 1930 (13. Okt.) notiert Moore diese Überlegung Wittgensteins folgendermaßen: „Development of human thought has kinks in it: there is one <u>now</u> in philosophy – namely a method has been found; […]" (MNW 5: 1)

Das heißt Wittgenstein selbst identifiziert das Eigentümliche seines Denkens nicht in erster Linie mit neuen Erkenntnissen, sondern mit einer neuen philosophischen Methode; und auch weiter weist er ausdrücklich auf die praktische Basis der neuen Methode, die sich nicht in Vorlesungen theoretisch erlernen, sondern nur praktisch in der Disputation einüben lässt: „Philosophy ist reduced to matter of skill: but it's very difficult to acquire any skill. You can't acquire it by hearing lectures: only way is to discuss." (MNW 5: 2)

Wittgenstein weist damit ausdrücklich auf den besonderen Stellenwert der Disputationen für sein eigenes Denken; und genauso wie die praktische Form der (neuen) Philosophie Wittgensteins ihr Zentrum im lebendigen Schlagabtausch der widersprüchlichen Positionen in den Seminaren findet, findet auch Wittgensteins Denken selbst dieses Zentrum in einer dynamischen Auseinandersetzung und Bezugnahme der verschiedenen Untersuchungsgegenstände aufeinander. Sowohl die diskursive Struktur der Methode als auch die aporetische Offenheit der Disputationen ermöglichen es, das Denken Wittgensteins als ein dialektisches zu verstehen – nach der Grundbedeutung von *dialegesthai* als ein *Sich-Unterreden* in *Frage und Antwort*. Und zugleich lassen sich umgekehrt von hier aus alle verschriftlichten Werke Wittgensteins als jeweils verschiedene Versuche verstehen, die dialektische Erfahrung des (flüssigen) Denkens in den Disputationen in die (feste) Wissensform eines philosophischen Buches zurück zu übersetzen – Versuche, die Wittgensteins selbst bis zuletzt als jeweils gescheitert ansehen wird.

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The Ethics and Limits of Understanding Literature

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Abstract

This essay aims to understand how literary texts can be read in relation to Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. In my essay, I will argue that understanding literary texts requires an approach akin to understanding a fellow human being – not with a cold, scientific rationality, but with our full sensibilities. Like how literary texts amaze us, we are often astonished by our fellow human beings – by their depth and incomprehensibility. To illuminate my point, I will evaluate the work of three scholars: Guetti's approach to literary interpretation based on Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical grammar, William Gass' method in *On Being Blue*, and Stanley Cavell's reading of *King Lear* in his essay *The Avoidance of Love*. With the help of Wittgenstein's concept of "Aspektwechsel" as embodied by his famous duck-rabbit, I will evaluate the named approaches and compare the act of "understanding" with the intuitive act of seeing.

Introduction

In his rigorous account of language, Guetti suggests that Wittgenstein sacrifices an acknowledgement of language's literary qualities, despite having a remarkable sensitivity to language. He writes, "That this was such a sacrifice is evident often in *Philosophical Investigations*, but nowhere more so than in the last line of the last quotation I gave: 'Call it a dream. It does not change anything.' ... But dreams, as you know, have heavy effects upon our lives." (Guetti 1993, 58)

Inspired by Wittgenstein's silence on literature, my essay ventures to understand how literary texts can be approached from the perspective of Wittgenstein's philosophy. In my essay, I will examine the grammatical, semantic, and contextual aspects of the text with reference to James Guetti, William Gass, and Stanley Cavell's work to show the Wittgensteinian understanding of a literary text. Ultimately, I will show that a work of literature, like a human being, can never be fully understood. Thus, instead of seeking the objective meaning of a work, one should read it intently, as if showing empathy to a person.

I. The Private Experience of Reading

In PI §156, Wittgenstein compares the experience of reading between a beginner who pretends to read, and that of an experienced reader who has had an experience of reading. Wittgenstein suggests the former has understood the text with an inner process. Yet, the criteria as an inner experience is unclear. The experienced reader might "read aloud and correctly without attending to what he is reading; perhaps with his attention on something quite different." (PI §156) Drawing attention to the disconnect between understanding and the appearance of understanding, he shows that an inner criteria for understanding cannot be established, since it cannot be evaluated. He demonstrates the same point with another example. When trying to read the arbitrary mark, ⬚ the sound 'U' occurred to Wittgenstein "I told myself previously that I was to think of a sound; there was a certain tension present before the sound came. And I did not say 'U' automatically as I do when I look at the letter U." (PI §166) Forcing himself to pronounce a mark without a pronunciation, he tries to force something "inner" to utter a noise, showing that what is a correct interpretation of a pronunciation can be totally subjective. Similarly, with an arbitrarily scribbled series of sign resembling a sentence, he shows that our understanding

of language producing meaning through the logical causation of words is false. Telling the reader to articulate the "sentence", he writes:

ﻙﺪﺑ ﻙ ﺩ ﺩﺪ ﻙﺪﻙ ﺩﺩ ﻙ ﺩﻙﺪ ﻙﺪﺑ

(PI §169)

Although there are no obvious connections between these marks, we feel that individual markings connect to form meaning, as each "word" should mean something. Wittgenstein begs an answer to his question, "But why do you say that we felt a causing? Causation is surely something established by experiments, by observing a regular concurrence of events, for example. So how could I say that I *feel* something which is found out in this way by experiment?" (PI §169) Enchanted by the illusion of causation, we feel 'guided' (PI §175) by the marks on the page. While we feel understanding, or the existence of this "ethereal, intangible influence" (Ibid.), it becomes apparent that what seems to be an external, objective meaning is only an illusion when we look closely at the words, which like "inessential processes were shrouded in a particular atmosphere, which dissipates when I look closely at them." (PI §173) As no objective criteria can be established for a work of literature, we become trapped in our own subjective interpretation of the text.

While it may be true that all reading processes are shrouded in privacy, it is undeniable that language has induced us to take on individual flights of imaginations and feel emotions. In *The Grammar of Literary Experience*, Guetti proposes that grammar is the instrument that enlivens our imagination, allowing us to respond "so energetically to language that is evidently not meaningful" (Guetti 1993: 6), as it is the structural element of language which enables the possibilities of meaning.

II. James Guetti's Approach in "The Grammar of Literary Experience"

Before we consider Guetta's grammatical approach, I will elucidate Wittgenstein's use of the term grammar. Suggesting that "All philosophy is 'language criticism'" (TLP, 4.0031), Wittgenstein takes language to be the medium for the expression of thoughts that depends on logical, "grammatical" structures.

In other words, philosophy is purely descriptive for Wittgenstein. It does not explain phenomena as scientific theories do. Instead, it is the grammar of human experience,

which "transgressions yield nonsense" (Baker & Hacker 1992: 19). For example, as Baker and Hacker suggest, words of sensation and color are abused when someone asserts that they are felt in the mind, as feelings are usually felt in the body (e.g., in the knee or back), not in the mind (Baker & Hacker 1992, 56). Although they make no empirical sense, its utterance is enabled by grammar to make hypothetical sense. Baker and Hacker argue that these statements are grammatically correct but nonsensical, as they make sense grammatically but are independent of reality.

It is from this detachment of reality that Guetti sees as a characteristic of literature, as literature creates hypothetical realities that can be sensed. Guetti begins with Wittgenstein's idea of "idling" language, which gives rise to philosophical confusions: "The confusions which occupy us arise when language is, as it were, idling, not when it is doing work." (PI §132). Idling language is language in its grammatical state of making logical but not empirical sense. Detached from reality, anything can make sense. Without context, philosophical statements are not debatable, "because everyone would agree to them." (PI §128) It is when we take these statements seriously that unnecessary philosophical problems arise, as they can be interpreted in every possible manner. While Idling language can lead to confusions in philosophy, Guetti argues that it is precisely this condition that gives language a potential for imaginative and mental experiences, as "it give us to suppose we could "mean" anything we liked." (Guetti 1993: 15) Identifying "idling language" as language in its "grammatical state" (Guetti 1993: 4), Guetti suggests that grammar is an essential feature of language that enables ambiguity. Without context, or "in the 'grammatical', so long as one makes some sort of sense, neither mistakes nor truth are in question' (Guetti 1993: 15).

Not only does grammar introduce tension between reality and hypothetical realities, the multiplicity of meanings attached to words also complicates our reading of a text, which I will explain in the following section with Gass' On Being Blue.

III. Verbal Ambiguity: Gass' Approach in *On Being Blue*

As Wittgenstein's Rabbit-Duck shows, our personal perspectives affect our ways of seeing, skewing the perception of a shared, empirical experience. Wittgenstein writes,

> If you put the 'organization' of a visual impression on a level with colours and shapes, you are proceeding from the idea of the visual impression as an inner object. Of course this makes this object into a chimera; a queerly shifting construction. For the similarity to a picture is now impaired. (PI II §134)

In showing that the spectrum of cultural contexts attached to the word *Blue*, Gass shows the many ways our interpretations of the word may be skewed. Not only does blue imply moods, "that lead-like look the skin has when affected by cold, contusion, sickness, fear; the rotten rum or gin they call blue ruin and the blue devils of its delirium;...afflictions of the spirit—dumps, mopes, Mondays... Nova Scotians, cyanosis, hair rinse, bluing, bleach; the rare blue dahlia like that blue moon shrewd things happen only once in." (Gass 1976: 1) it's also filled with cultural significance, "Confederate money... the constantly increasing absentness of Heaven (ins Blaue hinein, the Germans say)..." (Ibid.) Moreover, it saturates our idioms and daily uses, "blue bloods, balls, and bonnets, beards, coats, col-

lars, chips, and cheese". (Ibid.) As Gass has shown, the history of its use gives the word blue shades of meaning. It is "the way in which meanings are historically attached to words...so accidental, so remote, so twisted." (LeClair & Gass 1977) that gives blue such a great potential for meaning. With it manifold contexts, blue reflects many "forms of life".

Hindered by the tensions of grammar and the ambiguity of words, how do we draw a boundary, behind which we could understand a work without falling into an endless skepticism of what it means? To do so, one must understand the situation depicted in a work in their specific contexts, and I will point out how Cavell does so in *The Avoidance of Love*.

IV. Cavell's Approach in "The Avoidance of Love"

In *The Avoidance of Love*, through an interpretation of *King Lear*, Cavell sheds light on how philosophical criticism has led the understanding of King Lear astray by alienating words from their contexts.

To be able to understand a work, it is important to understand its characters by "attending with utter specificity to the [character] now before you" (Cavell 2015: 248.), which many critics have failed to do so. Because many critics privilege theory over understanding the characters as people, they appropriate characters to their theoretical explanations. Cavell thus claims that these Shakespearean critics "shun(s) direct contact with characters, [because] he has been made to believe or assume, by some philosophy or other, that characters are not people." (Cavell 2015: 247.) Using psychoanalysis, psychoanalytical theorists treat characters as if they were a species different from the people which we see every day, whom necessitate a special theory to be understood. And yet, how could it be true that our knowledge of characters could exceed what we know about humans? Characters are built on an understanding of human beings. How can armchair psychoanalysts, who merely theorize, be superior to other readers in their own theorizing or understanding of fellow human beings?

As Cavell suggests, theory leads critics to exaggerate their interpretations. For example, Alpers, in interpreting that eyes are symbols of moral insight and instruments to express feeling, he fails to see that eyes, in King Lear, function as they do in our everyday lives, with which we use them "to express feeling, to weep, and to recognize others." (Cavell 2015: 251) Eyes do not express feelings by "giving looks and of staring" (Ibid.), as looking and staring do not communicate. Rather, its "capacity to weep...[is]the most literal use of them to express feeling." (Ibid.)

Although such an interpretation of the "seeing" seems simplistic, it does not mean that they are untrue, compared to the conclusions that "armchair" (Ibid.) psychologists make. When critics look 'too high' for an aesthetic meaning or justification," (Cavell 2015: 253.) they drown out the voice of the character with their own. To do so would lead to tragedy, as in *King Lear*. For one, King Lear's failure to acknowledge Cordelia's love for him, drowning her silence with Reagan and Goneril's elaborate expressions of love led to his own downfall. Retiring from his throne, King Lear demands public expressions of devotions from his daughter to decide to whom he would leave his inheritance. Cordelia refuses to do so, saying instead, "What shall Cordelia speak? Love, and be silent." (Cavell 2015:

267.) Had King Lear parsed her words carefully, he may have seen the two possible intentions of Cordelia: that she refuses to love him, or that Cordelia intended to "love *by being* silent". (Ibid.) By refusing to ponder the subtext of her response, King Lear fell prey to the deceiving expression of love by Regan and Goneril, who led him to his demise.

In the end, however, like understanding another human being, any work of literature cannot be understood fully and completely, and neither can theoretical texts help us do so, for they only endlessly complicate what the text wishes to communicate. As the rabbit-duck suggests, there could be many ways of reading a text, depending on one's personal experience. However, as it is with understanding another human being, the key to reading a text is to listen intently and consider different perspectives, without letting one's own vision cloud the message the person or the book wishes to communicate.

In the spirit of the Foreword of *Philosophical Investigations*, no one can recreate the exact landscape of the philosophy of language. The best one could do to convey an idea is to create several 'sketches of landscapes' (PI, Foreword) which when seen together approximate the whole. Apologizing for "the immodest or melodramatic quality of the claims" (Cavell 2015: 286) in the conclusion, neither is Cavell fully confident of his conclusions. Perhaps, literary analysis should not be evaluated by its comprehensibility, but by the human effort made in trying to consider and understand the characters or the narrator.

Conclusion: Hope for the Isolated Reader

While we may have the power to interpret a text in our own personal ways, we should treat a work of literature as if it could lead many "forms of life". Like words and actions of strangers, it is difficult to pinpoint the intentions behind literary works, for they are shaped by many experiences, the impact of which we may never understand. Who knew that the color "blue" can be interpreted in so many ways? In showing that characters in books are like people, Cavell ultimately shows us that not only should we be able to consider multiple perspectives when reading, but also when we are communicating with others. Although our perspectives limit us from seeing the whole picture, we must try to listen and show empathy to others, for the fail-

ure to do so may result in miscommunication, and thus tragedy, as King Lear shows. What other people say may hurt is, such as how Lear became enraged by Cordelia's refusal to speak. But if we could step aside and walk into their shoes, we may understand their intentions. As Cavell writes, regarding the failure of Lear to acknowledge Cordelia's love,

> …People capable of such love could have removed mountains; instead it has caved in upon them. One moral of such events is obvious: if you would avoid tragedy, avoid love; if you cannot avoid love, avoid integrity; if you cannot avoid integrity, avoid the world; if you cannot avoid the world, destroy it. (Cavell 2015: 322)

As readers, we should above all lift our eyes from being dominated by our personal perspectives and try to recognize that there are many other voices around us that must be heard. The failure to do so will result in miscommunication, and thus tragedy.

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Direct Realism and Sense Data

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Abstract

My intention in this paper is to show how we can reconcile direct realism with the idea that we perceive the world through a veil of sensations. The paper suggests that contents given in perceptual experience have a kind of Janus face: they can be interpreted as sensory contents (also called sense data) or as perceptual contents (objectively given entities), although they are phenomenally experienced in the same way.

It is difficult to say something new about the problem of perception. Aware of this, my aim here is only to emphasize relevant points in the defence of direct realism, showing why we can reconcile it with the admission of sense data.

I.

My understanding of direct realism begins with the proposal that everything experienced in normal perception has a kind of Janus face. That is, we can conceive the phenomenally given in the sensory-perceptual experience of the outside world in two different ways:

(A) As the psychological experience of cognitively dependent internally given *sensory contents* (often called *sense data*).

(B) As the proper perceptual experience of cognitively-independent, externally given *perceptual contents* (understood as physically particularized entities).

Psychological experience (A) gives us what we may call *sensory impressions or contents* (also called sense data, sensations, sensa, qualia, ideas, phenomena, representations…). It seems beyond doubt that sensory contents are always present in perceptual experience, as I intend to show later. But thesis (B) also seems beyond doubt: it is the idea that in addition to sensory experience, when we perceive something it is given to us as an external entity. Indeed, it is also common-sense truth to say that we usually perceive the external world *as it really is*, constructed of mind-independent entities like material objects and its particularized properties.

The clearest evidence favouring this double view is tactile experience (*cf.* Searle 2015: 24). Suppose I touch a hot stove with my hand. I can say *I have a sensation of heat*: this sensory-impression is the psychological content of experience (A). Alternatively, and correctly, I can also say that *I have perceived that the stove as such is hot;* this is the correct perceptual experience of the externally given physical entity (B). The essential point to notice in this example is that in the normal case we cannot *phenomenally* distinguish experience (A) from experience (B). In a similar way, I can say:

(A) [I feel that] I am holding a tennis ball in my hand.

(B) I am holding a tennis ball in my hand.

Now, from auditory experience, I can say:

(A) I [have the auditory impression that] I hear thunder.

(B) I hear thunder.

And from the most common visual experience, I can also say:

(A) [I have the visual impression that] I am seeing a fishing boat entering the mouth of Pirangi River.

(B) I am seeing a fishing boat entering the mouth of Pirangi River.

As you can see, the phenomenal descriptions outside the brackets are the same, but in the (A) cases, I speak of *sensory contents occurring in my head* (*sense data*), while in the (B) cases I speak of independent *factual contents pre-existing in the external world.* The real thing (B) is *epistemically* dependent on sense impressions (A), since without (A) I couldn't know (B). On the other hand, sense impressions (A) are *ontologically* dependent on (B), which causes (A).

I can illustrate how harmless the above duplicity is by comparing it with the kind of doubling in our interpretation of objects we see in a mirror. What we see in a mirror can be interpreted as: (A') a simple image of things, for instance, the image of a vase of flowers on a table. But it can also be seen as: (B') the vase in itself that I am seeing in a mirror. For instance, I can point to an object I see in a mirror, and you can ask me if I am pointing to the reflected image of the vase of flowers or to the real vase of flowers. That they belong to different domains is made clear by functional differences: the image isn't considered real, because it has a changeable size, we cannot touch or smell it. The real vase of flowers, on the other hand, has an unchangeable size, can be touched, smelled, directly seen from all sides, manipulated, broken, etc. However, by looking at the mirror, we would not be able to see the vase on the table without the help of the image; and the elements and relations between both will coincide, at least partially. As in the case above (B') is *epistemically* dependent on (A'), because without the image (A') you couldn't see (B'). Alternatively, (A') is *ontologically* (causally) dependent on (B'). This is why when you pay attention to an object in a mirror you see it as perceptually dependent on its image, but when you pay attention to the image, you see it as causally dependent on the real object. You can easily say that you see the reality *through* the image. But you will never say that you cannot see the vase only because what you really see is only its image. Moreover, you can also say that you are seeing the real vase *directly* through its image, at least if you compare it with the same vase seen in a photo or a picture. You can see either the real vase or its image – but not both together. And the mirror-image also shows that our experience is perspectival. What we see are typically facets, aspects.

From a descriptive point of view, this is how we pass from the mind-dependent to a mind-independent interpre-

tation of phenomena. We can observe an external factual content by means of its phenomenal experience as involving a purely sensory content, which is internal. The phenomenon of post-images illustrates the point clearly: after looking at the sun one can close one's eyes, and the image of the sun does not disappear immediately. The dichotomy considered above is also important because it is a condition for the defeasibility of observational evidence: it allows us to explain why evidence can deceive us.

II.

There is, however, two traditional arguments designed to show that the kind of direct realism suggested above must be wrong and it is advisable to answer them before finishing. They are the famous *argument of illusion* and the *argument of science.*

I begin with the famous argument of illusion. It usually concerns cases of perceptual illusions in which what we think we perceive is not what we should perceive, particularly in the extreme case of hallucinations in which we only imagine we perceive something. The main goal of the argument of illusion is the replacement of direct realism by indirect realism, according to which we perceive the objectively real world *indirectly* through the *veil of sensations* constituted by sensory perceptions or sense data.

There is nowadays an extensive philosophical literature aiming to show that the argument of illusion is fallacious, and we directly perceive things around us as they really are. In my understanding of direct realism, I do not wish to deny that there are sensory impressions or sense data. I do not even wish to deny that we perceive the world through a veil of sensations or sense data, since by accepting (A) I accepted these conclusions. What I reject is the claim that these things make our perception *indirect.* For we never say we perceive our sensations; what we might say is that we perceive the world directly *through* our sensations or sensory impressions. This suggests that just because we can show that we perceive the external world through a veil of sensations doesn't make our perception of the external world indirect, and it is a category mistake to defend this view. Put simply: the central problem with the argument of illusion is that it is based on a misunderstanding of the semantics of our concept of *directicity.* Consider the following two sentence pairs:

1. The trip is direct (the bus travels directly from Constance, Germany to Munich with a lunch stop of thirty minutes).

2. The trip is indirect (first you take a bus from Constance to Lindau, then a train to Munich).

1. The bullet struck the victim directly (after piercing window glass).

2. The bullet struck the victim indirectly (after ricocheting off a wall).

These examples show that what makes some relations direct is not necessarily the fact that we cannot find *intermediaries* between the *relata* – they very often exist and there can be more than just one. Directness/indirectness is an *essentially conventional distinction* that depends on the relevance of the intermediaries for what we aim to consider.

In the case of perception, conventions allow us to say that we perceive things around us *directly*, even if by means of a causal process involving a number of intermediaries. And there is nothing wrong in accepting the view that we perceive things directly by means of sense data or through a veil of sensations, just as much as there is nothing wrong in saying that the victim was struck directly by a bullet, though it first had to go through window glass.

Having in mind what I just said, I will consider only a few well-known examples of the argument of illusion, showing where they fail to prove that perceptual experience is indirect:

EXAMPLE 1:

If I press the side of my right eye with my right finger, I have the impression that things in front of me move in the opposite direction. Consequently, what I see directly are only images of things, that is, sensory impressions, and not things as they are in themselves.

ANSWER:

Even if I show by pressing my eye that I see things moving through my visual field, this does not mean that I am not seeing the things *directly*. In fact, I can even say, 'I see external things directly and precisely as they are, although they seem as if they were moving.'

EXAMPLE 2:

If I hold my index finger fifty centimeters from my face and look at the other end of the room, I see *two* images of index fingers when focusing on the far wall. If I then focus my eyes on the finger, the two images merge into a single image. Since they are not phenomenally different in the two cases, I conclude that what I really see are sensory impressions of my index finger, even if I can locate my finger through these sense data.

ANSWER:

As Searle has noted, I can instead say, 'I do not see two fingers… I am *directly* seeing my index finger as if it were doubled.'

EXAMPLE 3:

I look at a coin that I am holding at an angle. I know it is round, but it appears elliptical. Indeed, only occasionally do I see a coin with a round form, which is called its real form. So, what I primarily see are my sensory impressions.

ANSWER:

About the form of the coin, it appears elliptical, but I can say that I *directly* see a round coin that only 'looks elliptical' because it is being held at an angle. – As A. J. Ayer noted, what we consider to be the real is often a question of convention (*cf.* Ayer 1973, Ch. 4). We have the convention that the real form of a coin or of a table is the form we see when we see them from above. In the same way, we have a convention that the real form of a mountain is the form we see when looking at it from the ground below it at a certain distance, but not an aerial view from above (e.g., Matterhorn, Sugarloaf). The real color of a tropical mountain is normally green, even if it may seem blue when viewed from a great distance, etc.

EXAMPLE 4:

Suppose I have a perfect hallucination of a white horse. What I see is not a real white horse, but only a hallucinatory image. Since this image made of sense data isn't different from what I see when I see a real white horse, the primary object of perception must be my sensory impressions or sense-data.

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ANSWER:

Finally, in the case of a hallucination, it is simply wrong to say that I *see* the content of my hallucination. I only *believe* I see it, when *in fact there is nothing there to be seen*! Verbs like 'seeing,' 'perceiving,' 'being aware of' are primarily related to the factual, objective content, and not to a merely sensory content. Even if it is *through* sensory content that we have perceptions of things, this does not make our realism indirect. In a similar way, when we say that a bus made a stop of thirty minutes for lunch, this does not mean that the bus trip was indirect.

Summarizing: we perceive things *directly*, even under misleading conditions like those of delusions, which justifies the direct realist view of whatever is given in perception; and this does not mean that there cannot be an irrelevant veil of sensory impressions or sense data in-between. This justifies my psychological interpretation (A) of a given content as based merely on sensory data, without forcing me to reject interpretation (B).

Finally, a word about the argument of science. According to this argument, perceptual experience depends on the stimulation of distal neuronal cells that in the end lead to the stimulation of occipital cortical regions in the brain. Thus, our experience is in fact the experience of something occurring in our brain, which is nothing but the experience of sensory impressions or sense data. Consequently, our direct experience can only be one of these sensory impressions occurring in our brain. From this should follow that we cannot have a direct experience of the world around us; it also follows that we cannot be sure that our contents of experience reflect the way the external world really is. Worse yet, we may be led to the incredible conclusion that since our brain also belongs to the external world, we cannot even be sure that our brain exists... All

we can be sure of is that there are these sensory impressions!

The answer to the argument of science is that there is nothing semantically wrong in saying that we *directly* experience things given in the external world, even if this experience requires underlying neuronal work as intermediary means. In the case of visual perception, the relevant point is that the sentence 'I directly see the object' belongs to our ordinary language, while expressions like 'by means of…' or 'through…' indicate underlying intermediating neurobiological processes responsible for this direct experience, expressible in a neurobiological language with a different semantic import. As far as I know, it seems that what we call sensory impressions or sense data in the visual case has to do with the activation of the striate cortex, because the stimulation of this region without the activation of photoreceptors in the retina is apt to produce hallucinatory phenomena (Teeple, Caplan, Stern 2009: 26-32). However, this fact alone does not make visual perception indirect, since it is not captured by the semantic conventions ruling what we should call directly perceived external objects.

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Perceptual Demonstrative Thought

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Abstract

There are three rival approaches to understanding the semantic nature of perceptual demonstrative thoughts: the *object-dependent* theory, the *descriptive object-independent* theory, and the *predicative object-independent* theory. All three theories are subject to serious objections. After detailing these, I sketch a more viable alternative, the *property-dependent* theory.

1. Introduction

Perceptual demonstrative thoughts are singular or *de re* thoughts about things to which the thinker stands in some kind of perceptual relation and which are such that the perceptual relation in question makes available the very thinking of the thought. They are typically expressed linguistically by sentences containing demonstrative pronouns, e.g., 'That is an apple' or 'That apple is read'. There are three rival approaches to understanding their semantic nature: the *object-dependent* theory (Evans 1982, McDowell 1984), the *descriptive object-independent* theory (Schiffer 1978, Searle 1983,) and the *predicative object-independent* theory (Burge 1977, 1982, 1991, 2005; Segal 1989).

The three theories can be characterized briefly on the basis of an example. Imagine that I see an apple and think to myself *That is an apple.* Counterfactually, no apple might have been there to be singled out by me, because of some kind of referential illusion or hallucination—call this "the empty possibility." Would there still have been a demonstrative thought for me to entertain? Alternatively, and again counterfactually, my thought might have singled out a qualitatively indistinguishable but numerically different apple—call this "the duplicate possibility." Would the resulting demonstrative thought have been the same one that I entertained in the actual situation? The object-dependent theorist gives a uniform 'No'-answer to both questions: demonstrative thought cannot remain constant across either empty or duplicate possibilities, because both the existence and identity of its content depend on the existence and identity of the actual object singled out. Both the predicative and descriptive views supply a uniform 'Yes'-answer to both questions because they deny the existence- and identity-dependence of demonstrative thought. I will suggest that we should answer 'No' to the first question and — in a certain sense — 'Yes' to the second: demonstrative thought cannot exist in the empty possibility but its demonstrative *content* can nevertheless remain constant across the duplicate possibility.

On the descriptivist conception, the content of a perceptual demonstrative thought *That F is G* can be stated descriptively, either in altogether demonstrative-free terms or by using demonstratives that refer only to the subject's perceptual experiences: e.g., as *The F in front of me now is G* or as *The F causing this perceptual experience is G.* According to the descriptivist, the thought *That apple is red* would still have possessed demonstrative content in the empty possibility but this content (e.g., *The unique apple in front of me now is red*) would simply be false. In the duplicate possibility, the resulting content would have been exactly the same as it actually is, just about or *of* a different object.

The descriptive view faces the powerful objection that while factors involving myself and my experiences, time and causation certainly enable me to have such a demonstrative thought, I do not—and need not—deploy concepts of any of these constitutive enabling conditions in my actual thinking of the thought. The descriptivist, that is, implausibly hyper-intellectualizes the nature of demonstrative thinking.

My concern centres primarily on the debate at this choice point. Given the rejection of descriptivism, should we choose object-dependence or predicative object-independence? Neither, I will argue—as both views face serious objections. I will sketch an alternative view I call the *property-dependent* view, according to which demonstrative thought is *existence-dependent*, in that it requires the existence of an object, but its content is *identity-independent*, in that macro-properties of numerically distinct lookalikes can ground type-identical demonstrative contents.

A good way to proceed is to set out the chief argument for object-dependence. It has three central premises:

1. Thought content is essentially truth conditional.
2. The truth conditions for singular contents are irreducibly singular.
3a. In the empty possibility, it is impossible for there to be a singular truth condition.
3b. In the duplicate possibility, the singular truth condition is necessarily different.

The object-dependent theorist infers existence-dependence from (3a) and identity-dependence from (3b).

The descriptivist rejects (2) by giving non-singular, descriptive truth conditions. The predicativist accepts (2) but rejects (3a). He argues furthermore that although (3b) is true, the identity-dependence of intentional content does not follow from it, because demonstrative content—in fact, all purportedly *de re* content—is predicative in nature, akin to the kind of content possessed by open sentences whose variables can be assigned different values. The idea is that *That is an apple* has the logical form 'That(x) is an apple', which expresses a single constant content, which can be mentally applied by a thinker in both empty and duplicate contexts (Burge 1977, 1982).

The predicativist faces the objection, however, that since no object is supplied as value to the free-variable-like demonstrative in the empty possibility, the predicative content remains incomplete so that no truth conditions for the overall thought are forthcoming. The object-dependent view, by contrast, suffers from phenomenological difficulties, implying implausibly that the numerical identity of an object can be determinative of perceptual content.

2. Against Predicational Object-Independence

In his formal semantics for a language containing demonstratives (Burge 1974, 1983), the truth conditions of sentences containing demonstratives—and of thoughts with demonstrative elements—are given by conditionalized bi-conditionals whose antecedents specify the value assigned to the free variable in the demonstrative element (among other things such as the speaker or thinker and the time of utterance or thought). If someone sees something and expresses his thought that it is an apple by saying 'That is an apple', then the following gives the truth conditions for his thought (I suppress agent and time indexes in the interests of simplicity):

If u is an utterance of 'That is an apple' and 'That' in u refers to a, then u is true if and only if a is an apple.

Demonstrative thoughts 'receive' or are 'assigned' truth conditions only by way of a *successful contextual mental application* of the free-variable-like predicative demonstrative content to an object. Crucially, however, in the empty case, since there is no object netted by the agent's referential act of demonstrative application, we are unable to detach the biconditional consequent of the overall material conditional in order to derive any truth conditions. It is very hard to see how, therefore, the predicativist can reject premise (3a). Indeed, barring descriptive reductionism, (3a) seems indisputable.

3. Against Object-Dependence

According to the object-dependent view, '*contents* ... are *de re*, in the sense that they depend on the existence of the relevant *res*' (McDowell 1984: 291). Unlike Burge's view*,* where the *res* occurs outside the content (Burge 1991: 209), on the McDowellian view, the *res* enters into the content and in such a way that if there is no *res* then there is no intentional content remaining left over, as it were, that could serve to characterize the belief. This object-dependent view of singular thought is worked out in great detail and sophistication by Evans (1982). His account is too complex to detail here. But one thing he makes clear, and which is all we need for present purposes, is that there is a 'connection between the concept of a mode of identification and the subject's awareness' (1982: 83). It is precisely the flouting of this fact that leads Evans to take the pure causal theorist to task. Evans attacks what he calls the 'Photograph Model of mental representation of particular objects' (1982: 81), which has it that a mental state can represent an object simply in virtue of the object playing a suitable role in its causal history. Against this, Evans objects that it invokes facts 'of which the subject himself may be quite unaware' (1982: 83) and that it is quite obscure how, if one mental state represents a particular object in virtue of one sort of causal relation to it, and another mental state (of the same subject) represents that object in virtue of another sort of causal relation to it, the sheer difference between the causal relations could generate a difference in *content* between the two mental states, given that it need not in any way impinge on the subject's awareness.

But if so, by parity of reasoning, it is quite obscure how the sheer difference between the identities of two objects could generate a difference in *content* between the two perceptual demonstrative thoughts about those objects given that it need not in any way impinge on the subject's awareness. So, there is good reason to reject the identity-

dependence of perceptual demonstrative content invalidly inferred from (3b).

4. For Property-Dependence

The intentional content of a perceptual demonstrative thought about a material object is intimately bound up with the perceptual experience of the object upon which the thought is based. A perceptual experience has qualitative features that are determined by the qualitative properties of perceived things in the external environment—such as *looking red*, *feeling rough*, or *having a waterish appearance*—and not by the things' essences or haecceities—such as *being identical with ...* or *having the chemical microstructure ...* . If a subject is having an hallucination of a particular object and no particular object is presenting itself to that subject, then no features of the world are being presented to the subject in any perceptual experience and so nothing is there to provide a perceptual demonstrative way of thinking that could constitute any demonstrative content that might figure in any perceptual demonstrative thought. But since, in a veridical perceptual experience in which the properties of an object are presented to a perceiver, such properties might have been instantiated by different things, in a counterfactual situation in which duplicate objects present themselves to the subject by way of instantiating the very same properties, the demonstrative content of the subject's demonstrative thought is the same as it would be in his actual situation; it is just that the demonstrative content of his thought would be about or related to a different object. So says *property-dependence* about perceptual demonstrative thought.

When it comes to perceptual demonstrative thoughts, the predicative object-independent view and the property-dependent view allow a distinction between the content and aboutness of thoughts that the object-dependent view does not. The *content* of a thought is its mental component and the *aboutness* of the thought is an extra-mental relation that the content bears to its object (cf. Burge 1982). The truth conditional semantics of a perceptual demonstrative thought is a *combination* of content and aboutness. The aboutness of a thought obviously determines its truth conditions: different aboutness relation, different truth conditions; different truth conditions, different thought. According to the predicative object-independent view and the property-dependent view, however, the fact that two thoughts have different truth conditions, due to their differing aboutness relations, does not mean that they have different *contents*, that is, that they are different in any *mental* respect. Since the object-dependent view construes content, the mental aspect of thoughts, as essentially representational, that is, truth conditional, it collapses the distinction between content and aboutness. If two thoughts are different because they have different truth conditions then they must have different content, they must genuinely differ in their mental aspects. Given the dispute over whether there is any distinction between content and aboutness, all that should be assumed in advance is that all genuine *de re thoughts* have truth conditions, that is, that all genuine *de re* thought is a combination of content and aboutness.

Consider a minor variation on Burge's (1982) example of Alfred and the duplicate apples. The property-dependent view has it that Alfred's thought *That is an apple* consists of two components: the demonstrative content made available by the observable properties of the object manifest in Alfred's perceptual experience of it, represented by the open sentence 'That (x)', and the actual apple, apple1. Counterfactually, it might have been that this same de-

monstrative content was applied to a different apple, apple2. Granted Alfred has a different *thought* in the counterfactual situation in which he is perceiving apple2. This is because the truth conditions of his thought differ and truth conditions lay down a requirement that the world be a certain way for a thought to be true *irrespective of whether the worldly conditions required by the truth conditions impinge upon the conscious awareness of the subject.* This is fully consistent with Alfred's thought in the counterfactual situation having the *same perceptual demonstrative content* as it does in the actual situation. Indeed, not only is this consistent, but it seems to be required by the condition that content be something of which the subject can be aware, a condition that Burge and Evans both accept.

So, what is right about the predicative objectindependent view is that differences between duplicates do not make for differences in demonstrative content. That is, whether it is apple 1 or 2 that Alfred's demonstrative thought is directed at is of no consequence for the individuation of the demonstrative content of Alfred's thought that *that is an apple.* As we have seen, however, it does not follow that the difference between there being *some* object that one's thought is directed at and there being *nothing at all* that one's thought is directed at does not make for a difference about whether one is having a demonstrative thought — for if no object is singled out then there are no truth conditions and if there are no truth conditions then there is no overall *thought* in the sense that the world is not being represented as being a certain way.

5. Conclusion

In summary, premise (1) above is false: *contents* are not essentially truth-conditional; rather, *entire thoughts*, which are composed of contents and the objects the contents are about, are essentially truth conditional. It follows from this conception that the inference from 3b to the identity-dependence of intentional content is invalid, because although different objects imply different truth conditions, different objects do not necessarily imply different contents. This, in turn, is because demonstrative content is predicative in nature, as the predicativist rightly insists, but it is type-identified on the basis of the discriminable macro-properties instantiated by the objects the contents are ap-

plied to—and numerically different objects in duplicate possibilities can instantiate identical discriminable macro-properties. However, on the property-dependent conception there can be no demonstrative thought in the empty possibility because in the absence of an object no truth conditions will be determined. *Pace* the predicativist, (3a) stands firm.

The debate thus far has proceeded upon the assumption, unquestioned by all participants, that existence-dependence and identity-dependence stand and fall together. By rejecting this assumption, the *property-dependent* view promises a better theory of demonstrative thought and hence a better understanding of our most basic form of empirical thought about reality.

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Wittgenstein and the Pluralist Theory of Truth

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Abstract

Many theories of truth have been ascribed to the later Wittgenstein. The reason for this is the unsystematic, antitheoretical nature of his thought and little evidence for his view on the concept of truth. There is no doubt that Wittgenstein's general pluralistic attitude to philosophical problems and concepts inspired the birth of alethic pluralism. However, the same can be said about the epistemic and deflationist patterns of his philosophy. The possible model for the Wittgensteinian pluralist theory are different concepts of truth in different language games, unified by the family resemblance. Yet it is doubtful whether Wittgenstein has one theory of truth at all, even a pluralist one, which is probably one of the reasons why his contribution to the theory of truth is so rich and diversified.

As Hans-Johann Glock puts it, "there is no theory of truth which has not been ascribed to Wittgenstein. He has been credited with a coherence theory, a pragmatic theory, a consensus theory. Furthermore […] it has been commonplace to assume that Wittgenstein's conception of truth is anti-realist in a more general sense" (Glock 2004: 13). This says something generally true about the actual state of Wittgensteinian scholarship, but we can immediately realize that in fact Glock has failed to mention all theories of truth. For the purpose of this paper, it is essential that he has overlooked the pluralist theory of truth. And it is not only Glock's case. Indeed, to the best of my knowledge, nobody has ascribed the pluralist theory of truth to Wittgenstein. As far as I am concerned, it is especially striking that the article on pluralist theories of truth in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* makes no mention whatsoever of Wittgenstein. This strikes me because I am deeply convinced that the historical roots of alethic pluralism lie in the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein. But am I right?

It is important to understand my claim properly. I am strongly convinced that Wittgenstein had a profound impact on the birth of alethic pluralism. I am not equally strongly convinced that he had a pluralist theory of truth. Thus, I think that it is possible that he had this impact on future alethic pluralism even if he was not an alethic pluralist himself. To understand this, we need to go back and ask why all these different theories of truth have been related to Wittgenstein. One simple answer could be that Wittgenstein was a famous philosopher and many today's philosophers want to use his authority to assist their cause, whatever it is. However, this answer is too simple – there are many famous philosophers and usually there are not so many variations in interpretation of their doctrines. There is also no problem of this plethora of interpretations in the case of the early Wittgenstein (today traditional correspondence reading of *Tractatus* is questioned, but still we do not find this radical diversity of opinions). Therefore, the reasons must lie elsewhere.

In my opinion, there are three main reasons of our difficulties in understanding the later Wittgenstein's view of truth: unsystematic nature of his writings, his deliberate antitheoretical attitude and the scarcity of evidence. First of all, we have no philosophical book of the later Wittgenstein in the traditional sense of the word. He struggled hard to produce one, but, as he himself puts it, "I realized that I should never succeed. The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks" (PI: Preface). Indeed, that is all that we have – philosophical remarks, in *Philosophical Investigations* and elsewhere, sometimes in fact only scattered notes put together by his literary execu-

tors or editors. Second, the later Wittgenstein does not want to "advance any kind of theory" (PI: 109), rejects the idea of some imaginable formal unity (PI: 108) and believes that "Philosophy just puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything" (PI: 126). What is perhaps even more important, he tries to convince us that:

> There are *countless* kinds, countless different kinds of use of all the things we call "signs", "words", "sentences". And this diversity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten (PI: 23).

That is the main reason why Wittgenstein does not want to provide us with a philosophical theory of the usual kind, he does not try to put things in a universal structure, but rather gives justice to the richness of language and the world. Third, in his later years Wittgenstein writes very little about truth. And when we have such little evidence about Wittgenstein's view of truth, in our accounts we often must appeal to his general philosophical approach. Horwich is a perfect example of this, when he says: "in accord with deflationary definition and expressive *raison d'être* of TRUTH, this concept is given no important role in *Investigations*" (Horwich 2016: 100). Horwich here makes some conclusions about Wittgenstein's theory of truth on the ground of his more general philosophical approach. In fact, it is an extreme case of this kind of inference, because we can argue that Horwich draws his conclusions *from the lack of evidence.* However, I think that his inference is plausible – that Wittgenstein gives so little place to the concept of truth in his later philosophy, and, accordingly, that this concept plays so minor a role in his thinking, is a good argument for a deflationary interpretation of his statements about truth. The whole approach of the later Wittgenstein is deflationary, so we can at least suspect that he also has a deflationary conception of truth. After all, Wittgenstein wrote: "What *we* do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (PI: 116) and "Where does this investigation get its importance from, given that it seems only to destroy everything interesting: that is, all that it is great and important? [...] But what we are destroying are only houses of cards" (PI: 118). It would be difficult to give a better example of deflationary thinking.

The problem with such considerations is that general approach of a philosopher often fails to come along with some particular part of his thought. This is also the case of Wittgenstein. Glock defies an antirealistic interpretation of him, stating: "Wittgenstein's verificationism is a stance on the concept of a proposition, not on the concept of truth"

(Glock 2004: 209). Glock's thought is not perfectly clear at this point, but I think that we could argue as follows. He has tried to prove that for Wittgenstein verification was always merely a tool to define meaningful propositions. Therefore, we can go on, Wittgenstein never defines truth by verification or some similar concept. Truth can be epistemically constrained in his thought, because what we can say in our propositions is epistemically constrained. It does not mean, however, that this epistemic feature of truth, inherited from propositions, is in any way constitutive of truth as such. And that is why, even if we acknowledge the existence of this feature, we can still hold to a deflationist interpretation of the concept of truth as something intimately connected to propositions and without any independent role. There is a reason why common Wittgensteinian slogan is "meaning does not transcend use", not "truth does not transcend use".

So, Wittgenstein has no epistemic theory of truth, yet this does not prevent him from having a profound influence on its development in the second part of the twentieth century. He strictly connects our ability of making meaningful statements with our epistemic capacities, and it was enough to make him the grandfather of semantic antirealism. For some philosophers, it is tempting to define truth by this epistemic feature. His more general approach to philosophical problems and concepts was also deflationist, so even if he had not left a single remark about truth in the deflationist spirit, he would still have had an impact on this theory of truth. And his thought is pluralistic in a very deep sense. For him reality is built from countless kinds of language games and forms of life, which are irreducible in their richness and diversity. According to Wittgenstein, we have no single standard of rationality, single philosophical method or concept of exactness, knowledge or certainty (PI: 88, 133, 332) (OC: 10-11, 92, 608-612). From this it is very easy to come to conclusion that we have no single concept of truth.

Wittgenstein's influence on pluralist theories of truth is easy to observe. I restrict myself here to two examples. Somewhere at the beginning of the history of alethic pluralism we encounter Friedrich Waismann, a philosopher deeply involved with Wittgenstein, who claims that "a physical law cannot be true in the same sense in which, say, a description of this building is, and the latter description cannot be true in the same sense in which a statement like "I've got a headache" is [...] Thus we see that statements may be *true* in different senses" (Waismann 1946, 226-227). Waismann believed that we have different concepts of truth at different levels of language. At the other end of this history we find Crispin Wright, whose *Truth and Objectivity* is responsible for getting alethic pluralism into philosophical mainstream. He has recently admitted that when he wrote his book he had in mind two possible models for a pluralist theory of truth: analogy of meaning and Wittgensteinian family resemblance (Wright 2013: 127f).

But did Wittgenstein have pluralist theory of truth, or is his influence on alethic pluralism similar in its pattern to his influence on semantic antirealism? Well, at the current philosophical market we have two interpretations of Wittgenstein's view of truth in largely pluralistic terms, although in neither case their authors ascribe to him alethic pluralism. According to Sara Ellenbogen, Wittgenstein "held that truth conditions are determined by criteria, that is, by conventional rules which tell us the circumstances under which it is correct to predicate "is true" of our statements. And he argued that, as statements within different language games are accepted as true upon different kinds of grounds, the kind of certainty that we require in order to accept a sentence as true depends on the language game

to which the statement belongs". Criteria "define what it means to call something true within a particular language game" (Ellenbogen 2003: 1, 9). The concept of criterion is central to Ellenbogen account of Wittgenstein's theory of truth and in her book, she never even mentions alethic pluralism. Cheryl Misak refers to the discussion of three theories of truth, namely: correspondence, coherence and pragmatic, in *Cambridge Lectures* of Wittgenstein. She notices that Wittgenstein concluded his discussion by repeating that each conception of truth has its proper place and that we must not aspire to a unified theory of truth. Wittgenstein believes that: "It is nonsense to try to find *a* theory of truth, because we can see that in everyday life we use the word clearly and definitely in this different senses" (LWL: 76). According to Misak, for Wittgenstein the truth predicate "is a concept that must be analysed, and analysed variously, in terms of its use in the practices in which it is heavily implicated. [...] Wittgenstein always takes a piecemeal, non-general approach, and is resistant to thinking of a unified account or theory of truth, even if that unity arises out of, and is sensitive to, diverse practices" (Misak 2016: 257). Ultimately Misak interprets Wittgenstein as a follower of a pragmatist theory of truth. She strongly connects the concept of language with the concept of a form of life, so she can say that practice is something central for Wittgenstein, although she admits that he was against a general view that constitute the pragmatic theory of truth (Misak 2016: 258).

Paradoxically, it is this fact that "Wittgenstein is dead set against any such general view" (Misak 2016: 258), and presumably lack of any monistic component in his view of truth, that is the real problem for alethic pluralism. Without some kind of unity from above between different properties of truth we end up with something that is not a pluralist view of truth, but "is a pluralist view of the meaning of the word 'true'" (Lynch 2009: 58). From Ellenbogen and Misak we can easily discern a pluralist component of Wittgenstein's alethic pluralism – different concepts of truth in different language games. But what unifies them, what is the reason enabling us to talk about a single pluralist theory of truth? Well, this is the place when we can get help from the insight of Wright – what unifies all kinds of language games is their family resemblance, and this kind of resemblance unifies also different concepts of truth in these language games. But still, family resemblance is something deliberately ambiguous and weak, so we can have real doubts if it is enough to have something like a consistent pluralist theory of truth (and this is why Wright ultimately rejects this Wittgensteinian model).

So, does Wittgenstein have a pluralist theory of truth? Well, I doubt it. I do not think that later Wittgenstein has any systematic theory of truth at all. We can only find some different patterns: an epistemic pattern, a pluralistic pattern, and a strong deflationist pattern. However, I would not say, for example, that Wittgenstein has a deflationist theory of truth, because all is so unsystematic and antitheoretical, and different remarks of Wittgenstein about truth are not especially consistent with each other. But "this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation. For it compels us to travel criss-cross in every direction over a wide field of thought" (PI: Preface). Wittgenstein was a great philosophical explorer, who discovered new lands in his unstoppable philosophical pursuit. He contributes to different theories of truth, and it is against the spirit and real greatness of his thought to confine him to one single theory and reject all other. And when someone breaks such a massive new ground, it is really mean to complain that he has failed to come from his journey with a perfect map of the discovery.

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Pictures and Perception in the *Tractatus*

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Abstract

In my paper, I engage with an interpretation of Wittgenstein's picture theory by Arthur Danto. According to Danto, Wittgenstein introduced the picture theory to exploit that for some pictures perceptual and pictorial competence coincide. Linguistic understanding could thus be explained on the basis of basic perceptual abilities. Using the example of the *Tractatus*, Danto's aim is to illustrate that there can be no purely mimetic language. I argue that Danto's critique is not applicable to the *Tractatus* as his interpretation does not square with many of its core claims, and that Danto misunderstands the intent of the *Tractatus* as explaining how we understand. Therefore, we need not ascribe the controversial theses on perception which follow from Danto's diagnosis to the early Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* has been connected only sparsely to the topic of perception. It might be odd that in the *Tractatus*, which depends fundamentally on the concept of a picture, perception itself plays no role. Unsurprisingly, therefore, there are attempts to claim that the topic of perception is involved in the background of the *Tractatus*. I will focus on a paper by Arthur Danto (1982), in which he critically explores such a possible role for the topic of perception and its implications. His treatment of Wittgenstein comprises a diagnosis and a verdict. I will argue that Danto's diagnosis probably does not coincide with Wittgenstein's views. Therefore, the *Tractatus* is no good exemplary target for Danto to illustrate his general verdict.

1. Danto's diagnosis – pictures and perception in the *Tractatus*

Danto begins his inquiry from the Platonian distinction between two modes of representation: mimesis and diegysis. Mimesis is a form of representation that relies on the resemblance between what represents and what is represented. Diegysis represents by describing what is represented. A car accident can be represented mimetically, e.g., by enacting the accident in a theatre play. But it can also be represented diegystically, e.g. in a newspaper report (or by being described by an actor in a play). Danto's question is whether language can represent at least as much mimetically as it can represent diegystically. To pursue this question, Danto focuses on Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* as an exemplary work, for, according to Danto, Wittgenstein advocates the thesis that a purely mimetic language is possible.

In the course of his inquiry, Danto asks what Wittgenstein's motivation for understanding propositions as pictures might have been. According to him, Wittgenstein states no explicit reason for propositions' being pictures, therefore, Danto tries to ascribe the following reason to him: we can exploit our competence in understanding pictures to explain our competence in understanding propositions. Danto's hinge is TLP 4.021:

> A proposition is a picture of reality: for if I understand a proposition, I know the situation which it represents. And I understand a proposition without having had its sense explained to me.

To show how Wittgenstein might have exploited our pictorial competence, Danto invokes pictures like photographs or line drawings. For these pictures, the competence to understand the picture coincides with the competence to perceive the object pictured. As soon as, for example, humans are able to recognize a house, they are also able to understand a drawing of a house without need for further learning or explanation, and vice versa. In these cases, the competence to perceive things and the competence to understand pictures coincide.

Danto claims that Wittgenstein could have been tempted to conceive of propositions on the model of this kind of pictures. A proposition, on this account, would be like a picture we "see through" to the pictured state of affairs. The identity of pictorial and perceptual competence, and of pictorial and linguistic competence, would explain how we understand propositions. To be able to understand a proposition, it would be enough to be able to perceive the state of affairs it pictures.

2. Danto's verdict – no purely mimetic language

For Danto, Wittgenstein champions a purely mimetic view of language as he claims that all meaningful propositions are propositions which picture. However, if the diagnosis presented above is correct, Wittgenstein's pictorial language cannot live up to this claim. For, according to Danto, what we can directly perceive in a picture simply by the help of perceptual competence is limited. This is because Danto wants Wittgenstein to exploit a sort of perceptual competence which is independent of further learning (further learning would probably depend on descriptive representation). This kind of perceptual competence allows us to perceive objects only "under such descriptions as do not imply inference to something outside the perceptual field" (Danto 1982: 15). Danto probably thinks of descriptions like "is blue" or "is sweet" in contrast to "is fragile" or "is taciturn". The latter imply inference to something outside the perceptual field while the former do not (this claim is controversial, for a classical critique see Sellars 1956). Thus, if Wittgenstein's motivation was to explain linguistic competence as pictorial competence and pictorial competence as perceptual competence, only a small range of things could be intelligibly expressed in language, namely things that could be perceived without inference to something outside the perceptual field. Such a mimetic language would be poor and could not represent as much as language which represents diegystically.

3. A critique of Danto

If Danto's diagnosis was adequate, several commitments on perception undiscernible at first sight would be present in the *Tractatus*. Danto's view seems to be supported by the only place in the *Tractatus* where Wittgenstein mentions perception explicitly. In TLP 5.5423 on the Necker cube, Wittgenstein claims that we see facts, which lends at least some support to Danto's reading. We could otherwise object to it that Wittgenstein's propositions picture *states of affairs* but that we perceive *objects* (and not states of affairs) and that Wittgenstein therefore cannot hold that the ability to understand propositions coincides with perceptual competence. But since Wittgenstein himself speaks of seeing facts, Danto can argue that if talk of perceiving facts or of states of affairs needs to be defended, it is Wittgenstein's task to do so and not his.

However, there are several problems with Danto's diagnosis. Of course, it is speculative in character and Danto himself does not deny this. But even for such speculation to be persuasive, it needs to be consonant with the wider framework of an author's thought. Danto's diagnosis, however, fits rather awkwardly with other claims Wittgenstein makes.

The core problem of Danto's approach is that it operates with a restricted understanding of what kind of picture a proposition could be. On Danto's account, Wittgenstein's model for propositions might have been photographs or line drawings. However, these are partly what Wittgenstein calls "spatial pictures". If they were not, coincidence of perceptual and pictorial competence would not be feasible in their case. Wittgenstein is clear however, that propositions are "merely" logical pictures (TLP: 4.03). Propositions lack the shared spatial structure necessary for photographs or line drawings, but still they are pictures. Wittgenstein is also explicit that propositions are not realistic pictures. In TLP 4.011 he claims:

> At first sight a proposition – one set out on the printed page, for example – does not seem to be a picture of the reality with which it is concerned.

Rather, Wittgenstein suggests parallels between propositions and musical notation. But musical notation is not a kind of picture where pictorial and perceptual competence coincide, at least not without further learning.

An analogy to propositions which Wittgenstein actually employs at the time of the development of the picture theory are models used in court to represent accidents (NB 2004: 29.9.1914). However, Danto's diagnosis cannot be exploited for these spatial models. Photographs or realistic line drawings are understood without explanation of their elements. In a spatial model however, some such explanation may be required. Often, we will need an explanation of what the elements represent (e.g., that the doll at the right side represents the pedestrian hurt in the accident). After having been given such an explanation, we will be able to understand what state of affairs the model represents. However, Danto claims that the advantage of identifying pictorial and perceptual competence for Wittgenstein is precisely that we need not "learn to associate the picture of *x* with *x* in the way in which we have to learn to associate the name of *x* with *x*" (Danto 1982: 14). But Wittgenstein's court model can be understood only after we have learned to associate the elements of the model ("names") with what they represent. Wittgenstein also insists that the meaning of names must be explained to us (TLP: 3.263). We understand a proposition only after having learned to associate names with objects. It is possible that, *after* this association, Wittgenstein thought of states of affairs as

directly graspable in the propositions (this would make sense of TLP 4.021). Understanding a proposition thus may involve a direct grasp of the represented state of affairs for Wittgenstein, but not because he conceived of propositions as analogous to line drawings and neither because he wanted to exclude that prior learning is necessary.

Danto also ignores Wittgenstein's insistence on the analyzability of propositions into elementary propositions. For Wittgenstein, if the meaning of a proposition is determined, it must be analyzable into elementary propositions in a definite way. However, if understanding a proposition works like understanding realistic pictures and like perception, as Danto's Wittgenstein claims, would that not mean that in understanding a picture or in perception we also analyze the picture or what we perceive into their elements? If this was so, the *Tractatus* would contain a controversial thesis on perception, against the common view that there is no theory of perception to be found there.

A further problem in Danto's approach is his reading of the saying – showing distinction. He seems to identify "showing" with mimetic representation and, in his essay, mimetic representation is paradigmatically representation by realistic pictures. Thus, Danto has the tendency to equate the Tractarian categories of showing and picturing on the one hand, and of saying and diegysis on the other hand. However, the category of showing includes more than the category of picturing. While propositions/pictures show something (namely what is the case if it is true; TLP: 4.022) there are aspects of language which show something but do not picture any state of affairs (tautologies, applications of signs; TLP: 6.127, 3.262). Furthermore, only sentences which picture a state of affairs *say* something (TLP: 4.03). Thus, the Tractarian category of picturing should rather be equated with the category of saying than with showing.

If Wittgenstein had conceived of understanding propositions on the model of perceiving photographs or line drawings, he probably would not have evaded Danto's verdict that his picturing language lacks the expressive power of describing language. But as Wittgenstein probably was not moved by the motive Danto attributes to him, it is an open question whether the *Tractatus* is subject to Danto's objections at all. This is not to say that the *Tractatus* offers a workable understanding of language, but only that it is not a target for Danto's more specific critique of the idea of a purely mimetic language.

That the *Tractatus* may not be the right target for Danto's critique is also shown by further considerations. Wittgenstein might have simply accepted that, at first sight, there is more we can do with diegystic language than with purely pictorial language. After all, one of the core claims of the *Tractatus* on one standard reading is that some parts, the non-pictorial parts, of what we ordinarily conceive to be our language lack meaning. Why could Wittgenstein not claim that the purely diegystic parts of language lack meaning, and that pictorial language is everything that remains when we restrict language to what is actually meaningful?

This possible line of defense for Wittgenstein indicates that Danto may misread Wittgenstein's motivation for introducing the picture theory and the intent of the *Tractatus* as such. Danto sees the *Tractatus* as an attempt to explain how we understand the world and language (see also Danto 1997: 30). However, what Wittgenstein seems to be actually concerned with are the foundations of logic and the conditions under which the meaning of a proposition is precise (in order for tautologies like "p or -p" to be possible the sense of p must be, in Wittgenstein's early understand-

ing, perfectly determined). And Pears (1987: ch. 6) shows that the picture theory may have been a reaction to the defects of Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment. Thus, a plausible motivation for Wittgenstein's picture theory is available, even though Wittgenstein does not state it explicitly. In contrast, the question *how* human beings understand propositions, or the world, would have been shoved aside by Wittgenstein as a problem for psychology.

As we have seen, Danto backs up his ascription by TLP 4.021. There, Wittgenstein claims that we can understand new propositions without them having been explained to us and that therefore, propositions must be pictures. However, this sentence can also be read in ways which avoid Danto's interpretation. That we understand propositions can be taken as a fact, the details of which must be explained by psychology. If this psychological process is successful, I will know what state of affairs is pictured by a proposition. But the only necessary resource for knowing this is the proposition itself, i.e., I do not need further linguistic input. The proposition needs to contain all the information to identify the represented state of affairs, and that it does is something to be explained, for example, by a picture theory of language. But the *Tractatus* does not address how we extract this information, i.e., how we understand.

To summarize, if Danto's speculative attribution of a motive for introducing the picture theory to Wittgenstein was adequate, the *Tractatus* would contain daring theses on perception and linguistic understanding. As Danto himself shows, these theses would be hardly defensible. However, there is much in the *Tractatus* which is in dissonance with Danto's attribution, and there are alternative explanations of why Wittgenstein introduced the picture theory. Danto's

reading might get some grip in Wittgenstein's post-Tractarian phase (see, e.g., PR 1975: 43: "The reality that is perceived takes the place of the picture.") but in the *Tractatus* with its suppression of questions deemed psychological, it does not. Therefore, while Danto's negative verdict on certain theories of purely mimetic language may be defensible as such, Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* is not an instance of such a theory.

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The Constancy Mechanism Proposal for the Limits of Intentionality

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Abstract

Naturalist theories of intentionality are often criticized of being too liberal about the requirements for a given state to constitute a representation – they treat certain states as representations when they are clearly not representational. But what is the lower border of intentionality that distinguishes the limiting cases of representational states from non-representational states? In order to solve this problem, it is necessary to establish conditions for minimal intentionality – those conditions satisfied by the most primitive representational states. It has been proposed that the employment of a constancy mechanism is such a minimal condition. In particular, Tyler Burge has proposed that the limits of intentionality are the limits of perception and that in order for a system to be perceptual, it required the employment of a perceptual constancy mechanism. My goal is to attack the motivations behind this proposal.

Tyler Burge has objected against naturalist theories of intentionality that they are too liberal on the requirements for a state to be representational (Burge 2010: 303f). A theory of representation is too liberal when it treats certain states as representational when they are clearly not representations. Behind this objection, lies the problem of demarcation: what is the lower border of intentionality that distinguishes the limiting cases of representational states from non-representational states?

In order to determine which states are genuine representations and which ones are not, it is required to establish minimal conditions for intentionality – those conditions satisfied by the states in the lower level in the hierarchy of representational states, the most primitive representational states. Hence, if a given state does not satisfy one of these conditions, it follows that it lies outside the representational realm. But what is a minimal condition for intentionality?

Consider a group of representational states. Some states are complex representations which representational statuses are not put into question (e.g., beliefs and desires), while other states are primitive states which representational statuses are put into question. Now consider a line that distinguishes representational states from non-representational ones. This line also distinguishes primitive representational states from other states that even though they are not representational, their non-representational statuses are also put into question. Thus, there are certain representational and non-representational states that it is not clear whether they are representational or not; rather, they are borderline cases of primitive representational states. The problem that arises is how to demarcate among these borderline cases which states are genuinely representational. It is here that minimal conditions for intentionality come into play. They are conditions that draw a line to distinguish the limiting cases of representational states from non-representational states. The literatures contains several proposals of minimal conditions for intentionality, the goal of this paper is to assess the constancy mechanism proposal and to attack the motivations behind it.

It is plausible to claim that a cognitive system represents a certain distal object but not the proximal stimulus because even though at different instants there is a great variety of proximal stimuli reaching the system's sensorial apparatus, the distal object and the system's response behaviour remains the same – there is no variety. Hence, the conclusion that the same thing is being represented throughout all these changes in proximal stimuli, namely, the distal object. That is the line of reasoning behind this conclusion. Given that there is a great variety of proximal stimuli reaching the system coming from the distal object and still the distal object and the system's responsive behaviour to the presence of the distal object remains the same throughout all varieties in proximal stimuli, it follows that the system is representing the distal object, not the proximal stimuli.

In order to achieve this result, the system should employ a constancy mechanism, that is, a mechanism that guarantees that the system will still represent the distal feature despite of huge varieties (to a certain extant) in proximal stimuli coming from the environment. There are several examples of constancy mechanisms, the most famous one being colour constancy: a given visual system sees an object as having the same colour even when there are huge differences in the environmental light conditions. The system keeps the representation of the object's colour constant despite of a great variety in the light reflected by the object under different lighting conditions. Consider a white cup that appears to us as having a uniform colour under a highly uneven illumination, despite of the fact that the light reflected by the cup's shaded region is very different from the light reflected by the unshaded one. This is a case of colour constancy – the visual system represents all regions of the cup as having the same colour even though there is a huge variation in the illumination incident on them.

In light of this feature of constancy mechanisms, some have defended the employment of constancy mechanisms as a minimal condition for intentionality. Burge has defended that perception constitutes the limiting case of intentionality and that the employment of perceptual constancy mechanisms distinguishes perceptual states from non-perceptual ones. Hence, what distinguishes representational from non-representational states is that the first ones employ constancy mechanisms (Burge, 2010). Kim Sterelny also reaches the same conclusion, even though he does not claim that the limits of perception are the limits of intentionality (Sterelny 1995).

One of the major motivations behind the constancy mechanism proposal is that it is quite plausible that the employment of constancy mechanisms is a condition for the system to represent the distal feature, not the proximal stimuli. This constancy mechanism criterion sounds plausible and so it is tempting to use it not only to determine when the system is representing distal objects, but also to demarcate the limits of intentionality. According to the resultant proposal, it is a minimal condition for a system to

be intentional that it employs constancy mechanism. However, this move is a *non sequitur*.

It is a great leap to infer from the thesis that a system represents a distal object in virtue of the employment of constancy mechanisms to the thesis that the employment of constancy mechanisms is a minimal condition for intentionality. First, the constancy mechanism criterion implicitly assumes that the relevant system is an intentional system – after all, to ask whether the system represents the distal feature or the proximal stimuli is already to assume that the relevant system is intentional. Second and more important, it is plainly possible that a mere non-intentional sensory system produces a state that correlates with a distal feature of the external environment even when the proximal stimulus reaching its sensorial apparatus varies a lot. That may happen for pure coincidence or because there is a third state which causes the production of the system's sensory state and the occurrence of the distal feature.

Since the thesis that the system represents distal objects in virtue of the employment of constancy mechanism does not entail the thesis that such employment is a minimal condition for intentionality, what other arguments are there for the constancy mechanism demarcation proposal?

Kim Sterelny has proposed an argument in favour of the constancy mechanism proposal that appeals to a distinction between two kinds of explanations, namely, robust-process and actual-sequence explanations (Sterelny 1995). This distinction is well illustrated via the explanation of the result of a football match. Consider the final of the 1970 World Cup in which Brazil defeated Italy. You may explain the result of this football match in two different ways. On one hand, there is the actual-sequence explanation which consists in a detailed description of the match, describing every pass, free kick, goal, etc. – that is, a complete physical description of every move in the match. On the other hand, there is the robust-process explanation, which consists in a description of the abilities of Pelé and other Brazilian players and concludes that given their superior quality over the Italian players, it was presumable that Brazil would win in one way or another. The actual-sequence explanation is more specific (i.e., it has a complete description of everything that happened in the match), but the robust-process explanation has the advantage of explaining what would probably have happened if things had been a little bit different – Brazil would still probably win.

The lesson that Sterelny has drawn from it is that intentional explanations are robust-process explanations, not actual-sequence ones. An actual-sequence explanation of the behaviour of a given organism describes the precise sequence of neurological and physical events which lead to the behaviour, while an intentional explanation of it is a robust-process explanation. But what is so special about the intentional explanation as a robust-process explanation in a way that the actual-sequence explanation of behaviour misses? The intentional explanation of behaviour explains how the organism would have behaved if things were a little bit different. Let's contrast the actual-sequence and robust-process explanations of the avoidance-behaviour of an animal when it stares at something in his visual field. The actual-sequence explanation specifies the shadow in the animal's retina, every detail of what happened in his brain, limbs, etc. But it cannot explain what would have happened if the animal were in a slightly different position. In contrast, the intentional explanation explains that the animal had this avoidance-behaviour because it saw a predator. Intentional explanations of behaviour are capable of giving an account of counterfactual scenarios, while ac-

tual-sequence explanations are not. In sum, intentional explanations are special because they have counterfactual robustness.

As it happened with the robust-process explanation of the result of football match, the intentional explanation of behaviour has the advantage of explaining what would have happened in different situations. It loses in richness of details in order to gain in generalization. While actual-sequence explanations of behaviour appeal to proximal features (e.g., a shadow in the retina), intentional explanations appeal to distal features which are represented by the organism (e.g., the representation of a predator which is trigged by shadows of different forms in retina). The intentional explanation explains behaviour as a response to a distal feature which may be trigged via different proximate stimuli (e.g., different shadows in the retina).

Constancy mechanisms allow the system's behaviour to be triggered by the same distal feature despite of a great variety of proximal stimuli. Without the employment of constancy mechanisms, the system's behaviour is trigged only by proximal stimuli. Since intentional explanations are robust-process explanations, the intentional explanation of behaviour appeals to the system's response to distal features of the environment and the only way that the system can respond to distal features but not to proximal stimulus is via the employment of constancy mechanisms. Hence, the conclusion that the employment of constancy mechanisms is a condition for the system's responsive behaviour to be properly explained in intentional terms and that constancy mechanisms constitute a condition for minimal intentionality.

What could be problematic with the counterfactual robustness argument? I will defend the thesis that the distinction of robust-process and actual-sequence explanations appealed by this argument does not draw a distinction between intentional and non-intentional states, but a distinction between two kinds of representational states, namely, proximal content and distal content representational states (i.e., states that represent proximal features and states that represent distal features). The counterfactual robustness argument fails because it merely proves that the employment of constancy mechanisms is required for the system to represent distal features. Given that the room is open for the existence of genuine representational states of proximal features and that the employment of constancy mechanisms is not required for a state to represent proximal features, the argument fails to show that the employment of constancy mechanisms is a minimal condition for intentionality. After all, there is still the possibility that the employment of constancy mechanisms is only a minimal condition for a state to constitute a certain kind of representation, namely, distal content representation, not to constitute a representation *tout court*. The conclusion is that the counterfactual robustness argument fails to show that the robust-process and actual-sequence explanations distinction draws a line between intentional and non-intentional explanations.

The counterfactual robustness argument assumes without any prior justification that there is no intentional explanation of behaviour which posits proximal content representations and so that there is no representation of proximal features. It assumes that there is no behaviour prone to proximal content intentional explanations. The fundamental assumption of the argument is that it is a distinctive feature of intentional explanations that they give an account of counterfactual cases and this assumption implicitly assumes that there is no proximal content intentional explanation since it is not possible to give an account of

counterfactual scenarios based on the positing of representations with proximal content. Only intentional explanations which posit distal content representations gives an account of counterfactual scenarios because here the employment of constancy mechanisms is required in order for the state to represent the same distal feature despite of variations in proximal stimuli. But if the content of a representation is the proximal feature, what kind of variation could there be among counterfactual situations in order for a proximal content intentional explanation to give an account of them? There is none. An illustration of the account of counterfactual situations by distal content intentional explanations makes this point clear.

Let's come back to the case of the animal's avoidance behaviour to escape predators. The animal still represents the same distal feature, the presence of the predator, despite of differences among the predator's spacial positions or in environmental lighting reaching the animal's retina. Variations like these constitute the counterfactual scenarios that the distal content intentional explanation are capable of giving an account of. It provides an explanation of the animal's avoidance behaviour throughout all these counterfactual situations and that is the reason that this intentional explanation is a robust-process explanation. But what varieties could there be in order for a proximal content intentional explanation to give an account? None. There is no variation that could constitute any counterfactual scenario which a proximal content intentional explanation could give an account. Hence, proximal content intentional explanations are not robust-process explanation.

The counterfactual robustness argument unjustifiably assumes that there is no proximal content intentional explanation by claiming that intentional explanations are robust-process explanations. Since the existence of proximal content intentional explanations is not ruled out by the argument, the room is still open for the existence of intentional explanations that are not distal content intentional

explanations and thus for the existence of actual-sequence intentional explanations. So, contrary to what the counterfactual robustness argument claims, the distinction of robust-process and actual-sequence behaviour explanations does not reveal an intentional and non-intentional behaviour explanations distinction. There is still the possibility that what this distinction actually reveals is rather a distinction between two kinds of intentional explanations – proximal content and distal content intentional explanations. The conclusion is that the counterfactual robustness argument fails to show that the constancy mechanism proposals draws a line between intentional and non-intentional states.[1]

What is the lesson to be drawn from this conclusion to the debate on the conditions for minimal intentionality? I think that it is that the appropriate proposal of minimal conditions should not entail that there are only distal content representations. Whenever a proposal of minimal conditions for intentionality excludes proximal content representations, it is prone to the objection that it does not draw a distinction between representational and non-representational states, but rather a distinction between proximal content and distal content representations.

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[1] Marc Artiga has also wondered whether the counterfactual robustness argument merely reveals a distinction between proximal and distal content representations. However, he admits that "this question is hard to settle" (Artiga 2016: 422). I take that the above objection settle this question against this argument.

Minimal Self, Mineness, and Intersubjectivity

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Abstract

In our presentation, we investigate the commonalities between Wittgenstein's account of sensation and recent accounts of the "minimal self" and its definition as "mineness" of experience. These recent accounts hold that "mineness" is characterized, (1) by a difference between the way I access my sensations as opposed to how others can access them and (2) by the *experiential* givenness of the self. We argue that Wittgenstein agrees with the first claim and that he holds that sensations are in a sense had by one person. Nevertheless, he implies that, if the determinate quality of a sensation conditions the meaning of a word in a language, that quality is intersubjective. With regard to the claim of *experiential* givenness, we argue that Wittgenstein would be unlikely to find a common kind of experience in all uses of the first-person pronoun, but that he may find resemblances between some uses.

1. Mineness of experience

There is a sense in which an experience such as pain may be bound to one person: only the person who is in pain *has* that pain (in this paper we are *not* concerned with the question if there are conscious experiences that might be shared with others). In this sense, we may speak of a "sense of ownership" (Gallagher 2000) or "mineness" of experience (Zahavi 2014). In other words, the having of an experience implies a "minimal self," which Zahavi also calls the "dative of manifestation."

According to Gallagher and Zahavi (2012), this minimal self is an implicit self-awareness; one is aware of oneself not as an object of experience, but implicitly as the subject who has the experience. For instance, if I perceive a tree in front of me, I am not only aware of *the tree itself*, but also implicitly aware of *myself seeing* the tree. Gallagher's and Zahavi's point is not restricted to a conceptual analysis, but fundamentally involves the lived experience of a person. It shows that I always experience my experience as mine rather than someone else's experience.

Would Wittgenstein agree with this notion of minimal self? He is widely considered an anti-subjectivist philosopher. One interesting connection is Gallagher's and Zahavi's indirect reference to Wittgenstein through their notion of "non-observational self-awareness." In their account of minimal self, they use the notion of non-observational awareness synonymously with "mineness of experience": in being consciously aware of a tree, I am non-observationally aware of my consciousness of the tree.

Gallagher and Zahavi take this notion from Shoemaker's work on self-reference and self-awareness, which is itself based on an interpretation of Wittgenstein's account of the use of the first-person pronoun. Shoemaker (1968) uses the notion of non-observational self-awareness to explain Wittgenstein's distinction between "subject" and "object use" of the term "I" in the *Blue Book*. There, Wittgenstein considers the difference between utterances like "I have toothache" and "I have a bump on my forehead" (BBB: 66). Wittgenstein calls the former use "the use as subject" and the latter the "use as object" (BBB: 66). While one can ask "are you sure that *you* have a bump on the forehead?" it is nonsensical to ask, "are you sure that it's *you* who have pains?" (BBB: 67). For instance, if I experience a pain I will not doubt that I do in fact experience a pain. Yet, if I look into a mirror and recognize that there is a bump on my forehead, I refer to my body and thus to myself as an ob-

ject. Under some circumstances, it might even be reasonable to ask whether it is *me* who I see in the mirror.

In other words, when I am using the term "I" as a subject (in first-person present tense statements), I am immune to misidentifying the referent of "I", which is by default me. This is true even for statements in which it makes sense to scrutinize my authority, such as "I see a *birch*". While I can be wrong in thinking that I see a *birch*, I cannot err in identifying myself as the one who sees it (independent of *what* is seen). The referent of the term "I" (in its subject use) is not some observational phenomenon; it is not an object of an inner "sense-perception" (Shoemaker 1968: 563). Shoemaker claims that the first-person pronoun refers to something even though it does not refer to an object, or a state of affairs. Self-reference, in his opinion, is only mysterious if we construe the self as *object* to which I have access by inner sense-perception. But does the subjective use imply that there is a *phenomenally experienced* self? According to Shoemaker, the self of the subject-use of the first-person pronoun is the non-observational awareness of the experience.

Wittgenstein, too, holds that experiences such as sensations such as pain play an important role in language-games. In (PU: 304) Wittgenstein's dialog partner accuses Wittgenstein to hold that "the sensation itself is a nothing." Wittgenstein responds: "Not at all. It is not a *something,* but not a *nothing* either!" In the above remarks from the *Blue Book*, Wittgenstein does reject the idea that the first-person pronoun in the use as subject refers to a worldly object. He does not, however, deny the existence of sensations. While he holds that "only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious" (PU: 281). This is not to be understood as a behaviorist statement. In (PU: 304–308) Wittgenstein objects to the indictment of behaviorism, stating that there could be no greater difference between pain behavior with and without the sensation of pain (PU: 304, also cf. Sluga 1996: 341).

But if it is clear that sensations are not reducible to behavior, does that not vindicate the common view that they are internal to the subject who has them? At least with regard to sensations such as pain one may be tempted to think that their qualitative character is only accessible to the subject who is in pain.

2. The intersubjectivity of experience

Wittgenstein points out that in the ordinary use of language experiences are conceived to be the same for different people. For instance, we take it as a matter of course that others can have the same impression of the blue sky (PU: 275). Wittgenstein recognizes that colors have different aspects and that one can concentrate on either the color of an object or the vivid impression of a color (PU: 277). Yet, the color of the object and the color impression are not two different things. Rather, the color impression is the way the color appears to the observer. The red color of the object and the way it appears to a person are two aspects of what we call "red."

One may try to object against Wittgenstein that there could be variation between the quality of experience between different persons. But the same holds for only one person, as well: there could be variation between the quality of experience the person has at different times. For instance, the color we see in objects often varies with changes of light—this is not something unusual in our perceptual experiences. We experience a white wall as being white independent of whether it reflects the warm evening light or the colder daylight. Besides the distinction mentioned above from PU §277, one may here distinguish two different impressions: 1. the immediate color impression one has of an object, such as a white page, which "really" appears white even under red light. 2. the impression one has when carefully concentrating on the color of the page and realizes that it "really" looks red. Such ambiguities in perceptual experience call into question the idea that the quality of one's immediate perception suffices to determine the meaning of a word.

Wittgenstein clearly rejects the idea that sensations are not intersubjective and only understandable by the subject of experience. What is often called the "private language argument" is a rejection of the claim that the meaning of words can be determined by the quality of the inner state of a subject. Wittgenstein's famous thought experiment of the beetle in the box (P: 293) is an analogy for the view that "pain" is a name for some inner object, the impression of pain. If the concept of pain is thus construed, it would be like a beetle in a box only one person can open. But here, Wittgenstein points out that it would not matter what the beetle would look like. Indeed, it would not even matter if there were no beetle in the box at all, for the determinate qualities of the object in the box play no role in the imagined language game. This thought experiment doesn't show that there couldn't be any qualities or feelings associated with a word by only one subject, but that these cannot determine the meaning of a word.

It is important here to distinguish between two ways by which Wittgenstein shows that even sensations such as pain are intersubjective. Firstly, sensations are not things in themselves independent of language, and language does more than merely naming them. This is not to say that there are no sensations without language, but that language shapes what counts as a sensation and assigns certain roles for the sensation in the respective language-games. One may here take it that Wittgenstein disregards the sensation and opts for a purely externalistic and behavioristic account of meaning, but, as we saw in the last section with regard to PU §304–308, this is not the case. What he rejects is the assumption that mental events or states are something inner. Rather than inner states indexed by an external concept, sensations are part of more complex language-games. Since language-games are intersubjective, so are the sensations that feature in them.

This takes us to the second claim, that the quality of sensations itself cannot be exclusively subjective. If pain would feel different to the majority of English speakers, or if it wouldn't be a feeling at all, the word "pain" would have a different meaning. Imagine, for instance, that the majority of people perceive pain as pleasurable rather than painful. This would surely shift the meaning of "pain" significantly. Wittgenstein's claim is not that there is no subjective quality to experience but that, in as far as it conditions the meaning of a word in a language, the determinate quality is intersubjective.

3. Conclusion

We have shown that Gallagher and Zahavi consider the "minimal self" as characterized by the "mineness" of experience. By this, they mean two things. On the one hand, that there is a difference between the way I access my sensations as opposed to how others can access them. In addition, they hold that the "mineness" implies an *experiential* givenness of the self. This second sense of "mineness" and "for-me-ness" is subtly but decisively different, however. Zahavi claims that for-me-ness entails "that we have a distinctly different acquaintance with our own experiential life than with the experiential life of others" (Zahavi forthcoming: 6). The difference of the acquaintance is supposed to be a matter of "what-it-is-like-for-me-ness" (ibid: 3).

With regard to the first claim, we have shown that Wittgenstein agrees that there is a difference between the way I access my sensations as opposed to how others can access them. We then explained that for Wittgenstein even sensations such as pain are nevertheless intersubjective in two senses. On the one hand, their determinate quality is not all there is to the use of a word such as "pain"; the word is not a name for an (internal) thing in itself. On the other hand, as far as the determinate quality is important for the meaning of "pain," it must be intersubjective.

It is far from clear, however, if Wittgenstein would also agree with the second claim, that there is a non-observational, *experiential* givenness of the self. Wittgenstein admits that having a sensation plays a non-redundant role in expressions of the sensation. That the person who has a sensation has access to it that differs from that of others does not imply by itself that there is a phenomenal givenness of the self.

Wittgenstein's frequent emphasis on the manifold of different uses of the same word in different language-games makes it unlikely that he would subscribe to the view that there is a common phenomenon to be found in all uses of "I." This does not exclude the possibility, however, that there are family resemblances between some uses of the first-person pronoun.

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Wittgensteinian Naïvety

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Abstract

The following develops an insight in the second part of the Investigations and applies it to issues in current issues in the philosophy of perception. The insight is found in Wittgenstein's discussion of aspect switches, where he emphasises not just the way experience changes through a switch but also the way it nevertheless remains the same. This latter emphasis in particular is shown to be relevant for recent debates concerning relational and representational views of perception. The paper argues that Wittgenstein's reflections on the relation between perception and thought leads to a relational view of perception – one which holds that the objects of experience are ordinary objects (as opposed to sense-datum theories) and where the relation is decidedly non-representational (as opposed to representationalism).

1. Seeing objects

It is helpful to start with a basic question: what is it to see an object? As with many of the concepts we most intimately live with, it is hard to explain it in other terms.[1] About seeing, like consciousness, one may be tempted to say, if you don't know what it is, you're never going to. But we can do slightly better. At least, there seems to be a relation between seeing and consciousness – between what it is to see and what it is for visual states to have phenomenology. As M.G.F. Martin notes:

> Our primitive idea of what it is for something to be seen … is for it to fix the way one then experiences, that is, the phenomenal nature of one's experience. (Martin 2005: 707)

Our conception of seeing an object is tied in with our conception of visual phenomenology: the object fixes or determines what it is like to undergo the experience. The idea here is modest. It is not intended to be anything like a definition – for instance, there is no claim that we can understand the idea of fixing the phenomenology of experience independently of the idea of seeing an object. Nor is the idea tied to any theory of perception. Perhaps reflection on the idea might help us towards a theory (for instance, in the direction of 'transparency') but the claim itself is just that our idea of seeing an object is connected to the idea of having that object fix visual phenomenology. In the following, I suggest that Wittgenstein's reflections on seeing-as can help us move from this neutral starting point towards a relational conception of experience.

The rest is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 briefly elaborate Wittgenstein's remarks of seeing of seeing-as and highlight his emphasis on the respect in which experience remains constant through a switch. Section 4 develops some of Wittgenstein's remarks on the relation between perception and thought. Section 5 then sketches how the constancy of experience and thought-like nature of seeing-as spell trouble for representationalist views.

It should be said the following is more sketched than argued, both as exegesis and as independent theorising. Still it is hoped that it can bring out how Wittgenstein's relevance is perhaps underestimated in current philosophy of perception.

2. Seeing and seeing-as

As usual with Wittgenstein, there is a lot going on in his discussion of experience and aspect change (Aspektwechsel) in the *Investigations* (Part II, section xi). The following makes no attempt to deal with all that is going on. It merely extracts a line of thought that can be found in Wittgenstein's remarks on the issue, taking his cue from Jastrow's famous duck-rabbit.[2] I shall be concerned in particular with the first 30 or so remarks (references are to the paragraph numbering in Wittgenstein 2009).

The point of departure is Wittgenstein's discussion of change and constancy:

> Der Aspektwechsel. 'Du würdest doch sagen, daß sich das Bild jetzt gänzlich geändert hat!'
> Aber was ist anders: mein Eindruck? meine Stellungnahme? – Kann ich's sagen? Ich beschreibe die Änderung, wie eine Wahrnehmung; ganz als hätte sich der Gegenstand vor meinen Augen geändert. (§129)

What has changed? As Wittgenstein notes, we describe it as if the object itself had changed. On that ground, there ought to be a change in the experience too. Seeing a duck is different from seeing a rabbit. But while experience changes, it also remains constant:

> 'Ich sehe ja jetzt das', könnte ich sagen (z. B. auf ein anderes Bild deutend). Es ist die Form der Meldung ei-

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[1] I shall be concerned with our paradigmatic notion of <u>conscious</u> seeing. This is not to deny either that there are scientific stories to be told about what seeing is, nor that there are states of unconscious seeing.

[2] Jastrow apparently did not invent the illusion. Illustration from the German satire magazine *Fliegende Blätter* October 23rd 1892. John F. Kihlstrom gives more information on the life of the early duck-rabbits on his homepage: http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~kihlstrm/JastrowDuck.htm

ner neuen Wahrnehmung. Der Ausdruck des Aspekt-wechsels ist der Ausdruck einer neuen Wahrnehmung, zugleich mit dem Ausdruck der unveränderten Wahr-nehmung. (§130)

Ich *sehe*, daß es sich nicht geändert hat; und sehe es doch anders. (§113)

Not just the change but the constancy too is manifest in experience.[3] Here it is important to note that experience itself is constant: it is not just that the object is constant but gives rise to changing experiences. In the following, I attempt to show that if this is right, then we have reason to accept a relational as opposed to a representational account of perceptual experience.

3. Change and constancy

As Wittgenstein points out in the above quote (§130), we As Wittgenstein points out in the above quote (§130), we can express the change in experience by mentioning objects: 'Now I see a duck – now a rabbit!' But of course in a sense neither of these are true. You are looking at a picture, there is neither a duck nor a rabbit there to be seen. This will normally be obvious from the conversational context.

There can be genuine confusion however. Sometimes we don't know what we are looking at. Suppose, for instance, that you see a lifelike presentation of a duck on a screen in zoological museum. The realism of the image (and your inattention) give rise to the impression that you are looking at a stuffed duck behind a glass screen. When you say that you see the duck, you mean not just that you 'see' it in the sense of seeing-as but that you (really) see it. In this rare case, you're mistaken.

The possibility of such mistakes matters for the following. Focusing on real cases brings out more clearly that we need not see what we see *as* what it is in order to see it. Indeed, we need not even see the object *as an object* at all. This is what spells trouble for representationalism, as I bring out in the last section.

4. Experience and thought

What remains constant in experience is the object you (really) see. In Wittgenstein's example, it is the picture of a duck-rabbit. But switches happen not only with pictures. Suppose that you see, in a dimly lit corner in the aviary section of the zoological museum, what you take to be the

silhouette of a stuffed duck. In fact it is a stuffed rabbit. Again, what you 'see' is a duck. What you *see* however is obviously a rabbit.[4]

This should be uncontroversial. We are ordinarily authoritative about what we 'see', just as we are authoritative about our intentional states in general. But we do not have the same authority about what we see, though we usually get it right too. Seeing is hostage to the world in a way seeing-as is not. What we 'see' need not be what we *see*.

This difference in first person authority is unsurprising if seeing-as is a matter of how we *think* of what we see, as Wittgenstein suggests:

Und darum erscheint das Aufleuchten des Aspekts halb Seherlebnis, halb ein Denken. (§140; cf. §144)

Das 'Sehen als…' gehört nicht zur Wahrnehmung. Und darum ist es wie ein Sehen und wieder nicht wie ein Sehen. (§137)

Seeing-as stands 'in between' seeing and thinking. How we think of the 'in between' here is a tricky question, but thankfully it doesn't matter much for present purposes. For instance, it doesn't matter whether we think of the 'thought' involved as full-fledged conceptual thought or rather some sort of proto-thought that we may, for instance, share with animals and infants. What matters is that the 'changing' aspect of experience belongs to a second 'layer' of experience, one where what we are anyway aware of is so to speak 'organised' by our reaction to it.

In the ordinary case, we just see things as what we believe (usually: know) them to be. In other cases, the capacities that allow us to form such beliefs go astray and have us see things as what these things are not. In yet other case, we use the same capacities in self-conscious 'mock seeing', as when we see a Rohrschach as a wolf's head.

What does matter is that we resist any temptation to think of this 'infusion' of 'thought' into perception as transcending an essentially 'inner' layer of sensation into awareness of objects. According to a very traditional line of thought, visual perception occurs when we 'imbue' the effects of external objects on our minds with 'meaning', transforming a patch-like 'colour mosaic' of 'sensations' (or perhaps just unconscious effects on us) – into a representation of the world.

It is much in Wittgenstein's spirit to reject this sort of idea (compare also his warning against 'inner pictures' in §§131–36). One can surely characterise seeing-as in

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terms of 'organising' experience, and surely such seeing-as is involved when, for instance, an illusionistic ceiling in an Italian chapel 'reveals' to us the heavens 'behind' it.[5] But we don't need such organisation to get at objects in perception. The 'organisation' (§§131, 134) involved in seeing-as changes *how* we see things, but it doesn't *make* us see those things in the first place.[6]

This is the important insight in Wittgenstein's insistence on the 'constancy' of experience: if what I face is a real duck, then *that* is what I see, whether or not it is also what I 'see'. It is also what, I suggest, allows us to move from the initial, neutral starting point towards a relational conception of experience. For we now have a way of fleshing out what it is for our environment to 'fix' the phenomenal nature of experience in the quote from Martin. Or rather, we can exclude certain ways for it to do so.

Organisation requires material. On the 'traditional' view, that material was constituted by sense-data (or their close relatives). Focusing on depictions might invite such views. Focusing instead on real objects – as I did in my examples from the zoological museum – allows us to discern what is right about the idea from what is wrong about it. What is wrong is the idea that experiential phenomenology is constituted by non-wordly items which are then organised. What is right is that organisation as such doesn't constitute the phenomenology of experience. Organisation 'shapes' a material of which we are already conscious. What we have seen is that that material is just what we confront. In the last section, I will show how this bears on representation in perception.

5. Experience as representation

Wittgenstein's reflections result in a two-layered conception of experience (even if these layers 'mesh'). At one (lower) level, we confront what is before us. This fixes the basic phenomenology of experience, which in turn provides the 'material' for 'organisation'. On this (higher) level, what we confront is imbued with meaning. One is the level of (real) seeing, the other the level of 'seeing' or seeing-as.

But isn't this all consistent with representationalism? Clearly, both naïve realism and representationalism can accepts 'layers' (as can sense-datum theories, which I will here set aside without argument – cf. again 'inner pictures').[7] A representationalist can thus hold that experience contains different levels of content. For instance, she can hold that a lower layer provides us with referents and some basic properties while other layers brings us more complex predicates through cognitive penetration.

This position can probably handle the examples considered so far. When I see a real duck as a rabbit, I do make reference to the duck. I can obviously do that without referring to it *as* a duck. All that is needed is that it is represented in *some* way in the basic layer. And clearly it is represented in some such ways – for instance, as an animal, but minimally as an *object*.

It shouldn't be difficult, however, to see that this move is insufficient. For it works only so long the objects we 'see' correspond (roughly) to the objects we confront. And this need not at all be the case. It is already unclear that one

'sees' something identifiable with the ceiling if one believes one looks at the sky. Here is a clearer example – surely an extraordinary one, but all the more vivid. As you rush into the street, you encounter an old officer. You 'see' him clearly: his bare head, his ear, his epaulettes, his determined look, his hand on his chest, and so on. Then it dawns on you. There is no old officer there to be seen. There is just wet street and the gate behind it, with its unlikely constellation: a dog, a fiddler, a woman, a cloud of hay. This was the 'material' that you (or your experience) 'organised' as an old officer.[8]

It is unlikely that you (or your experience) could refer to all the objects that you saw. There is too much of a mismatch between what you *see* and what you see it *as* – between, for instance, the fiddler and the facial features of the old officer. Arguably, none of the demonstratives that you are in a position to issue will pick out the fiddler. Demonstratives are guided by your *conception* of what you see. At best, you may successfully pick out parts of him, those corresponding to what you 'see'. Yet it seems undeniable that you are presented with the old fiddler himself and not just with his parts. He is right there before you. Without seeing the fiddler *as an object* at all, you nevertheless *see* him.

According to representationalism, we see objects in virtue of representing them. But it seems mysterious how you (or something in you) could make reference to the fiddler when you lack so much as an idea of him. Thus we have a counterexample to representationalism. It should not be difficult to come up with other examples. Barring sense-datum views, that leaves us with a naïve realism which holds that the basic phenomenology of experience is *constituted* by what you confront. This basic 'layer' might then be 'organised' by your thinking in potentially quite radical ways.

The examples have moved beyond Wittgenstein's own. But the force of his insistence on the constancy of seeing should be evident: only in *one* sense is something new brought to mind when the aspect changes. Though thought and perception mesh in experience, their contributions are nevertheless separable. In one way, seeing-as completely changes what we see. In another, it leaves everything as it is. is.

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[5] Photo of a fresco in Pallazzo Ducale in Mantua.
[6] This is not to say that there could be wholly 'unorganised' experience. Perhaps seeing is always accompanied by seeing-as. What matters, as I bring out shortly, is that an object can be seen without being 'seen'.
[7] Sense-datum theory is already committed to layers – one of unworldly objects that 'directly' fix phenomenology and one of ordinary objects that only 'indirectly' figure in it.

[8] The drawing can be found on various 'optical illusions' webpages, like this: http://www.opticalillusionsportal.com/47-awesome-multiple-meanings-illusion

Following a Rule without the Platonic Equivalent. Wittgenstein's Intentionality and Generality

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Abstract

Seeing that Wittgenstein's non-Platonist position in respect of numbers, as opposed to Russell and Gödel, is also his position on rules allows a fundamental breakthrough in the connections between how we individuate anything (as in counting) yet can think in terms of the 'heap' and how rules allow human practices to develop within a form of life with a deep need for convention yet without a defined precursor as template. Wittgenstein's objection to Russell's Peano-based definition of number in terms of equinumerity, is objecting to the use of classes to construct the definition of number on the logicist programmes. Peano's fifth postulate is, however, not lost on Wittgenstein but is, I suggest, prefigured in Wittgenstein's Tracterian non-class based, non-functionalist iterative operation in which intentionality plays a role. Even though moving on from the picture theory, I suggest that there are aspects of the *Tractatus* which provide a guide to characterizing the way use works.

Seeing that Wittgenstein's non-Platonist position in respect of numbers, as opposed to Russell and Gödel, is also his position on rules allows a fundamental breakthrough in the connections between how we individuate anything (as in counting) yet can think in terms of the 'heap' and how rules allow human practices to develop within a form of life with a deep need for convention yet without a defined precursor as template. Wittgenstein's objection to Russell's Peano-based definition of number in terms of equinumerity, is objecting to the use of classes to construct the definition of number on the logicist programmes. Peano's fifth postulate is, however, not lost on Wittgenstein but is, I suggest, prefigured in Wittgenstein's Tracterian non-class based, non-functionalist iterative operation in which intentionality plays a role. Even though moving on from the picture theory, I suggest that there are aspects of the *Tractatus* which provide a guide to characterizing the way use works.

1. BGM I.4: being true and being useful

Following a rule is not like a true/false proposition that is acted on, or the truth value decided in some way 'comparing' the proposition to the world in a one-to-one correspondence manner. This means that for Wittgenstein a rule does not have a 'Platonic equivalent'. To see that Wittgenstein's non-Platonic position in respect of numbers, as opposed to Russell's and Gödel's, is also his position on rules is to allow a fundamental breakthrough in the connections between how we individuate anything at all (as in counting) yet can think in terms of the 'heap' and how rules allow our human practices to develop within a form of life which has a deep need for convention and agreement yet without a fully defined precursor as template. Thus, when Wittgenstein at BGM I: 4 sets up the distinction between being true and being useful, he is by-passing or putting to rest in some way the question: "But is this counting only a use, then; isn't there also some truth corresponding to this sequence?"

While Wittgenstein assures the interlocutor that 'being true' does not mean being usable or useful: "that it can't be said of the series of natural numbers- any more than of our language that it is true, but that is usable, and, above all, it is used", we nonetheless are left with an overarching concept of use, of which it could be argued leaves us with problems of opacity and the charge of a type of definitional 'fixing', criticisms which Wittgenstein lodges against Russell and axiomatic/formalist programmes generally.

When Wittgenstein objects to Russell's Peano-based definition of number in terms of equinumerity, he is objecting to the use of classes necessary to construct the definition of number on the logicist programmes. Peano's fifth postulate is, however, not lost on Wittgenstein – that postulate which Hempel states "embodies the principle of mathematical induction"- but is, I suggest and as has been little understood, prefigured in Wittgenstein's Tracterian non-class based, non-functionalist iterative operation. Thus, while Wittgenstein moves on from the Tracterian picture theory of meaning (which is a correspondence theory) there are aspects of the *Tractatus* which provide a guide to characterizing the way use works (which needs non-disjunctive features). All Wittgenstein scholars are acutely aware of the problem of the transitions in a series. I will explore these issues as they relate to intentionality.

2. Generality

I have argued elsewhere, that generality for Wittgenstein is not a disjunctive set, rather it is "ein Weg", a direction as is infinity, and that the conception of counting as an agentive iterative-based operation does not need the set-theoretic apparatus of classes. This is not to suggest finitism, but we can see that Wittgenstein's *criticism* of Russell's conception of equinumerous elements (in one-to-one correspondence) to create numbers sits well within this conception of counting. Wittgenstein saw clearly that bijective mapping of elements could only establish that there were none or some left over, but all sets with no members left over would be indistinguishable unless we could count the number of elements. In other words, Russell must presume what he is trying to prove. This is a fairly powerful argument used in this context. The interesting question must be then: how is iteration without classes to be achieved or even conceptually construed? Is there a form of intentionality which distinguishes the Wittgenstein iterative-based calculus?

That a characterisation is necessary is seen in the fact that within a class-theoretic system a function cannot be its own argument. However, the Tracterian iterative operation provides a seamless progression from one member of the series to the next using the result of each as a base for the next. This facilitating is not available on the class-theoretic/function system. While at one level it can be argued that the intensional/extensional distinction is applicable, I do not agree that the Wittgenstein operation is

equivalent to Church's lambda calculus, though the surface similarities are interesting, and one which writers such as Floyd are exploring.

Certainly, the lambda calculus is an iterative 'machine' which allows operations to be performed on the results of these operations, unlike a functional calculus which must 'operate' externally on the boundary of a set, or predicate class (even when this has been pared down into quantified examples: universal, singular or unique). However, the lambda calculus (and Turing's version of this type of system) uses at least a loose conception of iterative *sets.* And when the lambda-type calculi are combined with a requirement of actual infinity and a disjunctive conception of generality, for whatever reasons, the concept of operation iteration is considerably weakened as is our conception of what would be criterially important in each act of iteration to count as more than an instance of following an *Über-command.*

3. Meaningful iteration

In short, operational iteration is, as it were, more *meaningful* on Wittgenstein's system. It would be perfectly possible for substitution of equivalents in the external sense, and as in the external case, to be accommodated within a planned operational-iteration-with-intention system. A human or computer or any other type of learner could be taught alternative translations and even construct further translations. Gödel did something similar to this incorporation of extensionality in terms of substitution salva veritate, combined with constructivist-intuitionist aspects in his first Incompleteteness Theorem.

The multiplicity which is required is, however not available on a class-bound, set-theoretically conceived programme of the actual infinite This necessary multiplicity, *unendliche Möglichkeit*, is the basis of generality because an agent (of whatever form) would have to be able to recognize an iteration as part of a series. This is the crucial aspect of intentionality which must be present. This necessary multiplicity sets up the possibility of aspect perception in its multitude of forms, and, I think much more importantly it sets up a conception of probability as linked to the human condition, both in the decision-making process and in how the universe works.

While at one important level the Tractarian operations are indeed t*ruth* operations, when the picture theory of meaning drops away it is no accident that Wittgenstein turns to rehearsal of the argument from every angle concerning the relation between unendliche Möglichkeit and logischer Zwang, which is at the heart of considerations of probability. McGuinness understands only too well that the Tractarian position is fluctuating even as we try to grasp it. It may be why Wittgenstein never wrote on probability directly again. Following a rule thus becomes the sense of what we can learn about how use works, and without intentionality in the full sense in this process we could not understand *a single member as part of a series*, we could not develop a series, we would not know how to go on. The *Tractatus* characterizes the iterative operation to mean "and so on". This is a very large task to fulfil which involves a conception of logical space, the logical aspects of imaging of conditions of satisfaction, perceptual, conceptual. scientific and cultural awareness. However, there is never a third way which breaks from the inexorable uncertainty that the probabilistic universe captures. This does not rule out realism, but it does create a more uneasy passage for Platonism.

4. Approaching multiplicity and uncertainty: rules and generality

In 1938 Wittgenstein's stay in Britain became what would become an extended period of exile. With the previous nine years' writings, he approached CUP in September 1938. He is looking back to the Vienna Circle years, with seminal connections which focus on *Gedanke* and *Denken* (thought and thinking), with no 'essentialist' locations or organic forms.

The textual network of TS213, MS117 impacts on our understanding of multi-levelled connections between *logischer Zwang* and *unendliche Möglichkeit* via exploration of the internal rule, the intricacies of the following of which are explored in the numerous cross-referencings between the 1938 MS117 and the earlier work. Wittgenstein asks us to compare rules with measurement of time and temperature, but the standard of measurement is arbitrary (MS117: 39; TS 213: 236v). We understand that the circle is in the square, we use colour words which by definition have fuzzy borders. We have a Mannigfaltigkeit of cases of spectra, all which play such a significant role in both the way in which we move through our world and the way in which science describes the world, the entanglement at such a level, with the measurer and the measure self-reflexive.

Perhaps the most fitting summary of the rule following paradox lies in the handwritten emendation TS213: 240: "Ist eine Regel ein Befehl? Oder eine Bitte?" The discussion at MS117: 147 then moves to the meaning of double negation and Gödel's proof. Gödel's Theorem says that the indeterminacy (epistemic) itself is determined because of limits to provability. Thus, the Entscheidungsproblem is inevitable. That it is proved that certain propositions of the system cannot be proved in the system means that, on this count, Platonism is proved. Gödel's proof is a reflexive proof: its form 'proves' itself – like a diagrammatic proof in some ways. Wittgenstein's point, however, is that while removing the last P from the original scope the infinite regress is stopped, it is arbitrary, ad hoc, in order to produce the desired outcome. Gödel merely pushes the problem to the next level in which it is solvable by recourse to Platonic numbers, with Cantor's diagonal method a precursor to the Gödelian solution. This, on Wittgensteinian mathematics, is playing no game at all.

Thus, we begin to get a clear sense that playing a game, developing a series, participating in a non-Platonist form of mathematics are linked, and my suggestion is that they are linked through the concept of intentionality in both an agentive sense and through Wittgenstein's conception of generality. The basics of agentive Wittgensteinian iteration which begins in the *Tractatus* is carried through into the later work, with the conceptions of generality shifting radically from the disjunctive conception, perhaps with seeds in the earlier work. (The Tractarian general proposition certainly has aspects of non-disjunctive generality.) This means that we have to be able both to count and to understand the heap, to use both individuated concepts and non-disjunctive generality.

In MS105 and later transferred to TS209 of the 1929-30 period, generality is characterised as a direction, as is the infinite, with the conception of generality linked with the potential infinite and the mathematical operation rather than the actual infinite and the mathematical function: "Generality in mathematics is a direction, an arrow pointing along a series generated by an operation. ... It is possible to speak of things which lie in the direction of the arrow but nonsense to speak of all possible positions for things lying

in the direction of the arrow as an equivalent for this direction itself" (PR: 42; TS209;64; MS105: 145,149). We are rapidly leaving fixed natural kinds cosmogony with a Platonic equivalent (for whatever kind of series we are considering) with a guided development of a series as replacement.

Also, the timelessness of a rule is introduced along the lines: when would we say that we know how to play chess? Now when playing, when doing other things; and the verb passen is brought into close contact with können: fitting and being able to do something are linked and contextualised as concepts that are timeless, rather than tensed. This steers us away from an easy finitism and towards intentionality as being at the heart of the iterative process. There appears to be a non-disjunctive sense of time. Relatedly, when Wittgenstein criticises Ramsey's conception of infinity, saying that a line is not composed of points, nor space of parts in the sense that all points and parts could be given at once to compose a large number, a completed infinite, he is also criticising a disjunctive generality. Ramsey's explanation of infinity "presupposes that we were given the actual infinite and not merely the unlimited possibility of going on" (TS209; MS106).

Indeed, Wittgenstein is a constructivist, but not a finitist, criticising both behaviourism and finitism in his notebooks. However, constructivism and finitism are often insufficiently distinguished, with Marion failing to do so, arguing that Wittgenstein is a finitist in mathematics, and the Edinburgh School of Sociology and Kusch at Vienna placing Wittgenstein within the finitist camp of meaning on the grounds that, in contrast to the deterministic school, extensions of concept words are not determined in advance. While this may be a necessary condition for finitism, it is certainly not a sufficient one.

While the material of TS213 and MS117 read in conjunction with MS116 and other supporting texts, allows a strong case for rebuttal of a naturalist-causal interpretation of Wittgenstein (see Kross 2006), a tendency in the litera-ture against which I have urged caution is an equating of the hardness of logischer Zwang to a 'false' Tractarian position and the "Drehung der Betrachtungsperpektive" away from logischer Zwang to the 'true' position of the language game. The picture is more complex. Wittgenstein's criticism of Euler, Cantor, Russell and Gödel fell within a strategy to disarm a philosophy of mathematics which relied on completed infinite sets and the conception of number as a bi-jective equinumerity between sets (Russell). I argue that it is the *combination* of der Härte des logischen Zwangs with unendlich Möglichkeit which produces a powerful philosophical argument at many levels, indeed that this sustained combination informs the agentive shift from the axiomatic programme to the rule-based system which can accommodate multiplicity and uncertainty, and help us to characterise intentionality and use. The mathematical criticisms also concern deep philosophical issues about individuated concepts and non-disjunctive generality, and Wittgensteinian iteration. Our constellation of ideas is now far richer.

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Hypotheses on Perceptual Hypotheses

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Abstract

Why are we, against better knowledge, reliably misled by Müller-Lyer figures? And why do we rely on our visual system in measuring-procedures unmasking illusions produced by the very same system? Extended perspective theory (Gregory 1968) offers a reasonable answer to our first question and an enormous coverage, particularly if we complement it by the Changizi *et al.* (2008) perspective of a moving perceiver's anticipatory perspective. It implies, I shall argue, hierarchical organization. Only a higher specialized level of now symbolic/measuring intelligence enables classifying and reconstructing (wrong) perceptual hypotheses. More specifically, I shall suggest an advantage of paying, in case of conflict, the price of erroneously estimated object size in favor of precisely estimated distance from the eyes. The alternative could result in a grasp at nothing, with fatal consequences not only in a monkey's flight through the canopy.

1. Perceptual hypotheses and optical illusions

How could we explain the fact that we are misled by the perception of Müller-Lyer figures, whether we are naïve or informed observers, and even if we have ourselves produced the drawings with a ruler or on coordinate paper? And why do we rely on our visual system in measuring-procedures unmasking illusions produced by the very same system? The latter kind of question seems to be a matter of concern already in Brunswik's (1957) "ratiomorphic" explication. Our answer to that question will, moreover, apply to Gregory's (1980) comparison between perceptual and scientific hypotheses.

Almost half a century before that paper by Gregory, Brunswik described the perceptual system as kind of relatively autonomous, primitive sub-system of cognition, "like a dumb animal in us", and perception as some "dem messend-denkenden Erkennen 'analoge Funktion'" ("to measuring-thinking cognition 'analogical function'"), though much faster and extremely rigid (Brunswik 1934: 127f).

The emergence of cognitive science in the 1950ies was characterized by shifting perspectives. The first use of the term "perceptual hypotheses" appeared, as far as I can see, in an article by Postman *et al.* (1951) that puts hypothesis testing in the perceptual system on par with hypothesis testing in scientific inquiry. Brunswik (1955; 1957) coined the term of a "ratiomorphic" perceptual system that should become, with some modification and greater emphasis on its computational capacity in Konrad Lorenz (1973), a central concept in Evolutionary Epistemology. Drawing the line between the ratiomorphic and the rational remained, however, a balancing act (Fenk 1992).

In his 1957-study, Brunswik recalls Helmholtz's doctrine of "unconscious inference" and takes up the term "perceptual hypotheses". He now characterizes perception more mildly as "the more intuitive type of cognition" (Brunswik 1957: 7) and the organization principles of *Gestalt* perception "by assuming that their underlying hypotheses are the outcome of some generalizing type of probability learning rather than of principles intrinsic to Gestalt dynamics." (Brunswik 1957: 25). His "ratiomorphic explication" on the same page: "It is only by comparing the reconstructed perceptual hypotheses with the ecological validities that their character mentioned above as crude overgeneralizations or stereotypes is revealed." This implies at least two different levels of hypotheses testing.

"Some generalizing type of probability learning" seems to be generally involved in the construction of human visual space: Relevant hypotheses in Yang and Purves (2003) successfully predicted the participants' estimations/predictions concerning spatial localization. Probability learning is in fact a presupposition of any anticipation, prediction, or expectation. And hypothesis testing is the evaluation of those expectations; cases of mismatch between the expected and the observed result in an adjustment or correction of prior generalizations. The motor of top-down, hypothesis-driven processing is, also on highest, linguistically dominated levels of processing (Christoff *et al.* 2003), self-generated predictive information.

Friston *et al.* (2012) implemented the title of Gregory's (1980) study on "perceptions as hypotheses" into the title of their own study that is experimentally testing hypotheses on patterns of saccadic eye movements as reflecting hypothesis testing in our visual system. Eye-tracking experiments are a fantastic opportunity to illustrate both the hypothesis-driven processes in perception and information gathering and the complexity of computation carried out during that process. Or should we ascribe "complexity" rather to the description of a process or structure (Simon 1962: 481)? Or rather to the experimental search for a relatively parsimonious description (Kim *et al.* 2017) of complex(?) computations carried out by the relatively simple brains of Drosophila, enabling a selective suppression particularly of potentially disturbing visual sensations being predictable as consequences of the insect's own, "saccadic" flight turns.

Eye-tracking also allows studying visual illusions in non-human primates (Tudusciuc and Nieder 2010). But do such illusions not rather demonstrate the obtuseness of perceptual apparatuses than the efficiency and flexibility of hypothesis-driven learning and perception? Let us have a view on Müller-Lyer figures and Necker cubes from different perspectives.

2. Hierarchical strategies and a decision-theoretic assumption

Gregory (1968) combined three arguments to explain the Müller-Lyer illusion, i.e. the illusion of extent in two parallel "arrow-shafts" of equal length, one of them equipped with two outward pointing arrowheads, the other one with two "inward pointing arrowheads" (or "featherheads"):

(a) The "perspective theory": "The oblique's readily suggest perspective and if this is followed one of the vertical lines appears farther away and therefore objectively longer than the other" (Woodworth 1938 concerning the Müller-Lyer arrangement in vertical position. Cited from Gregory 1968: 283).

(b) The view of perceptions as based on internal models or hypotheses: "If we regard the seeing of an object as a hypothesis suggested (but never strictly proved) by the image, then we may call this system 'depth hypothesis scaling'. […] When the hypothesis is wrong, we have an illusion which may be dramatic."

(c) The size constancy mechanism. Here, Gregory (1968: 287) is content to remind of Rene Descartes (1637).

Brunswik (1934) also describes an antagonistic relation between size constancy and Müller-Lyer illusion (Brunswik 1934: 150; 195) and, more sophisticated, between size constancy versus illusion of extent as depending on the (minimal) distance between two parallel vertical lines within a cuboid-representation in perspective (Brunswik 1934: 5). "Hypothesis testing" as a description of the functioning of our perceptual apparatus, or of "instinctive" decisions in rats, is, however, at those times some case of "intellectualization" (Brunswik 1934: 130) for him.

Perspective theory implies, I think, some kind of hierarchic processing (suggestively in Fenk 2000: 38). Processor (C) represents the highest integrative level in a hierarchically organized visual module and is, directly or indirectly, provided with results from lower level processors, such as an equal length of the picture of two parallels on the retina (Processor A). Retinal size, taken alone, could neither inform about size nor about distance. Two intermediate processors are instructed to relate retinal size to different cues indicating spatial depth, i.e., distances between parallels and observer in our case: Processor B1 does so on the basis of the angle between direction vectors of straight lines, and Processor B2 on the basis of gradient texture information. Thus, B1 will "suggest", according to perspective theory, the shaft with the outward pointing heads being nearer to the observer, whereas B2 "suggests" seeing the shafts roughly in the same distance to the eyes. Note that the fact of a representation of the figure on plane paper was not sufficient to exclude the interpretation by B1 from the outset. The only possibility for C to construe a preliminary picture without neglecting anyone of its informants is, then, the hypothesis that the shaft with the outward pointing heads is, in three-dimensional "reality", shorter than the other one.

Circuits above the perceptual module, and the integration of "speech mechanisms of thought" (Sokolov 1971), are however required for such "computational" modeling of that module and for classifying optical illusions and reconstructing perceptual hypotheses from the meta-perspective of Brunswik's "measuring-thinking" intelligence.

The Müller-Lyer illusion is so compelling because it admits, below that meta-perspective in our hierarchy, only one perceptual interpretation. But perspective theory plus the hypothesis of perceptual hypotheses not only fits illusions of extent, such as Müller-Lyer, Ponzo, or Titchener, but also the best studied ambiguous figure, i.e., the Necker Cube, and, more recently, the "Necker lattice" (Kernmeier and Bach 2012; for even animated illusions see Bach 1997). The "trick" that makes the cube ambiguous: Other than one would expect in a scenography of a cube, the observer is faced with an equal length of all vertical lines and thus also with strictly parallel "vanishing lines". In face of the resulting uncertainty, the perceptual apparatus tests,

in periodic reversals, the two possible hypotheses concerning the relation between the cube's and the observer's position in three-dimensional space.

The coverage of perspective theory could maybe even further extended by considering further models to explain Müller-Lyer illusions (Brunswik 1934: 151), and by integrating the perspective of a forward moving subject, as emphasized in the "perceiving-the-present" hypothesis by Changizi *et al.* (2008). Authors argue that its basic assumption of anticipatory perception, compensating for a time-loss (ca. 100 msec) due to neural-computational work, may also apply to classical geometrical illusions.

But why is the visual system rather wired to pay, in case of uncertainty, the price of erroneously estimated object size in favor of precisely estimated distance from the eyes? Processor C in our above hierarchy neglects – to be on the safe side, so to speak – none of the upstream processes, even if they provide conflicting information. Hierarchically organized processing has the selective advantage of higher integration levels evaluating, under "normal" conditions, rather mutual information, such as the transinformation between stereo and texture cues in the experiments by Knill and Saunders (2003). In case of discrepant information, however, instance C rather hazards the consequences of an illusion of extent. The visual system must have been selected to suppress, under uncertainty, the most serious miscalculation. This is, as far as I can see, wrong distance estimation: A grasp at nothing has more serious consequences for the monkey up in the trees, or for the trapeze artist under the circus dome, than a grasp at a bigger or smaller wood than estimated; the throw of the spear at an animal or enemy out of reach is more dangerous and/or uneconomic than hitting a bigger or smaller deer or aggressor than estimated; and similar is to say about a jink coming too soon or too late.

3. Meta-perspectives

What are "optical illusions"? In Müller-Lyer arrangements our criterion is the discrepancy between perceptual hypothesis and simple measurement. In the Necker cube we don't need any measure; some higher order hypothesis does not admit "subjectively" changing perspectives under constant conditions of "external" reality. The perspective on converging railway tracks and the rapid growth of the front of a rapidly approaching locomotive is not taken as illusion if we perceive it in "reality" – despite the fact that in that reality the approaching engine does not change in size. We rather talk about an illusion if we see that scene on a screen – despite the fact that in this other reality there is a real and measurable convergence of those railway tracks being parallel according to measures in the first reality. Some theoreticians go even farther and declare any 3D-interpretation of a 2-dimensonal representation as an illusion.

Our ways of classifying optical illusions are rather a matter of convention – in contrast to the mechanisms underlying those illusions. That claim holds irrespective of how much room those mechanisms leave for modification through learning and culture. If we look from the top of a tower down on a pool or on cars parking below, we see those objects smaller than from those rather horizontal levels from which we are used to approach pools or parking cars, and which therefore offer matchlessly more opportunity – especially with regard to distances being much longer than those between our eyes and the floor we are standing on – for the size constancy mechanism to "learn" from the interaction with co-ordinate sensory input.

Since the "perceptual brain must work in real time" and does not need the analytical power of symbolic mathematical operation, and since perceptual learning cannot require the learning of mathematics, Gregory (1968: 294) assumes "that it involves the building of quite simple analogues of relevant properties of objects: relevant so far as they concern the behaviour of the animal or the child." His 1980‑paper emphasizes parallels between scientific and perceptual hypotheses but ends up with a list of differences between them: Perceptions are "from a vantage‑point", "of instances", and "limited to concrete objects", whereas science "is not based on an observers' view" and "is of generalizations", "has also 'abstract objects'" and "explanatory" conceptions.

Those differences could easily boil down to a difference between linguistic and pre-linguistic intelligence; at least from the view of the linguistic sign as a *symbol* that designates arbitrarily abstract or general concepts, and concepts of concepts (Fenk 1994). Each symbol, and also the symbol "symbol", can become the referent of another symbol (Fenk 1994: 48). Language, as a tool of cognition and communication, determines "higher-order" cognition, but is in turn created – and permanently modified – by our cognitive system and the metaphoric process (Fenk 1994: 58). Meta-cognition remains however cognition, such as meta-linguistic expression remains linguistic expression*.*

Gregory himself was not really content with his list of differences and was hoping for further answers from developing Artificial Intelligence. At those times, Newell and Simon (1975) suggested a conception of the *symbol* that differs in many respects, though not in every respect, from the conception mentioned above. They ask: "What is a symbol, that intelligence may use it, and intelligence, that it may use a symbol?" (Newell/Simon 1975: 38). Some of the answers offered by themselves: A symbol-system's own data can be interpreted by that system (Newell/Simon 1975: 44). "Symbol systems are collections of patterns and processes, the latter being capable of producing, destroying, and modifying the former. The most important property of patterns is that they can designate objects, processes, or other patterns" (Newell/Simon 1975: 64).

Language facilitates thought and communication about the spatially and temporally remote, about the general, and about the possible. And it facilitates problem-solving by generating and testing hypotheses. For a perceptual/cognitive system, to be or not to be equipped with such symbol-system makes the difference between numerosity and counting (Koehler 1943) and between "ratiomorphic" and measuring-thinking intelligence.

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Representations, Private Experiences and Brain Activity – A Brief Investigation

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Abstract

The nature of mental states and events is a very controversial topic in the cognitive sciences and it has led cognitive neuroscientists to several confusions when it comes to understanding the relation between private experiences and brain activity. The idea that there is a gap between a physical scope, namely, the brain processes, and something immaterial such as private experiences is an illusion provoked by the conceptual conflicts of our understanding. To overcome this illusion, we have to clarify the foundations and implications of the uses of key concepts in the cognitive field such as the concept of representation.

In this paper, I will refer to the notion of representation and point to the idea that brain activity is merely correlated to private experience, without supposing neither a causal nor a traditional representative relation between brain activity and private experiences. This is justifiable based on Wittgenstein's beetle in a bottle analogy; for whatever the private events or states might be, they are irrelevant for understanding the processes correlated to them.

The notion of representation

Contemporary neuroscientific research performs an incredibly sophisticated investigation and data collecting. It is an fantastic achievement for science and it helps in a great deal to understand the processes of brain activity. Philosophy can and shall contribute to this investigation by helping to clarify the conceptual foundations embedded in the assumptions taken in the neuroscientific experiments. In cognitive neuroscience, what is called neural representation are neuron firing patterns that are associated with semantic properties, such as content, reference, truth conditions and truth values. In this paper I will (a) address the concept of representation in the attempt to clarify the foundations of the relation between private experiences and neural representation and (b) point out to the reasons why private states and events cannot represent.

One of the mainstream theories in cognitive sciences is the idea that neural activity is representative of private mental states or properties. One of the most entangling questions is how the brain transforms sensory into abstract representations creating what is called the ontological gap between mind and brain. In theory of mind it is broadly considered that a mental representation is an object with semantic properties, such as content, reference, truth-conditions and truth-values (Pitt 2017). However, mental representation and neural representation are two different concepts.

Let us consider the notion of representation. In cognitive neuroscience this notion derives from a broad use of this concept. It is commonly accepted that smoke represents fire, that a map represents a city, that language represents thoughts, emotions and scenarios. Nevertheless, the reasons why these cases are called 'representation' differ in quality.

The fire example is understood as representational with regards to causality. There is a causal association between fire and smoke that allows us to take that as a paradigmatic relation. Although not every time that there is fire we also have smoke and not every time that there is smoke there is also fire, we take smoke as representative of fire. This is due to the logically inductive aspect of a relation between natural events that we call causality. We have a reason to believe that where there is smoke, there is also fire.

The map example, on the other hand, displays an association based on rules of representation. This can be said to be the most fitting example of representation, for it displays clearly, the represented element, namely, the city, the very representation, namely, the map, and the conditions in which it represents, such as, the ratio, the position of the map and so on. (associative rules) Similarly, a graphic depicts. It represents to the extent that we establish a relation between its elements and the information we refer to. One knows how it represents when one is taught how to read the graphic. A picture (photograph or drawing) represents by it's similarity to the represented element. In this case, the associative rules don't have to be shown or taught, for they are evident to the observers. Let us say, easily identifiable.

Linguistic representations are uses of language that we can call descriptions. Not all language is representational. Most of our use of language is, in fact, instrumental, not representational. Language represents to the extent that a word stands for something else. This representation relation is stablished by means of learning processes in which we grasp the uses of words. It requires training (PI: 5). In this sense, the distinction between descriptive and instrumental uses of language[1] shows us that language does not represent thoughts and emotions, in the same way that it represents a scene. Language *expresses* thoughts and emotions. Learning how to express them in language also involves training, but this should not confuse us regarding the representationality of language. In this sense, a name represents by means of training. For, the name stands for what is named due to an arbitrary associative trained correlation. We learn to use names to refer to things and we answer to the question of how we know that the name represents by recalling what we were taught. How do you know that the name apple stands for the fruit apple? Because we've learnt to use this word in such way.

This comparison between uses of 'representation' allows us to identify similarities in the them. The three of them can be said to have (1) an element represented (content), (2) the one that represents and (3) the means of representation. In the fire example, the smoke represents fire by means of a reference to a paradigmatic causal relation. In the map example, the map represents the city by means of

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[1] Not all instrumental uses are descriptive, although descriptive uses are also instrumental.

associative rules. And in the language example, language represents the world by means of associative training.[2] To say that the associative training, the associative rules and the paradigmatic causal relation are the means of representation is justifiable by the fact that the three of them can be presented as an answer to the question 'How do you know that A represents B?'. 'How do you know that smoke represents fire?'- In this case, we mention the causal relation. 'How do you know that this map represents this city?' - For this we show the points of reference and how they refer (eg. each cm is equivalent to one km). How do you know that this linguistic description represents that scene? - Because this is how it looks like (we've learnt to describe this things is this way).[3]

Nevertheless, we do have to care for the implications of such distinct uses of representation. For a representation by means of induction from causal relations will not be considered equal to a representation by means of associative training regarding the natural aspect. This is to say that the associative training does not involve the observation of natural phenomena as much as the induction from causal relations. The arbitrary aspect of language is not present in the causal case. Other than that, a linguistic description, for example, does not involve graphic elements and precision as a map does in order to guide. Ignoring that, would mislead us to the idea that language is somehow graphic or invoke graphic elements.

Thus, the problems of the use of 'representation' in cognitive neuroscience are the implications of such and the subsequent idea that a neural representation could hold semantic properties, such as content, truth values and truth conditions. (Analogously to the mental representation idea in the cognitive sciences.) A representation, as we described above, is not an object with semantic properties, such as content, reference and truth values. A representation is a relation that involves 3 aspects: what is represented, the means of representation and the representation itself.

Given that (1) to represent is to stand for something else other than what is represented and (2) in order to say that something represents, we should also consider the means of representation, our question is 'In what sense do neural representations represent?'.

Neural activity can be said to be representational to the extent that there is a correlation between them and public events, such as what happens in our environment and expressions of private states. This correlation is what makes it possible to infer one from the other. This is why we call brain activity as representational. What is the nature of this correlation? Is it causal? Is its purely representational? In short, what is observed in scientific experiments are two aspects of the same event. Scientists, then, correlate them in time. When they observe a covariation between neural activity and public events, they infer that they represent them. Naturally, this is a topic for further investigation and specification, but let us consider for now that neuron firing can represent by means of covariation.

Mental representation and the beetle in a box analogy

The *beetle in the box* analogy (PI: 293) can be shortly described as: Every person has a box in which there is something. Every person sees its own something and everyone calls that something by the same name, namely, beetle. The content of the box is hidden from any other person. In this way each person can only see the content of its own box. Although no one has ever seen the content of the box of the other, they refer to that content by means of the same word, namely, 'beetle' (or words like 'pain' and 'desire' when it comes to feelings, sensations and private events or states).

The analogy with the beetle shows that the private experiences (sensations, perceptions, private events and states) are irrelevant to the meaning of the words that we use to talk about them. When we consider them as irrelevant, this doesn't imply that they don't exist or that we don't know them, but merely that they are not a requirement for us to publicly use words and understand words that stand for private states and events. Can we also, from this point, infer that the private states and events are irrelevant to our conceptions? -for what we understand as a beetle?

Let us consider color blindness. Is is possible for color blind people to understand what is red? One could answer that a color blind person understands that red is a color and that she cannot perceive it. In this sense, we would say that the color blind person does understand what red is and learns to associate the color red in many cases as much as we do, without actually considering the private experience of red. Red in the traffic lights would, then, be distinguished by the position of the light, in fruits like strawberries it would be distinguished by the size and hardness of them and so on.

In many cases, a standard for distinction would simply be missing for that person and the fact that she doesn't perceive would imply that she cannot distinguish. To this extent we would say that it is not possible for that person to use the word red in the same way that we do, for one very important paradigm of use is missing, therefore, they do not understand the concept of red in the same way that we do.

Given that, we can say that, to a certain extent, we need a common perceptual apparatus allowing us to capture paradigms that serve as identification criteria. Even if the very perception (the private experience) is not the same, it must be possible that my private perception counts as a paradigm for distinction in the same way that your private perception counts as a paradigm for distinction. Or, in other words, that we both have the capacity of distinguishing. That said, we come back to the statement that whatever the paradigm for distinction is, it is irrelevant given that they serve well the same purpose, allowing us to distinguish reds of non-red things. (The inverted spectrum problem would also be discarded since the standard for distinction is there). That is, even if the paradigms are variable in terms of private experiences, they can be standardized when it comes to public distinctions. Therefore, the character of our private experiences is irrelevant to the ability of making distinctions. For whatever the private state or event is (what is it like /what we perceive), it cannot count as a reference neither to the what the thing is, nor to what we call it (PI: 265). Naturally, this doesn't imply that we can dismiss our perceptions. It is absolutely not irrelevant that we have private experiences, that is, that we apprehend paradigms. Perception is the basic source of empirical knowledge. By means of our senses we can per-

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[2] The possibility of identifying the means of representation, even though they are not all the standard rules of our most fitting example of the use of 'representation', is very important for our analysis. This is how we will be able to say that neural activity represents.
[3] Here, the question 'how do you know' is neither asking for epistemic justification nor for conditions of knowledge.

ceive and apprehend things. (Hacker 2013). On the contrary, that we have the ability to perceive, is a condition for us to interact in the world.

The reason why we cannot account for private mental representations is analogous to Wittgenstein's private language argument: " (…) 'following a rule' is a practice. And to *think* one is following a rule is not to follow a rule. And that's why it's not possible to follow a rule 'privately'; otherwise, thinking one was following a rule would be the same thing as following it." (PI: 202). This paragraph refers to the impossibility of considering a standard for correctness when considering private mental states or events.

Similarly, according to Wittgenstein, the supposed private 'mental object', let us call it private experience, is dropped out of consideration if we conceive a relation between private experiences and a name (PI: 293). The problem is our assumption that the relation between private experiences and language must have the private experience as a reference in the same way that public objects are taken as a reference when we define them ostensively. For the private experience cannot count as a criteria for correctness. "[W]hatever is going to seem correct to me is correct. And this only means that here we can't talk about 'correct'." (PI: 258) for, "Looking up a table in the imagination is no more looking up a table than the image of the result of an imagined experiment is the result of an experiment." (PI: 265)

In other words, the private experience is automatically dropped out of consideration when we consider it in the same way we consider public objects, distinguishing them only by the fact that they are not public. The distinction is way bigger than that. Private experiences are not to be pictured/conceived analogously to public ones, for the main characteristic of public experiences, namely that they can be publicly verified, do not participate when it comes to private experience.

Concluding remarks

First, we have seen that the notion of representation is a matter of relation and we considered how it can be constituted with different means, such as training, induction from causal relations, associative rules and covariation. Secondly, we saw that private experiences cannot be said to represent for not counting as an element of reference in a representative relation. What do these remarks tell us? Based on them - and if we don't consider supposed causal relations between brain activity and private experiences - we can consider that the ontological gap between the brain and our private experiences is not to be understood as a gap. For, if there is no representative relation between private experiences and neural activity for the impossibility of private experiences being taken as a reference, the problem of how the brain transforms sensory into abstract representations does not exist, for what is called abstract representation cannot be a representation.

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The Fact of the Given from a Realist-Idealist Perspective

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Abstract

In his well-known Mind and World and in line with Wilfrid Sellars' (1991) or "that great foe of 'immediacy'" (ibid.: 127) Hegel, McDowell claims that "when Evans argues that judgments of experience are based on non-conceptual content, he is falling into a version of the Myth of the Given" (1996: 114). In this paper, on the basis of a) a mainly Kantian 'realist idealist' world view and b) an explication of Kant's concept of the "given manifold" (e.g. CPR: B138), I will argue that Kant and Evans (1982, chs. 5.1–5.2) were indeed mistaken in their versions of the given, but that Sellars and his student McDowell were even more mistaken and that, in the end, there would appear to be a non-conceptual and (thus) non-propositional given in perceptual experience from which we unconsciously and automatically infer to our first perceptual beliefs.

1. Defining 'Realist Idealism'

The following discussion is based on a certain ontological and epistemological or 'epistemontological' world view. Before starting the discussion proper and in order to prevent confusion at a later point, I will first introduce the three main theses of my respective and largely Kantian (CPR) but also Berkeleyian (PHK) world view of 'realist idealism' (for a much more in-depth discussion of this, see Flock draft version 2.2). First and contrary to direct realism and sense-datum theory which are both *physical realist* positions, realist idealism is a *physical anti-realist* or, more specifically, a *'noumenal realist'* position – i.e. it proposes that it is not 'the' physical world which is real, but rather Kant's noumenal world of things in themselves which, if one were to take into account the early Wittgenstein's claim that "The world is the totality of facts, not of things" (TLP: 1.1), one could perhaps also refer to as 'facts in themselves.' Furthermore, and due to also borrowing from Berkeley, realist idealism also claims that minds are real which, given that brains are physical, that everything physical is regarded as anti-real and that something about us has got to be real, is only consistent.

Secondly and contrary to direct-realism but in line with sense-datum theory, realist idealism is not a *'direct objectivist'* but a *'direct subjectivist'* position – i.e. it proposes that our direct or immediate perceptual awareness is never of something real (i.e. of something that exists ontically objectively or mind- or subject-independently) but always of something anti-real (i.e. of something that exists ontically subjectively or mind- or subject-dependently).

Thirdly, more in line with direct realism and contrary to or at least less in line with sense-datum theory and even though it is in the end *both* of the following theses that realist idealism endorses due to regarding the physical as part of the greater realm of the mental, direct realism is more specifically a *'direct physicalist'* and not so much or only more generally a *'direct mentalist'* position – i.e. it maintains that our direct or immediate perceptual awareness is more specifically of something physical, more generally of something mental and most certainly not of something non-physical as sense-datum theorists would claim.

This, in essence, is also what Kant proposed in somewhat different terms. Contrary to Kant, however, I speak of "realist idealism" as opposed to "transcendental idealism" (CPR: A368–370) mainly to fight off the misconception that idealism is opposed to realism. Kantian and even Berkeleyian idealism, however, are ontologically realist positions too since, even though they do not regard the physical as real, they clearly affirm that there is something which is real. Thus "realist idealism."

2. Kant's and Evan's Fundamental Mistake: The Notion of Given or Perceived Objects

In the very first paragraph of the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, Kant links the given to the four other key concepts of sensibility/Sinnlichkeit, understanding/Verstand, intuitions/Anschauungen and concepts/Begriffe via the following claim: "[B]y means of sensibility objects are *given* to us, and it alone supplies us with *intuitions.* Through *understanding*, on the other hand, objects are *thought*, and from it arise *concepts*" (CPR: A19/B33).

In other words and in order to delve a little bit deeper into those terms and definitions: Kant defines "intuitions and concepts" as constituting "the elements of all our cognition" (A50/B71) and as belonging to the wider category of sometimes given (A50/B74) "presentations/Vorstellungen" (A56/B80). Sensibility and understanding a.k.a. "spontaneity" (B69), "spontaneity of concepts" (A50/B71) or "spontaneity of thought" (A68/B93) are regarded as the faculties that produce the respective elements. It is also worth noting that Kant defines "(empirical) intuition" as "tak[ing] place only insofar as the [sensible!] object is given to us" (A19/B33, addition myself) or as "refer[ring] to the object" (A20/B34; also see B72) – i.e. as something like 'intuition as,' in order to allude to Wittgenstein's "seeing as" (PI: II, XI, 193ff). This definition, however, in my opinion clashes with Kant's claims that empirical intuitions (A20/B34, A50/B74) are produced purely by sensibility (A19/B33) or that they are not a "cognition through concepts" (A68/B93) insofar as the latter definitions of intuition as taking place *after* the objects are given to us would rather suggest the involvement of the faculty of understanding, the ensuing process of thought and the elements or presentations of concepts. Yet another problem with Kant's concept of intuition is that Kant also commits the mistake of conflating intuitions as processes with intuitions as products (e.g. A19/B33). My solution for these two conflations is to explicate intuition as an understanding based process of intuition as.

In order to return to the originally intended topic though, we see that Kant once again reaffirms the claim that "Through receptivity an object is *given* to us" (A50/B74) in the *Transcendental Analytic* and before suggesting to "give the name *sensibility* to our mind's *receptivity*, [i.e., to its ability] to receive presentations insofar as it is affected in

some manner" (A51/B75) – i.e. primarily by things in themselves.

That claim of objects or certain presentations being given to us, however, is very problematic. First of all, it is ambivalent since "object" could be used either for real or non-real objects and since Kant himself distinguished between "object as *appearance*" (cf. A20/B34: "The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called *appearance*") and "object as object *in itself*" (B68) only a few pages earlier and since it would actually make sense to interpret "object" as a real thing in itself if "given" were to be interpreted as something like "rendered." Since that does not seem to be the proper interpretation of the verb "given," since the given is generally to be understood as mental content or more specifically as *exclusively non-conceptual and (thus) non-propositional mental content* and since things or objects in themselves do not qualify as *any* sort of mental content, it seems fairly safe to say that Kant is talking about objects as appearances here.

Secondly and more importantly, to claim that receptivity/sensibility gives us objects as appearance is simply a mistake since the given must not feature any conceptual content and since, in my opinion, the identification of something as an object already requires conceptual content. As such, it is also the first part of the famous passage "Without sensibility no object would be given to us; and without understanding no object would be thought" (A51/B75) that is mistaken. To be more explicit about that: Kant apparently thinks that conceptual content is only introduced when the "undetermined object" of appearance is determined with the aid of understanding, thought and concepts or when an according "manifold of the appearance" or "manifold in experience" is "ordered in certain relations" (A20/B34) in a likewise manner and with the aid of a number of syntheses (B129ff or A98ff).

So according to Kant, an object as appearance or an according manifold of appearances that I later identify as a laptop or, additionally, as hands, a table, pencils, a calendar, a table, etc. is, at the time of 'purely' or 'undeterminedly seeing' these objects, supposed to still be non-conceptual content. A generally identical notion would also appear to have been entertained by Evans who mentions a "pure case" of perception where "the subject does not recognize the [object as a] cat, and has no information about it" (Evans 1982: ch. 5.1, 121, my addition; also cf. Sellars' "inner episodes" (Sellars 1991: 140)).

That notion, however, is a mistake since the use of the basic concepts of *unity* and *separation* are already required to 'perceive' or rather *conceive of* objects which are by default understood as a unity that is separated from its surroundings. What is all the more astounding about Kant committing that mistake is that he even explicitly mentions the "concept of divisibility" or that "all judgments are functions of unity among our presentations" (A69/B94). Apparently though it did not occur to him that these concepts or functions are required for the identification or construction of objects or that the thought "This is an object" or "this object" already is a by default conceptual content containing judgment or perceptual belief even if the object is or should remain undetermined. In other words: Even undetermined physical objects are never perceived via sensibility but always intuited as or conceived, i.e. constructed via understanding, thought and concepts.

3. Explicating Kant's Given Manifold

Kant's given manifold which builds on the mistaken notion of given objects could nevertheless serve as a given if all conceptual content is removed from it. This is why I explicate the manifold in the following manner and in accordance with Kant's general idea of the manifold being "given in the mind—viz., without spontaneity" (B68): Think of the given 'Kantio-Flockian manifold' in perception as something like a newborn's almost entire experience of the physical world: It perceives a manifold of appearances (colors, sounds, etc.) but would initially most likely even fail at making out objects within that manifold that we most likely could make out even if we were unable to determine those objects by "bring[ing] them under concepts" (A51/B75). That at least – i.e. completely independent and devoid of any conceptual content – is what a given manifold or any perceptually given must be, because otherwise, the given would indeed be nothing but a myth. To rephrase that as an argument: P1: The given must only result from or include sensibility and its products; i.e. it must not in any way result from or include understanding (including intuition as) and its products. P2: Concepts or conceptual content result from understanding. C: Therefore, the given must not result from or include any concepts or conceptual content.

4. The Usual Omission of Unconscious Inferences

There are a number of very understandable objections against the existence of such non-conceptual content such as the following one by Sellars: "There is no more such a thing as a non-symbolic noticing that something is red, than there is a non-symbolic saying that something is red" (Sellars 1991: 336). In that, Sellars is of course correct: We can neither notice or intuit something as red nor speak of red without concepts. The latter is also true for non-conceptual content which somewhat ironically or paradoxically requires conceptual content to be spoken of, thought about or even intuited as non-conceptual content (if you will and since this occurred to me in a conversation with Géza Kállay in 2016, call this the 'Flock-Kállay paradox of non-conceptual content'). Sellars, however, is sorely mistaken in inferring from by default conceptual intuiting, noticing or seeing something as red to the conclusion that the given or non-conceptual content is a myth since it is easily conceivable that light of a certain wavelength is first given to us via pure sensibility and that, after bringing that still non-conceptual content under concepts via understanding, we later see something in the manifold as red.

What Sellars, McDowell and other proponents of the myth of the given seem to have ignored, in other words, is the possibility of unconscious and automatic inferences (cf. Helmholtz 1867: ch. 26, or Evans 2008 for on overview over recent developments) that, together with concepts, are used to see something in the given manifold of appearance as red, as an object or as "these hands here." Adding such unconscious inferences to the picture also explains why we are generally unable to hold on to or maybe even to notice non-conceptual content as such – because non-conceptual content is automatically transformed into actually mixed conceptual content without us ever being consciously aware of those processes (if you will, call this the 'Flock-Kállay obscuration of non-conceptual content'). Note furthermore that one of the perhaps most obvious confirmations for the existence of unconscious inferences is that you automatically understood these words all this time without needing to consciously think about how to associate those signs or sounds with meaning.

5. Three Additional Sellarsian Myths about the Given

In this section, I will expound on section 4 by taking a closer look at three more specific Sellarsian myths about the given. The first of these myths can be found in deVries' (2016: sect. 4) reconstruction of the general Sellarsian argument against the given and goes as follows: "3. The doctrine of the given is that any empirical knowledge *that p* requires some (or is itself) basic, that is, epistemically independent, knowledge (*that g*, *h*, *i*, … .") Sellars seems to be taking that 'doctrine' from some of his contemporaries who apparently suffered from the mistaken notion that the given has or could have propositional form or content ("knowledge"). That, however, is utter nonsense that neither Kant's nor my own notion of the given manifold would support since the given must be entirely non-conceptual, since propositions can only be conceptual, and since the given can therefore not have propositional form or content. Since knowledge is propositional, the given can therefore also not be knowledge. Sellars, in other words, makes the mistake of merely refuting some pseudo-given instead of going the hard way of trying to refute Kant's rather well-conceived given.

The second, related and more than just Sellarsian myth is that "4. Inferential relations are always between items with propositional form" (2016: sect. 4). Here I once again need to point to Helmholtz (1867: ch. 26) who had the presence of mind to enlarge the ordinary picture of by default conscious inferences by counseling that we should also admit according unconscious processes into the category of inferences. In a likewise manner, I also think that it would be a huge mistake to believe that inferences involve only items with propositional form or content since perceptual beliefs such as "Here there are hands" or simply "This is a physical object" could just as well be regarded as conclusions that are inferred from the manifold of appearance (= non-propositional 'premise' no1) and concepts (= non-propositional 'premise' no2) and by means of a logical application of the latter to the former.

The third and once again related Sellarsian myth at least as far as Kant or myself are concerned is the absurd notion that the given somehow supports the existence of "non-inferential knowledge" (Sellars 1991: 128). There is no such thing as non-inferential knowledge or non-inferential beliefs since all beliefs, including 'knowledge-beliefs,' are conclusions that result from by default inferential justification. Neither do, as pointed out before, Kant or myself claim that the mere "sensing of sense contents" (ibid.: 128) or the given amounts to knowledge since the given must be entirely non-conceptual and since knowledge, beliefs or propositions clearly are conceptual. So much for the disenchantment of three additional Sellarsian myths about the given.

6. Conclusion

With a by default non-conceptual and thus non-propositional given in perception re-established, it is not only Kant or Evans that generally prevail over Sellars or McDowell in this respect. Furthermore, philosophers can also start to add mere coherentism (cf. Steup 2016: sect. 3.2) as well as traditional foundationalism (cf. Steup 2016: sect. 3.1) to the dustbin of history, because if that non-propositional given as well as non-propositional concepts are necessary 'premises' in the by default inferential justification of our first perceptual beliefs, then a respective version of moderate foundationalism according to which some by default propositional beliefs do not depend on other beliefs for their justification is pretty much the only remaining option.

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Who "sees the world rightly"?
The "I" as Tension in Wittgenstein's Writings

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Abstract

In recent years, many commentators have attempted to read Wittgenstein's works in light of the philosophy of subjectivity. Despite the fact that Wittgenstein himself never uses this term, it is clear that there is certainly a preoccupation in his writings with the question of the place of the self or subject. This paper will argue that rather than a philosophy of subjectivity, Wittgenstein's original contribution to the question arises from his existential presentation of the self or the "I" as tension, and that a tensed "I" is the mode of existence of the self.

There is a fundamental ambiguity in the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, apparent from the early *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* and persistent throughout: although Wittgenstein offers one of the most radical critiques of the notion of the subject or the *cogito*, affirming even that "there is no such thing" as "the thinking, presenting subject" (TLP: 5.631), the work is nevertheless oriented toward an "I" who ought to be able to learn "to see […] the world rightly" (TLP: 6.54). In the preface to the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein moreover insists on the personal character of understanding, noting that the "book will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it" and that it is indifferent to him whether this content "has already been thought before me by another" (TLP: 27). But who, what, is this "I", if it is not a thinking and presenting subject, nor an experiencing subject, and neither as such purely the metaphysical subject of which Wittgenstein claims that it is the limit of the world?

Far from being limited to the early period of Wittgenstein's writings, the tension around the nature of the subject is present all throughout his works, up to the last writings and *On Certainty*, where Wittgenstein asks: "Why is there no doubt that I am called L. W.? It does not seem at all like something that one could establish at once beyond doubt. One would not think that it is one of the indubitable truths. [Here there is still a big gap in my thinking. And I doubt whether it will be filled now]" (OC: 470). Of course, the tension here seems to have shifted from the initial position of the *Tractatus*; whereas the early text rejected the notion of the *cogito* and maintained the metaphysical subject as the limit of the world, the remarks of the later period question the knowledge the individual can have about himself, and the possibility to establish external criteria of verification for recognizing the "I". This shift is indicative of the efforts deployed throughout Wittgenstein's works to demystify the subject and the evolutions in his views of language and world. However, it is notable that Wittgenstein himself remarks that there remains a "gap" in his thinking, which he is himself doubtful of resolving. Between the intuition that there exists something which can rightfully be called an "I" or "self", and the absence of external proof or justification for this identification, remains a tension which takes on different articulations throughout Wittgenstein's writings. Rather than see this as a flaw, however, one might consider that this tension is precisely the mode of existence of the self.

In recent years, much work has been done on the question of subjectivity in relation to Wittgenstein's works, despite the fact that Wittgenstein himself never used the term subjectivity. As Chantal Bax notes: "in spite of the fact that he never explicitly took part in the debate about the subject, many of Wittgenstein's remarks can be said to address the problems or puzzles surrounding subjectivity" (Bax 2011: 4). Especially beginning with the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein's works engage with a number of very contemporary questions, among which the notion of interiority, the distinction between sensations, emotions and dispositional attitudes, and the linguistic and social embeddedness of our actions and beliefs. Far from the "myth of interiority" pointed out by Jacques Bouveresse (1976), Wittgenstein's works do offer an engagement with the question of the subject. Different perspectives have been adopted along these lines, generally phenomenological or linguistic. Jocelyn Benoist sees in Wittgenstein's works "a concrete phenomenology of subjectivity, that is, of the subject as it manifests itself in language," evoking the idea that subjectivity is a major fact about our language", "a linguistic function" before all else, which becomes concrete in confession, which Benoist sees as "the intensively subjective mode of existence, which is the site of the subject itself" (Benoist 1999: 165-66, 570, 580). For Sandra Laugier, who affirms that Wittgenstein is not a philosopher of logic and language, but a philosopher of the mind, Wittgenstein presents a de-psychologized theory of subjectivity, a subjectivity "expressed in language" (Laugier 2010: 9). According to Laugier, Wittgenstein's subject is that of the "ordinary voice" which appears through "the acceptation of expression as identically interior (it expresses me) *and* exterior (it exposes me)" (Laugier 2000: 179). Other commentators have also attempted to situate Wittgenstein's understanding of subjectivity beyond simple grammatical expression, such as Chantal Bax, who in her book *Subjectivity After Wittgenstein* draws out an understanding of the subject as both embodied and embedded (Bax 2011), while Søren Overgaard, in his book *Wittgenstein and Other Minds*, attempts to place Wittgenstein into dialogue with the phenomenological tradition, and insists on the fact that we must understand subjectivity and "mental life as *world-involving*, as *embodied*, and as *expressed* [and…] as having from the outset an irreducible 'ethical' aspect" (Overgaard 2007: 5).

While these various understandings of Wittgenstein's notion of subjectivity may be incompatible, both amongst each other and with various parts of Wittgenstein's writings, our aim in this paper is not to take issue with these analyses. Rather, in pointing to the variety of interpretations given to Wittgenstein's construction of subjectivity, we shall attempt to make sense of these in offering a new existential metaphor for understanding the complexity of

Wittgenstein's understanding of the subject, and suggest that an appropriate way to understand the self or subject in Wittgenstein's works is to consider the self itself *as tension*. There is obviously nothing radically new in such a portrayal; indeed, thinking the subject as tension has its origins in the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard, of which Wittgenstein was an avid reader during certain parts of his life. While Wittgenstein may have taken up this existential view from Kierkegaard, however, there are obvious differences between these two authors, and we do not wish to suggest that Wittgenstein's portray of the subject was directly inspired by the philosophy of the Dane. Indeed, one of these obvious differences resides in the fact that Kierkegaard makes extensive use of the notion of subjectivity, whereas Wittgenstein himself never even uses this term in his writings. This fact in itself, while not ignored by commentators attempting to offer a theory of subjectivity through Wittgenstein's works, ought to point to a flaw in attempts to theorize the subject—while it is certain that Wittgenstein is interested in the idea of an I or self, nothing in his writings indicates at all that he attempts to think *the* self or *the* subject, and even less such a vague notion as *subjectivity*.

Indeed, while the impression that there is something that one can meaningfully call "I" is an issue all throughout Wittgenstein's works, the critique of the subject as something in the world is equally present. This is particularly apparent in Wittgenstein's grammatical critique of philosophical problems; it is only once we recognize that "'I' is not the name of a person" (PI: 410) that we can hope to move beyond these. But precisely because "I" does not *designate*, there can be no criteria for verification or justification, and thus no question of "a subject, nor therefore of 'I' either" (PI: 398) in the world of facts. This does not imply that there is no subject or self, but rather that if such a thing does exist, it is certainly not *an object in our world*. Rather, subjective existence is said by Wittgenstein to obey a different kind of *logic* than objective existence or the facts of the world; rather than being different things, Wittgenstein insists on the fact that the subjective and objective (or the inner and the outer) are simply "different *categories*" (OC: 308).

How then do we gain access to the categories of subjectivity? There is at least one sense according to which our being in the world is, if not private or inner, at least *singular*. This is apparent in Wittgenstein's remarks on religion, ethics and the aesthetic. In the *Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough*, Wittgenstein insists on the fact that religious sentiment, the depth and value that we associate with rites and beliefs, and the intimate conviction which stems from these, do not proceed from proof or external actions, but rather, "it is *we* who ascribe them from an inner experience" (GB: 147). But this may be nothing other than the orientation, the attitude or the attention that we give to our own life: in other words, an existential orientation. This orientation or attitude, insofar as it is particular to each individual, can be seen as singular, but is nonetheless irreducible to a localisable, static or essential subject. On the contrary, Wittgenstein insists on the fact that "[a]ttention is dynamic—not static" (RPP2: 92); thus any conception of singularity that derives therefrom must be thought in a dynamic mode. If we wish to assimilate this understanding with the idea of an "I", we must therefore take into consideration the fact that what characterises our subjectivity may be nothing other than a particular way of relating to our life—perhaps, a certain profundity. And this is true as well of the grammatical difference between first and third-person expressions: "My own relation to my words is wholly different from other people's. I do not listen to them and thereby learn something about myself. They have a completely different relation to my actions than to the actions of others" (LW: 9).

Although Wittgenstein gives an important place to the question of the subject, it is clear that there is no theory of subjectivity (or even of the subject itself) in his works. The subject can be thought neither as an object, nor a fact, nor an experience, nor a horizon, nor a "point of view from nowhere" according to the expression formulated by Thomas Nagel (1989), nor the site of autonomy or authority. This may seem to leave us empty-handed. Yet the originality of Wittgenstein's approach to the problems of interiority and expression resides precisely in the fact that he refuses any form of determination with regard to the subject. And what we are left with is *not nothing*—even if it is *no thing*. What we are left with is a fundamental tension which runs throughout Wittgenstein's *oeuvre*, from the early *Notebooks* to *On Certainty*, and which marks a certain continuity despite the radical evolution of Wittgenstein's thought. This tension can be expressed by the apparently contradictory remarks found in the *Notebooks* and oft repeated throughout his writings: the affirmation, on the one hand, that "nothing is hidden," and the impression, on the other hand, that there *is* something which language incites us to call *I, me, subject, inner, spirit* or *soul*. Rather than see this tension as a flaw or an unresolved problem in Wittgenstein's thought, which requires a positive theory of subjectivity, we would suggest that it is this very tension which constitutes Wittgenstein's contribution to an existential understanding of the self. If we often forget that many of our concepts have fuzzy edges, this is certainly true of the notion of the self, and of concepts of spirit, soul or subject, which *in fine* only have meaning within the sphere of human life, of which the fundamental characteristic is variability.

Understanding the self as tension does not mean that we have to renounce all conception of the "I"; rather, this image should enable us to better seize the true nature of the particular type of existence for which subjectivity plays a part. A tensed "I" would be characterized by its own elasticity, its tension between two poles, themselves always in movement, and capable of expansion and retraction. As tension and movement, the self would thus present a dynamic structure, of which the centre would never remain static. Thus, the self would indeed be non-localisable although it would nonetheless maintain some form of stability from the dynamic link uniting the poles through which it is tensed. As dynamic, the self could thus be understood as moving without ever losing contact with its surroundings; its possibilities of extension would certainly be limited by its borders, but these would never constitute absolute limits. And is not such movement characteristic of living beings, a fundamental reality of the principle of life? In the remarks published in *Zettel*, Wittgenstein notes that: "The concept of a living being has the same indeterminacy as that of a language" (Z: 326). If language and life are undetermined, this is however not a defect, but rather precisely what opens up to the possibility of meaning and value. It is precisely the indeterminacy of the living being that constitutes its value; as undetermined, the living being is neither and object, nor an activity, nor a phenomenon, nor an experience—it is rather the flux or the movement of life itself. And since "meaning moves" (Z: 237) and "[o]nly in the stream of thought and life do words have meaning" (Z: 173), this also applies to the living being or to the "I" where these come into existence. And only such an "I" can learn to "see the world rightly".

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Intentionality and the Content of Perceptual Experience

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Abstract

In the first part of my paper I briefly present Wittgenstein's way of dissolving the problem of intentionality arguing that the relation between the content of mental states and reality is not representational. In the second part of the paper I explore whether this argument also applies with respect to perceptual experience. It is often assumed that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i.e. that it has representational content. I show that Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality is not quite suitable for either approving or rejecting this assumption. However, I shall give a further argument claiming that at least in some cases the content of perceptual experience is indeed not representational. As a conclusion, I present the view that perceptual experience should be understood as the ability to arrange sensations, rather than as mental states that have representational content.

One of the questions that Wittgenstein was concerned with during his lifetime is the question of how to understand the idea of intentionality. How can we understand the fact that inanimate things in the outer world become animated in our consciousness while finding ourselves in mental states that refer to them? Wittgenstein calls this the "old problem of the harmony between thought and reality". In the first part of this paper I briefly present his way of dissolving the problem arguing that the relation between the content of mental states and reality is not representational. In the second part of the paper I explore whether this argument also applies with respect to perceptual experience. It is often assumed that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i.e. that it has representational content. I show that Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality is not quite suitable for either approving or rejecting this assumption. However, I shall give a further argument claiming that at least in some cases the content of perceptual experience is indeed not representational. As a conclusion, I present the view that perceptual experience should be understood as the ability to arrange sensations, rather than as mental states that have representational content.

I.

Two core ideas can be identified in traditional theories of intentionality. It is first the idea that mental states have the property to be about or directed on objects in the world and, second, the idea that mental states have content. The object on which the mental state is directed is represented by the content of the mental state. To give an example, both ideas seem to be appropriate in cases of perceptional experience. When I observe my desk in front of me, my perceptual experience has a certain content that represents what is perceived in a characteristic way. The representational content includes the objects, properties and relations that are the subject of that perception in the sense that it is what that perception is about (see for example Peacocke 2001).

I shall discuss cases of perceptional experience later and first explore the ideas of intentionality using the example of expectations. Like beliefs, desires, hopes, etc. expectations are viewed as mental states that have content. It is often assumed that the content has the form of a proposition "that p", e.g. when I have the expectation that she is coming. If we think that the expectation is a mental state that has a proposition as its content, we must also think that the proposition "she is coming" that is the content of my expectation is different, for instance, from the statement "She is coming". For the latter expresses what is

actually the case whereas the former expresses what is expected to be the case. Mental states and their contents must be different in kind while the meaning of the content depends on the mental state. It follows that the content of an expectation has a different meaning than the content of a statement. Yet they must have the same meaning since the content of my expectation might come true. How can my expectation "that she is coming" come true if the proposition does not have the same meaning as the proposition of a statement?

We are already in the middle of a dilemma. If mental states and their contents are different things then the meaning of a mental state with a content that has not yet become true must be different from the meaning of the same content that has become true. But how can the content then ever become true if it does not have the same meaning? However, the conclusion that the content in both mental states has the same meaning leads to the other horn of the dilemma. If "she is coming" means the same in the statement and the expectation then it seem that the content of the expectation has already come true and therefore is not expected anymore. Somehow the expected event must be different from the occurring event, and yet there seems to be a similarity since the same words are used to explain what is real and what is expected.

What is the similarity between statement and expectation? It seemed to be the meaning of the words that constitute the content of the two mental states. But as we have seen this was mistaken. It might be assumed instead that the similarity is based on the behavior of a person that a description of the situation might refer to. But this seems to be equally wrong for the behavior of a person that expects someone is different from the case in which the expectation comes true. It is puzzling that we nevertheless use the same words in order to describe the situation although the situation in which someone has an expectation and the situation in which the expectation has come true are different.

The puzzle might be dissolved with a modified view of how to understand the meaning of expressions like "she is coming". From the fact that the same words are used in order to express the expectation and its fulfillment it does not follow that that those words also have the same meaning. This assumption is underlying the misleading idea that every word has a meaning that is the object for which the word stands (see Wittgenstein 2009, §1). It leads to the wrong impression that the similarity between statement and expectation is based on the outer appearance of the

used words. One might object to this view that the meaning of those words does not depend on their outer appearance but on how they are used in order to describe the agent's situation. The similarity of how the situations are described is based on the *use* of the same expression. Both expressions may have different functions without being necessary that they have the same meaning. The use of the expression "she is coming" may have various functions: it may have the function of a statement or the function of expressing that an expectation may come true.

Based on the view that the similarity in expressing statements and expectations is based on the use of expressions that describe the situation, we need to modify our view regarding the distinction between mental states and propositional contents. The assumption that the expressions belong to the content of a mental state and that the meaning of the content is depending on the mental state is wrong. The idea of "aboutness" or "directedness" of mental states is misleading us to the assumption of a distinction between the state of a person and what the state is about. The brief presentation of Wittgenstein's argument shows that this distinction leads into fundamental problems. The assumption of propositional content requires the possibility to individuate the content with respect to its meaning. However, the fulfillment of this requirement cannot be accomplished.

II.

I now turn to perceptual experience. It is widely assumed that the content of perceptual experience is what the perception is about and that it is characterized by the way of how things are perceived. This view is often called the "content view" (see for example Brewer 2006; Byrne 2009). As it was mentioned above, the content view seems to be perfectly compatible with the core ideas of intentionality which has the advantage, for example in cases of optical illusion, to distinguish the content of perceptual experience from the content of non-experiential mental states like beliefs or thoughts. Although we have seen that the assumption that propositional contents can be distinguished is problematic this must not be a problem for proponents of the content view if they presuppose that the content in their view is non-propositional. However, according to their understanding the content of perceptual experience is *in general* to be characterized as representational, i.e. as propositional[1]. In the remainder of this paper I shall argue against the claim that the content is representational since some perceptual experiences are sensory and not conceptual or propositional in kind.

Proponents of the content view must respond to the question under which conditions the content of perceptual experience is to be conceived of as representational. Presumably, they have to commit to the following three claims. First the representational content of perceptual experience is not sensory. For, under the condition that the content is representational, the content might be understood as the representation of a sensation but not as the sensation itself. Second, in some cases the content of perceptual experience is not conceptual since non-human animals and infants seem to have perceptual experience yet they do not possess the ability to create and apply concepts (see Bermúdez 1995; Peacocke 2001 for discussion). Third, if it is taken for granted that at least some perceptual experiences do not require the ability to create and apply concepts it can be no requirement for the content in general to

be propositionally structured (see Crane 2009 for the discussion of this claim). In holding the content view proponents must assume that the content of some perceptual experiences is not sensory, conceptual or propositional in kind.

One might then raise the question of whether the proponent of the content view may still hold the assumption that the content is to be understood as representational. One might argue that the content can be representational without being sensory, conceptual or propositional in kind. However, I want to object that as well as the requirement to individuate the propositional content cannot be met the individuation of the non-propositional content also cannot be accomplished. The idea that the content of perceptional experience is representational in kind implies the assumption that the content represents "something", i.e. it is a representing entity of what is perceived. One may ask, however, what is this representing entity that is the content of my perceptual experience, for example when I feel pain in my shoulder or when I observe my desk in front of me?

Whatever it is that I perceive it seems to be clear that its content cannot be individuated without viewing it in a given context. It is unclear how we could actually individuate or single out the contents of perceptual experience. Perceptual experience seems to be extremely rich[2], so this presents a formidable challenge for the proponent of the content view. In the most primitive sense this means, for example, that I can only visually perceive something on a certain background (e.g. a black spot on a white background or *vice versa*). In order to see something, I need to be able to make a comparison, i.e. to perceive differences and/or similarities between my sensations (e.g. between the black spot and the white background).[3] In order to see my desk the ability to perceive differences and/or similarities between my sensations is likewise needed to put them into a context. However, in this case the arrangement of sensations is much more elaborate and of higher complexity than in the example of perceiving a black spot. It requires an advanced ability to perceive things in order to arrange the sensations that make me see my desk in front of me.

In viewing the perceptual content as a representing entity, the proponent of the content view might object here, arguing that there is no advanced ability of the perceiver required in order to gain representational content. I think that this objection is a mistake since it is begging the question of what is the nature of the rules on which the agreement is based on between the perceptual content and what is perceived (i.e. the "old problem of the harmony between thought and reality"). Wittgenstein's suggestion, which I cannot discuss in detail here, is that the agreement is based on rule-governed practices that we have learnt to apply. Based on Wittgenstein's suggestion I finally would like to propose that our ability to make those arrangements, which I have sketched in this paper as a conception of perceptual experience, likewise imply rule-governed practices. When I see the black spot on the white background, when I see my desk in front of me, and when I feel pain in my shoulder, rules are applied. It seems that in

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[1] For the claim that the structure of perceptual contents is propositional and non-conceptual see (Byrne 2005).

[2] See (Heck 2000) who puts emphasis of this point.
[3] It is doubtful whether the idea of representational contents as single entities makes sense since those contents have no reference if they are conceived as non-propositional, as it is the case with the perceptual content of a pre-linguistic child or of a non-human animal for example. (Bermúdez 1995: 342) argues that if infants in Baillargeon's experiment (Baillargeon 1987) "had perceived an array of unstructured visual sense data rather than bounded segments, they would not have shown surprise when an apparently continuous surface comes apart". However, I do not see an objection here since Bermúdez also refers to the infant's perception as their ability, i.e. to "parse the visual array in a way that maps […] the boundaries between objects."

primitive cases of perceptual experience, those rules are established, mostly based on our natural condition. This view might be supported, for example, by our natural ability to distinguish between different color-sensations and to naturally express our pain-sensation. I assume that with increasing complexity of perceptual experiences the rules that govern the arrangement of sensations are based on the social practices in which we are inculcated by others. Further investigation of this thought, however, must be postponed to a different occasion.

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Transparency and Knowledge of One's Own Perceptions

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Abstract

So-called "transparency theories" of self-knowledge, inspired by a remark of Gareth Evans, claim that we can obtain knowledge of our own beliefs by directing our attention towards the world, rather than introspecting the contents of our own minds. Most recent transparency theories concentrate on the case of self-knowledge concerning belief and desire. But can a transparency account be generalised to knowledge of one's own perceptions? In a recent paper, Alex Byrne (2012) argues that we can know what we see by inferring from visual facts about our environment because such facts can exclusively be known by us through vision. I discuss his proposal and object that visual facts, as conceived of by Byrnes are odd: they cannot be remembered and we cannot, as yet, write them down. More needs to be said about them to make his account plausible.

1. Introduction

So-called "transparency theories" of self-knowledge are inspired by Gareth Evans's famous remark that I "answer the question whether I believe that *p* by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether *p*" (Evans 1982: 225). Authors who have recently attempted to construct theories of self-knowledge on the basis of this remark include Moran (2001), Byrne (2005), Fernández (2013) and Fricke (2009). The principal interest of these authors has been to explain self-knowledge of beliefs and, secondarily, of desire. But can the account be generalised to knowledge of one's own perceptions? In a recent paper, Alex Byrne (2012) discusses several proposals for accounting of such knowledge and defends a transparency theory that is in line with his explanation of self-knowledge regarding beliefs. In what follows, I shall examine Byrne's theory and develop an objection that he does not discuss.

2. Transparency in self-knowledge of belief

To begin with, it is useful to have a look at the model for self-knowledge which is supposed to be extended to knowledge of one's perception. As has been mentioned already, the model applies to knowledge of one's own *belief*. Byrne encapsulates Evans's remark in the epistemic rule BEL:

BEL   If *p*, believe that you believe that *p* (Byrne 2005: 95)

One follows BEL if and only if one believes that one believes that *p* because one recognises that *p*. Byrne also describes following this rule as a kind of inference from *p* to "I believe that *p*".

BEL is a particularly reliable rule in that if one follows it correctly, i.e. if one indeed recognises that *p* and on the basis of this recognition forms the belief "I believe that *p*", one necessarily arrives at a true ascription of belief. Even if one does not really recognise that *p* – say because it is not true that *p* – but falsely comes to believe that *p*, the resulting belief-ascription "I believe that *p*" will still be true.

It is also clear that BEL works particularly well for one's own beliefs. Consider an analogue rule for ascribing beliefs to other people:

BEL-3   If *p*, believe that Fred believes that *p* (Byrne 2005: 96)

BEL-3 is not altogether a bad rule. On the contrary, it might be a good working assumption (or even be a necessity, if Donald Davidson is to be believed), to suppose that others have more or less the same beliefs as oneself. But unlike BEL, BEL-3 is certain to lead to false ascriptions of belief to Fred at least sometimes, even if it is followed correctly.

The idea that BEL explains the knowledge we have of our own beliefs has come under several strong criticisms (cf. Boyle 2011, Gertler 2011, Carruthers 2011, Cassam 2015). It seems to me that there are some good replies to these criticisms. However, I shall not go into these arguments here, but instead examine the way Byrne attempts to generalise his explanation of self-knowledge concerning belief to that concerning one's own perception.

3. Transparency in knowledge of one's own perception

As is usual, Byrne concentrates on the case of vision. Using an example from Gilbert Ryle, Byrne supposes that he sees a hawk and asks the question "how *do* I know that I see a hawk?" (Byrne 2012: 185). As Ryle remarks, "My seeing of the hawk seems to be a queerly transparent sort of process, transparent in that while a hawk is detected, nothing else is detected answering to the verb in 'see a hawk'" (Ryle 2009: 134). Applying the model of self-knowledge concerning belief, it might be suggested that we know what we see by directing our attention outward at our environment. It might then be thought that we infer what we see from what we know about our immediate (visible) environment. The epistemic rule corresponding to BEL might be:

HAWK†   If there is a hawk over there, believe that you see a hawk. (Byrne 2012: 191)

Byrne dismisses this rule, because there are many ways in which one might know that there is a hawk over there that do not require vision. Someone might tell me or I might hear the hawk, while actually not being able to see anything at all. In all these cases, the rule would lead to a wrong description of one's visual perception. But our self-ascriptions of visual perceptions do not seem to be prone to such errors.

The problem with this kind of rule is that the proposition expressed in the antecedent is *amodal* in the sense that it can be known in various ways, through testimony, vision and auditory experience, for example. So just having the

information expressed in the antecedent is not enough for me to infer that this information is *seen*.

However, this diagnosis indicates how a transparency account for self-ascriptions of perceptions can be made to work: it must be exclusively based on such information about my environment that can be obtained in one modality only. If I have some information about my environment that can only be obtained through vision, then I can infer that I am seeing that things are so. If I know something about the environment that can only be ascertained through hearing it, then I know that I am hearing that things are so.

Byrne thinks that there is such modally exclusive information. He notes "[a]ssume, then, that visual experiences have contents, *v-propositions*; true v-propositions are *v-facts*. Let '[…F(x)…]ᵥ' be a sentence that expresses a particular v-proposition that is true at a world w only if x is F in w" (Byrne 2012: 197).

Granted that visual experiences have contents, it is not disputed that the content at least concerns what falls under the rubric of "mid-level vision" in vision science: shape, orientation, depth, color, shading, texture, movement, and so forth: call these sensible qualities. In fact, without begging any important questions we can restrict v-propositions so that they just concern sensible qualities. (Byrne 2012: 197)

He acknowledges that characterising "v-facts is difficult" (Byrne 2012: 199), but affirms that for the purposes of a transparency account of knowledge of perception such details are not required. The important point is that visual experiences have contents that concern sensible qualities which can only be ascertained through vision. It is from v-propositions about such exclusively visual qualities of the objects in our environment that we can infer that we are seeing. And analogously we can infer from exclusively olfactory facts that we smell something and from exclusively auditory facts that we are hearing something in our vicinity:

> Vision, we may say, reveals the visual world: the world of v-facts. In the visual world things are colored, illuminated, moving, and so on, but not smelly or noisy. Likewise, olfaction reveals the olfactory world: the world of o-facts. The olfactory world—at least, our olfactory world—is a relatively impoverished place, consisting of odors located around the perceiver's body. The auditory world, the world of a-facts, is considerably more complicated, consisting, inter alia, of sounds of varying loudness and pitch at a variety of locations. [...] Suppose one investigates one's environment, and finds that a certain v-fact, the fact that [...x...]ᵥ, obtains. Vision is, at least in creatures like ourselves, an exclusive conduit for v-facts. Hence one's information source must be vision, not audition, olfaction, testimony, or anything else. Although information is amodal *in principle*, for us v-facts *do* indicate their provenance—(visual) information is *practically* modal. (Byrne 2011: 200)

The epistemic rule which explains how we come to know that we are seeing something has the following form:

> SEE If [...x...]ᵥ and x is an F, believe that you see an F (Byrne 2012: 199)

4. Objections from memory and from known illusions

Byrne discusses two specific objections to his account: "the memory objection" and an objection from the case of known illusions.

The memory objection points out that a v-fact might be remembered, instead of being seen. If in this case memory, just like visual perception, provides knowledge of a visual fact [...x...]ᵥ, then SEE would lead to the ascription of a visual experience of seeing. But in this case, it is supposed that we do not see, but only remember the visual fact. Hence SEE leads to a false result.

Byrne's reply is, roughly, that remembered visual facts are not quite as vivid as the actual visual experience. They are just a "transformed and degraded version of the visual information that characterizes successful seeing" (Byrne 2012: 202). Because of this degraded character of the information, we can know that SEE is not applicable here (but perhaps an analogous rule for the ascription of a memory is), and we will not make a false ascription of visual perception.

The second objection asks what happens in cases where I suffer from a known illusion. Following Evans, it is thought that in this case we continue to see things a certain way, but we do not form the belief that they are this way. The perceptual experience is supposed to be belief-independent. But applying SEE requires to *recognise*, hence to *believe*, that [...x...]ᵥ and to infer from this supposed fact that one sees an F (because x is an F). In the case where the illusion is known, then, the antecedent of SEE cannot come to be fulfilled and we would therefore, contrary to actual life, not be able to report and know what we (seem to) see.

Byrne replies to this objection by casting doubt on the belief-independence of perception. In his view, even knowing about the illusion, we still form the belief corresponding to our visual perception (in addition to our veridical belief which is based on knowledge of the illusion). As a result, cases of known illusion will produce contradictory beliefs in us, but we will still know what we seem to see by using SEE.

5. Odd perceptual facts

Byrne's account is impressive and he has good objections to rival accounts that have not been mentioned here. But I think that there is something odd about the visual facts that are fundamental for his theory. Byrne says that it is "difficult" to characterise them, but allows that "perhaps one could in principle learn that [...x...]ᵥ by reading it in the – as-yet-unwritten – language of vision" (Byrne 2011: 201). Of course, knowing a visual fact by reading about it, rather than seeing it, would satisfy the antecedent of SEE and probably lead to a false ascription of seeing. In practice, this problem does not arise because the language of vision has not been written yet. But it is odd that Byrne's account depends on the fact that visual facts cannot easily be communicated.

It seems to me to be even odder that visual facts can neither be remembered, for the account to work. Although he concedes that the line between vision and memory might blur such that one might mistake a memory for vision, his theory depends on there generally being a clear distinction. If I know now that there is a hawk on the fencepost, I can certainly also know a moment later that there is a hawk, even if I do no longer see it. Memory is sufficient to hold on to this knowledge from one moment to the next. But knowledge of a visual fact $[...x...]_V$ is supposed to degrade and transform from one moment to the next, thus enabling us to distinguish between seeing that $[...x...]_V$ and merely remembering it. This is strange when we compare the visual fact with more abstract facts such as that there is a hawk. Perhaps Byrne is right about the distinction. But it is a distinction difficult to assess given the lack of detail when it comes to characterising visual facts.

Consider, in comparison, an olfactory fact. If I smell a beautiful (or not so beautiful) odour now, why should my knowledge of this olfactory fact disappear or degrade from one moment to the next, just because I tap my nose so that I can no longer smell it and can only remember it? It is very clear that there is a great difference between smelling a strong odour and not smelling it, but just remembering it. The question is whether this difference consists in losing knowledge of olfactory facts. If memory can preserve at least some knowledge of such facts from one moment to the next, then, according to a transparency account, I would seem to be able to infer that I still smell some odour. It seems that Byrne's theory, ingenious as it is, needs to tell us more about the perceptual facts from which we are supposed to infer that we are perceiving them.

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The Chinese Chess Room

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Abstract

When DeepMind's program AlphaGo beat one of the leading masters of the ancient board game Go Lee Sedol in March 2016 it was regarded as a major breakthrough in the development of Artificial Intelligence. In contrast to DeepBlue that relied on computing power to do extensive tree search and was designed to achieve one specific goal – excelling at chess, a program like AlphaGo by employing modern "Deep Learning" techniques should in principle be able to solve any problem at all without being taught first. That at least is the credo of its creators.
Do modern AI programs represent a step forward to "thinking machines"? And what becomes of old philosophical arguments that declare that such things are impossible? In a variant of Searle's Chinese Room, I am introducing a prisoner who has to do all learning and reasoning by himself to come up with answers to Chinese questions.

1. Deep Learning

In March 2016 AlphaGo, a program developed by a Google company called DeepMind, shocked the Go-playing community and at the same time developers of Artificial Intelligence when it beat one of the best players in the world the Korean Lee Sedol in a 5-game-match 4-1. Such a feat was not deemed possible for at least another decade. Ever since Kasparov lost against DeepBlue at chess in 1997 the game of Go has been regarded the new Holy Grail of Artificial Intelligence. Since Go is much more complex than chess and there are no practical heuristic evaluation methods for a given game position, it seemed that nothing less than true emulation of the Human mind would suffice for beating grand masters of the game. The magic word in the astonishing revolutionary leap in AI is "Deep Learning". In AlphaGo artificial neural networks "are trained by a novel combination of supervised and reinforcement learning". (Silver et al., 2016: 484)

Neural networks helped to overcome the two basic obstacles that made classical tree search practically impossible for Go. By analysing millions of game positions in a similar way that is used in picture recognition a "policy network" is established, meaning the software learns to "guess" which move is likely to be played. And this is what is then optimised by self-play. A second "value network" is able to predict the outcome of a game, given a game position. This is combined with a statistical approach, the Monte Carlo tree search, to determine the likelihood of a move to lead to victory. The resulting software "evaluated thousands of times fewer positions than *DeepBlue* did in its match against Kasparow". (Silver et al., 2016: 489)

In essence then, the game of AlphaGo in some respect mimics the human way of playing. To the expert human player only a couple of moves "suggest themselves". And depending on what intuition says about the position on the board a more aggressive or cautious move will be picked for further evaluation, meaning the next probable answers to the move candidate will be "read" out and the resulting position again evaluated.

But just as we do not really understand how human intuition works the programmers of AlphaGo do not really understand what exactly it is the software is "learning".

In contrast to GOFAI ("good old-fashioned AI") algorithms that are hand-crafted and fully understood analytically, many algorithms using artificial neural networks are understood only at a heuristic level, where we empirically know that certain training protocols employing large data sets will result in excellent performance. (Lin and Tegmark, 2016: 1)

2. The Chinese Room revisited

John Searle attempted in a series of articles to show that Artificial Intelligence was impossible, or more accurately, he stated that what he called the "strong" claim of AI that "computers given the right programs can be literally said to *understand* and have other cognitive states" is nonsense. (Searle, 1980: 417)

The "Gedankenexperiment" of the Chinese Room Searle introduced has been wildly discussed and although his conclusions are not universally accepted the Chinese Room still challenges proponents of the view that human thought can in principle be reproduced by artificial means.

Whether the argument of Searle is really valid I am not going to discuss here, but assuming he did establish, that for all machines one could imagine in the1980s thinking was impossible, does Deep Learning AI change the picture?

It might be argued that Deep Learning methods are just new techniques not altering the principle difference between carbon based "real thinking" and silicon based simulation of thinking. But it would not be the first time that a quantitative technical advancement results in a qualitative change. I am proposing a variant of the Chinese Room experiment that takes the ability of software to learn for granted.

In the classic Chinese Room (slightly simplified) we have a human being locked up in a room. She gets pieces of paper with some Chinese text from the outside. Not knowing any Chinese but having access to a book in which every "Chinese story" is represented together with an appropriate Chinese answer she is able to look it up, identifying "the symbols entirely by their shapes" (Searle, 1980: 418), and present the answer to the outside. To the outside it would look like the "the Room" knows Chinese since the correct answers are produced. The human agent, of course, together with the book represent a software program, and it certainly seems as if they still do not know Chinese although they succeed in communicating.

Now for the variant: In this we only have the human agent in the room, no book with previously implemented knowledge at all, but just a human being with the capability

of learning. The task remains basically the same. Get some Chinese text and produce the correct Chinese answer. Is it possible? Of course, the human being – or learning software – must be trained first. So, lets assume that together with the Chinese story our agent gets three answers, one of them is correct the others false. The object is to recognize patterns and in the end enough meaning to pick the right answer. To make it more dramatic, let us say that our Chinese Room prisoner will be released if she chooses the correct answer but killed if she picks the wrong one. An input story might start like this:

炮二平五 马2进3 马二 进三 炮8平6 车一平二 马8进7

炮八平六 炮2平1 马八进七 车｜平2 兵七进一 卒7进1 ...

And these are the possible answers:

1. 炮七平二

2. 一丨五平四

3. 兵五雄一

This looks quite difficult. But we are assuming that we get any number of story/answer examples. And after a while the Chinese prisoner will see that some of the Chinese "expressions" reoccur in the story as well as in the answer. Every expression is roughly the same length, as is the story. Under these conditions will it be possible to find a pattern?

3. Simplifying the Case

Maybe we should start with a more simple case. In real life, you do not expect a beginner to be fluent in a new language. When a child is learning language and it babbles "ball" when presented a ball, we rightly take this as a first step in the learning process.

As we all know, learning a language is easier when we are presented words together with pictures. Let us view another scenario, then. Here, in the learning phase the prisoner is presented with three cards depicting a ball, a banana and a bicycle and three cards with pictures of children again with symbols beneath. The symbols on the cards presumably are denoting the objects. Of course, there is no guarantee, but it would be rational to suppose a simple relationship between picture and symbols. The next card shows one of the children riding a bike. The question on the picture reads:

谁骑自行车?

The given three possible answers are the three kid cards. There is surely not enough information to give a definitive answer, but one already can make an educated guess. Let us say the last three symbols of the question are the same as on the bicycle card. What can the question mean if the answer is the name of a kid? It might very well be: Who is riding the bicycle?

This could be repeated a couple of times. Always one of the children is shown eating a banana, riding a bicycle or playing ball. Then a question is asked with one of the names for the objects and always the correct answer turns out to be the name of the child on the card.

This bicycle-banana-ball language game is, to be sure, very simple. Mastering it hardly counts as having learnt a language. But it is easy to see, how the learning phase could be prolonged by introducing more picture-symbol

cards. In principle, a complete language could be learned this way.

But isn't this completely obvious? We already know that a human being can learn any language. Being locked up in a room is not a serious handicap at all. Even deaf-blind people are capable of learning languages, and being deprived of vision and hearing surely constitutes a much more serious barrier.

And we also know, that unlike the prisoner in the Chinese Room, people can learn a language without any previous language. When a child is learning a language, it does not use conscious reasoning power to guess the meaning of words. It does not translate.

To go back to the prisoner in the Chinese Room: To the outside it looks like the Room answers like a native.

And according to the original premises, since there is no previous programmed knowledge, no bootstrapping, doesn't the fact, that after some training the agent (prisoner/program) can answer the questions, means, by definition, that he has mastered the (subset-) language?

But, Searle might response, the prisoner still does not "know" the language, all he has are some hypotheses and formal procedures to arrive at an "answer". If one squiggle in the questions looks like the symbol on a card he "assumes" that the question asks "who" is "doing" something with the object. He has no way of being sure, so it would be wrong to say that he knows the answer. At best, it can be said, that he is able to simulate real understanding, even if his answers are always right.

4. Understanding without reasoning

The picture cards example was at the same time too simple and too complicated to clarify the epistemological position of our prisoner. Now we take a look at a different language game. This time the prisoner gets one of three cards with these strings of symbols.

1. 石頭

2. 紙

3. 剪刀

Every card again means a question. And all three cards are at the same time the three possible answers. In this case the correct answer to the first card is the second, to the second the third to the third the first. After only a couple of training sessions this pattern becomes transparent.

The symbols in fact literally mean rock, paper, scissors. But even if the meaning were different, in this particular language game they certainly play the role of rock, paper, scissors in the well-known game. Knowing the answer to the question in this case is identical with knowing the meaning of the words.

And knowledge of the meaning does not at all involve consciousness. Imagine our prisoner being hungry.

To get food he has to click on a blue, yellow or green button. Above the buttons there is a small coloured plate that changes colours every day. It is blue, yellow or green. It does not matter which button he pushes he will always get food. But he will get slightly more food if he pushes the blue one if the plate is green, the yellow if it is blue, and the green if the plate is yellow. How long will it take till he always pushes the "right" button?

That paper "beats" rock is a semantic property. It is syntactical correct to answer rock with scissors, it just would be – the wrong move.

And a very simple software program would be capable to figure out the solution. In fact, in this case we can reverse one of Searle's battle cries. Instead of the computer has "a syntax but no semantics" (Searle, 1980: 423) we say: "it has only semantics". The program would "know" the answer and it does not matter, that it has no idea how a rock feels like. It does not have to know that scissors "cut" paper.

5. Conclusion

Do modern AI programs relying on Deep Learning refute Searle's argument? At first glance, the answer is easy. In the Chinese Room, the human agent is only blindly following some rules. The knowledge is in the book part of the system. What the agent extracts out of the book part and presents to the outside world might seem to the outside world as the correct answer but to the agent it is totally meaningless.

But in our Chinese Room variant as in the real Deep Learning world the book part of the system is missing. There is no predefined knowledge that just needs to be extracted by some rules. Instead the agent himself (or itself) must establish the knowledge base in the first place. So, by definition, everything that comes out of the system, comes out of the agent. If meaningful answers come out of the system, the meaning must be generated by the agent.

The Chinese Room picture closely resembles the language game Wittgenstein introduces in the very first section of his *Philosophical Investigations*. Someone gets a piece of paper with the sign "Five red Apples".

He opens a drawer with the sign "Apple" (by comparing the squiggles), then he compares a colour chart labelled "red" with the colour of the apples, then he counts up the cardinal numbers ("I assume he knows them by heart") up to the word "five", "and for each number he takes an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer."

This is what Searle's agent does, and this is what the agent in the variant does. Only, that in the variant the colour chart and the labelling of the drawer are not predefined but were created by the agent himself in the learning phase.

Searle's real puzzle then, is not how can a machine possibly think or "mean" something but rather how is meaning possible? This is what Wittgenstein's lets his puzzled interrogator ask: "But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word 'red' and what he is to do with the word 'five'?" (PH, 1) Wittgenstein's answer to this: "Well, I assume that he *acts* as I have described. Explanations come to an end somewhere." (PH, 1) And the meaning of the word "five"? The subject just did not come up yet, Wittgenstein says. He only showed how the word is used.

But if the agent does not know the meaning, is he in the end not just "simulating" understanding? In a way this is exactly true. But it is just like someone learning to play the piano. There are some dots on a piece of paper and by following some rules, the would-be-player just hits some keys in the sequence of the dots of the paper. This is at best first a simulation of piano playing. The point though is, that piano playing is nothing over and above hitting the keys in the right sequence – except practice.

Finally, to come back to the story presented to our prisoner in a Chinese Room. Let us reverse the situation and have a Chinese prisoner in an Austrian Room. He will get stories like this one:

1. e2-e4, e7-e5.

2. d2-d4, e5xd4.

3. c2-c3, c7-c5.

...

This, of course, is the notation of a chess game. Possible answers to this story include the chess mate move.

Similarly the prisoner in our Chinese Room variant was presented a game of Chinese Chess. The rules are slightly different, but there again the mate move is the "correct" answer to the "story". The challenge of extracting the rules out of examples of games should be equally hard. And it is for the reader to decide whether it is possible or not.

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The Later Wittgenstein on Personal and Social Change

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Abstract

The paper discusses some of the later Wittgenstein's views on personal and social change and philosophy's relevance. Specifically, it highlights how Wittgenstein's later anthropological perspective, as opposed to his earlier logical one, contributes to the unification of the 'personal' and the 'social' in his later philosophy. Moreover, the paper calls attention to the potentially transformational aspects of Wittgenstein's later philosophy and his own pessimism about its actual efficacy. It also hints at some of the features regarding the means and the direction of personal and social change that Wittgenstein discusses.

1. Introduction

The notion of change characterizes Wittgenstein both as a philosopher and a person. In fact, his whole life and thought can be viewed as a constant succession of changes: changes of place, field of study, occupation, as well as of philosophical perspective, positions, and ideas (see Monk 1991). No wonder then that the issue of change is one with which Wittgenstein is occupied in various parts of his writings. While personal change is a theme he discusses in all the different phases of his life and work, discussions of social change are not part of his early thematics. Something to be expected once we consider that man is almost completely absent from the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, appearing only in the form of the metaphysical subject as a limit and not a part of the world (Wittgenstein 1922: §5.632, §5.641) and in completely individualist terms, with solipsism coinciding with realism (ibid.: §5.62, §5.64). The social aspects of human subjectivity are completely ignored, with human intentionality being exiled to the field of psychology for which the early Wittgenstein does not have any concern (ibid.: §4.1121, §6.423). But what about his later phase? A question that becomes more intriguing once we consider the thoroughly social, non-Cartesian conception of human subjectivity in the *Philosophical Investigations*, where man is first and foremost approached as a social creature of praxis. In the rest of this paper we shall try to address that question by examining some of the later Wittgenstein's views on personal and social change and philosophy's relevance.

2. The Later Wittgenstein on Personal Change

In the early phase of his thought, Wittgenstein finds in personal change the key to a happy life, as the medium for bringing the individual will in harmony with the world and the metaphysical will, for reaching a certain form of *ataraxia* (tranquility) beyond fear and hope, a state in which the problem of life is dissolved (see Wittgenstein 1979: 74-77; Wittgenstein 1922: §6.43, §6.521; and Stokhof 2002: 216-225). This may be viewed as the flip side of his personal quest in World War I to come "eye to eye with death" aiming at an existential transformation that would make him "a decent human being", with the hope that "the nearness of death will bring light into life" (Monk 1991: 112). At first glance, this seems to be the case for Wittgenstein's later phase as well, as we find him observing in 1937: "The solution of the problem you see in life is a way of living which makes what is problematic disappear. The fact that life is problematic means that your life does not fit life's shape. So you must change your life, and once it fits the shape, what is problematic will disappear" (Wittgenstein 1998: 31). But in his later phase, the shape of life is no more to be associated with some kind of a Tractarian metaphysical subject or will, but with our human form(s) of life. Wittgenstein's broader anthropological turn (see Monk 1991: 261) is not without consequences for this particular issue. Thus, it could be said that through the radical change in Wittgenstein's philosophical perspective, his views on personal change do change as well. As he continues in the same remark, qualifying his position, Wittgenstein states that "Someone who lives rightly does not experience the problem as *sorrow*, hence not after all as a problem, but rather as joy, that is so to speak as a bright halo round his life, not a murky background" (Wittgenstein 1998: 31).

The problem of life no longer lies outside space and time, belonging to the ineffable mystical that only shows itself, being thus (dis)solved, as in the *Tractatus* (see Wittgenstein 1922: §6.4312, §6.5, §6.522). It is rather to be approached and (dis)solved by acknowledging its existence and changing our attitude towards it, not treating it negatively as a problem, misfortune, or deficiency, but positively, and that first of all means being agonistically engaged with it, as a constitutional and signifying aspect of our form(s) of life. Wittgenstein may be viewed at this point as pointing in the same direction as Camus, who upon concluding his discussion of Sisyphus as the prototypical absurd hero, holds that, despite the absurdity of Sisyphus's condition, and of the condition of the absurd, contemplating, self-conscious man too, "The struggle itself towards the heights is enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy" (Camus 2005: 119). The content (problematics) of the problem does not vanish, only its shape and status as a problem. This is made clear in the remark in Wittgenstein's notebooks that immediately follows the above quoted one, where he discusses the "strange demands life makes" (i.e., the questions raised regarding the shape of our life) in the context of modernity, and treats the question of being "able to play the game well" (the personal ethical demand for a good, happy, and virtuous life) as being surpassed by the more urgent and crucial question of "what sort of game is to be played now anyway" (Wittgenstein 1998: 31), a question of an essentially socio-political nature.

3. The Later Wittgenstein on Social Change

With the 'personal' becoming much more 'social' in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, as we can see for example in his discussions of rule-following, private language, and psychological concepts, "inner" processes, and mental states (see Wittgenstein 2001: §185-§242, §243-§315,

§316-§693), Wittgenstein's views on personal change take themselves a more social character. For that, the notions of 'form(s) of life' and 'language games' play a crucial role, functioning in later Wittgenstein's philosophy as the loci where the personal and the social are united. The rejected image of the traditional Cartesian subject based on the inner/outer, personal (private)/social distinction is not replaced by a conception of an individual form of life, but by a conception of the human subject as a social creature of praxis, constitutive of and constituted by the countless language-games and forms of life with which it is engaged. This very multitude of language games and forms of life raises the issue of the integration between them, both at a personal and a social level. An issue that Wittgenstein addresses through his distinction between a 'culture' and a 'civilization', talking, on the one hand, about the "spirit of the whole" and "the same great end" with regard to a culture, and, on the other hand, about the "opposing forces", the problem of fragmentation, and the pursuit of "purely private ends" within a civilization, such as the modern Western one (Wittgenstein 1998: 8-9). And it is from the same perspective that we can better understand his views of "people running in the same direction" as an important achievement of the USSR (see McGuinness 2002: 45-47).

When Wittgenstein remarks in the 1920s "Just improve yourself; that is the only thing you *can* do to better the world" (Monk 1991: 213) and in 1944 that "The revolutionary will be the one who can revolutionize himself" (Wittgenstein 1998: 51) he does not so much prioritise personal change over social, as highlight their interdependency. This interdependence between personal and social change has been a central theme for many emancipatory political approaches. Consider for example Marx's characterization of the coincidence of personal and social change as revolutionary practice in his third thesis on Feuerbach (Marx 1994: p. 99) or Gajo Petrovic's, one of the founding members of the humanist Marxist Praxis school, emphasis on that "it's wrong to think that the transformation of social institutions can be separated from the change of man, or that the change of the social order can precede the change of man. The transformation of society and the creation of new man are possible only as two closely connected sides of the same process" (Petrovic 1971: 289-290). Or, the case of Tolstoy, whose writings exercised a significant and lasting influence on Wittgenstein (see Monk 1991: 57, 115-117, 136, 193, 213), and who in his sympathetic discussion of anarchism remarks that "There can be only one permanent revolution – a moral one: the regeneration of the inner man. How is this revolution to take place? Nobody knows how it will take place in humanity, but every man feels it clearly in himself. And yet in our world everybody thinks of changing humanity, and nobody thinks of changing himself" (Tolstoy 1990). The duty to be true to oneself that Monk discerns as a constant guideline throughout Wittgenstein's life (Monk 1991: 17-18), takes a significant social turn in the later phase of his life and thought, where the self is constitutively social. This is made most clear when Wittgenstein observes, first, that:

> The sickness of a time is cured by an alteration in the mode of life of human beings, and it was possible for the sickness of philosophical problems to get cured only through a changed mode of thought and of life, not through a medicine invented by an individual (Wittgenstein 1978: Part II §23).

And, second, that:

> It is not by any means clear to me, that I wish for a continuation of my work by others, more than a change in the way we live, making all these questions superflu-

ous. (For this reason I could never found a school) (Wittgenstein 1998: 70).

In the above quotes Wittgenstein not only posits the change in the way we live (i.e., social change) as one of his (meta)philosophical and life goals, but he also acknowledges that this can only be realised through social and not individual means.

4. Philosophy and Personal and Social Change

Wittgenstein remarks in 1931: "Work on philosophy – like work in architecture in many respects – is really more work on oneself. On one's own conception. On how one sees things. (And what one expects of them)" (Wittgenstein 1998: 24). This work on oneself is for the later Wittgenstein a continuous endeavor, since "in doing philosophy you have got to be ready constantly to change the direction in which you are moving" (Rhees 1981: 229) and this is why "the philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas" (Wittgenstein 1981: §455). By approaching philosophy as a life-shaping enterprise Wittgenstein not only highlights its continuity with life, but also lays emphasis on its transformational character. In fact, Wittgenstein's later philosophical approach, with its thoroughly therapeutic character (see Wittgenstein 2001: §133), aims at being of a deep transformational nature. This can also be seen in his approach to philosophy as a hard attempt for a radical new way of thinking and as a call for change of (philosophical) taste, for liberation from certain pictures that hold us captive, for removing the pair of glasses on our nose that we never think of taking off (see Wittgenstein 1998: 25, 55; Wittgenstein 2001: §103, §115). This aimed transformation is not just of a personal character, but of a social one as well, something that is made clear once we consider his critical remarks to Norman Malcolm with regard to the term 'national character' and its essentialist, nationalist connotations: "…what is the use of studying philosophy if all that it does for you is to enable you to talk with some plausibility about some abstruse questions of logic, etc., & if it does not improve your thinking about the important questions of everyday life…" (Monk 1991: 424).

At the same time, Wittgenstein is quite skeptical of philosophy's efficacy in bringing about the desired change, holding that a philosopher's prompt to "Look at things *like this*" is not enough and that the "impulse towards such a change in the way things are perceived must come from another direction" (Wittgenstein 1998: 70). But, what direction could that be? Wittgenstein's discussion of religious instruction and the key role of example and personal initiative may offer a first hint. As he puts it: "It would be as though someone were on the one hand to let me see my hopeless situation, on the other depict the rescue-anchor, until of my own accord, or at any rate not led by the hand by the *instructor*, I were to rush up and seize it" (ibid.: 73). And what about the content, the particular orientation of Wittgenstein's aimed personal and social change? Certain characteristics of his life – such as his ascetic way of life, his distaste for personal property, and the disposition of the huge fortune he had inherited after his father's death (see Monk 1991: 171; Moran 1972: 89-90) – together with his expressed support of revolutionary defeatism in the first stages of World War II (see McGuinness 2002: 46-52) and his sympathy for the Soviet regime on the basis that it had abolished class distinctions and anti-Semitism (see Rhees 1981: 231; Moran 1972: 94-95) and stood for a new way of life (see Monk 1991: 349) offer us some first suggestions, but a proper discussion of this issue must be left for another occasion.

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How to Make Sense of the Ideas of Inner Perception and Observation According to Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology?

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Abstract

Contrary to the traditional behaviourist (Ryle 1949), logical behaviourist (Fodor and Chihara 1965), more recent psychologist (Hacking 1982) or expressivist (see e.g. Taylor 1980, Rosenthal 1993, Wright 1998, Moran 2001) readings of Wittgenstein, I intend to show that there is room both for the *expression* of *inner perception* and for the *observation of one's reactions* in Wittgenstein's last writings. In his last grammatical remarks, Wittgenstein (1980, 1982, 1992, 1998) indeed introduces a critical distinction between two kinds of psychological utterances: expression and description. The purpose of this paper is to show that, against behaviourist readings, a certain form of first person authority and of infallibility of linguistic self-analysis manifests itself in the grammar of "*expressions*". I will also show that the grammar of first person *descriptions* reveals, against psychologist or expressivist readings, a Wittgensteinian use of the notion of observation of oneself, based on reports and inference of my own psychic language games.

The notion of "inner observation", that is introspection, has been strongly opposed since Comte (1830)'s famous critical assessment. The French philosopher made obvious how problematic, or even contradictory, the notion is: using in particular the anger argument, he showed how difficult it is to observe one's own stream of consciousness without modifying it.

In his *Remarks on the philosophy of psychology,* Wittgenstein casts also some doubts upon this notion of "introspection":

> If someone says that he knows by introspection that it is a case of 'seeing', the answer is: "And how do I know what you are calling introspection? You explain one mystery to me by another." (RPPI: 3)

In order to avoid the use of such notion in psychology, following Comte's diagnostic, Brentano (1874) introduced an equally famous distinction between "inner observation" and "inner perception". Although inner observation is a highly problematic second order reflexive act, inner perception is non-reflexive, immediate and evident: thanks to inner perception, I would be immediately and infallibly aware of myself watching a tree, hearing the sound of the wind, feeling some pain, believing in God, etc. One can however wonder if the notion of "inner perception" is clearly less problematic than the notion of "inner observation/introspection". Following the Cartesian tradition (that is the "*cogito* argument"), the first "psychologists" (e.g. Mill 1865, Brentano 1874, James 1890, Russell 1912) certainly assumed the idea that self-consciousness had to be characterized by several distinctive features such as the evidence of inner sense (not reducible to outer sense), the immediacy of awareness and the first-person authority. But another tradition including for instance Russell 1921, behaviourists (e.g. Watson 1913, Skinner 1938), materalists (e.g. Armstrong 1968, Churchland 1984, Mellor 1977-78, Lycan 1996) or even cognitivists precisely denied the specificity and the infallibility of inner sense and the authority of first person. Arguing that the old-fashioned psychology relied on a metaphysics dualism, such new "psychologists" indeed defend the idea that inner consciousness has to be understood as an outer observation which proceeds through inference and which can be misleading (for an illuminating

analysis and a clear typology of those different positions, see Finkelstein 2003).

In this paper, I intend to show that Wittgenstein's position regarding the questions of inner perception and inner observation is much more complex than it appears at first sight. Far from defending the widespread behaviourist reading of Wittgenstein (mostly encouraged by Ryle 1949 and Fodor and Chihara 1965), I argue that Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology (1947-1951) makes room for the first-person authority and for the linguistic specificity of inner perception. Introducing a critical distinction between two kinds of psychological utterances, expressions and descriptions, he indeed endorses some original thesis which I intend to explain:

First, he argues that our unique access to sensations, emotions, mental acts, etc. is *conceptual*. Moreover, he adds that such psychological utterances have some specific formats: they are either expressions or descriptions which both present some specific grammatical features.

Second, Wittgenstein puts the emphasis on "expressions" which can only be expressed in the first person, using the present tense, and which are immune to errors inasmuch as they are neither true nor false. With this remark, Wittgenstein reintroduces, in a very new way, the traditional criteria of first person authority and of infallibility of the *linguistic expression of inner perception*.

Third, Wittgenstein characterizes "descriptions", contrary to expressions, as proceeding through observation and having a propositional content. He also remarks that the same utterance formulated in the first person of present tense can be used either as an expression or as a description. As a consequence, he introduces the very idea that a psychological utterance (for instance "I am in pain", "I wish", "I see", etc.) can be used as a *description*, that is: not as an inner observation but as an *observation* of the linguistic manifestation of one's *own* psychic life.

1. A denial of inner sense in Wittgenstein?

I think that the psychologist reading of Wittgenstein (e.g. Hacking 1982) is misleading. In Wittgenstein 1992, the philosopher indeed clearly rejects the Cartesian dualism between both substances: "the inner and the outer", the

psychic mental world and the external physical world. Such a dualism is problematic for at least two reasons. First, it tends to reify the socalled mental phenomena in hypostatising their reality (e.g. PI§598). Second it assumes that such an internal world is private in an ontological and epistemological sense. It would be my own world, which only I can access (see Glock 1996: 304). Moreover Wittgenstein clearly objects to the notion of inner representation (see e.g. Travis 2000).

However, I think that Wittgenstein doesn't deny the existence of inner life. As he clearly says: "it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them" (PI§308: 103). To put it otherwise, according to Wittgenstein, there is a huge "difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain": "Sensations" and other psychic phenomena are "not a nothing" (PI§304: 102).

As a consequence, I argue that the behaviourist reading of Wittgenstein is also inconsistent (see also Schulte 2000). Wittgenstein asks himself the question (to himself): "Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?" (PI§307: 102). His answer to the question is quite elliptical: "if I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a *grammatical* fiction". This means that if "psychic life" is a fiction, it has to be a "grammatical fiction", that is something about which we are at least able to speak.

This answer makes sense against the broader background of Wittgenstein's grammatical analysis. Wittgenstein indeed doesn't dispute the existence of our psychic life but argues that we can only analyse its linguistic manifestation. Only what we really express in language matters. Wittgenstein's formulations are very clear: "we are not analysing a phenomenon (e.g. thought) but a concept (e.g. that of thinking), and therefore the use of a word" (PI§383: 118).

As an illustration of this method, to clarify the concept of "impression", we have to imagine a *language game* in which such a concept is used: "Think of this language-game: Determine how long an impression lasts by means of a stop-watch" (LWII 51: 11). In his last writings, Wittgenstein pays special attention to the grammar of such language game, especially to the psychological language formulated in the first person.

2. First person expression

One of the main lessons of Wittgenstein's grammatical analysis of our psychological language games regards the possible format of first person psychological utterances. Wittgenstein suggests in a very convincing way that psychological utterances are not descriptions but mostly expressions. As a matter of fact, contrary to behaviourist readings, the recent literature put the emphasis on this notion of "expression" in Wittgenstein. A number of authors even regard his conception as "expressivist" (see e.g. Wright 1998, Taylor 1980, Moran 2001). However fundamental the notion of "expression" in Wittgenstein may be, I think that this "expressivist" reading of Wittgenstein is quite misleading. In a 1993 paper, Rosenthal suggests a paradigmatic reformulation:

> In *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein (1953) seems to have held, roughly, that although one can report that some other person is, for example, in pain, in one's own case on can only express the pain, and not report it as well. If so, sentences like "I am in pain",

which ostensibly report bodily sensations, actually just express them.
But however suggestive this idea may be, it is plainly possible to report explicitly that we are in such states. […] If we were unable to report on our own states of mind, but could only express them, this direct denial of the ascriptions others make about us would be impossible. If you deny that I am in pain and I simply say "ouch", we have not thus far contradicted each other (Rosenthal 1993: 203).

According to me, such reading is controversial for at least two reasons. First, I precisely think that Wittgenstein's conception of "expression" enables him to assert the authority of first person in the analysis of one's own psychic life. Second, I think that Wittgenstein distinction between expression and description (in the first person) introduces the idea that we are able "to report on our own states of mind".

In order to clarify the first idea, we have to pay attention to the specific grammar of "expression". "Expression" is the English translation of the German terms "Ausdruck" and "Äußerung ». Since Ryle 1949, "avowal" is also a usual translation. Wittgenstein remarks that even if an expression is often accompanied by a natural behaviour (see e.g. PI §257: pain is associated to wailing or a tremor, joy to laugh or smile, etc.), it is an irreducible linguistic utterance which can be characterized by some grammatical feature. First, an expression or an avowal is a linguistic utterance which is not based on a report inferred from a series of *observations*. For instance, I am not saying: "I am afraid" after having observed my hands trembling or my heart beating. Similarly, to use one of Wittgenstein's examples: "one doesn't shout 'Help' because he observes his own state of fear" (LWII §724: 120). To use another formulation, expression is a non-mediatised, that is, an *immediate* linguistic manifestation of our psychic life.

Second, Wittgenstein clarifies that expressions are always pronounced in the first person and at the present tense. For instance, "yesterday you were afraid" is not an expression. He even suggests that the use of the first pronoun "I" in an expression is redundant (PR §57). However, he remarks that one can express his own sensation or feeling in the first person in someone else's body. Following a "Humian" idea according to which the "self" is a fiction, he indeed remarks that "it is conceivable that I feel pain in a tooth in another man's mouth" (BBB: 49).

More fundamentally, Wittgenstein remarks than expressive utterances have a very special format inasmuch as they have no truth value (see e.g. RPP I §572): we cannot ask whether such utterances are true or false because they are neither true nor false. To put it differently, they have no propositional content. As a very consequence, we cannot deny someone else's expression. According to Wittgenstein, it is a logical nonsense to "try – in a real case – to doubt someone else's fear or pain" (PI§303: 102). Even more clearly, Wittgenstein asserts than "it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself" (PI§246: 89).

As a consequence, I personally consider than the notion of expression presents features that are similar to the psychological method of inner sense. More specifically, an expression has to be considered by its immediacy (it is not inferred from previous observations) and as it manifests a new kind of authority of the first person in the analyses of psychic life (which cannot be contradicted).

3. Description and observation in the first person

Contrary to an expression, a description results from a report and is inferred from an observation. It has a truth value: it can be true or false. In a more surprising way, Wittgenstein remarks that a description can be formulated either using the third or the *first* person. It means that a psychological utterance formulated in the first person (e.g. I am afraid, I see, I wish, I believe…) can also be used as a description and can rely on an *observation*. As a consequence, contrary to the first psychologists, who denied that "observation" had a role to play in psychological analysis of oneself (except through memory, cf. e.g. Brentano 1874), Wittgenstein makes some use of the notion of "observation" in self-analysis.

In order to explain this difficulty, one of Wittgenstein's grammatical remarks is very helpful. He indeed notices (for instance in PI §585-586, RPPII 156, RPPII 722) that the same utterance formulated in the first person in different contexts can be used either as an expression or as a description. For instance, an utterance as "I hope he'll come" can be used as an expression. In such a use, the utterance is expressed in the first person. It is neither true nor false, it cannot be contradicted and obviously doesn't result from an observation.

However, Wittgenstein remarks that the same "I hope he'll come" can also be used as a "report about his state of mind" (PI§585: 153), that is as a description resulting from an observation: "If I tell someone 'I can't keep my mind on my work today; I keep on thinking of his coming' – *this* [= ie "I hope he'll come] will be called a description of my state of mind". Wittgenstein 1980 develops many more cases. To take one of these, such an utterance as "I wish" is mostly used as an expression. It is however possible to use it as a description, that is not "on grounds of self-observation" but "by observing our own reactions" (RPPII §3: 2). For instance, I can observe that "for a long time I've been wishing" (RPPII 728: 120), etc. To a certain extent, I am attempting to generalize this remark and to say that all psychological utterance in the first person can be used, in a relevant context, as a description based on observation. Such observations do not have to be considered as inner observations nor as self-observations but as observations of our *own* psychic *language games*. What one observes is what one says when he is suffering, wishing, hearing, etc. Used as descriptions, psychological utterances based on observations of my own psychic manifestations are nonetheless obviously true or false and give us some "psychic" data. Consequently, Wittgenstein assumes that there is room for self-*knowledge* or at least for knowledge in the first person of our own psychic language games based on observations.

Conclusion

Contrary to the behaviourist, psychologist or expressivist readings of Wittgenstein, I tried both to show that even if Wittgenstein is not a psychologist and argues against the notion of inner observation, he nonetheless 1/ restores the authority and the immediacy of the first-person self-analysis of one's own psychic life (in expression); 2/ makes an important use of the notion of (outer) observation in self-knowledge inasmuch as he outlines the possibility of self-description of one's own psychic language games.

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The Form of Experience: Travis and McDowell on the Lesson of Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Considerations

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Abstract

John McDowell and Charles Travis disagree on how we should understand experience and the form of reason giving relations between experience and judgement. I want to suggest that a large part of this disagreement stems from their contrasting interpretation of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. Finally, I want to point in the direction of an argument that may serve to settle which of their views we should endorse.

McDowell and Travis disagree on whether what is given in experience is given in terms of objects falling under generalities. Travis (2013b: 124-125) defines the conceptual as what has a certain sort of generality, such that there is a variety of circumstances which would count as fitting it. There are multiple conditions the world can be in such that it is the case that there is nothing to drink. This can be the case while I am calmly sitting on the porch, but it can also be the case while I am rummaging panicky through the liquor cabinet.

According to McDowell (1996), experiences are conceptually structured. We experience an object as falling under the generality of being, say, being speckled. As there is a range of possible cases in which that object would be speckled, seeing something as being speckled is to be aware of something conceptually given. Travis (2013a & 2013b) disagrees. He claims that what we are aware of in experience is solely the particular. We don't experience the beetle *as being* green, we simply see the specific beetle and its particular shade of colour. Whether what we see counts as something being a beetle is a matter that the experience itself is silent upon. Whereas we, as judging subjects, may take a stance. Travis presents two positive arguments in favour of his claim. The first takes outset in Frege's claim that what we experience falls within the causal nexus in time and space. Travis (2013b & forthcoming) claims that if what is given in experience was general it could have no such location. I won't deal with this argument here (see Gersel (forthcoming) for a McDowellian response utilizing the notion of intuitional content). Travis's second argument is based on an idea he claims has its ancestry in Wittgenstein's thoughts on rules and the nature of concepts.

According to Travis (2013b: 134): "His [Wittgenstein's] interest, in the blue book, was in a sense in which *our* concepts leave it open what their proper application would be – what ought to count as fitting them. His point was: the *same* way things were might be counted as fitting a certain concept - as things being thus and so – or as not, for all the concept dictated as such.". Travis's (2013b: 134) concern is with what he calls 'occasion sensitivity'. The following illustrates the idea: If we are having guests over for dinner, or if it has just been one of those days, it may be right for me to say that there is nothing to drink, even though there is plenty of water in the tap. However, if I am just returning, utterly dehydrated, from a long run on a hot afternoon, this would be the wrong thing to say. Hence, whether the water in the tab counts as something to drink depends on the occasion on which that concept is used. A central element of Travis's theory is that we cannot specify ourselves out of such occasion sensitivity simply by using

further concepts, such as by saying that there is nothing alcoholic to drink; after all the cleaning detergent under the sink contains alcohol.

Travis (2011b: 180) sees Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations as a defense of the irrevocable occasion-sensitivity of all concept use. If our grasp of concepts amounted to grasp of a rigid rule for concept application this would provide a situation independent measure, such that independent of the occasion on which a concept was used it would be settled for any case whether it fitted the concept. According to Travis (2011b: 189), Wittgenstein has shown us that such determinacy is not to be had. What makes us rationally judging creatures is precisely our ability to discern in an infinitely variable set of situations whether how the world is counts as fitting a certain general, that is, conceptual, representation of it. Our ability to use concepts is rule-resistant in the sense that no rule can specify whether a concept applies to a certain case. There is nothing that rigidly count as being green, something might count now as green, now as not green, dependent on what else is going on. To possess the concept green is to be able to judge *in light of the occasion* whether something is green (Here it is crucial that 'occasion' refers, not merely to how the world we discuss is, but also to such things as what I want to do with saying something and the communal practices we are part of). Part and parcel of this conceptual capacity is to have the ability to provide reasons as to why one was correct in counting the thing in question as green. Those reasons might be publicly questioned by others, until we either come to an agreement or begin to wonder whether we use 'green' to refer to the same concept. (Travis 2011a: 20). Travis (2011a: 13) points to the following quote: "Understandings by means of language consists, not just in agreement in definitions, but (strange as this may sound) in agreement in judgements." (PI: 242). According to Travis, what makes us thinkers, rather than automata that simply respond to stimuli, is precisely our ability to engage in such open practices of justification of our concept use.

This view of concepts relates to experience, as Travis (2013b: 134) claims that

> Erasing the distinction [between the conceptuality of what is judged and the non-conceptuality of what is seen] …erases room for occasion-sensitivity; for the idea that the same thing may sometimes count, and sometimes not, as things being thus and so.

If I could see that the beetle was green then there would be no further issue of whether it would be proper to judge that it was green. Hence, on the assumption that Wittgenstein has taught us about the inherent occasion sensitivity

of concept use, we cannot have something conceptual, such as a fact, given in experience.

McDowell (1984) reads Wittgenstein differently. Clearly, Wittgenstein criticizes the idea that we can explain our conceptual capacities in terms of our grasp of some *substantial rule* which will inform us in the face of some non-conceptual given what conceptual representations it falls under. Where Travis objects to the 'rule'-part, McDowell objects to the 'substantiality'-part. He thinks that we can, and must, explain our understanding of concepts in terms of a grasp of rules. Only these rules won't be substantial rules that breach a gap between a non-conceptual given and a conceptual representation. Rather, they will be trivial rules between two parts of the conceptual. Any competent thinker can be attributed with grasp of the rule that if he sees that the beetle is green then he should judge it to be green. To grasp that is just to grasp that a judgement's truth depends upon the world.

> When we say "'Diamonds are hard' is true if and only if diamonds are hard", we are just as much involved on the right-hand side as the reflections on rule-following tell us we are. There is a standing temptation to miss this obvious truth, and to suppose that the right-hand side somehow presents us with a possible fact, pictured as a unconceptualized configuration of things in themselves. (McDowell 1984: 352)

According to McDowell (1996 & 2009), the reasons provided by experience must at the ultimate level be reasons on this trivial rule-bound form. Hence, what is given in experience must have a conceptual form. If it didn't our justification of how our concepts apply to the perceived world would be unable to take the trivial rule-bound form that Wittgenstein has, according to McDowell, shown us that it must take.

McDowell (1996) agrees with Travis that one wouldn't be a concepts user if one simply had the capacity to reliably express 'that is red' when encountering red things. To grasp a concept one must master its inferential role in a whole series of judgements. To both McDowell and Travis, this justificatory web that I see my judgement as placed within must involve experience itself. However, this grasp of how an experience provides a reason for judgement is for McDowell a matter of the ability to see that P and know the trivial rule that when one sees that P then one is justified in judging that P. For Travis, such grasp amounts to an occasion sensitive recognitional capacity to determine whether things on a given occasion counts as being P. To Travis, what makes this recognitional capacity rational is one's ability to engage in a web of justifications as to why one can indeed, when seeing this part of the non-conceptual, on this occasion, recognize things as being P rather than not P. Importantly, on Travis's theory, this web of justifications has no trivial end-point, nor any rigid rule to rely upon. Rather, we have the versatile capacity to explore various paths towards reaching agreement with those who challenge our judgement, until we either find such agreement or are led to question the commonality of the language with which we express our concepts. What I have suggested at this stage, is that both McDowell and Travis see their view as forced upon us by the lessons provided by Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations.

Wittgenstein interpretation aside, how should we settle the issue between McDowell and Travis. While I am not in possession of the full argument, I want to end by pointing in a direction where I think we should search. A central difference between McDowell's and Travis's view is the open-endedness of our justification. On McDowell's view, we can provide a reason that fully settles the issue of whether P was the thing to judge. We may of course be mistaken as to what reasons we have, but if I did indeed see that P, then that reason fully settles that I was correct in judging that P. One cannot question whether my reasons is sufficient; one can only question whether I do indeed have that reason.

On Travis's view, when I claim that P, the reasons I can provide will always remain open for questioning as to whether they sufficiently support my judgement. If I judge that there is nothing to drink I can at best provide controversial reasons as to why this way parsing things into drinkables and non-drinkables makes sense on this occasion. But are those reasons good enough? Given that Lucy is coming and she is a teetotaler shouldn't I then have parsed things differently? Such questions will always be available on Travis's model. For one cannot simply present one's reason as 'I recognized that P' for that would simply be a reassertion that one was right in one's judgement that P, and it is the propriety of that judgement that is under question. On McDowell's view, when one's judgement is questioned, one can retreat to the mentioning of one's perceptual state in providing a fully adequate reason. However, on Travis's view, if we attempt to do the same we would be retracting to our experience of some non-conceptual given, and whether the experienced non-conceptual case is a case that fits a certain conceptual representation is always an open occasion sensitive question. For, if Wittgenstein is to be believed, one thing is certain: we cannot provide justification in terms of a grasp of substantial rules that connect the conceptual and the non-conceptual.

A central question is then: What is the threat in acknowledging that we can never provide reasons for our perceptual judgements that fully settle their propriety? I think McDowell is worried about how we fare in our first personal epistemic enquiries. If someone else asks for my justification, and we let the discussion roam to its rational end, then we either reach agreement or, if we do not, I can write my interlocutor off as using different concepts. As long as some interlocutors agree with me, I can retain confidence in my recognitional capacity. For I never doubted it to being with, hence, I just need to avoid that this initial conviction is undermined. However, when I raise the first personal question 'With what right do I judge that P', then I *myself* question how my perceptual judgement could be adequately supported. This is a quid juris question in the Kantian (A84/B116) sense. If such an internal worry could never reach an end where a fully settling reasons was provided, then it would be scant support that others happen to agree with me, for their capacities are as questionable as my own. I think McDowell's worry is that we must be able to end such first-personal epistemic worries if we are to be rationally respectable self-conscious thinkers, and he thinks the only way of doing so is by supporting our active judgements by reference to our passive perceptions. However, if what is given in those perceptions is non-conceptual, and we lack any substantial rules that connect the non-conceptual to the conceptual, then such reference to the passive element of cognition will either provide inadequate support for my judgement, or rely on a tacit presumption of the adequacy of the very recognitional capacity that is questioned. This has merely been a preliminary sketch of a line of worry. But I think I may be developed, and if so it might show why the lesson from Wittgenstein's rule following considerations had better teach us to be wary of substantial rules, rather than wary of rules all together.

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Object of Perception. A Critical Analysis of Martin's Naïve Realism

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Abstract

Subjective indistinguishability of veridical perception with non-veridical experiences has been used to argue that object of perception are mind-dependent sense-data. This has been a serious challenge to realism about object of perception. M.G.F. Martin has responded to the challenge by arguing against bracketing perception together with non-veridical experiences and claiming that perception, unlike the non-veridical experiences, is indeed a relation to mind-independent objects. Martin's view is not just a criticism to sense-data view of perception but also to the content view about perceptual experiences which maintains both veridical and non-veridical experiences are mental states sharing representational content. This paper critically analyses Martin account of perception presenting criticisms levelled at the position by Susanna Siegel and John Searle. Also, the paper tries to produce independent arguments to show why a repressentative account to perception is a better response to sense-data theory than Martin's disjunctivist account.

I.

In our ordinary understanding, perception is the primal means of connecting to the world. It seems perceptually the objects in the world are directly presented to the subject. These objects are perceived as extra mental entities– objects out there in the reality – as opposed to fictions conjured up by the mind. The challenge to the ordinary understanding of perception comes from experiences like illusion and hallucination. In illusory and hallucinatory experiences, the appearance does not match the reality. Like a straight stick dipped in water illusorily appears bent. Or hallucinogens might result in a subject hallucinating a pink elephant. The challenge arises from the fact that such erroneous experiences may be experientially indiscriminable to the subject from veridical perceptual experiences where the subject is presented with real objects.

II.

The Argument from Illusion (Ayer 1953) is the classic argument to exploit this experiential indiscriminability to come to a conclusion that perceptual experiences – both veridical and non-veridical (illusion or hallucination) have mind-dependent objects or sense-data as the object of experience. It is argued that given illusory and veridical experiences are of the same qualitative kind, it is reasonable to hold that the objects for both experiences are of one kind. And as the object of illusion can't be physical (given the real physical world doesn't match with the experience in illusion) it is concluded that objects of all perceptual experiences – veridical or not – are mental objects or as they are otherwise called sense-data.

The sense-data view naturally raises difficult questions about the relation between such sense-data and the objects in the world. Further if the object of perceptual acquaintance is restricted to sense-data then the sceptical problem of knowledge of the external world is also raised. Given these problems, attempts have been made to refute the sense data theory of perception and establish realism about the object of perception. These realist accounts of perception belong to two major kinds namely: the disjunctivist/ object view and the representational/content view about perception (Fish 2010). Here, we would like to discuss one of the most important disjunctivist account of perception as advocated by M.G.F. Martin and discuss some of the objections to the view before concluding that

the representational theory of perceptual experience is the more adequate response to sense-data theory.

III.

Martin defends what he calls naïve realism, a pre-theoretic view about perception based upon introspection, which is supposed to be in tune with our ordinary conception of perception. According to Martin (Martin 2002) introspection upon experiences reveal experiences to be *transparent* in that it reveals not the features of experiences but rather concrete objects of the external world. Introspectively it also seems that the objects are also presented immediately. However we have already seen how the argument from illusion throws challenge to realism about objects of perception. Martin tries to retain realism by rejecting a crucial premise of the argument from illusion, that veridical and non-veridical experiences are of a common kind. Rejecting this premise means Martin doesn't need to give the same analysis to perception as to illusion or hallucination and thereby preserves the common-sense insight that perception is awareness of mind-independent objects. Martin characterises his position about perceptual experiences in this terms, "The disjunctive theory of perception claims that we should understand statements about how things appear to a perceiver to be equivalent to statements of a disjunction that either one is perceiving such and such or one is suffering an illusion (or hallucination); and that such statements are not to be viewed as introducing a report of a distinctive mental event or state common to these various disjoint situations." (Martin 2004, 37)

This allows Martin to characterise perception in fundamentally different terms independently of the nature of non-veridical experiences. Martin writes veridical experiences are, "at least in part, *nonrepresentational*. Some of the objects of perception –the concrete individuals, their properties, the events these partake in – are *constituents* of the experience. No experience like this, no experience of fundamentally the same kind, could have occurred had no appropriate candidate for awareness existed." (Martin 2004, 39, emphasis added) In contrast to veridical perception, Martin is reluctant to provide any positive characterisation of non-veridical experiences or to perceptual experiences in general. He doesn't think because veridical and non-veridical experiences may be subjectively indistinguishable there is any need to posit some common object or representational content for both cases. He characterises perceptual experiences in general to be experi-

ences which are introspectively indistinguishable from veridical perception. The only property perceptual experiences share is the negative epistemic property of introspective indistinguishability. This property, according to Martin is enough to explain why a veridical experience and a hallucination can give rise to same belief and behaviour. For instance, our behaviour after seeing a snake and after hallucinating a snake might be identical; and this is so as both of these experiences are indistinguishable from seeing a snake. Thus, having stipulated a definition for perception he provides a characterisation of perceptual experiences which is parasitic on perception. Martin also rejects – interestingly what seems to be a strong common-sense intuition – that perception and hallucination have similar phenomenal character. According to Martin, phenomenal consciousness is "simply the presence to us of the ordinary world around us." (Martin 2004, 83) As this presence would be lacking in hallucinatory case, hallucinations can't be considered as phenomenally conscious state of experience.

IV.

Martin's disjunctivism about perceptual experience has been subjected to various criticisms. Susanna Siegel (Siegel, 2004) doesn't think that perceptual experiences are best understood in terms of the indistinguishability condition. She provides examples of certain visual illusions which cannot be characterized in terms of indistinguishability with perception as there could be no veridical experiences like that. For instance, Escher's impossible staircase or the Muller-Lyer illusion. These are such experiences that it is empirically impossible for a veridical experience to be introspectively indistinguishable from it. Siegel's other criticism of the indistinguishability condition maintains that it fails to characterise perceptual experiences of creatures lacking the ability to introspect. I will not go into the details of this criticism as Martin has already responded to it by saying that the notion of indistinguishability he is maintaining is an impersonal notion and not species relative.

John Searle criticises the notion that the phenomenal nature of perception and hallucination are different. Referring to visual experience Searle says, "Once the visual stimulus is past the retina, the visual system knows nothing further about its external cause… So it is in principle possible to duplicate exactly the sequence of causal events minus the external stimulus. In fact, the conscious visual experience is fixed fairly far down the line in the visual system. According to Francis Crick and Christof Koch, V1 (Visual Area 1) has little, or possibly no, effect on the visual experience." (Searle 2015, 164) Searle also cities Dominic ffytche's study of hallucination on patients suffering from Bonnet's syndrome to claim that such patients report phenomenal character which is very much like the phenomenal character of perception[1]. Thus, it is not just counterintuitive that hallucinatory experiences lack phenomenal character there may be some empirical evidence in support of it.

It is also doubtful whether Martin's account really is a naïve or common-sense account of perceptual experience. Martin has said that his motivation for holding naïve realism that it is "the best articulation of how our experience strikes us as being to introspective reflection on them."

(Martin 2004, 42) However it seems to me, introspection upon perceptual experience not only provides the intuition that the objects are extra-mental it also seems to provide the intuition that there is something which is common between the perceptual experiences like perception, illusion and hallucination and precisely this commonality explains why subjectively the experiences may seem to be of the same kind. In particular introspectively it would seem both perception and hallucination are experiences with phenomenal character, in contrast to Martin's position as explained before.

It is also questionable whether introspection upon veridical perception reveal that the objects are constitutive of the experience. Introspection from naïve perspective, it seems, should reveal that the concrete object is there in the external world but it would not reveal that the experience contains the object in any sense. To use Searle terminology, how can an ontologically objective state of affairs be constitutive of experience which is an ontologically subjective?

I think introspective indistinguishability, if anything, should be considered as an argument against Martinian naïve realism. I think it is reasonable to suppose that the reason we cannot introspectively discriminate a veridical perception from a non-veridical perception is because there is no such fundamental difference in kind between the two experiences. I think the representative account captures why veridical experiences and non-veridical experiences are introspectively indistinguishable much better. According to standard representative account, the similarity in perception and hallucination is not in the object. The object is an ontologically real entity present outside the experience. Only perception but not hallucination are experiences with relations to such real objects. However, what explains the subjective indistinguishability of perception and hallucination is sharing a common content of experience. Now introspection upon perception and matching hallucination is directed to the experience and as the contents are matching introspection reveals the experiences being of the same nature. The disjunctivist account entails that introspection upon mental state is unable to even determine the fundamental nature of the mental state. It cannot identify the absence of something which is constitutive of it (the object). But from the representational account introspection need not be so maligned. Rather than holding that introspection upon experience cannot determine the fundamental nature of experience we may hold introspection doesn't distinguish the two experiences because there are no distinctions in the experiences per se as they have the same content.

A representative account of perceptual experience is also explanatorily superior to the disjunctivist account. Suppose we compare two experiential scenarios one of perceiving and other of hallucinating. For each of these cases the experience of one red ball is compared to the experience of two red balls. The question asked is how would the disjunctivist and the representationalist accounts explain these scenarios? In the case of perception, the disjunctivist would say, the difference in the constitutive objects of the two experiences explains the difference in experience. A representationalist would maintain the content of the two experiences differ. In the case of hallucination, the representational explanation would stay the same – one experience represents one red ball, the other represents two red ball. The disjunctivist explanation would however change. Since there are no constitutive mind-independent objects to such experience presumably the disjunctivist would have to maintain either, there is a representational difference due to difference in content or he has to maintain the difference is due to a difference in

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[1] Patients suffering Bonnet's syndrome have severely impaired vision. The hallucinations they suffer often have an amusing character or rich detail (which gets marked out given the condition of their eyesight) due to which it is possible for patients to detect the experience in question is hallucinatory. However, the claim here made by Searle is that the experiments suggests the phenomenal character of both perception and hallucination are similar in kind.

constitutive mental objects or sense-data. Thus, the disjunctivist has to give either a representational or a sense-data view based explanation to hallucinations even as it gives a naïve realist explanation for the veridical case.

Last but not the least Martin hasn't provided any explanation how two fundamentally different kinds of experiences can resemble? We know Berkeley made a famous criticism against Locke's theory of perception. Locke had maintained that primary ideas are copies of the physical objects. Berkeley's criticism was ideas can only resemble ideas. (Berkeley 1948–1957) Now one wonders whether a similar criticism is also applicable to Martin. How can non-veridical experiences which have representative contents or sense-data be indistinguishable from veridical perception which are non-representative experiences constituted by concrete objects?

Sense-data theory has fallen into disgrace in recent years and rightly so given that it posits private, subjective, mental objects to explain veridical experiences. Wittgenstein had criticised the notion of a private, subjective sense-datum as the object of perception. According to him objects are public: it makes no sense saying only a certain subject possesses an object of perception in his mind (Wittgenstein 1953) Responding to the sense-data theorists' conviction about private sense-data he writes, "Might I not ask: In what sense have you got what you are talking about and saying that only you have got it? Do you possess it? You do not even see it…And this too is clear: if as a matter of logic you exclude other people's having something, it loses its sense to say that you have it." (Wittgenstein 1953) Martin is also critical to the sense-data account however in this attempt he disjoints perception from other perceptual experiences in kind. Though logically there may not be any problem in doing so but the

claim remains counterintuitive and most likely scientifically flawed. The representational view of experience seems better equipped to provide a simpler explanation to questions about perceptual experience – like the phenomenal character, belief formation, and behaviour.

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Crisis of Meanings in the Field of Environment: A Wittgensteinian Critique

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Abstract

According to Wittgenstein in the *Philosophical Investigations*, meaning is not fixed for any given concepts in the language that we use. Contrary, it suggests that the meaning given for a concept was depended on the context where that concept is constructed or used. This idea of meaning which considers 'use value' is considered as a one of the central points of the philosophical analysis in Wittgenstein methods. This study aims to inquire the 'meaning issue' related to the context of environment using Wittgenstein´s method of investigation.

Meanings of the field of environment have gone into problematic situations. This leads to a dispute over meanings between environmentalist/philosophers and has led to cripple both the national and international programs and plans that have been applied to solve environmental problems and conserve the environment. The broad objective of this paper is to inquire into the meaning crisis in the context of the environment using Later Wittgenstein approach.

Introduction

The Subject of Environment and Environmental Protection has become a crucially important branch in conceptual mapping and the policymaking lobbies globally today. This importunacy gets more attention in social and political sphere in the current global political debates as well. The academic interest to these issues is also a vital. Therefore, the discussions of sustainability, environmental conservations and protecting biological diversities become key components of the international policy making endeavors (Barbour 1980). The mainstream conversationalists seem to use scientific tools (methods) to identify the environmental problems and to develop environmental management structures. However, the empirical data shows that just identifications of problems using the scientific tools and solving them designing management structures were not able to answer the issues and conflicts in this field. The data further suggests that the epistemological issues such as 'knowledge' and 'meaning' in the field of environment plays an significant role, which should be taken into consideration in the policy making process.

This study discuss above epistemological issue in the field of environment using Ludwig Wittgenstein's method of investigation. Wittgenstein, in his book *Philosophical Investigation*, attempts to show how his grammatical method diagnose philosophical confusions and counter those through developing clear view of how the concepts that make up the different regions of our language actually function. Developing this method Wittgenstein details pattern of use of our concepts- use of words- in various contexts (Wittgenstein 1953).

Concept of Environment in the History of Philosophy

"Nature" and "Environmental thoughts" in Early Modern Philosophy were mainly related with Western thinkers who developed a 'critique' on Medieval Religious thoughts. There were different developments in these critiques by different philosophers. One important development in early Modern period is to "move out" knowledge from authoritative religious ideology. It aims to open and to create a new worldview, which has "human controllability" over their divine powers. This move also raises the basic epistemo-logical questions such as "how we understand ourselves", "whether human being is an autonomous being".

Francis Bacon (1561 – 1626) in his book, *Advancement of Learning* (2000 /1605) developed an argument that "the objective of human knowledge should be of practical importance instead of being spiritual engagements". The important issue that he suggested was to change the then existing understanding on nature and environment and to focus "using the nature" not for itself but for the sake of human beings. Bacon uses a new concept *Philanthropia* (Bacon, 2000: 1605), which means, "love of humanity" to explain to this human centered new worldview. Bacon argues that the means to overcome the "necessities and miseries of humanity" is to use nature by gaining knowledge of it through observations and experiences. This helped to form a later developed concept of "anthropocentricism".

Rene Descartes (1596–1650) developed a new understanding on the relationship between mind and matter (Descartes 1981 [1637]). As Bacon, he also questions the religious authority over human rationality. In his famous series of texts under the name of *Meditations*, Descartes outlines the new understanding on the world and Nature. He theorizes that the "nature" as we see it is a "fiction" which is "created" by our mind. So mental substance is the primary force in human understanding by which the material substance is 'created'. This theory argues that nature (Environment) is mechanical in character. It is a "dead" domain that can be understood using mathematical and mechanical laws. Therefore, Descartes argues that the environment (animals or plants) can be "treated as an instrument to be exploited for human ends and human goals" (Descartes, 1981 [1637]). This worldview, scientifically backed by Bacon and philosophically by Descartes leads to late – Modern Philosophical and scientific developments of the world.

Hegel in his *Philosophy of Nature* (1970 [1800]) argues that "nature is more rational than productive". He identifies that nature is not a mechanical but a rational process. Schopenhauer, who was influenced on Wittgenstein's work as well, claimed in his *The World as Will and Representation* (1969 [1844]) that, unlike Hegel or Schelling, the human individuals are less free from the natural determination. He maintains that the human actions like that of other living beings are (animal and Plants) ultimately determined

by "will –to – life". More importantly the dialectical method that Hegel develops shows that "the relationship of 'humanity' to 'nature' is to be understood as a totality: the world is what it is as a result of its being lived in and transformed by humanity" (Soper 1986: 24).

Modern form of Environmental Ethics and Environmental Philosophy developed in the middle of the twentieth century. It is rooted in sense of crises occurred due to our way of life in the contemporary social and political setting. It alarms of global threats to the very existence of human beings. Since this Environmental problem in modern form relates to the continuation of "human understanding" and "history of ideas", it is more appropriate to examine it from a philosophical base.

Wittgenstein´s Methods

Ludwig Wittgenstein is considered as one of the leading philosopher in the twentieth century, who presented two significantly different philosophical positions consecutively, one by his early book, *Tractates Logico Philosophicus* (1924) and other by his later works, *Philosophical Investigations* (1953). Wittgenstein centered "language" as the 'object of inquiry'. In the *Tractates,* he argues that the language is the 'pictorial representation of reality' through examining the 'inner epistemological relation of language to its relations to outer world'. Contrasting to this position in *Tractates*, in *Philosophical Investigation* Wittgenstein argues that the 'meaning of a given statement is not a pictorial representation of the reality but its meaning is contextual which based on the use of language. This 'use value of linguistic presentation (not representation)' is varying according to the contexts that the language is being used. Therefore, the 'meaning' in his later philosophy is not something 'fixed' or 'represented' within the 'language' as it was claimed in his early philosophy. In this paper, I focus later philosophy of Wittgenstein's which presented mainly in *Philosophical Investigation*, (1953).

The idea of *grammatical investigation* is central to Wittgenstein's works and it is key to understand his later philosophy. He suggests that the language creates philosophical myths and logical confusions. In order to solve these confusions, he describes that the kind of investigation he is engaged in based on clarifying use of language as 'grammatical one'. This grammar differs from the traditional grammar we follow in language studies. He uses of the concept of grammar, not as a systematic arraignments of signs, but to frame the structure of our *practice of using* language. This concept of 'our practice of using language' does not take as 'some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm', but as a 'spatial and temporal phenomenon' (Wittgenstein 1953: 108). In doing this grammatical investigation, Wittgenstein suggests two important understandings which on one hand makes us aware of differences between our philosophical reflective idea of how a concepts works (use) and the way it actually functions and on the other, to draw our attention to how these differences in the patters of use characterize the different regions of our language. He calls 'the traditional philosophical notion of looking at functions of concepts' and 'how concepts in different region of our language used' as grammatical difference. Wittgenstein says " one can not guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that. But the difficulty is to remove the prejudice stands in the way of doing this." (Wittgenstein 1953: 340).

Analytical Philosophical Position of Environment

A Common feature of Analytic Philosophical tradition relates of Modern ages Philosophical foundations. The discussion on the concept of Environment in this tradition therefore is connected to that philosophical foundation. Firstly, Analytic tradition considers the 'world view', which is based on the classical Cartesian dualistic approach on substance. This dualistic form suggests that the world consists of physical and mental substance. Secondly the Analytic tradition depends on anthropocentrism. Assumptions in anthropocentrism is that the consideration of the existence of all other beings is for "the consumption of human beings". Thirdly, the Utilitarianism on economic and ethical grounds is also a theoretical foundation of Analytic tradition. Fifthly this tradition approves the modern scientific method, which developed in the West with the reductionist approach to warn human beings of the Nature. Creating "criterion" for the role of philosophy and searching for the "meaning" in given statements can be seen as the main function of the tradition of Analytical Philosophy. All aspects that are needed for human beings to lead a prosperous life are covered by this tradition. Culture, language, politics, economy, ethics and so on are the main areas that are taken into consideration by this school. Environment, natural world or the physical world have become one of the key segments in the subject of Analytical Philosophy. Analytical Philosophy has paid attention to four important areas of environment such as (a) Nature of environment, (b) Environmental problems, (c) Environmental conservation, (d) Sustainable use of natural resources. Overall objective of these four areas are either highlighting the importance of environment or to urge people to consider environment before committing any act that leads to destruct the equilibrium of the environment. It can be argued that the "other side" of the later Wittgenstein critique is represented in the positivistic approach of environment.

Contemporary Environmental Philosophy

Environmental philosophy in contemporary form developed in late 1960 as a process of (a) understanding the environmental issues (b) as a response concerning diverse queries and questions arise from naturalists, scientists, specialists in technological fields and policy makers (Brennan 2001: 372). In 1962 Rachel Carson published *Silent Spring*, a book which documented issues and nature of the accumulation of dangerous pesticides and chemicals in our food processing systems. This influential work raised very fundamentally important issues regarding an academic discipline that should address issues of environment and analyse the nature of such issues in order to find some solutions. This discussion was supported by the Paul Ehrlich works, *Population Bomb* which was published in 1968 (Ehrlich 1968). This discussion turned into a new area of the subject with the Historian Lynn White Jr. who published an essay on " The Historical Roots of our ecological crisis" *Science* magazine in 1967. He argued that the Judo-Christian thought is responsible in forming a worldview, which destructs the environment. Richard Routley claimed that the narrow focusing on humans as only morally valuable thing on the earth is unjustifiable. According to him this narrow focus is a discrimination, which can be called as "human Chauvinism" (Routley1973: 270).

Philosophers who study more broad areas of the human-natural relationship took the philosophical roots developed on environmental studies. Many different theorists in philosophical and ethical domains enhanced this move.

These trends spread between North American and European academia. As Andrew Brennan contends this development "environmental philosophy has explored new criteria of such considerability including being alive (Goodpaster 1978); being a community or holistic entity of a certain kind (Callicott 1980, 1987; Rolston 1994); being an entity or organism that has an end (or telos) in itself (Taylor 1981, 1986, Rolston 1994); being subject of life (Regan 1983); lacking intrinsic function (Brennan 1984); being a product of natural process (Rolstin 1989, Elliot 1982); or being naturally autonomous (Katz 1997)" (Brennan 2001: 374). Beside these developments there are another philosophical intervention by Norwegian thinker Arne Naess who took a different path by introducing the idea of Deep Ecology (Naess 1973).

Reading Environment through Wittgenstein

Later Wittgenstein philosophy (mainly based on *Philosophical Investigation*) provides more 'critical' arguments on knowledge and the way knowledge is gained. It analyses concepts and the statements in the light of human experience and the context its presents. It argues that the meaning of a philosophical-claim differs from what Analytical tradition suggests. Wittgenstein maintains that knowledge is something which 'constructs' meaning mainly dealing with the 'textual and contextual' reading of a given thing, focusing its context, space and time, language, culture and history. He also developed a critical way to understand how we gain knowledge. This position is relating with the Continental Philosophy (Glendinning, 1999) which suggests more 'inclusive' process of making 'meaning' in the knowledge seeking exercises. The Continental thoughts contrast with the Analytical epistemological position on meaning and the meaningful statements. More precisely, Continental philosopher Critchley Simon suggests that the "philosophical arguments cannot be divorced from the textual and contextual conditions of its historical emergence" (Critchley, 1998). Irene J Klaver (2005) clams that the subject of environmental ethics developed in the context of Anglo-American philosophical traditions in later twentieth century and "remained mainly based on the analytical tradition while the areas of environmental philosophy mainly deals with the areas that the continental traditions suggested.

Michael E. Zimmerman observes the significance of the continental philosophical traditions readings on Environmentalism. He argues that within the continental tradition there are two approaches that we could use for 'theorizing' environmentalism. In the first approach, he says, "which has had mixed results, involves showing how the work of some leading thinkers – such as Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, or Wittgenstein – may be read as consistent with environmental practice and theory and the second approach applies to the contemporary continental theories, such as postmodernist theory to environmental practice and theory" (Zimmerman 2005).

Epistemological Explanations on Environment

Epistemology is a main branch of philosophy, which focuses on the "area of knowledge" and on "how human beings acquires knowledge". Hence, it is important to discuss epistemological roots in the Nature and Environment. Such a discussion helps to examine the human-nature relationship by elaborating questions like "how we create our epistemic system on the nature" and "what is the way that we value the non human substances in the environment".

Even though, Epistemology mainly deals with areas of defining knowledge and outlining the ways and means how we gain that knowledge, in the history of philosophy, it shows that this section of philosophy also engages in developing the 'meaning criteria' for logical thinking and the truths. Further, it defines philosophical concepts related to meanings and application of those in the historical contexts that are used for justifying the knowledge. The broad objective of this paragraph therefore, is to discuss the Epistemological Explanations on Environment and to see the relationship between human epistemic process and the nature. Popular epistemological inquiries in environment can be formed as follows;

(a) Meaning of the concept of environment (b) Crisis of the Meanings in the context of environment (c) Order of things in the modern world (d) Environmental crisis: (e) Epistemological understanding Environmental Ethics.

Meaning of the Concept of Environment

There are different meanings, which have been used to explain the concept of environment by different thinkers in the history of philosophy. Searching the 'meaning' for the concept of environment therefore is one of the main topics in the epistemological discussion too. This background paves the way to emerge different meanings for the said concept. Among them "the nature as totality", "Dualistic World", 'Anthropocentric Ideology' and "Bacons Scientific Methods" are widely discussed meanings.

The concept of "the nature as totality" is based on the answers for the questions such as whether the term "environment" represents human + non-human entity as a whole or whether it represents only the non-human section of the world leaving the 'human factor' out of this domain. However, the central discussion of the concept of "the nature as totality" is to discuss the factor as to how to place "the human being" into environmental totality or "the natural whole". On the other hand this concept argues whether, the human being and environment are in the same domain that is called environment or not. The answer for these questions relates to the concept of Cartesian Dualism and later developed concept of anthropocentrism, which led to industrialization and market economy.

This theoretical background helps to create a new social meaning given to the natural environment based on human centric principle, which is called "Anthropocentric World view". This noval meaning leads to "reduce" human being to a super level in the hierarchy of the world. The development of this kind directs us to consider the environment as an entity, which is "isolated" from the human. This imagination is central and can be identified as one of the main epistemological bases to create another meaning for the environment.

Another important issue with regard to the meaning of environment is to inquire whether the "value" in environment is intrinsic or instrumental (conditional). It means to examine whether the environment has intrinsic "value in its own or whether the value is being conditional to the human interest. The issue of "intrinsic value of environment" versus "human centered value on environment" is a main debate in Environmental Ethics. According to some critics deviating the environment into commodities, which have just an "exchange value", is the logical result of human centered value system on environment. This subversive attitude towards the environment and taking it as a "dead" material domain under the human's authority is central in the discussion in environmental philosophy. The meaning

given to the concept of environment based on this value argument has long a history in the philosophical debates.

Crisis of Meanings in the Context of Environment

"Crisis of Meanings" refers in this study for discussing the different meanings given to one incident of things. Sometimes, different groups of people or within the different contexts they can give different interpretations for a single incident or thing. This background or "crisis of meanings" in general creates problems among philosophers and among general public when understanding the social and environmental phenomena and issues.

It is a widely accepted fact that, there is not any fixed meaning for any concepts in the subjects related to social sciences and humanities. However, when it comes to the context of environment and discussion of the environment, there are two positions in creating meanings, which can be identified. They are (a) Universalistic meanings of environment (b) Contextual meanings of environment.

'Universalistic meaning' of environment can be identified in the Positivistic Philosophy in Analytic Tradition and 'contextual meanings' of environment can be traced to the Phenomenological and Deconstructive methods in later Wittgenstein philosophy.

Universalistic Meanings in Environment

The "Meaning" has become the important area of study in the Western Philosophy particularly within the Contemporary Analytical Philosophy in 20th century. Positivistic Philosophers in Analytical traditions who developed the "meaning criterion" for searching knowledge claim that the meaning would develop within the domain of "language". Further, they argue that language represents the "reality". According to the Analytical traditions, meaning of given things can be objectified and established with the physical domain. Fixed meanings for anything in the world were given by this tradition. Such trends of making meaning pave the way to emerge universal meaning related to socio-economic and environmental issues. This position helps to create universalistic meanings in the context of environment. Therefore, universally accepted meanings were developed related to environment and environmental issues such as, Defining environmental crisis, Identifying the root causes of environmental problems, Developing strategies for environmental conservations, Designing mitigation measures for environmental problems and Formulating environmental management tools.

Contextual Meanings of Environment

Though contextual meanings of environment are centered within the several traditions of the Contemporary Continental Philosophy, it can be argued that these traditions mainly based on the philosophical method of Wittgenstein. Meanings, according to these traditions, are based on the context. Generally, contexts vary temporally and spatially.

The phenomenon, process and states of being related to the studies of environment have been developed within complex contexts. Similarly, the meanings of the context of environment too have gone into a problematic situation. This leads to a crisis between environmentalists and philosophers within same school of philosophers and among different schools such as Contemporary Continental Philosophy and Contemporary Analytical Philosophy. There-

fore, it is difficult to find fixed or unique definitions or meaning for any technical terms or concepts that are discussed within the subject of environment. However, the Environmental Philosophers claim that it is a fundamental requirement to use fixed definitions to solve environmental problems and conserve the environment within the given context.

"Order of things" in the Modern World

Philosophers who discuss on modernity and the modern culture had paid attention to the foundation of the modernity. Main feature of this development was to search a systematic arrangement to keep "things in order". That means, the modern philosophers argued that there is a logical sequence for anything to happen, exist or emerge. This is common for any phenomenon in natural or artificial world, physical or metaphysical world and living and nonliving things that exists on earth. This argument, which relates to the rational thinking and rationalization process, means the concept of the order of the things in modernity has the direct relationship with the history of ideas and social structure of power. However, the simple meaning of the concept of "order or things" is identifying the structure of social formation of modernization projects. For instance, relationship between man and environment, which is described in the concept of order of things, where "nature" is considered as a *passive agent* where the "human being" is identified as an *active agent*.

Michael Foucault in his ground braking work *Order of Things* (1966) argues that knowledge is not "absolute" as Analytical Philosophy suggests and it is "contextual" which mainly includes the "observers' interventions in to the observation". According to Foucault there is a clear brake in the theory of knowledge in the sixteenth century between the knowledge of Classical Ages and modernity. As a result of this division, he argues that there are three areas of knowledge that we could identify in the history of ideas of human being. Those are (a) linguistic (b) economic and (c) biological areas of knowledge. These three areas have contributed to the development of modernity and the modern world that we experience today. The biological areas of knowledge in modernity, Foucault interprets, directly relate to the discussion of environmental domains. The knowledge which dominates the modern world putting 'things in order' by producing hierarchical structure where the economical and used values of things get priorities and the rest (including resources and beings in the environment) is treated as secondary stages.

Conclusion

With the conceptual and historical examination of the evolutionary process of the 'idea of environment', this study suggests the importance of understanding the 'meaning crisis in context of the environment' is more vital in policy making endures. While dispatching the 'structural and phenomenological settings of our explanations and understandings of the environment, the study argues for a deconstructive methical intervention into the existing debate in environment in general and environmental management in particular.

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Perceptual Metaphors

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Abstract

The main aim of this paper is to analyze pictorial metaphors – both in the fine arts and mass culture – as creative means of artistic expression. By comparing them with the verbal and literary figurative *tropes*, one can show how they are suggestive and effective in communicating ideas to a viewer. The answer to the question on how universal themes are depicted and perceived (encoded and decoded) is given. Special emphasis is put on selected surrealist and symbolic paintings as well as caricatures and advertisings.

1. The Metaphors "We Live By" and Which We Perceive

There is a long tradition of attributing metaphors as a distinguished characteristic among other linguistic figures (*tropes*) such as metonymies, similes, allegories or synecdoche. The metaphoric nature of language in its literary as well as/or communicative (rhetoric) modes and functions rather does not cause any controversy. Thanks to metaphors people not only make their speeches and texts more elegant, but also effectively (rhetorically) influence others while doing common tasks. Yet nonverbal – visual and multimodal – metaphors, widely used both in fine arts and mass culture, provoke disputes compelling us to rethink the standard view-point on metaphors. Perceptual metaphors, which have been researched for the past few decades, while confronted with the verbal and linguistic *tropes*, reveal both resemblance and dissimilarity. They also touch the essence of the arts – the role of symbols depicting universal themes.

The classic, Aristotelian tradition, which defines the metaphor as comparing one thing in respect of the other by using different phrases in both cases, has not changed till very recent times. This new theory of metaphors, not just rhetoric studies, called interaction and semantic theories of metaphors (initiated by I. A. Richards, P. Ricoeur, M. Black, M. Hesse, et al.) as well as empirical analyses of metaphoric conceptualization started by G. Lakoff and M. Johnson (1980), and others (Gibbs 2008) opened quite new perspectives – *conceptual* and *cognitive* (not just purely linguistic) ones. As Lakoff and Johnson admit: "We have found that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language, but also in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 3).

But what does a metaphor really do, and how does it influence us? It consists of two formally different ontological domains: (1) a *target* (Richard's *tenor*) – a complex and abstract phenomenon, not yet known or ambiguous, about which something new is called by (2) a *source* domain (*vehicle*), which is a simple and well known, concrete and empirical thing, process or event. A metaphor is an expression of perceived analogy between two different domains of things, comparing them in respect of one distinguished aspect implicitly entailed in figurative phrase. Metaphoric thinking opens new horizons and perspectives, especially in science as well as in art. Yet metaphorical thinking and figurative utterances may also, apart from revealing analogies and similarities, obscure what one primarily wants to reveal. This fact shows that comprehending metaphorical thinking, no matter what expressions are used and which domains are considered, requires specialized cognitive abilities both on the side of its creators and interpreters.

Linguistic metaphors can be so deeply rooted in thinking that they unnoticeably remove from the scope of our research the question of nonverbal, yet nonetheless pervasive figures, which have especially prevailed in art and mass communication. This is the case because the majority of our metaphors that "we live by" (as Lakoff and Johnson say) inhabit to a larger degree our everyday as well as specialized languages. Let's notice that we are keen to search for them just out there, while omitting other domains of life, in which metaphors are also present. Thus, metaphoric structures occur also in those human domains, the understanding of which requires not only intellectual and/or linguistic abilities, but also, if not primarily, a *sensory embedded* comprehension or even intuition. Our multimodal perceptual systems – mostly visual, tactile, and auditory – make us susceptible to complex situations, in which one abstract event – general experience, symbol or idea – is presented (depicted) by more concrete and sensible things or processes. When being confronted sensitively with such structures, where linguistic rules or instructions are easily available, we in fact have to rely on our own capabilities (i.e. intuition, imagination, and practice) or on the coining of such perceptual-figurative structures. What really matters is the ability of recognizing and understanding a universal aspect in these pictures (e.g. symbols, values) which a particular depicted sign (e.g. mimics, gestures, anecdotes etc.) figuratively and metaphorically refers to.

2. Perceptual Metaphors – Their Structures and Functioning

Widely characterized, perceptual and pictorial metaphors – specific for the *fine arts* such as painting, graphics, sculpture as well as for the mass media and the "new media" – photography, cartoons, caricatures, video games, and advertising – exhibit in principle the same formal elements akin to linguistic metaphors in speech or text. Both genres, despite a few crucial differences (investigated in the next section), are construed in the same fashion – a concrete manner, rich with sensory detail (a thing from everyday life), which serves as an explanation for the other, more complex and less, or still unknown. Visual art as well as visual communication, using widely metaphoric figures, therefore enriches our worldviews.

Confrontation with pictorial or verbal metaphors does not entail, at least not primarily, a sensory perception, but

mostly *imagination*, the multisensory nature of which (apart from the linguist-semantic aspect) is crucial and unquestionable. They are created as well as understood thanks to the intellectual, nurtured and inherited cognitive operations. Metaphorically speaking, pictorial metaphors, which inhabit the sentences, proverbs and texts, require in principle for other texts to be understandable. When we bombastically compare our life to a theatrical play we rather refer to the Shakespeare's phrase "All the world's a stage/ And all the men and women merely players", but not to some particular stage performance that we have watched at a given point. Pictorial and perceptual metaphors (structurally and formally considered) seem to function in the same way as their linguistic counterparts, although they differ in some aspects, revealing an aesthetic sort of value and an advantage over them. Their merit is indeed certified by the proverb "one image is worth a thousand words". Words and text are nevertheless the intellectual *context* for pictorial metaphors, especially in early modern art when mythological, biblical and literary sources (oral or written) were their background.

> On the whole, concepts of visual sign systems in artworks rely upon verbal and visual sign systems that were created earlier in visual art (…). By perceiving the environment, people produce visual information on the basis of conceptual schemas. (…) Any fragment of visual information can be interpreted on the basis of conceptualization, and it gains sense due to this. (Somov 2010: 476).

The history of European art convincingly shows then that both verbal and pictorial means are mutually entangled in artistic depictions of the world.

What is, therefore, the essence of pictorial and metaphorical symbolizing? Rudolf Arnheim admits that each great piece of art (both figural and abstract, mimic or illusionary) through detailed and empirical means always symbolizes universal concepts and ideas. This aim of the fine arts is achievable both by the content and the form, no matter what the theme (subject) is of the particular painting.

> [P]ainting is able to express or symbolize universal content not only by the formal pattern but also by depicted object, if only such object exists. (…) Great artworks convey the human eyes their deepest meaning with the intense straightforwardness of the perceptual features of the compositional pattern. (Arnheim 1974: 336)

What is *general* with what is *particular* plays out in art in various ways. In order to make certain depicted details such as shapes, colors or gestures universal, that is transform them into symbols and metaphors, the artists (especially painters) have at their disposal a variety of means used for depicting. Although they differ depending on the historical period in which the painting was made, they are used invariably with the same purpose – to attribute to the detailed elements of the picture something new, which is not depicted directly and that refers to a viewer's attention outside a given picture.

Many specialized painting techniques are used to achieve such a goal. Among them is the *changing a scale* of the depicted objects suggesting another (not transparent, but equivocal and richer) meaning of the rescaled object. The same is achievable while, for instance, the curvature or shape of the depicted objects has been changed (including the reverse change from curved lines to straight ones) as it's included in the caricatures or cartoons, which are commonly carried on. Changes in the shapes or scales figuratively "say" more than is directly depicted in the realistic (mimetic) picture. They do not even demand the mediation of verbal means since direct perception and intuition are sufficient. Reference to the symbolic domain can also be realized by establishing analogies between colors as well as their intensity and the things from the source of the target domain. The metaphoric effect is also achieved by the *oxymoronic* depicting (in surrealistic paintings, especially by Salvador Dali) of contradictory (i.e. not existing) things or events which, somehow paradoxically, suggest to the viewer a more universal, not merely ambiguous situation.

3. Gestures and Metaphors

The communicative effect of pictorial as well as perceived metaphors is effectively accomplished in paintings, in a no lesser extent in the applied arts, where gesticulating people, or other characters, are depicted. *Gestures* – mimics, posture, especially the arrangement of arms, hands and fingers – are the most common and suggestive means of metaphorical symbolizing. They directly and predominantly unambiguously indicate what is "apart" and "beyond" the depicted character as well as the scene in which he/she occurs. "[I]n gestures, the kinesthetic experiences of pushing, pulling, advancing, obstructing, are likely to play an important part" (Arnheim 1971: 118). The composition of gestures is metaphorical *per se.* It may realize itself in two ways, where the first is rather common and obvious, while the second may entail some controversies. In the first case, a gesticulating person can be, metaphorically speaking, "read like a book" thanks to the cultural context – myths, literature, proverbs etc. – which enable the interpretation of what has been depicted. This context enhances what is perceived directly and undoubtedly by a viewer, whose literacy is helpful in the realization of a "visual and metaphoric literacy", which human beings seem to possess. A convincing example of such an instance is present in the "Sacred and Profane Love" by Titian (1514), which presents in a renaissance, allegoric style two women, whose clothes, postures and gestures (e.g. glances, hands) refer a viewer's attention to the two concepts of love – earthly and divine. And these are to be understood through literary knowledge from antiquity. A painting by Jacek Malczewski, titled metaphorically "Polish Hamlet", is in no way more complex and demanding. The painter (depicted allegorically) in it is surrounded by two women, a young one and an old one, whose expressive gestures (hands putted in irons) and glances indicate (but rather for a viewer educated in Polish history) a situation of a half-and-half political as well as artistic coercion and decline. Both examples belong to the allegoric painting in which "reading" metaphors demands not only perceptual, but also literary skills.

One can also consider the second manner by which gestures and other details (e.g. shapes, colors) metaphorically refer to what is universal. This is the case in which no previous knowledge as well as any acquired abilities or skills would be prerequisites for the abovementioned "visual and metaphoric literacy". Yet there are multiple examples of such pictures designed in the applied arts, especially in advertisement, with the strict aim to "tell" and "convey" the client (i.e. buyer, consumer, engaged spectator) that the product, good, commodity possesses a universal value and meaning. Such things, called "hybrid metaphors" by Charles Forceville, are recognizable by a viewer in the concrete context in which they function. Moreover, there are external, verbal or pictorial signs, such as logos or brand names, which verbally supplement what was originally and pictorially "said". As a source (an extra-vehicle)

they are, paradoxically, also a target. These contextual elements elaborate what is universal – namely – luxury, comfort and uniqueness. Pictorial metaphors of this sort are *multisensory* as well, since they appeal not only to a sensory, but also to an auditory and tactile experience.

4. What Pictorial Metaphors Give and do to us?

Pictorial metaphors are, as the history of human art and the practice of painting shows, a specific type of invention or device used by generations of artists, whose aim it is to create a new cognitive perspective. As Ernst Gombrich says:

> Similes, metaphors, the stuff of poetry no less than of myth, testify to the powers of the creative mind to create and dissolve new classification (…), the fluidity of our categories (…)". Thanks to such inventions the artist is able to "extend his awareness of the visible world" and make "the discovery of appearances, that is really the discovery of the ambiguities of vision. (Gombrich 1960: 313-314)

But metaphoric pictures are to be "read" and "comprehended" by the viewer, who must cope with concealed analogies and ambiguities. That is the viewer's task, to whom a painter tries to rhetorically "convey" a message. But who is the real "constructor", not only the receiver of a pictorial metaphor? An artist or a viewer, or maybe both of them, although in a different manner?

After being cleverly depicted, perceptual metaphors function as an *open artwork* – ready for reconstructions and interpretations, which are the duty or privilege of a viewer, who either follows some remarks encoded by an artist or makes his/her own interpretations. In the latter case, a viewer may additionally utilize extra-textual, literary knowledge (indicated indirectly by an artist, by the titles etc.), previous experience and specialized (own or inherited) epistemic-esthetic beliefs. Actually, there is a specific cognitive play between an artist and a viewer, who wants to cope with pictorial *tropes*. "In short", Charles Forceville concludes, "the construal and interpretation of such implicitly signaled metaphors depend on the interpreter, while the responsibility for the derivation of explicitly signaled metaphors is the responsibility of the maker" (Forceville 2008: 469). Both of them fulfill a multilevel task of perceiving, analyzing, comparing and comprehending the depicted (encoded) and interpreted (decoded) elements.

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What is the Form of the Relation between the Colours of the Rainbow?

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Abstract

A speck in a visual field need not be red, but it must have a colour (2.0131), and, however, objects are colourless (2.0232). Are colors internal relations? Is it possible to state the structure of internal relations among qualities such as color? What is the form of the relation between red and blue? In his *Remarks on Color*, Wittgenstein believes color can be resolved by the notion of language-games. I will investigate whether the *Tractatus* already allows explaining the ontology of color. My aim is to evaluate whether it is possible to describe the pictorial internal relation among color qualities. As a method, I will focus on the notions of internal properties and internal relations on the *Tractatus*, particularly addressing the concept of configuration. Since Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*, unlike Frege and Russell, thought the configuration of objects as a material property, this should allow us to frame the problem of color and answer my initial question. I finally argue that color is a form because the visual field requires color for its configuration.

> …the relationship between the lightness of certain shades of color
> (…)
> it is an internal relation and the proposition is timeless.
> −Remarks on Color, §1.

1. Spatial objects and color

The visual field must have a color. There is no speck in the visual field which does not have a color, nor there is the possibility for an object not to be colored. A tone requires a pitch, as much as a color requires a visual field (2.0131). With color, however, this is a biconditional relation: a visual field also requires a color.

Such a biconditional is established on the grounds of a relation between a spatial object and a non-physical quality that the object requires; quality that is required by the spatial object, but that is not a property of the object, objects are simple (2.02), and colourless (2.0232). Even so, spatial object and a non-physical color maintain a biconditional relation. Since the spatial object, in the visual field requires color as a determinant for its configuration, color seems to play the role of a form, for the spatial object. Color is a form in the sense the configuration the object assumes is dependent on the configuration of its possible internal properties (its atomic facts) (2.0141). A property is internal when it is unthinkable that an object does not have it. It is as much unthinkable that an object appears 'without' a color, as it is that an object appears out of space and time. From this follows that color is as much a requirement for a spatial object to be a spatial object as space and time are. "Space, time and colour (colouredness) are forms of objects" (2.251). So, space, time and color determine the configuration of the objects, that is, they form the atomic fact (2.0272), the substance of the world (2.0231). An object presents a configuration that varies (2.0271), bringing it to assume a specific position in visual space. Color is hence an internal property of the object because it is unthinkable that an object does not possess color. This relation can be propositionally put by "that object presents a coloration", this is a picture that represents the reality whose form it has the spatial object, everything spatial, the coloured, everything coloured, etc. (2.171), the substance of the world is given.

We understood the nature of the relation between a spatial object and color. Can we do better? We should now be able to explain how color as a form operates. In order to do that, we certainly need to look at the modes of appearance of color, and principles of their internal relations, such as, "this blue colour and that stand in the internal relation of brighter and darker eo ipso. It is unthinkable that these two objects should not stand in this relation" (4.123).

2. The structure of the form of color

An object cannot be simultaneously yellow and orange, for that would result in a physical and a logical contradiction. It is in the structure of color that it is impossible for two colors to be at one place in the visual field, this would be physically impossible (6.3751). Physics tells us that a particle cannot have simultaneously two velocities, nor can it be in two places simultaneously; and so, particles in different places at the same time cannot be identical. Do colors obey the principles of physics? Unique hues, it is generally agreed, are the ones that consist in one single color, and so, they are primary colors. Binary, or mixed hues are the ones that result from the mix of two primary colors. So, we can conceive that unique hues do follow that principle of physics. Mixed or binary hues, however, seem to defy physics by showing that two colors can indeed be at the same place at the same time, for instance, red and yellow, for an orange color. This brings us to question, under these circumstances, how are colors composed? What are the rules, the principles that guide the mixing of colors from unique hues into binary hues? To put differently, how do colors relate with other to the point they re-configure their appearance? Is a 'pure' white paper still white when placed next to snow? What are the rules that determine that a light blue becomes lighter in relation to a darker blue and it becomes darker in relation to a lighter blue? Apart from colors relating in such and such manner with other colors, they seem also to respond to other qualities present in the visual field. I will now deal with the observations on the relations of color with other qualities, to further look at how colors relate with each other.

Qualities with which colors relate are not only denotative (hue, lightness, saturation/chromaticness), but also, there seems to be a connotative dimension governing the principles by which a color can be cold (could blue be a warm color?), it precedes or succeeds other color (what color do you place between red and blue? Where do you locate orange?). Our answers to these questions seem so instantaneous and natural to us, and yet whatever principles we

are using to formulate the answer, they are certainly not to be found in a physics book. What is more is that answers to questions like this seem beyond subjectivity. That is, humans tend to agree if asked to order colors in a circle, for instance: red, purple, green, orange, blue, yellow.

How would you order? The answer comes naturally to mind. For that reason alone, color does not seem analogous to sensations such as pain, for instance, as it does not convey the propositional difficulties inherent to pain or other solipsistic traps. Color is not revealed in private experience. How would it? Color is a form of configuration whose founding internal relations are exposed in perception, there to be seen, as is space or time. There is neither solipsistic trap, nor such thing as individual colors, experienced privately, but intrinsic features of individual colors as a product of their relations to other colors, as well as with other qualities of perception. We know and agree that blue is followed from green, yellow, orange, red, and purple. We know which colors to identify as warm, and which to identify as cold. "Red is a warm color", is this a proposition describing external or internal relations? Could we conceive red as a cold color? Recall, "a property is internal to the object if it is unthinkable that its object does not possess it" (4.123). If we look closer, we might even be able to pick the colors that are sweet, and the ones that are sour. It is so evident that for instance, 'orange is sweet' and 'yellow is sour'. So does that mean 'Cold is sour' and 'warm is sweet'? None of those propositions, however, are to be found in a natural science book. Even if it is perhaps pointing the existence and non-existence of atomic facts, spatial object, everything spatial, the coloured, everything colored, the relation, all the relations.

Now, one thing is to say that colors maintain relations with other qualities such as cold, sour or sweet. What about the relations that they maintain with each other, are they internal or external? To determine that colors are internally related with each other would certainly require the demonstration that the relation is essential to being and nature of the related items. Orange would not be what it is unless in a particular, unique relation with red and yellow, that is to say, 'orange resembles red and yellow equally'. So, orange's identity is dependent on being in a relation with red and yellow. Could we conceive an orange that has no relation with red and yellow? Furthermore, consider an orange spatial object, say an orange. Let us place our orange with the sky as a background. Now let us place our orange over a red tablecloth. What is the case in which the orange seems brighter? So it seems our orange is not only internally relating with red and yellow, but it is also internally relating with the blue in the sky and the red in the tablecloth, as if those relations would function as coordinates in how the color should appear. Under those different circumstances, the orange is telling us, 'hey this is me, and this, and this, always me'. An analogy with a taste seems convenient, a color appearance seems to relate to other colors as 'ingredients', in the same way we obtain a single taste from a soup – it is the result of the amount and variety vegetables we mixed. A tomato, as red, can assume many possibilities of configurations of atomic facts (internal relation with) and states of affairs (external relation with). Those relations seem to constrain the particular configuration drawn from the possibilities that lie in the nature of the object. No other color has the set of possibilities orange does, and this is why no other color is orange (intrinsic nature color). The identity of a color requires thus reference to its relational place in the color array, its *betweenness* relation.

So, the complex *betweenness* relations play the very important role of allowing natural perception (human, and non-human, think about animal camouflage effects) to understand the whole structure. In the case of color perception, to understand the entire color array,

2.0123 If I know an object, then I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in atomic facts.
(Every such possibility must lie in the nature of the object.) A new possibility cannot subsequently be found.

By the same token, were all colors ever given, then all possible atomic facts would be also given (2.0124), that is, all the internal qualities were given; and so, all possibilities and states of affairs (2.014), the external qualities. Luckily for us, we don't need to know the representational model of all existing colors and all its possible internal relations, since knowing a color means already knowing all the possibilities of its occurrence in atomic facts. How is this operationally possible? Can we push this understanding deeper?

The relations established among colors constitute the whole structure of the entire color array. Perceiving a color is perceiving the whole array. Although it seems empirically odd, the array of colors is not constituted by its individual colors, for different tones of the same colors can equally constitute an array of colors. Provided the relationships remain the same, we can recognize a color array, because the whole depends on the configuration of its parts, and not of the single individuals that constitute the whole, as shown in figures 1 and 2. The same configuration appears thanks to an equality (possibility of all similes, 4.015) in the form of the established relations, that can be directly noticed (not deduced or abstracted): internal similarity is established between those things that at first sight seem to be entirely different (4.0141).

Figure 1. Color circle 1

Figure 2. Color circle 2

Conclusions

There are possibilities that lie in the nature of the object. An object appears according to a particular configuration of its internal qualitative relations. A relation is said to be internal (and not external) if it is essential to being and na-

ture of the related items. So, knowing the object depends on knowing the configuration of its internal qualities. The counterpart is also reasonable, knowing a relation means knowing the whole structure of object. This does not mean that the object is a complex in space. The object appears to perception with a specific 'location', that determines its internal relations, and so how it appears. In other words, the object appears in a specific position out of a set of other possible ones.

The object cannot appear, of course, outside the laws of space and time. Nor can it appear without a color. The visual field must have a color. The problem is that objects are colorless, so we ought to look at a relation between a spatial object and a non-physical quality that the object requires. This relation, I argue, is an internal biconditional, because it is as unthinkable that an object of space does not have a color, as it is unthinkable that a color appears anywhere else than in an object of space. The relation is hence essential to being and nature of the related items. Spatial object and a non-physical color maintain a biconditional internal relation, because the spatial object in the visual field requires color as a determinant for its configuration, and color seems to play the role of a form for the spatial object. Color is a form in the sense the configuration the object assumes is dependent on the configuration of its possible internal properties (its atomic facts). There are particular consequences of this view to color composition theories. We can conceive that unique hues do follow the principle of physics that the same particle cannot be at the same time on the same place. This would be very well for what is generally called unique hues. Binary or mixed hues would be shown, however, to defy that law, as they result from the 'mixture' of two unique hues, which means two colors can indeed be at the same place at the same time. This evidence necessarily brings colors away from its physical nature and closer to its phenomenological. If this reasoning is correct, colors are not particles, but internal relations among qualities in the object. Those relations constrain the particular configuration drawn from the possibilities that lie in the nature of the object. As I argued, no other color has the set of possibilities orange does, and this is why no other color is orange, it has the intrinsic nature of being orange. *Being in* relations play the very important role of allowing to naturally perceive not a spatial object, but an object of a presentation. Objects present themselves not only according to the forms of space, time, and color, but also in their relations with qualities such as 'cold' or 'sweet'. These relations constitute the visual phenomena.

In the study of the ontology of colors, the discovery and analysis of the necessary functional connections among visual phenomena should motivate a concern with the identification of the conditions that help or hinder the appearance of color, or the degree of their evidence. Put differently, the determination of the laws which the colored visual field obeys. And this without leaving the phenomenological domain, without, that is, referring to the underlying neurophysical processes. The role of the visual system certainly cannot be denied, but the relational conditions under which color configure to appear are certainly a phenomenological problem.

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Wittgensteins russisches Abenteuer

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Abstract

Im Mittelpunkt steht Wittgensteins Absicht, in die Sowjetunion zu emigrieren. Zur Umsetzung seines Plans führte er 1935 eine fact-finding-mission durch. Das politische Umfeld dieser Reise soll ausgeleuchtet, ihr genauer Ablauf rekonstruiert werden. Des weiteren bot die Veröffentlichung der Maiski-Tagebücher Anlass, sich etwas näher mit der Rolle des sowjetischen Botschafters Iwan Michailowitsch Maiski zu befassen. Eine kurze Analyse der stalinistischen Ideologie erlaubt das Fazit: Wittgenstein hätte in der Sowjetunion sowohl mit seiner frühen als auch mit seiner späten Philosophie Anstoß erregt.

Im Jahr 1935 trug sich Wittgenstein mit dem Gedanken, in die Sowjetunion zu emigrieren. Sein fellowship in Cambridge lief aus und eine Verlängerung war keineswegs sicher. Um sich vorzubereiten, nahm er bei Fanja Pascal Russisch-Stunden.

Bereits sehr früh interessierte sich Wittgenstein für russische Autoren. So studierte er während des 1. Weltkriegs als Soldat Tolstois „Kurze Darlegung des Evangeliums". Er begeisterte sich auch für dessen Aufforderung an die Intellektuellen, aufs Land zu gehen und den Bauern Lesen und Schreiben beizubringen. Ähnlich fasziniert zeigte er sich von Dostojewski, den er gemeinsam mit Nikolai Bachtin in der Originalsprache las.

Der von Kimberley Cornish in dem Buch „Der Jude aus Linz" geäußerte Verdacht, Wittgenstein wäre das Haupt eines sowjetischen Agentenringes in Cambridge gewesen, ist natürlich total abwegig. Dennoch fällt auf, dass einige seiner Freunde wie Piero Sraffa und George Thomson der „linken Szene" zugerechnet werden können.

Es kann nicht ausgeschlossen werden, dass Wittgenstein selbst gewisse Sympathien für das politische System in der Sowjetunion hegte. So bemerkte er gegenüber Rowland Hutt - einem Freund von Francis Skinner, den er 1934 kennenlernte: „Im Herzen bin ich Kommunist" (Monk 1992: 366). Dem entspricht auch die Einschätzung von George Thomson: „Theoretisch war er gegen den Marxismus, in der Praxis jedoch dafür" (Monk 1992: 366).

Wittgensteins Reise fügt sich nahtlos in eine Reihe ähnlicher Unternehmungen zahlreicher westeuropäischer Literaten. So besuchten etwa George Bernard Shaw, Antoine de Saint Exupéry, Romain Rolland und André Gide die Sowjetunion und schrieben zum Teil hymnische Kommentare.

Vor Antritt seiner Reise hatte Wittgenstein Kontakt mit dem sowjetischen Botschafter Iwan Michailowitsch Maiski. Sein Kommen wurde von John Maynard Keynes mit den Worten angekündigt:

Darf ich mir erlauben, Ihnen Dr. Wittgenstein vorzustellen ... der ein ausgezeichneter Philosoph (und) ein sehr alter und intimer Freund von mir ist ... Ich wäre für alles, was Sie für ihn tun könnten, außerordentlich dankbar ... Er hat starke Sympathien für die Lebensart, die seiner Meinung nach das neue Regime in Russland verkörpert. (Cornish 1998: 134)

Schließlich kam es dann zu dem Treffen in der Botschaft. Wittgenstein schrieb darüber an Keynes: „Er [= Maiski] war entschieden nett und versprach mir zum Schluss, einige Anschriften von Leuten in Russland zu schicken, von denen ich nützliche Informationen bekommen könnte. Er hielt es anscheinend nicht für völlig aussichtslos, dass ich versuche, die Erlaubnis zu erhalten, mich in Russland niederzulassen, obgleich auch er nicht meinte, es sei wahrscheinlich." (Monk 1992: 373) Maiski verschaffte Wittgenstein jedenfalls das gewünschte Visum. Ob auch über Philosophie gesprochen wurde, darüber lässt sich nur spekulieren.

Maiski vertrat die Interessen seines Landes in London von 1932 bis 1943. Sein Hauptziel war die Bildung einer möglichst breiten Allianz gegen die Nazis. Solange Litwinow an der Spitze des sowjetischen Außenministeriums stand, erfreute er sich des vollen Rückhalts der Moskauer Zentralstellen. Dies änderte sich radikal mit der Amtsübernahme durch Molotow im Mai 1939. Tiefpunkt seiner diplomatischen Laufbahn war der Nichtangriffspakt zwischen Deutschland und der Sowjetunion. Die Schuld daran schob Maiski den Sympathien der Cliveden-Clique für Hitler zu. Die Appeasementpolitik - so meinte er jedenfalls - hätte sich bemüht, den deutschen Expansionsdrang nach Osten umzulenken.

Wittgenstein selbst war übrigens kein „Appeaser": Nach dem Münchner Abkommen schrieb er auf die Rückseite eines Fotos, das Chamberlain zeigte: „Wenn du ein Brechmittel brauchst - hier ist es." (Monk 1992: 422)

Besonderen Wert legte Maiski auf gute Kontakte zu britischen Intellektuellen wie George Bernard Shaw, Herbert George Wells, John Maynard Keynes etc. Die Sympathie, die ihm aus diesen Kreisen entgegenschlug, äußerte sich auch darin, dass er von Oskar Kokoschka porträtiert wurde. Seine „Memoiren eines sowjetischen Botschafters" gewähren tiefe Einblicke in die britisch-sowjetischen Beziehungen am Vorabend des 2. Weltkriegs. Interessanterweise kommt darin Wittgenstein mit keinem Wort vor.

Nach seiner Abberufung übte Maiski die Funktion eines stellvertretenden Außenministers aus. In seine Zuständigkeit fielen nun Fragen der Reparation. Er wollte ganze Zwangsarbeiter-Armeen aufstellen. Zehn Jahre lang sollten fünf Millionen deutsche Zivilisten beim Wiederaufbau der Sowjetunion helfen. „Die unmittelbare Nachkriegszeit", forderte Maiski, „muss unter dem Zeichen der Vergeltung stehen." (Maiski 2002: 62f)

Anfang 1953 wurde er eingesperrt. Im Rahmen einer antizionistischen Kampagne klagte man ihn wegen Hochverrats an. Seine Tagebücher ließ man beschlagnahmen. Vermutlich rettete ihn nur der Tod Stalins vor der drohenden Liquidierung. Erst 1955 kam er wieder frei. Auch nach seiner Entlassung wurde die Rückgabe seiner Tagebücher abgelehnt. Als er seine Memoiren schrieb, durfte er wenigstens Einblick nehmen.

Bei einer Suche im Archiv des russischen Außenministeriums entdeckte der britisch-israelische Historiker Gabriel Gorodetsky Anfang der 90er Jahre die Maiski-Tagebücher. Sie erschienen zuerst bei Yale University Press in einer drei Bände umfassenden englischsprachigen Ausgabe. Seit 2016 liegt auch eine stark gekürzte Version in deutscher Übersetzung vor. Ich hoffte, hier etwas über Wittgenstein zu finden. Leider erbrachte eine genaue Durchsicht ein negatives Resultat. Weder Wittgenstein noch irgendein anderer Philosoph - wie etwa Russell - kommen vor. Offenbar war Maiski an der Philosophie nicht sonderlich interessiert.

Am 12. September kam Wittgenstein mit einem Schiff in Leningrad an. Dort traf er die Philosophin Tatjana Gornstein - Autorin des Buchs „Lenins Kampf gegen den Machismus [= Lehre von Ernst Mach]". Sie bezeichnete darin Carnap, Reichenbach, Schlick und Wittgenstein als Hauptvertreter des Machismus. Wittgenstein attestierte sie einen Hang zum Solipsismus und zur Mystik. Nicht ganz unzutreffend, wenn wir uns die Traktatstellen 5.62: „Was der Solipsismus nämlich *meint*, ist ganz richtig, nur lässt es sich nicht *sagen*, sondern es zeigt sich." und 6.522: „Es gibt allerdings Unaussprechliches. Dies *zeigt* sich, es ist das Mystische." vergegenwärtigen. Über den Gesprächsablauf ist nur relativ wenig bekannt.

Wittgenstein reiste schließlich weiter nach Moskau, wo er am 14. September ankam. Hier war seine wichtigste Gesprächspartnerin die Philosophin Sofia Janowskaja - Herausgeberin der mathematischen Schriften von Karl Marx. Sie forderte Wittgenstein angeblich auf: „Sie sollten mehr Hegel lesen." (Monk 1992: 375) Dazu fehlte ihm wohl jede Lust.

Auf all jenen, die sich damals in der Sowjetunion mit Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie beschäftigten, lastete ein besonders starker Druck, sich vom Machismus bzw. Positivismus zu distanzieren. Die vorherrschende marxistische Ideologie behauptete ja: Die Philosophiegeschichte wäre durch den Gegensatz von Idealismus und Materialismus bestimmt. Damit ging auch eine Zuordnung zu klar definierten sozialen Schichten einher. Der Idealismus wäre die Philosophie der Ausbeuter, der Materialismus die Philosophie der ausgebeuteten Klassen. Da der Positivismus eine eindeutige Parteinahme vermeide, spiele er indirekt den Ausbeutern in die Hände. Bestenfalls könne man ihm eine agnostische Haltung attestieren. Besonders deutlich wurde diese Kritik in Lenins Werk „Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus" vorgetragen.

Es ist nicht weiter verwunderlich, dass die sowjetischen Philosophinnen und Philosophen Wittgenstein als Vertreter des Positivismus ansahen. Bekannt war ja nur der Traktat, der zunächst fast ausschließlich im Wiener Kreis rezipiert wurde. Man kann also davon ausgehen, dass Wittgenstein von offizieller Seite mit äußerst scheelen Augen betrachtet wurde.

Trotzdem bot ihm die Universität von Kasan - die Universität Tolstois und Lenins - einen Lehrstuhl für Philosophie an. Wittgenstein hätte es aber vorgezogen als einfacher Arbeiter auf einer Kolchose zu arbeiten.

Die Unerreichbarkeit dieses Ziels mag ihn bewogen haben, Russland bereits nach etwa zwei Wochen wieder zu verlassen. Die Strecke von Leningrad bis nach London legte er wieder mit dem Schiff zurück. Bei seiner Ankunft sagte er zu Gilbert Pattison:

Man kann dort leben, aber nur, wenn man sich die ganze Zeit bewusst bleibt, dass man niemals wirklich seine Meinung äußern darf ... Es ist, als ob man den Rest des

Lebens in einer Armee, irgend einer Armee der Welt, verbringen würde und das ist für gebildete Menschen ziemlich schwierig. (Nedo 1989: 69)

Tatjana Gornstein geriet bald nach dem Treffen mit Wittgenstein in die Mühlen der sowjetischen Justiz und wurde verbannt. Länger hielt der Kontakt mit Sophia Janowskaja. Da sie an Diabetes litt, sandte ihr Wittgenstein Insulin. Möglicherweise gab es im Sommer 1939 sogar eine zweite Fahrt nach Russland. Gewisse Hinweise legen nahe, dass Wittgenstein von Berlin nach Moskau reiste und Sophia Janowskaja ein weiteres Mal traf. Die Quellenlage ist aber sehr unsicher.

Manchmal wird der Standpunkt vertreten, die kontextualistische Sprachspieltheorie des späten Wittgenstein wäre sehr gut vereinbar mit einer marxistischen Sprachtheorie. Dass dies von den Autoritäten der Partei genauso gesehen worden wäre, darf bezweifelt werden. So stellte Nikolai Jakowlewitsch Marr die These auf, dass die Sprache ein Überbau-Phänomen sei, das vom jeweiligen sozioökonomischen Unterbau abhinge. Demzufolge komme ihr ein „Klassencharakter" zu. Unterschiedliche Klassen würden unterschiedliche Jargons, bisweilen sogar unterschiedliche Sprachen verwenden. Zur Bekräftigung dieser These wird oft die Situation im mittelalterlichen England angeführt: Die normannische Oberschicht sprach französisch, die angelsächsische Unterschicht englisch. Niemand geringerer als Stalin selbst antwortete in zwei Artikeln, die erstmals 1950 in der „Prawda" erschienen und dann auch in der Schrift „Der Marxismus und die Fragen der Sprachwissenschaft" abgedruckt wurden. (Über die Existenz eines Ghostwriters ist nichts bekannt). Dort werden folgende Gegenargumente vorgebracht:

1) Nicht alle englischen Feudalherrn sprachen französisch.
2) Französisch war zumindest in Frankreich die Sprache des einfachen Volkes.
3) Letzten Endes setzte sich in England Englisch als gemeinsame Sprache aller Klassen durch.

Daraus leitete Stalin ab: Sprache ist immer die Sprache des ganzen Volks. Sie ist ein Werkzeug, mit dessen Hilfe die Menschen miteinander kommunizieren. Ohne diesen Gedankenaustausch wäre es nicht möglich, ein gemeinsames Handeln der Menschen im Kampf gegen die Naturkräfte und für die Produktion der notwendigen materiellen Güter sicherzustellen. Zurückgewiesen wird auch Marrs These, dass alle Sprachen aus einer Ursprache hervorgegangen seien.

Meines Erachtens ist Stalins Position völlig unvereinbar mit Wittgensteins Konzept, die Einheit der Sprache zugunsten einer Mannigfaltigkeit von Sprachspielen aufzugeben. Um dies zu untermauern, zitiere ich aus §23 der Philosophischen Untersuchungen: „Das Wort 'Sprachspiel' soll hier hervorheben, dass das Sprechen der Sprache ein Teil ist einer Tätigkeit, oder einer Lebensform." Eine Lebensform kann zwar sicher nicht auf den materiellen Unterbau reduziert werden. Das Sprachspiel ist auch nicht getrennt von der Lebensform, sondern *Teil* der Lebensform, während der Überbau vom Unterbau abgehoben ist. Entscheidend ist aber: Verschiedene Lebensformen führen zu verschiedenen Sprachspielen. Damit fehlt der übergreifende Aspekt der Sprache, der Stalin so wichtig war. Daraus lässt sich die Konsequenz ziehen: Wittgenstein hätte in der Sowjetunion auch mit seiner Spätphilosophie „angeeckt".

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Maßstab und Regel.
Ein Berührungspunkt zwischen Hegel und Wittgenstein

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Abstract

Hegel und Wittgenstein untersuchen Wissensformen, die „Phänomenologie des Geistes" verfolgt die Entfaltung des „natürlichen Bewusstseins", die „Philosophischen Untersuchungen" beziehen sich auf das Alltagsverständnis als Regulativ der Kritik an der herkömmlichen Philosophie. Am Beispiel der Messpraxis, die beide Philosophen als regelgeleitetes Verfahren betrachten, lassen sich Affinitäten zwischen ihnen zeigen. Sie implizieren eine vergleichbare Sicht dynamischer Erfahrungsprozesse, verschwinden aber, wenn es darum geht, ihnen eine Richtung zuzuweisen.

Wittgensteins *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* entwirft ein System zur Erfassung aller möglichen sinnvollen Sätze und damit zur Aufstellung wahrer Behauptungen insgesamt. Dieses System wird absolut gesetzt. Die Aufgabe der Philosophie sei nicht weniger, als die komprehensive Auskunft über alle Fragen, die sich vernünftig formulieren lassen. So gesehen lässt sich eine Verwandtschaft mit Hegels Systemanspruch konstatieren. Auf den zweiten Blick ist mit dieser Parallelisierung allerdings nichts anzufangen. Die treibende Kraft der Reflexion, die Hegels Gedankengänge durchzieht, wird im *Tractatus* von vornherein ausgeschlossen. Zum Abschluss, als es darum geht, sich über die Verständlichkeit der Konstruktion Rechenschaft zu geben, winkt Wittgenstein mit einer enigmatischen Formulierung ab.

Die Arbeiten des späteren Wittgenstein sind aus Hegelianischer Sicht nicht weniger fremdartig. Aus der Verweigerung der Reflexion über die Systembildung wird eine Vermeidung des Systemanspruchs. Angesichts dieser manifesten Inkommensurabilitäten muss eine Zusammenstellung der beiden Philosophen zunächst angeben, worauf sie sich stützt. Der folgende Abschnitt dieses Beitrags skizziert eine Konstellation, welche die Aufgabe übernehmen kann. Zweitens werden am Beispiel des Maßstabs Korrespondenzen der beiden Seiten deutlich gemacht. Der dritte Abschnitt thematisiert Diskrepanzen, die vor dem teilweise geteilten Hintergrund noch deutlicher sichtbar werden.

Hegel und Sokrates, Wittgenstein und Augustinus

Statt des Vergleichsparameters „System" hilft eine andere Option weiter. Eine richtungweisende Selbstbeschreibung aus Hegels *Einleitung zur Phänomenologie des Geistes* lautet: „… indem das erscheinende Wissen unser Gegenstand ist, so werden auch zunächst seine Bestimmungen aufgenommen, wie sie sich unmittelbar darbieten." (Hegel 2013, 75) Hegel betrachtet es als seine Aufgabe, eine bestehende Wissensform, man kann sie Alltagsverständnis nennen, zu Wort kommen zu lassen. Seiner philosophischen Arbeit bleibe, „indem das Bewusstsein sich selbst prüft" „nur das reine Zusehen" (Hegel 2013, 76). Diese Denkfigurur ist offensichtlich von der sokratischen Mäeutik inspiriert (Seidl 2016, 45). Ein Philosoph entwickelt im „elenchus" landläufige Überzeugungen zu einer anspruchsvolleren Version des Wissens. Die Anfangspassage der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* lässt sich auf ähnliche Weise lesen.

Wittgenstein nimmt seinen Ausgang bei einer verbreiteten Auffassung über den Spracherwerb und fragt, in welcher Hinsicht sie berechtigt sei (PU: 1). Hier wie dort ist ein Philosoph nicht direkt mit einer Sachfrage beschäftigt, sondern mit einer ihm gegenüberliegenden Wissensform, die er in eine Art Gespräch verwickelt, um der Sache auf den Grund zu gehen. Die Kontroverse zwischen Hegel und Wittgenstein betrifft Ergebnisse, die jener dem „natürlichen Bewusstsein" (Hegel 2013a, 71) und dieser dem Alltagsverständnis abgewinnt. Vergleichbar werden die Positionen in der Triangulierung durch einen Sachbezug. Um diese höchst allgemeinen Bemerkungen zur Methodologie philosophischer Vergleiche greifbarer zu machen, folgt eine beispielhafte Zusammenstellung Hegelianischer und Wittgensteinianischer Überlegungen zum Thema „Maßstab". Sie zielt darauf ab, Affinitäten und Befremdlichkeiten zwischen den Protagonisten anhand eines Einzelfalls darzustellen.

Ein Maßstab ist eine Art Regel

Der im vorigen Abschnitt skizzierte Vergleichsrahmen greift auf hochabstrakte Selbstdarstellungen zurück. Um ihn exemplarisch auszuführen, ist der Bickwinkel einzuschränken. Die zitierten Hegel-Passagen stammen aus der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Auf diesen Kontext wird sich auch die folgende Diskussion stützen. Zuvor muss aber angemerkt werden, dass Hegels *Wissenschaft der Logik* eine davon abweichende Behandlung des Maßstabs bietet. Dort handelt es sich nicht um die Explikation einer Wissensform, sondern um die dialektische Ausfaltung des gesamten Seins- und Verstehenshorizontes der Menschheit. Maßstäbe tauchen dort in der Erörterung von Quantität und Qualität auf. *„Alles, was da ist, hat ein Maß"* (Hegel 2013b, 394. Original kursiv) und Maßstäbe sind dienen einer Größenbestimmung, deren Eigenart darin besteht, erstens, wie jedes Erfahrungsobjekt eine eigene Größe zu besitzen, zweitens aber, darüber hinaus, mittels dieser Konstante die Messung anderer vorliegender Quanta zu ermöglichen. Ein jedes Ding, sagt Hegel, hat seine spezifische Größe und Maßstäbe machen diese Beschaffenheit nach einem äußerlichen Kriterium vergleichbar.

„Diese Vergleichung ist ein äußerliches Tun ..." (Hegel 2013b, 399). Ein Maßstab wird angelegt, ein willkürlich gewähltes Ding, das auf andere Dinge appliziert wird, ohne Auskunft über deren spezifische Qualitäten zu geben. In diesem Zusammenhang nennt Hegel Maßstab eine Regel; „das Etwas der Regel" ist die Gegebenheit, die ihrer Anwendung unterliegt. Diese Identifizierung hebt hervor,

dass für philosophische Zwecke nicht das physische Gerät, sondern seine charakteristische *Verwendung* im Vordergrund steht. Die daran anknüpfenden, spekulativen Ausführungen über das „spezifizierende Maß" laufen darauf hinaus, dass das Gemessenwerden nicht (sozusagen) untätig bleibt, sondern vom Maßstab affiziert wird *und* ihn seinerseits affiziert. „Sein Maß (sc. das Maß des Etwas der Regel, h.h.) reagiert dagegen, verhält sich als ein Intensives gegen die Menge und nimmt sie auf eine eigentümliche Weise auf; es verändert die äußerlich gesetzte Veränderung ..." (Hegel, 2013b, 398f). Hegels Deduktion kann hier nicht weiterverfolgt werden. Eine entscheidende Pointe liegt darin, dass die beiden Seiten, die Messvorgabe und das Gemessene, aneinander bestimmt sind.

Zurück zur *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Dort wird das im Erfahrungsprozess vorfindliche Bewusstsein als dynamische Einheit konzipiert, die aus jedem Prüfvorgang selbst verändert hervorgeht. Das „erscheinende Bewusstsein" ist nicht bloß der Gegenstand der Untersuchung; es führt sie auch selbst durch und zieht die notwendigen Konsequenzen aus diesem Vorgang. Hegel kommt in diesem Zusammenhang nochmals auf die passive Rolle der philosophischen Exposition zurück: „… so dass, indem das Bewusstsein sich selbst prüft, uns auch von dieser Seite nur das reine Zusehen bleibt." (Hegel 2013a, 72) Dieses Bewusstsein ist ein interaktiver Maßstab, der gemäß den veränderten Umständen adaptiert wird. Erfahrung besteht darin, mit einer Messvorgabe an die Welt heranzugehen, dabei bisweilen auf unvorhergesehene Schwierigkeiten zu stoßen, und sie durch Nachbesserungen des Messverfahrens in den Duktus der Welterschließung zu integrieren. Hegel hat Maßstäbe mit Regeln parallelisiert. Wie passt dieses Verständnis zu Wittgensteins Perspektive?

Eine Diskussion des Pariser Urmeters, die sich bei dieser Gelegenheit aufdrängt, würde den Rahmen dieses Beitrags sprengen. Markante Beiträge Wittgensteins zum Thema lassen sich anhand durch die Stichworte „Körperlichkeit" und „Intentionalität" kennzeichnen. Instruktiv ist eine Bemerkung, in der er die Kommensurabilität von Sätzen und jenen Tatsachen, die sie verifizieren, mit der Voraussetzung des Messvorgangs verglichen wird. Satzbestätigungen müssen affin zur Gegenwart sein, in der sie stattfinden, so wie eine Längenmessung nur durch die geteilte physische Länge möglich ist. Freilich macht nicht diese Erstreckung als solche den Maßstab. Er ist vielmehr eine Messlatte-in-Anwendung. „... und wenn ich auch verstehe, dass in einem bestimmten Sinn nur die Länge des Maßstabs misst, so bleibt doch was ich in die Tasche stecke der Maßstab, der Körper, und ist nicht die Länge." (MS 107: 223) Das führt zur Intention. Was macht den Unterschied zwischen dem Ding, das in der Tasche steckt, und einem Maßstab in vollem Sinn?

Die Antwort greift auf ein zentrales Motiv des *Tractatus* zurück und transformiert es zu einem Eckpunkt der späteren Entwicklung. Anfangs hieß es: „Das Bild ist so mit der Wirklichkeit verknüpft – es reicht bis zu ihr. Es ist wie ein Maßstab in die Wirklichkeit angelegt." (TLP 2.1511f) Es drängt sich die Frage auf, wer oder was dieses Anlegen bewirkt und Wittgenstein antwortet in seiner Wiederaufnahme des Themas nochmals mit diesem Vergleich. „Die Intention ist nichts als ein Maßstab den wir an das was geschieht anlegen und nach dem wir es beschreiben." (MS 109: 268) Im *Tractatus* war die *Anwendung* von Bildern/Sätzen nonchalant übergangen worden. 1930, als sich Wittgenstein überlegt, wie es zu dieser Verwendung kommen kann, und dafür die menschliche Intentionalität verantwortlich macht, greift er neuerlich auf den Maßstab zurück. Er ist sein Leitbild zur Erklärung des Weltbezugs sprachlicher Ausdrücke. Nicht einfach ein toter Gegen-

stand, sondern eine spezifische Verwendung seiner Materialität in der Projektion auf die Umwelt. „Nur das intendierte Bild reicht als Maßstab an die Wirklichkeit heran. Von außen betrachet steht es gleich tot und isoliert da." (MS114: 207)

Metaphernfrei beschreibt Wittgenstein die Intention folgendermaßen: „Mit Intention meine ich hier das, was das Zeichen denkt was das Zeichen richtet was ihm die Meinung gibt." (MS 145: 49) Diese Charakteristik ist nicht aufschlussreicher, als die Verbildlichung. Anders gesagt: die Beschreibung der Funktionsweise eines Maßstabs und das Verständnis der Intentionalität, die sie veranschaulichen soll, sind untrennbar verbunden. Maßstäbe intendieren Zustände, wie umgekehrt Intentionen Zustände dimensionieren. Damit verbindet sich ein Schlüsselthema der Spätphilosophie Wittgensteins, das Regelfolgen. Die physische Beschaffenheit des Maßstabs gleicht dem Ausdruck, der eine Regel notiert. Sie schreibt nicht vor, was und wie zu messen/zu befolgen wäre. „Der Ausdruck der Regel, obwohl er natürlich ein Bild der Anwendung der Regel sein muss, kann doch in der Anwendung nicht vorkommen ..." (MS 109: 268). Am Maßstab erläutert: „Nur die äußersten Punkte der Teilstriche berühren den zu messenden Gegenstand." (TLP 2.15121) Aus diesem Anwendungsspielraum ergibt sich eine vieldiskutierte Konsequenz.

Gewöhnlich wird an den Teilstrichen eines Maßstabs die (konventionelle) Länge eines Objekts gemessen. Und wenn der Maßstab sich ausdehnen oder zusammenpressen lässt? Seine Teilstriche berühren in diesem Fall noch immer das Messobjekt. Wittgensteins Kommentar ist bekannt. „Einen Maßstab, der sich bei der Erwärmung außerordentlich stark ausdehnte, würden wir unter gewöhnlichen Umständen deshalb unbrauchbar nennen." (MS 117: 10) Die Regel der Größenmessung wäre verletzt. Aber wo steht, dass ausgerechnet *so* gemessen werden muss? „Wir könnten uns aber Verhältnisse denken, in denen gerade dies das Erwünschte wäre." (MS 117: 10) Die Teilstriche lassen sich, je nach Material und Anwendungsweise des Maßstabs, verschiedenartig auf Objekte projizieren. Diese Überlegungen sind eine Variante der Diskussion des Regelfolgens, z.B. des Verständnisses der Addition. Es ist nicht *ab initio* auszuschließen, dass der Ausdruck „+2" für eine Vorschrift steht, der gemäß ab der der Zahl 1000 zur Addition „+4" überzugehen ist (PU: 185ff). Die Notation der Regel kann nicht alle Eventualitäten abdecken, die in ihrer Befolgung zu beachten sind. Das Bild kann seine Anwendung nicht vorwegnehmen.

Berührungspunkte, Unvereinbarkeiten

Einige Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen Hegel und Wittgenstein fallen ins Auge. Eine methodologische Korrespondenz ergibt sich generell aus philosophischem Blickwinkel. Verglichen mit der Darstellung operativer Messtheorien erscheinen beide Autoren im Einklang. In deren Fall wird ein Mess-System als jene Verbindung zwischen Prozessen und Betrachterinnen konzipiert, die den wahren Wert einer Variable möglichst getreu auf ihren gemessenen Wert abbildet (Bentley 2005, p.3). Die Erläuterung des Sinns von „wahrheitsgetreuer Abbildung" fällt nicht in die Zuständigkeit solcher theoretischer Nachzeichnungen der Wissenschaftspraxis. Der Hinweis auf die eigentümliche Gleichartigkeit von Messgeräten und gemessenen Objekten bildet dazu einen deutlichen Kontrast.

In Hegelscher Terminologie treten die Komponenten des Mess-Systems, wie die Gegenstände, auf die es angewandt wird, als Quantum auf. Und Wittgenstein statuiert:

"...wenn ein Körper Länge hat, so kann es keine Länge ohne einen Körper geben." (MS 107: 222) Diese Aufmerksamkeit auf die einschlägigen Apparate gilt den *Bedingungen* der Ermittlung von Messwerten. Dabei ist zu beachten, dass die Ergebnisse der Prüfung nicht unabhängig von der Materialität ihrer Instrumente erreicht werden, und dass Maßstäbe darum ihrerseits derartigen Prüfungen unterliegen können. Das Hegelsche „Bewusstsein" exemplifiziert eine solche Reflexivität. „Denn das Bewusstsein ist einerseits Bewusstsein des Gegenstandes, andererseits Bewusstsein seiner selbst; Bewusstsein dessen, was ihm das Wahre ist, und Bewusstsein seines Wissens davon." (Hegel 2013a, 76) Der prüfende und geprüfte Faktor des Prozesses koinzidieren. Wittgenstein sieht den Sachverhalt nicht so idealisiert, im Endeffekt aber vergleichbar. „Wie drückt es sich im Messen aus, ob ich den Maßstab messe, oder den Tisch? Ich sehe auch manchmal nach, ob der Maßstab stimmt, indem ich den Tisch mit ihm messe (oder ihn mit dem Tisch)." (MS 118: 90v) Aus diesen Ansätzen folgt eine überraschende Konvergenz zwischen den beiden Positionen.

Hegel begreift die „dialektische Bewegung, welche das Bewusstsein an ihm selbst ... ausübt", als einen Vorgang, in dem der Gegenstand des Wissens Rückwirkungen auf das Wissen selbst zeitigt. „...der Maßstab der Prüfung ändert sich, wenn dasjenige, dessen Maßstab er sein sollte, in der Prüfung nicht besteht; und die Prüfung ist nicht nur eine Prüfung des Wissens, sondern auch ihres Maßstabes." (Hegel 2013a, 77) Ein derartiges Vorgehen würde man im Alltagsverstand als Regelverstoß und in der Wissenschaftstheorie als Relativismus betrachten. Was ist das für eine „Messung", in der sich im laufenden Verfahren die Parameter verändern? Eben diese Frage stellt Wittgenstein angesichts des durch ein elastisches Gerät ermittelten Tischmaßes. Jemand kann unversehens die Projektionsmethode ändern. „Aber das ist dann doch überhaupt kein Messen." (MS 117: 10) Wittgensteins Antwort auf diesen Protest klingt an Hegels Erfahrungsbegriff an. Ein Feedback aus der Anwendung auf die angewandten Instrumente ist nicht auszuschließen. „Gewiss, es ist nicht was wir messen nennen; kann aber unter Umständen auch praktische Zwecke erfüllen." (MS 117: 10). Der Vorgang darf nicht ausschließlich als Observation messbarer Quantitäten betrachtet werden, sondern ist unweigerlich auch ein Test der Verfahrensregeln selbst.

Ist diese Skizze nicht überzeichnet? Der Duktus der Hegelschen *Phänomenologie* führt doch unbeirrbar zu einem erhabenen Ziel, während Wittgensteins Erörterungen im Aufweis möglicher Störungen hergebrachter Selbstverständlichkeiten enden. Der Einwand ist berechtigt, die Diskrepanz ist offensichtlich. Dennoch findet sich auch an dieser Stelle eine Vergleichsgrundlage. Der gemeinsame Nenner: Maßstäbe funktionieren nicht von sich aus, sondern regelgeleitet. „Objektive" Meßergebnisse sind für beide Philosophen Momentaufnahmen und abstrahieren von den Anwendungsbedingungen, in denen sie zustande gekommen sind. Hegels „Erfahrung des Bewusstseins" und

Wittgensteins Überraschungen beim Regelgebrauch verfolgen benachbarte Motive. Die Anerkennung eines solchen Berührungspunktes schließt indes Unvergleichbarkeit nicht aus. Sie macht die Distanz, an dieser neuralgischen Stelle, erst richtig sichtbar.

Der Punkt sind Regeln generell, nicht Maßstäbe als Regeln. Die Meta-Regel, welche Hegels Gedankengänge leitet, nennt sich Dialektik. Sie gilt für alle Probleme, auf die er im Duktus seiner Expositionen trifft. Ihre Anwendungsfelder sind vielgestaltig, doch ihre Methode setzt sich überall durch. Diese Unbeirrbarkeit sichert den geordneten Fortschritt in Hegels weltgeschichtlichen und logisch-systematischen Entwürfen. Wittgenstein erhebt keinen prinzipiellen Vorwurf gegen die Veränderung des Maßstabs während der Messung, derer sich der dialektische Prozess konstitutiv bedient (das „Aufheben"). Sie kann sich nahelegen und sie kann berechtigt sein. Doch er würde hinzufügen, dass Dialektik die Charakteristik *aller* Regeln teilt: sie greift auf ein Anwendungsgebiet vor, dessen Beschaffenheit sie nicht vorweg fixieren kann. Nirgends ist garantiert, dass Erfahrungen in der Entfaltung unseres Wissens sich nach dem Dreischritt richten (müssen), den Hegel durchexerziert.

Die Triangulierung zweier philosophischer Positionen mit einer Sachfrage ist die Vorbedingung für deren Vergleich. Seine Schlüssigkeit hängt daran, wie plausibel die Annahme erscheint, es würde sich um dieselbe Sache handeln. (Ohne diese Voraussetzung reden die beiden Seiten aneinander vorbei.) Für ein solches Urteil bestehen keine kontextunabhängigen Kriterien. Der nächste Schritt im Sinn der vorgelegten Überlegungen wäre daher die Präzisierung eines Rahmens, der die wesentlichen Merkmale von Maßstäben festlegt und die Nähe der philosophischen Positionen danach bestimmt. Dies ist nicht der Ort für einen solchen Versuch. Es scheint auch zweifelhaft, ob er den diskutierten - zwiespältigen - Befund entscheidend vertiefen könnte.

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Bouwsma, Smythies, and Wittgenstein

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Abstract

O.K. Bouwsma spent two years (1949-51) meeting often with Wittgenstein for philosophical discussions. Through Wittgenstein he met the latter's unusual student Yorick Smythies. That, in turn, led to frequent discussions with Smythies. Bouwsma kept detailed and reflective journals in which he recorded discussions with both Wittgenstein and Smythies. The present paper is an account of culled journal entries on Smythies revealing interesting insights to Smythies' thinking in relation to Wittgenstein. In particular, they show Smythies objecting to Wittgenstein's analysis by means of examining the grammar of a word, an activity that Smythies thought made philosophical analysis seem dead and ignored the deeper insights into our sub-conscious motives for speaking – a kind of inauthenticity or "falsity." The notes show Smythies finding in Dostoievski and Kierkegaard what he could not find in Wittgenstein.

In the academic year 1950–51, O.K. Bouwsma was a Fulbright scholar at Oxford University where he lectured and discussed philosophy. His primary interest in being there was the opportunity to continue discussions with Wittgenstein, whom he had met the previous year at Cornell University. While at Oxford, Bouwsma was asked by Gilbert Ryle to deliver the newly founded John Locke Lectures as a prominent representative of the "Ordinary Language" school, reflecting what might be done with Wittgenstein's philosophical insights. Wittgenstein was Ryle's first choice, but turned down the invitation, saying that his ideas could not be conveyed in lectures and would surely be misunderstood.

Through Wittgenstein, Bouwsma met Wittgenstein's student Yorick Smythies with whom he formed a life-long friendship. Smythies spoke openly in countering some of Wittgenstein's thinking about language. The introduction led to frequent meetings and discussions that year and later.

It was Bouwsma's practice to maintain a daily notebook – what might be called a "commonplace book" – which included conversations that he had with Smythies, Wittgenstein, and other Oxford philosophers that year. The Fulbright year provided many occasions for such discussions and his commonplace book swelled with notes on discussions with prominent Oxford philosophers. In addition to Bouwsma's recorded discussions with Wittgenstein (now published in *Wittgenstein Conversations 1949-51*), the most frequent and interesting recorded discussions were with Yorick Smythies. The notes on Smythies presented in this collection have been culled from Bouwsma's commonplace book over the period of the Fulbright year and extending through 1976. Smythies died in 1980.

The Smythies notes begin with their discussions on Kierkegaard – a common interest – with Bouwsma proposing some generalizations about Kierkegaard's intentions. Smythies objected to these generalizations, as he seems to have done with all generalizations. These objections pushed Bouwsma, peaking his interest in Smythies and exciting him to draw out Smythies. Bouwsma, a Calvinist, and Smythies, a Catholic convert, took each other's religious foundations seriously and, together with their common attention to language's relation to philosophy by way of Wittgenstein, prodded and responded to each other's existential interests beyond Wittgenstein's insights into "language as technique."

Those "existential interests" led them to reading and discussing some of Kierkegaard's books, particularly *The Concept of Anxiety*, and then on to Dostoievski's *Notes From Underground*. In turn, these topics led to Bouwsma's probing Smythies on his ideas of cleansing the soul of "falsity." Smythies gave Bouwsma a copy of his paper, "Non-Logical Falsity," which reads like a guide for preparation of the Sacrament of Reconciliation in the Roman ritual. Bouwsma probed Smythies to speak of his connecting such psychoanalytic uncovering of spiritual falsity with Wittgenstein's uncovering of depth grammar and analogies leading to philosophical confusions. Herein lie Smythies' dissatisfaction with Wittgenstein. Where Wittgenstein believes that reminding us of forgotten uses to offset philosophical missteps, Smythies believes that in doing so we have not attended to unconscious motives in representing ourselves as we do. This failure to confront unconscious motives is the "non-logical falsity" of which Smythies would purge the soul. In the religious sphere, such conscious hiding amounts to a falsity before Absolute Consciousness – God.

Much of the affinity that Bouswsma and Smythies shared for each other was based in a philosophical interest in coming to understand Christianity. In addition to their immediate shared interests in Kierkegaard and Dostoievski, they each probed the meaning and implication of orthodoxy's concept of sin. Whatever else they unpacked from that concept, they each understood that the consciousness of sin entails honest self-evaluation before God, requiring confession, reconciliation, and an adjustment of the relationship with God and neighbor. For both Bouwsma and Smythies, the consciousness of sin was central to Christianity, not merely for understanding its essence, but as essential to the practice of Christianity. Here, Smythies' paper "Non-Logical Falsity" was not an academic exercise but a collection of guidelines and admonitions for self-examination, taking one past what might be a superficial ritual of reconciliation to a deep inventory of one's sins. Bouwsma was fascinated with this paper and reflected on it repeatedly in his notebooks. There, he also reflects on other topics such as Smythies' expression "giving oneself a character," care of the soul, and theological and Biblical themes such as the Incarnation and grace. All these topics relate, finally, to the centrality of the consciousness of sin – the consciousness of the difference between Creator and created.

Bouwsma's record of these conversations with Smythies, also provide glimpses of Wittgenstein as well. Some entries convey interesting personal notes, for example, that

Wittgenstein met separately with Bouwsma and Smythies. Smythies' wife Polly related that her husband Yorick and Wittgenstein met once a week for discussion. Surprisingly, Anscombe does not know of these weekly meetings. Why not? In those discussions, Smythies pressed his dissatisfaction with Wittgenstein's falling short of deeper probes into our non-logical falsity. Smythies felt that Wittgenstein had an invincible shield against extending his logical probes to such deeper non-logical probes. There are, also, interesting "throw away" remarks about Wittgenstein's attempting to immigrate to Russia and again to stay for a time at a monastery. Smythies, having made these arrangements for him to stay at the monastery, remarked that when asked by the abbot if he had enjoyed his stay, Wittgenstein answered emphatically, "No!" On watching English soldiers marching, Wittgenstein commented on their "slovenliness" as compared to the sharpness and orderliness of the German soldiers. In another note Bouwsma records Polly Smythies taking great pains in the wording of a wedding invitation to Wittgenstein because she feared he would seize on a single word giving it some unintentional reading. From such jottings we get glimpses of Wittgenstein beyond his philosophical insights.

More significantly, though, we are treated to some understanding of Wittgenstein through Bouwsma's reflections on Smythies' reflections on Wittgenstein. Of course, we see what Smythies wanted from Wittgenstein that he could not find in him – that it was as if Wittgenstein had promised psychoanalysis but did not deliver it. Smythies found the promise bogged down in Wittgenstein's directives: "Think of 'language as use' as a tool" and "Think of language as a technique." To Smythies these philosophical directives made language seem "dead." The directives were limited to reminders of the actual uses of words that captured our attention as philosophers: "real," "appearance," "time," "know." But confining one's attention to the unconscious motives of language-games in which these words are used misses the unconscious motives the soul may harbor in creating an identity with which it can live. Smythies thought that ignoring the inner life of the speaker, who regularly engaged in identity projects of self-deception and falsity, will leave the words of Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations dead on arrival – of interest only to logicians and grammarians who can do no more with them than destroy "houses of cards." Bouwsma struggles with Smythies' thoughts on these matters, asking what it is like to think of language as "mastering techniques" and as a "tool." Is a word used like a tool? Can a word be compared to a facial expression – not used, simply frowned? While appreciating Smythies concerns, Bouwsma doubts that this point is altogether lost on Wittgenstein as Smythies seems to think.

Sometime in 1970, Bouwsma showed Smythies the record of his conversations with Wittgenstein that he made in 1949–51. Bouwsma had culled these notes from his commonplace book, typed and assembled them into a single document. He rarely showed the typescript of these separated notes to anyone, as he considered them private conversations in which Wittgenstein spoke freely to him without a sense that they would be written down and known to others. Further, Bouwsma was aware that he was remembering what Wittgenstein said some hours later and that he, Bouwsma, was transitioning Wittgenstein's words through his own interests and questions that he had put to Wittgenstein. Not only did Bouwsma not show them to any but a few friends, he, through his literary-estate executor and historian son William J. Bouwsma, insisted that they not be made available in his collected papers at the University of Texas until enough years had passed that parties mentioned negatively in them would not be embar-

rassed. It was the editors of the Bouwsma papers who eventually published the typescript and not Bouwsma himself.

In any case, Bouwsma showed the typescript to Smythies, who, in turn, responded in a lengthy letter. In the letter, Smythies analyzes the notes by way of his technique of searching for the truth and falsity in the voice of the author. He notices that these are not simply remarks that Wittgenstein made to Bouwsma, but that there is a Bouwsma–Wittgenstein voice emerging from the pages. Smythies also read the exchanges hearing Wittgenstein's voice as "mindless," "overpowering," and "stunning," and Bouwsma's voice as "mindful," "relaxed," and leaving the audience "unstunned" and "uncoerced." One can hear Smythies' fear of a conversation with Wittgenstein in these words. Bouwsma, in turn, ruminates on Smythies' assessment of the Bouwsma–Wittgenstein voice and their relationship. Bouwsma readily acknowledged that he was stunned by Wittgenstein and that, while he, Bouwsma had a talent for a certain kind of modest work in philosophy, he was no match for Wittgenstein's genius. In fact, Bouwsma wondered what Wittgenstein saw in him and why Wittgenstein would open up to him as he did. Was it his direct and simple manner of questioning and philosophizing without theorizing? – his religious faith? – his presenting himself without pretention? In any case, Bouwsma treasured the opportunity to put topics forward for their walks and talks and to see a side of Wittgenstein that one does not get from reading his books or listening to others who knew him. Consider this remark from of Wittgenstein from the notes:

... had I read Newman? He was much impressed by Newman. … Newman had a queer mind … [Why? – because of his conversion to Catholicism? – No. Because of his giving probabilistic accounts of miracles.] Later, when we were sitting, he remarked that twenty years ago he would have regarded Newman's action as incomprehensible, as insincere perhaps. But no more … he [Wittgenstein] came to see that life is not what it seems. (Bouwsma 1986: 34f)

In one of Bouwsma's reflections on Smythies' letter, Bouwsma, agreeing with Smythies, says that the words that he put down as Wittgenstein's words were not to be treated as if he had a tape recorder. Rather, they were words that had transitioned through his memory, interests, and his relationship with Wittgenstein. Continuing the reflection, Bouwsma revisits Smythies' worries of Wittgenstein's understanding of language as a technique, giving an account of his own understanding of Wittgenstein on this issue, now developed over the many years since hearing Smythies' objection.

The reader of these notes on Smythies, then, may get glimpses of the minds of these fascinating thinkers – Smythies and Bouwsma – each entangled in the web of the 20th century's most unusual philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. While the reader can find stimulation for thoughts on Wittgenstein in these notes, he can also find stimulation for thoughts on the unique figure of Smythies about whom Wittgenstein said: "He is too serious to find an academic job." And, about whom Iris Murdoch said in her acknowledged Smythies' character Hugo in *Under the Net*: "Hugo's inquiries rarely failed to throw an extraordinary amount of light on whatever he concerned himself with. For Hugo each thing was astonishing, delightful, complicated, and mysterious. ... He was interested in everything, but in a peculiar way. Everything had a theory, yet there was no master theory. ... All his theories, if they could be called theories, were particular." And Bouwsma, who, in contrast-

ing Smythies with Wittgenstein, remarked "Wittgenstein looks at something and tries to make it clearer, while Smythies looks at something and makes it complicated." Smythies' propensity to complicate was a distinguished feature drawing Bouwsma back to Smythies' remarks over the twenty-year friendship that followed their initial meeting in Oxford arranged by Wittgenstein.

Overall, the culled record of discussions with Smythies display the quality of mind of O.K. Bouwsma, who saw the unique intelligence of Smythies. As Bouwsma said of his recorded discussions with Wittgenstein, "not anyone with a tape recorder could have written them."

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Familiar Faces and Noticing Aspects

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Abstract

Wittgenstein's discussion of noticing aspects flows from his attempt to clarify the grammar of "seeing"–a task that is necessitated by his critique, beginning in 1929, of sense-datum theories and, more generally, of the misleading analogy that they presuppose between physical space and phenomenal space. In his writings of the early 1930s Wittgenstein presents a dilemma for sense-datum theories: they must treat the dawning of an aspect either as the appearance of a new sense-datum (Broad 1923: 260), or as the interpretation of a neutral perceptual substrate (Russell 2001 [1912]: 4). Each option faces fatal difficulties. I have elsewhere defended the first horn of this dilemma (Hymers 2017: 68-70). Here I elaborate and defend the second horn.

1. Recognizing Faces

In a 1933 discussion of recognizing faces, much of which reappears in the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein aims to clarify the interrelated concepts of recognition and familiarity. He distinguishes two different kinds of recognition. There is a sense in which I recognize *everything* familiar to me, but my recognition of it consists in "my being at home in what I see" (PG: 165; MS 115: 3): (Asked: "Did you recognize your desk when you entered your room this morning?" – I should no doubt say "Certainly!" and yet it would be misleading to call what took place "a recognition". (PG: 165; MS 115: 2; PI: §602) What Wittgenstein calls "a recognition" ("*ein 'Wiedererkennen'*") and distinguishes from the experience of seeing his desk in its usual place, is related to what he later calls the "dawning of an aspect" ("'*Aufleuchten' eines Aspekts*") in contrast with the "continuous seeing" of one (PI: II 194). (Someone approaches me in the street, and my eyes are drawn to his face; perhaps I ask myself, "Who is that?"; suddenly the *aspect* [*der Aspekt*] of his face alters in a particular way, "it becomes familiar to me"; I smile, go up to him and greet him by name; then we talk of past times, and perhaps a memory image of him occurs to me; I see him in a particular situation. (PG: 167; MS 115: 7-8; my translation and emphasis) It is tempting to say that I recognize him *when* "the aspect of his face alters," and if I think of my impression of someone's face as an object – as a sense-datum – then it may seem as though I could, albeit with difficulty, detach the familiarity from the sense-datum. But this is a misleading picture of recognition, says Wittgenstein, "For I have no notion how I should so much as try to separate these two things" (PG: 175; MS 115: 20). Separating the familiarity from the appearance of the face is not merely "a matter of psychological difficulty, a difficulty of introspection" (PG: 175; MS 115: 20). The two are *internally* related. So the alteration in aspect does not *coincide* with, or *bring about*, my recognition–it *is* my recognition.

Similar considerations apply to facial *expressions*: (If I say that this face has an expression of gentleness, or kindness, or cowardice, I don't seem just to mean that we associate such and such feelings with the look of the face, [but] I'm tempted to say, that the face is itself one aspect of the cowardice, kindness, etc. (PG: 176; MS 115: 23)) That the face can be an *aspect of* cowardice or kindness should not mislead us, for this is compatible with saying that we recognize different aspects *of* the face, including its cowardice or kindness. What matters is that the facial expression "doesn't seem to be merely associated, outwardly connected, with the face" (PG: 176; MS 115: 23; PI: §537). There is, again, an internal relation.

Certain pathologies may seem to cast doubt on the claim that the relation between a face and its cowardice or kindness–or, especially, its familiarity–is an internal one. People with Capgras Syndrome, for example, believe that loved ones have been replaced by impostors, who look just like those loved ones, but who seem to the Capgras sufferers unfamiliar. That a loved one should be thought an *impostor*, and not *merely* unfamiliar, though geometrically similar, suggests that more is going on here than mere detachment of familiarity. And that the loved one should nonetheless be seen as geometrically similar suggests that there is still a kind of recognition. (Capgras patients have no difficulty re-identifying the alleged impostors.) But the standard explanation of this pathology is that recognizing faces involves two separate processes, one of which provides "a veridical image of the person ... which stimulates the appropriate overt semantic data held about that person," and the other of which "gives the face its emotional significance" (Ellis and Young 1990: 244).

However, even if this standard empirical account is correct, it does not follow from the fact that there are two physiological processes at work that we have "two experiences" (BBB: 168)–perceiving the face and then its familiarity. A failure to integrate these two processes in pathological cases may produce the disjointed experience of seeing a familiar face without seeing its familiarity, but this does not show that the normal seeing of a familiar face simply *adds* an experience of familiarity to this same disjointed experience.

2. Faces in Context

The case of Capgras Syndrome can be seen as an empirical instantiation of a general worry that if we take a face and its cowardice, fear or familiarity to be internally related, then we can make no sense of how a face can change its aspect and remain the *same* face. The answer to this general worry, I think, is that in seeing a facial expression we *understand* something about the face, and understanding is a matter of degree. So when we notice a change of aspect, we come to *understand* something further about the *same* face, something we had not grasped before. Suppose I see a cowardly face: (If we were asked: "Can you think of this face as an expression of courage too?" – we should, as it were, not know how to lodge courage in these features. Then perhaps I say "I don't know what it would mean if this is a courageous face." ... But what would an answer to such a question be like? Perhaps one says: "Yes, now I understand: the face as it were shows indifference to the outer world." So we have somehow read courage into the face. (PG: 177; MS 115: 23; cf. PI: §537))

How do I come to see a cowardly face as courageous? I imagine the face in different *contexts*: (I see a picture which represents a smiling face. What do I do if I take the smile now as a kind one, now as malicious? Don't I imagine it with a spatial and temporal context which I call kind or malicious? Thus I might supply the picture with the fancy that the smiler was smiling down at a child at play, or again on the suffering of an enemy. (PG: 177; MS 115: 24; cf. PI: §539)) In this new context the same smile presents a different aspect.

However, Wittgenstein's point is not that the new context *causes* me to reinterpret the facial expression. The relation between this new context and the new aspect is, again, an internal one. (I say "I can think of this face (which at *first* gives the impression of timidity) as courageous too." We *do not mean* by this that I can imagine someone with this face perhaps saving someone's life (that, of course, is imaginable in connexion with any face). I am speaking rather of an aspect of the face itself. Nor do I mean that I can imagine that this man's face might change so that, in the ordinary sense, it looked courageous; though I may very well mean that there is quite a definite way in which it can change into a courageous face. The reinterpretation of a facial expression can be compared to the reinterpretation of a chord in music, when we hear it as a modulation first into this, then in to that key. (PG: 179; MS 115: 26-27; cf. PI: §536)

To imagine someone timid-looking saving another is to imagine circumstances contingently associated with the face. Such circumstances might well *cause* me in some way to come to see the face as courageous. Indeed, they might be crucial to my recognising such characteristics in a face. But such a causal story, Wittgenstein says, "is of no fundamental interest to us" (BBB: 164). As he tells us later of noticing an aspect, "Its *causes* are of interest to psychologists" (PI: II 193).

What is of interest to Wittgenstein is the sort of context that *constitutes* a change of aspect, one that *consists in* our seeing a new internal relation between the face and courage, or, perhaps, other courageous faces. We imagine the face in the context of courageous faces that we remember, and we are struck by its relation to them.

3. Faces and Harmony

In the *Investigations* the remark that the reinterpretation of a facial expression is like the reinterpretation of a musical chord follows the question: "What happens when we learn to *feel* [empfinden] the ending of a church mode as an ending?" (PI: §535). Wittgenstein had already answered this question in *1930*: (Isn't harmony, at least partially, phenomenology, i.e. grammar! Harmony isn't a matter of taste. To understand an ecclesiastical mode doesn't mean to get used to a sequence of tones in the sense in which I can get used to an odour and after a while no longer find it unpleasant. It means, rather, to hear something new, something that I haven't heard before, say like – indeed quite analogously to – suddenly being able to see 10 lines ||||||||||, which earlier I was only able to see as 2 times 5 lines, as a characteristic whole ["*charakterisches Ganzes*"]. Or like suddenly seeing spatially the drawing of a cube that I had previously been able to see only as a flat decoration. (BT 2005: 322; PB: §§4, 224; MS 108: 91)

When I become familiar with an ecclesiastical mode, I cease merely to hear individual notes and begin to hear them as related to each other distinctively. Some notes are ruled out; others are ruled in; and the music that I can make using those notes produces a distinctive impression that differentiates it from the music of other modes. If I insert a note foreign into that mode, then the impression may be jarring or innovative, depending on the case, but the piece will change as a "characteristic whole." This is why harmony is not a matter of taste, but of grammar. The combination of tones is governed by rules, and the rules present us with distinctive musical aspects. The *musical* context–the relationship that a chord bears to other chords in a given musical work–is what guides the reinterpretation of that chord. When we come to hear a complete musical phrase, then we know how to interpret the chords or notes that make it up.

What is the analogue in the case of understanding facial expressions? A succession of facial expressions is not like a musical work, and it may seem artificial to talk about a "grammar" of facial expressions–but every facial expression *is* embedded in a succession of facial expressions, and seeing that succession is informative. Taken out of such a context, a facial expression may be unusually difficult to read.

Moreover, my ability to understand a musical expression is partly a cultural product. If I have been raised in one of many western musical traditions, I may be at a loss when it comes to understanding a Japanese shakuhachi performance or improvisations on a Turkish maqam. (When young American concert-goers applauded the sound of Ravi Shankar's sitar at Madison Square Gardens in 1971, he quipped, "If you like our tuning so much, I hope you will enjoy the playing even more.")

Likewise, my ability to read a face depends on a background of understanding certain faces as typical expressions of certain emotions. Some of these seem to be universals among humans and beyond–the "disgust" face, for example, or bared teeth, but others may vary with time and place (Barrett et al. 2011).

Whether constant or variable, however, they constitute the background against which we interpret and reinterpret facial expressions: (It may be said: the friendly eyes, the friendly mouth, the wagging of a dog's tail, are among the primary and mutually independent symbols of friendliness; I mean: They are parts of the phenomena that are called friendliness. If one wants to imagine further appearances as expressions of friendliness, one reads these symbols into them. ... If I were asked whether I could imagine a chair with a friendly expression, it would be above all a friendly *facial expression* I would want to imagine with it; I would want to read a friendly *face* into it. (PG: 178; MS 115: 26))

We learn to identify cowardly or courageous faces in learning the concepts of cowardice and courage. To read courage into a face that at first seems timid, I must see some internal connection between this face and a paradigmatically courageous face (or, perhaps, some other symbol of courage). Thus, Wittgenstein later tells us, "...what I perceive in the dawning of an aspect is not a property of the object, but an internal relation between it and other objects" (PI: II 212). Such perception is informed by "the kind of understanding that consists in our 'seeing connections'" (BT 2005: 398; MS 110: 257). It is, above all, not a matter of imposing an interpretation on a neutral substrate, as the sense-datum theory of perception might tempt us to think.

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Wittgenstein on Subjectivity and the View of 'I' as Field

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Abstract

In early 1930s Wittgenstein came to grips with the problem of subjectivity. During the period, he came to think 'something exclusively I have' is so ineffable that the word 'I' can be omitted in representing immediate experience. His idea on the ellipsis of 'I' is similar to contemporary cognitive grammarians and Merleau-Ponty in that the word 'I' is implicit when it has no neighbor, and that embodied 'I' am assimilated with 'field' in which things happen.

1. Wittgenstein' dilemma and his tentative solution

In early 1930s Wittgenstein came to grips with the problem of subjectivity and the use of the first-person pronoun 'I' in representing immediate experience. During the period, he seemed to vacillate between the two opposing ideas.

One idea is expressed in solipsistic way as in "*I am* absolutely different from anyone else." In his remarks: "I *am* in a favored position. I am the center of the world" (LPE: 299); "'I' is no longer opposed to anything" (AWL: 22); "Among all the languages with different people as their centres, each of which I can understand, the one with me as its centre has a privileged status" (PB: 58); "'Surely,' I want to say, 'if I'm to be quite/ really/ frank I must say that I have something which nobody has.' ---But who's I? ---Hell! I don't express myself properly, but there's *something*! You can't deny that there is my personal experience and that this in a most important sense has no neighbor." (LPE: 283) Thus, the only reality is 'my' present experience.

The other idea is more general, not solipsistic. The first-person pronoun 'I' is not a special word reserved just for me, and is a linguistic instrument used in turn by anyone. Just as 'here' or 'now' is not a name of a place or a time, 'I' is not a name of a person either. He says "The word 'I' is one symbol among others having a practical use, … It does not stand out among all other words we use in practical life." (YB: 11) So, in this sense, 'something exclusively I have' cannot be designated by the word 'I'.

Wittgenstein wrapped up the two inconsistent ideas as follows; "There is a temptation for me to say that only my own experience is real: "I know that *I* see, hear, feel pains, etc., but not that anyone else does. …I can't know this, because I am I and they are they. On the other hand, I feel ashamed to say to anyone that my experience is the only real one; and I know that he will reply that he could say exactly the same thing about his experience." (BBB: 46)

A tentative solution Wittgenstein reached in the period seems to me that he made a distinction between two different categories in the use of the word 'I', the use of 'I' as subject and as object, each sense of which is different. (BBB: 66f) For instance, "I have a piece of chalk", an example of the use of 'I' as object, has analogous verifications to "He has a piece of chalk", whereas "I have a toothache", the use of 'I' as subject, is different from "He has a toothache" in verifications. (AWL: 19, 21) In the use of 'I' as object the word 'I' is on a par with such personal pronouns as he and she, and they occupy a subject position in turn in the same way. The sentence 'I have/ He has a piece of chalk' describes the fact in the material world, treating of physical objects. (BBB: 46) This case involves

the recognition of a particular person, and its sense is given by the criterion for its truth. If we ask a question 'How can one know it?' to the sentences, we can reply in the same way. Also, the possibility of an error has been provided for in both sentences. (BBB: 67) Thus, the use is called objective.

On the other hand, as to the use of 'I' as subject, 'I' behaves differently from other personal pronouns. "The function 'x has toothache' has various values, Smith, Jones, etc. But not *I*. *I* is in a class by itself. The word 'I' does not refer to a possessor in sentences about having an experience, unlike its use in 'I have a cigar'." (AWL: 21) 'I' and 'he' are different in the expressions representing immediate experiences. (AWL: 21) It is sensible to ask 'How do I know this?' for 'He has a toothache', but not for 'I have a toothache'. While 'He seems to have a toothache' is good, 'I seem to have a toothache' sounds strange. (AWL: 17ff) So, in a sentence 'I know I have a toothache,' 'I know' is truly redundant. If I say 'I feel my pain', 'my' is redundant because I cannot feel other's pain in any way. Even more, the word 'I' is redundant in 'I feel pain' or 'I have a toothache', because pain or a toothache is exclusively felt by me. In the use as subject the word 'I' has no neighbor, and it does not stand in contrast with he or she, and hence is redundant. (Glock 1996: 352) Wittgenstein says "We could adopt the following way of representing matters: "If I, L.W., have a toothache, then that is expressed by means of the proposition 'There is toothache'. " (PB: 58) Similarly "We could have a language from which 'I' is omitted from sentences describing a personal experience. Instead of saying 'I think' or 'I have an ache' one might say 'It thinks' (like 'It rains'), and in place of 'I have an ache', 'There is an ache here'." (AWL: 21)

Wittgenstein once attempted to look for 'something only I have', which makes 'I' the center of the world, in the real objective world. The soul, the Cartesian ego, the personality, the inner 'I', something which just now inhabits me, something which the others can't see, etc., all would have been a candidate for 'the something'. However, he gave up the search. Whatever it is called, it is a mirage in the world and a tangle caused by language. It is what "is connected with the peculiar grammar of the word 'I', and the misunderstandings this grammar is liable to give rise to." (BBB: 66) "We are up against trouble caused by our way of expression." (BBB: 48) We must not confuse the reason with the effect. It is not that because there is 'something only I have' the word 'I' has a subjective use and is so different from other personal pronouns that it is ineffable (can only be 'shown'). It is just that the grammar of the word 'I' induces me to think of myself as a privileged being in the world. We are tempted to be misled by language. From the time on, he talked much less of the use of the word 'I' and

focused much on language games in which we use the word in various ways.

2. Embodied 'I' as field: cognitive grammarians and Merleau-Ponty

What I would like to show in this paper is the similarity between Wittgenstein's idea on 'I' ellipsis expressions and those ideas developed by contemporary cognitive grammarians and Merleau-Ponty. I think no one has pointed it out yet. The similarity can be summarized as the view of embodied 'I' as field.

The problem of subjectivity is actively discussed in cognitive grammar, led by Ronald Langacker, Yoshihiko Ikegami and so on. For them, subjectivity pertains to 'construal' (i.e. cognitive processing of one's experience with a view to encoding it in language). They think the subjectivity in language accrues in the cognitive interaction between the embodied cognizing subject and the situation (the world) through construal. Subjectivity is maximized in their view when the subject is located in the very same situation she is to construe and construes it as it is perceivable to her; she is embedded in the very same situation and she herself is not within the scope of her perception, and hence she may not be explicitly (linguistically) encoded. Japanese is one of the typical languages the speakers of which prefer this subjective construal. They need not a first-person subject in the following sentences; "HA GA ITAI" (A tooth aches / I have a toothache); "FUNE GA MIERU" (A ship is visible / I see a ship); "KOKO HA DOKO?' (What place is this place? / Where am I?) As is clear in those examples, 'I' am made so maximally subjective that it is implicit with no phonological realization. In a language like Japanese, there is a striking grammatical asymmetry between the first person and the third person subjects. When 'he' is a subject, they have to say "HA GA ITASOUDA" (A tooth seems to ache / She seems to have a toothache) instead of "HA GA ITAI", which is exclusively used by the first person. Another example of the subjective construal, which seems more universal, is "Vienna is approaching." The subject 'I', though mentioned implicitly, is embedded in the situation and construes it as it is perceivable to me. Even though 'I' am implicit, everyone understands it is 'I' who approach Vienna. When embodied 'I' make a subjective construal, 'I' am embedded in the situation and 'I-consciousness' functions as if it were a field (place, environment) in which things occur: as it were, "Vienna is approaching IN ME".

In my view, Wittgenstein's examples of 'I' ellipsis language seem very close to that of cognitive grammarians in that 1) the word 'I' can be omitted when construal is maximally subjective, namely when 'I' have no neighbor; 2) as in the example "There is a toothache here" instead of "I have a toothache", 'I' am transformed to and assimilated with a certain field called 'here', in which things happen.

Next I take Merleau-Ponty for comparison. With the knowledge of developmental psychology, he demonstrates that an infant of sixteen months, who has not yet mastered the system of personal pronouns, does not employ 'I' as grammatical subject; "At the age, the child is not yet conscious of his own perspective. To refer to himself, the child does not employ the subject (in order to say '*je veux écrire*' [I want to write], he says "*kire*"). For others, he uses a subject (to say '*papa écrit*' [Papa writes], he says '*papa kire*')." (Merleau-Ponty 2010: 259) He continues: "The acquisition of the proper name is made after other characters. The use of the pronoun 'I' comes still later, at least in its full sense, when the child understands that everyone in his

turn can say 'I' and can be considered as 'you' [*toi*]." (Merleau-Ponty 2010: 259) According to him, a child of the age lives in a world in which there is no distinction of perspectives. Self-other distinction is absent in its primordial consciousness.

With the development of the reflective awareness of perspectival differences between her experience and that of others, a child acquires 'I-consciousness', which marks the passage out of infancy. Even in adulthood a person retains anonymous and general consciousness called the tacit cogito at the basis on which she has the Cartesian cogito, which is reflective and personalized. The tacit cogito is anonymous because it is pre-personal. It is latent and unexpressed, while the Cartesian cogito is thematized in language. Since perceptual experience is presented to us anonymously, 'I' is no more the true subject of the perception. (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 215)

Merleau-Ponty thinks pain or vision is pre- and impersonal and does not belong to anybody. Rather it belongs to a certain field. (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 216) If an embodied person stands upon and occupies the position from which pain or vision is opened, she feels or perceives it. If another person occupied the same position, the same perspective would be opened. In this sense, an embodied subject is assimilated with a certain field in which anonymous and general sensation or perception takes place. Thus, he says "So, if I wanted to render precisely the perceptual experience, I ought to say that *one* perceives in me, and not that I perceive." (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 215) It would be a typical mistake for adults if I think this is 'my' pain or 'my' vision which only I can access to. "The perception of other people and the intersubjective world are problematical only for adults." (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 355)

When Merleau-Ponty says "One perceives in me", his idea is similar to that of Wittgenstein or cognitive grammarians in that 'I' am embedded in the situation, am transformed to and assimilated with a certain field in which anonymous perception occurs.

Just like Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein also mentions the impersonal character of vision and the embodiment of 'I-consciousness'; "If we describe the visual field, no person necessarily comes into it. We can say the visual field has certain internal properties, but it being *mine* is not essential to its description. That is, it is not an intrinsic property of a visual sensation, or pain, to belong to someone. There will be no such thing as *my* image or some else's" (AWL: 22; LPE: 283); "'I' only has meaning with reference to a body." (YB: 10)

They are similar in that 1) pain and a vision are anonymously neutral; 2) when they are felt by embodied 'me', I mistakenly think they are mine; 3) when subjectivity is embedded in the situation 'I' am transformed to and assimilated with field; 4) though maximum subjectivity and impersonality seem at first glance inconsistent, it finally coincides with each other because both have no neighbor.

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Paradigm Case Argument and Ordinary Cases

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Abstract

The paradigm case argument could be considered as an enigmatic example of hastened conclusions that we could see in the heydays of the Ordinary language philosophy. The paper tries to analyze the basic form of the argument and review its critique. Then it offers what could be still followed while remaining inside the paradigm of the ordinary language – the argument failed not because it followed ordinary language, but because it did not follow it enough.

Once popular and heavily criticized, the paradigm case argument is an interesting philosophical tool, that was supposed to deal with substantial questions. It was heavily discussed and used by the so called Ordinary language philosophy (OLP). The apparent naiveté makes it a good target for analysis. Could we really get rid of philosophical problems by showing paradigm cases of language usage? The following article will concentrate on the formulation and aims of the argument followed by its critique and in the end showing that we can still be ordinary language philosophers and don't have to accept the crude form of this argument.

The argument

As the name of the argument suggests, it is based around something called a paradigm case. There were several uses of it, but two of the most famous (and criticized) proponents were Flew and Malcolm. The basic thought lies in the fact, that when there are some paradigm cases of usage of some concrete term X, there must be correct occasions when to use X (and therefore there are some "things" of the kind X). If that was true and we could accept it without hesitations, it would be a great weapon against skepticism of any kind – there could be no way how to doubt existence of free will, material world, justice, responsibility etc.

Flew argues that "if there is any word the meaning of which can be taught by reference to paradigm cases, then no argument whatever could ever prove that there are no cases whatever of whatever it is" (Flew 1966b: 19). And we can find similar version in Malcolm when he claims that in "the case of all expressions the meanings of which must be *shown* and cannot be explained … it follows, from the fact that they are ordinary expression in the language, that there have been *many* situations of the kind which they describe" (Malcolm 1967: 120).

The argument in this version can be reconstructed in the following form:

1. "X" was learned by reference to paradigm cases of X.
2. Therefore, it cannot be the case that there are no cases of X.

Probably what we see here as the missing premise is the claim that ordinary language is correct language, which Malcolm tries largely to argue for. We will not go into this line of thought, because the very idea of a correct language is problematic. Not Flew, nor Malcolm tackle the question of correctness of the description to cover the corresponding facts. Does the world coerce the dictionary we use? Does the language force some forms of life? Instead

of these questions we shall concentrate on the original aim of the argument.

We can see it clearly in work when we consider one example. Flew claims that "since the meaning of 'of his own freewill' can be taught by reference to such paradigm cases as that in which a man, under no social pressure, marries the girl he wants to marry … it cannot be right, on any grounds whatsoever to say than no one *ever* acts of his own freewill" (Flew 1966b: 19). It is clear the paradigm case argument should guarantee the existence of some kind, in this case the existence of acts based on free will (hence the existence of free will). To be correct, we should add that both Flew and Malcolm claim it is only the first step. If we "succeed in making the philosopher refuted," adds Malcolm, we do "not succeed in curing the philosophical puzzlement which caused the philosopher to make the paradox which needs to be refuted" (Malcolm 1967: 123).[1].

Before we proceed to the critique, we should reformulate the argument to get rid of one troubling part, namely the teaching. It is doubtful whether there is any situation we can simply describe as "learning by referring to paradigm cases". If one does not know the idea of free will and comes to a wedding, simple saying "look, the groom has decided to marry on his own free will" would not teach us the meaning. And if someone explained us the meaning, we would not have to be at a wedding. It is what Hanfling calls the ostensive teaching argument (Hanfling 2000: 76). The argument can be reconstructed by reference to use of a term in the following way (Minas 1977: 221):

1) X is used in certain paradigm cases.
2) The referred objects are X (and any denial of it is meaningless).
3) There are X's.

The conclusion in this version stays the same, only the premises are changed. Later we will try to make some use of it without such a hasty conclusion, but let's move to the critique first.

Miracles and ghosts

Many critics of the argument generally assumed it is an important part of the OLP with the loudest one being the book Words and Things by Ernest Gellner (Gellner 2005). We do not have to agree with that and certainly we can imagine the OLP without it, but the case of Gellner is strong when we see Malcolm being a prominent advocate

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[1] To be correct even more, we should add that in the quoted reprint Malcolm adds, that he no longer feels that cases he was presenting as such (Moore's examples) can be taken as paradigm cases (Malcolm 1967: 124).

(Malcolm 1967) and Flew claiming interlocking of the argument with the OLP (Flew 1966a: 261). The critique was as simple as the argument itself. It tried to point to examples which follow the procedure, but which manifest the existence of some kind we would not accept (such as miracles or witches).

Gellner, who saw in the OLP a conservative apology of the dictionary of the current society argued, that the "fact that there are standard cases for the application of the term such as "miracle" in a given society in no way proves that such terms have a *legitimate* use" (Gellner 2005: 67). Even if we do not believe in miracles and do not use the word ordinary for concrete examples in the world, we can surely imagine people who do. We can go to a catholic mass and when the bread is transformed to the flash and the wine to the blood of Christ, we can refer to it as a miracle. Does this prove it is a miracle and that there do exist miracles? Or, does it necessarily mean that since the believers use the word to refer to such things as the Eucharistic miracle, any refusal of it is bound to be meaningless?

Malcolm is aware of this problem and therefore he tries to get away with it by dividing words to those whose meaning can be shown and cannot be explained and those whose meaning can be explained (Malcolm 1967: 120). One must see an example of an X (spatial relations like "to the left" or temporal relations like "earlier" or "later") to be able to understand it, while to understand other words (like "ghost") it is enough to get an explanation. But that does not seem to be the case and any such distinction is in the post-quinean philosophy bound to fail.

Even if we succeeded somehow to get away with the "miracle" problem, the more serious accusation is of begging the question (Minas 1977). If the existence of X means that X is used in some paradigm cases, then what we try to prove is what we already assume. If what must be proved is the existence of X, it cannot be already a part of the premise. "If the philosopher could show that it was *certain* that the object presented is of the relevant type, then there would be no question-begging, because his proof of certainty of this premise would be a proof of the premise. That is, presuming that this proof is not itself a question-begging one" (Minas 1977: 223). However, showing a case of usage (even if we call it a paradigmatic one) does not seem what any philosopher skeptical about existence of some X would consider as showing with certainty that some presented object is an object of the relevant type.

Free will and paradigm cases revisited

The paradigm case argument tries to stand on the shoulders of the basic idea, that meaning of a term lies in its use. However, it goes only half-way in doing it. Malcolm later retreated from his previous positions and no longer viewed showing arbitrary examples as providing paradigm cases. Instead he tried to show that this very method is not consistent with our ordinary usage since ordinary usage requires ordinary context (Malcolm 1949).

Though Malcolm revisits in this article the previously discussed problem of certainty, we can apply it to the case of free will. Were we at a wedding ceremony and Flew sitting next to us pointed at the groom and said: "he has decided to marry on his own free will", we could ask – what is the difference from when I decided to come to the ceremony? We could continue and ask him whether he has some information about someone trying to influence him. Or is he suggesting that people usually do not decide to marry

freely? (The same may apply if he said the groom has not decided freely.)

When we try to bring the free will problem back to the earth, we must at first make it clear, the problem may lie in the very idea of free will. It is of no surprise Wittgenstein in his lecture about free will makes it clear that what he says about free will "might look as if I wanted to argue for the freedom of the will or against it. But I don't want to" (YSF: 436). That is the basic problematic assumption of the simple approach we can see in Flew's notes – he does no doubt the problem may lie in what he is trying to accomplish.

What Wittgenstein tries to do instead is to tackle the ideas that disturb us, that bring us to doubt whether we are free and eventually lead us to the big dualism of free will and determinism. The two ideas he deals with are 1) laws of nature and 2) conception of "choosing otherwise". He, so to say, is trying to come to the problem from the other side – what is a (paradigm) situation when we would say we are not free? We do not need the idea of a free will, unless we do not feel threatened by an idea of a compelled will. It is only a special conception of regularity that makes us doubt the presence of a free decision. When we regularly clean our teeth every morning, there is nothing coerced about that, nothing "non-free". "There is nothing about regularity which makes anything free or not free. The notion of compulsion is there if you think of the regularity as compelled; as produced by rails" (YSF: 431).

The problem lies in thinking about ordinary cases in a special way. "We are comparing the case of a human being with those special cases where we *would* say that a man was decided: where we would say that he thought he was deciding freely, but was actually compelled. Why should anyone be inclined to compare ordinary cases with such a very special case?" (YSF: 435). An example is a man "who could make someone choose the card he wanted him to choose. This is of course a primitive case. Everyone would say he chose freely, and everyone would say he made him choose what he wanted him to choose" (YSF 193: 434).

But there is something compelling about the wedding case. It may indeed be in the end a paradigm case of free will, but for different reasons. It is a situation which we tend to think fully through, when we consider many angles of the decision we are going to make and existence of a social pressure, which Flew seems to be counting as condition refuting the possibility of deciding on one owns free will, can just play a part in our examination of the situation. And for these reasons it may create a paradigm (a *nuclear sense* (Austin 1979: 71)) for the cases which we would for some *philosophical* reasons like to call as examples of free will.

We may ask, what is left of the argument. When Hanfling tries to reconstruct it, and save it from the initial problems, he begins with saying "it is essentially an argument about description and not ostension" (Hanfling 2000: 76). It cannot prove an existence of something – no argument can. It does not fix necessary conditions of usage (as if they were some), it just points to ordinary cases and says we must try to understand them. The problem was not that it followed the ordinary language, the problem was that it did not follow it enough, it did not try enough to understand what the ordinary is. It is then these fixed ordinary usages and situations to which we must bring our philosophical thoughts about free will (certainty, knowledge, whatever you have) back and where we must make sense for them.

Conclusion

The paradigm case argument has a longer history than the one described here. What we tried to show it cannot be a proof of existence of some kind and cannot be considered as based on reference to ordinary use. After a reformulation, it is no longer a confirmation of existence, it only points to cases that must be attained by any philosophy that tries to analyze the undergoing problem.

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I Am Seeing (Faces in) Clouds. On the (Half-)Truth of/in Perception

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Abstract

My main question is whether there is a sense in which one can say that (some of) our perceptions are true. I survey some quasi-perceptions, mainly illusions. I present the so-called problem of perception: arguments from hallucinations and illusions entailing that even in genuine, veridical perceptions we are not aware of ordinary objects. I comment on the notion of veridicality and the conditions for applying the notion of truth. I discuss five major types of philosophy of perception, as answers to the problem of perception and to my main question. I conclude that three of them have some place for truth. Finally, I suggest that illusions could be said to be 'half-true' and maybe even hallucinations might be accorded some particular variant of truth.

> There is no truth. There is only perception.
> (Gustave Flaubert)
>
> Reality is merely an illusion, albeit a very persistent one.
> (Albert Einstein)
>
> Is Truth Dead?
> (Time Magazine, April 3, 2017)

1. Introduction

I am seeing a book in front of me, and there indeed is a book in front of me. This is true of many other things. But there are a lot of different situations and cases. Eyes closed, I often see little moving clouds or changing faces or light patterns. Recently, I got impressed with cases of uniformity illusions. I have tinnitus, on and off migraine ophthalmique. I have had many, sometimes weird, dreams.

There are mirages, afterimages, hot/cold illusions, taste changes through music, magic tricks, imaginations, ambiguous images. There is the Müller-Lyer illusion, apparent motion, binocular rivalry, subliminal priming, mental imagery, mimicry, camouflage, the McGurk effect, superstitious perception, delusions, blindsight, also cultural influences on perceptions. Many "illusions" are quite simple: blurred vision, a white wall in red light, an elliptically looking coin on the table, or one finger in front of your nose becoming two, when looking at a distance.

My main question is whether there is a sense in which (some of) our perceptual experiences can be said to be 'true'. I present the problem of perception: arguments from hallucinations and illusions which entail that even in genuine, veridical perceptions we are not aware of ordinary objects. I comment on the notion of veridicality and the conditions for applying the notion of truth, not clearly satisfied by perceptions. I discuss five major types of philosophy of perception, as answers to the problem of perception and to my main question. Three of them have some place for truth. I suggest that illusions could be said to be 'half-true' and maybe even hallucinations could be accorded some particular variant of truth.

2. The Problem of Perception

One usually distinguishes between veridical, or genuine, perceptions and quasi-perceptions like illusions or hallucinations. Our ordinary, or intuitive, conception of perceptual experiences is that in genuine perceptions we are aware of mind-independent objects and situations. Illusions and hallucinations, we consider as errors. Yet, they give rise to what is called 'the problem

of perception' (Crane and French 2017): since they are possible, perception in the ordinary conception is impossible. Roughly, the arguments entailing such a conclusion, run as follows:

(A) In illusory and hallucinatory experiences, one is not aware of ordinary objects.
(B) The same account of experiences must apply to veridical experiences and especially to their hallucinatory counterparts and to illusory experiences.
(C) Therefore, one is never perceptually aware of ordinary objects.

The idea is that in all those cases we have to do with the *same kind* of experiences. It is supportable by the circumstance that by simple introspection, it seems, one cannot tell veridical perceptions and illusions or hallucinations apart. Theories opposing such a view, upholding that these types of experiences are not of the same kind, are known as 'disjunctive theories of perception'. Disjunctive theories, in their turn and maybe strangely enough, are sometimes said to find support in introspective *reflection* on perceptual and quasi-perceptual experiences (Martin 2004).

3. Veridicality and Truth

Genuine perceptions are called 'veridical'. 'Veridical', according to dictionaries, means 'truthful'; literally, it means 'truth-telling'. At least in that vague sense, perceptual experiences are connected with truth. Is there a more precise sense? (Incidentally, one sometimes speaks of 'veridical hallucinations' or 'veridical dreams' – or 'Veridical Hospitality Apartments' in Mumbai').

Paradigmatically it is propositions – expressed by statements, like 'a cat is on the mat' – that can be true or false. Here, truth is a relation between a proposition and a state of affairs, which is represented by the proposition. The relation in question is a *relation of representation.* And the corresponding statement has a clear propositional content, a representational content. There are comparable items: At the 33th Wittgenstein Symposium, I argued that scientific diagrams, photos, flow charts can be accorded truth, since they are representational. Yet, perceptual experiences, percepts, sensory appearances are not, and not comparable to, propositions or statements. Can they be said to possess any of the just-mentioned features. We will see that different theories give different answers.

Of course, perceptual *beliefs* and *judgments* – like 'this is red' –, also appearance *beliefs* and *judgments* – like 'this

partially immersed stick looks bent' – state true or false propositions. Attempts of justifying them will always rely on perceptions and sensory appearances. Such matters pertain to the epistemology of perception (Lyons 2017) and to its central question of "how perception could give us knowledge or justified belief about an external world" (ibid.). Although intimately interrelated, these matters do not form our central topic here. (Admittedly, my main question could lead to the question of whether perceptual experiences can count as knowledge.)

While truth is a question of yes or no, veridicality seems to be a matter of degrees. According to Wiktionary, 'veridicality' could just mean truth, but in philosophy it means "the degree to which an experience, perception, interpretation accurately represents reality". So, veridicality usually implies some relationship of representation, and accurate can be said to connote true in certain respects.

I shall now consider a few major theories of perception, in their role of answering the problem of perception and also my main question.

4. Radical Causal Theories of Perception

There are positions, such as radical embodied cognitive science or eliminative materialism, according to which perceptual processes are purely physical-causal processes. There are bodily stimuli causing perceptual experiences as effects. These are causal relations, but not representational relations: effects do not represent their causes, they never are "false". Such views have no place for questions of truth or veridicality.

They also have no use for the idea of being aware of ordinary or non-ordinary objects. So, they reject our ordinary conception of perceptual experience. They can distinguish between external and internal stimuli, between distal and proximate causes. So, they can easily account for cases of perceptual experiences and perfectly matching hallucinations: they just have the same proximate causes.

However, such views do not do justice to the fact that perceptions are not just a simple causal process. Rather, there are at least some transmissions of patterns, if not representational content.

5. Sense-Datum Theories

On sense-datum theories, a perceptual experience in which something appears to be red consists in the perceptual awareness of something which actually is red. This object of experience is called a sense-datum. This could be an ordinary (quality of an) object in mind-independent reality. But for most sense-datum theorists all sense-data are non-ordinary. In line with conclusion (C), they hold that even in veridical experiences one is aware of just non-ordinary objects.

This view involves a relation between acts of sensing and sense-data. But this is not a representational relation. Thus, there also is no place for truth. However, there are sense-datum theorists who are *indirect* or representative realists. Distinguishing between direct and indirect awareness, they hold that we can be indirectly aware of real ordinary objects in virtue of being aware of sense-data. So, in this view, there is a representative relation between sense-data and ordinary objects, providing a place for truth.

A main objection, especially to indirect realist versions of sense-datum theories, is that they construct a phenomenologically absent "veil of perception" between the mind and the world. Against the main versions one could even object that they erect a just as unacceptable "wall of sense-data" between them.

6. Adverbial Theories

While also adopting conclusion (C), adverbalists reject the idea of sense-data as a medium in perception. Rather, they regard experienced sensory qualities as modifications of experiences themselves. If one is seeing a red square, adverbalists say that he is "visually sensing redly and squarely". His experience is a mental event modified in this way. These sensory qualities, called 'qualia', are considered to be *intrinsic* properties of experience itself, and this means that they have no representational or intentional and also no relational aspects. This leaves no place for truth. An adverbalist may not exclude that an actual red square is responsible for the experience in question. But he would not even admit that the red square presents itself this way. Qualities are constitutive of the phenomenological character of experience, but not as qualities of things, presented from the external world.

One general objection to adverbalist theories is that they cannot distinguish, for instance, between seeing a red square and a green circle simultaneously and seeing a green square and a red circle simultaneously. They characterize both states of mind as a "sensing redly and greenly and squarely and circularly". In order to make distinctions here one would need to introduce something like objects of perceptual experience.

7. Intentionalist/Representationalist Theories

Intentionalist theories treat perceptual experiences as forms of intentionality, which are construed as mental representations. In line with the phenomenological tradition, an intentional mental state is normally understood as one which is *about* something in the world. If a cube appears white to one, this is, for intentionalists, because one's experience represents whiteness in the environment. So, there is clear place for truth.

When an intention represents something as white, there may not actually be something that is white. While perceptual experience is representational, it is not relational in that sense, certainly not a relation to non-ordinary sense-data. When a white cube in blue light appears blue, it is considered a case in which the white cube is presented and represented as blue. In this simple illusion, we are aware of an ordinary cube, yet with a misrepresentation of its color. So, intentionalists reject conclusion (C) for illusions.

Hallucinations are more troublesome. Intentionalists accept premise (B) in the sense that the same kind of mental event can occur in veridical perception and in hallucination. Here, too, they avoid the force of conclusion (C), yet by means of a perhaps too subtle distinction. They accept (C) in the form "veridical experiences are not *fundamentally cases of* awareness of ordinary objects", but say that this does not entail "veridical experiences don't *give us* perceptual awareness of ordinary objects" (Crane and French 2017). Thus, they can be disjunctivists: In veridical perceptions, but *not* in hallucinations, we are directly aware of ordinary objects.

One criticism of intentionalist theories is that they do not offer an adequate distinction between perceptual experience and other forms of intentionality, like visualizing or thinking. Specifically, they cannot account for the qualitative or phenomenal sensory character of perceptual experience.

8. Naïve Realist Theories

Naïve realist theories come closest to our ordinary conception of perceptual experience. They hold that in genuine veridical perception of the world, the mind-independent objects of perception are constituents of one's experience, which is not so in other, quasi-perceptual experiences. Thus, they are disjunctivists, rejecting conclusion (C).

Ordinary objects and the awareness relation to them are said to explain the character of perceptual experiences. Many naïve realists consider this primitive relation of awareness as non-representational. This would directly imply that no room is left for the notion of truth. Yet, I would side with those naïve realists who think that perceptions have representational content, even if this content is not appealed to in explaining the phenomenological character of perceptual experience.

Firstly, mind-independent objects are said to be constituents of one's *mental* perceptual experience, yet certainly not as physical objects; experience after all is a mental affair. Secondly, naïve realists also know that perceptual experiences vary greatly. Thus, we have varying representations of things in the world, and places for the notion of truth.

Naïve realists tend to explain the character of illusory experiences by appealing to ordinary objects and their features. Say, one is seeing a white piece of chalk as red. One proposal (cf. Crane and French) is that a white piece of chalk, seen in red light, just looks like paradigm cases of real red pieces of chalk. I would add, the chalk's redness is a representational feature of the perceptual experience.

As disjunctivists, naïve realists will insist that veridical perceptions and hallucinations are of different kind. One can object that a veridical perception and a totally matching hallucination have the same neural proximal cause and thus are of the same kind. Yet, naïve realists can deny that sameness of cause implies sameness of the kind of experience: there are also "non-causal constitutive conditions for the occurrence of veridical experience which are not satisfied in the hallucinatory case" (ibid.).

9. Concluding Remarks

We have found that only some theories of perceptions postulate or allow for a representational relation in perceptual experience and thus have room for the notion of truth: indirect realist theories, intentionalist theories and realist theories, in my minority view.

Our ordinary perceptual experience is extremely rich, and dubious sensory impression get corrected by other sense perceptions. Such habitual adjustments do not brush away the philosophical problem of perception. We are "condemned" to rely on sensory perceptions, and the question about their nature remains. We cannot take a God's eye view.

Yet, our perceptual experiences also are limited, biased, selective, distorted: we don't sense radioactivity, etc. If we characterize particular illusions as half-true and half-false, we could so characterize all perceptual experience of ours. Still, by and large, it is good enough for getting around.

There have been numerous scientific findings about all details of perceptions, illusions and hallucinations. The Müller-Lyer illusion can be considered to be induced by certain automatically activated memory patterns. An impaired primary visual cortex can lead to geometrical hallucinations, damage in the fusiform gyrus can lead to seeing faces with deformed eyes and teeth.

One of my daughters is an extreme-distance runner. Running at night and for lack of sleep, she has seen fairies in the bushes. We count the perception of bushes as veridical, that of the fairies as mistaken. Yet, could we not accord hallucinations some version of truth, inasmuch as they truthfully report or register particular stimulus patterns in the brain? Only, can hallucinations be erroneous?

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Seeing Aspects Anew – Wittgenstein, Bruegel, Titian and Taking Puzzling Innovations in Art History Philosophically Seriously

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Abstract

This essay explores the usefulness of insights of the ubiquity and multi-valence of Wittgenstein's work on "aspect perception" for a framework, which brings recent approaches to the histories of science (Chandler *et al* 1991, Doniger *et al* 2016) and philosophy (Neiman 2002) together with alternatives to 'secularisation' or 'disenchantment' models of art history. Emphasis falls upon the usefulness of insights suggested by Victor Krebs (2010) into the roles played by puzzlement (making strange, de-familiarising) in Wittgenstein's discussions of "aspects," which relate to the question that links *aesthetics*, *ethics* and *metaphysics*: What drives reason to efforts that do not pursue ends or results, that are reducible to a 'rational' - 'irrational' dichotomy. Key points are illustrated with puzzling innovations in Peter Brueghel (1525 - 1599) and Titian (Tiziano Vecelli, 1485/90- 1576).

Contextualising Uncertainties – Why "Seeing Aspects" Now?

> Art historians today tend to be divided between those who study what objects mean and those who study how objects are made.... On the one hand, self-consciously cutting-edge art history emphasizes materiality but has small interest in what the materials are.... Technical analysts, on the other hand, master materiality but have trouble communicating why materials matter culturally (Koerner, J.L. 1999: 5).

Until quite recently, (with notable exception) few would have seen Wittgenstein as a critical resource for rethinking problematic generalisations about art, science and modernity from perspectives offered by alternatives to these option. Gary Hagberg (1995: 119) recognised conflicts between acceptance that Wittgenstein "did something of the first importance for our conception of meaning in the arts" and "an uncomfortable feeling of uncertainty [about] not quite knowing why." Hagberg *(Ibid*: 126) stresses light Wittgenstein can throw on problematic presuppositions that: "(1) the artwork functions as an outward physical sign, (2) artistic meaning is ultimately mental and hence private, and (3) the fundamental task of criticism is to lead us from sign to meaning." It is difficult to overstate the problems at stake, including: the roles of disenchantment or secularisation models of art history play in perpetuating the problems that concern Hagberg and Koerner; the prioritisation of epistemology of science over aesthetics, ethics and metaphysics; and lack of means to address the question above about "reason," and to render how we are affected by good and evil intelligible (Neiman 2002).

Today new possibilities are arising for bringing new approaches to the histories of science (Daston 2008; Doniger *et al* 2016) and philosophy (Neiman 2002) together with alternatives to secularisation and/or disenchantment models of art history - alternatives informed by the multivalent, sensible and mimetic dimensions of Wittgenstein's "aspect perception" (cf. Krebs 2010). These possibilities have not grown in a vacuum. For many, the current state of the world shows that the desire to render good and evil intelligible is not a 'childish whim' -

> What binds the real and the rational together must be so fragile that it will seem miraculous - and on occasion the miraculous occurs. As with any other miracle, it takes something like faith to perceive it (Neiman 2002: 327).

Seeing Wittgenstein's Puzzlement Anew

> A philosophical problem has the following form: 'I don't know my ways around (Wittgenstein 1958: 49).

Ludwig Wittgenstein ended *The Tractatus* (1922) with section 7 saying: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." On the one hand, one might see this only as restating that work's arguments that *what cannot be said* in (logically sensical) propositions *must be shown*. But, from very early on through his latest works, Wittgenstein was preoccupied with the extent to which the "whereof what cannot speak" (e.g., *aesthetics*, *ethics*, *metaphysics*) lie outside of the ordinary - outside of realms of dispassionate knowledge: "things that cannot be put into words,.. make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical" (*Tractatus* 6.522). And in the *Philosophical Investigations*, the most puzzling realms (those that 'make strange' - 'de-familiarise' - give rise to what Aristotle called 'anomie' - are of central importance to practical philosophy:

> We find certain things about seeing puzzling because we do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough (Wittgenstein 1958: 212).

Here Wittgenstein has re-interpreted and/or expanded his early distinction between "saying and showing" in terms of such distinctions as those between: a psychological "science of aesthetics" and his arguments for needing to study a "culture" to understand its "aesthetic rules"; "aspect perception" and "blindness," and "seeing" and "noticing an aspect" (seeing anew) (Koerner, S. IWS 2016). *Seeing Wittgenstein Anew* (Day and Krebs 2010) provides insights of these trajectories; and the multi-valence of "seeing an aspect." These open new possibilities for rethinking *puzzling innovations* in art history - such painting techniques that make things appear (at a glance) to be self-evidently 'natural' and 'realistic' - but, strangely, have no visible real world analogues. An example of multi-valence is where Wittgenstein (1958: 16) invites us to "point to a piece of paper," "its shape," "its colour," and "its number," and then asks: How did you do it? - You will say that you 'meant' a different thing every time you pointed. And if I ask how is that done, you will say you concentrated your attention on the colour, the shape, etc. But I will ask again: how is *that* done?"

Krebs' (2010) essay points to the longevity of Wittgenstein's preoccupations with issues his 1930s critique James Frazer's (1854-1941). For Wittgenstein (1993: 38) Frazer's "scientific way of looking" was blind to aspects of

symbolic systems of decisive importance to the meanings and values of human life ways. For Krebs (*Ibid:* 120-121), already in that critique, Wittgenstein "introduces the very method upon which he will re-conceive his later philosophy" - problems in Frazer are "a general philosophical problem that will become central to his later work." Krebs' essay draws attention to the central roles *puzzlement* plays in Wittgenstein as the "undogmatic" methodology needed in order to: cultivate valuable realms of human life; see ethics as the study of "what is good... valuable... really important... the meaning of life... what makes life worth living... the right way of living" (Wittgenstein 1993: 38); and regard understanding how the "sacred" and "miraculous" brings people together as a philosophical task (Wittgenstein 1980: 874). Here, *puzzling*, becomes a method to bring about deep and far reaching ("miraculous") change in what we "see things as," and experiences of meaning and forms of life. It is a methodology of major significance for appreciating the philosophical significance puzzling sensorial and mimetic innovations in art.

Taking Puzzling Innovations in Art History Philosophically Seriously

> The purely corporeal can be uncanny. … So-called "miracles" must be connected with this (Wittgenstein 1998: 50).

Few innovations (besides 'perspective') have been seen more often as evidence of disenchantment and/or secularisation models of art history than those introduced by artists such as Bruegel and Titian to make paintings, which offer very different images depending on whether we look at them from a distance or close up. At a distance, we scan and see key things in a painting straight away - we *recognise* things as the objects, people and places in the painting's narrative or title. But when we look close up at *how* the painting was *made*, motifs vanish into abstractions - materials, under drawings, brushstrokes, highlighting blobs, blurry areas left unpainted.

The above-mentioned models treat this as the reason why we find the painting so 'natural' and/or 'realistic'. They disregard such important questions as: Why was the artist so preoccupied with depicting things for which there are no 'real' counterparts this way? - as well as one of these painting most puzzling aspects. Besides the images differences noted above, they offer another (at the very least). When we move away to see the painting all-at-once again, there is something 'unfinished' about key elements. How puzzling - "how is *that* is done" (cf. Wittgenstein (1958: 16)? Might the artist have innovated in making things visible, which *cannot be said in words*? Might puzzling unfinish illuminate areas of aspect blindness - render things that Wittgenstein called "mystical" intelligible? These questions are considered from perspective offered by Joseph Koerner's (2004, 2016) work on Bruegel's *The Adoration of the Kings in Snow* (or *Epiphany*) (1557) and Marcia Hall's (2011) on Titian's *Saint Margaret* (1558).

Along with numerous differences, there are significant parallels between Bruegel and Titian. Both practiced a trade rooted in institutions centring on sacred images, which were being transformed by a huge variety of factors, including: struggles over Reformation and Counter-Reformation culture and pressures on artists; new values and forms of patronage, relating to Hans Belting's (1996) "age of art"; and politics that conflated law and violence. While some artists abandoned sacred image painting, conformed to pressures, or took up caricaturing enemy religious cultures - Bruegel and Titian innovated in deeply

puzzling sacred images - that *show meanings* through *how they are made*. Bruegel's small painting pictures the story of the *Epiphany* in a snowy winter townscape in remarkable ways. In a tiny scene at the lower left, "the sacred actors recede into the shadows of the ruined stables" - [i]t takes work to make them out" Koerner (2016: 284). We cannot see them better by peering closely - they vanish into dark brushstrokes. We recognise them a bit again when we step back - but they are *unfinished* forms. Why this puzzling innovation - this *making* sacred images (biblical narrative) *strange*? To see 'career choice' as an adequate answer, is to disregard the possibility that Bruegel portrays:

> the true state of things, both back then, when Christ was born... and now, in the painter's age, in the Flemish life world.... While the Magi gather around Christ, their entourage loiters, armed, idle, and potentially dangerous, as Netherlands in 1567.... [T]he locals labour to survive.... The snow, their actions suggest will grow into a blizzard (*Ibid*: 285).

Bruegel's snow is a bold innovation - it renders a large amount of the finished painting underneath invisible. But human indifference that precisely something the painting means - the snow that is turning the dim *Epiphany* a blinding white conceals what human beings eclipse" (*Ibid:* 287).

Marsha Hall's *The Sacred in the Age of Art* (2011) focuses on Italian Renaissance artists, who mainstream art history does not associate with sacred imagery. The book is not an explicit engagement with Belting's (1996) model of a history of the "icon's likeness and presence" and that of a secular "age of art." Instead, Hall explores an alternative Italian Renaissance art history, commencing with two remarkable 1563 events: the conclusion of the Council of Trent and unset of the Counter-Reformation; and the establishment if the Florentine art Academy by Giorgio Vasari (painter and author of the *Lives of the Most Excellent Painters, Sculptors, and Architects*, 1550) and Medici patrons. Hall's approach - like Koerner's - opens prospects for alternatives to disenchantment and secularisation models; and for exploring Bruegel and Titian's commitments to producing images, which link viewers to sacred *meanings* through how they are *made and used* (seen). Hall's book is a valuable resource for such alternatives; and bringing new light to the importance of *puzzling innovations* in making art to Renaissance meanings - and to what we can learn about these today.

I do not think is a mistake - or exaggeration - to suggest parallels between Wittgenstein, Koerner and Hall's methods; and Bruegel and Titian's innovations. Titian's *St Margaret* (set in a deeply *de-familiarising* context of a cavern on the edge of a stormy night sea) goes against the grain of traditional iconography so deeply that, without it title, we might not recognise the narrative. And why does the woman in the picture look how she does if she has just been disgorged by the terrible dragon pursuing her? St Margaret runs for her life - a cross clutched in an outstretched hand: "The claustrophobia we feel is increased by the lowered sky and burning city in the distance, creating an eerie light" (Hall 2011: 155). It takes work to make out the city's details across the dark waters; and looking closely does not help. They vanish into how Titian painted the frightening scene. But stepping back we notice the importance of this *unfinish* is to how his *St Margaret's* means.

> Titian has made the landscape alive and threatening with his paintbrush.... He... show[s] us a saint who is not above the emotions we experience, but whose courage is all the greater because she conquers them.

Her faith does not inoculate her against terror (*Ibid*: 156).

In its ominous *un-finish*, Titian's painting shows both how difficult pathways to the sacred are; and the importance of their pursuit to the human condition.

Concluding Questions

When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primaeval chaos and feel at home there. (Wittgenstein 1998: 65).

In tandem with his later work on "aspect perception" relating to the philosophical significance of aesthetics, metaphysics, and ethics, Wittgenstein (1998) expressed concerns about obstacles that problematic generalisations about science and art pose for appreciating art's pedagogical and philosophical significance. Some steps towards addressing such concerns might be made by asking whether Breugel and Titian would have agreed that:

The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity.... - And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and powerful (Wittgenstein 1958: 50).

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Perception and Delusionary Concepts in Science

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Abstract

In the present paper I will investigate how language and the concepts we use can delude us when scientific theories suggest that abstraction, as a necessary condition of concepts, is rooted in anatomical structures of the brain, and that language as it expresses meaning is based on embodied cognition, i.e., language is deeply integrated into our physical structure.
First, I will outline the characteristics of language and concepts that might provide ground for delusion. In so doing, I will rely on some ideas from Bergson, Wittgenstein, and Maturana. Then, I will delineate theories suggesting that the capability of abstraction is hardwired as Ramachandran explicates, and the meaning of linguistic expression is rooted in embodied cognition as Merleau-Ponty, and later, cognitive metaphor theory suggest. In conclusion, I will attempt to reconcile the seemingly conflicting views – language is deluding and hardwired at the same time – with the help of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological account.

1. Deluding Language and Deluding Practice

In the first part of this paper I will attempt to delineate those features of concepts which sometimes entail imprecision and misunderstanding. I will then investigate how language can, in specific cases, lead us astray. Finally, I will relate this to scientific practice.

In his *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Bergson emphasized two important facilities: Concepts are based on generalizations and when we try to get a grip on an object with "concepts, laid side by side" we gain only "an artificial reconstruction of the object", though "it is useless to believe that with them we can seize a reality of which they present to us the shadow" (Bergson 2007: 12). Additionally, "the concept generalizes at the same time as it abstracts. The concept can only symbolize a particular property by making it common to an infinity of things. It therefore always more or less deforms the property by the extension it gives to it. ... Thus the different concepts that we form of the properties of a thing inscribe round to so many circles, each much too large and none of them fitting exactly." (Ibid.) That is, beyond the illusion of being able to "seize reality" with concepts, a concept's meaning changes in accordance with the subject it is applied to, and since its meaning can be extended on the basis of analogy and/or resemblance, errors and misunderstandings can result. (Consider polymorphism as Aaron Sloman (2010) construed it.)

Wittgenstein does not question the effectiveness and usefulness of language in everyday life, but many times and in many ways, he highlighted how language can *bewitch* its users, at least in certain cases. Regarding language, there are puzzling gaps between rule and its application (ALW: 90), thought and reality (LWL: 37), words and their meaning (Ibid., 23), and unnoticed switching between language games is also possible. Additionally, because "our language is tempting us to draw some misleading analogies" (BBB: 48) and because of its loose grammar (AWL: 32), it is capable of creating unsolvable puzzles, especially in philosophy. I will not go into detail regarding the kind of difficulties we face due to analogy, but rather focus on the role the first person pronoun, or more precisely subjective vs. objective perspectives, imposes upon us.

If we take into consideration the effort in recent literature to reconcile the so-called subjective (first person) and objective (third person) access and perspective, this gains special importance. As we will see, scientific rigour can only widen the gap between the phenomenal and objective; *heteropheomenology* as Dennett suggested is not capable of dissolving the difference between being immersed in a situation and being observed (even by oneself) in the same situation.

Wittgenstein proposes, that "the use of the word 'I', particularly when it is used in representing immediate experience" is a "misleading representational technique in our language" (PR: 57). He clearly explicated how this representational technique is difficult to reconcile with the physical world described by language. The hardly noticeable trap is that the usage of the pronoun "I" obscures the difference between "'the use of object' and 'the use of subject'" (BBB: 66), or in other words, it eliminates the difference between "physical language" and the language of "epistemology or phenomenology" (PR: 57). As he put it:

> In the … language of 'objective' –physical– space, visual space is called subjective, or rather, whatever in this language corresponds directly with visual space is called subjective. …The essential thing is that the representation of visual space is the representation of an object and contains no suggestion of a subject. …There isn't an eye belonging to me and eyes belonging to others in visual space. Only the space itself is asymmetrical, the objects in it are on a par (PR: 71-73).

This may have been in Maturana's mind when he suggested "our language is a language of objects" (Maturana 1983: 257). In accordance with perception regarded as dynamic and active, as Maturana suggests, perceiving something is a call for doing something, acting upon or cooperating with the environment. The linguistic set up which suggests having given objects around, strengthens our confidence in an objective world that independently exists from us and our perception. This unnoticed belief is reinforced by scientific practice; however it does not provide evidence. As Wittgenstein proposed, "it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are *in deed* not doubted" (OC: 342). Similarly, Maturana noticed that claiming "the existence of an objective world accessible to our perceptions and cognitions, is a necessary condition for the existence of science" (Maturana 1983: 257), but only so far as we accept this objectivist view.

Maturana underscores the importance of how we define perception – when perception is investigated in a scientific manner – because it determines how we relate to a phenomenon. Accordingly, he suggests "to perceive is not to grasp the features of an outside world of objects". When

an organism "exhibits perception", it "brings forth a world of actions through sensory motor correlations congruent with the perturbations of the environment in which … it conserve[s] its adaptation" (Maturana 1983: 256). This dynamic and active concept of perception can illuminate the extent to which an examined activity will be modified due to the experimental situation and at the same time reveals how strong an effect linguistic conductance has on implicit beliefs. As he wrote:

> Unfortunately we forget that the object that arises in this manner is a coordination of actions in a social domain, and deluded by the effectiveness of our experience in coordinating our conducts in language, we give the object an external preeminence and validate it in our descriptions as if it had an existence independent from us as observers (Maturana 1983: 269).

2. Abstraction and Metaphors

In the following section, I will attempt to briefly delineate two basically different theories regarding how deeply abstraction among different sense modalities and cross-domain mapping is hardwired in human cognition. First, I will adumbrate V. S. Ramachandran's *synesthetic bootstrapping theory,* which attempts to reconstruct how a proto-language can evolve based on our present knowledge of brain functions and anatomy, and then I will concisely outline the core idea of cognitive metaphor theory.

Synaesthesia was described by Galton as far back as the 19th century, but until recently there was no established scientific theory that could explain its source and function. Ramachandran and his colleagues tried to find out how it is possible for some people to unintentionally attach colour to numbers, sounds, days of the week, or taste sensation and/or emotion to touching different textures. He suggests "that synesthesia is a concrete sensory process whose neural basis we can uncover, and that the explanation might in turn provide clues for solving the deeper question of how metaphors are represented in the brain and how we evolved the capacity to entertain them in the first place" (Ramachandran 2011: 79). The fetus starts its life with "an initial dense overproliferation of connections that get pruned back as development proceeds" (Ramachandran 2011: 96). This spacing/pruning is genetically driven. Cases of synaesthesia are anatomically well explicable: the different functional areas are close to each other, hence cross-activations, especially if we take mutation into consideration, are quite possible.

But, as Ramachandran noted, "at some level we are all 'synesthetes'" (Ramachandran 2011: 108). The famous *kiki-bouba* experiments provided evidence that there is a cross-talk between visual and auditory perception when (even illiterate) subjects relate the jagged shaped form to *kiki* and the amoeboid shape to the smooth sound of *bouba.* Additionally, as Ramachandran highlighted, not only the shape and sound, but the motion/formation of the lips when pronouncing these words are similar.

Based on experiments with synesthetes and with patients with lesions in the relevant areas of the brain, Ramachandran suggests a functionally and anatomically plausible model of how the lexicon (words), its elements' meaning (semantic), and syntactic structure could evolve on the basis of sensory abstraction, which is built upon *synaesthetic cross-talk.* Of course, synaesthesia without *synkinaesia* (the motor component as it works among hand, lips, and tongue) could not result in language.

Cognitive metaphor theory does not start with brain anatomy and evolution, rather it tries to anchor meaning in everyday bodily experience. According to Mark Johnson, our conceptual system is based on image-schemas on the one hand, which are able to structure our experience because they are based on perception and motor activity, and metaphor on the other hand, by which we can relate different domains of our experiences. (Johnson 1990) This theory, as Johnson's term *embodied imaginative understanding* also indicates, reaches back to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological account of *significance* and the *incarnated mind* (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 3), or in more recent terms, *embodied cognition.*

Perception, according to Merleau-Ponty is not a passive subject-object relation, but rather, as we can also see in the case of Maturana, "[w]e experience perception and its horizon 'in action' " (1964: 12). Similarly, the perceived world is not a set of given objects, rather perceived things "are open, inexhaustible systems which we recognize through a certain style of development, although we are never able, in principle, to explore them entirely" (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 5). Accordingly, our world of perception is in continuous formation in accordance with current and prior perceptual experiences.

Merleau-Ponty does not stop at revealing how perception, our body, and consciousness relate, but continues to illuminate how our mind is intertwined with significance and intersubjectivity. Consciousness plays a central role regarding significance. "[W]hat we call nature is already consciousness of nature, what we call life is already consciousness of life and what we call mental is still an object vis-à-vis consciousness." (Merleau-Ponty 1963: 184) And because the body has "sensory fields" it is, "so to speak, predestined to model itself on the natural aspects of the world. But as an active body capable of gestures, of expression, and finally of language, it turns back on the world to signify it." (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 7) Because the relations between body and perception, and, conscious perception and significance are intertwined, and importantly, because the body is capable of expressing itself, it creates an intersubjective (not private) world. Merleau-Ponty concludes that:

> if the words 'enclose' and 'between' have a meaning for us, it is because they derive it from our experience as embodied subjects. In space *itself* independently of the presence of a psycho-physical subject, there is no direction, no inside and outside. A space is 'enclosed' between the sides of a cube as we are enclosed between the walls of our room (Merleau-Ponty 2008: 236).

This is the core idea upon which cognitive metaphor theory provides a frame within which cross-domain mapping and kinaesthetic image-schemas establish both our basic categories and highly abstract concepts.

3. The Hardwired Dogmatism of Realism

As we can see, *synesthetic bootstrapping* offers a plausible reconstruction of how abstraction, and on the basis of this abstractive capability expressive faculties and skills, can evolve. Similarly, the phenomenology of perception, as Merleau-Ponty construed it, within the framework of the perceiving body, its environment, and consciousness, bestows a double function upon language: as part of the intersubjective world, it expresses and at the same time it forms significance in the world.

The roots of the curious situation described by Merleau-Ponty as the dogmatism of realism (as philosophy and/or

that of science), I suggest, can be found exactly in this multiple function of language. It both describes and it also forms the world we perceive. In the case of science and psychology in particular, consciousness *per se* is hardly accessible. "The psychologist always tends to make consciousness into just… an object of [mere factual] observation" (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 58). Additionally, the object of science is "defined by the mutual exteriority of parts and processes" (Merleau-Ponty 1963: 9). That is, Merleau-Ponty suggests a built-in mechanism in both philosophical and scientific practice whereby

> the realistic thesis of common sense disappears at the level of reflexive thought, which encounters only significations in front of it. ... *As philosophy, realism is an error because it transposes into dogmatic thesis an experience which it deforms or renders impossible by that very fact.* But it is a motivated error; it rests on an authentic phenomenon which philosophy has the function of making explicit. (Merleau-Ponty 1963: 216; emphasis mine)

That is, if we attempt to investigate any aspect of human life, in particular perception and consciousness, we face the distortive potential of the investigation itself: we focus on an aspect one-sidedly, analysis entails dissection and division that is extraneous to the investigated phenomenon, we impose additional implicit beliefs based on scientific practice, and sometimes we yield ground for the *bewitchment* of language. Although the creative power of (linguistic) expression exerts considerable influence on us, the *motivated error* which is committed by scientists and philosophers – as we can see – does not hinder either the birth of new findings or criticism.

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Aesthetic Correctness and Rule-Following

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Abstract

In the paper, I put under consideration the concept of aesthetic correctness and reformulate the problem into terms of the rule following problem. I argue that an answer to the question about what makes aesthetic judgments and works of art correct lies not in extrinsic standards that we can have a propositional knowledge of, but in the perceptual capacity to perceive the world aright.

We are tempted to think about what is to be art in terms of craftsmanship: it is that there is a way to act correctly, for example that there is a way to paint properly or to speak correctly. The same is the case in aesthetic judgments. Aesthetic judgments are not only descriptive but also prescriptive. They say how something was done as well as how something ought to be done. If one states that "painting X is well composed", this means that the painting has such and such layout as well as that it was designed the way it should be designed.

Pointing at the problem of aesthetic correctness is important for at least two reasons. First, as Wittgenstein teaches, in the case of aesthetic judgments usually we do not use predicates such as "beautiful" but rather "a dress does not look well" or "that sounds good" (Wittgenstein 1967: 3; Schulte 1989). Second, I claim that understanding the nature of aesthetic correctness is crucial for understanding the nature of art. Thinking about art in terms of correctness is not news. For a long time, artists were considered as craftsmen. Of course, nowadays, art, and artists, has become more professionalized; they are often taught in schools and graduate to become individual artists. But that is an important lesson: one can teach artists, and if it is so, there have to be standards of correctness according to which one can be taught.

Yet, we have to ask what correctness is? From the grammatical point of view the concept of correctness is analogical to the concept of the good (Geach 1956; Thomson 2008: 14-15). Strictly speaking "correctness" is an attributive adjective that ascribes standards of correctness to an event. If one calls a performance "correct" then one states that the performance fulfills the standards of correctness. Still, the question (*Q*) is what makes a performance correct? Precisely speaking, *Q* contains two distinct questions that are strictly related to the rule-following question:

(*EQ*) Epistemological question: how do we *know* that something is correct?

(*MQ*) Metaphysical question: what *constitutes* correctness?

But there is another threat: if we say that there is a way to paint correctly, we do not say that there is a way to paint a good painting, that there is some sort of a magic formula that sets up an infinite set of good paintings or a way which, when followed, always produces a good painting. That goes too far.

However, we also have to reject the opposite view, that there is no way to set up what is correct. Of course, one could still reasonably doubt whether there is a correct way to love someone or to write a poem but what we are miss-ing here is an understanding of what constitutes correctness. We can think about art and love in terms of uniqueness but still it would not be a counter-intuitive belief that there is some sort of behavior in love and in art that is *not* correct. But if that is so then the *MQ* arises: what constitutes the correctness of a behavior of a lover, a dancer, or a painter?

1. Standards of correctness

What then are the standards of correctness? We have at least two possibilities:

External Standards (*E*): There is an external source for the correctness of an action, for example ideal beauty, nature or the intention of an author.

Description (*D*): An account of the standards of correctness of an action is given by a mere description of the action, for example the action of a teacher.

We are tempted to think that (*E*) is required for a full-blooded explanation of standards of correctness, since without it we will lose the normativity of the standards. The standards of an action must be external to the action, for otherwise there would be no source to the normativity regarding correct action (Korsgaard 1996). It seems that we can point at least at three candidates for the title of "external source of correctness": a model; a rule; and a criterion.

First, a model. We are tempted to think that to act correctly is to act in accord with some kind of a model or an ideal. This ideal could be mother nature, a masterpiece, a score etc. All these examples point at one common feature, that there is a kind of a source we can act in accord with. Maybe the most evident is the case of a musical performance. It would not be wrong to say that a correct performance is the performance that is in accord with a score. If a score requires to play a sound A, then performance of a sound B would not be a correct performance. However, that is the point where we should stop. There is nothing wrong with the statement that if we instantly do not play in accord with a score, for example the prelude to the first act of Wagner´s *Tristan und Isolde*, then we are not performing the prelude. But it *does not* mean that we play incorrectly. We are not performing the prelude but that is all. Obviously, something could be a work of art even if it is not the performance of the prelude to "Tristan und Isolde".

One can argue that the model sets up minimal conditions of correctness, for example for a performance to be correct we should play A if a score sets up A. Nothing more. However, for two reasons even that will not do. First, a score does not set up all relevant requirements for a performance. We could justly assume, that even composers do not

have to treat scores as valid ones. This is true at least in the case of Chopin or Bach who loved to improvise during a performance. As a consequence we can never say that our interpretation of a score is a correct interpretation. Second, even if we could set up all requirements for a performance, then acting in accord with them *would not* be correct. Take the example of an imaginary perfect work of art. One could think that if we had an example of a perfect work of art then we would have a standard to measure the correctness of our actions. Sometimes we even think that. If we teach someone how to paint, then we could say: "Look how Cezanne did that" or "Try to do what Delacroix did" but that could be misleading. If I perfectly depict a perfect model, then my work of art is not perfect – it is plagiarism. If Dostoyevsky's "Idiot" is a masterpiece, it does not mean that if I write a perfect copy of the "Idiot" I would act correctly. Making art is not doing the same thing as others did, regardless of the "correctness" of the things others did.

Second, a rule. We can think that the correctness of a performance depends on the accordance with some rules. The advantage of this view is that it saves the normativity of judgment and art. It is also a common practice to refer to rules in education: we possess rules of composition, rules of perspective etc. Alas, that will not do.

If one refers to rules, one has to respond to the rule-following objection (Kripke 1982). The latter could be described from two sides. First, one could say that in order to follow a rule one needs to be aware of the rule. However, if so, then we embark on a regress: to be able to act in a certain way we need rules that would establish standards of correctness for the action; however, to be able to apply the rules we are required to follow further rules for the correct application of the rules. Therefore, following any rule would require following a further rule etc. Second, one could argue that even if we could not find a criterion for the application of a rule, one could still *implicitely* follow a rule (Brandom 1998). This means that one could possess implicit rule-guided dispositions, where explicit rules are brought to light thanks to the act of reflection upon the dispositions. However, this also does not work, since one still has to answer what distinguishes rule-guided dispositions from merely regular ones. There is a lack of a criterion that could help us to differentiate both of them; therefore the very difference between implicit and explicit rules is merely verbal (Quine 1966: 104-106; Glüer-Pagin 2002).

The last but not least answer is a criterion that enables us to measure an action where it is open question what the nature of such a criterion is – whether it is a rule, a model or whatever else. If we would like to ascribe the feature "correctness" to the performance, then we need a criterion according to which we could assess the performance – or so many believe. Thus, if we assume a valid criterion is a correspondence of a representation to the represented object, then a performance that depicts something correctly is a correct performance. But that is wrong, since without a meta-criterion one can never know whether a criterion is validly applied. The threat is even more serious. If an action could be consistent with an infinite number of incompatible criteria, then an action, first, is subject to an *infinite* number of criteria; second, if there is no single criterion that we could apply to, then we cannot determinate which criterion one is applying; if that is so, then we cannot determine what is and what is not correct. Additionally, if that is true, then we cannot say at all that one is doing something correctly at all, because in order to say that one is acting correctly we need a possibility of acting incorrectly. As a consequence, neither model, nor rule, nor criterion could be a valid candidate for an a external source

of correctness. This makes the answer *E* to the *MQ* implausible.

2. Art as a way of perceiving

If we deny *E*, then it lseems we are left with nothing more than a description. However, if we accept *D*, then there are no standards of correctness at all. If we say that something is correct we are not saying that something is only in accord with something else did. If we say that something is correct then we presuppose not only that something was done so and so but also that it *ought* to be done so and so. However, without some kind of a supplement, 'ought' does not follow form a mere description. Still, one can argue that the 'ought' is contained in the agreement of a community but even that communitarian view will not do, since a community can simply be wrong. From the history of art we simply know that the development of art often goes against the opinion of a community.

However if we reject *E* and *D* then what is left is to steer a course between implausible transcendent standards of correctness and a mere description without normativity, which means in fact to abandon the idea of correctness. Luckily, there is a position between them. The solution to the problem rests on the idea that such standards of correctness reside in our capacity to *see* things aright (Luntley 2003). It is not possible to articulate fully the conditions for the possibility of correctness, since the conditions include our capacity to see things right. Normative standards of action are immanent to action, not extrinsic. Central issue is to make a shift to a perceptual account of the conditions for the possibility of correctness. Yet, what does it mean to see the world aright?

First, there is nothing wrong with the statement that the subject's attitude to the world consists in a repertoire of capacities or dispositions for seeing patterns or similarities, yet these are not reducible to lists of properties or criteria in virtue of which one thing is similar to another. Learning to see things aright requires experience and training but the point of the training is to get you to see the correct *use* of our concepts and techniques. Learning is knowing 'how to go on'. Training in this sense cannot be conceived as simply acquiring a set of responses – causal dispositions to respond to such and such stimuli. The goal of training is the point when the subject knows how to go on because he or she knows the point. Training consists in learning forms of perceptual awareness, it consists in sharpening one's attitude to things. It is seeing what comes next or how to play the game.

Second, the subject's attitude is an attitude of judgment. It is a matter of attitude that one goes on correctly. There is no single fact in the world that sets up the correctness of action. A master in the arts is not only the one who goes on correctly, but also the one who perceptually assesses actions as correct or incorrect. The making or creating of art is not something modeled in terms of the mechanical application of techniques or procedures that could be articulated in explicit rules. It does not mean that art does not have rules or standards of correctness, it means, however, that rules and standards of correctness are a non-starter. They need to be explained rather than bring explanation. It means that when the learner acquires the knowledge of the game he or she does not acquire a body of theory, but he or she acquires an ability to face things with the right perceptual attitude, the attitude that enables them to judge that such and such is a correct move that belongs to the game. Only then one could say about rules and correctness standards. As a consequence, art is not a matter of

how to act but how to perceive. Aesthetics is a matter of perceiving not acting.

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The Marxism of Wittgenstein. An Overview

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Abstract

The paper analyses an interpretative tradition that considers the Sraffa-Wittgenstein relationship and identifies some core themes that frequently emerge from the reading of this literature. It is held to be possible that Wittgenstein developed such themes through his dialogue with Sraffa in the thirties.

1. Wittgenstein and Sraffa

The intense and close relationship between Wittgenstein and Sraffa, a relationship that caused Wittgenstein to consider Sraffa a fundamental source of inspiration for the writing of the *Philosophical Investigations* (*PI*, preface), is a frequent subject of debate among Wittgenstenian scholars. The relationship begins in 1929 with Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge (See Morra 2016), and continues for as long as Wittgenstein was developing a philosophy that, at least, challenges and, often, strongly criticizes the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* (see von Wright 1958, Morra 2017). This philosophy finds its initial maturation in the first manuscript version of *Philosophical Investigations* (1936/1937), and, as we well know, is ongoing and never finds a final version (von Wright 1982). Unfortunately for scholars, Wittgenstein and Sraffa left little trace in writing of their frequent discussions (see Wittgenstein 2008; Schweizer 2012). However, historical reconstructions and speculations have never stopped.

In 1966 an article by Ferruccio Rossi-Landi poses issues which impact so profoundly on the Wittgenstein-Sraffa relationship, that continue to be discussed today. Rossi-Landi is convinced that there is nothing but an irreconcilable fracture between the *TLP* and the *PI*. "The world of the Tractatus is a sort of immobile logical paradise, of which thought reflects the structures, so to speak once and for all, and without knowing why" (Rossi-Landi 2002: 192). Instead of such a logical-metaphysical paradise, Rossi-Landi asserts that in *PI* we find a contextual and immanent dimension of semantics: "Everything must be seen in context and we must guard ourselves against general statements which by their nature extend beyond the various contexts and obscure, rather than clarify, understanding" (Rossi-Landi 2002: 192). Words and expressions find meaning in circumstances of use, i.e. within the activities which speakers perform, and which are important to their life. Furthermore, we should guard ourselves against a certain enchantment of thought, which seeks to find explicative theories that transcend contingent situations.

Rossi-Landi attributes this radical change in Wittgenstein to Sraffa's influence and criticism. It is through Sraffa that Wittgenstein may have developed interest in ideas like semantic contextualism and immanence of meaning. In order to support his assumption, Rossi-Landi identifies common philosophical methodology in late Wittgenstein and Sraffa's book "Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities" (Sraffa 1960). Indeed, according to Rossi-Landi, economic value and meaning are treated in the same way by Sraffa and Wittgenstein. That is, a context must first be specified to determine the meaning of a sentence and the value of a commodity. Meaning and value are something shared in social groups, which means that relationships within societies create meaning and value.

Furthermore, value and meaning are negotiated within social relationships, they are not located in a transcendental plane which is placed above human agency. As fundamental elements for establishing meaning and value, immanent context and praxis are peculiar features of the Marxist tradition to which Sraffa belongs.

Via Sraffa Wittgenstein definitely had the opportunity to draw near to a Marxist tradition. It is not a coincidence that similarities between late Wittgenstein and ideas on language exposed by Marx and Engels in the "Deutsche Ideologie", published in 1932 (i.e. around the same years in which Wittgenstein matures his ideas), have been underlined not only by Rossi-Landi in the article under discussion, but also by other scholars (Rubinstein 1981; Sharpe 2002: 116). In this interpretive context, which sees a Marxist influence on Wittgenstein via Sraffa, Rossi-Landi draws some important differences between late Wittgenstein and Marx. Basically, he denounces the fact that in late Wittgenstein there is no historical dimension of semantics, which is, on the contrary, as we know, fundamental for Marxist tradition. According to Rossi-Landi, Wittgenstein has a *public* view of language, not a *social* one. Speakers perform in a public space, which is the audience that judges whether or not the performances are correct. To Rossi-Landi, this view is not social, since the dynamics which contribute over time to allow (and allowed) certain linguistic performances to be considered correct or not, is not explained it. In other words, the social historical background which leads to judgments, considerations and evaluations over the linguistic performances is not described. Furthermore, a historical reconstruction of the meanings used in the linguistic performances is lacking, there is no historical dimension of linguistic performances, that is linguistic use: "He (Wittgenstein) lacks a theory of society and history on which to base his research", claims Rossi-Landi very critically (Rossi-Landi 2002: 209).

In any event, Rossi-Landi establishes a link between late Wittgenstein and a Marxist tradition channelled through Sraffa. However, it is very difficult to establish *what* of Marx came to Wittgenstein, since it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine exactly what Sraffa and Wittgenstein said during their meetings. Amongst the evidence is the famous anecdote told by Malcolm (1958: 56; Monk 1991), according to which it seems that while Wittgenstein expounded the idea in the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* on the internal relation between proposition and state of affairs, Sraffa in a typical Neapolitan gesture asked what logical form it had. Presumably, Sraffa wanted to push Wittgenstein towards the idea that semantics cannot be a mere reflection of states of affairs, but is intrinsically intertwined in a way of life (von Wright 1958; McGuinness 1982; Monk 1990; Albani 1998; Gebauer 2006; Venturinha 2012; Engelmann 2013).

2. Wittgenstein and the Gramsci Connection

According to Rossi-Landi, the revolutionary shift in approach taken by Wittgenstein in the thirties is the introduction of notions like praxis, social context and immanence as elements to consider when establishing meaning. The introduction of those elements was matured though Sraffa's Marxism. At this point, scholars have investigated the sources of Sraffa's Marxism, and obviously, Antonio Gramsci has immediately made his entrance. Indeed, in 2003 Amartya Sen suggested that Sraffa revealed the linguistic ideas of Gramsci to Wittgenstein. In his historical reconstruction, Sen refers to the period that Gramsci and Sraffa spent together from the 1920s, when Gramsci headed the newspaper "L'Ordine Nuovo" and Sraffa was hired as his assistant. This collaboration was interrupted when Gramsci was arrested and imprisoned in 1926. Sraffa knew Gramsci's theories; and, according to Sen, Gramsci's ideas were part of the intellectual route which led Wittgenstein to the philosophical shift previously discussed. In his article, Sen insisted on the non-deterministic approach which Sraffa practiced in his economic analyses: social, historically determined relationships are the factors which establish economic value. This non-deterministic approach of Sraffa, which is common to Gramsci as well, could have motivated Wittgenstein to abandon the idea of language as calculus.

Chronologically, Sen is not the first to claim that behind the Sraffa-Wittgenstein relationship there is the long shadow of Gramsci. In two articles published in 2002, John B. Davis reconstructed possible theoretical paths which are common to the three philosophers. Davis firmly insisted on the concept of immanence. Indeed, he argues that immanence is common to Gramsci, Sraffa and late Wittgenstein. Briefly, to Gramsci immanence means refusing any deterministic view of Marxism. For Sraffa it means refusing the idea that economic dynamics can be grasped by an abstract model, and in late Wittgenstein it means refusing the idea that meaning is placed above the human relationships in a transcendental space, which might be the Fregean third realm, or a psychological individualistic private space (see also McGuiness 2008). In summary, the dynamics of historically determined human relationships lead to power relationships between the classes, market trends and uses of meaning, with possible changes, among speakers (Davis 2002, see also 2002a: 387).

In order to give consistency to the speculation on the Gramsci connection, Lo Piparo has advanced an interesting and very provocative thesis: both historical and theoretical (Lo Piparo 2014). Moving away from Sen's hypothesis that focuses on the Sraffa/Gramsci relationship before the arrest of the latter, Lo Piparo argues that Sraffa discussed with Wittgenstein the ideas that Gramsci was developing in prison and wrote in the *Notebooks*. Indeed, it is no mystery that Sraffa followed the personal and theoretical course of his friend Gramsci during his imprisonment. Lo Piparo's hypothesis, namely, Sraffa knew the contents of the notebooks both while Gramsci was in prison and when he was released, paves the way for extremely exciting interpretations. However, the hypothesis is highly controversial because it is based on contrasting historical and historiographical sources (see de Vivo, Naldi 2014 who are sceptical about this hypothesis). From a strictly historical and historiographical point of view, albeit extremely plausible, the possibility that Sraffa knew the contents, or at least the theoretical course of the Gramsci Notebooks remains controversial at present. For current historiography, it remains very difficult to establish exactly

when Sraffa read Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks*, since the sources as well as public and private testimonies are influenced by the climate of fear and repression that was present in the thirties in Italy. Be that as it may, Lo Piparo also finds interesting links between the philosophy of the *Prison Notebooks* and the *Philosophical Investigations* from a theoretical point of view, Basically, on the one hand, he confirms what previous interpreters have said: praxis, immanence and sociality of meaning are the main elements of novelty channelled by Sraffa. On the other, Lo Piparo endorses the view on Gramsci by affirming that the anthropological change in direction by Wittgenstein in the thirties is to be attributed to the Gramscian influence on Wittgenstein via Sraffa.

3. The Marxism of Wittgenstein

As previously seen, scholars who have been investigating the Wittgenstein-Sraffa relationship —and then the Gramsci Connection—have identified the fact that starting from the thirties Wittgenstein was made to rethink semantics towards the notions a) sociality of meaning, b) immanence of meaning, c) meaning as linguistic praxis through the influence of Sraffa, and eventually of Gramsci. Let us briefly consider what those notions mean: a) meaning is elaborated, fixed, rethought and eventually removed or replaced within social relationships that bond people. b) There is no place above or beyond social relationships from which it is possible observe, manipulate and even fix meaning. Meaning always and only develops within social relationships. c) Meaning with its dynamic is always immersed in praxis; to mean is to perform.

From my perspective, at this stage of the investigation, at least two extremely promising interpretative routes open up. On the one hand, the archival work can continue and an attempt be made to dig deeper to discover new elements regarding the relationship between Sraffa, Wittgenstein and Gramsci. On the other, it is extremely interesting to reconstruct the reception of late Wittgenstein (under the influence of Sraffa) among philosophers who have a Marxist background. For instance, I find the reception of late Wittgenstein among the philosophers of the so-called Italian Theory (Esposito 2010, Gentili-Stimilli 2015) very exciting. Many of them have been developing the notions discussed above in an original way, giving late Wittgenstein´s philosophy a historical, or at least dynamic, perspective, which was denied by Rossi-Landi. Very briefly, also of great interest, for instance, is how Virno has worked extensively on the notions of immanence and linguistic praxis in late Wittgenstein (Virno 2003 and 2005), or how Agamben and Hardt-Negri have reinterpreted the notion of form of life (Agamben 2014; Hardt-Negri 2009; La Licata 2014 and 2015). Those philosophers reinterpret the philosophy of late Wittgenstein and turn it into a useful tool for contemporary debate.

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Strong Reduction Against Mechanistic Pluralist Causation in Human Visual Perception

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Abstract

One of the central aims of the twenty-first century multilevel mechanistic theory of human cognition is to propose 'pluralistic/multilevel causation' within neuro-cognitive phenomena through the notion of 'mechanistically mediated effects' which are hybrids of 'inter-level constitutive/compositional relations' and 'intra-level causal interactions'. However, criticism from different authors has presented a challenge to this pluralistic ambition. Focusing on the concrete example of human visual perception, it is my aim to investigate whether the mechanistic framework can meet the challenge. I argue that the mechanists' replies are not enough to overcome the problems, and the theory leads to a strong neuro-cognitive reductionist position.

A new comprehensive theory concerning the explanation of human cognition has been proposed in recent years. The theory can be called *mechanistic theory of human cognition* (MTHC) and its most prominent proponents are William Bechtel (2008) and Carl Craver (2007). Its central idea is that human cognition can be explained in terms of multilevel neuro-cognitive mechanisms that process information. Mechanistic explanations of human cognitive phenomena have been recently becoming increasingly dominant in the fields of cognitive neuroscience (Bechtel, 2009) and cognitive science (Samuels et al. 2012). Some authors even consider such new ideas as the new revolution in the cognitive and neural sciences (cf. Boone and Piccinini 2015). Given this enthusiasm, Weiskopf goes as far as to the point to claim that we are "in the midst of a mania for mechanisms" (2011: 313). The mechanistic theory is been offered thus as one of the major approaches to human cognition and related sciences in the first period of the twenty-first century.

However, the theory has attracted equally a great deal of criticism on many of its theoretical dimensions. Particularly interesting is the commitment of MTHC to neuro-cognitive causal pluralism and non-reductionism (Craver and Bechtel 2007) and the criticism raised in the literature to this specific theoretical aspect of the framework (Fazekas and Kertész 2011; Soom 2012; Rosenberg 2015). These authors point out to a very similar conclusion: the mechanistic theory cannot provide a consistent defence of causal pluralism and therefore needs to be understood as a reductionist framework. Nevertheless, in a very recent paper, Bechtel attempts to provide an answer to this criticism, arguing that his framework provides a way to avoid the commitment with the "closedness of the physical", thereby saving neuro-cognitive pluralist causation (2017: 273).

In the present paper my aim is to investigate whether the twenty-first century mechanistic theory is able to stand with neuro-cognitive pluralistic causation in despite of the criticism presented in the literature. The thesis I defend is that it cannot and, therefore, it ultimately leads to a form of neuro-cognitive reductionism.

In order to argue for my point, firstly, I present the arguments for neuro-cognitive causal pluralism offered by the mechanistic approach to human cognition using the process of visual perception in humans as an example. After this, I analyse the arguments offered by the opponents of the mechanistic framework concerning causal pluralism and reduction. This analysis, as I argue, supports the conclusion that the mechanistic framework has not yet been able to overcome its critics' arguments that ultimately it collapses into a reductionist position.

1. Mechanistic Theory and Neuro-cognitive Pluralist Causation

According to MTHC, a biological 'mechanism' (such as the human neuro-cognitive mechanism) can be characterized as a system performing a function in a given environment in virtue of its component parts, component operations, and their organization (Bechtel, 2008: 13; cf. Craver 2007: 5). The core idea is that the behavior of the whole system is a result of the specific internal organization of its components and its external interactions with a given environment. To illustrate more precisely the theoretical elements of the theory, let us consider the example of the human visual perception, which is roughly understood as the capacity of an organism (in this case humans) to acquire and process visual information from objects and events in the environment (cf. Eysenck and Keane 2015: 35).

In the human visual perception mechanism, the occipital lobe is central (Bechtel, 2008, chap. 3). Many studies on humans show deficits in visual processing due to damage in the occipital lobe. The mechanism also includes a projection of the optic tract going from the eye, passing by the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), which is an area of the thalamus, and achieving the occipital lobe. Besides, it includes the eyes, optic nerves and other brain areas responsible for visual perception, namely the posterior parietal cortex and the inferotemporal cortex. All these areas can be decomposed in working components and their operations, and each decomposition is considered to be a lower level in the entire constitution/composition of the mechanism. The occipital lobe, for instance, can be itself decomposed in areas responsible for particular visual functions, such as the striate cortex, also known as *Brodmann area 17*, or *V1* (primary visual cortex, or visual area 1).

The same procedure can be done for all the other areas in the brain which are also part of the mechanism responsible for visual perception; for instance, *V2, V3, V4, V5/MT*. It is necessary to identify also the cells (including visual receptor cells in the retina of the eye, such as cones and rods), networks of cells, or larger neural systems in these areas that are responsible for processing information, for example, about light and dark spots, bars of light (edges), size, shape, color, depth, location and motion of objects in the visual field. The mechanism also includes the pathways and channels through which the information is

transmitted and the information about intercellular, intracellular and molecular processes.

In this mechanism of human visual perception, there are thus, according to MTHC, many levels of constitutional/compositional organization, such as the level of connections between systems of neural networks, particular inter-cellular processes, intra-cellular processes, and molecular processes. In each of these constitutional/compositional levels, there are different causal processes occuring always at the same level, but these causal processes are mediated by the constitutional/compositional relations, affecting many different levels of the mechanism (cf. Craver and Bechtel 2007). There is here, therefore, causal pluralism and not strong reduction.

In the view of MTHC's advocates, the problem with strong neuro-cognitive reductionism is due to the fact that "whole systems exhibit behaviors that go beyond the behaviors of their parts" (Bechtel 2008: 129; cf. Craver 2007: 216). Since the system is organized in a specific manner, and there are more causal processes occurring at this higher level than the causal processes at a lower level related to individual or sets of parts, then there is some independent causal higher level – consequently causal plurality. Therefore, the first line of argument is the emphasis on the importance of the internal organization of a given whole, which in their view already undermines strong reduction.

Another problem for strong reduction is that in highly dynamical complex systems, there is no linearity in the causal interactions and the components of the system relate not in a static, but in a dynamical way, which makes the system to change constantly its own state and the way it is related to the environment. In such systems accuracy in explanations and predictions is not so high. This is another reason why reduction fails: certain mechanisms with highly complex and dynamical internal organization behave in a way that cannot be predicted with high accuracy (Craver 2007: 216-217).

Moreover, as Bechtel emphasizes: "Both the level of the parts and the level of the mechanism engaging its environment play roles in mechanistic analyses." (2008: 148). This means that a particular whole mechanism behaves in certain way "only under appropriate conditions." (Bechtel 2008: 146). Therefore, the environment in which the mechanism behaves is another important aspect for understanding its behavior, not just the internal components, operations and their organization (cf. Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005: 426), but the reductionist cannot account for this. Ultimately, thus, the theory stands for neuro-cognitive pluralistic levels of explanation and pluralistic levels of causation, not for any kind of strong reduction such as the one defended by Bickle (2003, 2006, 2012).

2. Mechanistic Theory and Strong Neuro-cognitive Reduction

The strategy of MTHC' advocates is to argue that the 'behavior of a whole mechanism is more than the behavior of its parts' because the overall organization is important. However, strong neuro-cognitive reductionism does not argue that just a single part of the whole mechanism always explains the function of a given whole mechanism. It argues instead that all the information about the organization at a higher level can be described in terms of lower level causal processes. In fact, as Fazekas and Kertész (2011: 373) correctly point out, the possibility of describing all the information at lower levels follows from the very as-

sumptions of MTHC, in which the relation of constitution/composition is not the *asymmetrical* 'part-whole' relation, but the *symmetrical* relation of 'parts + organization = whole', which is identity. There is, therefore, no causal higher levels here (Rosenberg 2015: §1 argues for the same conclusion in a slightly different way). This can be illustrated in the example of human visual perception. All the information concerning the neural network connections between the areas in the human visual system *V1*, *V2*, *V3*, *V4* and *V5* can be in principle described in terms of particular molecular and cellular causal processes. For, since 'parts plus organization' is identical to the given mechanism, the relevant causal explanation for the given phenomenon under investigation is just the same in all levels, presented with different vocabularies. There are just "different levels of description", but one can be fully reduced to the other since there is no causal process over and above the organized components of the given mechanism (Soom 2012: 655).

Even in cases concerning unpredictable complex systems there is reduction. For it is irrelevant if at a certain point in time a phenomenon occurs that cannot be completely predicted with great accuracy on the basis of the initial state of the system due to the inaccuracy of the measures at the start. What really matters for neuro-cognitive strong reduction is whether it is possible to describe these phenomena in causal lower level mechanistic physical language – and then to identify as many variables in the system as possible, and ultimately produce a scientific explanation of the whole complex system's behavior at hand. Even if the human visual system, for example, is considered to be a complex system hard to predict, nothing prevents scientists to describe its variables and processes in terms of lower level particular neural circuits, intra-cellular and molecular processes.

There are also serious problems with the appeal to external factors that arguably play a causal role at the higher level of the whole mechanism. Since the interactions at the higher level are also among mechanisms, i.e. the whole target mechanism and its environment, which is composed of other mechanisms, there is nothing that prevents all these whole mechanisms that interact to be further decomposed in sub-components and sub-functions. Reduction to lower levels can be equally applied to whole mechanisms that interact with a target whole mechanism at the relative higher level of these wholes. Fazekas and Kertész (2011: 378) note that everything that is in the higher-level context of a whole target mechanism can be further decomposed and explained in lower levels. Since they are all mechanisms, the reduction should be applied to all of them, without exception. For example, the area *V1* in the brain, which arguably contains the mechanism for a particular function of the human visual system, can be affected externally by, let us say, *V2* and *V3*. But nothing poses a difficulty for decomposing these areas in still lower levels of description. Not just it has been already empirically done, but the mechanistic framework itself points out exactly in this very direction.

The difficulties discussed here are not clearly addressed and properly answered by Bechtel (2017). The objections to the framework still hold. They are summarized in the crucial point raised by Rosenberg (2015: §1): the mechanists claim that there are higher levels of explanation because it is possible to identify higher level autonomous causal processes; at the same time, however, they demand a complete explanation in terms of the organized constitutive/compositional lower level parts of the mechanism. This is clearly an inconsistency.

3. Concluding Remarks

The mechanistic theory's plea for neuro-cognitive causal plurality fails to overcome the challenge of strong neuro-cognitive reductionism, and the mechanistic framework indeed collapses into a form of reductionism. The theory's advocates argue that the strong reductionist position is committed with the view that 'a part of a whole must explain the behavior of the entire whole'. That is not correct, however. Strong neuro-cognitive reductionists say instead that all the causal processes relevant to explain the function of a given mechanism can be described as well in lower levels with appropriate vocabularies. This includes the internal causal organization of the mechanism, includes mechanisms with high degree of complexity, and includes the external factors affecting the mechanism. Consequently, no clear form of neuro-cognitive causal plurality and thus explanatory plurality is achieved by MTHC.

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'Reading' Gestures: Mirror Neurons and Wittgenstein's Philosophy

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Abstract

Research on the mirror neuron system reveals that perception is sensimotoric: that cognizing other people's actions resonates in the beholder's own motor system. Even though Wittgenstein's philosophy is conceptual rather than encompassing empirical research, some of his remarks from the private language argument anticipate and elucidate these findings. For, in his later philosophy he dispels the myth that intentions for actions are 'inside' the body and shows in numerous examples all the cases in which these supposedly 'interior' states of intentions are directly 'legible' from the body.

The mirror neuron system was first reported in a 1992 paper by Giuseppe di Pellegrino et al. with the unsensational title "Understanding motor events: a neurophysiological study", where the authors describe a series of experiments done on macaque monkeys (*Macaca nemestrina*) with the result that the monkey's neurons responsible for goal-oriented hand movements, like grasping (in macaque monkeys called F5 neurons), also become active when the monkeys merely observe others making grasping movements (even humans) (di Pellegrno et a- 1992: 176). In subsequent research, the term "mirror neurons" is employed and Giacomo Rizzolatti and Laila Craighero work out the differences between monkeys' and human neurological mirroring of others' actions in a paper from 2004. Brain imaging evidence has shown that, comparably to the macaque monkey, when human "individuals observe an action done by another individual their motor cortex becomes active, in the absence of any overt motor activity." (Rizzolatti/Craighero 2004: 174) While observing, for instance, hand movements, the human motor cortex (functionally homologous to that of the macaque's area F5) activates the same neurons responsible for hand movements, thus "mirroring" them neurologically. The action of another literally "resonates" in one's own brain. However, as Rizzolatti and Craighero go on to explain, human motor resonance (as neuron mirroring is also called) exceeds that of the monkeys' by far in its range: it is capable of mirroring not only explicitly goal directed actions, such as grasping an artifact or food, but also so-called "intransitive" actions, that is, purposeless gestures, as well as pantomime. (Rizzolatti/Craighero 2004: 175, 183)

Guillemette Bolens helpfully distinguishes conceptual knowledge and lexical knowledge and cites Daniel Tranel et al. from their study "Neural Correlates of Conceptual Knowledge for Actions", "the retrieval of an action concept does not necessarily require the concomitant retrieval of a word-form […]. [O]ne can have an action concept in mind, and yet be incapable of activating and/or retrieving the desired word-form" (Bolens 2012: 14). Conceptual knowledge thus corresponds more with Wittgenstein's notion of knowledge of a rule, according to which the rule (i.e. the concept) need not explicitly be put into words, but the sufficient condition for the knowledge of a rule is its correct use. In a simple case, one sufficiently demonstrates one's conceptual understanding of "kicking" if one is able to imitate a kick, not necessarily by retrieving the word "kick".

Bolens furthermore discusses studies that show that the same visual stimulus—being presented with "the combined contraction of […] the zygomaticus major and minor, the orbicularis oculi and oris, the buccinator muscles, etc." that are empirically known to compose a smile—can lead to vastly different interpretations due to the social context described to the test subjects as a background narrative to the smile (Bolens 2012: 42). And the test subjects cognize the smile by allowing this narrative to resonate in their own facial motor cortexes, they understand it by—figuratively—putting it on their own face. This meshes well with Wittgenstein's notion of aspect seeing, according to which the material stimulant—e.g. the drawing of the rabbit-duck—remains the same, yet the conceptual framework applied to it—"duck" or "rabbit"—determines the interpretation of the perceptual content (PI II: 520)

For some, it still seems jarring to affirmatively associate Wittgenstein's philosophy with findings in cognitive science, for Wittgenstein is often considered to be opposing the basic assumptions of cognitive sciences. As Diane Proudfoot argues in "On Wittgenstein on Cognitive Science", Wittgenstein's philosophy can be used as an analytic tool to criticize the Cartesian picture involved in the experiment-design of the majority of cognitive studies, namely the view that intentions and other mental states are comparable to 'things' 'inside' the brain (*res cogitans*), and that they can be understood in abstraction from both the body and the conceptual, social contexts in which the person in question is involved in. This picture basically assumes that the human mind is comparable to a computational mechanism that operates over mental representations (Proudfoot 1997: 189ff). By contrast to the representationalist view, still very much based on Descartes's seventeenth century model of the mind, Wittgenstein explicates cognition in terms of capacities and dispositions, not static mental pictures 'inside' the brain (Proudfoot 1997: 198). In fact, in research pertaining to the question of artificial intelligence (AI), many scholars have referred to Wittgenstein's philosophy to argue against the possibility of exhaustively simulating the mind with a computer, since the latter is only capable of manipulating formal symbols in pre-programmed fashion and do not first-personally experience their meaning in a rich language-infused social environment (Hyman 1991: 18-19), as well as the Cartesian dualist view that thought "controls" and "commands" the body, and that the body is a mere "prosthesis" that is still very common in AI research (Hyman 1991: 21).

Currently, as Terence Cave asserts in *Thinking with Literature,* there has been a paradigm shift in cognitive science itself that acknowledges the limits and reductivity of the computational model of the mind, and that currently attempts to focus on more holistic notions of *embodied* cognition. He notes,

> Rationalist approaches […] belong […] to what are known as 'first-generation' cognitivist studies, in which the human mind was assumed to be a thinking machine, on the analogy of the computer. Current 'second-

generation' approaches insist, as I have done from the outset in this study on the continuity between mind and body. (Cave 2016: 28)

The "second-generation" approach that stresses continuity between mind and body, and allows a certain 'readability' of the body—as Cave continues, in cognition, one is not "reading abstractly remote 'minds': what you read is bodies" (Cave 2016: 30) and "mind-reading and motor resonance are not two separate areas ('mind' and 'body') but twin aspects of the incessant efforts we make to penetrate the intentionality of others and make plain our own" (Cave 2016: 112)—sounds almost as if "second-generation" cognitive scientists have been listening to the philosophers' criticism.

As Proudfoot rightly points out, Wittgenstein was not in the least bit interested in the sort of explanations that would reduce human life and experience to neurobiological data (cf. also Bax 2011: xx). However, Wittgenstein's remarks from the *Philosophical Investigations,* especially his private language argument, provide a conceptual framework compatible with mirror neuron research, one that makes sense of the apparent non-inferential 'legibility' of the body. Even though many of Wittgenstein's remarks on faces should be read against the historical background of the dubious pseudo-science of physiognomy (he mentions the physiognomist Galton in his *Lecture on Ethics* (Wittgenstein 2014: 43), some of them anticipate the kind of structures today known as mirror neurons. For instance, Wittgenstein notes, „Denke auch daran, wie man das Gesicht eines Menschen nachahmen kann, ohne das eigene dabei im Spiegel zu sehen." (PI: 285). A mirror is not needed to imitate another person's facial expression, because their expression is not simply an exterior mask that "means" an interior sensation (such as "joy"). Rather, according to Wittgenstein, the expression of feeling and the feeling itself are inextricably intertwined, which is why perceiving another's facial expression resonates in our own emotionality, allowing us to understand how they feel and imitate their expression.

Wittgenstein consistently rallied against the Cartesian notion that mindedness is to be pictured as 'interior', to be inferred, or guessed at, and the mind as a kind of a container for thoughts. He consistently argues against the notion that memory is merely seeing a picture of the past before one's eyes (PI: 56), or even the seemingly common-sense view that thinking is an 'inner' process. As Bax shows, for Wittgenstein, the so called 'interior' states are understood as always already embodied. She argues,

[W]hen we say of a person that she is thinking, we mean to say something about the way in which her (external) activities are performed. By means of words like 'thought' and 'thinking', we distinguish her activities from actions of a purely mechanical kind. (Bax 2011: 37)

And indeed, Wittgenstein himself makes numerous remarks that subvert the seemingly 'natural' assumption that thoughts and mental states are 'inside' a person and can at best be deducted or guessed at by others. He writes for instance, „Wen ich, mit offenbarer Ursache, sich in Schmerzen winden sehe, von dem denke ich nicht: seine Gefühle seien mir doch verborgen" (PI II: 568) By contrast, he proclaimed that "The human body is the best picture of the human soul" in the sense that when we say "I believe he is suffering", we are not making hypotheses about an object hidden inside the suffering person's body, "pain", rather, we are quite capable of non-inferentially perceiving it (PI: 178). Wittgenstein therefore relativizes a rigid 'inner/outer' dichotomy by pointing out all the ways in which

the supposedly 'interior' is directly legible from the human body.

The principle of a dissolved 'inner/outer' binary is particularly salient in PI §244, where Wittgenstein notes,

Wie *beziehen* sich Wörter auf Empfindungen? – Darin scheint kein Problem zu liegen; denn reden wir nicht täglich von Empfindungen, und benennen sie? Aber wie wird die Verbindung des Names mit dem Benannten hergestellt? Z.B. des Wortes „Schmerz". Dies ist eine Möglichkeit: Es werden Worte mit dem ursprünglichen, natürlichen, Ausdruck der Empfindung verbunden und an dessen Stelle gesetzt. Ein Kind hat sich verletzt, es schreit; und nun sprechen ihm die Erwachsenen zu und bringen ihm Ausrufe und später Sätze bei. Sie lehren das Kind ein neues Schmerzbenehmen. (PI: 244)

Wittgenstein resolves the paradox between public language and private sensations by reminding that concepts need not necessarily work like labels for thing-like Cartesian interior objects. Rather, pain concepts can be understood as practical means of expression (*Schmerzbenehmen*) and, for instance, demanding help, much like a child's cry. As he notes in PI §304, sensations are not to be hypostasized, and the aforementioned paradox only arises if one insists on the object – designation schema of language, "[Die Empfindung] ist kein Etwas, aber auch nicht ein Nichts! [...] Das Paradox verschwindet nur dann, wenn wir radikal mit der Idee brechen, die Sprache funktioniere immer auf *eine* Weise." (PI: 304) By contrast to other Post-Cartesians, like Michel Foucault with his thesis of the "death of man", Wittgenstein does not claim that subjectivity does not exist, rather that it requires another kind of language, and not that of reification.

In conclusion, Wittgenstein's philosophy offers plentiful conceptual resources for bridging humanities and cognitive science. For, firstly, in dissolving the 'inner/outer' dichotomy he anticipated the recent, "second-generation" insight of cognitive scientists that the mind is not to be understood independently of the body and that even visual cognition has sensomotoric implications. Furthermore, this means reversely that perception is not a purely physionomical and neuro-biological process, but that perceptual content is always potentially conceptually framed, and therefore embedded in a socio-historico-cultural context accessible to humanities to a finer degree than to neuroscientists. Secondly, by contrast to humanities scholars who adhere to Foucault's deconstruction of subjectivity and are dismissive towards it, Wittgenstein scholars are able to take cognitive contents seriously, and therefore can work on constructing a common language with cognitive scientists, even if they often criticize the latent assumptions in the latter's experiment design.

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Perceiving is not a Form of Knowing: Wittgenstein and Sensorimotor Theory

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Abstract

Sensorimotor theory claims that perceiving is a form of knowing (O'Regan and Noë 2001). Using Hamilton's (2014) reading of Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*, I will challenge this claim. Specifically, I will argue, not that the SMT claim is false, but rather that it is senseless or nonsensical, that is, it is senseless or nonsensical to claim that perceiving is a form of knowing.

1. Sensorimotor Theory

Few would deny that what you do impacts on what you perceive. Action clearly plays an important role in perception. Sensorimotor theory (henceforth SMT) attempts to do justice to this role by claiming that an agent's perception is mediated by knowledge of how their perception will change when they move in an environment (O'Regan and Noë 2001). I will focus on the status of this claim. O'Regan and Noë offer the following example:

> the feeling of seeing a stationary object consists in the knowledge that if you were to move your eye slightly leftwards, the object would shift one way on your retina, but if you were to move your eye rightwards, the object would shift the other way. *The knowledge of all such potential movements and their results constitute the perception of stationarity*" (O'Regan and Noë 2001: 941, my italics).

Hence, my perceiving a stationary object consists in my knowing how my perception of the object would change if I were to move in relation to the object.

The example of stationarity highlights two key features of the O'Regan and Noë view of sensorimotor knowledge.

First, as Shapiro (2011) notes, we can distinguish between a strong and a weak reading of sensorimotor knowledge. On the strong reading, I must interact with an environment *now* in order to perceive: no action, no perception. On the weak reading, it is my (perhaps long acquired) skills and abilities to move and interact with an environment that realise my perception. O'Regan and Noë seemingly endorse the weak reading, since they speak of "knowledge of all such *potential* movements and their results" (my italics). Second, SMT regards sensorimotor knowledge as *constitutive* of perception. For example, my knowing how my perception would change if I were to move in relation to the object *is* my perception of the object, that is, my know how is what helps constitutes my perception of the object.

These considerations reveal SMT to be a claim, not simply about *what* we perceive and/or *how* we perceive, but also about what perception *is*. Perceiving, insists SMT, is a form of knowing.

2. Wittgenstein

In *On Certainty* (1969), Wittgenstein examines (among other things) G.E. Moore's well-known attempt to affirm realism about the external world and thereby refute skeptical doubt about the external world.

According to Hamilton's (2014) reading of *On Certainty*, Moore understands propositions, like 'This is a hand', as possible objects of knowledge. Since they are possible objects of knowledge, then they can be used to refute the skeptic. By contrast, Wittgenstein insists that such propositions 'hold fast' (OC: 173) for us. In holding fast for us, they do not play a role within the language-game. As a consequence, such propositions cannot be possible objects of knowledge.

Moreover, doubting is a practice, one that ends in propositions that "lie apart from the route travelled by enquiry" (OC: 88). On the other hand, skeptical doubt has no end. For Wittgenstein, this reveals the nonsensicality of skeptical doubt: "[a] doubt that doubted everything would not be a doubt" (OC: 450), and "[a] doubt without end is not even a doubt" (OC: 625). According to Hamilton, Wittgenstein regards both Moore's realism about the external world ('I know that this is a hand'), and skeptical doubt about the external world ('How do you know?') as equally nonsensical (Hamilton 2014: 216).

I will focus on two parts of Hamilton's reading. The first is the link between knowledge and doubt. The second is skeptical doubt itself. These issues are intertwined: skeptical doubt is nonsensical because it fails to accord with our practice of doubting, a practice that displays the link between the concepts knowledge and doubt.

Wittgenstein remarks:

> If "I know etc" is conceived as a grammatical proposition…it properly means "There is no such thing as doubt in this case" or "The expression 'I do not know' makes no sense in this case". And of course it follows from this that "I know" makes no sense either. (OC: 58)

According to Wittgenstein, to understand "I know" as a grammatical proposition is to gain a "logical insight" (OC: 59) into how we play the language-game (OC: 56). Seen from this logical or grammatical perspective, there is a conceptual link between knowledge and doubt, such that once doubt is excluded, then so too is knowledge. Hamilton terms this KILPOD, the claim that "knowledge implies the logical possibility of doubt" (Hamilton 2014: 39). KILPOD is the assumption that knowledge is "an achievement and not merely an occurrence, and thus involves the possibility of failure…For someone to be credited with an achievement…it must be possible for them to fail in it" (Hamilton 2014: 41).

KILPOD is a grammatical proposition. As a grammatical proposition, KILPOD is, strictly speaking, 'senseless', in that it is not a possible move within the language-game,

but rather lies "at its limits, and show[s] which moves make sense [within the language-game]" (Hamilton 2014: 43).

So, for example, I say: "I know there is a tree in front of me because I cannot doubt that there is a tree in front of me". Following KILPOD, my statement is 'nonsensical' (unsinnig). It is not gibberish – what I say is indeed intelligible. Nonetheless, my statement does not have sense within the language-game (akin to trying to move a pawn in any direction while playing chess). For if I cannot doubt that there is a tree in front of me, then I also cannot claim to know that there is such a tree either.

Another way to illustrate KILPOD (an illustration Hamilton favours – see Hamilton 2014: 39f) is via consideration of the asymmetry between first person present tense psychological statements e.g. "My shoulder hurts", and third person present tense psychological statements e.g. "John is in pain".

Wittgenstein, in his *Philosophical Investigations* (PI), maintains that first-person present tense psychological statements are avowals, on a par with natural expressions of pain, like holding an injured body part or crying out (PI: 244). Since these statements are avowals, then issues to do with accuracy or doubt are not applicable. For example, I were to fall down and cry out, "My shoulder!", then, barring very unusual circumstances, I have the final say on which part of my body is hurting.

This ensures that, contrary to the Cartesian position, I do not know that I have a pain. Wittgenstein remarks:

One says "I know" where one can also say "I believe" or "I suspect"; where one can find out (PI, Part II: 188).

I can know what someone else is thinking, not what I am thinking. It is correct to say 'I know what you are thinking', and wrong to say 'I know what I am thinking' (PI, Part II: 189).

That is, since circumstances such as 'finding out' are absent in the first-person case, then, for example, it makes no sense for me to say, "I know I have a pain". Yet the situation is very different when it comes to third person present tense psychological statements.

Suppose I state: "John looked very upset yesterday". Suppose also that, unbeknownst to me, you too saw John yesterday but you don't recall him looking so upset. You may thus doubt the accuracy of my statement. You might ask me: "Why did you think John looked so upset? What did he say?" If I were to reply, "John told me that his wife had recently become seriously ill", then this would likely settle any qualms you might have.

This reveals the asymmetry between the third person case and the first-person case. Knowledge and doubt are applicable to third person present tense psychological statements. I can know that John looked upset because if questioned, I can settle any doubts you may have about my knowledge. However, knowledge and doubt are not applicable to first person present tense psychological statements. If I were cry out, "My shoulder!", then it would make no sense for me to try and doubt the accuracy of my own statement. KILPOD thus indicates what does and what does not make sense to say within the language-game.

Skeptical doubt about the external world, according to Hamilton's reading, is entirely lacking in sense, however. This is because doubting whether there is an external world is not part of our practice of doubting. For example, in our practice of doubting, doubting has an end. You doubted whether John looked upset yesterday. I settled your doubt by revealing that John's wife is seriously ill. By contrast, skeptical doubt has no end. If you were to doubt the existence of the external world, for example, then any evidence I appealed to in order to settle or end your doubt must fail, since any such evidence would be equally subject to doubt. Your doubt is thus not wrong or false. Rather your doubt is senseless or nonsensical, equivalent to continually opening the same empty drawer, hoping to now find the object you are looking for (OC: 315).

Hamilton thus reads Wittgenstein as offering a 'combative' and 'therapeutic' approach to skepticism. Wittgenstein's approach is combative, insists Hamilton, because Wittgenstein is aiming to refute skepticism. However, unlike Moore, Wittgenstein refutes skepticism, not by demonstrating realism about the external world, but rather by demonstrating the senselessness or nonsense that is the skeptical position. Wittgenstein's approach is also therapeutic, according to Hamilton, because Wittgenstein offers reasons as to why skepticism is nonsensical, reasons that are based on grammatical considerations, such as KILPOD.

3. Wittgenstein and SMT

In section 1, I argued that SMT is a constitutive claim about what perception is, namely that perception is a form of knowing. In section 2, I clarified how, according to Hamilton's reading of Wittgenstein, skeptical doubt, unlike our normal practice of doubting, is senseless or nonsensical.

However, if perceiving is a form of knowing, as SMT claims, then it must be possible to doubt, not only *what* and/or *how* you or I perceive, but also *that* you or I perceive. Yet such a doubt is senseless or nonsensical. But if so, then it is equally senseless or nonsensical to claim that perceiving is a form of knowing. Or so I will argue.

Consider the following two scenarios. Scenario A: you say to me, "There is a tiger in the bushes! I can see the bushes rustling." I doubt your claim. I reply: "That's no tiger. It is just the wind making the bushes move." This is our usual practice of doubting. We can all make mistakes about what we see and such doubts can be settled or ended. If a tiger jumps out of the bushes, for example, then it was I, and not you, who were mistaken.

Scenario B: I proceed to doubt, not *what* you perceive or *how* you perceive, but rather *that* you perceive. Wittgenstein asks: "Doesn't one need grounds for doubt?" (OC: 121). What could be the possible grounds for my doubting *that* you perceive? You may describe your surrounding environment to me. You may demonstrate to me how you can navigate that environment, avoiding objects when needed, grasping objects when required etc. Yet all of this merely demonstrates what you perceive and/or how you perceive, neither of which I am currently subjecting to doubt. My doubt attacks instead the fact *that* you perceive. How could my doubt be settled or ended? Following Hamilton's reading, there seems to be a senselessness or nonsensicality to my doubt.

KILPOD is the grammatical proposition that knowledge implies the logical possibility of doubt. Following scenarios A and B, KILPOD entails that while I can claim to know *what* or *how* you perceive, since I can sensibly doubt *what* or *how* you perceive (scenario A), I cannot claim to know *that* you perceive, since I cannot sensibly doubt *that* you perceive (scenario B).

Scenario B also applies in the first person. For example, what grounds could I have for doubting *that* I perceive? Moreover, once raised, how could I settle or end my

doubt? Following KILPOD, if I cannot doubt *that* I perceive, then I cannot claim to know *that* I perceive either.

SMT is the claim that perceiving is a form of knowing. We can now see why this claim is senseless or nonsensical. For if perceiving is a form of knowing, then it must be possible to doubt *that* I perceive. But when I attempt to engage in such a doubt, my doubt is revealed to be senseless or nonsensical. That is, I cannot doubt *that* I perceive without losing all sense or engaging in nonsense. Yet if so, then it is equally senseless or nonsensical to claim that perceiving is a form of knowing.

Proponents of SMT might object that my argument misconstrues the SMT claim. For SMT is a claim about what perception *is*. Hence, while KILPOD may indeed show what it makes sense to say within the language-game, KILPOD cannot be used to show that the SMT claim is nonsensical, since SMT is not a claim about what makes sense to say within the language-game.

However, there are grounds to think that KILPOD does apply to SMT. First, KILPOD is a grammatical proposition. It thus offers us a "logical insight" into all uses of "know", that is, both propositional uses (know-that) and non-propositional uses (know-how). If proponents of SMT are to support their claim that perceiving is a form of knowing, then they need to address KILPOD. Second, KILPOD assumes that knowledge is an achievement i.e. something one can fail to do. According to the weak reading of sensorimotor knowledge, it is my skills or abilities that realise my perception. Skills or abilities are achievements and so things I can fail to do. Hence, sensorimotor knowledge, like KILPOD, assumes that knowledge is an achievement. This then supports the contention that KILPOD does in fact apply to sensorimotor knowledge. If so, then the SMT claim that perception is a form of knowledge is senseless or nonsensical.

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Paradigms and Self-Reference

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Abstract

Paradox according to Wittgenstein is something surprising that is taken out of its context. Thus one way of coping with paradoxical sentences is to imagine the missing context of use. Wittgenstein formulates what I call the paradigm paradox: "one sentence can never describe the paradigm in another, unless it ceases to be a paradigm." (PG: 346) There are several instances of this paradox spread throughout Wittgenstein's writings. I argue that this paradox is structurally equivalent to Russell's paradox. The above quotation is Wittgenstein's version of the vicious circle principle which counteracts the paradox. This ban is, however, restricted to a certain language-game. Finally, I argue that there is a structural analogy between the employing of a noun as a self-membered set and a paradigmatic sample being included in or excluded from the set it generates. Paradoxical sentences are not banned forever, they can indicate the change of the method of dealing with paradigms.

A paradox is usually defined as a self-contradictory conclusion that is derived from true premises by sound reasoning. For example, Russell's paradox is derived from the axioms of the naïve set theory and this derivation is sound. A self-contradictory conclusion indicates that there is something wrong with the original premises. The original Greek meaning of "paradox" is, however, different. παράδοξος is something contrary to common belief (doxa). A paradox is, thus, something unexpected, strange, something surprising.

Wittgenstein's understanding of paradox goes back to this original Greek meaning. We can find places in his writings where "paradox" is an alternative wording for "surprise": "[such a] representation of it makes a situation surprising, or astonishing, even paradoxical." (RFM: I, appdx. II, §1) Here is Wittgenstein's key specification of a paradox: "Something surprising, a paradox, is a paradox only in a particular, as it were defective, surrounding. One needs to complete this surrounding in such a way that what looked like a paradox no longer seems one." (RFM: VII, §43) Hence, paradoxes arise when we take sentences out of their context of use. A sentence appears as a paradox, i.e. as a surprise only if we take it from its context of use – only if its context of use is missing. One way of coping with paradoxical sentences is just to imagine the missing context of use, i.e. the missing language-game.

Let a *paradigm* of X be a *physical object* together with the *praxis* of applying this object in a given situation. I call the object of a paradigm a *paradigmatic sample*. "Object" is meant very broadly here. Paradigmatic samples are real material things ranging from clearly defined objects like the meter stick or a color plate to intricate structures like formalizations of mathematical proofs or works of art; paradigms can be events involving such objects. Such objects even do not need to be continuous. A paradigmatic sample is a model of a situation. A paradigmatic sample is also an object of comparison (PI: §130).

Regarding paradigms, Wittgenstein formulates the following paradox: "one sentence can never describe the paradigm in another, unless it ceases to be a paradigm." (PG: 346) Let me call this paradox the *paradigm paradox*. There are several instances of this paradox spread throughout Wittgenstein's writings: "one cannot say of a group of strokes serving as a paradigm of 3, that it consists of 3 strokes" (ibid.) – or of the standard meter rod that it is or is not one meter long, or of the standard sepia sample that it is of this color or it is not (PI: §50). Why cannot we say this? To be one meter long means having the same

length as the standard meter when compared – and there must be a standard method of comparison. To say that the standard meter is one meter long requires us to compare the standard meter with itself. If this peculiar kind of comparison should make sense, we have to lay down how it works. We can say that the length of the standard meter is always identical with itself. That is, the standard meter is always one meter long, whatever happens. But this is an *ad hoc* stipulation that, moreover, does not explain its negation, i.e. saying that the standard meter is not one meter long.

What we can do, however, is to describe a paradigm by using another paradigm. Then, of course, the original paradigm ceases to be a paradigm in this very language use. We can say, for example, about the standard meter that it is 1.0936133 yards long. Then, however, the paradigm of length is the standard yard, not the standard meter.

Remember, paradoxes arise, according to Wittgenstein, when we take sentences out of their context of use. When one says this rod is one meter long, there is always an implicit commitment to the act of comparing the rod with the standard meter. This praxis is part of the meaning of "one meter long" A proposition may be a paradox, if we abstract from this praxis, from this context of use and take "one meter long" to be a function ranging over all objects. Then the situation may occur that we apply this function onto an object that is involved in its definition, that is, onto the standard meter rod.

The (intuitive) belief that we can express in language any property whatsoever has been captured by various *principles of unrestricted abstraction* (e.g. by Frege's Basic Law V). The principle states that for any property nameable in language, there is a concept expressing this very property. This principle implies that we can express in language properties like "being one meter long", "have sepia color" or "having three elements". We can, of course, do this, intuitively. This intuition says that these concepts can be truthfully applied to *any* objects having this or that property. The principle of abstraction is *unrestricted*; this means that nothing can be excluded from the range of the universal quantifier. For instance, the concept "being one meter long" can be truthfully applied to *any* object having the length one meter. The standard meter cannot be excluded. This captures our everyday intuition that the standard meter is one meter long. This intuition is wrong, though. It is well known that the principle of unrestricted comprehen-

sion leads to a contradiction. *Russell's paradox* follows from a set-theoretical version of the principle:

For any formula φ(*x*) containing *x* as a free variable, there will exist the set {*x*: φ(*x*)} whose members are exactly those objects that satisfy φ(*x*).

And again, this principle is quite intuitive. If φ(*x*) stands for "*x* is one meter long", then {*x*: φ(*x*)} will be the set containing all objects that are one meter long, including the standard meter. Russell's paradox follows if we let φ(*x*) stand for ¬(*x* ∈ *x*). *R*ussell's initial solution or rather response to his paradox is by adopting the so-called vicious circle principle. This principle states that whatever involves all of a collection must not be one of the collection.

Back to paradigms. We can look at paradigms as characteristic functions of collections. A paradigm generates a collection of objects that are in accord with this paradigm. Accordingly, a paradigmatic sample is exactly an object that is presupposed by the collection of objects that are defined by this paradigm. The question whether we can describe a paradigmatic sample using the very same paradigm is structurally equivalent to the question whether a set contains itself as a member. From this structural equivalence there follows that the vicious circle principle effectively counteracts the paradigm paradox as well. Wittgenstein's claim that *"*one proposition can never describe the paradigm in another" is a version of the vicious circle principle.

Russell's vicious circle principle is a ban on possible members of a collection. The principle states something we *must not* do. Wittgenstein's own principle, however, goes on: "…unless it ceases to be a paradigm". This means that if we attempt to apply a paradigm onto its own paradigmatic sample, *it* ceases to be a paradigm in this very language use. This is the point that goes beyond Russell's vicious circle principle. There is no such absolute ban in Wittgenstein's version of the principle. Propositions describing the paradigm are not banned. They are, however, paradoxical. But remember again, a sentence is only seemingly paradoxical because we are not aware of its context of use. Our task is to figure out a language-game with such sentences and the paradox then vanishes. What I'm going to do next is to figure out what a reasonable use of this kind of paradoxical sentences might be.

When Wittgenstein says: "There is *one* thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris." (PI: §50), then this ban is restricted to "the game of measuring with a metre-rule" (ibid., translation amended) I take this to mean that we cannot ascribe the property of being one meter long to the standard meter by using the sentence "The standard meter is one meter long". This, however, doesn't exclude the possibility that there is another use of the sentences "The standard meter is one meter long" or "The standard meter isn't one meter long". Let us move on to a remarkable passage from the final part of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*. The remark opens with:

What sort of proposition is: "The class of lions is not a lion, but the class of classes is a class"? How is it verified? How could it be used?—So far as I can see, only as a grammatical proposition. To draw someone's attention to the fact that the word "lion" is used in a fundamentally different way from the name of a lion; whereas the class word "class" is used like the designation of one of the classes, say the class lion. (RFM: VII, §36)

This remark says that paradoxical sentences like "The class of lions is not a lion, but the class of classes is a class" can be used as a grammatical reminder. Or – as Wittgenstein suggests furthermore – we can employ the Tractarian method of analysis and say that "lion" is used in two different ways or meanings here (e.g., "Lion" as a name of a particular lion). Another suggestion is that we can "ascribe a sense out of politeness" to these sentences. I take this sense to be a whatever sense ascribed by an accidental stipulation – analogous to the stipulation that the standard meter is (always) one meter long.

These are, however, ways how to analyze the paradox away by getting rid of the self-referential structure. Wittgenstein wants to take the sentences in the right way – not to analyze them away but to find language-games for these sentences. Animal fables are the first context of language-games that Wittgenstein considers:

The fable says: "The lion went for a walk with the fox", not a lion with a fox; nor yet the lion so-and-so with the fox so-and-so. And here it actually is as if the species lion came to be seen as a lion.

Wittgenstein undertakes a grammatical analysis based on the use of the definite and indefinite articles. An instance of a noun is, in this context, analogous to an element of a set. Wittgenstein considers and opposes another analysis that was suggested by Lessing:

It isn't as Lessing says, as if a particular lion were put in the place of some lion or other. "Reynard the Fox" ["Grimmbart der Dachs"] does not mean: a fox of the name "Reynard". (RFM: VII, §36)

Lessing says, in his "Essay on Fable", that the fox represents a distinctive feature of its species (e.g., cunningness) and continues: "It would be a childish abuse of words to say that the particular is *similar* to the general, the individual to the species, and the species to the genus." (Lessing 1825: 72) Lessing's view is, thus, that in a fable, a particular animal *exemplifies* a certain feature of its species. Accordingly, Reynard the Fox represents the characteristics of being thoughtful and calm, for instance. However, exempla are not mere instances; by exemplifying a certain feature, they involve all of its species (of a set, of a collection) and in this way, they are akin to paradigms. Lessing's view is, thus, not as simple as putting a particular animal (lion, fox, etc.) in the place of some animal in a fable. Lessing's views are, I would say, closer to those of Wittgenstein whose point is that the definite article must not be analyzed away by the indefinite article. Finally, let us move on to Wittgenstein's positive examples of this kind of self-reference. The remark continues:

Imagine a language in which the class of lions is called "the lion of all lions", the class of trees "the tree of all trees", etc.—Because people imagine all lions as forming *one* big lion. (We say: "God created man [Gott hat den Menschen geschaffen]".) (RFM: VII, §36; MS 124: 125f.)

These lines present Wittgenstein's suggestion of language-games dealing with self-membered classes. In "God created man" (in German with the definite article), man refers to all men and at the same time to a particular man Adam. The quotation from *Genesis* 1: 27 continues with "in his own image, in the image of God created he him". The first man and man, the class of men, is created as an image of God. The first man is itself an image of man, it is, so to speak, an archetype of man – a paradigmatic sample. In the same way, the lion of all lions can refer to the paradigm of a lion.

I take from these considerations that there is a structural analogy between the employing of a noun as a self-membered set and a paradigmatic sample being included in or excluded from the set it generates. If there is a reasonable use for employing self-membered sets, there might be a reasonable use for describing paradigmatic samples by the very same paradigm. Wittgenstein's vicious circle principle says, that if we attempt to use such a self-referential description, the paradigm ceases to be a paradigm. What would be, then, the use of the sentence "the standard meter is *not* one meter long"? To point out two different uses of "meter"? This would be too confusing, and besides, there is a better way of putting this. It cannot mean that the standard meter has changed its length either, for this must be put in terms of another paradigm, e.g. the standard meter is not 3.28 feet long anymore. A reasonable employment of this sentence is to indicate a change in the praxis with the standard meter or, more precisely, a change of the method of comparison (e.g., with respect to the accuracy of the comparison). Let us imagine that we can use the standard meter to measure another object using the old method, and subsequently we can use this object to measure the standard meter using the new method. Then we might say that the standard meter is *not* one meter long.

Is the sentence "The standard meter is not one meter long" paradoxical? It may be when "paradox" means "surprise" and when we aren't envisioning its context of use, i.e. an attempt to compare a stick with itself. However, if we are aware of the context, we can be surprised nevertheless because then this sentences indicates that the method of comparison (or the praxis at all) has changed. Moreover, there is an additional surprising element: The

way in which the praxis has changed is completely arbitrary, at least from the point of view of this sentence. The old paradigm has ceased to exist and no new paradigm has been established by the assertion of this sentence.

It is often said that a paradox can cause confusion when undetected. If "paradox" means "surprise", there are no undetected paradoxes. We cannot be surprised without knowing it. However, one can cause confusion by describing paradigmatic samples by the very same paradigm *without realizing it*. This situation arises when we derive a measuring instrument (e.g. a ruler) from the standard meter and subsequently use this instrument to measure the standard meter without realizing that the measured object is the standard meter. That leads to the conclusion that one can confuse a paradigmatic sample with an object generated by this paradigm. This is analogous to confusing a set with its member (we have seen above that this is possible as well) and, of course, to confusing a concept with an object.

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Meaning, Representation and Knowledge: Notes on Wittgenstein's Presence in Current Contextualism

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Abstract

In this paper, I take a close look at a relatively recent critique made by Avner Baz on the work of contemporary contextualists in philosophy of language, especially the work of Charles Travis, and at the way in which Travis's work relates to Wittgenstein's latter philosophy. Baz's critique centers on the idea that, while Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP) attacks a representationalist view of meaning, current contextualism is still attached to the notion that the main function of the meaning of assertive sentences is to represent reality, i.e. to express truth-conditions. In this way, contextualism would be an illegitimate heir to the work of the second Wittgenstein. By addressing Travis' read of Wittgenstein's remarks on knowledge in *On Certainty*, I provide some elements to counter Baz's critique.

1. Three features of the traditional idea of meaning attacked by OLP

According to Avner Baz, the most common accusation against OLP regarding its take on the meaning of a word is the way it allegedly conflates meaning and use. Critics like John Searle[1] have pointed out that what a word means, i.e. the way in which it contributes to determine the truth-conditions of a sentence, has been mixed by OLP with the purposes of uttering a sentence in a given moment or situation. In other words, a sentence's capacity to determine the elements in the world about which we are talking – its 'aboutness´ – gets confused with the acts we perform in pronouncing it. As a result, according to this view, OLP loses sight precisely of this aboutness attained through the work done by that which Frege called the Sinn of a word.

The point Baz rightfully wants to make is that the notion of meaning OLP's critics see as being in peril is precisely one of OLP's main target. While having as its chief goal the dissolution of philosophical problems, OLP's means to attain this objective is to attack a prevalent conception of meaning built on three related features. The first feature corresponds to what is commonly called *the platonic view*. For every word, there is something referred to as its meaning, which is "theoretically separable from, and makes the word fit for, its ordinary and normal uses" (Baz 2012: 13). The second feature expands the idea of a theoretically independent entity from something referred to by words into something related to full sentences. The third feature, central to Baz's argument, is the connection between a platonic view of meaning and its power to refer to the world, presented as taking

> …the meaning of a word […] to be a matter of what it refers to […] And [taking] the meaning of a sentence to be, or to determine, what the sentence 'says' or expresses, where that has often been called 'proposition' or 'thought' and taken to be cashable in terms of the conditions under which the sentence […] would be true. (Baz 2012: 15)

The point Baz wants to stress is that, while being two different features of the prevailing conception, platonic meaning and *the power to refer* go hand in hand. That is to say, the notion of a capacity to *pick out* or to name something in the world entails, if not necessarily at least often, the

idea of meaning as a particular entity attached to words regardless of what we do with them when we speak.

This pair of features is the foundation of what Baz sees as the representational core of the prevailing conception attacked by OLP. This representational core is described as "…the idea that language is first and foremost an instrument for the formation of representations or for the expression of truth-evaluable thoughts or propositions…" (Baz 2012: 18). Because considering the meaning of words from this representational perspective has led to unsolved puzzles and deep confusion, OLP appeals to the ordinary use of words as a way of getting rid of such difficulties. Meaning as representation is OLP's target in its route to dissolve philosophical problems.

In presenting OLP's reaction to this idea of representation, Baz regards the work of its so-called continuators, the contemporary contextualists, as departing from OLP's original intentions. They are said to do so precisely because they would preserve the representationalist view. If we look closely at the problem Baz is stating, we see that its foundations are constructed around the link between "*platonic meaning*" and "*the power to refer*" he established early on as the basis of the representationalist view. That is, if the reference of a word and a proposition's truth-conditions come first in the way we approach language, they most certainly will carry with them an idea of meaning as independent from the use we make of our words. This foundational link reappears when Baz presents contextualism as responsible for maintaining a distinction between semantics and pragmatics in spite of its avowed intentions: "In challenging as he does the traditional separation of semantics from pragmatics, the contextualist is still committed to the traditional categories of 'semantics' and 'pragmatics' themselves" (Baz 2012: 138). In the end, what a sentence states about the world is independent from the use we make of it; it is independent from the work the words are fitted to do, i.e. the specific point of their application.

I believe there is a significant misconception in Baz' characterization of the contextualist's position—or at least of Travis' position—as representationalist in the sense presented above. To try to make this clear, let us consider the case Baz uses to make his point: a case of *ascriptions of knowledge* exemplified by the sentence 'N knows that such and such'.

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[1] Although Searle is OLP's main heir, the conflation of use and meaning is part of his objections to this philosophy.

2. Knowing that the milk is in the refrigerator

Travis proposes the following situation:

Hugo, engrossed in the paper, says 'I need some milk for my coffee'. Odile replies, 'You know where the milk is'. Suddenly defensive, Hugo replies: 'Well, I don't really know that, do I? Perhaps the cat broke into the refrigerator, or there was just now a very stealthy milk thief, or it evaporated or suddenly congealed' (1989: 156)

Let us start by considering the way in which Baz reads this example. After listening to Hugo's words, Odile makes an ascription of knowledge to him. She claims that he knows where the milk is. Hugo then raises some doubts that question his possession of the referred knowledge. Sharing a representationalist view with the traditional philosopher, the contextualist would only be interested in answering the following question: does Hugo as he stands know where the milk is? His concern could be reduced to what follows: take any pair constituted by a person N and a given fact and one may simply ask whether ´N knows that such and such´, where 'that such-and-such' represents the fact to be known.

Taken in this way, Travis' description of his example is insufficient. Odile is clearly reacting to Hugo's chauvinist posture and accordingly says that 'he knows where the milk is' as a way of telling him to get his own milk or something similar. This is her way of using these words in this situation. No question of knowledge is in place since Odile is not truly ascribing any knowledge to Hugo. Being "…essentially a theory about the truth-conditions of utterances of declarative (…) sentences" (Baz 2012: 143) contemporary contextualism is blind to this illocutionary dimension of Odile's words.

The nuance introduced by the contextualist to the traditional question of knowledge is, in Baz's view, an inquiry concerning a) *who* says that 'N knows that such and such' and b) under what conditions he says it. However, apart from these two factors, the fundamental question remains the same: does Hugo know what a given person says he knows? In other words, despite the nuances introduced by the contextualist, the propositional content of Odile's sentence is still a representation of the world that has to be evaluated as true or false. Hugo either knows that such and such or he doesn't.

The problem could be summarized in this way "Given that the doubts [Hugo] raises […] are ones that he has not ruled out and that he is not in a position to rule out, does he or doesn't he know what Odile says he knows?" (Baz 2012: 149) and the answer to this question for the contextualist would be "sometimes 'yes', sometimes 'no', and sometimes 'the question is not determined enough to be answered either correctly or incorrectly', depending on the circumstances under which the question was raised and answered." (Baz 2012: 150). The point here would be to show that if Hugo knows something, *what* he knows depends on the occasion, while knowledge is a predetermined condition that might or might not correspond to Hugo's present situation.

However, I want to argue that Travis' example is formulated not to ask whether an occasional determined ascription of knowledge is true or false, but to ask, as he puts it "how—and when—we actually do speak of knowledge" (Travis 1989: 159). Travis' example follows directly from a section in which he had made an explicit reference to the opening remarks of Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*, where the Austrian philosopher is questioning Moore's right to pursue

inquiries about knowledge by abstractly enumerating what he knows while seated in his room. To question Moore's right means in Wittgenstein´s terms asking if the situation in which Moore has started to enumerate what he knows is a situation allowing for the use of an expression like 'I know'. Wittgenstein's answer is "no". He says, "§6 Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not—for otherwise the expression 'I know' gets misused" (Wittgenstein 1972: 140). But what is Wittgenstein proposing when he says that an expression has been misused?

The answer comes at paragraph 11: "We just do not see how very specialized the use of ´I know´ is" (Wittgenstein 1972: 140). Here, Wittgenstein is suggesting that Moore's misuse of this word is due to the fact that, as Travis puts it, "he ignores the fact that 'know' is a special word, requiring special circumstances for its proper use" (Travis 1989: 151). The problem with Moore's use is the fact that, pronounced outside a precise circumstance, words of the form ´A knows that F´ cannot determine a definite thought: why is A´s knowledge about F being stated? Is there any doubt about that knowledge? If so, isn´t the point of the statement of knowledge to answer this precise doubt?

'I know that I am a human being'. In order to see how unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider its negation. At most it might be taken to mean ´I know I have the organs of a human´. (E.g. a brain which, after all, no one has ever yet seen.) But what about such a proposition as ´I know I have a brain´? Can I doubt it? Grounds for doubt are lacking! (Wittgenstein 1972: 140)

What would the doubt about having a brain mean (if anything)? Travis presents the example of the milk in the refrigerator as a way of illustrating Wittgenstein's point regarding that problem. When facing Odile's ascription of knowledge to him, 'you know where the milk is', Hugo enumerates doubts that supposedly question such an ascription. He mentions a variety of possibilities: a cat breaking into the refrigerator, the mysterious evaporation of the milk or the existence of a very stealthy milk thief. Facing Odile's remark in such a way, Hugo resembles Moore in his activity of listing what he knows. In both cases, the list might continue indefinitely. Hugo could go on and suppose that Odile might have drank the milk while sleepwalking, that they never bought the milk in the first place, etc. Just as Moore could have spent a long time producing an interminable inventory of what he knows while seated in his room.

Such an indefinable number of possibilities has the effect of producing a sentence to which no truth-condition can be assigned. That is, it is not possible to determine what would count as Hugo knowing where the milk is because his answer to Odile doesn't restrict the possibilities of what counts as knowing and not knowing where the milk is. Hugo´s statement simply do not correspond to an example of ´speaking about knowledge´. It is only when pronounced on a proper occasion that a sentence of the form 'N knows that such and such' can be subjected to the kind of restriction required to determine what counts as knowing that such and such. On such an occasion, we will be able to both provide a paraphrase to 'Knowing that such and such' and state what would be a case of not knowing that. The paraphrase and the counter example show, as Travis says

an important part of Wittgenstein's point on Knowledge, and on Moore. Moore disagreed with the sceptic on what knowledge consisted in. But he shared with the sceptic the more crucial assumption that there was just

one thing it consisted in […] whereas Wittgenstein's point, put non-linguistically, is that different things would count as knowing that F on different occasions for judging whether A, in a given condition, counts as knowing this. (Travis 1989: 155)

If we now come back to Baz´s account of current contextualism as a representationalist perspective, we recognize it as a clear departure from the way Travis actually reads Wittgenstein. The point Travis is advancing regards precisely how the concept of knowledge must be envisioned in the specialized way mentioned by Wittgenstein and therefore cannot be taken as one pre-determined concept. That is, what counts as 'knowing that such and such' is precisely what is dependable on the circumstances. That is how the epistemological conception being advanced in his works is profoundly intertwined with a fundamentally non-platonic view of meaning. At the same time, Travis and the contextualism he represents are deeply concerned with the occasions in which we use words to refer to objects in the world or to pronounce sentences trying to state something that is true or false

Therefore, Travis' work is not based on a representationalist idea, at least not one presupposing a link between platonic meaning and the referential capacity of words. In fact, the problem regarding the delimitation of the truth-conditions of a sentence without the appeal to a platonic notion of meaning informs not only his work, but also Wittgenstein's. It is precisely the link between contemporary contextualism and OLP in its classical form.

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On the Possibility of Acquaintance

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Abstract

There has been a recent resurgence in the notion of conscious acquaintance in the philosophy of mind and perception. A crucial feature of acquaintance is the supposed knowledge it affords us of objects that is a type of knowledge which is distinct from propositional knowledge. This feature has been put to work in debates in philosophy of mind, perception, and epistemology. In this paper, I look at Bertrand Russell's original thesis that knowledge of objects is logically independent of knowledge of facts. I argue that Russell's view on what he calls intuitive knowledge undermines his thesis that knowledge of things is logically independent of knowledge of truths. One consequence of this argument is that if conscious acquaintance is to play to the role that philosophers have been using for it in recent debates, then it must be revised in order to avoid the pitfalls of Russell's original thesis.

1. The Official Taxonomy

I find it useful to begin by quoting at length. Russell (1912), gives the following taxonomy of knowledge:

> We have first to distinguish knowledge of things and knowledge of truths. In each there is two kinds, one immediate and one derivative. Our immediate knowledge of things, which we called *acquaintance,* consists of two sorts, according as the things known are particulars or universals. Among particulars, we have acquaintance with sense-data and (probably) ourselves. Among universals, there seems to be no principle by which we can decide which can be known by acquaintance, but it is clear that among those that can be so known are sensible qualities, relations of space and time, similarity, and certain abstract logical facts. Our derivative knowledge of things, which we call knowledge by *description,* always involves both acquaintance with something and knowledge of truths. Our immediate knowledge of *truths* may be called intuitive knowledge, and the truths so known may be called *self-evident* truths. Among such truths are included those which merely state what is given in sense, and also certain abstract logical and arithmetical principles, and (though with less certainty) some ethical propositions. Our derivative knowledge of truths consists of everything that we can deduce from self-evident truths by the use of self-evident principles of deduction (Russell 1912: 109)

Following Proops (2014), we can call this the "official taxonomy".[1] The following diagram may help (on the right and on the next page).

Some notes on the diagram: First, I've left out specific examples of the types of things or truths we know (e.g., sense-data, self, logical facts, and so on). I have done this because Russell changed his mind on the type of things or truths we could know and how. Yet despite the changes in the objects known, the taxonomy of knowledge stayed the same for Russell.[2] Second, the two arrows under "knowledge by description" are meant to indicate addition. This is to indicate that Russell says when we know something by description we always have knowledge of truths plus acquaintance. This claim needs some explanation. It is not to say that the thing we know by description we also know by acquaintance.

Rather, Russell's thought is that in order to have knowledge by description of something X, you must know some truths about X. Yet knowing truths requires understanding the propositions that represent that truth.[3] This, in turn, requires being acquainted with the constituents of that proposition. For instance, take the proposition 'the first man to run a four-minute mile had black hair'. While I am not acquainted with the first man who actually ran the four-minute mile, I am acquainted with the constituents that make up that proposition (e.g., the concept BLACK, the

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[1] See especially endnote 47 on page 839.
[2] Since Russell uses "thing" for a very specific type of entity, I use "object" as a very broad and ontologically neutral term to cover *at least* the following: things, truths, facts, particulars, universals, and relations.

[3] Assuming, as Russell does, true propositions correspond to facts.

concept HAIR, and so on). In short, to know a thing by description requires acquaintance, but not acquaintance with the thing known. This is what the lines with arrows in the graph mean. I bring this up only to avoid confusion. I now set it aside.

At first glance, Russell's taxonomy seems plausible. There are different sorts of things we can know, namely things and truths. And there are different ways of knowing these things, namely having immediate knowledge of them or having derivative knowledge of them. If the immediate knowledge is of a thing, then it is called *knowledge by acquaintance*. If the immediate knowledge is of a truth, then it is called *intuitive knowledge*. Similarly, if the knowledge is derivative and of a thing, it is called *knowledge by description*, while when it is derivative knowledge of a truth Russell it is called *derived knowledge of truths*.

In this paper, I scrutinize this taxonomy. I argue that Russell's claims about what the differences between knowledge of things and knowledge of truths amounts to, eventually undermine the taxonomy.

2. The Differences Between Knowledge of Things and Knowledge Truths

Russell makes two important claims about the distinction between knowledge of things and knowledge of truths. First, he says,

> Knowledge of things, when it is of the kind we call knowledge by *acquaintance*, is essentially simpler than any knowledge of truths, and logically independent of knowledge of truths, though it would be rash to assume that human beings ever, in fact, have acquaintance with things without at the same time knowing some truth about them (Russell 1912: 46).

Second, he says,

> Knowledge of truths raises a further problem, which does not arise in regard to knowledge of things, namely the problem of *error*. Some of our beliefs turn out to be erroneous, and therefore it becomes necessary to consider how, if at all, we can distinguish knowledge from error. The problem does not arise with regard to knowledge by acquaintance, for whatever may be the object of acquaintance, even in dreams and hallucinations, there is no error involved so long as we do not go beyond the immediate object: error can only arise when we regard the immediate object, i.e. the sense-datum, as the mark of some physical object. (Russell 1912: 110)

Russell is claiming that having knowledge by acquaintance of a thing, such as a sense-datum, is logically independent of knowledge of any truths about that thing. Furthermore, the object of acquaintance when it is a *thing* is not truth-evaluable, while the object of acquaintance when it is a *truth* is truth-evaluable. I take these each of these claims in turn.

The claim that knowledge of things is logically independent from knowledge of truths we can gloss by saying that it is logically possible to have knowledge of a thing without knowing some truth about it. For instance, I could be acquainted with a blue sense-datum merely by seeing it before me. Of course, Russell admits that human beings rarely ever have knowledge by acquaintance of a thing without knowing some truth about it. I might, for instance, know that the blue sense-datum is the color of the skin of the blueberry before me. Russell's point about logical possibility, I take it, is supposed to contrast with something like psychological possibility. That is to say, regardless of whether or not it is psychologically possible for us, given the types of creatures we are, to have knowledge by acquaintance independent of any knowledge of truths, it is nevertheless not a contradiction to think of knowledge without thinking it as knowledge of a truth. Thus, there is a type of knowledge, knowledge by acquaintance of a thing, which a knower can have without knowing any truths about said thing.

At this point, it will be useful to say more about how Russell conceives of the nature of acquaintance. According to Russell (Russell 1910-1911), acquaintance is a direct cognitive relation to an object. On Russell's picture, there are many types of cognitive relations which we can stand in to objects (e.g., we can wish for them, love them, hate them, and so on). Russell (1910-1911) claims acquaintance can be thought of as a kind of presentation, as when a sense-datum is presented to one.

The most common type of object we are acquainted with is a sense-datum. In experiencing a round red patch one is presented with a particular complex that has both colour and shape, the colour and shape being universals for Russell. Thus, we are usually presented with complex particulars which instantiate universals. When this happens, we do not know any truths about the sense-datum, not even that it exists. We merely are presented with an item.

This brings us to the second point, namely truth-evaluable objects. The sense-data that we are aware of are not true or false, they are just things that exist in the world. As Russell puts it,

> the actual sense-data are neither true nor false. A particular patch of colour which I see, for example, simply exists: it is not the sort of thing that is true or false. It is true that there is such a patch, true that it has a certain

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shape and degree of brightness, true that it is sur-rounded by other colours. But the patch itself, like eve-rything else in the world of sense, is of a radically dif-ferent kind from the things that are true or false, and therefore cannot properly be said to be *true* (Russell 1912: 113).

Like all things in the world of sense, these things just exist and, according to Russell, we know them simply by being acquainted with them. This differs from the objects of judgements or beliefs which are truth-evaluable. I said ear-lier that Russell conceives of acquaintance as a direct cognitive relation between a subject and an object, and mentioned that there are many types of cognitive relations which subjects can stand to objects. Judgements are an-other type of cognitive relation between a subject and an object, but unlike acquaintance judgments are not a dual relation. Judging or believing is a mental act whereby the mind knits together many terms (Russell 1912: 127). For instance, in believing Desdemona loves Cassio, a subject S bears a certain relation, namely the relation of believing, to Desdemona, the loving relation, and Cassio, and knits these items together in a certain order.

Russell takes truth to be a property of beliefs that is de-pendent on the relation that the belief has to objects out-side the belief. Thus, a belief B has the property of being T just in case it stands in the right relation to something out-side of it, namely the corresponding fact F. And a belief is false when it lacks a corresponding fact. Thus, Russell says,

> of course a judgement or a statement may be true or false in one sense, although it is an event which may be an object of acquaintance. But it is fairly obvious that the truth or falsehood which is attributed to a judgement or statement is derivative from the truth or falsehood of the associated proposition (Russell 1992: 108).

And on the same page: "the fundamental characteristic which distinguishes propositions (whatever they may be) from objects of acquaintance is their truth or falsehood. An object of acquaintance is not true or false, but is simply what it is" (Russell 1992: 108).[4]

What we are acquainted with is not truth-evaluable. The judgements we come to make about the things we are ac-quainted with are truth-evaluable. This is one of the fun-damental differences between the acquaintance relation and the judging relation. When we make judgements, we come to know truths (assuming we make true judgements) about the things we are judging.

So, Russell's claim is that we can know something with-out knowing any truths about it, which is to say without making any judgements about it. This is perhaps most sa-lient in sense perception where the things with which we are acquainted are not the sorts of things that are truth-evaluable. The question we need to ask is, if the relation of acquaintance is a direct cognitive relation that is *not judgement,* and that it is a relation to things which are truth-evaluable, then what do we know in such cases? It seems the best gloss is to say that we are aware of items in our environment and that is *all we can say.* For Russell claims that the judgements of perception, judgements such as "this sense-datum exists" or "this sense-datum is red and round" are cases of intuitive knowledge.

Intuitive knowledge is knowledge of truths. Like knowl-edge of things by acquaintance, it is known immediately.

That is to say, there is no mediate thing by which we come to know the truth known. If we can know some truth, call it X, without knowing any other truth, call it Y, by means of which we know X, then we know X immediately. Russell glosses this as being truths that are incapable of proof. Certain truths, for instance the principles of logic, are inca-pable of demonstrations. They are self-evident to us. But self-evidence is a psychological notion, not an epistemic one. Thus, there are some truths, according to Russell, which are self-evident but also capable of proof. Arithmetic is like this according to Russell. To know the proposition 'two and two are four' is true and self-evident, but never-theless can be deduced from the principles of logic. Thus, self-evidence and incapable of proof are two distinct no-tions. When Russell discusses intuitive knowledge, he moves in between these two notions. I think what he really means is intuitive knowledge is that which is known without proof, despite his often employment of the phrase "self-evident" to explain intuitive knowledge in this section.

Intuitive knowledge then, consists of forming judgements or beliefs that correspond to the facts. This includes judgements of perception. If we are acquainted with a red sense-datum, we can judge that there is a red sense-datum. That is, sense perception makes us aware of some item in our environment, we then judge "*that* is red" or "there is *that*" where "that" is a demonstrative. This is im-mediate knowledge of truths which do not rest on knowing any other facts. Such judgements are capable of being false. For *this* might not be red or might not exist. Of course, it is not that these judgements are capable of be-ing wrong *simpliciter* that is the problem. That is to say, it is not merely because we *might* go wrong that is the prob-lem. For even if we were omniscient and could *never* go wrong, these judgements would still be problematic. The problem is that it is the type of information that is in fact capable of being true or false.

But if these judgements of perception are supposed to be knowledge of truths by acquaintance, then how can knowledge by acquaintance of things be logically inde-pendent of truths? If awareness of items results in knowl-edge that is propositional in form, then it is not logically independent of knowledge of truths. So, there must be something else we can know when we have knowledge of things that is logically independent of truths. But what could it be? The simple case that was supposed to ground knowledge of things by acquaintance, namely awareness of sense-data in sense experience, turns out to be a judgement based on sense experience according to Rus-sell. That is to say, what seems problematic about this is that Russell doesn't seem able to give an example of the type of knowledge that is gained by knowledge by ac-quaintance. Even when he tries to extract any type of knowledge of truths, he still relies on statements that have a subject-predicate form to say what is that we know. And that is a form of a statement is capable of being true or false. It is the type of form Russell explicitly says is truth-functional. That is to say, they are knowledge of truths. Knowing that *this* is a red sense-datum involves knowl-edge of truths. But if those cases count as knowledge of truths, what cases are left to be free of knowledge of truths? It seems the most basic type of thing we could know is something like "there is this". But even that seems to be of the subject-predicate form, for we can rephrase it as "this exists". So, despite the initial plausibility of there being a class of things we can know without knowing any truths about them, it seems that Russell cannot give an example of such things.

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[4] I realize I explained true beliefs in terms of correspondence to facts and then quoted a passage from TK which doesn't mention facts at all. In the next draft I intend to remedy this.

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Zur Vielfalt der Schachanalogien in Wittgensteins Philosophieren

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Abstract

Einführend betrachten wir Schachanalogien als Gegenstand der Wittgenstein-Forschung im Kontext des Gesamtwerks. Der Ausdruck „Schachanalogie" kann dabei selbst als ein Beispiel von Familienähnlichkeit betrachtet werden. Als Indikatoren kommen eine ganze Reihe sprachlicher Ausdrücke in Frage, wobei wir uns hier auf Vorkommen von möglicherweise zusammengesetzten Ausdrücken der Form „Schach–" beschränken. Bereits mit Bezug auf wenige Beobachtungen lassen sich eine *Aufgabe* und eine *Vermutung* formulieren. Die durchaus anspruchsvolle *Aufgabe* besteht darin, Wittgensteins gesamten Nachlass auf die Verwendung von Themen mit Bezug auf Schach in ihren jeweiligen sprachphilosophischen Kontexten zu durchforsten. Die *Vermutung* betrifft den Eindruck, dass sich bestimmte Aspekte der Bezugnahme auf Schach in der Übergangsphase von der sogenannten mittleren zur späten Philosophie nachweisbar verändern, wohingegen andere nur variiert werden. Im zweiten Teil betrachten wir ausgewählte Schachanalogien aus den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* etwas näher. Bereits hier zeigt sich die Vielfalt als Methode bestimmte Aspekte zu beleuchten und neue Aspekte klar zu sehen.

Schachanalogien als Gegenstand der Wittgenstein-Forschung

Es wurde bereits mehrfach vermerkt,[1] dass Wittgenstein häufig recht unterschiedliche Aspekte des Schachs in seine philosophischen Überlegungen einbezieht. Es geht dabei um Aspekte, wie die Struktur des (Schach-)Bretts und die Möglichkeiten seiner Zusammensetzungen, die Klassifikationsvarianten von Schachfiguren, die Rolle und Bedeutung einzelner Figuren, die Form und Gestalt des Schachkönigs, die Verwendung des Schachkönigs bei der Auslosung der Spielfarbe, Schachzüge als Handlungen, das Aufstellen der Schachfiguren in der Ausgangsstellung, die Unterschiede zwischen Schach*spiel*, Schach*partie*, ein Schach*problem lösen* etc. bis hin zur Betrachtung von Schach in seiner *Gesamtheit*.

Folgen wir Wittgensteins Programm des Philosophierens, dann ist der Ausdruck „Schach*analogien*" ganz bewusst im Plural gewählt und in seiner Bedeutung nicht abschließend fixierbar. Eher haben wir es mit einer *familienähnlichen Verwendung* des Ausdrucks *Schach* und der mit diesem Ausdruck gebildeten Komposita der Form „Schach–" (Schachbrett, –figur, –spiel, –problem, –könig etc) zu tun. Die Anzeige von Analogien zu den von Wittgenstein im jeweiligen Kontext behandelten philosophischen Problemen erfolgt durch eine Vielzahl variierender individueller Formen bzw. einfach durch eine Einbettung in einen Argumentationsstrang. Z.T. sind ganze Abschnitte bzw. Paragraphen dem Thema „Schach" gewidmet. Z.T. erscheinen diese Verweise nahezu aus dem Nichts innerhalb eines anders gelagerten Themas, um einen ganz bestimmten Punkt aus einer erhellenden analogen Perspektive zu beleuchten.

Zu einer vollständigeren Analyse der Schachanalogien gehören natürlich auch die Gebrauchsweisen weiterer schachbezogener Ausdrücke, die aber den Ausdruck „Schach" selbst nicht enthalten: „Dame", „Rössel" (so Wittgenstein in der Regel für „Springer"), „Läufer, „Turm", „Bauer", „Matt (setzen)", „Remis", „Rochade", „en passant (Schlagen)" etc. Wir werden uns im Folgenden jedoch weitgehend auf Ausdrücke der Form „Schach–" beschränken.

Es fällt auf, dass Wittgenstein offenbar den Ausdruck „Schach" in seinem gesamten Frühwerk nicht verwendet.

Dies ist in gewisser Weise erstaunlich, da davon auszugehen ist, dass Wittgenstein zeitig mit dem Band II von Freges „Grundgesetzen der Arithmetik" (GGA II) vertraut war. In diesem Band kritisiert Frege ausführlich die *formale* Arithmetik von Thomae und stellt sie seiner *inhaltlichen* Arithmetik gegenüber. Zu dieser Kritik gehört die Zurückweisung der Analogie Arithmetik–Spiel vor allem auch mit Bezug auf Schach in den GGA II §73 bis §132 mit immerhin 79 Vorkommen von Ausdrücken der Form „Schach–"! Aus den Aufzeichnungen Waismanns wissen wir, dass die GGA II mehrfach Gegenstand von Lesungen und Diskussionen bei Schlick in Wien waren.[2]

Die erste Verwendung von „Schach–", die ich im Nachlass finden konnte, stammt von ca. Anfang 1929: „Man kann nun tatsächlich ein materielles Schachbrett als Einheit – nicht aus seinen Feldern zusammengesetzt – sehen, indem man es als ein großes Viereck sieht und von seinen Feldern absieht. – Sieht man aber von seinen Feldern nicht ab dann ist es ein Komplex und die Felder sind seine Bestandteile die es konstituieren um die Ausdrucksweise Nicods anzuwenden." (Ms-105, 44[3]) Auf dieses Thema – die Relativität der verschiedenen logischen Möglichkeiten der Zusammensetzung und damit der Einfachheit – kommt Wittgenstein in der Folge immer wieder zurück. In Ms-105 ist dies das einzige Vorkommen.

In Ms-107 (1929) finden sich 4 Vorkommen, wobei hier bereits die Analogie „Wort–Schachfigur" auftritt: „Die Frage ‚was ist ein Wort' ist ganz analog der ‚was ist eine Schachfigur'". Wittgenstein übernimmt diese Formulierung mit einem Einschub von „eigentlich" in die Philosophischen Untersuchungen (PU) 108: „Die Frage ‚Was ist eigentlich ein Wort?' ist analog der ‚Was ist eine Schachfigur?'"

In der Folge intensiviert sich die Verwendung von Schachanalogien bis hin zu einer umfassenderen sprachphilosophischen Betrachtung von Schach: Im Ms-108 (datiert auf 13.12.1929–09.08.1930) finden sich 13 Vorkommen von „Schach–", im Ts-208 (15.03.1930?–15.04.1930?) 5 Vorkommen, im Ms-109 „V Bemerkungen" (11.08.1930?–03.02.1931?) 37 Vorkommen und im Ms-

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[1] Vgl. z.B. Kemmerling 1997, Weiss 2004, Buchholz 2006 und Kuhn 2014.

[2] Waismann liest am 30. Dezember 1930 (WWK 130 f.) und am 1. Januar 1931 (WWK 150) aus GGA II (§§117, 118 bzw. 107, 108) vor. Wittgenstein bezieht sich an diesen und weiteren Stellen (WWK 105, 119, 124, 138) ebenfalls auf die GGA II.

[3] Die Angaben zu den Manuskripten und Typoskripten erfolgen mit den gängigen Kürzeln und Blattangaben mit Bezug auf http://wab.uib.no /transform/wab.php?modus=opsjoner und „Select a Nachlass item:".

110 „VI, Philosophische Bemerkungen" (10.12.1930–06.07.1931) 61 Vorkommen. In WWK findet sich der erste Eintrag in der Aufzeichnung des Treffens vom 19.06.1930 (S. 103).

Bereits aus diesen wenigen Beobachtungen leiten sich eine Aufgabe und eine Vermutung her. Die durchaus anspruchsvolle Aufgabe besteht darin, Wittgensteins gesamten Nachlass auf die Verwendung von Themen mit Bezug auf Schach in ihren jeweiligen sprachphilosophischen Kontexten zu durchforsten. Bereits dies wäre ein interessanter Beitrag zur Wittgenstein-Forschung. Die Vermutung betrifft meinen Eindruck, dass sich bestimmte Aspekte der Bezugnahme auf Schach in der Übergangsphase von der sogenannten mittleren zur späten Philosophie nachweisbar verändern, wohingegen andere nur variiert werden. Es bestünde damit eine *Familienähnlichkeit* von *direkten* und *indirekten Verwandtschaften* (vgl. PU 67) zwischen verschiedenen Aspekten von Schach und damit auch zwischen verschiedenen Formen von Schachanalogien. Ein Projekt, welches hier natürlich nicht geleistet werden kann, wäre dann die Darstellung des Übergangs von der frühen zur späteren Philosophie Wittgensteins im Lichte der variierenden Bezüge auf Schach.

## Zu einigen Schachanalogien in den Philosophischen Untersuchungen

Eine ausführlichere Analyse der Bezüge auf Schach in Wittgensteins Nachlass würde deren enorme Vielfalt zutage fördern. Obgleich dieser Nachweis hier nicht geführt werden kann, zeigt die Analyse der PU, dass zwar eine ganze Reihe von Aspekten – jedoch bei weitem nicht die gesamte Vielfalt – in den Text eingegangen ist. Hier besteht eine Analogie zur Grammatik der Farbausdrücke: Gleich am Anfang der PU finden sich „Farbmuster" (PU 1, 8, 18), „rot" (PU 1) etc. Erst der genauere Blick in den Nachlass fördert Wittgensteins enorme Intensität zutage, mit der er sich mit der Logik bzw. Grammatik der Farbausdrücke beschäftigt hat.

In PU 17 diskutiert Wittgenstein mit Bezug auf das Sprachspiel aus PU 8: die Einteilung der sprachlichen Ausdrücke in Wortarten. Er betont dabei die Abhängigkeit solcher Einteilungen vom Zweck und unserer Neigung. Zur Verdeutlichung dieses Punktes ruft er die Analogien zu möglichen Einteilungen sowohl von Werkzeugen in Werkzeugarten als auch von Schachfiguren in Figurenarten auf und belässt es dabei. Es seien einige Einteilungsmöglichkeiten für Schachfiguren benannt. Physikalisch könnten wir diese (bzgl. Ausgangsstellung 16) weiße und (bzgl. Ausgangsstellung 16) schwarze einteilen. Die Einteilung in (anfangs insgesamt 16) Bauern, (je 4) Türme, Läufer, Springer, (je 2) Damen und Könige kann physikalisch (Aussehen), aber auch logisch (Zugmöglichkeiten) gemeint sein. Wegen der Umwandlungsmöglichkeit von Bauern in Dame, Turm, Läufer bzw. Springer kann sich im Verlaufe einer Schachpartie die Anzahl von Figuren bestimmter Arten sogar erhöhen. Theoretisch könnten 9 weiße Damen auf dem Brett stehen. Garantiert nicht physikalisch gemeint sein kann die Einteilung der Figuren in diejenigen, denen im Prinzip alle Felder des Brettes zugänglich sind (Könige, Damen, Türme, Springer) und denen für die das *nicht* gilt (Läufer und Bauern ohne Umwandlung). Eine andere Einteilung in Leichtfiguren (Läufer und Springer), Schwerfiguren (Damen und Türme) nebst Königen und Bauern geht von einer bestimmten Bewertungsskala der Figuren aus. In PU 47 thematisiert Wittgenstein die Beziehung zwischen *einfach* und *zusammengesetzt* und damit die Frage des *logischen Atomismus*. Ein Schachbrett scheint „offenbar und schlechtweg zusammengesetzt" zu sein. Vielleicht wären dann farbige Quadrate seine Elemente? Wittgenstein macht nicht nur klar, dass verschiedene Formen der Zusammensetzung angenommen werden können, sondern auch, dass die Verteilung auf Farben (physikalisch) und Zahlen bzw. geometrische Formen (mathematisch) unterschiedlich vorgenommen werden kann: 32 weiße und 32 schwarze Quadrate (jeweils Zahl–Farbe–Form-Angabe) vs. Farben Weiß und Schwarz einerseits sowie Schema des Quadratnetzes andererseits. Es gibt keine ausgezeichnete Zusammensetzung: „Das Wort ‚zusammengesetzt' (und also das Wort ‚einfach') wird von uns in einer Unzahl verschiedener, in verschiedenen Weisen miteinander verwandten, Arten benützt." Dies gilt selbst für die Farbe eines Schachfeldes. Was für das Schachspiel einfach ist – die Farbe des Feldes e4 z.B. –, kann für den Designer eines Schachbrettes höchst zusammengesetzt sein.

In PU 31 geht es gleich um mehrere miteinander verbundene Aspekte: Die mittels „entspricht hier" angezeigte Analogie lautet: „Die Form der Spielfigur entspricht hier dem Klang, oder der Gestalt eines Wortes." Sowohl *sprachliche* als auch *schachbezogene* Ausdrücke (Worte bzw. Figuren) beziehen sich u.a. auf physikalische Eigenschaften. Diese dürfen aber nicht mit dem Gebrauch (der Bedeutung) dieser Ausdrücke verwechselt werden. Der Gebrauch der Königsfigur ist nicht durch das Zeigen auf eine solche und die hinweisende Äußerung „Das ist der Schachkönig" *allein* erklärbar. In der Folge schildert Wittgenstein – eingeleitet durch „Man kann sich aber auch denken." und „Betrachte noch diesen Fall:" – mögliche Situationen für die sinnvolle Verwendung dieser Äußerung im Sinne einer Erklärung des Gebrauchs. Im ersten Falle lehrt die Erklärung „Das ist der König" jemandem nur dadurch den Gebrauch „daß er in anderm Sinne schon ein Spiel beherrscht". Im zweiten Fall muss der Schüler bereits wissen, was eine Spielfigur ist und dies besagt wiederum, dass es schon irgendeine Form des Bezugs auf die Praxis des Spielens geben muss.

Dieses Thema wird in PU 33 weitergeführt, indem Wittgenstein dafür plädiert, dass sich die Handlung „seine Aufmerksamkeit auf die Form, die Farbe etc. richten" nicht vollständig lokalisieren lässt. Gleiches soll für *Schachzüge* gelten. Die lokalisierende Annahme eines Schachzuges bestünde darin, dass eine Figur, z.B. ein weißer Springer (kurz: wS) vom Feld mit den Koordinaten f4 auf das Feld g6 gezogen wird und damit *allein* die Veränderung der Position einer Figur die Bedeutung eines Zuges sei. In einer Schach*partie* kann dieser Zug jedoch eine ganze Reihe anderer Funktionen haben, die sich erst aus der konkreten Stellung ergeben und nicht im Zug selbst und auch nicht in den Regeln für die Zugmöglichkeiten dieser Figur liegen können. Es kann mit diesem Zug z.B. eine schwarze Figur auf f6 geschlagen werden. Dies geht jedoch nur, wenn sich dort eine solche Figur befindet. Es kann mit diesem Zug ein Schachgebot gegen den weißen König aufgehoben werden. Dies ist der Fall, wenn die geschlagene Figur zugleich die schachbietende war. Die Aufhebung des Schachgebots erfolgt auch dann, wenn die schachbietende schwarze Figur (Dame, Turm, Läufer) verstellt wird. In diesem Fall muss kein Schlagen auf f6 vorliegen. Desweiteren kann dem schwarzen König Schach geboten bzw. dieser sogar Matt gesetzt werden. Doch hängt dies von der Position der Königs und der Position weiterer weißer bzw. schwarzer Figuren – im Extremfall sogar aller weiteren Figuren und damit der gesamten Stellung – ab. Hier ein extremes Beispiel in dem viele der genannten Möglichkeiten durch den genannten Springerzug realisiert werden:

Der Zug Sf4-g6 hat folgende Funktionen, die in verschiedener Hinsicht abhängig von konkreten Stellungsmerkmalen sind:

- Eine Figur wird geschlagen: der schwarze Turm auf g6.

- Damit wird das Schachgebot von Schwarz abgewehrt wegen sTg6 und wKg1.

- Weiß bietet seinerseits Schach: wegen des sKh8.

- Weiß setzt zudem Matt: wegen der Fesselung des sBh7 durch wTh1 und den für den schwarzen König durch eigene Figuren verstellten Feldern: sTg8, sBg7, sBh7.

In diesem Beispiel sind damit neben dem Springer alle weiteren Figuren in ihren jeweiligen Positionen beteiligt und zudem ist die spezielle Position des Gesamtmusters auf dem Brett relevant. Stünden im rechten Diagrammausschnitt alle Figuren analog auf der f- und g-Linie statt auf der g- und h-Linie, dann wäre es keine Mattstellung. Wittgenstein bemerkt zur Analogie zwischen *Aufmerksamkeit richten auf* und *einem Schachzug*: „Aber das ist es nicht allein, was uns sagen läßt, Einer richte seine Aufmerksamkeit auf die Form, die Farbe, etc. Wie ein Schachzug nicht allein darin besteht, daß ein Stein so und so auf dem Brett verschoben wird, – aber auch nicht in den Gedanken und Gefühlen des Ziehenden, die den Zug begleiten; sondern in den Umständen, die wir nennen: ‚eine Schachpartie spielen‘, ‚ein Schachproblem lösen‘, und dergl.“ Eine weitergehende Überlegung betrifft den Punkt, dass in einer bestimmten Hinsicht „eine Schachpartie spielen“, „eine Schachpartie analysieren“ und ein „Schachproblem lösen“ zwar sehr verwandte, aber doch verschiedene Spiele sind. Schachprobleme beginnen in der Regel mit Stellungen, die keine Ausgangsstellungen für Partien sind. Ein Schachproblem aus der Ausgangsstellung heraus wäre die Frage, ob Weiß (der Anziehende) jeden Partieverlauf gewinnen kann. Auch Analysen von Schachpartien beginnen nicht in der Anfangsstellung. Außerdem können hierbei Züge zurückgenommen werden, was für Schachpartien verboten ist.

In welcher Beziehung stehen nun Benennen und Beschreibung zueinander? Gehören sie zu demselben Sprachspiel oder nicht? In PU 49 vermerkt Wittgenstein, dass Bennen und Beschreibung „nicht auf *einer* Ebene“ stehen. „Das Benennen ist noch gar kein Zug im Sprachspiel“. Die Analogie zum Schachspiel ist hier höchst illustrativ. Das Aufstellen einer Schachfigur, d.h. die Positionierung einer Schachfigur auf dem Ausgangsfeld einer jeden Schachpartie, ist *kein Zug* in irgendeiner Schachpartie. Dies erkennt man leicht daran, dass die Beschreibung von Zügen logisch die Benennung von zwei Schachfeldern er-

fordert: z.B. wKe1-f1. Die Angabe für eine Ausgangsposition erfolgt z.B. mittels wKe1. Hier erscheint keine Angabe eines zweiten Feldes. Ganz allgemein sind die logische Form der Angabe der Position einer Schachfigur und die der Angabe des Zuges einer Schachfigur streng geschieden. Eine Irritation kann dadurch entstehen, dass wKe1 als Abkürzung für z.B. den Zug wKe2–e1 verstanden wird. Dies ist nun wirklich ein Zug und es ist sogar ein Zug des weißen Königs auf sein Ausgangs*feld*. Aber der König erreicht nie wieder die Ausgangs*position*, was sich z.B. daran erkennen lässt, dass er selbst nach Erreichen des Ausgangsfeldes nicht mehr rochieren darf. Anders ausgedrückt: Es gibt zwar Zugfolgen, die zu einer Stellung führen, deren Beschreibung genau so aussieht wie diejenige der Ausgangsstellung. Es gibt jedoch überhaupt keine logische Möglichkeit *die* Ausgangsstellung zu wiederholen, da diese die Stellung *vor* dem 1. Zug einer jeden Partie und *nicht* die Stellung *nach* dem *n*-ten Zug ist.

Bereits erwähnt wurde die Analogie zwischen „Wort“ und „Schachfigur“ in PU 108, die bis 1929 zurückreicht. Dieser Analogie geht jedoch eine weitere Analogie voran, die zunächst problematisch erscheint. Wittgenstein stellt zunächst fest: „Wir reden von dem räumlichen und zeitlichen Phänomen der Sprache; nicht von einem unräumlichen und unzeitlichen Unding.“ Dies suggeriert, dass dann eine *physikalische* Redeweise angemessen wäre. Ist doch die Physik die Wissenschaft räumlicher und zeitlicher Phänomene. Dagegen geht es Wittgenstein um die *Logik* bzw. die *Grammatik*. Doch was bedeuten hier Raum und Zeit? Der Raum muss der Raum der Regeln sein, zu dem z.B. die Angabe der Geometrie des Schachbretts, die logische Form der Ausgangsstellung und die Regeln der Zugmöglichkeiten gehören. Schachzüge können zeitlich verstanden werden, obgleich die Angabe wKe1–e2 keinerlei Zeitparameter enthält. Wittgenstein möchte von der Sprache reden „wie von den Figuren des Schachspiels, indem wir Spielregeln für sie angeben, nicht ihre physikalischen Eigenschaften beschreiben.“

Daraus ergibt sich jedoch das Problem, dass zwar im Kontext von Theorien (z.B. einer Linguistik bzw. einer Theorie bestimmter Schachendspiele) die Bedeutung von bestimmten Worten und Figuren fixiert werden kann. Mit Bezug auf das „Phänomen der Sprache“ ergibt sich die Bedeutung eines Wortes jedoch aus *allen* grammatisch möglichen Verwendungen dieses Wortes in der Sprache *ohne* Einschränkung! Genauso ergibt sich die Bedeutung einer Schachfigur aus allen regelkonformen Verwendungen dieser Figur in jeder möglichen Schachpartie bzw. auch damit verwandten Tätigkeiten (Partieanalyse, Schachaufgaben etc.) ebenfalls *ohne* Einschränkung. Dies scheint jedoch menschenunmöglich zu sein. Dazu PU 197: „Es ist, als könnten wir die ganze Verwendung des Wortes mit einem Schlag erfassen.‘ – Wir sagen ja, daß wir es tun. D.h., wir beschreiben ja manchmal, was wir tun, mit diesen Worten. Aber es ist an dem, was geschieht, nichts Erstaunliches, nichts Seltsames. Seltsam wird es, wenn wir dazu geführt werden, zu denken, daß die künftige Entwicklung auf irgendeine Weise schon im Akt des Erfassens gegenwärtig sein muß und doch nicht gegenwärtig ist.“ Praktisch verfügen wir über das *ganze* Erfassen einer Schachspiels, ja sogar des ganzen Schachspiels. Doch bedeutet dies weder die Vorwegnahme künftiger Verwendungsmöglichkeiten einer Schachfigur noch die Vorwegnahme künftiger Schachpartien. Das Missverständnis besteht darin, dass wir glauben, dass sich der Sinn der Worte „Spielen wir eine Partie Schach!“ in der Angabe eines bestimmten

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Regelverzeichnisses (z.B. der FIDE-Gesetze[4]) erschöpft: „Wo ist die Verbindung gemacht zwischen dem Sinn der Worte ‚Spielen wir eine Partie Schach!' und allen Regeln des Spiels? – Nun, im Regelverzeichnis des Spiels, im Schachunterricht, in der täglichen Praxis des Spielens." Zur Bedeutung des Wortes *Schach* gehören neben einem Regelverzeichnis vor allem auch verschiedene Praxen, die sich selbst durch *regelgeleitetes Handeln* auszeichnen. Nicht einmal die Bedeutung von „guter Schachzug" ist der Definition von „regelgemäßer Zug" (FIDE-Regel 3.10a) zu entnehmen.

Dies liefert nur eine Auswahl der von Wittgenstein in den PU verwendeten Schachanalogien und erst recht mit Blick auf die Vielfalt im gesamten Nachlass. Es ist zudem eine verheißungsvolle Perspektive, aktuelle philosophische Fragen unter dem Gesichtspunkt geeigneter Schachanalogien im Stile Wittgensteins zu klären.

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Knowledge and Representations: Explaining the Skeptical Puzzle

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Abstract

This paper provides an explanation of the skeptical puzzle. I argue that we can take two distinct points of view towards representations, mental representations like perceptual experiences and artificial representations like symbols. When focusing on what the representation represents we take an *attached* point of view. When focusing on the representational character of the representation we take a *detached* point view. From an attached point of view, we have the intuition that we can know that *p* simply by *using* the representation and without having prior knowledge about the reliability of the source that delivers the representation. When taking a detached point of view, we tend to think that we must have this kind of prior knowledge. These two conflicting intuitions about knowledge and representations provide the basis for our intuition of immediate perceptual knowledge on the one hand and for the skeptical intuition of underdetermination on the other hand.

1. The Immediate-Knowledge Intuition and the Intuition of Underdetermination

The skeptical problem is usually regarded as a puzzle about conflicting intuitions. First, we are convinced that we have perceptual knowledge about the external world, second, the intuition is persisting that we do not know that the skeptical hypotheses are false, and, third, we think that if we know the first then we know the second. Each of these three intuitions seems plausible, but together they are inconsistent. The skeptical and the anti-skeptical intuition that I will focus on here are the intuition of immediate perceptual knowledge about the external world on the one hand, and the underdetermination view that all our evidence equally supports the real-world-hypothesis and the skeptical hypothesis on the other hand.

According to our natural and pre-philosophical understanding of knowledge external world knowledge via perception is simple and immediate. Intuitively, we attribute knowledge about the surrounding to infants before they acquire concepts of reliability, trustworthiness or of skeptical hypotheses and we attribute *additional* knowledge to them when they acquire these concepts. This is the *immediate-knowledge-intuition*. This intuition is compatible with numerous knowledge accounts, such as process reliabilism, dogmatism as put forward by Pryor (2000 and 2004) or Sosa's (2007) concept of animal knowledge.

The intuition of underdetermination is one of the most persisting anti-skeptical intuition. It states that our evidence does not favor the real-world-hypothesis that the world is broadly the way we believe it to be to a skeptical hypothesis that we are systematically deceived in falsely believing. We can formulate this intuition as follows.

The intuition of underdetermination: Our evidence does not favor the real-world-hypothesis over the skeptical hypotheses.

The skeptical argument based on this intuition is often called the argument of underdetermination, which is the argument that we do not have any perceptual knowledge because our evidence underdetermines the real-world-hypothesis given that it does not favor it over some skeptical hypothesis.

Let me reflect on the skeptical intuition of underdetermination in more detail. For example, S's experience as of a computer in front of her underdetermines the hypothesis that there actually is a computer in front of her because it does not favor this hypothesis over the skeptical hypothesis that S is a BIV deceived in falsely believing that there is a computer in front of her. S experiences as of *p* but there are two competing hypotheses about the origin of S's experience, the real-world-hypothesis and a skeptical hypothesis. S's knowledge about her experiences and beliefs does not favor the real-world-hypothesis over the skeptical hypothesis. Hence, S's belief in the real-world-hypothesis is evidentially underdetermined.

It is important to note that the intuition of underdetermination is not only characterized by what we do *not* know and why we do not know, but also by what we do know. S does know that she experiences as of *p*. Thus, it is assumed that S has knowledge about her own current mental states, most plausibly via introspection. S just does not know what caused her experiences.

2. Liberalism and Conservatism

Pryor (2004) introduced the terminology of liberalism and conservatism for referring to two rival accounts on perceptual justification. According to Pryor (2004: 355) liberals and conservatives diverge about the role of non-perceiving hypotheses which are "(known to be) incompatible with one's experiences being genuine perceptions" like the hypothesis that I am hallucinating right now. Conservatives about perception like Wright (2002 and 2004) defend the following claim.

Conservatism: S is justified to believe that *p* based on her experiences as of *p*, only if S has prior justification to believe that any non-perceiving hypothesis is false.

Liberalism is the denial of conservatism. Liberals like Pryor (2000: 520) hold that "not only can we have perceptual knowledge and justified perceptual belief, we might have it without being in a position to cite *anything* that could count as ampliative, non-question-begging evidence for those beliefs." Liberals treat non-perceiving hypotheses only as underminers, i.e. evidence for non-perceiving hypotheses tends to undermine our perceptual justification. However, in the absence of any evidence for or against non-perceiving hypotheses, we have prima facie perceptual justification.

Hence, the conflict between liberals and conservatives is one about the architecture of knowledge. Liberals accept that perceptual knowledge can be immediate and non-inferential. This view is accordance with our natural and non-philosophical understanding that perceptual knowl-

edge is simple and immediate. Conservatives deny the immediacy of perceptual knowledge or at least have to explain why it is immediate despite not being fundamental.

3. Knowledge and Representations

In this section, I will argue that the conflicting intuitions of liberalism and conservatism rely on two distinct concept of knowledge via representations, first, knowing simply by *using* a representation (or by being confronted with a representation) and, second, knowing by *reflecting* on the representation and on its representational character from a more detached point of view. I understand representations as *mental* representations like experiences and beliefs or *artificial* representations like symbols, signals or texts.

When confronted with representations we can, first, acquire knowledge about what the representation represents and, second, about the representation itself. We can acquire knowledge that *p*, when having an experience as of *p*, when reading in a textbook that *p* or when being told that *p*. This is knowledge about what the representation represents based on the representation. Moreover, we can acquire knowledge *about* representations and their representational character, for example that I have an experience as of *p*, that the textbook says that *p* or that S asserts that *p*. There is no tension between the two kinds of knowledge, i.e. between knowledge via representations about the represented facts and knowledge about the representations themselves. The crucial point is that we can have conflicting intuitions about the *relations* between knowledge that *p* based on representations that *p* and knowledge about these representations. The first intuition is one about knowledge when *using* representations (or when being confronted with representations). The second is one about knowledge when *reflecting* about representations.

(a) The intuition of knowledge from an attached point of view (I$_A$)

From an attached point of view, we think that we can come to know that *p* simply by being confronted with a representation that *p*, but without knowing much or even anything about the representation or its source. In this case, we simply use a representation for acquiring knowledge but without doing much prior reflection work on it. We can distinguish between a strong claim and a weak claim about knowledge from an attached point of view.

> **I$_A$-strong** When S is confronted with a representation R that *p*, then S can know that *p* simply by forming a belief that *p* on the basis of R (i.e. without knowing that R is a representation that *p* and without knowing that R is delivered by a reliable source.)

> **I$_A$-weak** When S is confronted with a representation R that *p* and when S knows that R is a representation that *p*, then S can know that *p* simply by forming a belief that *p* on the basis of R (i.e. without knowing that R is delivered by a reliable source.)

I$_A$-weak is weaker than I$_A$-strong, because I$_A$-weak allows knowledge via a representation R that *p* without even knowing that R is a representation that *p*. Process reliabilism defends I$_A$-strong since it claims that a belief that *p* is justified, if the belief-forming process is reliable which is the case, if the representation is delivered by a reliable source, no matter whether S has knowledge about the representational nature of the representation involved. Furthermore, Sosa (2007) presumably defends this strong

claim with respect to animal knowledge and Pryor (2000: 520) plausibly accepts this view with respect to experiences and perceptual knowledge. Various intermediate versions of I$_A$ are possible, e.g. that S must implicitly believe that R is a representation or that S must be in a position to know that R is a representation. We assume that a version of I$_A$ is true if we make knowledge ascriptions of the following kind: The infant knows that there is a red ball in front of her because she sees a red ball in front of her. I know that the Giants won their last game because I read it in the NYT.

(b) The intuition of knowledge from a detached point of view (I$_D$)

When focusing our attention on the representational character of the representation rather than on what the representation represents we take a detached point of view towards the representation. The resulting intuition about knowledge via the representation can be characterized as follows. When S is confronted with a representation that *p*, e.g. a travel report in a newspaper or the output of a measurement device such as a thermometer, then it is naïve to assume that S can know that *p* without knowing anything about the reliability of the newspaper or the measurement device. In order to know that *p*, S must have knowledge about the reliability of the representation delivering source, for example by comparing the reports of the newspaper to reports of other newspapers, by getting background information about the newspaper, by comparing the output of the thermometer to the output of other thermometers or by acquiring background information about the company that produces the thermometer. For having knowledge that *p* when confronted with a representation that *p*, we must have this kind of *prior* knowledge about the reliability of the representation. If S does not have this prior knowledge, S only knows that *the newspaper says that p* or that *the thermometer indicates that p*, but S does not know that *p* itself. We can summarize this intuition from a detached point of view (I$_D$) as follows.

> **I$_D$** If S is confronted with a representation R that *p*, then S can know that *p* via R only if S knows that R is a representation that *p* and if S has prior knowledge that R is delivered by a reliable source.

Note that I$_D$ not only state that S does not know that *p* when confronted with R, if S has knowledge or reasons to believe that R is *not* reliable. Rather I$_D$ is the stronger claim that without any prior evidence about the reliability of R, S does not know that *p* on the basis of R. This view captures the skeptical intuition of underdetermination. The two intuitions I$_A$ and I$_D$ contradict each other. I$_A$ states that S can know that *p* via R, without having prior knowledge about the reliability of R. I$_D$ precisely denies this.

How can we explain why these two conflicting intuitions arise? They are based on *shifts of attention* which support two different points of view that we can take towards representations. On the one hand, we can primarily use representations for acquiring knowledge about the world without doing much or even any reflection work about the representation. In this case, we focus our attention on what the representation represents and take an *attached* point of view towards the representation. On the other, we can take a *detached* point of view towards representations and focus our attention on the representational character of a representation R, i.e. on the fact that R is a *representation*

that p.[1] When taking a detached point of view, the representational character of R becomes *salient* to us. From that point of view, it seems plausible that we only know that R is a representation that *p*, unless we have prior evidence that R is delivered by a reliable source. The two conflicting intuitions I_A and I_D are motivated in the following way.

> When focusing our attention on *what* R represents, we take an *attached* point of view towards R that supports I_A.

> When focusing our attention on the *representational character* of R, we take a *detached* point of view towards R that supports I_D.

It is important to note that I do not argue here that one of these intuitions is accurate and the other one not. They both seem legitimate. I only want to explain how they arise. Moreover, I do not claim that when confronted with a representation R, we take *and maintain* either an attached or a detached point of view. Rather we can switch between the points of view by shifting our attention between what R represents and R's representational character. Furthermore, I do not think that we can only take one point of view at one moment of time. Rather we can hold both points of view, but one is *dominant* and the other *recessive*, depending on what we focus on, and accordingly, one intuition is dominant and the other recessive.

According to the presented view, there is a cognitive difference between primarily using a representation that p for coming to believe that p and primarily believing that some thing is a representation that p. In this sense, representations are Janus faced. On the one hand, we can use them for forming beliefs; on the other hand, we can focus on their representational character. I think that this Janus-faced nature explains at least one type of skeptical intuitions, namely the intuition of underdetermination.

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[1] Bilgrami (2006) uses the concept of a detached point of view in a similar way, but regarding values in the world.

The Ethical in Wittgenstein's Writing: A Reflection on Pleasants Conception of Wittgenstein Ethics

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Abstract

The paper takes issue with Nigel Pleasants (2008), specifically on his views about the tendency to overmoralize the study of Wittgenstein as expressed in the work of Alice Crary (2005). I point out that there is an inconsistency in Pleasants´ claim that the study of Wittgenstein is a non-moral intellectual undertaking and his claim that the Wittgensteinian idea of basic moral certainty is a limit or hinge that reveals our fundamental way of being in the world. By drawing from Cavell and from Wittgenstein´s own remarks about this, I explain that Wittgenstein evokes a kind of "Socratic mirroring" that has the potential to bring about an existential crisis and transcendental turn. This transcendental turn involves a kind of self-knowledge that has implications to ethics.

1. Pleasants skepticism toward Wittgenstein's ethics

Pleasants claims that Wittgenstein leaves behind his earlier view on the immanence of ethics and adopts a more traditional view where ethics is treated as one domain of discourse among others, a domain where particular skills of judgment need to be learned via "language-games with a family of ethical terms" (Pleasants 2008: 249). In his view, the study of Wittgenstein is an "intellectual and non-moral undertaking" which involves skills specific to a domain. Just as being a good piano player does not make a person morally good because of his piano playing skills, so does being a good Wittgensteinian philosopher does not become morally better off through his skills on linguistic clarification (Ibid: 246).

This position is in contrast with that of Crary (2005). For Pleasants, Crary is among the New Wittgensteinians who adopt an "intrinsically-ethical reading" of Wittgenstein where the philosophical clarification of language is itself taken as a form of ethical activity. Their view, Pleasant explains, is a usual assumption in the humanities where a background in the literature and the arts is taken to sensitize people towards moral behavior. This belief, Pleasants says, is false. And he draws from the claims earlier advanced by George Steiner.

Steiner (1967) claims that many administrators of the holocaust had a good background in the literature and the arts. They had knowledge of Goethe and Rilke, and yet such knowledge did not prevent their inhumane supervision of concentration camps. Likewise, Pleasants says it is also unreasonable to expect readers of the *Investigations* to become any less evil. In a skeptical tone he writes, "What, exactly, is imbibed by those that read Wittgenstein well —*even very well*— that is supposed to act as prophylactic against moral insensitivity… and blindness?" (Pleasants 2008: 247f).

I believe Pleasants position raises a controversy. Indeed, there are many readers who consider their study of Wittgenstein a kind of ethical praxis. Pleasant seems to be aware of this. So he mentions possible replies to his claim to give his advance rebuttal. Among these replies are:

1. Morally insensitive Wittgensteinians have failed to read Wittgenstein well.

2. Wittgenstein mentioned that philosophy is also a work on oneself.

It seems to me that Pleasants have failed to appreciate the full import of these replies as he says of the first claim that it is a mere evasion and as he says of the second claim that it is unclear and trite (Pleasants 2008: 247f). I believe that clarifying these replies (which Pleasants simply brushes off) can show why the study of Wittgenstein can indeed have ethical significance. And so I ask, "What does it mean to read Wittgenstein properly?", and "what does it mean to read Wittgenstein in a way that one also works on oneself?"

In answering this question, I find it important to consider a kind of Socratic mirroring that Wittgenstein requires of his readers. Like Crary, I find a continuity in Wittgenstein's early and later work, but I take this continuity as expressed in Wittgenstein's use of Socratic mirroring in his writing. Here, I take inspiration from Stanley Cavell (1962), on his advice to pay attention to the "important difficulty" Wittgenstein wanted to convey through his writing. I take this "Socratic mirroring" as what Cavell refers to as the "important difficulty" the neglect of which turns our Wittgensteinian insights into a theory.

In my view, this "Socratic mirroring" is indicated in the preface of the *Tractatus* where Wittgenstein says that his work is "not a textbook" and it will be understood only by someone who, in some way, already has those thoughts in himself. It is also mentioned in the preface of the *Investigations*, where Wittgenstein says that his work merely involves "sketches" that do not spare others the "trouble" of thinking their own thoughts. More evidently, I take this Socratic mirroring as described in *CV* where Wittgenstein says that his writing must be "nothing more than a mirror in which a reader sees his own thinking with all its deformities and with this assistance can set it in order." (CV: 25 as cited in Heaton 2010: 13)

This last passage, Heaton suggests, was written out of Wittgenstein's familiarity with Lichtenberg's remark: "my work is a mirror: if a monkey looks in, you can expect no apostle to look out." (Ibid.). Wittgenstein is said to have encrypted his thoughts so that it will eliminate readers who are "monkeys" and yet be treated like a jewel by the "apostle". But I believe that if we are to set aside the dichotomy of being a monkey and an apostle and consider that there is both a monkey and an apostle in us, then we can also make sense of the "Socratic mirroring" in Wittgenstein that has ethical significance.

2. Socratic mirroring: the ethical in Wittgenstein's mode of writing

What we can say of a mirror is that it allows us to see our self (or an image of our self), and what we can say of Socrates is that he does not make conclusions for us. Or, if he is understood as making conclusions, these are conclusions that emerge from the exercise of connecting thoughts in a debate about an issue where he professes ignorance and lack of definite stand. Likewise, Wittgenstein's phrasic and metaphorical style of writing renders his work too opaque to allow for definite insight. This phrasic writing, and the obscurity that comes with it, makes the reader feel that he has nothing to appeal to for coherence; so he projects his own thoughts and perceptions onto Wittgenstein's remarks. Hence, I believe that Wittgenstein really intended to evoke the readers own thoughts and project them onto his remarks through his writing. This is confirmed by how the passages I mentioned above talks about the importance of his reader being "possibly stimulated into thinking his own thoughts" or ending up "reflect[ing] on thoughts that he already has in himself". So Pleasants is right in his claim that even the most astute of Wittgenstein readers projects their own biases onto his work (Pleasants 2008: 248).

What Pleasant's misses is the nature of the "difficulty" involved in projecting this bias which he depicts as a merely "intellectual". It is indeed intellectual, but it is inaccurate to describe it as "merely intellectual". As I see it, the difficulty of understanding Wittgenstein aims to include an existential and hence also ethical difficulty. Admittedly, the passages I have cited make no mention of the existential nature of this difficulty. It only mentions how Wittgenstein's work will ideally involve a "trouble of thinking" or a "mirroring" that allows us to see our "thinking with all its deformities." However, we can draw again from the kind of difficulty we encounter in Wittgenstein's writing. Here, I now focus on the *Investigations*.

The *Investigations* is not without its paradoxes which I consider to be a tool for Wittgenstein's "Socratic mirroring". Paradoxes are essentially confusing because it makes our projections difficult to proceed in one way. Hence it also involves a kind of internal self-correction in our projection. And so, through those paradoxes, what we can possibly realize is that our projections are mere perceptions or facets of our thinking. Aside from paradoxes, Wittgenstein's writing style in the *Investigations* is characterized by conflicting voices, which Cavell describes as the voice of temptation toward ideal language and the voice of reason toward ordinary language. Cavell says that the *Investigations* does not really aim to make the reader end up with a claim that is partial to any of those voices (even to the voice of "ordinary language"); its point is to make the reader "go beyond" those voices in a way that it becomes part of the very "sensibility from which [his] assessment proceeds". This process implies a difficulty that comes with a kind of self-knowledge along with a corresponding search for "new terms of criticism"; it implies making the unconscious conscious and finding the rights words to describe what we are *on the verge* of becoming conscious off.

Cavell has been understood as more aligned with the therapeutic reading of the New Wittgensteinians and is not really considered a transcendental reader per se. But I believe that what he has written can also give a greater appreciation to the more substantial versions of the transcendental reading found in the works of Bernard Williams (1974) and Johnathan Lear (1984). These readers brave on to claim that Wittgenstein, both early and late, was con-

cerned with a mode of philosophy that aims at "knowledge" of the metaphysical subject. This metaphysical subject may be understood as having a kind of correlation to the "sensibility" and "mode of thought" Cavell mentions. For Williams and Lear, any claim about this metaphysical subject is bound to end in some vague or nonsensical use of words because it is a "transcendental insight" that describes the very condition and limit of our thought and language. This "transcendental insight" is something that alludes to our "philosophical self", a self that science and psychology has no access to but which we are immediately acquainted. Hence, an experience of philosophical nonsense, is also an experience of the self through the very condition through which judge and think.

Against this background, I find it puzzling that Pleasant's describes the study of Wittgenstein as a merely an intellectual activity. I find it absurd that he describes the study of Wittgenstein as "non-moral and merely intellectual undertaking" when he also describes his Wittgensteinian idea basic moral certainties as something that is "ensnared in the limits of language" and that it reveals of our fundamental way of being in the world through our use of language (Pleasants 2008: 259). Pleasant's criticizes Crary for overmoralizing ethics, but it seems to me that he has failed to consider that the limits of language Wittgenstein intends to clarify is a limit that is inescapably existential; reflecting on "it" also means reflecting on our life and the experiences which have become the transcendental conditions or hinges under which we understand anything. This involves not just our method of projection, but also involves our very sense of self. And that sense of self, to borrow the words of Crary, "pervades all domains of thought and talk".

Thus, I believe that Pleasant's idea of basic moral certainties are neither neutral nor merely intellectual. Getting acquainted with it involves a transcendental inquiry on our philosophical self, and it has moral and political implications.

3. A self that can deal with differences

I would like to conclude by pointing out my stance on the relativity of basic moral certainties and how dealing with this relativity shows the ethical significance of studying Wittgenstein. Pleasants (2015) denies this relativity. He says that basic moral certainties are universal and come from our "socio-biological form of life" as human beings. It is not impossible to doubt them because they naturally allow for exceptions, the acceptability of which belongs to "the unspoken and taken for granted" (Ibid). But they are universal.

This kind of response takes the "the unspoken and taken for granted" (and the "universal") as a limit to criticism, and this conception is what New Wittgenstein's like Crary seeks to show Wittgenstein as critical of. Steffan Rummens (2013), for example, criticizes Pleasants universalistic conception of basic moral certainties in light of how "the wrongness of murder" does not seem to be something that people take for granted in many times in history like the holocaust. Pleasant replies with what he acknowledges as seemingly absurd explanation: people during those times were simply made to believe that they were not "killing" because Jews were not considered humans. He continues, however, that these Nazi perpetrators still considered the wrongness of murder as basic moral certainty. They only differed in terms of their more particular judgments on what counts as an exception, which Pleasants explains away by mentioning how they belong to "the unspoken and taken for granted".

Here, I side with Crary's critical stance toward Pleasants' notion of certainty. It seems that Pleasants notion of basic moral certainty (and the unspoken and the universal that comes with it) becomes an *a priori* limit to criticism and explanation that Wittgenstein undermines. For Crary, Wittgenstein's idea of certainty does not imply a limit to criticism in the way Pleasants work seems to imply. Yet, I believe that Crary's position should also not be taken to imply the contrary dogmatic claim that there is no limit to criticism. What it implies is that this limit is not fixed and that it can change as we use language to talk to others. As such, what Pleasant's considers as "exceptions" may in fact be included in what counts as the meaning of "the wrongness of murder" (and so they are still subject to meaningful talk and debate). They are the very sensitivities, which for Crary, also constitute our concepts, including ethical ones like "the wrongness of murder".

I believe it is these sensitivities and our senses of self that can flex with them which allows us to continue talking with each other despite fundamental differences in our moral and political stance. I believe also that they reveal our "ethical selves".

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Is *Defactoism* a Kind of Naturalism?

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Abstract

This paper focuses on Fogelin's *defactoist* interpretation of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, as it is found in *Taking Wittgenstein at his word* (Fogelin 2009). Fogelin explicitly states that *defactoism* must be distinguished from other labels. However, his defactoist reading seems reasonably akin to a naturalistic reading. This paper argues that *defactoism* might be considered a form of liberal naturalism and that the notion of liberal naturalism fits best with Wittgenstein's overall later philosophy. It will be shown that, although *defactoism* clearly accounts for Wittgenstein's peculiar treatment of traditional philosophical problems, it does not include important aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy, such as the morphological method and the relevance of imaginary cases as a non-metaphysical form of estrangement.

1. Introduction

In *Taking Wittgenstein at his word*, Fogelin coins an interesting interpretative concept called *defactoism*. He defines it as a word which "in its bluntness it is descriptively apt in characterizing a central feature of Wittgenstein's mode of philosophizing" (Fogelin 2009: 29). This feature stands for an anti-intellectualist approach which demotes the role of the intellect by stressing the importance of training and human shared primitive reactions. In the same passage, Fogelin states that *defactoism* "does not carry the freight of other labels" that had been employed in discussions of Wittgenstein's philosophy, and he interestingly does not mention naturalism among them. However, this paper tries to argue that the defactoist reading might indeed be considered a kind of naturalistic reading and that, therefore, *defactoism* might be a form of what Strawson calls liberal naturalism (Strawson 1985: 1). Moreover, it will be shown that the notion of liberal naturalism is broader and more apt to characterise Wittgenstein's later philosophy as a whole. This is because this notion includes important aspects that Fogelin's reading fails to take into account.

Fogelin's interpretation of the main wittgensteinian themes is not disputed in this paper. His book provides a compelling and clear reading which tries to take Wittgenstein's methodological pronouncements seriously. Nevertheless, the book has not found a great place in the literature. Fogelin is cited critically in Stern (Stern 2015: 193ff). However, Stern's critique is highly selective and does not mention the general defactoist reading, which seems to be the greatest original contribution of the author. If the following arguments are sound, they might suggest a possible reason for this lack of interest.

Firstly, the naturalistic elements of Fogelin's interpretation are traced in the chapters dealing with Wittgenstein's remarks on Rule-Following and conceivability of private language. Secondly, some critical remarks on *defactoism* are offered. However, some preliminary remarks on naturalism are needed, as they will function as a reference point for the subsequent discussion.

2. Natural*isms*

As stated by Strawson, "the fact that [the term 'naturalism'] has been applied to the work of philosophers having as little in common as Hume and Spinoza is enough to suggest that there is a distinction to be drawn between varieties of naturalism". It is also enough to claim that philosophical naturalism is not reducible to scientific naturalism.

Strawson indeed makes a distinction between *reductive* naturalism and *liberal* naturalism (Strawson 1985: 1). Quine's naturalized epistemology is an example of the former, while Hume's limitation of the pretensions of reason in Book II of the *Treatise* is an example of the latter (Strawson 1985: 10). Scientific or reductive naturalism is well expressed in Sellars's motto "science is the measure of all things" (Sellars 2004: 59). In general, it is grounded on the idea that philosophy should be continuous with science, broadly conceived. Liberal naturalism, by contrast, does not entail any identification between philosophy and science. It is rather an anti-intellectualist attitude that limits the role of the intellect and of *a priori*.

Given the variety of contemporary naturalism, it is possible to set down some features of a minimum sense of naturalism; none of these features necessarily leads to the scientific version. First, an ontological aspect: as stated by Glock, naturalism "denies that there is any realm other than the natural world of matter, energy, and spatio-temporal objects or events" (Glock 2008: 138). Second, an anti-foundationalist aspect: philosophy loses the role of foundation of all knowledge. Third, a metaphilosophical aspect: a particular conception of philosophy is built in relation to the nature of scientific practise. Strawson's liberal naturalism stands as a fair candidate for a non-scientific form of naturalism and it is employed as a reference point in the following discussion.

3. The naturalistic elements of Fogelin's reading

According to Fogelin, Wittgenstein's defactoist account of Rule-Following aims to show that "there is a way of grasping a rule that is not an interpretation" (PI: 201). Contrary to Kripke's claim, Fogelin argues that Wittgenstein does not endorse any sceptical paradox and, consequently, he does not offer any sceptical solution. The paradox he is dealing with in PI 198 and 201 is the result of the misleading *interpretational account* of Rule-Following, that is, the idea that following a rule always involves acting in conformity with an interpretation. The first naturalistic element of Fogelin's reading is the emphasis given on Wittgenstein's remarks on the grammatical connection between training and habits, and between training and natural responses. First of all, in PI 198, Wittgenstein famously writes that there is a connection between the expression of a rule and my actions, that is, the fact that "I have been trained to react in a particular way to this sign, and now I do so react to it [...] a person goes by a signpost only in so far as there is

an established usage, a custom". Secondly, the consensus people join in Rule-Following is not about their opinions, but it's a consensus in action, that is, a consensus in doing the same things, reacting in the same way (LFM: 183f). According to Fogelin, the defactoist account of Rule-Following partly consists in stressing the importance of such shared natural reactions, namely, to show the fact that the consensus is "grounded in the kind of training we, as humans, *can* successfully undergo and the kind of training we actually *do* undergo in the community in which we are reared. The consensus is grounded, as Wittgenstein puts it, in facts concerning our *natural history*" (Fogelin 2009: 28). The defactoist dissolution of the paradox of interpretation consists in showing that following a rule is a practice, the product of a kind of training that is strictly influenced by our arrays of natural responses. If we look at things from this perspective, we will be able to see that there is no philosophical problem of Rule-Following. There are just activities and practices that we, as a matter of fact, *do* as humans and as members of a specific society. This brings us to the second naturalistic element, that is, the naturalistic stopping-place of the justification chain. Wittgenstein often reminds us that one of the typical philosophical mistakes is to look for ultimate reasons (Z: 314). Fogelin argues that the defactoist mode of philosophizing offers an antidote to this misleading tendency. Wittgenstein's remarks on nature are read as an example of an anti-intellectualist attitude that substitutes a kind of analysis grounded in the search of what is hidden. We need to look at what humans, in fact, do. It is not surprising to see that Fogelin deals with the expression "natural history" by looking only to paragraphs 25 and 415 of the *Investigations*: this suggests that, according to Fogelin, Wittgenstein talks about facts of nature in order to find a stopping level of the philosophical investigation. The author employs the expression "nothing-more move" (Fogelin 2009: 36). The stopping place is not intellectualistic but, we may say, naturalistic, because it involves the recognition of some facts of human nature.

There is a third naturalistic element in Fogelin's reading. It is traced in Fogelin's account of the defactoist dissolution of the problem of private language. Firstly, it has to be specified that, according to Fogelin, Wittgenstein does not *say* that private language is impossible. He rather writes some grammatical remarks on the expression "following a rule privately" in order to show the lack of coherent content of the notion of private language. This goal is reached through a grammatical elucidation of the expression "I know I'm in pain" (PI: 248, 251). This expression is based on two assumptions: first, the epistemic priority of the first person, that is, the idea that who is in pain knows that she's in pain better than anyone else. Second, the idea that sensations are private. Now, if we apply the denotative model to sensations terms, we are led to think that the concept is in itself private, because it refers to a private object. Private is then equivalent to hidden. Fogelin argues that Wittgenstein tries to dissolve the philosophical problem by offering an alternative to the denotative model: "words are connected with the primitive, natural, expressions of sensation and used in their place [...] the verbal expression of pain replaces crying" (PI: 244). Thus, the philosophical confusion consists in this: we learn the use of sensation terms in substitution of some natural expressions that are private in the sense of individual. From this fact, though, we erroneously conclude that sensation concepts are private, as they refer to hidden objects. Wittgenstein, thus, presents an alternative which is, we might say, naturalistic, because the use of sensation terms is clarified through the reference to the natural, pre-linguistic expressions of sensations.

Three naturalistic elements have been traced so far: emphasis on human training and human facts of nature, a naturalistic stopping-place of the justification chain, and a naturalistic account of the meaning of sensation terms. These all convey the idea of an anti-intellectualist attitude which is compatible with both Strawson's liberal naturalism and the minimum sense of naturalism described above. For this reason, the defactoist reading seems reasonably akin to a naturalistic reading. Fogelin indeed starts his book with a comparison between Wittgenstein and Hume. What they share is an anti-intellectualist mode of philosophising, that is, they both "demote the role of the intellect to a subservient status. Both [...] ground our intellectual capacities in our animal natures" (Fogelin 2009: 23).

4. Some critical remarks

Fogelin rightly underlines the grammatical character of Wittgenstein's remarks; they are not empirical propositions *about* the world, or about human nature. At the same time, he wants to present a textual analysis in accordance with Wittgenstein's methodological pronouncements. However, Fogelin restricts such pronouncements to the remarks about the distinction between philosophy and science. This is correct but, at least, incomplete, because it does not take into account the morphological method that is used by Wittgenstein in order to reach the goal of the philosophical enquiry: the *übersichtliche Darstellung* (PI: 122). Wittgenstein derives this method from Goethe and Spencer's works; it is, in general, a comparative strategy useful to highlight the way in which terms are used in ordinary language (Andronico 1998). Limited portions of language are compared with others and the governing rules come to light (PI: 89, BBB: 26). Now, it must be noted that Wittgenstein employs this strategy also between given concepts and *imaginary ones*. Wittgenstein repeatedly asks us to imagine cases in which concepts are used in a very different way. These cases include simpler language games: games that might be played by a child, or by a primitive tribe (BBB: 109,124,133,134). In this way, it should be possible to describe our linguistic games even if we are *inside* the system: imagination provides a non-metaphysical form of estrangement (Bouveresse 1975: 63). Fogelin does not take this aspect into account. As a result, he seems to restrict the descriptive character of Wittgenstein's philosophy to a mere description of what men as a matter of fact do. The defactoist attitude risks becoming a factual interest in what actually happens, contrary to the logical-grammatical character of the philosophical activity.

Moreover, Wittgenstein seems to be interested in the actual usage of words in order to dissolve traditional philosophical problems, as Fogelin shows. On the other hand, though, he is interested in the *possibility* of phenomena. The imaginary cases play a further role: they exhibit the contingency of our concepts, that is, the idea that our concepts and forms of life have no philosophical foundation. "What is insidious about the causal approach is that it leads one to say: 'Of course, that's how it has to happen'. Whereas one ought to say: It may have happened *like that*, & in many other ways" (VB: 45).

5. Conclusion

To conclude, the previous discussion should have shown two aspects: first, *defactoism* seems to reduce to a form of liberal naturalism. Second, the defactoist reading is successful in presenting Wittgenstein's peculiar treatment of philosophical problems but it does not include important

aspects of Wittgenstein's later philosophy: a "defactoist response", rather than a "defactoist mode of philosophizing". However, Fogelin's reading might be completed with the reference to the morphological method and the importance of imaginary cases. Finally, the first aspect might be one of the reasons why *defactoism* is scarcely considered in the literature: if it is indeed similar to liberal naturalism, it might rather be a new term for a not new philosophical attitude.

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"Primary Colours" – Wittgenstein on the Division(s) in Colour in the 1938 Lecture Notes

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Abstract

The "Whewell Court Lectures" give us new insights into Wittgenstein's interest in the concept of colour. This essay looks at what Wittgenstein says about W.E. Johnson's remark that the colours of things are "absolutely determinate" by examining the idea of a "continuous band of colour" in which colours are identified by extensions. As we will see provide these lectures the beginning of an understanding of the relation between predicating colour concepts and talking about them that will eventually lead to Wittgenstein giving up the aim to represent our "system of colours" in an geometrical way.

In a discussion that took place in April 1938 shortly before the Easter Term in Cambridge started (Munz/Ritter 2017: 46, see also 4), Ludwig Wittgenstein gave an example of how we use colour concepts. Standing in front of a painting or discussing the quality of a particular fabric, one might say: "It's pinkish white" (Munz/Ritter 2017: 75).

A remark like this sounds very familiar. At the same time, we know that what for a non-philosopher – a painter, a florist, a designer – is a question of the determination of the "*exact* colour" (Munz/Ritter 2017: 75) is for the philosopher a starting point to wonder:

> What is the relation of our system of colour words to all the things coloured?" – a question that often has its sources in a negative answer to "Are there at all 'primary colours' and with them an exhaustive division to which all the different colours can be reduced?" which goes along with a negative answer to "Does the 'ish-quality" of colour show that the colours of things are 'determinable'?

In the notes by James C. Taylor, a student of Wittgenstein's at that time – now for the first time available as part of the "Whewell's Court Lectures" edited by Volker Munz and Bernhard Ritter – the (ordinary) quote above comes right after a passage that promises to give an answer to the first question by answering the later ones affirmatively:

> The practical impossibility of literally determinate characterization must be contrasted with the universally adopted postulate that the characters of things which we can only characterize more or less indeterminately, are, in actual fact, absolutely determinate. (Johnson, W.E.: 1921: 185)

What W.E. Johnson says here can be found at the end of his analysis of the conditions of ascribing colour "adjectives" to things in the chapter XI of the first volume of his *Logic*.[1] He also lectured in Cambridge repeatedly about colours and number before and after its publication in 1921. Johnson here sums up a most original "bottom-up" determination of (our) colour concept that in the 20ies of the last century became used in disciplines other than philosophy.

For Taylor saying that a shade of colour is "in actual fact, absolutely determinate" is clearly as wrong as Johnson's whole "framework" of raising questions concerning our concept of colour.

Whether Wittgenstein became sufficiently interested in W.E. Johnson to closely read parts of his *Logic* after his first not very satisfying experience with him as a teacher is an open question. The impression one gets from the notes is that what made Wittgenstein *say* something about this passage has above all to do with his student. Taylor might have confronted Wittgenstein with the passage quoted from Johnson's *Logic* or might have only alluded to it. But this alone cannot be proof either that Wittgenstein had not thought about Johnson's view of the relation between particular colours to their 'kinds', as the relation between pink or violet to red. He could have learnt about it from much earlier discussions with Frank Ramsey who had studied Johnson's *Logic* closely and thought it to be "the most important work on Logic that has appeared … It throws new light on almost every topic" (Ramsey in 1922 in one of his reviews "*Johnson's Logic*") or with J.M. Keynes who throughout his work expressed the highest admiration for this once so influential philosopher. As much as early remarks by Wittgenstein do not point to much praise, he could have been familiar with parts of Johnson's *Logic* and found in it much inspiration independently of any student wanting to have some passage discussed or rather opposed.

From what Wittgenstein is reported to have said, however, we can conclude that whereas Taylor is critical of W.E. Johnson and believed Wittgenstein would be so, too – "How can what Johnson would call a perfectly determinate shade of red occur?" (Munz/Ritter 2017: 76) –, he does not echo this stance at all. The notes "Absolutely Determinate", "Continuous Band of Colour" and "Are there an infinite number of shades of colour?" – all from the Easter Term 1938 (or right before) – suggest that he has an altogether different attitude to "Does the 'ish-quality" of colour show that the colours as things are ultimately not 'determinable'?" There is a way to take *this* question as a support of the feeling that the first question's aim "What is the relation of our system of colour words to all the things coloured?" is mistaken. But in another sense, it just prevents us from understanding our usage of colour terms.

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In the lecture notes "Absolutely Determinate", "Continuous Band of Colour" and "Are there an infinite number of shades of colour?" we find various pictures to investigate our usage of colour words. I want to concentrate here on Wittgenstein's reconstruction of Taylor's alleged "counter-example" to the idea of "the colours of things being determinate", i.e. the conception of a "band of red varying con-

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[1] Similar passages can be found in his *Logical Calculus* from 1892

tinuously from one end to the other" (Munz/Ritter 2017: 76.).

Let us begin: Imagine a colour band with two different colours named "A" and "B". A occupies the space on the left half of the band and "B" on the other half to the right. It then looks as if "What colour is *this*?" – asked when pointing to a particular place could be answered by measuring the distance from the middle of the band to the right or to the left. "This is still 'A' or just "This is A". Now, let's follow Wittgenstein further and "(s)uppose we take three colour-strips". The colours named "A", "B" are distinguished from each other by the space they occupy: (wherever) A is (there is) not B and vice versa (Munz/Ritter 2017: 76). The newly introduced colour "α" is also defined through the space it occupies – in the middle of the band; in Wittgenstein's example, exactly one half of both the halves of B (to the right) and A (to the left). In relation to A and B α then occupies some space that identifies A *and* that what is *not* A (i.e. B). Wittgenstein says: "(T)he result – A, α, B – will be a continuous strip" (Munz/Ritter 2017: 76).

The construction that allows any space to be divided into further halves might invite one to agree immediately that the colours of things cannot be said to be "absolutely determinate". It seems as if an answer to "Can we say of what α^n is the colour?" or "Do these divisions mean every colour is subsumable under A *and* B, is not A?" has to be ,Yes'. After all: If one has as criteria for the determination/identification of a colour nothing but the space occupied on a band on which two colours are divided in a way that the result is an overlap of entities/things originally excluding one another, the dissolution of any colour determination follows. But truly the answer has to be "Does this mean every colour is subsumable under A *and* B?" is 'No'.

Why? Because if a model fails to make a determination/identification possible, then one does not have to infer that this reveals the "essence" of that to be identified. It could also just be the case that the model does not fit because we are not able to say what x is. I would like to argue for the latter and believe Wittgenstein would have done so as well.

As Wittgenstein points out: The plausibility that every colour is a colour α comes from imagining oneself to look at "A, α, B" one time from the left, i.e. at "α and A *alone*" and another time from the right end of the colour band, i.e. at "α and B alone". This way to look at colours does not only presuppose a system of (here) two primary colours, it also presupposes an understanding of "covering the middle space of two colours" as being a shade of a colour "kind"– let's say red – that, in case it can be thought to be a *singular* colour – as orange – can be thought to be a shade of another colour – let us say yellow. There is then not only "(…) no contradiction (there) between saying that a strip of colour varies continuously and saying that it is composed of such and such a number of shades (…)" (Munz/ Ritter 2017: 76) rather: the singular colours – as orange – are a determinate of what a colour "kind" – as red – is. Because of the necessary presupposition of associating *colour* with the extensions (of strips on a band) the colour band example could not possibly show that all colours are shades or that all singular colours stand on the same level. The idea, to the contrary, stems from thinking of the sequence "A, α, B" as "Ab –Ac – Bc".

But if "α" were understood in the way of "Ac", we would not have something that is equally present in two objects, so that we had any means to identify α as A (or B). Or α would be understood to be solely as what is as distinct from A or B which violates the assumption of generating different colours by "shared" extensions.

The outcry "How can what Johnson would call a perfectly determinate shade of red occur? (Munz/Ritter 2017: 76) is insofar inappropriate. The identification of a particular colour presupposes an *exhaustive* division of primary colours, which themselves are determined by their shades. If Taylor was opposed to the very idea of "determinate colour characteristics" because of an allegedly too naïve realism, Wittgenstein could be understood as showing him that his idea that the indeterminacy of α – as it is both A-like/subsumable and B-like/subsumable – lives on one hand from imagining this realism as reference point for the quest for a determination of "α" and on the other hand from wanting to repudiate it by not presupposing "our" colour-system", i.e. an exhaustive division in colour.

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Interestingly, Wittgenstein from very early on acknowledges that the concept of colour is a special one. It is a concept, but we do not divide things in being coloured or not. We only say that they are of a *particular* colour. This is why Wittgenstein in the TLP puts *colour* in the neighbourhood of *space* and *time*: Space, time, colour (being coloured) are forms of objects. (TLP 2.0251) [...] the pseudo-concept object. "All things are coloured" would be like "there are objects" ... nonsensical … . One cannot say, for example, 'There are objects', as one might say, 'There are books' (TLP 4.1272). As "things" is not the name of a class under which things as objects fall, "colour" is not a concept under which some objects could be said to fall and some do not. That the concept of colour cannot be understood in analogy of class membership shows that there is then no answer to the question "in virtue of which" objects are coloured. There is *no open* question for us, something to inquire into as far as objects being coloured is concerned.

The idea of generating colours by dividing spaces on a band rests on the idea that a particular colour could be identified by the property it shares with others as well as by the property in virtue of which it differs from other colours. The "property by which it differs" is, however, nothing but the particular colour itself. The answer to "in which way does being red differ from being yellow?" is therefore simply: "by being *red*". So colours cannot be identified by what they share with others; they cannot be identified by their differences, if how they differ from each other, is just by being what they are.

I believe that it is of significance that in 1938, in the "Whewell Court Lectures", the name of W.E. Johnson occurs. For it is Johnson's conviction that a determination of colour cannot be achieved by a process that arrives at a determination/identification of a colour by using properties of the "kind" particular colour belongs and together with a property that could mark the difference to what also falls under a "kind". This "top down" approach, appropriate as it is for many concepts, is not applicable in the case of number or colour.

As much as one has as a reader the impression that what Wittgenstein will later suggest about the failures any such a spatial representation (in the so called "Remarks on Colour") – 'The colours' are not things that have any properties [...]. (RC III: §127) – is directly connected with what Wittgenstein shows about how *not* to understand the colour band in these lectures – as if the (re?)introduction to Johnson's *Logic* would have shown him a way out of the difficulties involved in connecting predicating colour concepts to objects and talking about them – this is not so. For Wittgenstein himself in the late 30s or even early 40s has not given up the aim to represent "our colour-system" in a

three-dimensional way. But no representation could possibly explain or illuminate the character of the colours we know to apply to objects if no colours terms are to be used. So even Wittgenstein's version of such a representation – where the colours are not sought to be identified by what they have in common but by that what singles them out as particulars, i.e. as their particular position in a geometrical space – will fail W.E. Johnson's view of colours was in this respect for Wittgenstein more an inspiration to develop an original way to represent the relations between colour than an argument against such a representation.

But of the three questions:

"What is the relation of our system of colour words to all the things coloured?", "Are there at all 'primary colours' and with them an exhaustive division to which all the different colours can be reduced?" which goes along with a negative answer to "Does the 'ish-quality' of colour show that the colours of things are 'determinable'?"

the first therefore should not be raised, if the others must be answered affirmatively.

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The Tractarian Influence in von Wright's Deontic Logic

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Abstract

In this article, I explore whether there is still a Wittgensteinian influence within the 1951 von Wright article entitled "Deontic Logic". I shall first present the different elements that Wittgenstein adds to the concept of truth function in 1921, and then attempt to show how these elements are to be found within the method of decidability of the deontic utterances presented by von Wright in his 1951 article.

Introduction

When reading von Wright, it is easy to find texts seeking to clarify the theses that Wittgenstein maintained or to correct the posterity's perception of it. However, within Wright's own work it is not always easy to detect a Wittgensteinian influence, which is due in part to the fact that most of the philosophical problems which seemed to interest him were not always the same as those that concerned Wittgenstein.

Having said that, are there still traces of Wittgensteinian influence within the corpus of von Wright's works that have not been detected until today? The purpose of this paper is to answer this question by attempting to demonstrate that such influence still exists within one of the most popular articles published by Wright, the article published in 1951 entitled "Deontic Logic".

Within this article, two important elements are presented. The first is the logical system **P**, and the second is a procedure for deciding the truth value of deontic propositions, which the language of this system allows to formulate. As Wittgenstein's influence is essentially felt in relation to the second element, we will attach more importance to it than to the first. Thus, to present this method, we will review two well-known tractarian elements that we see in this article (section 1). Then we will present the rudiments of the system **P** (section 2), and, finally, we shall present this procedure by giving an example of how it is applied (section 3).

1. Truth function, truth table and tautology

Before Wittgenstein and his *Tractatus*, we already knew the truth concept function and its usefulness in defining the conditions for making propositions with n propositional variables that are true or false. We already know, thanks to Boole and Frege, that a proposition could be a truth function of a second proposition if the truth value of the first exclusively determines that of the second. In so doing, it was already possible to define propositions using logical connectors of negation, conjunction, disjunction, implication and equivalence as truth functions of n propositions that constitute them. For example, the proposition $\neg p$ is a truth function of the proposition p since the first will be true if and only if the second is false and, in the same way, the proposition $p \wedge q$ is a truth function of the propositions p and q since the first will be true if and only if p and q are true propositions.

Moreover, by virtue of the principle of transitivity, it was also possible to define molecular propositions as being truth functions by arguing that a molecular proposition to n propositions was a truth function of the n propositions that constitute it (*TLP*: 4.41, 4.431 and 5).

That being said, in 1921 we found two new elements inside the *Tractatus* which Wittgenstein brought to these various considerations. These will prove necessary to enable von Wright to solve the problem of decidability of deontic propositions in 1951. The first of these is the well-known truth function presentation using truth tables. We assume that this method is known to our reader.

As to the second element that Wittgenstein brings to von Wright, we find it particularly in *Tractatus* 4.46, when Wittgenstein notices that some propositions are always true regardless of the truth of the propositions that constitutes it. Using truth tables, it becomes possible to show that such propositions are always true due to their logical form. On the basis of these considerations, Wittgenstein will be the first to characterize logical truths as tautologies. This characterization of logical truths will be the second element that von Wright retains in his 1951 article.

In *Value, Norm, and Action in My Philosophical* Writings, von Wright mentions the subject that occupied him in 1948: the problem of decidability affecting existential statements. The result of this research led him to publish his first paper on modal logic, "On the Idea of logical truth (I)". This text essentially aims to exploit the tractarian idea defining logical truths as tautologies by extending its scope beyond simple propositional calculus, or to a system of existential logic constructed in a modal way. As he said in 1996, "I wanted [in "On the idea of logical truth (I)"] to show that Wittgenstein's idea in the *Tractatus* of logical truth as tautology could be extended beyond propositional logic" (von Wright 1999). To this new theory of quantifiers, it will provide a method for determining the truth value of the statements that it allows to formulate using truth tables. The method that we present in the third section will be a reproduction of this procedure adapted to a deontic logic.

2. The P system: language, definitions and axioms

To understand the procedure for deciding the truth value of the deontic propositions of the **P** system, which is an extension of propositional calculation, we must know two elements of this system: the interdefinitions of the deontic concepts contained within this system and its axioms. We must address these two elements before presenting the procedure that we shall outline.

The interdefinitions of the deontic concepts, which are permission, prohibition, and obligation, are respectively symbolized in **P** using modal unary operators **PE_**, **IN_**

and **OB**_[1]. In 1951, Von Wright stated that these notions are interdefined in the same way as the alethic notions. This allowed the formulation of the following three definitions using the primitive deontic notion of permission.

D1: $\neg$**PE**ϕ =$_{def}$ **IN**ϕ

D2: $\neg$**PE**$\neg\phi$ =$_{def}$ **OB**ϕ

D3: **PE**$\neg\phi$ =$_{def}$ $\neg$**OB**ϕ

There are three axioms, but our reader only needs to know two to understand the procedure that we will present in the following section.

A1$^{\textbf{P}}$: **PE**$(p \vee q) \equiv$ (**PE**$p \vee$ **PE**q)

A2$^{\textbf{P}}$: $\neg$**PE**$p \wedge \neg$**PE**$\neg p$ are invalid.

The first axiom is included in **P** on an intuitive basis. As A2$^{\textbf{P}}$, it means that either p or $\neg p$ is allowed, but that it is not possible in for an act name and its denial to be prohibited at the same time. We will see that this exercises a restriction within the procedure, which we will present.

3. Procedure for decidability of deontic propositions

The procedure we are about to present will be described in two stages. First, we shall see how it is possible to determine the truth value of deontic proposition. Then, we will show how to determine the truth value of a complex statement that contains deontic n propositions.

To present the procedure that von Wright proposes in 1951, consider the three following deontic propositions, which use the three deontic notions:

(1) **PE**α

(2) **IN**β

(3) **OB**γ

(2) and (3) can be translated in terms of permission using definitions D1 - D2:

(4) $\neg$**PE**β

(5) $\neg$**PE**$\neg\gamma$

Using classic logic, it is possible to present α, β and $\neg\gamma$ in their normal disjunctive form (NDF) to n connective elements (c) which we shall name constituents. Thus, (1), (4) and (5) are equivalent to (6) – (8):

(6) **PE**$(c^{\alpha}_1 \vee c^{\alpha}_2 \vee c^{\alpha}_3 \vee \ldots \vee c^{\alpha}_n)$

(7) $\neg$**PE**$(c^{\beta}_1 \vee c^{\beta}_2 \vee c^{\beta}_3 \vee \ldots \vee c^{\beta}_n)$

(8) $\neg$**PE**$(c^{\neg\gamma}_1 \vee c^{\neg\gamma}_2 \vee c^{\neg\gamma}_3 \vee \ldots \vee c^{\neg\gamma}_n)$

The axiom A1$^{\textbf{P}}$ says that a permissible disjunctive proposition is equivalent to the disjunctive proposition that mentions that the two elements of the disjunction are allowed. Therefore, (6), (7) and (8) are respectively equivalent to (10), (11) and (12):

(10) (**PE**$c^{\alpha}_1 \vee$ **PE**$c^{\alpha}_2 \vee$ **PE**$c^{\alpha}_3 \vee \ldots \vee$ **PE**c^{α}_n)

(11) $\neg$(**PE**$c^{\beta}_1 \vee$ **PE**$c^{\beta}_2 \vee$ **PE**$c^{\beta}_3 \vee \ldots \vee$ **PE**c^{β}_n)

(12) $\neg$(**PE**$c^{\neg\gamma}_1 \vee$ **PE**$c^{\neg\gamma}_2 \vee$ **PE**$c^{\neg\gamma}_3 \vee \ldots \vee$ **PE**$c^{\neg\gamma}_n$)

---

[1] It should be noted that the variables p, q, r... of this system must be interpreted as variables of names of acts such as "steal", "eat", and "talk" that may or may not be performed. To signify that an act is performed, we will simply write p, and to signify the non-performance of an act, we will use negation to form the expression $\neg p$.

We can easily see that (11) and (12) are respectively equivalent to (13) and (14):

(13) ($\neg$**PE**$c^{\beta}_1 \wedge \neg$**PE**$c^{\beta}_2 \wedge \neg$**PE**$c^{\beta}_3 \wedge \ldots \wedge \neg$**PE**$c^{\beta}_n$)

(14) ($\neg$**PE**$c^{\neg\gamma}_1 \wedge \neg$**PE**$c^{\neg\gamma}_2 \wedge \neg$**PE**$c^{\neg\gamma}_3 \wedge \ldots \wedge \neg$**PE**$c^{\neg\gamma}_n$)

By virtue of the manipulations we have just done, it is possible to notice that (1) is equivalent to (10), (2) to (13) and (3) to (14).

We will describe the connective elements permitted by statements (10), (13), and (14) as **PE**-constituents of statements (1), (2), and (3). Thus, the **PE**-constituents of statements (1) – (3) are the following:

PEα: **PE**c^{α}_1, **PE**c^{α}_2, **PE**c^{α}_3, …, **PE**c^{α}_n

INβ: **PE**c^{β}_1, **PE**c^{β}_2, **PE**c^{β}_3, …, **PE**c^{β}_n

OBγ: **PE**$c^{\neg\gamma}_1$, **PE**$c^{\neg\gamma}_2$, **PE**$c^{\neg\gamma}_3$, …, **PE**$c^{\neg\gamma}_n$

The idea that will allow von Wright to decide the truth value of deontic propositions will be to make statements (1) – (3) truth functions of their **PE** constituents. In other words, von Wright will consider the statements (1) – (3) as truth functions of propositions (10), (13), and (14).

PEα will be true if and only if at least one of the PE constituents of (10) is true, and false otherwise.

INβ will be true if and only if all PE-constituents of (13) are false, and false otherwise.

OBγ will be true if and only if all PE-constituents of (14) are false, and false otherwise.

The presentation of these truth functions can be done using the Wittgensteinian truth tables. For example, if we seek to decide the proposition OB($p \equiv q$), we must translate it using D2 into $\neg$PE$\neg(p \equiv q)$; finding its PE-constituents by translating under its DNF in terms of p and q, these will be PE($p \wedge q$) and PE($\neg p \wedge \neg q$); and setting the table of truth with OB($p \equiv q$) as a function of truth of PE($p \wedge q$) and PE($\neg p \wedge \neg q$). It looks like this:

PE($p \wedge q$)	**PE**($\neg p \wedge \neg q$)	**OB**($p \equiv q$)
V	V	F
V	F	F
F	V	F
F	F	V

That being said, consider the following truth table presenting the truth value of the propositions **PE**p and **PE**$\neg p$ by virtue of their respective **PE**-constituents, **PE**($p \wedge q$) and **PE**($p \wedge \neg q$) for p, **PE**($\neg p \wedge q$) and **PE**($\neg p \wedge \neg q$) for $\neg p$.

PE($p \wedge q$)	**PE**($p \wedge \neg q$)	**PE**($\neg p \wedge q$)
T	T	T
T	T	T
T	T	F
T	T	F
T	F	T
T	F	T
T	F	F
T	F	F
F	T	T
F	T	T
F	T	F

F	T	F
F	F	T
F	F	T
F	F	F

PE(¬p ∧ ¬q)	PEp	PE¬p
T	T	T
F	T	T
T	T	T
F	T	F
T	T	T
F	T	T
T	T	T
F	T	F
T	T	T
F	T	T
T	T	T
F	T	F
T	F	T
F	F	T
T	F	T

PE(¬p∧¬q)	OBp	OB(p⊃q)
T	F	F
F	F	F
T	F	F
F	T	F
T	F	T
F	F	T
T	F	T
F	T	T

OBq	OBp∧OB(p⊃q)	(15)
F	F	T
F	F	T
F	F	T
F	F	T
F	F	T
T	F	T
F	F	T
V	T	T

We notice that the last row, which presented the four **PE**-constituents as being false, was deleted. The reason for this lies in the restriction imposed by the axiom A2$^{\text{P}}$. It cannot be the case that an act and its negation are not allowed at the same time.

Now that we know how deontic propositions can be decided, it becomes simple to decide the truth value of the molecular complexes of *n* deontic propositions. It will be enough, thanks to the thesis of verification, to determine the truth value of a molecular complex such as (15) by virtue of the truth value of the propositions that constitute it:

(15) **OB**p ∧ **OB**$(p \supset q)$ ⊃ **OB**q

This complex has three deontic propositions possessing the form of (2), which have the following **PE**-constituents (in terms of p and q):

OBp: **PE**$(\neg p \wedge q)$ et **PE**$(\neg p \wedge \neg q)$

OB$(p \supset q)$: **PE**$(p \wedge \neg q)$

OBq: **PE**$(p \wedge \neg q)$ et **PE**$(\neg p \wedge \neg q)$

We should note that only three **PE**-constituents are included in this list. Knowing them, it is possible to know the truth value of the propositions **OB**p, **OB**$(p \supset q)$ and **OB**q, of the molecular complex **OB**p ∧ **OB**$(p \supset q)$, and lastly, of the entire molecular complex **OB**p ∧ **OB**$(p \supset q)$ ⊃ **OB**q. In doing so, we can draw the following truth table:

PE(p∧¬q)	PE(¬p∧q)
T	T
T	T
T	F
T	F
F	T
F	T
F	F
F	F

In the right-hand column of this truth table, we see that only the truth value "True" is found there. Thus, (15) is proved to be a tautology since the truth value of the molecular complex does not depend on the truth value of the deontic propositions that constitute it. Under the characterization of logical truths as being tautological made by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*, von Wright proposes a procedure using the tractarian truth tables to determine what the logical truths are of the **P** system, a modal deontic logic.

Conclusion

Thus, a Witggensteinian influence resides well within the article "Deontic Logic". As we said earlier, in his 1951 article, von Wright does not mention how he was influenced by Wittgenstein. However, in 1996 he acknowledged that in his article "On the Idea of Logical Truth (I)", what he sought to do was extend the characterization of logical truths as tautologies to existential logic. However, since the method of decidability for recognizing tautologies by using the truth tables used in this paper is the same as that used in "Deontic Logic", we are led to recognize that a Wittgensteinian influence is undeniably present in this article.

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Wittgenstein on the Problem of Consistency of Arithmetic

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Abstract

Wittgenstein's views on consistency of arithmetic and formal systems are often neglected or considered as mistaken. In this paper, I reconstitute and structure these views around a single *Grundgedanke*. Remarks on the notions of consistency, triviality and negation in mathematics are considered in this light. It is also analyzed to what extent these remarks correspond to a critical development of his thinking.

1. The case of Gauss's summation

Legend has it that at the age of nine Gauss surprised his teacher by computing the sum of the first 100 natural numbers in a few seconds. The impression one has of this story is that Gauss did the task in a "clever way". Indeed, Gauss was supposed to have written the numbers to be summed like this:

| 1 | 2 | 3 | ... | 50 |
| 100 | 99 | 98 | ... | 51 |

and noted that in each of the 50 columns the sum was 101. The sum could then be computed by multiplying 50 by 101.

Let us now ask the following question: did Gauss really *solve* the task if it consisted in adding, one by one, the first 100 natural numbers? For one thing is clear: there was a technique to sum the first 100 natural numbers and Gauss did not apply it. How is it possible that Gauss, having applied *another* technique, has got the *same* result? At this point I wish to introduce Wittgenstein's fundamental idea, namely, that *there are no shortcuts in logic*. According to this principle, it cannot be said that Gauss discovered a new technique that provides the same result as the old one, because the result is part of the technique. If we attach an index to the sign "=" according to the technique applied (T: traditional; G: Gauss), we obtain the following pair of equations:

$$1 + ... + 100 =_T 5050$$

$$1 + ... + 100 =_G 5050$$

Note that even if a mistake was made when applying T and the result $1 + ... + 100 \neq_T 5050$ obtained, this result would not be in conflict with $1 + ... + 100 =_G 5050$. Note also that if the question set by Gauss's teacher was written as $1 + ... + 100 =_T ?$, then Gauss did not answer the question, whereas if it were written as $1 + ... + 100 = ?$, it would be ambiguous.

It might be objected that the result of a sum is simply a number, i.e., an object or structure having identification criteria independently of the processes used to compute it. Even if we adopt the view that it is a certain process that results in a number (say, the sum of units), it is *this* canonical process that provides its criterion of identity. Moreover, the identity of results between T and G is not a mere coincidence, but something demonstrated by an inductive proof. Such a proof shows, one may be tempted to say, that no matter what technique one applies the result will always be the same.

We must therefore discuss two things:

1. the idea that a number has identification criteria regardless of the means by which it is generated;

2. the idea that the inductive proof demonstrates the identity of result of two different techniques.

2. Hidden contradictions and hidden truth-functions

Wittgenstein, following Frege's discussion on *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*, compares arithmetic (formally conceived) with a game. He agrees with Frege's that it is imperative to distinguish between the rules and the its configurations. When conceived as a configuration, a formula like "0 ≠ 0" is as little a contradiction as any configuration of chess pieces is. The accusation that the presence of such a "contradiction" makes the game trivial (capable of demonstrating any formula) and therefore "uninteresting" will be analyzed later. Here it is important to emphasize that only in the context of rules can there be, in the strict sense, contradictions. A contradiction occurs when there is both a rule that allows a certain movement and a rule that prohibits the same movement. What happens in this case is that one does not know what to do: the action inside the game becomes uncertain. In the absence of a decision, the game cannot proceed. In this context, a hidden contradiction is by no means harmful. The reasoning is this: if the result of a conflict between the rules is the impediment of proceeding in the game, as long as we proceed in the game there is no conflict between the rules. If a contradiction in the rules is later "brought to the surface", what has occurred earlier can be seen as a tacit decision to prioritize one rule over another. But what happens if, from this point on, we decide to prioritize the opposite rule? Simply that, prior to this decision, another game was being played, a game with distinct rules.

The immediate objection to this reasoning is that not every game with numerals would be called arithmetic. Decisions to be taken when a conflict between the rules occurs must be justified by the structure of the numerical series. A rule that allowed the derivation of the equation "2 + 2 = 5" is a false rule in this sense. Arithmetic is not a mere game with signs, since a decision about the rules can be made on the basis of this underlying structure.

The strength of this objection lies in that it can be based on what Wittgenstein himself says about logic in the TLP, namely, that it is a "mirror-image of the world" (6.13). Logical calculus could not be entirely arbitrary, since it must mirror the logical (internal) properties of the propositions with which it operates. The same holds *mutatis mutandis* for arithmetic.

I think that a careful analysis of Wittgenstein's remarks about mathematics in his middle period could benefit from what is a question of style in his thinking, namely, that much of what he writes may be read as a criticism or as an in-depth discussion of the *Tractatus*. The critique of the obsession with hidden contradiction in mathematics, for example, seems to me tributary to a critique of a T*ractarian* idea: the idea of a hidden truth function, which could be revealed by logical analysis. Take, for instance, the proposition "this is red and this is green". According to the *Tractatus*, logical analysis would make evident that this proposition is a contradiction by showing that at least one of the two components of the above conjunction contains, in its sense, the negation of the other. When both propositions are written in the truth table notation, it would appear that all the rows in the table that verify one of the components also falsify the other. The rule of inference that allows us to move from "this is red" to "this is not green" could then be extracted from a canonical notation for both proposition, namely, the notation by means of truth-tables.

In the early 1930, Wittgenstein abandoned the postulate of a privileged logic notation, from which the rules of inference could be extracted. In the context of this critique he said that the propositions "this is red" and "this is green" do not contradict one another unless there is an explicit rule that forbids to consider both propositions as true. Wittgenstein cam to hold the idea that grammar is transparent, there being nothing to be brought to light regarding grammatical rules. In what concerns the discussion of the consistency of arithmetic, this new position gives rise to two "theses":

1. The techniques that compose a mathematical system are, apart from the addition of new rules, independent of each other. No technique can conflict with another, since they not only generate results, but also constitute the criterion of identity of them.
2. There is no "canonical process" that can provide the criterion of identity of "mathematical objects". All techniques have the same rights: none is more fundamental than the others.

3. Inductive proofs and semantical mutation

But what about an inductive proof? Does it not demonstrate that two techniques provide the same result and that, therefore, this result is independent of which technique one applies? But what would we say if the technique T does not provide the same result as G? Would we say that G produces false results? Or would we say that there was a miscalculation? According to Wittgenstein, an inductive proof shows that the technique T *must* provide the same result as G or, similarly, that the *correct* application of T provides the same result of G. The calculus, thus, does not prophesy the result, but only determines what shall count as a correct or incorrect result.

Let us see, then, what occurs when an induction is proved. Before the proof, there were two independent techniques (T and G), two systems of calculus. Each system introduces a distinct concept: T introduces the concept "sum of the first *n* natural numbers" and G the concept "half of the product of *n* by its successor". Each system introduces a set of distinct questions: "What is the sum of the first 1, 2, ... natural numbers?" and "What is the half of the product of 1, 2, ... by its successor?". After the proof, a new system composed of two related techniques is created. The concept "sum of the first *n* natural numbers" changes, since it includes a new criterion, given by the technique G. The inductive proof did not justify a new way

of answering an old question, because it altered the meaning of the question by changing the meaning of the concepts involved. For the criterion of identity of a concept is the totality of criteria for its correct and incorrect application.

4. Triviality and negation

We have seen that a "hidden contradiction" in the rules is not harmful to the game insofar as it remains hidden, i.e., insofar it is possible to proceed in the game. As long as it is hidden, it is, as Wittgenstein says, "as good as gold" (LFM: 219). This argument, however, risks being aimless, because the danger of a contradiction, would say the logician, lies not in the rules, but in configurations. This is because the proof of a configuration of the form "p∧¬p" in a formal system (classical or intuitionist) implies its triviality, in the sense that any formula becomes "trivially" derivable. And the triviality of the formal system represents, one may be inclined to say, its ruin.

But it is important to note that a "trivial game" is different from a "tautological game". A game is tautological when its rules are tautological, i.e., when they do not allow or forbid nothing (see WWK: 132). A trivial calculus can still distinguish between correct and incorrect proofs. If this is so, then why a trivial game is "uninteresting"? Is it uninteresting because it cannot be applied as a theory? But would it not be possible to map correct proofs in sentences asserted as true by the theory and incorrect proofs in false sentences according to the theory? For it is not necessary, of course, to conceive of the application of a calculus according to the orthodoxy of model theory.

It seems that the arguments against a trivial calculus rest on a prejudice, namely, that only the *demonstrability* of a formula is relevant to the application, not the *way* the formula is proved. But we can conceive of an application in which the way a proposition is proved is important to the application. In the conversations with Waismann, Wittgenstein gives the following example: suppose that to the axioms of Euclid it is added the axiom "the sum of the internal angles of a triangle is 181°". In this case, we can think of an application in which the sum of the angles of a triangle is 180° by a method of measurement and 181° by another method of measurement (WWK, 127). It is obviously not a contradiction to obtain 180° when measuring angles by a protractor and 181° by a theodolite.

Therefore, it seems sufficient for the application of a calculus that it be a calculus, i.e., that it can distinguish between correct and incorrect applications of a technique of calculation. The possibility of applying a calculus would only find problems when any result obtained could be considered as correct and incorrect or, alternatively, as neither correct nor incorrect. The *bipolarity* necessary for the applicability of the calculus does not lie in the set of demonstrable sentences, but in its rules.

And if this is so, should we not search for the meaning of negation in mathematics where this bipolarity is present? In fact, Wittgenstein seems to conceive the negation of a mathematical formula neither "classically" (as the claim that a formula is false because it gives an incorrect description of some reality) nor "intuitionistically" (as the claim that a formula is false because a proof of that formula would lead to a proof of an absurdity), but as the claim that there is a miscalculation in a supposed proof of that formula. The proof of a negative formula, thus, can only consist in the recognition that it is *another* calculation that is correct.

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Having given this sense to negation, what does it mean to say that a calculus is consistent? Only that it is capable of separating correct moves from incorrect ones within the calculation game. But this is a *constitutive*, not a merely *desirable*, property of a calculus. Consequently, a proof of non-contradiction of a calculus is impossible, for it is impossible to give the object of study without seeing simultaneously that the property is satisfied for it. As Wittgenstein thought, the "problem" of the consistency of arithmetic belongs to the *prose*, not to the *calculus*.

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Wittgenstein and Pragmatism: On the True Meaning and Knowledge of our Conventions

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Abstract

Wittgenstein's difficulty with the *forms of life* and their *conventions* is that he offers no objective criteria for their common knowledge, to explain our behaviors in language-games. Without proving that our basic *conventions* are true knowledge they remain only a *mythology*, although we perceive them as a given. Wittgenstein's conception of *linguistic meaning* in regard to their *use* is similar to James' conceptions of *meaning* and *truth* through their *practical consequences*. The distinction I wish to draw is between Peirce's *Pragmaticism*, which claims that our ensuing conduct is based on the proved true interpretation of meanings of our cognitions and their true representation of reality, and James' *Pragmatism*, which claims, conversely, that the truth of conduct determines meaning and truth. Wittgenstein's criterion for the meanings of human behaviors is their *mythology* of the common *background*, yet this method remains subjective and, hence, we cannot be released from the mental prisons.

1. The Epistemology of Forms of Life and Their Conventions

In Wittgenstein's conceptions of *forms of life* and their *conventions*, there is no clear indication whether there can be any objective criteria for understanding how they can be known and considered as the framework for our entire cognitive life. The challenge is to show how the common-sense knowledge of those conceptions can make them valid and true explanations of human activity (Nesher, 1994).

"To *imagine* language means to *imagine* form of life." (PI: 19) Indeed, according to Wittgenstein, to understand language is to consider it a component of our activities in language-games, operating in the framework of our entire form of life. "Here the term "language-*game*" is meant to bring into permanence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life." (PI: 23)

The difficulty is to show how we understand each other in different language-games and, moreover, how we can distinguish between true and false in the activity of *speaking* in language-games.

> It is what human beings *say* that is true or false, and they agree in the *language* they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. (PI: 241)

> What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—*form of life*. (PI: 226)

Accordingly, we accept our *form of life* as a given and, hence, to be our last criterion for understanding each other, i.e., as our accepted conventions, but the conventions without being proved true cannot be the criteria for agreement on truth and falsity, but only the mode of behavior. In that case, however, the truth and falsity of linguistic behavior is no more than an empty convention, as Wittgenstein cannot explain how our linguistic cogitations can be true, in the sense of "agreement with reality" (OC: 215). Therefore, the epistemological difficulty is to explain how our forms of life can serve as criteria of agreement for our linguistic behaviors in language-games if in our life if we cannot be prove our true knowledge of them. We can only conclude that by assuming that our forms of life are common to us without providing proof of their veracity as common knowledge, they remain a *mythology*, although in most cases, it is felt grounded (OC: 95). Hence, as there is no commonly accepted criteria for truth and falsity of any

eventual agreement on our social behaviors to be the rules for the meanings of our activities in language-games (OC: 204).

The concept of *the given* is the Positivistic-Analytical *sense data*, the so-called facts of the world, which are accepted as given without proving them; they are merely our perceptual cognitions, which we accept tacitly most of the time (Davidson 1986; Nesher 2002: VI). Wittgenstein's conception of meaning and use in language-games is of the Ordinary Language Philosophy, as the given forms of life, and his *Philosophy of Common-sense*, which is the phenomenological investigation of our ways of behavior in speaking language. Yet, Wittgenstein cannot explain how we can commonly behave common-sensically, and the difficulty remains how can the meanings of our behavior serve as the criteria for judging their truth, without any objective criteria? And if we cannot prove them to be objectively true, then we cannot presume to understand either our behaviors or our basic judgments. (OC: 38, 308; Nesher 1992, 1994).

2. Wittgenstein on Propositional Meanings in Use and James' Practical Consequences vs. Peirce on Truth

It is illuminating to see the similarity between Wittgenstein's conception of *behavioral-linguistic meaning* in *use* and James' conception of meaning and truth as traceable through their *behavioral practical consequences*, which can be attributed to Wittgenstein's interest in James's writings and their eventual influence on his own theories (PI: 219f; OC: 422; Goodman, 2002).

> I have tried to show that, even if Wittgenstein was not in the strict sense either a "pragmatist" nor a "neo-Kantian" he shares with pragmatism a certain Kantian heritage (which Wiliam James, too, was extremely loathe to acknowledge), and he also shares a central – perhaps *the* central – emphasis with pragmatism: the emphasis on the primacy of practices. (Putnam 1995: 52; comp. Nesher 2014)

In this context it is interesting to follow the controversy between Peirce's and James's understanding of the Pragmatic conception of meaning, by either the proof of its truth or by its practical consequences.

The pragmatist method in such cases [of disputes] is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle. (James 1907: 28)

In a nutshell, it is the Jamesian position to consider behavior as based on the semiotic interpretation of meanings; if our interpretations lead us to accomplish our intentions, they can be considered *behaviorally* true. Although James' formulation seems to echo Peirce's initial explanation of the Pragmatic Maxim of 1878, however, later (about 1898-1907) Peirce elaborated his realist epistemology and dub it Pragmaticism, to separate it from James' Pragmatism. Thus, according to Peirce, proving the true interpretation of cognitive meanings is by true representation of reality and this is the condition for the successful conduct in such known reality (Nesher 1983, 2014). However, epistemologically, James' Pragmatism is rather similar to Peirce's early Pragmatism, still being nominalist, but in controversy with Peirce's mature Realist Pragmaticism.

Pragmaticism makes the ultimate intellectual purport of what you please to consist in conceived conditional resolutions⊥ or their substance; and therefore, the conditional propositions, with their hypothetical antecedents, in which such resolution consist, being the ultimate nature of meaning, must be capable of being true, that is, of expressing whatever there be which is such as the proposition expresses, independently of being thought to be so in any judgment, or being represented to be so in any other symbol of any man or men. (Peirce, *CP*: 5.453, 1905)

To say, as the article of January of 1878 seems to intend, that it is just as an arbitrary "usage of speech" choses to arrange its thoughts, is as much as to decide against the reality of the property, since the real is that which is such as it is regardless of how it is, in any time, thought to be. (Peirce CP: 5.457)

The above is the criticism of the phenomenalist nominalism of James' Practicalist Pragmatism and, indirectly, of the ordinary-language language-game of Wittgenstein's conventionalism. According to Peirce's realist epistemology, the meaning of the basic intellectual concepts, the linguistic symbols, can be interpreted and proved true by quasi-proving the truth of our perceptual judgments as our basic true facts representing external reality (Nesher, 2002: X). Hence, our conduct in reality can be considered as the extension of the proof the truth of a proposition or a theory, which through them we are able to accomplish our resolves (Peirce CP: 5.467, 1907).

But that the *total* meaning of the predication of an intellectual concept consists in affirming that, under all conceivable circumstances of a given kind, the subject of the predication would (or would not) behave in a certain way,—that is, that it either would, or would not, be true that under given experiential circumstances (or under a given proportion of them, taken *as the would occur* in experience) certain facts would exist, —*that* proposition I take to be the kernel of pragmatism. (Peirce EPII: 28, 402, MS 318)

Hence the core distinction between Peirce's Pragmaticism and James' Pragmatism is that according to the former, our ensuing conduct is based on the proved true interpretation of meaning and true representation of propositions and theories, and not reversely, as James contends, that the truth of conduct determines their meaning and truth.

'The true,' to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way, of our behaving. (James 1907: 106)

Well, I need hardly explain that that degree of truth is also provided for in my account of the matter. And if satisfactions are the marks of truth's presence, we may add that any less true substitute for such true idea would prove less satisfactory. (James 1907: 254)

Thus, we can understand the controversy between Peirce's Pragmaticism and James' Pragmatism, namely his "Radical empiricism," and also, how it relates to Wittgenstein, as he follows the Jamesian Practicalism, by understanding meaning in practical use (Wittgenstein, 1930-1932: 75-76). However, according to the Peircean realist epistemology, the proof of the truth of our interpretation of meaning is gained by proving the truth of our propositional representation of reality which is independent of our experience. Such proof constitutes the objective criteria with which we seek to ground our knowledge of cognitive meaning and conduct in reality (Nesher, 2014). Hence, given that without knowledge of external reality we cannot achieve our purposes and gain "satisfaction" through acting, the behavior is the application of the experiential knowledge and not the criterion of it (Peirce EPII: 28).

This is the difference between the Peircean Pragmatic Maxim of his early writings, from 1878, his "Pragmaticist" Maxim, expressed in his controversy with James' Pragmatic "Practicalism" (which James presented in his 1898 lecture in California), and Peirce's mature epistemology, of the years 1903-1907 (Fisch 1986: 284ff).

3. Was Wittgenstein Phenomenalist in his Epistemology of the Language-Games and the Form of Life?

Interestingly, for James *use* or *usefulness* is related to the notion of *Truth, whereas* for Wittgenstein, the *Use* is the criterion for *Meaning* in playing language-games, probably because Wittgenstein does not have a real theory of truth and meaning in his late philosophy (Wittgenstein RPP: 266; PI: 136-138; OC: 200; Ellenbogen 2003).

191. Well if everything speaks for an hypothesis and nothing against it—is it certainly true? One may designate it as such—but does it agree with reality, with the facts? — With this question, you are already going round in a circle.

200. Really "The proposition is either true or false" only means that it must be possible to decide for or against it. But this does not say what the ground for such a decision is like.

378. Knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgment. (OC)

Indeed, we use the words *true* and *false* to say something about propositions pertaining to our eventual knowledge, but on what grounds? What can be the criterion, for such a decision, if it is not possible to represent the reality in which we live? If propositions cannot represent reality, how can we determine whether they are true or false, and how does the absence of such criteria affect the language-games in our form of life? According to Wittgenstein, the ultimate criterion for judging the empirical propositions of our linguistic behavior is not whether they correspond to reality or facts, but if they correspond to the "ungrounded way of acting" (Wittgenstein, 1950-1951, *OC*: 110). In the Jamesian behaviorist phenomenology, the meaning and

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truth of our linguistic behavior is in the practical acting, but the difficulty is about the criterion for our action, and how can we know whether we act in an effectively or illusory manner if we do not know the reality in which we act, or if our behavior is indeed *expedient* (James, 1907: 106). The "radical empirism" of James and the linguistic behaviorism of Wittgenstein, are enclosed in the phenomenal human experience, wherein inexplicable common-sense is the accepted background. Neither James's nor Wittgenstein's conceptions constitute a realistic epistemology and neither offers objective criteria or proof of the truth of the interpreted meaning or of the true representation of reality (Ellenbogen 2003: I.2.).

> But you aren't a pragmatist? No. for I am not saying that a proposition is true if it is useful. The usefulness, i.e., the use, gives the proposition its special sense, the language-game gives it. (RPP: 266)

This can be argued as well, when we understand that Wittgenstein basically accepted the Jamesian phenomenal Practicalism of Deweyan Conductivism without accepting their conceptions of truth, but rather attributing our phenomenal understanding of meanings to our conduct in language-games (Goodman, 1998, 2002). In that respect, it is interesting to note —and I wish to emphasize— that the body of philosophical works of the last two centuries is basically neo-Kantian, including the works of the contemporary "American Pragmatists," with the exclusion of Peirce (Nesher, 2014).

4. Wittgenstein's Return to Solipsism is Enclosed in the Prison of Phenomenal Form of Life

Indeed, Wittgenstein is philosophizing within his behaviorist *grammatical phenomenology* and looking into the meaning and the use of words and propositions in language-games, including the meanings of "true" and "false", in order to understand common human behavior. However, Wittgenstein's methodology misses the basic problem of philosophy, namely, how we attain *true knowledge of reality*, including our knowledge of the social reality and of ourselves. Alas, without attaining this knowledge, we cannot explain how we reach our common social conventions, which are based on meanings and knowledge. It seems that Wittgenstein's behavioral-linguistic approach is related to his type of solipsism, as expressed in his *Tractatus*. Despite his efforts to avoid solipsism, Wittgenstein, like his contemporaries, could not explain how we can go beyond the subjective cognitive-phenomenal perception to truthfully represent the external reality, as Russell sorrowfully admitted (Russell, 1914, 1959; Pears, 1988). Indeed, there are traces in Wittgenstein's later epistemology of a criterion for understanding the human behaviors that serve as a common backdrop of human experience in this form of life. Nevertheless, without having any proof of its truth, this understanding of common human behavior is no more than a myth, because humans cannot accept any convention without proving its truth. Only objective criteria can suffice if we are to prove our ability to truthfully represent the external reality, and only by attaining such proof, can we agree to accept our propositions, and be released from the prison of our subjective, mental, and private languages.

In memoriam of Jaakko Hintikka and Hilary Putnam, astute Wittgensteinian Scholars and dear friends

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Naïve Realist Conception of Perceptual Phenomenology

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Abstract

This article argues that naïve realists should adopt the radical sort of disjunctivism, which states that the phenomenology of veridical visual experience differs not only in metaphysical nature but also in type from the phenomenology of hallucinatory experience. To do this, I first make an objection to the modest sort of disjunctivism, which states that the phenomenology of veridical visual experience can be the same in type as the phenomenology of hallucinatory experience. I then defend the radical sort of disjunctivism against an objection.

1. Introduction

This article discusses the naïve realist conception of perceptual phenomenology. Naïve realism is a view about the phenomenology of perceptual experiences, which states that the phenomenology of veridical perceptual experience fundamentally consists in the subject's perceiving external objects/events with perceptible properties. Although naïve realism can be taken as a view about veridical perceptual experiences of any modality, naïve realists typically focus on *visual* experiences. Following this trend, I also exclusively discuss naïve realism as a view about veridical *visual* experiences, which states that the phenomenology of veridical visual experience fundamentally consists in the subject's seeing external objects/events with visible properties.

It is important to note that *the relation of seeing* is object-involving in the sense that if the relation holds between a subject and certain object O, then O exists. It is in this respect that the relation of seeing differs from the (quasi-)relation of visually representing. Since the relation of visually representing is not object-involving, even though it holds between a subject and O, it does not imply the existence of O.

Since naïve realism is a view about *veridical* visual experiences, it does not say, in itself, anything about the phenomenology of *hallucinatory* experiences.[1] What should naïve realists say about the phenomenology of hallucinatory experiences? For the sake of argument, I focus here on *total and neurally perfect* hallucinations. A total hallucination is such that the subject is not seeing any environmental object, yet still has a visual experience. A neurally perfect hallucination is such that there could possibly be a veridically perceiving subject whose brain states are identical to those of the hallucinating subject. If a hallucination is neurally perfect, then the hallucination is introspectively indiscriminable from a corresponding visual perception.

The phenomenology of total and neurally perfect hallucinations *cannot* consist in the subject's seeing an environmental object with visible properties, for there is no environmental object that the hallucinating subject is seeing. This means that the phenomenology of veridical visual experiences differs *in metaphysical nature* from the phenomenology of total and neurally perfect hallucinations. From here on, by "hallucination" I mean total and neurally perfect hallucination, and I call the phenomenology of a

veridical visual experience "PV" and the phenomenology of a hallucinatory experience "PH".

What does this difference in metaphysical nature between PV and PH imply? Naïve realists may claim that the fact that PV differs in metaphysical nature from PH implies that PV and PH cannot be the same *in type*. Put differently, such naïve realists claim that the difference in metaphysical nature implies the difference in type-identity. This view leads to *the radical sort of disjunctivism about visual phenomenology (RD)*, which states that PV differs in metaphysical nature from PH and they *cannot* be the same in type. Alternatively, naïve realists may deny that the difference in metaphysical nature implies the difference in type-identity, claiming that PV and PH can be the same in type. This view leads to *the modest sort of disjunctivism about visual phenomenology (MD)*, which states that PV differs in metaphysical nature from PH but they *can* be the same in type.

In this article, I address the question of which sort of disjunctivism, namely RD or MD, naïve realists should adopt. To do this, I will first argue against MD (Section 2) and then defend RD against an objection (Section 3).

2. An argument for RD against MD

In this section, I will provide an argument against MD. I first make one clarificatory remark on the type of visual phenomenology. The type of *visual phenomenology* is distinct from the type of *visual experience*. A visual experience has various aspects, such as cognitive and epistemological ones, in addition to the phenomenal aspect. The cognitive aspect of a visual experience can be characterized in terms of how it influences the subject's cognitive states/activities. The epistemological aspect of a visual experience can be characterized in terms of how it provides the subject with the knowledge about the external world or how it can justify the subject's beliefs about the external world. Accordingly, there are several ways to individuate the type of a visual experience. The cognitive, epistemological and phenomenal aspects are all available for the individuation task. Let us consider two cases, one in which there are a lot of actual lemons on a table and another in which there are a lot of lemon-like soaps and only one actual lemon on a table (and here I do not know that these lemon-like soaps are not actual lemons). The visual experience when I look at an actual lemon in the first case is the same in phenomenal type as that when I look at the actual lemon (by accident) in the second case. However, these two experiences may be different in epistemological type. Whereas the former experience seems to provide the subject with the knowledge that there is a

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[1] Although non-veridical visual experiences include not only hallucinatory but also illusory ones, this article focuses on hallucinatory experiences for the sake of argument.

lemon on the table, the latter experience may not provide the subject with such knowledge. If we appeal to the phenomenal aspect for the individuation task, thus, these two experiences are counted as belonging to the same type. In contrast, if we appeal to the epistemological aspect, these two experiences are regarded as different in type. In this sense, visual experiences can be type-individuated in several ways; a visual experience can simultaneously belong to several types, each of which has a distinct standard of individuation.

In contrast, this sort of plurality does not hold for the type of *visual phenomenology*. The type of the phenomenology of a visual experience cannot be individuated in terms of its cognitive and epistemological features; rather, it should be individuated in terms of its phenomenology. In addition, it is impossible for a visual experience to have two distinct phenomenologies; one visual experience can only have one phenomenology. For instance, when my visual field is wholly filled with trees, it cannot be simultaneously filled with any other items, such as cars or apples. This suggests that there is one and only one phenomenal type to which a visual experience belongs. It is thus reasonable to deny the plurality of the type of visual phenomenology.

With this in mind, let us next examine the *explanatory role* of the fundamental constituent of visual phenomenology. Assuming that PV fundamentally consists in the subject's seeing an environmental object O, how does the relational state of seeing O contributes to PV? One idea is that it serves to determine the type of PV. If the relational state of seeing O does not play this role, however, what substantial explanatory role it plays for PV? If the relational state of seeing O does not play any role for PV, it does not make sense to say that PV fundamentally consists in the subject's seeing O.

One might claim that the relational state of seeing O plays a role in explaining the cognitive and epistemological features of veridical visual experience. If the relational state of seeing O does not serve to determine the type of PV, however, this claim is not tenable. In order to see this, let us consider a case in which a subject is seeing a red apple and thereby having a veridical visual experience with red-apple-phenomenology. In this case, the subject is inclined to form a belief that there is a red apple before him/her but not many other beliefs, such as that there is a yellow banana before him/her. This should be explained by appealing to the fact that the veridical visual experience has red-apple-phenomenology rather than other types of phenomenology, such as yellow-banana-phenomenology. This means that the cognitive inclination in question should be explained by appealing to the type of the phenomenology of the experience, namely, the type of red-apple-phenomenology. Importantly, if the type of the phenomenology of the experience is determined by the subject's seeing the red apple, it is reasonable to think that the cognitive inclination in question is *fundamentally* explained by appealing to the fact that the subject is seeing the red apple. If the type of the phenomenology of the experience is not determined by the relational state of seeing the red apple, however, it seems implausible to think that the cognitive inclination in question is explained by appealing to the fact that the subject is seeing the red apple. This is because it leads to an explanatory overdetermination, that is: the cognitive inclination in question is doubly explained by appealing to the fact that the veridical visual experience has red-apple-phenomenology *and* the fact that the subject is seeing the red apple. This explanatory overdetermination is ad hoc and theoretically undesirable. Thus, if the relational state of seeing O does not serve to determine the type of PV, it is not plausible to think that the cognitive

features of veridical visual experience can be explained in terms of the relational state of seeing O. The same argument can be constructed for the epistemological features of veridical visual experiences.

This consideration suggests that if the phenomenology of a visual experience consists in X, X should serve to determine the type of the phenomenology. Thus, naïve realists should think that the type of PV is determined by the relational state of seeing O. Note that if the type of PV is determined by the relational stat of seeing O, PH cannot be the same in type as PV. Therefore, naïve realists should not adopt MD, which states that PH differs in metaphysical nature from PV but they can be the same in type.[2]

3. A defence of RD

In this section, I will defend RD against an objection. RD states that PV differs from PH not only in metaphysical nature but also in type, even though PH is introspectively indiscriminable from PV. Considering this, RD seems to lead to a consequence that there is a factor that (1) is not introspectively knowable but that (2) serves to determine the type of visual phenomenology. This consequence may seem implausible, since the notion of phenomenology seems to be such that the type of phenomenology is *totally* determined in terms of *introspectively knowable* factors. How can naïve realists who adopt RD deal with this challenge?

There are two strategies to deal with this challenge. First, naïve realists can claim that even though PH is introspectively indiscriminable from PV and they differ in type, it does not entail that there must be a factor determining the type of PV or PH *which is not introspectively knowable*. Note that the introspective indiscriminability of PH from PV can be unsymmetrical (Logue 2012, sec. 2). The introspective indiscriminability in question can be analysed as follows: When a subject has a hallucinatory experience, the subject cannot tell by introspection alone that it does not have PV but PH. According to this analysis, the introspective indiscriminability of PH from PV does not entail the introspective indiscriminability of PV from PH.

Given this, naïve realists can coherently say that (1) when a subject has a hallucinatory experience with PH, the subject *cannot* introspectively know that the experience does not have PV but PH, and that (2) when a subject has a veridical visual experience with PV, the subject *can* introspectively know that the experience does not have PH but PV.[3] Assuming naïve realism, the latter statement implies that the subject can introspectively know that the relation of seeing holds between the subject and O. Thus, naïve realists allow the relational state of seeing O to determine the type of PV without committing to the claim that the holding of the relation of seeing is not introspectively knowable.

The second strategy to deal with the above challenge to RD is to change the conception of phenomenology itself. As we have seen, our conception of phenomenology would be such that the type of phenomenology is totally determined in terms of introspectively knowable factors.

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[2] We can arrive at the same conclusion through a slightly different pathway. One theoretical motivation for naïve realism is that it can explain how the phenomenology of a veridical visual experience enables us to have an object-involving thought and to know an object-involving proposition (Campbell 2002; Niikawa 2016). This explanatory advantage of naïve realism presupposes that the factors determining the type of PV include the object-involving relation of seeing. Thus, if naïve realists hold onto this theoretical motivation, they must deny that PH can be the same in type as PV.

[3] I leave it open how naïve realists should explain the introspective access to PV. For this issue, see (Logue 2012, sec. 5).

However, we can make a change in it in such a way that the type of phenomenology can be *partially* determined in terms of introspectively unknowable factors.

Certainly, it is implausible to think that the type of phenomenology can be totally determined in terms of introspectively unknowable factors. The concept of phenomenology cannot be entirely disassociated from the concept of introspection. That said, there is no reason to think that every phenomenal difference must be introspectively knowable. There can be series of experiences E_1, E_2 and E_3 such that (1) they differ in phenomenology and (2) it is introspectively knowable that the phenomenology of E_1 is not identical to the phenomenology of E_3, but (3) it is introspectively *unknowable* that the phenomenology of E_1 is not identical to E_2 and that the phenomenology of E_2 is not identical to E_3. This suggests that the type of phenomenology of E_1 is determined by a factor F_1 and the type of phenomenology of E_2 is determined by another factor F_2, but we cannot introspectively know that F_1 is different from F_2. If this is acceptable, it should also be acceptable that the type of PV is determined in terms of the relational state of seeing O and the type of phenomenology of hallucinatory experience is determined in terms of something different, but we cannot introspectively know that the relational state of seeing O is different from the something.

In conclusion, naïve realists should adopt RD rather than MD.

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The Non-Observables in Perceptual Knowledge:
A Basis for Complementary Epistemology

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Abstract

For many ordinary people, nothing can be as real as that which one sees, touches, smells, etc. For instance, at the time I was writing this paper, there couldn't have been any better way of demonstrating that I was writing the paper except by coming to see that I was actually writing the paper. Some philosophers like G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell did recognize a common-sense perception of reality at one time or another, especially because of the appealing force of that which seems to be obvious. However, this paper argues that there are non-observables and beliefs in a supposedly obvious perception; events that challenge us to abandon a univocal approach to knowledge and to embrace an interdisciplinary investigation into any datum of knowledge that is presented before us. The process and outcome of such investigation is termed here "complementary epistemology".

Introduction

The activity of perceiving is one that is inserted within the broader context of sense experience insofar as what one perceives takes place within the experiential field. Almost all empiricists and some rationalists assent to the relevance of experience. The empiricist recognition of sense experience is total, evidenced in the Scholastic dictum: *"nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu"*. The rationalist approval of sense experience is rather a scrutinized one. One of them, albeit a critical thinker (Kant 1929: B1) observes that 'all knowledge begins with experience, but they do not all arise from it'. Therefore, the empiricist and the rationalist approaches to knowledge recognize the relevance of sense experience. Despite their contributions, humans seem to be entrapped in this dilemma: *we cannot deny that our senses deceive us, and at the same time, we cannot help returning to the same senses for concrete validation of facts.*

However, this paper tries to review the non-observables or the unknown in sense perception as a platform to argue as follows: if there are obscurities in perceptual knowledge which claims to have a good dose of certainty, then the disciplines that are dependent on such knowledge as well as those of non-perceptual kind must exercise an epistemological caution in their claims; a caution that allows for inclusive rather than exclusive knowledge.

The Meaning and Content of Perceptual Knowledge

The meaning of perceptual knowledge is rooted in the Latin verb: *"percipere"* meaning 'to perceive or to recognize'. This etymological meaning comes close to the definition of Wood (Runes 1984: 244) that perception is "the apprehension of ordinary sense-objects such as trees, houses, chairs, etc, on the occasion of sensory stimulation". The definition underscores the link between the perceiving subject and the object perceived; a link that suggests a process, and hence implies duration. Indeed, the epistemology of perception shows an indisputable feature of perception, namely, its procedural/causal nature. An epistemologist (Arner 1972: 19) explains it thus: "perceptual experience is normally dependent on a series of events which begins with something stimulating the sense organs and terminating with a modification of the brain". In any attempt to outline those series of events, one must, at least, reckon with these four major factors: (a) the presence of stimulating source (e.g. sunlight for the eyes and sound for the ears); (b) a perceiving subject who is conscious of something; (c) the object about which one is conscious; (d) a particular *locus* of space-time region inhabiting the object perceived. One of the good ways of explaining the link among these perceptual factors is to examine how perception is fundamentally an empirical phenomenon.

Perception as an Empirically Complex Phenomenon

As indicated above, the activity of perceiving harbours some errors that emerge from our senses. However, the givenness of the objects of perception before the senses has an appealing 'force of concreteness' that makes us to recognize them. To prove that 'I can see anything at all' can best be demonstrated in 'my act of seeing a particular thing'. This may be called the commonsense view of perception and such position rests on this argument: *if every object must have a name in order to be identified and understood, and if anyone who is perceiving something cannot be perceiving nothing, then any perception must necessarily involve the perception of an object* that is represented by that name. Another group, otherwise called sense datum theorists, deny a direct perception of physical objects and accept only an indirect perception through the data of the senses like colour, smell, etc. But a thorough analysis shows that the sense datum theorists do not substantially differ from the commonsense view because a sense-datum like colour has spatial extension, and since only a piece of matter can exhibit the property of extension, then colour might somewhat be considered a physical object.

In furtherance of the discourse, some epistemologists (O'Connor et al., 1982: 89ff) underline the point that "sense perception gives us information about physical objects". They equally discuss the properties of physical objects and the ways by which we apprehend them. In this way, they underscore *the interrelatedness of physics, physiology and psychology in perceptual knowledge.* Indeed, O'Connor et.al. maintain that the physiological overlaps with the psychological. For example, the sunlight that shines on the grass is white, yet produces green sensation on the grass because of the interplay of its absorption and reflection, both of which are dependent on the "molecular

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structure of grass itself" and the eventual process of modifications of mental activities in the brain of the perceiving subject.

Perception as involving the non-observable sphere

Most informed epistemologists know that all events in the phenomenon of perception are not observable. It is a known fact that the sunlight which is the originating source of sense perception displays a chain of events, otherwise called *'causal lines'* and some of them may no longer be existing at the time someone is perceiving an object. An example is the perception of the night sky/star which we ordinarily assume to be shining in the present, but which, indeed, is 'an event that has flashed out of existence for a long time' (Arner 1972: 19). Hirst's scientific remark validates Arner's view: *'the light from the sun takes about eight minutes to reach the earth while the one from the nearest star takes about four years and four months to become noticeable on the earth'* (Edwards 1967: 82). Hence, Arner concludes that physical objects are not immediately perceptible, but indirectly, namely: they are discovered through their sense data. For him, what exists in physical reality is "structured energy". This kind of energy, one may argue, is non-simple, but complex, and hence, difficult to be directly apprehended. The overall consequence of the sense datum theory and the time-lag implied in the causal theory is that *we now have the impetus to speak of the non-observable in perception.* Such basis is validated by Arner's earlier allusion that sensation 'modifies our brain', modifications that are not observable because they are mental and also complex.

Furthermore, a significant issue in the causal theory of perception is that it has a metaphysical flavour because a causal line provides the ground for an inference/deduction. A scientist-Philosopher (Russell 1984: 477) explains it thus: *"causal line is a temporal series of events that so related in such a way that, given some of them, something can be inferred about others elsewhere.* It can be regarded as the persistence of an entity: a person, a table, a photon or what not". To be noted is the fact that inference of this kind belongs to the intellectual order or reflection; and in metaphysics (Renard 1946: 123), an intellectual reflection "transcends the empiricism and particularity of sensible experience". Thus, Russell was right in calling 'causal law' (derived from causal theory) a principle because a principle itself is explained as 'a relation between cause and effect in a sort of causal chain' (Bunge 1963: 3). Even after Russell had accused Berkeley of making unperceived events to be conclusive (because he made God the all-perceiving being), the same Russell (1992: 215ff) assumes that *"there are events causally connected with percepts, but which we do not know whether they are perceived or not".* This assertion implies that no matter our ability to connect causal events, there shall always be an aspect of the unknown in a perceptual activity.

There is another dimension that is worth considering here. It concerns the *spatio-temporality of perceptual knowledge.* The dual concept, space-time, shall always be considered in any discussion on perception. When the concept is considered in non-empirical terms or as a priori forms of our sensibility in the manner that Kant did (whereby space must be intuited before we can recognize objects existing within it, and time postulated before we can speak of measuring anything), *then, we have an overlapping of metaphysics (the non-observable) with physics (the observable).* Such overlapping compels us to admit that some dose of belief (i.e. the non-perceptual) enters into what we claim to perceive and to know.

The Interplay between Perception and Belief

The primary question here is: what does believing mean? This is no easy question because it involves a number of complex issues like true and false beliefs, the believer and the believed, etc. In an effort to explain these issues, some theories of belief have emerged: (i) belief as a mental act, (ii) belief as a behavioural disposition and (iii) belief as a mental state. The first theory which owes its origin to David Hume (Hume 1969: I §VII) defines belief as "a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression". This definition maintains that belief has to be located within the context of a present impression which is tied to an expectation. The explanation immediately shows a link between perception and belief because belief is spoken of in connection with a present impression/happening. For instance, the perception of 'a cloudy sky' (present impression) ignites a lively idea (i.e. a belief/expectation) that 'there shall be rainfall'. Therefore, the sense in which belief is a mental act has to do with answering the question: what goes on in the mind of the believer who is presently experiencing a certain impression? A modern version of the mental-act theory is called cognitive theory which Price explains as 'the conjunction of two separate acts: entertaining a certain proposition and giving assent to that proposition' (O'Connor et al., 1982: 46). These two ideas are theoretically separable, though may not always be so in praxis since believing in something suggests assent to it.

The second theory which is rivalry to the first is concerned with belief as a behavioural disposition. Its remote origin is also traced to Hume who avers that 'belief influences our passions by bringing a simple idea to the level of impression as it makes it forceful and vivacious' (Hume 1969: I §X). Hume mentions customs and habits (kinds of belief) as those that contribute a lot to our way of thinking, thereby influencing our actions and passions. O'Connor et al. cite Alexander Bain as another advocate of this second theory and his own view is categorical: "belief has no meaning, except in reference to our actions". The second theory brings out more the connectivity between perception and belief in this way: though not all beliefs or perception of things automatically produce expected actions, we still believe that some phenomena must produce certain reactions. For instance, a loud cry like "there comes a car!" is expected to produce the response of running away from the oncoming car. But, it is not always the case that we have such response. The third theory of belief (i.e. belief as a mental state) which is intended to address the inadequacies of the earlier two theories holds that belief displays the character of a continued mental existence. Compared to belief as a mental act, belief as a mental state is not an act that is happening now, but a disposition that may or may not excite one to action. For instance, the belief that the sun will rise tomorrow hardly excites us to action, but it remains a constant mental state in us. Wittgenstein can be classified into two of these three theories because he opines that "believing is a state of mind" or "a kind of the disposition of the believing person" (Wittgenstein 1958: II, §X) where disposition is always in view of an expected action.

The Limitations of Perceptual Knowledge as a Basis for Complementary Epistemology

Our considerations in the previous sections showed not only some indisputable facts about perception, but also many limitations: indistinct mental acts, non-observable events and beliefs that may be true or false, etc. Given those limitations, the search for more credible ways of knowing becomes an imperative; a search which, in order to be critical, must abhor pre-conceived epistemic ideas. This is the sense of *'complementary epistemology'*: an epistemology that derives its remote influence from Niels Bohr's use of the word *"complementarity"* in scientific context (Ogbozo: 2013, 422). Hodgson explains Bohr's use of the concept thus: 'the use of two modes of description of an entity which are mutually exclusive in circumstances where concepts are inadequate'. Leaning somewhat on this meaning, *a complementary epistemology concerns itself with examining any knowledge-datum presented before an epistemologist from multiple epistemic-related disciplines like psychology, cognitive science, language, etc with the aim of arriving at a comprehensive cum inclusive knowledge of the datum under consideration. This epistemic outlook has become urgent because of the diversified and complicated nature of human environments, thoughts and actions today.* Such multi-faceted epistemic engagement facilitates academic interdependence, mutual critique and enrichment. This kind of epistemology could equally be termed *'process epistemology'* in the sense of being an open and continuous epistemic investigation of any datum in its *interdisciplinary* outlook, and subsequently, expected to unravel the multicultural dimensions of our human knowledge.

Conclusion

This paper displays a trajectory of discussions in this way: the nature of perceptual knowledge, its inadequacies that are evidenced in the non-observables, its connection with belief, etc. These analyses were made in order to argue for a credible option in complementary epistemology that has enormous theoretical and practical gains.

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Perception, Intuitions, and Mathematics. A Kantian Perspective

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Abstract

Traditionally, intuitions stand for images that our mind's eye represents without any help of perceptions. In mathematics, the appeal to intuitions aims to furnish a stronger foundation, for instance, of geometric constructions, whose figures can be visualized completely in imagination. In his *Aesthetic*, Kant seems to agree with this classic view. However, in his *Doctrine of Method* and *Lecture on Metaphysics*, he reduces mathematical concepts to intuition-based constructions. "There is nothing – warns Hintikka – 'intuitive' about intuitions so defined" (1992: 23). Breaking with visual images, sensible intuitions require a non-philosophical explanation. My aim is to defend this thesis. I will discuss *1)* what is an intuition for Kant, especially in relation to perceptions and mathematical concepts, and *2)* why it must be understood logically. Then, I will show *3)* how Kant builds abstract entities such as quanta and numbers on such sensible intuitions. Finally, I will compare *4)* Kant's perceptionism to Wittgenstein's conception of 'visual field' (especially in the *Tractatus*), developed in rejection of Russell's multiple-relation theory of judgments (1913).

Intuitions are usually associated with mental pictures. After all, they are images represented by means of our mind's eye without any help of sensible impressions. In mathematics, the appeal to intuitions aims to furnish a stronger foundation, for instance, of geometric constructions, whose figures can be visualized completely in imagination. Kant seems to agree with this classic view, especially in his *Aesthetic* (Kant 2003). However, Hintikka warns against this interpretation (Hintikka 1992a). The relation between Kantian intuitions and mathematics may suggest otherwise.

Kant holds that mathematics depends on sensible intuition, indeed that mathematical claims in some way refer to this intuition. He also regards such claims as synthetic rather than analytic and grounds on them the possibility of the a priori knowledge. In Kant's *Doctrine of Method* and *Lecture on Metaphysics*, mathematical concepts are exhibited *in concreto* by means of intuitions and are ultimately reduced to intuition-based constructions. "There is nothing – says Hintikka – 'intuitive' about intuitions so defined" (Hintikka 1992a: 23). Breaking with visual images, sensible intuitions require a non-philosophical explanation. They rather call for a logical-mathematical characterization.

My aim is to defend this thesis. I'll discuss 1) what is an intuition for Kant, especially in relation to mathematical concepts, and 2) why it must be understood logically. Then, I'll show 3) how Kant builds abstract entities such as quanta and numbers on sensible intuitions. Finally, I'll answer a couple of objections regarding the logical nature of intuitions and derived mathematical entities.

1. Intuitions and Mathematical Concepts

Intuition is a type of representation by means of which our mind can relate to or be conscious of objects. Since everything in our mind is a representation, Kant distinguishes intuitions from other types of representations such as perceptions and concepts:

> The genus is *representation* in general (*repraesentatio*). Subordinate to it stands representation with consciousness (*perceptio*). A *perception* which relates solely to the subject as the modification of its state is *sensation* (*sensatio*), an objective perception is *knowledge* (*cognitio*). This is either *intuition* or *concept* (*intuitus vel conceptus*). The former relates immediately to the object

and is single, the latter refers to it mediately by means of a feature which several things may have in common. (Kant 2003: A320/B376-7)

As contrasted with concepts, intuitions are first characterized by immediacy. Concepts relate to objects only mediately, they contain certain properties that are possessed by those objects. In this sense, concepts represent the common features shared by several objects.

Therefore, they are called "a universal (*repraesentatio per notas communes*) or *reflected* representation *(repraesentatio discursiva)*" (*The Jäsche's Logic*, 91 §1; Kant 1992). On the opposite, intuitions are singular representations (*repraesentatio singularis*). They have only one individual object and relate to it immediately: "In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, *intuition* is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed" (A16/B33). "Thus far – says Parsons (Parsons 1992: 44) – the distinction [between intuitions and concepts] corresponds to that between singular and general terms."

Immediacy comes with singularity. The two characterize the nature of sensible intuitions only if they stay together. An intellectual intuition, for instance, would satisfy the immediacy criterion but not the singularity one. The immediacy of intuitions consists in representing their objects without relying on those properties that are shared by these objects. Concepts can be singular as well, but only as mediate representations.

In this way, concepts contrast with intuitions. However, they are also closely related. In fact, the classification of concepts depends on the distinction between empirical and pure intuitions. Let's first address this distinction.

Intuitions turn empirical as sensation comes into play. This latter is a posteriori since it derives from an affection: "that intuition which is in relation to the object through sensation, is entitled *empirical*"; whereas representations "in which there is nothing that belongs to sensation" (Kant 2003: A20/B34) are *pure*, namely pure intuitions. Therefore, the access to pure intuition requires a process of abstraction:

> If I take away from the representation of a body that which the understanding thinks in regard to it, substance, force, divisibility, etc., and likewise what belongs to sensation, impenetrability, hardness, colour,

etc., something still remains over from this empirical intuition, namely, extension and figure. These belong to pure intuition, which, even without any actual object of the senses or of sensation, exists in the mind *a priori* as a mere form of sensibility. (Kant 2003: A20-1/B35)

After abstraction from anything empirical, something remains in every representation, namely a pure intuition. If an object is a collection of representations, each representation occupies a place in space; if abstracted from anything concrete, the collection itself (synthesis) nonetheless remains along with its ideal places. These ideal spaces are pure intuitions that, accordingly, behave like placeholders. Thus in the *Aesthetic*, an intuition is intended "as containing an infinite number of representations *within* itself", while a concept is thought of "as a representation which is contained in an infinite number of different possible representations (as their common character), and which therefore contains these *under* itself" (Kant 2003: A25/B40).

At this point, Kant distinguishes the mathematical concepts from the philosophical ones, and shows them to be an alternative way of conceptualizing: "philosophical knowledge considers the particular only in the universal, mathematical knowledge the universal in the particular, or even in the single instance, though still always *a priori* and by means of reason" (Kant 2003: A714/B742). Thus, "philosophical knowledge [...] has always to consider the universal *in abstracto* (by means of concepts), mathematics can consider the universal *in concreto* (in the single intuition) and yet at the same time through pure *a priori* representation" (Kant 2003: A734-5/B762-3).

Mathematical concepts rely on intuitions. Kant holds that "in mathematics [...] the concepts of reason must be forthwith exhibited *in concreto* in pure intuition" (Kant 2003: A711/B739), therefore "to *construct* a concept means to exhibit *a priori* the intuition which corresponds to it" (Kant 2003: A713/B741). Thus, mathematical concepts are reduced to intuition-based constructions. And these intuitions must instantiate universality under individuality (i.e., exhibit the concept *in concreto*). In this sense, pure intuitions behave logically, namely as individual representations that stand for other representations. Kant's philosophy of mathematics stands or falls on this. Let's consider a few suggestions regarding how sensible intuitions are to be properly intended.

2. Intuitions as Variables

In his *Doctrine of Method*, Kant looks to the Euclidean model. He notices that the truth value of geometric propositions runs from one claim to another "through a chain of inferences guided throughout by intuition" (Kant 2003: A716/B744). Any inference is both synthetic and evident, but none of them comes from experience since their synthesis carries on strict and not merely comparative universality. Euclidean claims are not valid generalizations derived from Hume's custom-induced inferences.

> For the construction of a concept we therefore need a *non-empirical* intuition. The latter must, as intuition, be a *single* object, and yet none the less, as the construction of a concept (a universal representation), it must in its representation express universal validity for all possible intuitions which fall under the same concept. Thus I construct a triangle by representing the object which corresponds to this concept […]. The single figure which we draw is empirical, and yet it serves to express the concept, without impairing its universality. (Kant 2003: A713-4/B741-2)

Non-empirical intuitions clearly realize the idea that a single object or individuality may stand for a manifold of objects or universality, which is exactly the idea of free variable (x, y, z), for instance in first-order quantificational logic.

This argument is suggested by Beth, developed by Hintikka, and discussed by Parsons. In the proof that the base angles of an isosceles triangle are equal, Beth was the first to notice that:

> We proceed, as is well known, as a rule as follows first we consider a particular triangle, say ABC, and suppose that AB=AC; then we show that ∠ABC=∠ACB and have thus proved that the assertion holds in the particular case in
>
> question. Then one observes that the proof is correct for an arbitrary triangle, and therefore that the assertion must hold in general. (Beth 1957, 365)

Parsons reads Beth's argument as a case of universal generalization (UG), where we want to prove $(x)(Fx \supset Gx)$. Therefore, we assume a particular a such that Fa, deduce Ga, and obtain $Fa \supset Ga$ independently of the hypothesis; but since a was arbitrary, $(x)(Fx \supset Gx)$ follows. Hintikka rather focuses on the existential instantiation (EI): $(\exists x)Fx/Fa//p$. But both UG and EI, says Parsons, turn on "the use of a free variable which indicates *any* one of a given class of objects, so that an argument concerning it is valid for *all* objects of the class" (Parsons 1992: 55). Thus, in modern logic, pure intuitions behave like instantiations. In fact, argues Hintikka[6], by instantiation methods "we introduce a representative of a particular entity a priori, without there being any such entity present or otherwise given to us" – this logical characterization of Kantian intuitions, he concludes, "has been misunderstood almost universally" (Hintikka 1992b: 345f).

The possibility of a priori knowledge relies on this use of a singular term as representative. Beth's triangle serves as a paradigm of all triangles: although it is itself an individual triangle, "nothing is used about it in the proof which is not also true of all triangles" (Parsons 1992: 61). In this case, constructing such a triangle cannot appeal to any object, it is rather a construction of concepts in pure intuition. Shabel (2006) correctly points out that constructing a single triangle provides a pattern for triangles in general, and then for all of them; since it instantiates a universal rule in a single figure, which nevertheless is ultimately made of non-empirical intuitions (intuitions without a reference to objects). Shabel's thesis is consistent with the distinction emphasized by Guyer (1987) between image and schema: "the concepts of number and triangle are [...] rules, not images of any sort" because "it is schemata, not images of objects, which underlie our pure sensible concepts" (Kant 2003: A141/B180).

> No image could ever be adequate to the concept of a triangle in general. It would never attain that universality of the concept which renders it valid of all triangles, whether right-angled, obtuse-angled, or acute-angled; it would always be limited to a part only of this sphere. The schema of the triangle can exist nowhere but in thought. It is a rule of synthesis of the imagination, in respect to pure figures in space. (Kant 2003: A141/B180)

Thus, Kant's mathematical method turns on constructions. It consists, says Hintikka, in "introducing particular representatives of general concepts and carrying out arguments in terms of such particular representatives, arguments which cannot be carried out by means of general con-

cepts" (Hintikka 1992b: 24). In fact, argues Parsons, the algebraist's "manipulating symbols according to certain rules [requires] analogous intuitive representation of his concept", and that "the symbolic construction is essentially a construction with *symbols* as objects of intuition" (Parsons 1992: 65). The same conclusion is independently reached by Friedman: "from a modern point of view, we could perhaps reconstruct Kant's conception of arithmetic as involving a sub-system of primitive recursive arithmetic (such as Robinson arithmetic) where generality is expressed by means of free variables and there are no true quantifiers" (Friedman 1992, 113).

In what follows, I'll briefly show how Kant builds quanta and numbers on the notion of sensible intuitions.

3. Quanta and Numbers

As we just saw, Kant conceives mathematics and its concepts in terms of intuition-based constructions. Then, he combines these intuitions and derives *quanta,* namely quantified parts or properties. Recall that in modern logic, binding a variable that ranges over a domain is called 'quantification'. Therefore, if intuitions stand for free variables, they are supposed to be quantified. Let's take a closer look.

According to the Kantian variation of Hume's bundle theory, an object is a collection of representations (properties), each of them corresponding to an intuition. The same collection (concept) can be seen either as empirical or as pure, depending on (the presence or absence of) sensations. But if it is the case, what kind of object does derive from the synthesis of such a pure manifold? What object is made by pure intuitions alone? Kant answers straightforwardly:

> As regards the formal element, we can determine our concepts in *a priori* intuition, inasmuch as we create for ourselves, in space and time, through a homogeneous synthesis, the objects themselves – these objects being viewed simply as *quanta*. (Kant 2003: A723/B751)

From the synthesis of the pure manifold derive *quanta*, namely objects (wholes) whose parts allow for quantification. Each of these parts corresponds to a pure intuition, which is, therefore, thought of as quantifiable. Kant's leading idea is that combining (*zusammensetzen*) homogeneous parts leads to magnitudes (Kant 2001; 29: 991, 1794-5) – an idea borrowed from Euclid (see Sutherland 2004). Such combining is to be understood in terms of proportions or ratios, though. In order to be either bigger or smaller or equal, two parts must be conceived as inside of one another, that is, as part and whole: "A > than B if a part of A=B; in contrast A < B, if A is equal to a part of B" (28: 506, late 1780s) or "something is larger than the other if the latter is only equal to a part of the former" (28: 561, 1790-1). This explains quantity in terms of *part-whole relations* and *homogeneity.*

At this point, Kant can directly develop the notion of quanta into that of number. He just needs to differentiate between ostensive (geometric) and symbolic (arithmetic) constructions.

> But mathematics does not only construct magnitudes (*quanta*) as in geometry; it also constructs magnitude as such (*quantitas*), as in algebra. In this it abstracts completely from the properties of the object that is to be thought in terms of such a concept of magnitude. (Kant 2003: A717/B745)

Numbers[1] are homogeneous parts (quanta) combined in succession. In his *Metaphysics L$_2$* (28: 561, 1790-1), Kant argues that "each quantum is a multitude [and] must thus also consist of homogeneous parts" and that, as such, "each quantum can be increased or decreased". This goes through combining its parts, "the parts that, connected (*verbunden*) with each other, make a number concept". In this mereological connection "something is larger than the other if the latter is only equal to a part of the former"; in fact, "for something to alter into a larger is to increase, and for something to alter into a smaller is to decrease".

Recall that "the *subsumption* of intuitions under pure concepts" (Kant 2003: A138/B177) follows certain rules, which are called by Kant schemata. Therefore, "the pure *schema* of magnitude (*quantitatis*), as a concept of the understanding, is *number*, a representation which comprises the successive addition of homogeneous units" (A142/B182).

If sensible intuitions stand for logical placeholders, Kant's notion of number could be accommodated in the set-theoretic way described by Benacerraf's Ernie theorem (Benacerraf 1965, 54), "for any two numbers, x and y, x is less than y if and only if x belongs to y and x is a proper subset of y" rather than Johnny's "given two numbers, x and y, x belongs to y if and only if y is the successor of x" – i.e., $0=\emptyset$, $1=\{0\}=\{\emptyset\}$, $2=\{0, 1\}=\{\emptyset,\{\emptyset\}\}$, $3 =\{0, 1, 2\}=\{\emptyset,\{\emptyset\},\{\emptyset,\{\emptyset\}\}\}$, and so on. If this is right, the mathematical intuitionism of Kant somehow anticipates Cantor's theory of sets and opposes Dedekind's relationism (including his fellow neo-Kantians).

4. Conclusions

In conclusion, let's address a couple of objections. As most of us hold, there are individual variables (intuitions) of algebra that do not entail any relation to our sensibility. We can know individuals and do not involve sense-perceptions, e.g., in dealing with numbers and other abstract entities. In this case, "*a priori* intuitions – says Hintikka – are not characterized by an especially immediate relation to their objects; they are precisely intuitions used in the absence of their objects" (Hintikka 1992b: 358) and can hardly be intended as perceptual. However, this possibility is explicitly ruled out by Kant in the *Aesthetic*, where all intuitions (including those used in mathematics) are seen as *sinnlich* and reduced to *passive* perceptions. But, if Kantian intuitions really stand for variables, why are they sensible?

Hintikka dismisses the *Aesthetic*. In his eyes, Kant's philosophy of mathematics exclusively derives from his *Doctrine of Method*, where sensible intuitions stand for logical instantiations. Arbitrarily chosen representatives of general concepts are introduced a priori into mathematical claims, as Kant says: "our new method of thought, namely, that we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them" (Kant 2003: Bxviii). By means of this instantiation method (identified by Hintikka with EI: $(\exists x)Fx/Fa//p$), we anticipate certain properties and relations of particulars. Then, "*we have ourselves put those properties and relations into* objects in the processes through which we come to know individuals (particulars)" (347). These processes are carried out by our sense-perceptions. Hence, those properties and relations are due to the structure of our sensibility, namely space and time. Kant draws a legitimate conclusion.

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[1] Only *quanta* whose magnitude is *extensive* qualify as numbers (*discrete quanta*). The parts of *continuous quanta* are indeterminate and their magnitude is *intensive*, namely given by a degree.

Parsons endorses this solution. After all, the symbols implied by conceptual constructions in intuition are perceptible objects. Those constructions need something phenomenological like perceptions (represented by single instances).

A correlated issue concerns the nature of mathematical objects. Kant does not explicitly grant existence to them. He rather takes 'existence' as a concrete attribute, ultimately perceivable. "But what – asks Parsons – are a priori intuitions, as singular representations, intuitions *of*?" (Parsons 1992: 73). In other terms, if mathematics contains a priori knowledge (which is knowledge of objects), what kind of objects does it really know? A suggestion may be to postulate *abstract* entities "beyond the field of possible experience" and to construct them as "in arithmetic and predicative set theory", namely "as *forms* of spatiotemporal objects" (Parsons 1992: 64).

After all, the object dependence doesn't hold for intuitions whose nature isn't empirical but logical-mathematical.

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Against Hearing Phonemes – A Note on O'Callaghan

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Abstract

Casey O'Callaghan has argued that rather than hearing meanings, we hear phonemes. In this note I argue that valuable though they are in an account of speech perception – depending on how we define 'hearing' – phonemes either don't explain enough or they go too far. So, they are not the right tool for his criticism of the semantic perceptual account.

Casey O'Callaghan has taken issue with what he calls the semantic perceptual account (SPA) in various papers (O'Callaghan 2009; 2010; 2011; 2015; this note relies mostly on 2011). The account considers the phenomenological difference between hearing a language we understand and one we don't, to be an indication that we actually hear meanings.[1] O'Callaghan agrees that there is indeed such a phenomenological difference, and, it seems to me, anyone who has ever learnt a foreign language will concur. When we first hear the language, it appears like an uninterrupted stream of sounds and what we discern in it is prosody and a couple of phonetic elements, a particular vowel or consonant perhaps, that are salient – maybe because they recur often or because they are unusual to our ears, or both. In the early stage of learning the language when we are taught individual words, we begin to pick them out from the stream of sounds, and with time, we gradually learn to discern most of the words and phrases, even if we don't always know what they mean.

The SPA attributes the phenomenological difference between the stream of sounds we heard when we first heard the language and what we hear once we know it to the fact that we understand it. Against this view, O'Callaghan argues forcefully that we don't hear meanings. His argument stresses that understanding what someone says is importantly different from perceiving our environment auditorily. First, he states what it is to form a belief based on what one perceives:

> (PE) Imagining aside, I cannot have a perceptual experience in which I perceptually entertain that something is the case, or is present, without having a perceptual experience which purports that this is the case or is present. (O'Callaghan 2011: 793)

So, the idea is that we cannot think we heard the door shut with a bang without having heard the bang, for example. His argument now runs as follows:

> (1) Understanding an utterance *u* which states that *p* means grasping the meaning of *u*, namely *p*.
> (2) However, when I hear *u*, I do not auditorily grasp, represent, experience or enjoy awareness as of *p*.
> (3) So I don't hear meanings.

Continuing our example, this means that when we hear you say "The door has banged shut", we hear that you said that the door has banged shut, but we don't hear the bang of the door. But the meaning of your utterance just is that the door has banged shut. Therefore, if that is not what we hear, we don't hear meanings. So we don't hear meanings, and the SPA is mistaken.

O'Callaghan goes on to develop an alternative account to the effect that we hear phonemes that we will get to below. Let us first analyse the attack against the SPA.

The first thing that is noticeable is that the argument only works where we can apply a naïve verificationist truth-conditional account of meaning, i.e. for present-tense, indicative assertions about things in our surroundings. It is evidently false for speech acts, but, it seems to me, also for any utterance that expresses the speaker's mental state. It seems quite plausible to claim that hearing you say "Can I have a biscuit?" just is hearing that you want a biscuit. But O'Callaghan is aware that he is caricaturing the account[2] and it serves as an exposition of the line his argument takes.

O'Callaghan's *modus tollens* argument has a distinctly Pittsburghian ring to it, in that it starts from the belief.[3] In many contexts, this move skilfully evades the sceptic, but I propose to turn the argument around and employ sceptical doubt to tease out the direction our investigation needs to take.

Hearing what goes on around us may prompt us to form beliefs. We sometimes have reason to doubt the accuracy of what we believe ourselves to be hearing and suspend judgment until we have tested our belief. But we will test our beliefs differently when we are not sure we heard the door bang shut from when we are not sure you said that the door banged shut. In the first case, we may look whether the door is shut, or what else may have made the bang; in the second case, we would ask you to repeat what you have said. If we checked whether the door is shut in the second case, we would be testing the accuracy of your statement, not of our auditory perception. Of course, we may be in a situation where we aren't sure we have understood you correctly (either because we had trouble discerning your words acoustically or because we don't know your language well) and we may be too shy to ask you to repeat and therefore prefer to check the door instead. But doing this means that we assume a whole baggage of prior beliefs – that you were trying to inform us of something and therefore truthfully described an event in our surroundings (to give a rough summary) – and it does not alter the fact that we are in the first place testing our understanding of your utterance, even if the way we are doing so is by checking whether what we believe you may have said is actually the case. If, in the second case, we find the door is still open, we will have a choice between thinking you were lying or we've misunderstood you. In the first case, the choice is between thinking something else

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made the bang or the door did bang shut but was then opened again.

So, taken like this, it is easy to agree with O'Callaghan that the object of perception in hearing somebody say something is the utterance, not what makes the utterance true. This means that the issue is between hearing and understanding.

O'Callaghan focuses on hearing. He asks: If we don't hear meanings, what is the difference between hearing a familiar language and hearing a language we don't understand due to? He points out that every language has its own distinctive system of sounds, not only in terms of what sounds are used to make up words and how they combine, but also within what ranges variation of those sounds is possible without changing the meaning of the word they constitute. The smallest units of sounds in a language whose change makes for a change of meaning is called phoneme. O'Callaghan stresses that human infants take a special interest in language[4] and learn to discern phonemes of the language(s) they are born into very early, while at the same time beginning to disregard nonphonemic differences in sounds. So, learning a language means acquiring the skill to distinguish its phonetic structure at the expense of discerning sounds that are not phonemic in any language we are familiar with – we learn to hear phonemes. Backed up with examples that show that polysemy does not change the phenomenological experience, O'Callaghan considers his explanation superior to the SPA.

In order to assess his claim, we first need to define 'hearing' with respect to the phenomenal experience it provides and how it relates to understanding. Since the demise of the unfortunate sense-data theory, it seems to me that relative to issues like ours we have a choice between two basic options. The first is a wide-reaching option that comprises the entire mental state of the hearing subject caused by the auditory input, that I shall call the "thick option". It builds on O'Callaghan's explanation that experience is to be understood "in the broadest possible sense, so that it may encompass, for instance, sensory, perceptual, bodily, affective, emotional, imaginative and even occurrent cognitive events or states" (O'Callaghan 2011: 785), and phenomenal difference as "a difference in what it is like for you as a conscious subject to have each experience" (ibid.). Its focus is on the experience and what caused it. The second option comprises merely the auditory impact our environment makes on us, the "thin option". Its focus is on the cause and its immediate effect on the perceiver.

The "thick" option therefore takes into account in a generous way what it is like for a subject to be in a state of hearing certain sounds. For instance, it would regard the shiver going down my spine at hearing a fingernail scratch a blackboard as part of what hearing that sound comprises. The "thickest" option would include the recognition that the sound is produced by a fingernail scratching a board in the phenomenological status of the subject.

In our example of a familiar language, this option would go far beyond discerning phonemes and hearing speech as a sequence of words, with pauses, coughs, uhms and ahs. It would have to comprise also the analogues to the shiver and recognising the fingernail. But what produces the analogue of the shiver? There is the sound of the voice, which conveys the speaker's emotional state and which can produce an emotional response in the hearer. But that can't be all, for compare someone screaming "My knee!" with the same person in the same tone of voice screaming "There's a fire!" The first scream is likely to produce the immediate effect of compassion, while the second scream will cause fear in the hearer. But these effects are, of course, linked to understanding what is said. In fact, it seems to me that the analogue of recognising the screech as the sound of the fingernail scratching the board is recognising the scream "My knee!" as the sound people make when they hit their knees and thereby grasping the meaning of the utterance. The "thick" mental state produced by hearing an utterance simply comprises understanding what is said.

For support of this claim, since we are more accustomed to thinking about vision than audition, let us take an example from seeing language, as it were, the Stroop test. It has names of colours printed in colours other than the one they denote; for instance "red" would be printed in yellow ink, "yellow" in green ink, "green" in blue ink, etc. The task is to tell the colour of the ink. When a sheet of such words is shown to a person who can either not read or doesn't understand the colour words (because they are in a foreign language), the task is very easy. But for fluent readers of the relevant language, it is really hard. When I tried it, I felt that the word I grasped at a glance interfered with my perception of the colour of the ink. I had two contradictory visual pieces of information and although I knew which one to go for, the other one was impossible to block. The visual experience was equally immediate, and, moreover, concerned the same issue. Now, if the meaning of words composed of written letters is grasped so quickly that it interferes with the perception of colours, it is likely that the meaning of words composed of phonemes would be grasped just as quickly.

Why understanding language can be as immediate as grasping anything else in perception is a topic for another day. For the thick option, where the subject's entire mental state resulting from hearing a language utterance is taken into account, the Stroop test supports the claim that understanding what the utterance means must be part of hearing it.

The thick option would then still have to deal with O'Callaghan's argument. It can do so by referring to the form / content dichotomy and give (PE) another twist: There is no way to perceive the content of an utterance other than through perceptual experience of the form. But the Stroop test is an indication that once we have acquired the relevant interpretive skills, we immediately perceive the content, not the form, and it takes a big effort to block perception of the content when we perceive the form.

So, on the "thick" account, SPA is right and O'Callaghan's attack misses the point.

But O'Callaghan seems to favour some version of the "thin" option which keeps all cognitive contributions to mental states out. It must therefore focus exclusively on the acoustic effect. But as we are concerned with perceptual experience, we don't want to speak only of the mechanical effect: soundwaves hitting the eardrum at a certain Hertz rate and being transmitted to the brain by the vestibulocochlear nerve, etc. That would be insufficient for an account of hearing; instead, such an account must also include awareness of what is thus perceived, the "sensory mode of presentation" (as Ayers puts it in a very similar account in 2004: 249) – we hear music, we hear noises and we hear someone speak. The thin account leaves out the subject's mental state beyond this bare minimum, but it

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[4] This is surely less surprising than O'Callaghan seems to think (I infer that from how he stresses the fact) considering that foetuses hear as of the end of the second trimester, and what they hear most, apart from digestive and breathing sounds, is their mother talking (see Birnholz/Benacerraf 1983).

packs the source of the sound into its concept of hearing (if it didn't, it would amount to a mere sense-data theory).

But if this is the idea, O'Callaghan's account seems to involve too much. Phonemes are the smallest phonetic units that determine meaning. They are as much semantic building blocks as letters are in written language. Just as the thick account argued that we cannot hear phonemes without hearing words and grasping their meaning, the thin account must now argue that we cannot discern phonemes without having acquired the skill to do so; but this skill was acquired jointly with knowledge of the relevant language. If the thin account wants to keep cognitive mental states out, it must stick to form. But phonemes are the first step into content and cannot be isolated from it by the hearer.

If the skill to discern phonemes is what makes hearing a familiar language phenomenally different from hearing an unfamiliar language, that skill is inseparable from understanding the language both in origin and in its employment when we hear an utterance. The thin account is not entitled to take recourse to phonemes and without them, it can account for the difference between hearing a person sing or speak, for instance, but not between hearing familiar and unfamiliar languages. An example of what the thin account can deliver is hearing sounds in the room next door and being able to tell language apart from music or the sounds an animal makes.

So, in spite of their importance in speech perception, phonemes are not the right tool to argue against SPA. For the thick account of hearing, they don't comprise enough, and for the thin account they go too far.

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the obvious candidate for such a comparison, prompting him to make the daring comparison between philosophy and art. As Schildt puts it in his thesis:

> Cézanne created a pictorial language, the consequences of which seem to be inexhaustible. That this language, or we might say this artistic attitude, really meant the beginning of something and not the end, is proved by the abundant influences emanating from Cézanne. (Ibid., 208)

The idea of Cézanne as the creator of a whole new tradition or "pictorial language" would appear to be the model for what von Wright says about Cézanne being the "pioneer" who also "fulfilled" his own style. But it is also echoed in von Wright's characterisation of Wittgenstein, in the letter to Schildt, as a thinker who "crisscrossed, in every direction, the philosophical domain to which his work of youth had opened the gate". Another parallel between von Wright and Schildt emerges with regard to the impossibility of improving on the achievements of Cézanne. For von Wright, as we saw, it was impossible to "improve" or "develop" the kind of painting Cézanne had introduced. It could only "become petrified into various mannerisms and -isms". According to Schildt:

[...]

Von Wright might seem to go even a bit further than Schildt in claiming that not only is it impossible to improve on Cézanne's style, but a new "genius in the history of painting must, in a certain way, go against and not with Cézanne". However, a similar idea is in fact also present in Schildt's thesis, when he claims that in order to become fruitful, the influence of Cézanne must be "freed from its dependence of the special motifs of the master" (ibid., 209).

This already gives us some idea of how von Wright made use of Schildt's work. But we have not yet touched upon the most important question, concerning the point of von Wright's comparison – its *raison d'être*, so to speak. Here it is essential to realise that von Wright was not primarily out to make a contribution to our understanding of Wittgenstein's historical position. The point was a personal one. This is quite obvious from the way von Wright concludes his discussion about Wittgenstein and Cézanne in the letter to Schildt, where he suddenly turns to his own situation:

> I believe it is my destiny, so to speak, to live "in the shadow" of this genius. I must, in other words, be prepared for my own work never to be anything more than a mannerism – at least a decent handicraft – springing from the Wittgensteinian style, without ever being able to create something of my own. (von Wright 1947)

Von Wright would later express the same worry in *Myten om framsteget* (The myth of progress), where he actually uses the Cézanne-analogy to describe his situation in the late 1940's:

> [...] I could not avoid coming under the influence of his way of thinking. It was an influence which, in a way, was not good for a person wanting to philosophise on his own. Wittgenstein's way of seeing things was so fascinating and overwhelming that one easily became blind to other possibilities. Just as, according to what I once wrote, no painter has been able to learn anything fruitful from Cézanne, I do not think that any philosopher has been able to learn anything from Wittgenstein – except perhaps his method. (von Wright 2008, 140)

So, the comparison with Cézanne was above all a way for von Wright to come to grips with his own situation as a philosopher in the shadow of the great master. Still, one might ask whether there

also borrowed from Schildt, who describes Cézanne as the "Fulfiller", who remains unsurpassed by his epigones, "simply because his art is brought to perfection of its kind" (ibid., 207). Schildt even seems to confirm von Wright's conclusion that the next great painter must go "against Cézanne, not with him", when he writes that the reformers of art are not to be found among artists who only assimilate, but among the "seemingly destructive" (ibid., 154).

Let us now turn to the important question of the *motivation* von Wright had in bringing up the subject of the relationship between Cézanne and Wittgenstein in the two letters to his friends. As already hinted at, von Wright did not *only* want to convey his impressions of Wittgenstein and his significance for contemporary philosophy to Söderman and Schildt. For, clearly, the sections about Wittgenstein and Cézanne also had a personal background, as thoughts that were maturing in the wake of a very upsetting re-encounter with Wittgenstein in the spring of 1947 (described as being "hit by a hammer" in the letter to Söderman). The background to this is the following. During his first meeting with Wittgenstein before the war, von Wright was an only 22-year-old student working on a thesis on the logical problem of induction. As were so many others, he was greatly impressed by Wittgenstein as a person and as a philosopher. However, in 1947 von Wright had gained in academic stature, for instance, by acquiring the Swedish-language chair of philosophy at the University of Helsinki. Most importantly, having shaken off some of the early influences of Wittgenstein, he also believed he had found a philosophical expression of his own (von Wright 2008, 177).

Some of von Wright's recently acquired sense of autonomy might also have been reflected in a letter he wrote to Wittgenstein before he went to England. Unfortunately, this letter, which we know was dated 14 February 1947, has been lost. However, judging from Wittgenstein's answer on 21 February 1947, he might have suggested that Wittgenstein would attend his lectures in Cambridge, possibly his book on induction was also enclosed with the letter. In any case, it becomes very clear from Wittgenstein's reply that he neither had any intention of attending his younger colleague's lectures, nor of reading his book (Wittgenstein 2008). Instead, it was von Wright, once again, who followed Wittgenstein's lectures in Cambridge (two double lectures a week, and one seminar, according to the letter to Söderman).

Thus, the encounter with Wittgenstein in the spring of 1947 left von Wright in a position where his own philosophy was challenged by Wittgenstein's superiority. Furthermore, his own way of thinking, in itself, was set in turmoil by Wittgenstein's dominating mind. Should he, after all, try to (re-)align his thinking to Wittgenstein's? As we have seen, von Wright thought this was possible only in the form of a philosophy in decay. This brings us to the part played by the comparison between Wittgenstein and Cézanne. Was the similarity something that simply *occurred* to von Wright in his troubled deliberations about Wittgenstein, prompted by recently having read a book written by Göran Schildt? This would, I think, be to underplay its significance. Rather, it seems to be the case that his friend's description of Cézanne provided von Wright with a *pattern* which he applied to Wittgenstein – with the purpose of *solving his own problem*. In fact, we may quite easily see that von Wright's thoughts about Wittgenstein contain elements that do not only have a *counterpart* in the world of the arts, but appear to be *derived* from it. What I have in mind is the whole idea of thinking about philosophy in terms of different *styles,* instead of applying a more science-like conception of theories that may be falsified or

corroborated, for instance. Similarly, the idea of *imitation as derogative* has a special significance within the arts, where, for instance, "painting like Picasso", would not normally count among the most favourable things we can say about a work, or an artist. Naturally, by applying the patterns of art to philosophy, we also bestow the latter with values like *creativity*, *originality* and *novelty*. Of course, these are not strangers to the sciences either. However, it does seem obvious that the role they have within these is much more instrumental than within the arts, where they rather appear as constituents of the value of a work.

We can now quite easily see how Schildt's conception of Cézanne was helpful to von Wright in his struggle with the dominance of Wittgenstein's philosophy. What he needed, we may assume, was to restore his shaken confidence in the meaning of following the philosophical path that he had entered upon during the 1940s. Obviously, for this very purpose, the idea of different philosophical styles came out quite handy. For, it would no longer seem for instance, that he had to trouble himself with the question of whether his philosophy might be of the "wrong kind", where Wittgenstein's was right. Furthermore, the idea of Wittgenstein as the *fulfiller*, who only leaves imitation and mannerism in his wake, clearly suggests that von Wright would do better if he stayed within the limits of his own way of doing philosophy, however limited it might appear for the moment. In fact, the only way of producing good decent philosophy for von Wright, and anyone else it would seem, was to go *against* Wittgenstein, and not with him.

Later developments

We have seen how his thoughts of Wittgenstein as the Cézanne of philosophy must have appeared helpful to Georg Henrik von Wright during his stay in England 1947. However, at the time he was only in his early thirties, and had a career in front of him in which Wittgenstein would play no minor part. Thus, we may wonder to what extent von Wright really was able to follow a philosophical path of his own. Quite well, actually. He soon became known as an outstanding innovator in the field of philosophical logic. When his philosophical repertoire was extended towards value theory and the philosophy of the humanities in the 1960s, there were certainly traces of Wittgenstein's philosophy, but nothing that would even remotely qualify as an imitation of his style. It is also noteworthy that some of the main elements of the 1947 letters would also appear in his writings on Wittgenstein later, although in a somewhat different shape. Thus, for instance, in his well-known "Biographical Sketch", originally published in 1954, von Wright returns to the question of the dominating influence of Wittgenstein's thought, but Cézanne has now been dropped out of the picture. Whereas von Wright in 1947 mostly seemed concerned with the perils of continuing in the footsteps of a philosophical genius, there is a new, personal twist to the observations he makes seven years later. For now, he is speaking about "the magic of Wittgenstein's personality and style", which made it so difficult to learn from him without adopting not only his forms of expression, but also his tone of voice and gestures. The idea of a fulfilment of a style has been replaced by the idea of the "simplicity and naturalness" of the teachings of great men, which make them easy to copy, resulting in the emergence of "insignificant epigones". Interestingly however, this no longer leads to the conclusion that any serious philosopher necessarily must go *against* Wittgenstein. Instead, von Wright now seems to suggest a positive way in which philosophers might take impressions from the great philoso-

pher, that is, in the form of influences "of a more indirect, subtle and, often, unexpected kind" (von Wright 1958, 19).

Almost thirty years later, in the introduction to his book *Wittgenstein* (1982), von Wright once again returned to his relationship with Wittgenstein. At this stage, von Wright had already published many of his more central philosophical works. Now he was also prepared to admit that Wittgenstein, after all, had influenced his intellectual development "more than anyone else could have done". However, it still seems easy to trace a line back to the earlier views. For, in the 1980s, von Wright was still maintaining that he had been unable to follow Wittgenstein in his *writings*, the reason being the by now familiar *difference in style* – or a difference in the *style of thought*, as he now specified it. What was new was the idea of having been influenced by Wittgenstein's *example*, which, clearly, could be included among the influences of the "subtle kind" described in the "Biographical sketch" (Von Wright 1982, 11).

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Perception and Intentionality

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Abstract

Can scientific approaches to perception account for intentional content? In this paper I will provide some reasons for denying this, based on a distinction between a subpersonal level of description in which scientific talk of the visual system belongs, and a level of the animal as whole in which talk of intentional content belongs. I proceed to argue that philosophical naturalists tend to conflate these levels of description, but that science remains on a sound track as long as it is understood as providing causal explanation, and not constitutive explanation, as sometimes supposed. I then illustrate how a naturalistic view of perception, namely Quine's, which holds that intentional content can be preserved in terms of talk of the machinery of the visual system, generates conceptual confusions by conflating the two levels of description.

Some philosophers have argued that scientific approaches to perception cannot account for the world-directedness, or intentionality, of perception. That is, perceptual experiences are supposed to have *intentional content* to the effect that things are *thus and so,* which we cannot make sense of in purely scientific terms, such as the terms employed in investigations of the visual system.

Others think that such pessimism is the height of philosophical nonchalance, and that it is up to scientists to determine what is possible to achieve for scientific inquiry. After all, don't cognitive scientists talk about informational transmission in the visual system? Does this notion of informational transmission not imply that states of the visual system can be ascribed intentional content? To say that all scientific work on perception appealing to informational transmission is misconceived, would certainly be a hazardous claim.

In this paper I will exploit and develop some ideas of McDowell to explain how we should understand scientific approaches to perception if we accept the claim that they cannot account for intentional content. In section (I.) I will provide some reasons for this claim, and argue that it is based on a distinction between a subpersonal level of description in which scientific talk of the visual system belongs, and a level of the animal as whole in which talk of intentional content belongs. I proceed to argue that philosophical naturalists tend to conflate these levels of description, but that science remains on a sound track as long as it is understood as providing causal explanation, and not constitutive explanation as sometimes supposed. In section (II.) I illustrate how a naturalistic view of perception, namely Quine's, which holds that the intentionality of perception can be preserved in terms of talk of the machinery of the visual system, generates conceptual confusions by conflating the two levels of description. Finally (III.), I make some concluding remarks.

I. Two Levels of Description and Two Forms of Explanation

According to McDowell, who holds that scientific approaches to perception cannot account for intentional content, we can allow locutions such as 'the eye tells the brain…'. For this sub-personal metaphor of telling is understood in terms of informational transmission between one *part* of an organism and another *part* (hence "sub-personal"). It would be an illegitimate use of language if we extended the metaphor and talked about informational transmission between *part* of an organism (the eye or the

brain) and the *organism* itself (McDowell 1998: 346). Why so? – because we would cross two different metaphors of telling, or two distinct notions of informational transmission. One functions in the account of inner workings, say, the visual system, where one sub-personal part of the animal transmits information to another part. But in the sense in which the eye tells the brain things (i.e. in terms of electrical signals via the optic nerve), nothing tells the animal anything. For in visual perception, what tells the animal things is the sensible environment, and this is a completely different metaphor of telling. These are both metaphors, however, since what does the "telling" has no linguistic capacities.

The essential difference is that the involvement of content in the second metaphor (the environment telling the animal) is literal – the literal truth that the animal becomes informed of things. Any talk of content at the sub-personal level must be understood differently. If it is understood as intentional content, that would be metaphorical use of language, since what the eye transmits to the brain (electrical signals) has no representational structure in virtue of which it can convey intentional content. Nor does it come with subtitles. Moreover, electrical signals are not capable of being subject to reflection about their correctness, which is a requirement for states with intentional content insofar as they are supposed to represent the world correctly or incorrectly.

If we ascribe states with genuine intentional content to (parts of) the visual system, that would be what Bennett and Hacker (2003) call a 'mereological fallacy' – ascribing to a part of an animal what only makes sense to ascribe to the animal as a whole. The descriptive level of the animal (or human being) as a whole – which embraces contentful states such as perceiving and believing – is a different one to the level of its parts and their functioning. For it is the animal that sees, perceives and believes literally speaking, not (parts of) the visual system.

The two levels of description, however, are perfectly compatible. The sub-personal level of inner workings is appealed to in order to explain what happens at the upper level of the animal as a whole. As McDowell puts it:

> [N]obody knows how to make sense of an animal's internal control mechanism, and connect it conceptually to the competence it is supposed to explain, except by describing it *as if* it were, what we know it is not really, a semantic engine, interpreting inputs as signs of environmental facts […] (McDowell 1998: 351).

In other words, the "internal mechanism" (e.g. the visual system) is described in the same terms as those functioning at the level of the human being or animal as a whole, in order to "connect conceptually" with, and enable explanations of, what happens at the latter. The internal mechanism is therefore described as a "semantic machine", that is, dealing with intentional content. Again, this is only metaphorical, for the sense in which we find it useful to talk about content or information being transmitted in the internal mechanism is not the literal sense of taking in or transmitting that things are *thus and so*.

The crucial point is the kind of explanation that is in play here. We can follow McDowell and distinguish between '*causal* explanation' and '*constitutive* explanation' (McDowell 1998: 352). Confusion results when taking the application of content-involving terms to the visual system to belong to the latter, i.e. saying that the content-involving states of the visual system are identical to, or constitute the content-involving states of the animal as whole. For then we would have to cross two categorially distinct notions of informational transmission, that belong to different levels of description. Hence, we should understand the explanation in play as *causal* explanation – explaining what makes genuine content-involving states possible – in terms of metaphorical attributions of content-involving states to the internal machinery, which do not *constitute* the genuine content-involving states in terms of which we describe the animal as whole.[1]

What does this tell us about scientific approaches to perception? Firstly, philosophical reductionist views which hold that states with intentional content can be reduced to states of the internal machinery, seem to be committed to conflate the categorially distinct notions of informational transmission and the two levels of description. For according to such reductionism, talk of states with intentional contents can be reduced to talk of states that cannot literally be ascribed conceptual contents. Secondly, it may well be that scientists themselves talk as if the notion of content-involving informational transmission in the visual system is literal. But denying this, on the basis of conceptual reasons, is not lack of respect for science. It is to free it from conceptual confusions that everyone, including scientists, can fall into. It is to assist it to remain on a sound track. What scientists can tell us is what makes animal and human perception possible, in terms of how mechanisms of the visual system are necessary causal conditions, not that perceiving something is really a causal impact on, or state of, the visual system or its parts.

II. Reductive Naturalism: Quine's View of Perception

To illustrate the point, let us consider Quine's view of perceptual experience as 'stimulation of sensory receptors' (Quine 1969: 75). As a subject for the naturalized epistemology he envisages, Quine asks us to imagine a human being who is accorded a certain experimentally controlled input, for instance certain patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies. In due course the human being delivers as output a description of the three-dimensional external world and its history. According to Quine, this might be studied to see "[…] how evidence relates to theory, and in what ways one's theory of nature transcends any available

evidence." For "[o]ur retinas are irradiated in two dimensions, yet we see things as three-dimensional without conscious inference." (Quine 1969: 83f). That is why Quine thinks one's 'theory of nature' (the description of the three-dimensional world) *transcends* the available 'evidence' (the irradiation of one's sensory receptors). It is, according to Quine, a "torrential output" transcending a "meagre input" (Quine 1969: 83f). As he formulates the point elsewhere:

> Science itself tells us that our information about the world is limited to irritations of our surfaces, and then the epistemological question is in turn a question within science: the question how we human animals can have managed to arrive at science from such limited information. (Quine 1981: 72)

This is misguided. If experience is conceived along these lines then it is not 'evidence' that can be 'transcended' by contentful 'output' – whether this be descriptions, beliefs, theories of nature, or other. To be sure, one informational content can transcend another informational content, *but only if they are 'informational contents' in the same sense.* Surface irritations, that is, the stream of photons striking the retinas, cannot have informational or intentional content literally speaking. For reasons explained above, surface irritations have no intentional content in the sense in which perceptual beliefs, judgements, or descriptions of the environment have intentional content. Consequently, surface irritations are not the *information* or *evidence* on the basis of which we describe our surroundings. What science can tell us is that surface irritations are causal conditions which enable us having requisite evidence or acquiring information, *not* that 'our information about the world is limited to irritations of our surfaces'. What I see, read, hear or get told may be 'information about the world'. But the stream of photons and sound waves are not. No matter how necessary such irradiation is for acquiring information, it does not *constitute* the information one acquires.

Quine is surely right that irradiation of the retinas is two-dimensional, while we describe the world as three-dimensional. But that we describe the world as three-dimensional is not a *transcendence* of our evidence on which we justify our descriptions. For our evidence is that *we have seen that the world is three-dimensional*, not two-dimensional irradiation causally implicated with the nerve endings in the retinas. Going from the sub-personal level of scientific description (irradiation of our retinas) to the upper (what we see and so might describe) is a source of fundamental conceptual confusion. To say that the output (in terms of beliefs about, or descriptions of, the three-dimensional surroundings) *transcends* the input (in terms of irradiation of our retinas) makes no sense. For as indicated, what is transcending must be described (at least be describable) in the same terms as what is transcended. Otherwise there is no way to make sense of the transcendence relation. Here they are described in completely different terms. Furthermore, it would not help if we altered the terms of description so that they would be in the same content-involving terms, for then we would conflate two categorially distinct notions of content, one of which is literal and one of which is irreducibly metaphorical.[2]

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[1] Hornsby makes similar points (Hornsby 1997: 159, 167), but follow Dennett in speaking of 'levels of explanation'. I cannot argue here whether it is correct or not to take the levels of description as essentially about "explanation". For a critical view with regard to this, see Bennett and Hacker (2003). The distinction that I have invoked is primarily about sense; what we can correctly say of, or ascribe to, the animal as whole *versus* the internal machinery.

[2] Nor, of course, does Quine conceive the transcendence itself in terms of 'irritations of our surfaces'. That is, he is not finding it baffling that the sound-waves coming out of someone's mouth in making a description of what she perceives are more intense than the irradiation of their sensory receptors which supposedly prompted the utterance. As if more flashing of light, loud noises, more heat and less cold would make this relation more intelligible and less surprising to Quine. But in the terms he puts it, that is actually the only way his statement can turn out coherent.

By the same token, Quine's input is not "meagre" in comparison with his "torrential" output. That would only make sense to say were the input and output described i) in the same terms, and if so, ii) with the same literal sense, (which, of course, is not necessarily to say the output would be true). The appearance of disparity between input and output is an illusion, generated by conflating two levels of description.

III. Conclusion

It has been claimed that denying a naturalization of intentional content is to disregard cognitive science. In this paper I have tried to disarm this worry. For pointing out conceptual confusions that one can fall into is not to disregard or disrespect cognitive science. The point is only that occurrences studied by natural science, such as irritation of sensory nerve-endings, *make possible* the perceptual experiences with intentional content that the animal has. They therefore belong to *causal* explanations. Such explanations of the visual system are not a substitute for thinking straight about perceptual experience as genuinely content-involving. True, we might use the same (seemingly content-involving) terms in describing the inner workings of an organism and the happenings at the level of perceptive animals as whole. But they are not used in the same sense. If we are misled by the similarity between literal and figurative use of language, we easily conflate two levels of description.

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The Role of Education in Culture:
An Understanding in Wittgenstein´s Philosophy

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Abstract

Man's existence on the earth is marked by the evolutionary history in terms of his anthropological development as well as his ever-growing interpersonal relations through representations of the general facets and occasional conflicts. In this sense, we can say the arts, literature, folk songs, are nothing but the representation of such relationships only. But these are only a smaller part of that broad framework. Here the modes of representations contain, at a more comprehensive level, man's way of looking at the world at large, and at further cosmic level, his way of looking at the entire universe. These modes of representations are collectively called Culture. In this context, a thorough investigation can be proposed for a healthy and solidifying influence of culture on man, as man's existence is rooted in the culture with respect to time and space. Thus, the aim of this paper is to explore Wittgenstein's notion of education in culture.

Man's existence on the earth is marked by the evolutionary history in terms of his anthropological development as well as his ever-growing interpersonal relations through representations of the general facets and occasional conflicts. In this sense, we can say the arts, literature, folk songs, are nothing but the representation of such relationships only. But these are only a smaller part of that broad framework. Here the modes of representations contain, at a more comprehensive level, man's way of looking at the world at large, and at further cosmic level, his way of looking at the entire universe. These modes of representations are collectively called Culture. In this context, a thorough investigation can be proposed for a healthy and solidifying influence of culture on man, as man's existence is rooted in the culture with respect to time and space. Thus, the aim of this paper is to explore Wittgenstein's notion of education in culture.

For Wittgenstein, the concept of culture is more ethical and sociological than scientific. For him, culture does not merely meant tools of civilization and the technological advancement exhibited through its industries and scientific achievements. His notion of culture comprised of moralities and decorum of the society, religion, ethics, language and its mode of apprehending the world and nature. Culture for Wittgenstein was closely related to values. In his words,

> A culture is like a big organization which assigns each of its members a place where he can work in the spirit of the whole; and it is perfectly fair for his power to be measured by the contribution he succeeds in making to the whole enterprise. In an age without culture on the other hand forces become fragmented and the power of an individual man is used up in overcoming opposing forces and frictional resistances; it does not know in the distance he travels but perhaps only in the heat he generates in overcoming friction. ... I realize then that disappearance of a culture does not signify the disappearance of human value, but simply of certain means of expressing this value, yet the fact remains that I have no sympathy for the current of European civilization and do not understand its goals. (Wittgenstein 1980: 6)

Education is the core component of culture. It is the way through which cultural values and norms are transferred from one generation to another. Education builds of the mindset of the individuals by providing them with parameters of rights and wrongs of behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs in a particular culture. Apart from learning from experience, cultural norms and belief-systems are instilled in the younger generation through education in schools. Hence, there is lot of thrust on curriculum, ways of teaching, teacher-learner relationship, etc. in the debate about how and what kind of education should be imparted to the children.

Culture is the collective expression of people living together. The language that people speaks carries the shared beliefs, traditions and norms of a particular culture. A culture can live and maintain its distinct identity among host of other cultures only, if these are truthfully imparted to the younger generation. The way in which this teaching is done can have a profound impact on the way these norms are received by the younger generation. It is the duty of the older generation to impart all those essential elements of their culture without being prejudiced about what they particularly do not like, without missing core values etc. For, new learners may be carried away easily by the attractive teachings of a competing culture in case they are not provided enough food for their brains in their own culture.

Education acts as a catalyst in binding people within a society. It helps people in socializing and prepares the younger generation for challenging roles that they are expected to play in their later stages of life. It enables children to learn their distinct cultural identity. It acts as a disseminator of cultural values and norms. It opens up the minds of its learners by introducing to them new ways of thinking, attitudes and belief systems. It helps in specializing learners for different professions and thus channelizes their creative abilities in the fields they are best fitted in. It develops sense of living rightly in society, fosters creative abilities, and instills moral preferences in the individuals.

The aim of the schooling is to not just to impart academic skills to the learners, but also transmit the socio-cultural values of the society to the learners. Schools are the mirrors of society at large. The kind of hierarchies, control, administration, norms, laws exist in society, the same in small form exist in schools as well. In a society, where there is no mono-framework of value system, but different value-systems exist and cohabit together, it is pertinent that the schooling methodology must incorporate different value systems in its educational program. If education at large is to be inherently purposeful, socially relevant and individually beneficial, then the elements of multiculturalism cannot be ignored. It does not become a matter of

choosing options between adopting mono or multi frameworks in educational patterns, but rather it becomes a matter of survival of the society itself. As long as different ethnic groups remain in minority in a given society, their particular needs or value-system can be ignored, but as they expand out of their cloistered seclusions, and become part of mainstream society at different levels of social interaction, political, law and governance, they voice their concern and demand right to be treated sensitively by mainstream society. To avoid clashes at such times, it is necessary that cultural sensitivity be garnered at grass root level, i.e in schools themselves.

This can be achieved by right methods of socialization among students. Cultural behavior is the result of interactive socialization of the human beings, and this process of socialization is always context-specific. The members participating in the socializing activities come with their particular historical and ethnic background with their particular parameters of likes and dislikes inherited to them by their societies. The aim of education is although to treat every learner as equal to the other, but it should not be at the cost of disregarding the important differences that exist between different learners. Such a forcible equation would tend to either marginalize those ethnic groups in minority in the class, or amalgamate them within the majority. Either option is detrimental to multi-cultural growth and sensitivity of the learners. Human beings are not cultural abstractions. Rather, culture itself is not an abstraction. Culture is always this or that culture, because in this or that culture only, we can study the underlying principles existing in all the cultures. Thus, cultural differences of the learners within a multi-cultural class need to be taken in consideration while formulating polices at higher level.

Wittgenstein's contribution to education can be examined at various levels. His insistence on the ordinary language as the proper object of study languages can be seen as the proper medium of teaching to the learners. Further, his insistence on clarification of thoughts more significant can be seen as significant in analyzing various concepts of the field of education itself. Rather, Dolhenty finds that, the biggest contribution of Wittgenstein to the field of education is the clarification of pedagogical tools itself. With his insistence on clarification of thoughts as the proper object of philosophy, analytical philosophy can contribute a lot in clarifying the intellectual muddle that has been created in the field of pedagogy. Whereas formal analysis, as distinguished by Kneller, relates to analysis of scientific discourse, it is the informal analysis of ordinary language which is more important as it is the, "language of more general thinking, the language in which common discourse takes place, the language of many disciplines of knowledge outside of the sphere of science as it has become understood. Informal analysis is more inclusive, causal and unsystematic, attempting to examine concepts and statements in the language in which they occur." (Dolhenty, Jonathan, 2015) This analysis is necessary because the terms used in education are taken from ordinary day language that is used by people and are therefore polysemous in nature. That is, these terms have more than one meaning. Without properly clarifying what usage does the educator has in mind while communicating to the learner, such terms can cause unnecessary confusion and obscure the real intentions of the educators. This defeats the purpose of education which is imparting knowledge to the children. If children are getting only confused and unintended ideas of the teachers in the end, of what use is the education then? Dolhenty's observation here deserves a full quote:

Consider, for example, the word "understands". What does it mean to understand something? Does the term "understand" means the same thing to an educational philosopher as it does to an experimental psychologist investigating learning styles, to a school administrator enforcing the rules of a school, or to a mother teaching her daughter to bake a cake? Does it mean the same thing to understand a rule in mathematics as it does to understand the concept of democracy? Does one verify understanding of historical concepts the same way one verifies an understanding of a school regulation? Is understanding a recipe the same as understanding the meaning of a word? (Dolhenty, 2015)

Since education is usually imparted in ordinary language, analyses of ordinary language concepts help diffuse the confusion that surrounds these polysemous words used in the field of education. It can further help to build a compact, tightly structured terminology of Education itself in return. It is also necessary because of the fact of very purpose of education. The purpose of education is to enlighten the students, impart knowledge of this world, the history and geography of their particular socio-cultural reality. These are all problems pertaining to life which are addressed by people generally and academically also, but not in structured languages of sciences, but every day, common ordinary language in which they speak. Education heavily borrows the concepts from general life discourse to impart this knowledge to the learners. If it will go on using these concepts with their varied meanings, it will be imparting only confused and incoherent ideas to the learners. Thus, it becomes imperative that the language of education in which the culture is to be transferred to younger generations be clear of confused, incoherent or biased attitudes of the educators.

Since many of the conceptual problems arise only because of the ill-use of language, the proposal to clarify concepts first can help enormously in clearing many ideas about what should be the proper goal of education. Wittgenstein's concept of language-game has proved enormous in clarifying these conceptual muddles. Outside academia, it can provide new perspectives to the learners whereby they can have new look at the distinct ethnic-social phenomena in their society. In a multi-cultural society, this could help in fostering social understanding between the competing learners. If learners just try to see the logic of other-ethnic activities in their proper context (in their own language-games, to use Wittgenstein's phrase), they might be able to see the sense of them, which earlier would not be so sensible to them. It could be most effective in imparting education of religion as by that students can be, "made aware that the domain of religion, though one worthy of engaged attention, involves uncertainty and controversy and the question of religious faith and practice is therefore a matter for personal reflective evaluation, decision and response." (Mclaughlin, 1995: 296). It can go a long way in establishing an objective way of evaluating things in the learners which is most importantly required in the education system of multi-cultural society. Language-game can connect learners to different *forms of life* which earlier they thought was one and universally valid. They come to realize that there is no universally true, absolute form of life, or way of living that is true and binding for all the people on earth. Just as there are many language-games, there are many forms of life. People can live differently, hold different views about same reality, act in many different ways which depends upon the different socio-cultural background they are embedded in. Language-games thus aid in introducing and cementing the cultural relativism and pluralism in learner's attitudes.

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This is especially beneficial for religious education whereby pupils can get acquainted to different forms of life (scientific rationality, religious rationality and so on) or frames of references. In Culture and Value, he writes,

> It strikes me that a religious belief could only be something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference. Hence, although it is a belief, its really a way of living, or a way of assessing life. It's passionately seizing hold of this interpretation. Instruction in a religious faith, therefore, would have to take the form of a portrayal, a description, of that system of reference, while at the same time being an appeal to conscience. And this combination would have to result in the pupil himself, of his own accord, passionately taking hold of the system of reference. It would be as though someone were first to let me see the hopelessness of my situation and then show me the means of rescue until, of my own accord, or not at any rate led to it by my instructor, I ran to it and grasped it. (Wittgenstein 1980, 64)

Thus, modern man has progressed in all external spheres of life with the help of science and technology. But there is no corresponding development to his inner life. Modern man has the control of the force of material nature but there has been no simultaneous development of control over the inner psychological nature. If human race does not evolve its spiritual culture and remains satisfy with material progress it will perish. It is for acquiring material benefits that the Europeans at one time enslaved Afro-Asian countries. Unless human race is directed towards the spiritual its material pursuits will continue. If human race is to survive there is no other alternative for it but become spiritual.

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Wittgenstein's Influence in Dennett's Theory of Free Will

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Abstract

In this paper, I shall present two points of resemblance between Wittgenstein's *Lectures on Freedom of the Will* and Daniel Dennett's theory on free will. I shall begin with their critique of determinism and specifically with what determinism doesn't entails. Then, I shall try to demonstrate how they both insist on the importance of the perspective to adopt to avoid any mistakes regarding our free will.

1. Introduction

In one of his articles, Dennett claims that "wherever progress is stalled on a philosophical problem, a tactic worth trying is to find some shared (and hence largely unexamined) assumption and deny it". (Dennett 1984, 553) In fact, that's exactly what he's doing when writing about the free will problem. One of the largely and unexamined assumption he wants to deny is the assumption that in the presence of a deterministic world no one can be free or responsible for what one has done or will do. As it turns out, Wittgenstein also examined that assumption in his seminar *Lectures on Freedom of the Will*. Considering that Dennett characterises himself a huge fan of Wittgenstein in *Consciousness Explained* and the points of resemblance between them both it is justified to suspect a potential of influence from Wittgenstein into Dennett's work. I shall present two major points of resemblance between the two by strictly referring to Wittgenstein's seminar primarily because the influence from the *Philosophical Investigations* is well known and not to be questioned. As for the work of Dennett, I will mainly refer to his first book on free will *Elbow Room* and his most recent *Freedom Evolves.* The two points of resemblance I want to explore are (1) the denial of the implication made by the incompatibilist between determinism and inevitability and (2) the perspective from which to observe the concept of responsibility and free will.

2. Examining the thesis: determinism implies inevitability

In *Lectures on Freedom of the Will*, Wittgenstein opens his seminar with the following question: "Could one say that the decision of a person was not free because it was determined by natural laws?" This question addresses in fact the position of the incompatibilist supporting that in the presence of a deterministic world governed by natural laws in which "there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future" (Dennett 2003, 25) there would be no place for some sort of free will. Intrigued by the power natural laws seemed to hold, Wittgenstein begins to examine how we use the term "natural laws" in our assessment of the chain of causes and effects around us. In doing so, it become clearer that the issue relies in fact in the understanding of what it mean to follow a natural law:

> Our decisions are determined by the circumstances of our education and our whole anatomy. We don't know in what way they are determined. We can't predict except in very rare circumstances and then very roughly. All the same it is reasonable to think they follow natural laws and are determined." "They follow natural laws" would only mean that one day we may, though it is

most misleading and out of the question in fact, forecast a man's actions. But thinking this is no reason for our saying that if the decisions follow natural laws – that if we know the laws which they follow – they are therefore in some way *compelled*. (Wittgenstein 1998: 14)

In fact, Wittgenstein seems to believe that the term "law" might be misleading whereas the term implies something more than a regularity someone can observe. To put it differently: "the usage of the word natural law connects, one might say, to a certain kind of fatalism". (Wittgenstein 1998: 14) To the idea that somewhere lays a book that contains all the laws of nature that governed the universe within which we find ourselves. From a fatalistic point of view, the future wouldn't be up to us, it would have been settled way before we were born, everything we do would be inevitable. Except, what does it mean to say that an event is inevitable by someone? Wittgenstein claims in his seminar that he thought that the whole point of the inevitability laid in the regularity of the observations. So why someone would compare itself with a falling stone, asked Wittgenstein. It's seems to be to avoid responsibility. But even if that were the case Wittgenstein doesn't see a "reason why, even if there was regularity in human decisions, I should not be free. There is nothing about regularity which makes anything free or not free" (Wittgenstein 1998: 18) In essence, the first part of his seminar is a critic of the incompatibilist's position based on a psychological bias where you may be incline to deny the moral responsibility of an agent based on a regularity that may or may not be there. In fact, Wittgenstein concludes claiming: "I can't see why they should not have held that a human being is responsible, and yet held that his decisions are (…) determined, meaning that people may find natural laws (but nothing else)". (Wittgenstein 1998: 26)

Let us now turn our attention toward Dennett's approach on determinism to try and see if we can find a resemblance with Wittgenstein. In many of his publications, Dennett tries to demonstrate that determinism is not something to be afraid of. That despite the fact that science can show certain regularities in the world, and more recently in the human anatomy or even behaviour, we can still have a kind of free will worth wanting.

In *Freedom Evolves* Dennett uses a game – The Conway's Game of Life – as a deterministic world from which he can show that events can be avoided. From this game he attempts to examine a myriad of concepts involved in the free will debate, like the concept of chance or opportunity, to show that in the end it's all a question of perspective. But we'll come back to this point in the next section. Our main concern at this point is to understand how Dennett denies the thesis defended by the incompatibilist that determinism entails inevitability. In order to do so we have

to understand what it means and what it entails to say that an event is "inevitable" What are we saying exactly when we say that something is inevitable? According to Dennett, it means *"unavoidable"* something that can't be avoided. But what thing and avoided by who? In the Game of Life, which is in fact a two-dimensional grid of pixels, Dennett presents three levels from which we can observe and talk about what going on in this grid. What he comes to argue is that the more distance you take from it; the more complex your ontology of what exists grows. You can't talk about avoiding something when you refer to a single cell at the first level, but if you talk about a mass of cell from the second level, you can begin to detect some patterns, some design, and some persistence. A mass of cell can be observed to resist certain encounter or seize to exist after it. When playing the game you can design it so that a mass of your choosing survives longer by avoiding other masses. In doing so, you are giving the opportunity to an individual, given its design, to avoid certain events in a completely deterministic universe. Hence the following reasoning upon which Dennett arrives:

- In some deterministic worlds there are avoiders avoiding harms.
- Therefore in some deterministic worlds some things are avoided.
- Whatever is avoided is avoidable or evitable.
- Therefore in some deterministic worlds not everything is inevitable.
- Therefore determinism does not imply inevitability. (Dennett 2003, 56)

Having said that, Dennett wishes to alter the following and familiar implication: "If determinism is true, then whatever happens is the *inevitable* outcome of the complete set of causes that obtain at each moment" which is the same implication Wittgenstein drew from determinism, by replacing the term "inevitable" with "determined" which give us: "If determinism is true, then whatever happens is the *determined* outcome of the complete set of causes that obtain at each moment". (Dennett 2003, 56-57) This distinction is significant because it gives us some elbowroom for concept such as chance, opportunity, and even moral responsibility. By stating that even if determinism is true, certain events can be avoided, Dennett is walking the same road as Wittgenstein before him in believing that determinism is not to be associated with fatalism on the basis of the laws of nature. They both admit that there are regularities in the universe that can be observed but this isn't enough to grant the future inevitable.

Of course, one could object that "determined avoiding isn't real avoiding because it doesn't actually change the outcome." (Dennett 2003, 59) Because, lets face it, the avoiding presented in the Game of Life is a determined one. In fact, that objection brings us to the second point of resemblance between Wittgenstein and Dennett and represent, I think, the heart of the influence that Wittgenstein could have had on Dennett because of the impact it has on all his philosophical views, it's the notion of perspective.

3. A question of perspective

It would seem that when we express ourselves on a day to day basis we believe that the future is open to us, that possibilities exist, that we are able to make choices and act on them. Then again that intuition seems often undermined when a scientific team discovers something new about the human brain or about our cognition. The more we learn about the human mind the more mechanical it gets, and the more our perspective on ourselves shifts.

Fatalism was an example of that pattern. Well, that's what Wittgenstein pointed out in 1939 and what Dennett also pointed out in 2003. With that in mind, let us turn to one of the last passage of Wittgenstein's seminar:

> When we talk of choosing and someone says this is not compatible with calculating our choice, we might say: "Then our choice simply depends on our ignorance. If we weren't as ignorant as we are we should have no choice". You might say: "Our apprehension of freewill is only due to our ignorance of the laws of nature". It looks as if, if we knew these laws, we should know we have no freewill. On the other hand we could say: "If we knew these laws then our will wouldn't be free", in the sense in which one might say: "If I had prophesied to Mr. Malcolm what he was going to choose tomorrow and he had read my prophecy, then he would not deliberate." (Wittgenstein 1998: 62)

This passage, I believe, is of great importance. There are many resemblances with Dennett in it but I shall focus my attention on one: the idea that the future is open to us and that we have a choice to make is due to our ignorance of the laws of nature. As it turns out, it is a key element in Dennett's theory of free will.

In fact, Dennett introduces in *Elbow Room* a natural and evolutionist theory of free will, which means, that free will is presented by Dennett as a natural feature humans acquired. They are able to seek information surrounding them, analyse it, and act upon it. For him, "the confusion arises when one tries to maintain two perspectives on the universe at once: the "God's eye" perspective that sees past and future all laid out before it, and the engaged perspective of an agent *within* the universe". (Dennett 2003, 93) As pointed out earlier, science gives us information about the universe, and based on this information we are able to make certain prediction about the future. In his chapter "Acting Under the Idea of Freedom", Dennett attempts to design a perfect deliberator that turn out to be an illustration of our own faculties of deliberation. In the end, he concludes the following:

> So the manifest image of any deliberator will include a partitioning of things into some that are to emerge as the results of the deliberator's deliberation – things that are thus "up to" the deliberator – and things, predictable or not, fixed or not, that are not up to the deliberator. It is this epistemic openness, this possibility-for-all-one-knows, that provides the elbow room required for deliberation. Even if one knew one's decision was determined, but did not know what decision one was determined to make, one would be in a position in which there would be a sound rationale in favor of the policy of deliberating. (Dennett 2015: 123)

So this intuition that we have an open future would be the result of our perspective from an agent within the universe with limited knowledge while its opponent would be the result of our attempt to maintain a higher perspective. When all's considered, Dennett claims that the rational thing to do is deliberate. The deterministic or indeterministic nature of the universe doesn't affect the problem. What we want, the free will worth wanting is one where we are able to be responsible for the choice we make, because we are making them, because from our perspective, which is from the manifest image, there are such things as chances and opportunities. The illusion might as well be the idea that we will one day elevate ourselves to the God's eye view. Therefore, are we really avoiding something when we're talking of determined avoidance? Yes, because as far as we know there was a possibility and we avoided it.

4. Conclusion

To summarize, Dennett presents determinism from a new angle from which the theses that were leading to incompatibilistic theories are no longer necessarily true. Determinism doesn't imply inevitability anymore due to his natural and evolutionist approach. Taken into account the human's changing nature Dennett presents determinism like something stable that answer to constants without them constraining the agent to the point that he's left without any possibilities. By including epistemic possibilities, Dennett brings back the rational idea of deliberating within a world that may or may not be determined. Even if Wittgenstein wasn't advocating for any precise position in the free will debate, I think it is justified to admit an influence from his seminar into Dennett's position. Not only are they both criticizing determinism and for the same reasons, they both reduce the exclusion of moral responsibility and free will to a question of perspective.

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Seeing the Same Thing Differently

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Abstract

Perception is often quite correctly said to be the primary source of knowledge. "Seeing is believing" is an idiom which stresses the authority of perception over belief and knowledge. However, in this paper I shall not discuss the traditional epistemological problem of how perception gives rise to knowledge and belief, rather, I will draw in the opposite direction and ask, how perception depends on knowledge and belief. In what sense, if any, do our beliefs affect or shape what we see? A positive answer to this question necessitates a distinction between different senses of the verb "seeing", one which is logically independent of beliefs, expectations, etc., and one which isn't. Questioning the view that the latter can be analyzed in terms of the former plus belief, I will argue for the controversial claim that this distinction applies to different forms of seeing.

Perception is often quite correctly said to be the primary source of knowledge. "Seeing is believing" is an idiom which stresses the authority of perception over belief and knowledge. However, in this paper I shall not discuss the traditional epistemological problem of how perception gives rise to knowledge and belief, rather, I will draw in the opposite direction and ask, how perception depends on knowledge and belief. In what sense, if any, do our beliefs affect or shape what we see? A positive answer to this question necessitates a distinction between different senses of the verb "seeing", one which is logically independent of beliefs, expectations, etc., and one which isn't. Questioning the view that the latter can be analyzed in terms of the former plus belief, I will argue for the controversial claim that this distinction applies to different forms of seeing.

1. The Hanson Question

The American philosopher of science Norwood Russell Hanson raises an interesting question:

> Let us consider Johannes Kepler: imagine him on a hill watching the dawn. With him is Tycho Brahe. Kepler regarded the sun as fixed: it was the earth that moved. But Tycho followed Ptolemy and Aristotle in this much at least: the earth was fixed and all other celestial bodies moved around it. *Do Kepler and Tycho see the same thing in the east at dawn?* (Hanson 1965, 5)

Since Hanson does not get the astronomical details straight, let me first clarify the question. The Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe (1546-1601) believed that the planets revolve around the sun but that the sun revolves around the earth. His later assistant Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) on the other hand believed that all planets, including the earth, revolve around the sun. Thus, the two astronomers agree about the movement of all the planets but planet earth. However, from where the two astronomers are looking at the sun, daylight neither depends on earth's moving around the sun, nor the sun's moving around the earth since daylight is causally related to the earth's own rotation about its axis. As to that, these two astronomers had no disagreement, it is their intellectual role models, Ptolemy and Copernicus, who had different views about the rotation of planet earth. For the sake of argument, however, I suggest that we stick to Hanson's story and just suppose that the sunrise for Tycho is a matter of the earth's revolving around the sun, whereas Kepler thinks that the spot from which he is standing is coming to face the sun.

The question Hanson raises is simple: Are the two astronomers seeing the same thing, when they look at the sun in the early morning? One might feel inclined to give the following straightforward answer: Tycho and Kepler both see the same thing, the *sun*, they just have different *beliefs* about that object. Interestingly, this answer doesn't satisfy Hanson, who neither denies that Tycho and Kepler are both aware of the same physical object when looking at the sun, nor that they have different beliefs about the object they see. What Hanson tries to bring out is that 'in some sense' Tycho and Kepler cannot be said to *see* the same thing. Given the beliefs they have, Tycho and Kepler see something different when looking at the sun at dawn. Tycho does not just see the sun; he also observes a sunrise. Kepler, on the other hand, cannot be said to observe a sunrise, since in his view the sun is neither rising nor falling.

Hanson uses this example to make a case for the "theory-ladeness" of both scientific observation and everyday perceptual experience. Our perception of the external world is not a neutral source of knowledge but depends on the beliefs and theories we have about the world. He provides many examples in support of the thesis that observation is theory-laden. Some of his examples draw on the difference between experts with scientific knowledge and laypersons; others address the perception of ambiguous figures such as the famous Necker cube, which apparently does not require knowledge. Hanson is not careful enough in spelling out these details and can be accused of glossing over the subtle differences between scientific observation and aspectual seeing. But the general conclusion he draws from his discussion of these examples are philosophically rewarding and made an impact on thinkers no less prominent than Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend.

2. Hanson on Observational Seeing

In this section, I will argue that Hanson's answer to his question is not satisfying. He first points out that an affirmative answer to the question whether Tycho and Kepler see the same thing cannot merely allude to the fact that they have the same retinal images. They both see the sun, but not a retinal image of the sun. Hanson conjectures that their seeing the same thing, which is essential to make the question intellectually attractive, needs to be explained in terms of their sharing a visual experience, not in terms of retinal images.

Second, Hanson argues against the idea that the difference in what the two astronomers see is a question of *in-*

terpretation. Tycho and Kepler are not having the same visual experience giving different interpretations to it, first and foremost, because to see something is to do *one* thing, not two. Furthermore, one does not refer to interpretation when recognizing a different aspect in an ambiguous figure. Ordinarily, interpretation is a time-consuming process similar to thinking, but to see the sun or an aspect of the Necker cube does not take time, nor does one have to think of anything in particular. Wittgenstein's influence on Hanson's considerations is evident: "Ist das Auffallen [dawning of an aspect] Schauen + Denken? Nein. Viele unserer Begriffe *kreuzen* sich hier" (Wittgenstein, PI, xi).

Third, Hanson discusses ambiguous figures, claiming what changes in aspectual seeing is the *organization* of what one sees. The organization is not itself an element in the visual field, such as the lines and colors of a drawing, but "rather the way in which elements are appreciated" (Hanson 1965, 13). Later, he generalizes this claim from the perception of ambiguous figures to ordinary cases of seeing: "Seeing is not only the having of a visual experience; it is also *the way* in which the visual experience is had." Note that linguistically "the way in which an experience is had" calls for adverbial qualification, but for Hanson, the way in which an experience is had depends on the knowledge, experience, and theories of the perceiver.

To accommodate the relation between seeing and knowledge, Hanson turns to the verb 'seeing that', which supposedly "threads knowledge into our seeing" (Hanson 1965, 22). Unfortunately, this section is not a piece of clarity, particularly because Hanson sticks to this metaphor. He contents himself with the knowledge being "there in the seeing not an adjunct of it" just as the pattern of threads is there in the cloth and not tacked on to it. Fair enough, to see that the light bulb will break if it is dropped on a stone, one needs to know something about light bulbs. But the metaphor of knowledge threading into our seeing merely states that the knowledge is not superimposed onto visual impressions, and does not explain the conceptual relations between seeing and knowledge.

3. Seeing Objects and Seeing Facts

One of the most detailed examinations of the verb "seeing" is Fred Dretske's book *Seeing and Knowing* (1969). In this section, I will argue that Dretske's distinction between seeing objects and seeing facts makes a substantial contribution to answering the Hanson question. Dretske famously promotes the idea of what he calls "non-epistemic seeing". Seeing, he claims, normally involves knowledge or beliefs about what is seen. When I see a cat, I normally believe that it is a cat what I am seeing. But this implication does not generally hold. Dretske argues that there is a way of seeing, which does not imply that the perceiver is aware of what he or she is seeing.

Non-epistemic seeing, or "simple seeing", as he will call it later, is consistent with having no beliefs about the perceived object, it has "zero belief content" (Dretske 1969: 5). In addition to this negative criterion, he also gives a definition: To see something non-epistemically is to "visually differentiate it from its immediate environment" by the way it looks (Dretske 1969, 20). For present purposes, I will ignore the difficulties of this definition and just assume that the verb "to see" has an extensional kernel, such that reports of seeing not necessarily imply belief attributions. Note that paradigmatic cases of non-epistemic seeing involve physical objects or other features that can be visually differentiated. Applied to the case of Tycho and Kepler, we

could say that the two astronomers both non-epistemically see the sun.

Dretske contrasts non-epistemic seeing with epistemic seeing ('seeing that'). We not only see objects, events, and properties, we also see facts. When we see that the water is boiling, we do not just see the boiling water in non-epistemic fashion, that is, without knowing that it is water which is boiling, but we see that it is water and that it is boiling. Thus, seeing that the water is boiling is epistemic insofar as it is inconsistent with having no beliefs about the perceived object. Dretske also gives a sophisticated definition for epistemic seeing, which I will not discuss in detail here. Roughly, for a person to see that the apple in front of her is red, she needs to differentiate the apple visually, the apple has to be red, since 'seeing that' is factive, and she somehow has to take the apple to be red by the way it looks.

Heil (1982) criticizes Dretske's account to non-epistemic seeing, arguing that seeing always implies the acquisition of beliefs. He thinks that Dretske's examples for non-epistemic seeing are compatible with a doxastic account to perception, once we drop the assumption, that the perceiver always has to be aware of what he believes. According to Heil, there is no need to tell apart two sorts of seeing, an epistemic and a non-epistemic sort since all seeing is epistemic.

However, it is interesting to follow Heil's attempt to answer the Hanson question. He thinks that the question is nothing more than an invitation for confusion: There are not two ways of seeing, but two different ways of characterizing beliefs. Tycho and Kepler see the same object, but they have different beliefs. One way to characterize a belief is to ask for its *content*, but another way of characterizing a belief is to ask for the belief's *object*, that is, the state of affairs which gives rise to the belief. Thus, in the sense, in which Tycho and Kepler see the same thing when looking at the sun, we are focusing on the object of their beliefs. But in the sense in which they don't see the same, we are focusing on the content of their beliefs.

Apart from being a slap in the face of Wittgenstein, Heil's remarks take us back to what I called the "straightforward answer". Hanson denies neither that Tycho and Kepler have different beliefs, nor that they see the same physical object. The point he tries to hammer home is that their *seeing* is different, *because of their respective beliefs*. According to Heil, they make the same observations but use them differently because of their individual beliefs. Hanson thinks that this is "too easy" and "would not explain controversy in science: "Were there no sense in which they were different observations they could not be used differently" (Hanson 1965, 19). In defense of Hanson's insistence, we could also hold against Heil that their *seeing* must be different because of a difference in perceptual content. How come that Tycho and Kepler form different beliefs, given the fact that they make the same observation?

4. Seeing Something "under a Description"

There is a more fundamental objection to the kind of answer that Dretske's account to epistemic seeing would provide. It is almost certainly true that Tycho and Kepler both see the sun, and that "seeing the dawn was for Tycho [...] to see that the earth's brilliant satellite was beginning its diurnal circuit around us, while for Kepler [...] it was to see that the earth was spinning them back into the light of our local star" (Hanson 1965, 20). And it is also almost certainly true that this kind of perceptual undertaking requires knowledge. But "seeing that *p*" is a factive construction,

that is, you cannot see that *p* if *p* is false. The Hanson question cannot be answered by pointing out that Tycho and Kepler see different facts since Tycho did not get the facts straight in the first place.

Hanson tries to weaken the facticity of 'seeing that' in making both, *seeing as* and *seeing that*, "logical elements" of the concept of seeing, the former not being factive. He is campaigning for a *conceptual* notion of seeing, that is not factive. But this is not achieved by making 'seeing that' and 'seeing as' ingredients of our ordinary notion of seeing — no more than making an inconsistent set of propositions consistent by adding logical tautologies.

What could help to give a complete answer to the Hanson question is Anscombe's notion of seeing something "under a description" (Anscombe 1965). Usually, we don't just non-epistemically see an object, we see the object under a certain description: For a person to see a cat is for her to see something under the description of a cat; for a person to see a hungry cat is for her to see something under the description of a hungry cat. Note that the construction generates an intensional context just like constructions with 'seeing that'.

Furthermore, the phrase "seeing something under a description" also illuminates the metaphor of "knowledge threading into seeing". For a person to see something under a description is for her to know what the world would be like, given her experience was true. You can see some-thing under the description of a cat, only if you are familiar with the concept of a cat, and when you see something under this description, this piece of knowledge is exercised. There need not be a cat in your visual field, but you know what would have to be the case if your seeing was true, viz., there being a cat.

Now, do Tycho and Kepler see the same thing? They both see the sun, but they see the sun differently, insofar as they see it under different descriptions. Tycho sees the sun under the description of a rising celestial body, and Kepler sees it under the description of a static body towards which he is about to turn.

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Normativity of Perception and Predictive Processing

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Abstract

These reflections will focus on the problem of normativity in the theory of predictive coding. First (§1), we will briefly discuss the predictive conception and two types of reasoning. In §2 we will analyse the importance of prediction in perception processes and differentiate between two kinds of perceptive normativity which is closely related to predictions made by the generative model. Next (§3), we will highlight the need to discuss the role the ability to recognise patterns plays in predictive processing. In §4 we will put forward a research hypothesis according to which human normative intuitions about the world and other subjects derive from a sensory, perceptive-predictive experience of the world.

1. Theory of predictive coding

According to the theory of predictive coding, sensory cognition is built on the basis of hypotheses (predictions) related to the causal structure of the world. These hypotheses provide a top-down way of organising bottom-up sensory input originating with the senses. They are conditioned, on the one hand, by the internal world model of a given cognitive system, and on the other, by changeable information coming from the world. The two layers are mutually restrictive and dynamically interdependent (Hohwy 2013: 69-70). Drawing upon the knowledge about causal relations existing in the world, the mind makes hypotheses about the probability of certain events. It can thus reduce the so-called predictive error. These findings are based on the observation that sensory information does not shape perception directly. Rather, they are actively selected and used as required. Our expectations govern what we perceive and the way we integrate specific aspects of the perceived world. Hence, the problem of perception is about using the data entering the brain through sensory inputs in such a way that the cognitive system does not make predictive errors. Such errors result from ignorance about the causal sources of our sensory stimulations: there is no bijective function (one-to-one correspondence) linking causes and effects; different causes may trigger the same effects. In practical terms, if it is not aware of such causes, an organism may put itself in danger. Therefore, in all interactions between a cognitive system and its environment, perception serves a specific normative function. This is why we should say that predictive coding is strictly related to action control coding. In the words of Andy Clark: perception is action-oriented predictive processing (Clark 2013). The observation is important because it allows us to treat perception as an element in our psycho-physical structure which helps explain the dynamics and involvement of a given organism in a specific environment.

Hohwy claims that the conception of the brain minimising predictive errors does not explain the fact of our perception, but the way in which perception takes place (Hohwy 2013: 1). What does it mean? The predictive approach to perception is supposed to offer access to all levels of sensory cognition, understanding them as a hierarchical order. It is also sensitive to perceptive variety instead of mere subtleties of conceptual categorisation as in the case of many other theories. The aim is therefore not to engage in simple categorisation or conceptual labelling, but to achieve the first-person perspective. This means that the way we speak about, label and, eventually, categorise objects is strictly dependent upon how objects are perceived during temporary changes of perspective.

It turns out that to explain the nature of perception we must refer to the key issue of predictions made by a cognitive system each time it enters into contact with reality. From this perspective, the problem of perception focuses on the method of developing and selecting true hypotheses about the world (Hohwy 2013: 16). This raises the following question: how can the brain use sensory stimulations as a basis for adequate hypotheses without knowing the causes of such stimulations? The action should consist in extrapolating specific information from an uncertain data set. Thus, information processing in the brain is based on some form of statistical reasoning. Some researchers (e.g. Harkness, Keshava 2017; Hohwy 2013, 2016) have adopted the Bayesian Brain hypothesis according to which the central nervous system constructs and tests internal models of the external world by running cognitive processes which approximate Bayesian reasoning. Using hierarchically organised inferences, the brain then develops relevant multi-level generative models which generate top-down hypotheses "interpreting" bottom-up information coming from the sensory signal. In such a model, each level minimises predictive errors occurring one level down: from neural processes up to conscious decisions and actions (Clark 2013, 2016; Friston 2010).

An occurring perceptive error, that is a discrepancy between expectations (hypotheses developed on the basis of an internal world model) and the actual state recognised on the basis of information coming from sensory inputs may be minimised in two ways (Friston 2010, 129):

(1) through passive inference, i.e. a review of the generative model and formulated hypotheses;

(2) through active inference, i.e. through such actions taken in the world which will help maintain an adequate hypothesis formulated by the model. Active inferences, therefore, interfere with the causal structure of relevant states of affairs.

2. Predictions and normativity

The concept of prediction is particularly important in the conceptions of predictive processing. Predictions serve specific cognitive and non-cognitive aims pursued by organisms. This is why the proponents of the Bayesian Brain hypothesis claim that the brain is a hypothesis testing, i.e. predictive, machine. It seems, therefore, that predictions serve a vital normative function in the theory of perception.

At its current stage of development, the theory of predictive coding is first and foremost a neurological theory. It is

great at providing explanations at the neuronal level, but, if we are to believe researchers, its ultimate goal is to explain cognition also from the first-person perspective (Howhy 2013; Wiese, Metzinger 2017: 2). Undoubtedly, minimising the predictive error directly assumes a "low-level" biological normativity which is related to maintaining a living system in a condition which is far from thermo-dynamical balance. Friston calls this a *free-energy princi-ple* as it assumes that free energy should be minimised to arrive at homeostasis (Friston, Daunizeau et al. 2010; Friston, Stephan 2007). At higher levels, normativity may be linked to: (1) patterns of neural stimulations based on minimal predictions, and (2) the function served by predictions in decision-making processes and action control. The latter functionality is specifically important for our reflections. It should be primarily related to the so-called active inference. Based on the hypothesis it has formulated, the cognitive system takes relevant action which is supposed to interfere with the causal structure of the world in a way which will make the hypothesis or prediction probable or true. In this sense, a relevant prediction serves a specific normative function. This normativity should be understood in two ways:

(1) *veridical normativity*: the hypothesis is treated as objectively important, i.e. by adopting it, the organism is obliged to behave in a way resulting from assuming the hypothesis to be true;

(2) *primary normativity*: hypothesis (prediction) obliges the organism or cognitive system to take specific action. For example, while driving, I can see a car coming towards me at great speed from the opposite direction. I assume (adopt a hypothesis/ make a prediction) that if the situation on the road does not change, it is highly probable that the car going the wrong way will collide with the car I am driving. What do I do? I can pull over onto the shoulder or try to evade the imminent danger. It is not important, however, which action I will eventually choose. What is important is that the prediction I have adopted obliges me to take *some* action. It does not cause me to do this and that but obliges me to take an action of any kind. In such a case, my lack of reaction is also understood as *some* form of reaction to the adopted prediction.

In the light of the predictive brain hypothesis, the situation described above is possible thanks to the application of the generative world model: bottom-up information is "interpreted" on successive levels by specific top-down hypotheses. Situations of great danger "activate" higher levels of the generative model assuming conscious involvement of the "I". However, there are also situations where the body takes specific action without going through a conscious decision-making process. It is easy to imagine, for example, what happens when a ball is flying fast in the direction of my head. I dodge, as if by a reflex, without thinking about it (Milner, Goodale 2004). From the perspective of predictive coding, however, the action is not caused by a reflex but by specific hypotheses made as a result of neural attention processes. Predictive coding is inextricably linked to action control coding.

In conclusion, predictions in the theory of predictive coding derive their normative function from the brain as shaped by evolution. It would be a mistake, however, to reduce normativity to a biological function alone. While at lower levels of bodily functions it is strictly related to Friston's principle of free energy, i.e. self-regulation, at higher levels it is closely associated with the subject's knowledge and beliefs or, in other words, with what we might call a conceptual model of the world which I believe may be interpreted in the categories of the representational genera-

tive model[1] whose higher layers incorporate the levels of concepts, self-knowledge and subjective preferences as well as specific domains of feelings, emotions and motivations. According to the theory of predictive coding, these individual levels are consolidated by predictions organising our experience of the world throughout the model – from neural processes to conscious experience and decision-making.

3. Predictive processing and pattern recognition

A statement of key importance for predictive models is that a cognitive system is not able to discover the causes of sensory stimulations. This is why it is said that the aim of active reasoning is to predict hidden causes of such stimulations in the environment. The inability is strictly related to the existence of perception errors. It seems that, at its current stage of development, the theory of predictive coding is satisfied with the above conclusion which means in practice that it is mainly focused on subjective analysis, i.e. the conditions which a subject must meet to make a given prediction. The analysis is quite satisfactory as it is based on the most recent findings in exact sciences and experimental studies. What has been neglected, however, is the objective aspect of the problem, that is an analysis of causal relations between states of affairs in the environment of a given cognitive system. The problem also bothered Immanuel Kant who could not explain the causes behind the phenomena we experience. As we remember, such causes could not be provided by things in themselves as these are located outside the domain of any potential experience.

Current research into *cognitive science* as well as the so-called *deep learning* and *machine learning* suggests that the processes of perception, learning, language acquisition, face recognition and so on are based on the ability to recognise patterns. In a nutshell, perception is possible thanks to the existence of some fixed, regular and non-random elements in the sensory experience which allow us to organise data present in the statistical sensory signal (Piekarski 2017b). Thanks to patterns, information reaching us through sensory modalities is arranged to an extent and, what is particularly important, can be used to predict, to a degree, how a given experience will continue. Pattern recognition is thus specifically important in terms of providing norms for our perceptive experience.

We may therefore conclude that without analysing the nature of pattern recognition and patterns themselves, we will not be able to provide a fully adequate explanation of predictive processing. There is definitely some sort of feedback between the ability to make perceptive hypotheses and the ability to recognise patterns, but the analyses carried out so far say almost nothing about the nature of this relation. At higher levels of the generative model, the cognitive system seems to perceive patterns rather than individual differences (Hohwy 2013: 69). Consequently, we would be justified in saying that, in order to explain perception normativity fully, we should first explain the function of pattern recognition in predictive processes.

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[1] Proponents of Radical Predictive Processing (Clark 2015; Orlandi 2015) claim that only some elements of the generative model may be interpreted as representational. The opinion is not shared by Hohwy 2016 and Gładziejewski 2016.

4. Cognitive foundation of normativity

Following upon the above analysis of predictive process-ing, we may put forward a non-trivial research hypothesis according to which normative intuitions about the world and other objects are based on the perceptive experi-ence.[2] Predictions determining our perception are strictly normative. Their presence triggers relevant normative in-tuitions which may be described as *quasi*-beliefs about relations and objects of an obliging, prescriptive or pattern-generating nature. Thus established, normative intuitions, which should be juxtaposed to intuitions about causal rela-tions in the world, pave the way for moral intuitions related to ascribing guilt, responsibility or intentionality (Piekarski 2017a; Hindriks 2008). We want to defend the following thesis – the normativity we associate with moral principles, ethical norms, legal codes or, for example, regulations governing particular types of behaviour, is based on pri-mary perceptive normativity determined by the anticipatory or predictive nature of our sensory experience.[3]

An argument in favour of such a thesis is that it is possi-ble to justify the existence of normative constructs by refer-ring to real cognitive processes which may be described with the language of naturalism in terms of the theory of predictive coding. The approach we suggest here makes it groundless to justify the existence of normativity by some ideal constructs or unspecified values which can only be known in an essentially mysterious way.

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[2] The hypothesis needs further justification. Given the limits of this article, the problem will be discussed elsewhere.
[3] Using the language of action theory – predictions and anticipations provide objective reasons for our actions.

How to use Wittgenstein to Oppose Marxism

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Abstract

Our interest here will be limited to decide how *we* could use the philosophy of Wittgenstein to oppose Marxist theorizations. We will not imply, thus, that Wittgenstein himself made that use or wanted anybody else to make it. Our focus here is not Wittgenstein's possible intentions against Marxism, but his implications against it. We have found five possible implications of this kind. The first one links his private language argument and Ludwig von Mises' argument about why Marxists fail in determining prices. The second one goes from that very private language argument to a liberal argument against the dictatorship of proletariat. The third is a skeptical argument for participatory democracy that undermines some of Marx's ideas about power. Finally, the fourth and fifth implications use Wittgenstein's philosophy against the Marxist ideas of an essential divide in society and a common human progress, respectively.

As the title of this contribution shows, our interest here will be limited to decide how *we* could use the philosophy of Wittgenstein to oppose Marxist theorizations. We will not imply, thus, that Wittgenstein himself used his philosophical work to oppose Marxism, nor that he had any specific concern in anybody doing so. Reducing the interest of Wittgensteinian tools to the use that the individual called Ludwig Wittgenstein made of them or wanted others to make of them would be a curious case of the "intentional fallacy" (Winsatt and Beardsley 1946) that precisely Wittgenstein's philosophy so hardly combated (Winch 1972: 61-66; Holiday 1988: 88). Hence, our focus here is not Wittgenstein's intentions or inclinations against Marxism, but his implications against it. This is, for one, the same focus applied to Wittgenstein's political ideas by Alice Crary (2000).

Both Marxist (Eagleton 1982; Easton 1983; Moran 1972) and non-Marxist (Apel 1973: 275; Fann 1969; Holiday 1988: 2-23, 115-117) scholars have often linked the insistence on the importance of praxis of Wittgensteinian philosophy with Marx's *prima facie* similar positions on this issue. If we should follow this thread, Wittgenstein's philosophy would be useful mainly to defend Marxism, not to argue against it. Susan Easton (1983: 54-82) *e.g.* has claimed that Marx's second thesis on Feuerbach ("The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth […] in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely *scholastic* question") would be of help to understand how Wittgenstein tried to solve the problem of knowledge and his diffidence towards scholar philosophy. In fact, Wittgenstein himself went as far as to praise Lenin not for his philosophical works (he thought that his shortcomings as a philosopher were evident) but for his endeavor to apply to the praxis his theories (Drury 1996: 126). And when Wittgenstein was asked about his opinion on the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach (where Marx asks the philosophers to stop interpreting the world and start transforming it), the Austrian philosopher answered with a skeptical "Let them [the philosophers] try!" that emphasizes, if possible, Marx's distrust of the theories of the philosophers to achieve anything if they continue to be, as usual, severed from the praxis (Easton 1983: 76). If we also recall that one of the few philosophical figures to which Wittgenstein explicitly recognizes to be intellectually in debt is the Marxist economist Piero Sraffa (PI: ix-x), then the plausibility of his connections to Marxism might look stronger.

Nevertheless, without discussing the extent of these possible connections, the question we want to ask here is if and how we could find as well in Wittgenstein any arguments *against* Marxism. My position is that we may find at least five different kinds of Wittgensteinian (or Wittgenstein-inspired) arguments that can be used against some key contentions of Marxism.

The first one has an economic flavor and deals with the Marxist idea of how to determine the price of a commodity. Two Wittgensteinian specialists so relevant as Saul Kripke (1982: 112-113, n. 89) and David Bloor (1997: 74-78) have openly connected Wittgenstein's "argument of private language" and the criticisms that libertarian economists like Ludwig von Mises (1963: 698-715) have made against the Marxist idea of determining prices without a market economy, only on a bureaucratic basis. Let us remember that the argument of private language showed us that following a rule that cannot be corrected by other people is like not following a rule at all, is like acting whimsically. I do not follow a rule if everything that looks correct to me *is* then correct; someone must be in the position of hypothetically correcting me. Similarly, a price that is determined by a class of bureaucrats that cannot be corrected by other people (consumers, producers, etc.) is a price determined by no rule at all, a whimsical way of fixing prices. If, in a Socialist economy, every price that looks correct for this class of bureaucrats is *then* correct, and no consumer or producer is able to correct them, then no real rule is being followed by those Socialist bureaucrats. It will lead an economy to chaos in the same way that a language with only private rules will be, according to Wittgenstein, chaotic.

This might head us to a second argument inspired by Wittgenstein against Marxism. In fact, the same problem in economics with the absence of rules in the Marxist determination of prices can be used, in politics, against the absence of external control (and, hence, of rules too) over power in the Marxist dictatorship of proletariat. For Marx, this dictatorship implied that the government "was to be a working, not a parliamentary body, executive, and legislative at the same time" (Marx: 1986, 331). No need of checks and balances is shown in this description. The very idea of an external control of this government would be absurd for Marx: the government represents the democratic will of the people, and who is allowed to limit that democratic will? Why should democracy be limited at all? Any external control of this government would be undemocratic, because this government *is* democracy. This explains why liberal and "formal democracies", with their

checks and balances, were so virulently despised by Marxists.

However, what Wittgenstein might teach us here is that in a political system as the one envisaged by Marx, or in any totalitarian regime in which government does not accept external controls, governments rule without rules. If a government cannot be corrected by someone else, this government cannot be said to be following a rule at all. These regimes give thus to the government the possibility of practicing any irrational and capricious politics that they want. It is ironic that those regimes usually boast of being an especially rational and systemic organization of power, often on Hegelian grounds, as opposed to the disorganized multiplicity present in liberal democracies whereas, according to this Wittgensteinian argument, the truth is the reverse: these regimes put power beyond any rational rule.

A possible Marxist answer against this criticism of Marxism could go as follows: in fact, Marxism *did* accept the possibility of controlling those in power during the dictatorship of the proletariat. As Engels (1986) put it, this would be done by means of "the right of the same electors to recall their delegate at any time". However, we must not forget that the same Engels (1972: 730-733) qualified this statement elsewhere: "If the victorious party does not want to have fought in vain, it must maintain this rule by means of the terror which its arms inspire in the reactionists". Who decides if someone is an elector that legitimately wants to recall their delegate or is instead a reactionist that should be prevented by all means (even violence and terror) to do so? Once again, the lack of a Wittgensteinian rule (a rule external to the opinions of the Marxist ruler) is evident. And, thus, a Wittgenstein-inspired criticism of this Marxist element looks pertinent.

A third Wittgensteinian argument against Marxism may have to do as well with politics, more precisely with political participation. Of course, the Communist society that Marx foresaw as the last stage of human history would be a paradise of political participation, in which everybody will decide everything, as long as no government will exist. But political participation is on the contrary quite restricted in the previous Socialist stage of history, during the dictatorship of proletariat. As the word dictatorship clearly insinuates, this transitional period cannot be fully trusted to the mass of people who emerge from capitalism, given that "economically, morally and intellectually" they would be "still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges" (Marx: 1970, 13-30). Lenin was quite vocal in deducing from it the need of a one-party rule. This is quite contrary to the conclusions drawn from Wittgenstein political philosophy by authors like Aryeh Botwinick (1985).

According to his reading of Wittgenstein, only a staunch participatory democracy would be congenial with his contributions. Botwinick finds the basis for this reading in Wittgensteinian excerpts like this: "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is" (PI: 124). If we try to apply these sentences to the world of politics, we may find that this world is also full of "language games" of many actors who share the political field. Now, the political philosopher's attitude to these array of language games cannot be "interfering" with them, or give any "political foundation" to this arena. A philosopher confronted with politics and its language games only may, as Wittgenstein states, "leave everything as it is." This Wittgensteinian denial of the ability of philosophy (and philosophers) to give a definite answer to the most important questions of the political sphere does not lead Botwinick to defend a passive approach to politics. In fact quite the opposite. If philosophical theory cannot give a definite answer to political questions, then the road is open to everybody to try and give it. If philosophers are unable to grasp the "truth" of politics, then everybody's opinion is welcome on that level. If no group holds the "correct answer" to politics, then it is everybody's task to cooperate in deciding our answers. A participatory democracy (in which everybody is allowed and incited to express their voice about any political matter and to take the last decision about it) is thus the system that best reflects Wittgenstein's conclusions about the relationship between philosophy and politics. No philosopher king (and no Marxist philosopher king, or bureaucrat, either) is allowed to steal the leading role from the hands of everybody's participation. When the (Marxist) philosophers (and the ruler who bases his or her decisions on their philosophy) are disempowered, participation of pethe ople is empowered.

This leads us to the fourth and fifth arguments that I would like to expose here. If there is no common ground for political action that a philosopher can determine, two typical features of Marxist philosophy must be discarded too. The former is the Marxist conviction that there is only one essential division in society that splits it in two main groups or classes: that of the (economic) oppressors and that of the (economically) oppressed. Now, according to the Wittgensteinian line of thought that we have exposed, no philosophical theory should take away from the people the right to decide which divisions are pertinent for them and when, and which are not. When we leave in the hands of the people (and not of a Marxist philosopher that tries to "instruct" them) which social divisions are pertinent for their political action, we find a plurality of them: gender divisions, religious divisions, national divisions, racial divisions, not only the economic division that Marx considered *a priori* the essential one. In this sense, Wittgenstein's arguments may be considered an early envisioning of the postmodern (and anti-Marxist) idea of a plurality of social conflicts, with no central gap to explain all of them (Schatzki: 1996).

This shows us the way to the last of the five uses of Wittgenstein against Marx that I want to cite here. If there are many possible divisions in society that the people, and not the (Marxist) philosopher, decide, then there are many possible stories (and many histories as well) to be told about that society and its political evolution, not only the dialectical history of progress that Marx believed that he had discovered. Some of these groups may see a concrete event in history as progress, some may see it otherwise, and an individual that belongs to several of those groups may thus see history *both* as progress and as regress. The Marxist idea of progress for the whole of the human race loses then any appeal; a loss that surely Wittgenstein, as a person, would hardly regret, by the way. However, we promised at the beginning of this paper not to indulge in Wittgenstein's inclinations (as an individual), only in his (and his arguments) main implications. Therefore, we will leave this possible thread for further research.

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Perception as a Social Phenomenon

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Abstract

The aim of this contribution is to establish perception as a social phenomenon. I argue that perception requires the ability to discriminate between true and false beliefs and I elaborate on the conditions for such a discrimination. I show that the acknowledgment of another person can provide a criterion relative to which a belief is true or false. Such an understanding of perception allows for an investigation into the role of sensations.

In the essay "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge" (1983) Donald Davidson discusses the relation between beliefs and sensations. The pertinent questions are whether sensations (or their twins such as sensory stimuli, sense-data, etc.) can justify a belief or not. And if not, what does the relation between thinking subjects and the independent world amount to? Davidson argues that we are on the wrong track if we think that sensations can justify beliefs. His credo is that "*nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief*" (Davidson 1983: 141). This, however, does not mean that sensations do not play a role at all if one wants to find out what the case is – but more to the contrary. For Davidson sensations are the cause of beliefs a person entertains.

In what follows I want to discuss the conditions of the possibility of sensations as causes of beliefs and what an incorporation of sensations into a comprehensive theory of perception requires. I argue that it presupposes an understanding of perception as a social phenomenon. I expound briefly the significance in accepting perception as a predominantly social phenomenon. Then I discuss some implications for our understanding of perception.

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We know many things about the world through the use of our senses. We see that the leaf is green, we hear that the dog is behind the door and we smell that the apple is decayed. As it is widely acknowledged, perception – and I mean by that sense-perception – is not as reliable as one would hope. We might err in what we see, hear, touch, taste, or smell. It might be the case that the leaf actually is brown, it might be the case that there is no dog behind the door, and it might be the case that the apple is not decayed. This aspect of perception is one reason why many philosophers have raised fundamental doubts concerning the possibility of knowledge of the world as it is. Perhaps it is only due to the lack of alternatives to get in touch with the world that we still feel obliged continuing to examine the nature of perception. Whether or not we pursue the struggle with the skeptic concerning the reliability of our senses and knowledge of the world, it is still perception which carries the burden in providing us with a relation to the world. Wittgenstein would probably harshly reply "Look and you will see" in case one raised doubts about whether the leaf in front of him is really green or not. In any case, a comprehensive theory of perception needs to account for the incorrect cases as well. By that I mean that we have to account for cases where our senses deceive us. What we need to do is to address the conditions of the possibility of the discrimination between true and false beliefs.

*

I want to focus on a short exchange between Jack and Jane. Imagine that Jack ponders about whether there is an owl in the tree. Due to his superstitious beliefs it is very important to him to find out whether there is really an owl in the tree or not. He changes his position several times as he is staring out of the window, but he just cannot figure out whether there is an owl in the tree or not. After some time he gives up and he asks his wife Jane what she sees in the tree. She assures him: "I see an owl". Even if this need not be the final verdict – for Jane might err – her acknowledgement is a way to dissipate Jack's doubts concerning his thought whether there is an owl in the tree or not. Without her confirmation Jack cannot form the belief that there is an owl in the tree. Jane, in turn, would not assert that she sees the owl if she did not believe that it is true that there is an owl in the tree (unless she is lying, but it is assumed not to be the case). Her sighting of the owl gives her a reason to hold this belief. This is trivial and what is also trivial is that if Jane had not had her eyes open, she would not have seen the owl. And also, if she had not been turned towards the owl, she would not have seen it. Further conditions and factors could be specified but what seems to be obvious is that these factors are essential for what Jane sees. By the same token, we might say that she had not had the belief that there was an owl in the tree if the it had not been caused by a sensation. Consequently, if this is true, sensations are also relevant for what she believes and what she asserts. So even more we need to understand the relation between beliefs and these factors. Davidson stipulate that "*the relation […] cannot be logical, since sensations are not beliefs or other propositional attitudes. What then is the relation? The answer is, I think, obvious: the relation is causal.*" (Davidson 1983: 143). In contrast to the relation between beliefs – which can be logical, i.e. a belief can justify another belief – for Davidson beliefs are *caused* by sensations. But how can we say what caused a belief? And how can we say what else determines the formation of Jane's belief that there is an owl in the tree?

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My thesis is that perception is a social phenomenon. By that I mean that perception requires the interplay between different subjects and a shared world. Consider Jack – in order to dispel his doubts and to discriminate between the true belief that there is an owl in the tree and the false one that there isn't an owl in the tree he needs the acknowledgement from Jane. This holds even if sometimes a change in the perspective suffices for dispelling doubts concerning what one sees. But in principle, one cannot set the criteria for distinguishing between true and false beliefs

alone. Having a belief requires the ability to distinguish between true beliefs and false ones, hence one needs to understand the concept of truth, i.e. an understanding of what it means that the world is independent of what one believes. The key to truth is communication with other people. For Jack's own uncertainty prevents him from holding the belief that there is an owl in the tree. Consequently, he cannot draw on himself in order to dissipate his doubts. What he needs is an external acknowledgement from another person and he can get such an acknowledgment only by means of communication. I do not want to suggest that because of the uncertainty in this situation Jack does not trust his perceptual abilities in general. My point is that in this scenario only the exchange with Jane can help him to distinguish between the true and the false belief. He can neither appeal to his own beliefs or his own visual system – for it is this which is being doubted – nor will the owl in the tree "tell" him whether it is true to believe that there is an owl in the tree or not.

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What I want to emphasise is that having a belief that this or that is the case requires the concept of truth. This, in turn, requires a criterion relative to which a belief is true or not. In the scenario above it is Jane's acknowledgement which assures Jack that there is an owl in the tree, and this requires linguistic communication. Jack is asking Jane "What do you see in the tree?", and she expresses what she believes by using the sentence "I see an owl". She might also add some further reasons as to why she believes the object in the tree is an owl.

Let me now elaborate on the dialogue. Jack asks Jane what object she sees in the tree and she replies that she sees an owl. The sentence she uses to express her belief consists of a referring expression ("I"), a verb ("see") and an object ("an owl"). In her paper "The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature" (1981) G.E.M. Anscombe discusses the ambiguity of the term "object". According to her, the term "object" could either refer to the object as a part of the sentence or it refers to what the phrase is supposed to stand for. It goes without saying that if Jane sees the owl in the tree, then she does not see the object-phrase. But let's assume for a moment that there isn't an owl in the tree – then there is nevertheless an object: "the owl", or to be precise, the direct object of the sentence "I see an owl" with the caveat that now the sentence would be false.

Against the idea that "to see" takes a direct object Charles Travis counters that the verb "to see" is not "a*n intentional verb, for one thing, because it is a success verb*" (Travis 2015: 47). Intentional verbs are those verbs which take intentional objects, which form a sub-class of direct objects. Travis' rationale for categorising "to see" as a success verb is the assumption that one cannot see the (or an) object if it does not exist. But how can Jack find out whether the owl really is there? How can he find out whether he really sees an owl in the tree or whether he suffers from a hallucination? If "to see" is a success verb, it requires criteria in order to differentiate success from failure. But neither Jack's visual system nor the mere existence of the owl can fulfil the role of the criterion alone.

What my brief discussion of the dialogue and the conditions for having a belief are supposed to show is that at least in some cases two subjects need to discuss what they believe based upon what they see and they acknowledge or they correct each other. Without this they cannot

discriminate between a true and false belief. This presupposes that they can communicate what they see - or what they don't see - and this requires a certain form of the perceptual report. To wit, sentences with direct objects. Without that we cannot speak of a successful perception or a failed one, for we would lack criteria to distinguish between them.

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In the exchange between Jack and Jane the role of the owl is not removed: it serves as the shared object between them. But again, without Jane and the linguistic interaction between her and Jack there is no way for him to discriminate between the true or false belief concerning the owl in the tree or, if one likes, between a veridical perception or a hallucination. If one now objects that without the owl's presence Jane would not have seen the owl, one has to bear in mind that these are counterfactual conditions stated using the grammatical object of the perceptual report. Of course, further counterfactual conditions need to be satisfied, such as if Jane had not had her eyes open, she would not have seen the owl. Or, if the sensations had not caused the belief, Jane would not have seen the owl.

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One might demur that I have introduced a new understanding of perception. In the first instance, perception, as the complaint might go, does not concern perceptual beliefs, but what is going on at the phenomenological level of a subject. The study of perception concerns sensory stimuli, sensations or perceptual experience and these phenomena stand apart from our beliefs about the world. But now we return to the initial problem: We want to know how the world is – what is true to believe and what not. In order to find this out, we have to rely on our perceptual abilities and must assume that these phenomena – sensations, experiences etc. are somehow relevant to these beliefs. If so, what is the relationship between belief and these kinds of phenomena? Whether or not we assume that the relationship is causal in nature, we might study the relationship and introduce intermediaries at this level – such as sensations or neurophysiological events etc. only *from within.* We have to start with the beliefs we have and we have to take into consideration that only in exchange with other persons we can discriminate between true or false beliefs. These beliefs form the basis of assertions. With the help of perceptual reports such as "I see the owl" and the appeal to the grammatical object of them, we can state what we think caused a belief.

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"La sculpture est l'art de l'intelligence" (Pablo Picasso) – Ludwig Wittgenstein, Anton Hanak, Michael Drobil

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Abstract

Ludwig Wittgenstein hatte sich eingehend mit modernen und in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts zeitgenössischen Skulpturen, etwa von Auguste Rodin und Ivan Meštrović, die sich ja in der Kunstsammlung seines Vaters Karl Wittgenstein befanden, beschäftigt. Für eben diese Beschäftigung können hier nun weitere Beispiele genauer dokumentiert werden, nämlich: Plastiken von Anton Hanak und Plastiken von Michael Drobil. August Schmarsow konstatierte 1899: „Keine Kunst ist dem modernen Menschen so entfremdet wie die Plastik." – Ludwig Wittgenstein kann uns einen neuen Zugang zu und eine adäquate Umgangsweise mit Skulpturen nahe bringen.

A) Ludwig Wittgenstein und Anton Hanak

Anton Hanak (1875-1934) studierte in Wien an der Akademie für die Bildenden Künste. Er war ab 1913 Lehrer an der Kunstgewerbeschule in Wien und ab 1932 war er dann Professor an der Kunstakademie in Wien. Er war Mitglied der Wiener Secession und der Wiener Werkstätte. Karl Wittgenstein, Ludwigs Vater, war Mäzen von Hanak und hatte von ihm mindestens drei Skulpturen erworben, nämlich: Torso (Marmor, 1906), Torso des „Hl. Sebastian" (Marmor, 1908) und ein weiterer Torso.[1] Später hatte Hanak auch eine Portraitbüste von Margarete Stonborough-Wittgenstein (Marmor, 1925) geschaffen.[2] Anton Hanak befasste sich fast zwei Jahrzehnte – etwa von 1911 bis 1929 – sehr intensiv mit dem Typus der „Gewandfigur". Im zweiten Jahrzehnt davon – 1919/20 bis 1928/29 – beschäftigte ihn ausführlich und in mehreren Phasen bzw. Fassungen „ein spektakulärer Auftrag"[3] für solch eine Gewandfigur von und für Margarete Stonborough-Wittgenstein.[4] „Die Studien zu dieser Statue gehen in die Hunderte. Im Jahre 1927 bezeichnet Hanak eine dieser Studien als 'Entwurf Nro = 257 im 5ten Arbeitsjahr'."[5] Die Wittgenstein-Geschwister – Margarete, Hermine, Ludwig – nahmen intensiv den Fortgang der Arbeit an diesem Projekt Hanaks wahr, begleiteten ihn – kommentierten, klärten und bewerteten. „Der Aspekt des Belehrens spielt in diesem Zusammenhang allgemein in der Familie [Wittgenstein] (besonders bei Ludwig) eine große Rolle und wird, zumindest was die Kunst betrifft, mit 'Korrektur' bzw. 'Verbesserung' in durchaus ethischem Sinn in Zusammenhang gebracht." Denn: „Die Intentionen der Geschwister gehen von einer prinzipiellen Dominanz des Menschenbildes aus, so wie Goethe den Menschen als vornehmsten Gegenstand der Bildhauerei sah: 'Der Hauptzweck aller Plastik …

ist, daß die Würde des Menschen innerhalb der menschlichen Gestalt dargestellt werde.'"[6] Marguerite Respringer, die im Zeitraum 1925-1932 in Wien, in Gmunden und auf der Hochreith beim Wittgenstein-Clan lebte und sehr eng mit Ludwig Wittgenstein in Kontakt war, studierte übrigens Anfang der 30er Jahren an der Wiener Kunstakademie auch bei Anton Hanak.[7]

B) Ludwig Wittgenstein und Michael Drobil

Ludwig Wittgenstein verbrachte die Zeit von Januar bis August 1919 im Kriegsgefangenenlager Montecassino in Italien. Dort lernte er, neben den beiden Volksschullehrern Ludwig Hänsel und Franz Parak auch den Bildhauer Michael Drobil (1877-1958) kennen. Drobil hatte 1897-1905 an der Wiener Akademie der Bildenden Künste studiert, war 1920-1939 Mitglied der Wiener Secession, wechselte im Dezember 1939 dann als Mitglied ins Wiener Künstlerhaus. 1930 wurde er selbst Professor an der Wiener Akademie der Bildenden Künste. In den 20er Jahren gestaltete er ein Marmorportrait von Ludwig Wittgenstein[8] und es fand ein reger Austausch zwischen Drobil und Wittgenstein insbesondere auch über Bildhauerei allgemein und Gespräche bzw. Auseinandersetzungen über bestimmte Werke Drobils statt. Wittgenstein selbst hat dann – in klärender Tätigkeit – einen Mädchenkopf selbst modelliert. Folgenden Eintrag diesen „Kopf für Drobil" betreffend schreibt Ludwig Wittgenstein im Jahre 1931 in sein Taschennotizbuch MS154,16r-16v:

> Als ich seinerzeit den Kopf für Drobil model[l]ierte so war auch die Anregung wesentlich ein Werk Drobils & meine Arbeit war eigentlich wieder die des Klärens.
>
> Ich glaube das Wesentliche ist daß die Tätigkeit des Klärens mit Mut betrieben werden muß: fehlt der so wird sie ein bloßes gescheites Spiel.

In den Familienerinnerungen berichtet Hermine Wittgenstein diesbezüglich eingehender über ihren Bruder Ludwig:

> Während er noch an dem Haus baute, beschäftigten Ludwig auch andere Interessen. Er hatte sich seinerzeit in dem italienischen Offiziers-Gefangenenlager mit dem gleichfalls gefangenen Bildhauer Michael Drobil befreundet und er interessierte sich später in Wien ausserordentlich für die bildhauerischen Arbeiten, die die-

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[1] Siehe Mrazek, Abbildung 2 und beistehend folgendes Zitat aus Hanaks Tagebuch: „Zur selben Zeit (1906) hat mich die Wiener Secession zum Mitglied ernannt … Jetzt habe ich mit doppeltem Eifer gearbeitet … einen gleichzeitig ausgestellten Torso (weiblich) hat Herr Karl Wittgenstein erworben … Im Jahre 1907 habe ich … in Arbeit bekommen … 2 Torsi für das Palais Wittgenstein". Abbildungen der beiden erstgenannten Skulpturen auch bei Neuburger S. 260-261.
[2] Abbildungen dieser Marmorbüste bei Krug, S. 226-227 und in Mrazek, Abbildung 23.
[3] Siehe dazu Prokop, S. 142-145.
[4] Siehe dazu die Ausführungen und Abbildungen bei Krug S. 241-257 und bei Neuburger S. 258-267. Auch Mrazek, Abbildung 30. Ein Gipsabguss einer lebensgroßen Gewandstatue wurde beim Brand des Glaspalastes München 1931 zerstört, wie aus einer Meldung dazu im „Der Wiener Tag" vom 14. Juni 1931, S. 32 mit Abb. zu entnehmen ist. Bei den Wittgensteins dürfte sicher die 1923 in Wien erschienene Hanak-Publikation von Rochowanski (1888-1961), der in Wien Philosophie und Jura studiert hatte, bekannt gewesen sein; und auch die Hanak-Veröffentlichung des Wiener Kunsthistorikers Eisler (1881-1937) aus dem Jahr 1921.
[5] Siehe Mrazek, Text zu Abbildung 30.

[6] Neuberger, S. 265. Das Zitat ist bei Goethe „Jena, den 27. Juli 1817 – Verein der Deutschen Bildhauer" genau zuzuordnen.
[7] Siehe dazu eingehender Sjögren, S. 99-124 und Wijedeveld, S. 147.
[8] Abbildung in Nierhaus 1989, S. 245 und Fleck 1993, S. 15.

ser Künstler in Angriff nahm, beeinflusste ihn auch in gewisser Weise; das war fast unvermeidlich, denn Ludwig ist sehr stark und, wenn er Kritik übt, seiner Sache sehr sicher. Schliesslich fing er selbst an zu modellieren, da es ihn lockte, einen Kopf, der ihm an einer Plastik Drobils missfiel, in der Haltung und mit dem Ausdruck, die ihm vorschwebten, darzustellen. Er brachte auch wirklich etwas sehr Reizvolles zustande, und der Gipsabguss des Kopfes wurde von Gretl in ihrem Haus aufgestellt.[9]

Im Interview „Wittgenstein war ein Stern in meinem Leben" aus dem Jahr 1995 antwortete Marguerite Respinger (1904-2000) auf die Frage „Ist es zutreffend, daß Ludwig Wittgenstein Sie als 'Vorbild' nahm, um seinen Mädchenkopf zu modellieren? Was waren die näheren Umstände der Entstehung dieser Büste? […]" folgendermaßen: „Von der Büste erfuhr ich erst, als sie schon fast fertig war und ich sie noch in ihrem Rohzustand (nasser Lehm) sah. L.W. drückte damals noch etwas Lehm auf die Wangen."[10]

Ansatzpunkt für die Entstehung dieses Wittgensteinschen Mädchenkopfes (siehe Abb. 1)[11] soll die von Drobil geschaffene Ganzkörperaktfigur *Kauernde* gewesen sein.[12] (Abb. 3 und Abb. 4) Robert Fleck: „Der Ausgangspunkt für Wittgensteins eigene Plastik scheint eine Plastik von Drobil mit dem Titel ‚Kauernde' gewesen zu sein."[13] – Irene Nierhaus: „Der Kopf war demnach als ‚Verbesserung', als eine zum Objekt gemachte, visualisierte Korrektur zu einer Plastik Drobils – wahrscheinlich der ‚Kauernden' – gedacht."[14] Die Formulierung in den Familienerinnerungen: „einen Kopf, der ihm an einer Plastik Drobils missfiel" deutet ebenfalls darauf hin.

Abb. 2: Michael Drobil: *Mädchenkopf*

Abb. 3: Michael Drobil: *Kauernde* (Detail)

Abb. 1: Ludwig Wittgenstein: *Mädchenkopf*

[9] Hermine Wittgenstein, S. 166.
[10] Rothhaupt/Seery, S. 124.
[11] Drei Farbabbildungen in Fleck 1993, Vorsatz- und Nachsatzblatt; SW-Abbildung in Nierhaus 1989, S. 238. Für die Erlaubnis hier eine Abbildung wiederzugeben sei Frau Andrea Wachschütz von der Volksbank GHB, Kärnten, Klagenfurt gedankt. Dort in der Volksbank befindet sich das Original dieses Mädchenkopfes von Wittgenstein.
[12] Eine Abbildung der *Kauernden* bei Nierhaus, 1989, S. 239, Abb. 2 und bei Fleck, S. 15.
[13] Fleck 1993, S. 9 (mit Fußnotenreferenz auf Nierhaus 1989, S. 239).
[14] Nierhaus 1989, S. 246.

Abb. 4: Michael Drobil: *Kauernde*

Die Ähnlichkeit und die Übereinstimmung des Mädchenkopfes von Wittgenstein mit dem Kopf der Mädchenskulptur *Kauernde* von Drobil ist verblüffend und offensichtlich. Aber: „Wie weit an der bestehenden Plastik [*Kauernde* von Drobil] möglicherweise bereits ein Einfluß der Wittgensteinschen Formüberlegungen mitspielte, wäre nur durch eine genaue Werkanalyse Drobils andeutbar."[15] Hier kann diese Werkanalyse nicht durchgeführt bzw. dokumentiert werden; aber eine gut denkbare, alternative Möglichkeit soll hierzu vorgetragen werden. Nämlich: Drobil selbst hat mindestens einen *Mädchenkopf* geschaffen (siehe Abb. 2).[16] Diese Plastik hat ebenfalls markante Ähnlichkeiten mit Wittgensteins Plastik *Mädchenkopf*. Und so wäre auch folgende Sachlage möglich gewesen: Zuerst hat Drobil seine Figur *Kauernde* (als nackte Person) modelliert; dieser Drobilsche Skulptur hat dann Wittgenstein provoziert und motiviert selbst seinen *Mädchenkopf* zu modellieren; und dieser Wittgensteinsche *Mädchenkopf* hat dann wiederum Drobil inspiriert und motiviert einen *Mädchenkopf* (nun mit dem Ansatz von Oberkörperbekleidung) nach dieser Wittgensteinschen Vorgabe zu gestalten. Für eben diesen Verlauf spricht etwa eine werkanalytische Beobachtung die an der Plastik *Kauernde*, die übrigens als Brunnenfigur konzipiert war, gemacht werden kann: „Die allegorischen Nymphen des Jugendstils sind durch ein anonymes Arbeitermädchen ersetzt, wobei die Plastik durch einen eigenartigen Gegensatz zwischen dem auffallend dynamisch gehaltenen Unterleib und der neutra-

len Gestaltung des Oberkörpers und des Kopfes unmerklich in zwei Teile zerfällt."[17] So wäre ein wichtiger Aspekt für den „Einfluß der Wittgensteinschen Formüberlegungen" auf das Drobilsche Kunstschaffen gezeigt. Drobils Plastik „Kauernde" (Marmor, 1925) ist nicht zu verwechseln mit Drobils Plastik „Sinnende" (Marmor, 1925). Die Skulptur „Sinnende" wurde von den Wittgensteins erworben und war im Palais Wittgenstein in der Alleegasse auf dem ersten Treppenabsatz der Eingangshalle aufgestellt worden.[18]

Es kann nachgewiesen werden, dass im Besitz der Wittgensteins mehrere Kunstwerke von Drobil waren. Neben der bereits erwähnten Plastik „Sinnende" (Marmor, 1925) und der Büste „Ludwig Wittgenstein" (Marmor, 1928) mit Bleistiftzeichnungen davon lassen sich weitere Drobilsche Kunstwerke in ihrem Besitz – etwa der Abguss einer „Karyatide" (1931)[19] – recherchieren. In einer Ausstellung im Wiener Künstlerhaus im Jahre 1942 wurden auch Skulpturen von Michael Drobil gezeigt. Und mit Dokumenten von bzw. zu Drobil – wie sie im Archiv des Künstlerhauses vorhanden sind – kann nachgewiesen werden, dass einige der dort präsentierten Kunstwerke im Besitz der Wittgensteins waren, nämlich: „Schlafendes Kind" (Marmor), „Sinnende" (Marmor, 1925), „Weiblicher Torso (Marmor), „Schlummernde" (Marmor, 1936). Weiter kann dargetan werden, dass Drobil, der ja auch während der Nazidiktatur, nach dem Anschluss bzw. der Anexion Österreichs, Professor an der Wiener Kunstakademie im „Großdeutschen Reich" war, bei der *Großen Deutschen Kunstausstellung im Haus der Deutschen Kunst zu München* im Jahre 1937 zwei Skulpturen, nämlich: „Knabenkopf" (Marmor) und „Mädchenkopf" (Marmor), im Jahr 1938 eine Skulptur, nämlich: „Mädchenkopf" (Marmor) (siehe hier Abb. 2)[20], im Jahr 1939 zwei Skulpturen, nämlich: „Schlummernde" (Marmor) und „Stehende" (Gips), und im Jahr 1943 drei Skulpturen, nämlich: „Selbstbildnis" (Marmor), „Bildnis Professor Teschner" (Metall) und „Sämann", präsentierte.[21] Ludwig Wittgenstein hatte in den Jahren des Zweiten Weltkrieges keinen Kontakt oder Austausch mit Michael Drobil; danach aber von 1946 bis 1951 wieder.[22]

Auch für den Einfluß des Drobilschen Gestaltens auf Wittgenstein und seine Art und Weise zu philosophieren lassen sich treffende Beispiele anführen. So trägt Wittgenstein in seinen Manuskriptband MS132,150 am 8.10.1946 folgende zwei Bemerkungen ein:

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[15] Nierhaus 1989, S. 251, Anmerkung 24.
[16] Wo sich dieser Drobilsche *Mädchenkopf* nun befindet konnte (noch) nicht geklärt werden. Nachweisbar ist die Existenz mindestens eines Mädchenkopfes von Drobil durch die Abbildung auf einer Postkarte, die vom Verlag Karl Kühne (62/VII Wien, Neubaugasse 8) verlegt worden ist und die Aufschrift „Wiener Künstlerhaus / Prof. Michael Drobil / Mädchenkopf" trägt. An dieser Stelle sei Herrn Paul Rachler, dem Archivar des Wiener Künstlerhaus, für die Erlaubnis hier eine Abbildung zu veröffentlichen Dank gesagt. Da im Jahr 1930 Drobil zum Professor ernannt wurde, ist diese Postkarte also erst ab 1930 entstanden, was natürlich nicht besagt, dass auch die Plastik *Mädchenkopf* von Drobil erst ab diesem Jahr entstanden ist, sondern vielmehr, dass dieses Werk nach 1930 im Wiener Künstlerhaus war bzw. ausgestellt wurde. Drobil hatte übrigens in der Wiener Secession in der Ausstellung 9.5.-31.8.1930 ein Werk mit dem Titel *Mädchenkopf* (Marmor) gezeigt. Diese Plastik muß 1930 oder davor entstanden sein. Mit weiteren Dokumenten kann gezeigt werden, dass Drobil höchstwahrscheinlich weitere Mädchenköpfe geschaffen hat.

[17] Fleck 1993, S. 9
[18] Abbildung des Stiegenhauses mit der Skulptur „Sinnende" auf dem Treppenabsatz bei Nedo, S. 48, Abb. 41.
[19] Abbildung dieser Wittgenstein-Büste und einer Zeichnung dazu bei Nedo S. 248, Abb. 304 und Abb. 305. Der Abguss einer Karyatide wird im Brief vom 18.2.1931 Brief von Margarete Stonborough-Wittgenstein an ihren Bruder Ludwig erwähnt.
[20] Für eben diesen Mädchenkopf von Drobil kann nachgewiesen werden, dass er anlässlich dieser Ausstellung 1938 von Adolf Hitler angekauft wurde. Im „Offiziellen Ausstellungskatalog" von 1938 ist diese Plastik aufgelistet (S. 38) und es ist darin sogar eine Abbildung enthalten (S. 70). Siehe hierzu die Auflistung „Adolf Hitler's Purchases at GDK" für das Jahr 1938 bei Schlenker, S. 235: „Drobil, Michael: Mädchenkopf (marble), 1.500 RM". Und eben diese Skulptur wurde dann auch 1942 in der bereits erwähnten Ausstellung im Wiener Künstlerhaus gezeigt.
[21] Bei der Durchsicht aller – insgesamt acht, nämlich von 1937 bis 1944 – „Offiziellen Ausstellungskataloge" der jährlich stattgefunden habenden *Großen Deutschen Kunstausstellung im Haus der Deutschen Kunst zu München* konnten diese Daten recherchiert werden.
[22] Am 29.12.1938 schreibt Ludwig Wittgenstein von Cambridge aus an seinen Freund Ludwig Hänsel: „Ich habe nie mehr etwas von Drobil gehört. Weißt Du etwas?" und dann ist im erhaltenen Gesamtbriefwechsel erst wieder in Wittgensteins Brief vom 17.5.1949 von Dublin aus an seinen Freund Rudolf Koder in Wien über Drobil zu lesen: „Bitte ruf Drobil einmal in seinem Atelier vor 5h an (R 40719) & sag ihm, es tut mir leid, daß ich ihm nicht adieu sagen konnte." Eine letzte Erwähnung von Drobil findet sich in einem Brief den Ludwig Wittgenstein am 12.1.1951 von Oxford aus an Ludwig Hänsel in Wien geschrieben hat: „… von herzlichen Grüßen, die ich Dich bitte meinen Schwestern & dem Koder & Drobil, wenn Du kannst, zu übermitteln." Und in MS132,150 findet sich ja die am 8.10.1946 eingetragenen Bemerkungen zur „Zeichnung eines <D'schen> Kopfes", eines „Drobil'schen Kopfes".

∫ / Ich sehe die Zeichnung eines <D'schen> Kopfes, & könnte von der Notwendigkeit aller dieser Züge reden. Es muß gerade so sein. Aber warum muß es gerade so sein? Es ist solcherart, daß ich ihm einen Platz unter den Paradigmen einräumen will – & freilich hat das wieder mit unzähligen Dingen zu tun.

∫ / Daß mir ein Paradigma ganz fern liegt & ein anderes nicht, das zeigt noch nicht, daß mir dieses vorschwebt.

Und die Formulierung „die Zeichnung eines <D'schen> Kopfes" bedeutet höchstwahrscheinlich eine konkrete Bezugnahme auf „die Zeichnung eines <Drobil'schen> Kopfes". Die extra eingefügte Ergänzung „<D'schen>" macht diese Referenz auf Michael Drobil[23] deutlich, auch wenn hier von der Formulierung her offen bleibt, ob es um „die Zeichnung eins Drobil'schen Kopfes" geht, welche dieser Künstler selbst angefertigt hat oder um „die Zeichnung eines Drobil'schen Kopfes" geht, den dieser modellierte und eine andere Person dann abgezeichnet hat.[24]

Zwei zusätzliche, anschauliche Beispiele dafür, wie die Vertrautheit und der Umgang mit Skulpturen Ludwig Wittgenstein auch beim Philosophieren inspiriert haben, sollen hier noch geboten werden. In Manuskript MS156a,53r+53v aus dem Zeitraum 1932-34 findet sich folgende Sequenz von Bemerkungen:

Schafft der Künstler nur etwas ihm angenehmes hervorzubringen um etwas zu machen was ihm gefällt?!

Dieses Gesicht ist dumm ist keine Aussage über eine Erscheinung (eine Empfindung) die dieses Gesicht hervorruft.

Wenn ich nun von einer Skulptur sagte: „dieses Gesicht hat einen zu dummen Ausdruck"; was bedeutet das „zu". Zu dumm wofür? Um mir Freude zu machen?

Oder auch: Was ist es daß<s> schließlich für sich selbst sprechen muß?

Heißt „so wollte ich's": so ist es mir angenehm??

Denken wir an den aesthetischen Unterricht der dadurch gegeben würde daß man einem die Skitze eines Meisters zeigt & wie er sie dann verändert hat.

Und am 28.7.1946 hat Wittgenstein in den Manuskriptband MS130,107r-107v (=TS245 §825) folgende Bemerkung niedergeschrieben:

„Ich habe Zahnschmerzen gehabt" – wenn ich das sage, so erinnere ich mich nicht an mein Benehmen, sondern an meinen Schmerz. Und wie geschieht das? Es schwebt einem wohl ein mattes Bild des Schmerzes vor? – Ist es also, als hätte man s e h r schwache Schmerzen? „Nein: es ist eine andere Art von Bild; etwas spezifisches." Ist es also so, als hätte einer nie ein gemaltes Bild gesehen, sondern immer nur Büsten, und man sagte ihm „Nein, ein Gemälde ist ganz anders, als eine Büste, es ist eine ganz andere Art von Bild." Es wäre etwa möglich, dass man es weit schwieriger fände

einem Blinden begreiflich zu machen, was ein Gemälde, als was eine Büste ist.

Wittgensteins Arbeit beim Umgang mit Kunst – speziell mit Skulpturen etwa von Rodin und Meštrović[25], von Hanak und Drobil, u.a. – war „die des Klärens". Mit Wittgensteins philosophischer Zugangsweise zu Kunst im Kopf und im Herzen antike, mittelalterliche, neuzeitliche, moderne und aktuell zeitgenössische Skulpturen – speziell Büsten und Portraits – zu betrachten, zu kontemplieren, zu analysieren und zu kommentieren ist eine höchst spannende Angelegenheit.

Whilst I was drawing and copying in the Louvre I was especially attracted by sculpture, and Greek sculpture in particular, because I realised that sculpture, more so than painting, was the art of the invisible.

- Phillip King 1979

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[23] Es könnte prinzipiell, wenn auch sehr unwahrscheinlich, auch eine Bezugnahme auf „die Zeichnung eines Dobson'schen Kopfes" sein, denn auch diesen Künstler erwähnt Wittgenstein.
[24] Möglicherweise nimmt Ludwig Wittgenstein mit der Referenz „die Zeichnung eines Drobil'schen Kopfes" sogar konkret Bezug auf eine jener Bleistiftzeichnungen, welche Michael Drobil von ihm selbst angefertigt hatte. Dazu berichtet Hermine Wittgenstein in ihren „Familienerinnerungen": „Drobil hat von Ludwig ein paar flüchtige, aber sehr ähnliche Bleistiftzeichnungen gemacht, die mir sehr lieb sind […]." Die Abbildung der Wittgenstein-Büste und die Abbildung einer Wittgenstein-Zeichnung findet sich in Nedo 2012, S. 248, Abb. 304 und Abb. 305.

[25] Siehe dazu Rothhaupt 2015.

Perceptual Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach

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Abstract

The nascent field of evolutionary psychology can shed some new light on the concept of perceptual biases. Rather than interpreting a bias as a cognitive flaw, evolutionary psychology seeks to reveal its adaptive function. Systematic distortion of reality can act as a first-line safety mechanism limiting the exposure to potentially lethal abiotic and biotic environmental factors. Several such biases affect vision by influencing the perception of size or geographical slant. The sense of hearing is systematically biased due to the effect of auditory looming, while gustatory and olfactory perception tend to act as a safety measures against environmental toxins and pathogens by oversensitization to bitterness. The variety of adaptive perceptual biases suggests that the prime role of human perception is not truth-seeking, but action-guiding, such as navigation in a dangerous environment or deciding whether to confront a foe or flee.

Introduction

The reliability of sense perception belongs, without a doubt, to the catalogue of canonical questions pondered by philosophers since at least the time of Parmenides and Heraclitus. The most common view about the purpose of sense-perception assumes it to be a kind of a truth-seeking mechanism, a reliable source of knowledge about the external word, and, finally, an important foundation of human cognition. Philosophical debates concerning the reliability of senses seem to be a very diverse field of dispute, yet a slightly more in-depth investigation reveals the common assumption held by the proponents of vastly dissimilar theoretical standpoints. Namely, an assumption that perception serves primarily as a knowledge-acquisition mechanism. However, contemporary evolutionary psychology offers an indubitably different approach. The key assumption is that sense-perception is not a truth-seeker, but an action-guide; formed by natural and sexual selection to be a source of incomplete and highly-biased information about one's surrounding environment.

Biased Doesn't Mean Non-Adaptive

How do we justify the reliability of sensory perception? Historically speaking, the two most popular strategies are based on the concept of an external guarantor of perceptual reliability, which, depending on the further assumption, may be the Cartesian God or the principle of natural selection. However, these two superficially opposing traditions offer, in principle, a very similar solution by making a claim that human sensory perception is overall highly-reliable. In the Cartesian tradition, a genuine sensory-deception, contrary to the mere imperfection of the senses or a source of an environmental noise interfering with the processes of perception, is impossible due to the action of an aforementioned guarantor. A perfect being cannot deceive due to its perfection – the claim which can be inferred from the ontological argument itself. Similarly, the principle of natural selection is often claimed to be a guarantor of perception-reliability, because of the underlying assumption that unreliable sensory perception is simply non-adaptive, and therefore natural selection would have eliminated biased-perception genes from the populational gene-pool. Not to mention the gross over-simplification of the biological evolution, this line of reasoning suffers from a major flaw which results from the assumption that sensory-biases are essentially non-adaptive. Contrary to the above-mentioned view, the nascent field of evolutionary psychology can shed some new light on the reasons behind some well-known sensory biases and, hopefully, pinpoint their adaptive role as the action-guiding heuristics.

The Error Management Theory

Undoubtedly, smoke detectors are the first line of defence when it comes to fire prevention, but only when they are fine-tuned to detect even trace amounts of smoke before the fire spreads beyond control. A feature enabling them to precisely discern between rather harmless and potentially dangerous sources of smoke would certainly be very desirable, although when perfection is not an achievable option it is generally advisable to adjust them for higher rather than lower sensitivity. The rationale for this decision is called the principle of asymmetric harm since the potential cost of a false alarm (e.g. cigarette smoke) results in only minor inconveniences and is greatly outweighed by the cost of negligence in the face of a real fire threat.

The smoke-detector principle also helps evolutionary psychologists to explain why human beings systematically overestimate the height of a platform they are standing on, the steepness of a hill they are descending or the speed of an approaching sound source. In all these situations, the additional time wasted on being more careful than necessary is a negligible cost in comparison with recklessness resulting in swift death or debilitating injury. Concluding, the principle of asymmetric harm severely limits the evolution of sensory perception by imposing hard-wired perceptual biases with the sole role of an early warning system (Haselton, Nettle, Murray 2016).

Auditory Looming

Generally speaking, the principle of natural selection tends to cause perception to be more biased whenever more vigilance or swifter reaction to an imminent danger is an adaptive behaviour. The well-studied example of auditory looming accurately illustrates the type of bias in question. Both visual and auditory clues about the speed of a moving object are systematically biased providing a kind of a safety margin, which can be used for a preparation for combat or an instantaneous retreat. Not only our brain interprets the approaching sound sources as faster than the receding ones, but also strengthens the overall effect by underestimating the distance from the sound (Neuhoff 2016).

The systematic underestimation of distance and overestimation of speed is not a fixed-rate effect, but depends on several other factors, including sex, age, and overall health condition. There is no golden rule in the evolutionary arms race, which is why most perception biases seems to be governed by multifactor context-dependant heuristics. For example, when it comes to age-related effects, the influence of auditory looming is the more evident, as well as when the person in question is physically weaker or less-agile. There is also a strong correlation with the motor system capacity measured with the recovery heart rate, which is a reliable predictor of the total organismal aerobic fitness. In other words, the faster and longer one can run, the weaker is the effect of auditory looming (Neuhoff, Long, Worthington 2012).

Systematically Biased Slant Perception

Navigating through space can be certainly classified as an action requiring the use of complex heuristics, which, in many instances, also serve as safety measures, counteracting reckless intents potentially resulting in a dangerous fall followed by death or injury. Consistent with this very idea, evolutionary psychologists proposed the concept of the evolved navigation theory (ENT) describing how the human brain biases the perception of height and steepness. While moving on a horizontal plane is usually a safe endeavour which requires a rather accurate estimate of distance, climbing a cliff is affected by the principle of asymmetric harm. After all, falling from a cliff or a tree could easily result in death or at least a major incapacitation. In accordance with the ENT, people tend to overestimate the height of a cliff when they are standing at the top of it, but their height-estimates are roughly correct when they are located at the bottom. The effect was observed in nearly all experiment participants and was decisively significant. On average, the height was estimated to be 1.84 times of its true value (Jackson, Cormack 2007). Moreover, a similar effect affects the perception of steepness. Ascending a steep hill is generally more tiresome, but descending it is definitely more dangerous, which is the reason why the human brain is equipped with the hard-wired tendency to overestimate the steepness of a hill when looking from the top. Once again, other health-related factors can influence the sense-perception, as in the case of the physical fatigue, which may trigger steepness overestimation during the hill ascension (Proffitt, Bhalla, Gossweiler, Midgett 1995).

Fear and visual illusions

The abiotic environment is not a sole factor influencing human visual perception. Apart from hunting or climbing mishappenings, other important life-threats may result from the actions of other people. Confronting a potentially dangerous human opponent requires a reliable estimate of his size, strength and stamina, which are decisive factors influencing the fight-or-flight response. Once again the error management theory can be applied to predict the presence of a specific bias modulating the perception of an opponent's size, while in such situations overconfidence is rarely a good survival strategy. In many instances, the visual perception systematically misinterprets the reality to prevent potentially dangerous confrontations. For example, physical incapacitation may influence the perceived and conceptualised size of an angry-looking opponent. The greater the incapacitation the larger and more muscular the foe seems to be (Fessler 2013). The opposite is true when we can find safety in numbers. The presence of

comrades creates an illusion that the opponent is substantially smaller and less formidable. The relative safety of a group plays the crucial role of an environmental trigger increasing confidence in the positive outcome of a prospective confrontation (Fessler, Holbrook 2013). However, the presence of children may substantially discourage parents from direct aggression in favour of a more peaceful solution, such as negotiations or a swift retreat. As a rule of thumb, parents tend to overestimate the size and formidability of their opponent in all situations involving their children (Fessler, Holbrook, Pollack, Hahn-Holbrook 2013). The size bias can also be modulated by our cultural experience, such as in the case of a gun influencing the estimated height and muscularity of the foe. A man holding some sort of weapon (the form can be culturally-varied) is perceived to be larger and more formidable than he really is (Fessler 2012). All the above-mentioned effects make human perception very unreliable when it comes to gaining accurate knowledge about the biotic and abiotic environment, which is another argument for the principle of natural selection transforming perception to be an action guiding system able to systematically distort reality for the sake of safety.

The Gustatory and Olfactory Perception

The principle of asymmetric harm affects not only vision and hearing, but also the other senses as well. Unpleasant flavours or smells are often regarded by the human brain as important signals about the toxins or microorganisms present in food. But human behavioural defences reach a lot further than that. Any episode of severe sickness may even trigger a life-long aversion to food supposedly responsible for it. The indigestion of a particular substance may be completely harmless, but the brain labels it as dangerous and repulsive due to the sole coincidence in time with the episode of sickness (Garcia, Hankins, Rusniak 1976). In a similar manner, pregnant women are generally more sensitive to even trace amounts of bitterness, which is an adaptation designed for the elimination of a wide variety of plant toxins from the woman's diet. Usually innocuous for adult organisms, small doses of plant toxins can be potentially lethal for the developing foetus, which is why frequent nausea during pregnancy often corresponds with the lower risk of a miscarriage (Breslin 2013). Food aversions and sensitivity to bitter taste are just two elements of a wide spectrum of behaviours known as the behavioural immune system (BIS). Both the innate and the adaptive immune system are merely reactive due to being able to trigger immune response only after the viral, bacterial or fungal invasion. They are costly in terms of the basal metabolic rate increase and their activity often proves to be debilitating because of associated symptoms connected with high immune activity, such as fever, nausea or constant fatigue. However, protective behaviours comprising the behavioural immune system are purely preventive due to being able to limit the very contact with the toxic substances or lethal pathogens (Schaller 2011).

Conclusion

Evolutionary psychology offers an interesting insight into the source of human sensory biases. The principle of asymmetric harm allows researchers to interpret systematic distortion of reality as a hard-wired safety mechanism restricting human action whenever environmental clues suggest such a response. Because of that, the partial unreliability of perception seems to be overly adaptive due to it limiting the exposure to toxins, pathogens, and danger-

ous foes alike. Nevertheless, the catalogue of perceptual biases should not be used to undermine the very concept of objective reality. Most perceptual biases do not occur at random, but are highly predicable due to their systematic nature.

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Perceptual Contact, Acquaintance and Phenomenal Presence

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Abstract

What kind of perceptual contact with an object can ground a perceptual demonstrative thought about it? I shall address this issue by focusing firstly on Evans's acquaintance-based picture and secondly on a criticism recently raised by Montague (2016) against it. What her criticism shows in my view is that Evans's picture is incomplete, not that it is wrong. What is lacking is an account of what it is to be phenomenally presented with something in one's experience of it. I shall provide some hints as to how Evans's picture could be revised in conformity with his claim that perceptual demonstrative thoughts are about ordinary external objects in a direct, non-inferential way.

1. Evans on the notion of acquaintance

There is a kind of thought whose being about an object depends on the subject's standing in perceptual contact with it. In such cases one does not have to bring the object before the mind because the object is, so to say, directly available. Some philosophically interesting questions that arise in this connection are the following: what is it to be "in perceptual contact" with something? Are there some requirements that have to be satisfied on order for such a relation to ground the subject's ability to demonstratively think about the object?

I shall confine my attention to acquaintance-based models of perceptual demonstrative thoughts. There are two main families of them: the epistemic and the causal ones. Both depart radically from Russell's characterization of the notion of acquaintance, mainly on the ground that it promotes an unbearable restriction of its extent to only sensible particulars, universals and abstract logical facts (Russell 1914: 127). This point of agreement notwithstanding, the two families differ radically as regards the requirements they put on the acquaintance relation. Whereas the latter claims that a causal connection with the object is sufficient to ground a thought about it, the former, while acknowledging the relevance of a causal link (and more generally of an external constraint), stresses the need of an internal constraint (which is characterized in epistemic terms). The most comprehensive account of the latter type is the one provided by Evans in *The Varieties of Reference.* In that work, in the attempt to extend the application range of the relational model beyond Russell's strictures, in full adherence with "Russell's Principle" (RP) (also known as "the know-which requirement"),[1] Evans promoted a radical revision of Russell's picture whose upshot is his neo-Fregean theory of singular, object-dependent thoughts. According to Evans, Russell was wrong in thinking that ordinary spatio-temporal, mind-independent objects are no possible relata of the acquaintance relation. In order to correct this mistake, he rejected what he took to be its main sources, namely Russell's interpretation of genuine epistemic requirements upon direct reference as requirements of infallibility and Russell's Cartesian conception of the mind. Moreover, in order to make the required extension compatible with the dictates of (RP), Evans got rid of two further claims, namely the idea that Russell's intuitions about the functioning of genuine referential expressions are incompatible with the ascription to those expressions of a sense and the idea that senses are always descrip-

tive. In Evans's Frege-inspired revision of Russell's relational model of singular reference, the kind of direct, non-inferential knowledge of the object able to ground non-descriptive thoughts amounts to the subject's practical ability to discriminate the object of her thought from any other objects on the ground of the subject's standing, or having been stood, in some kind of informational relation with it (Evans 1982: chp. 5). Crucial in Evans's proposal was a drastic revision of the notion of experience. Evans replaced Russell's somewhat technical use of the notion – which was motivated by Russell's idea that the term "experience" must not be used uncritically in philosophy on account of the "vague, fluctuating and ambiguous" meaning of the term in its ordinary use (Russell 1914: 129) – with a use according to which experiencing an object means consciously receiving information from it.

I think that Evans was right in stressing, against what he called "the Photograph Model", that a correct account of demonstrative thoughts requires not only an external constraint but also an internal one. The role of the internal constraint was to account in his view for the way in which the object is presented. In stressing the role of a "presentational element" in an acquaintance-based account of mental reference Evans showed adhesion to an important aspect of Russell's picture according to which the acquaintance relation between subject and object is the converse of the relation between object and subject which constitutes presentation (Russell 1911: 209-210). A subject is acquainted with an object only insofar as the object is presented to the subject. But what kind of presentness has to be in place in order for one to stand in an acquaintance relation with something suited to ground a thought about it? Moreover, does Evans's account provide an adequate characterization of it?

2. Montague's criticism

Evans put two requirements on a subject's ability to demonstratively refer to an object in one's thought:

(i) the subject must stand in an informational link with it (Evans calls "target" the source of the information)

(ii) the subject must be able, on the ground of that link, to form a sufficiently clear idea of it (when the second requirement is satisfied Evans says that the subject's thought has an object).

Moreover, he claimed that (i) and (ii) must converge on one and the same entity. When this does not happen, Evans says that the subject's attempt at a thought is ill-grounded. Some words about Evans's somewhat technical

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[1] The requirement according to which in order for a subject to have a thought – or to make a judgment – about an object she must have knowledge of which object is in question (Russell 1912: 58).

use of the notion of idea are in order. An idea of an object is a mode of identification of that object which enables the subject to have discriminating knowledge about it. As far as perceptual demonstrative ideas are concerned Evans claims that having such a knowledge amounts to the subject's ability to locate the object in the objective space and keep track of it.

Montague (2016) has recently claimed that Evans's account is wrong and that this can be shown by providing examples in which, even though Evans's conditions are satisfied, there is a strong reluctance in allowing that the subject succeeds in homing his thought on the object. She provides an example in which a subject is in causal contact with something (a garden shed) but, due to some kind of garbling and distortion, the light-waves reflected by the shed reach the subject rearranged in such a way that the subject ends up having an experience of a pink elephant (Montague 2016: 153). According to Montague, since the subject is in causal contact with the shed and has discriminating knowledge about it (in so far as it can locate and track it), it ought to follow, if Evans' were right, that the subject can think about the shed. But this is false; therefore, Evans's account is wrong (Montague 2016: 159-161).

I have to express my disagreement with Montague on this point. In my view, what Evans would have said as regards the example she provides (which, by the way, is very similar to one he himself provides) is that the subject cannot be credited with such a thought because, even though his attempted thought is based on information derived from the shed, the informational link at play does not provide the subject with a sufficiently clear idea of the shed (notwithstanding the subject's ability to locate and keep track of it). And this is so because the *conception* of the target which governs the subject's attempted thought of the shed in this case is too defective. The notion of conception that Evans mobilizes in this connection is very important to address the present issue; I think that Montague, while considering the passages in which Evans makes use of this notion, does not give it the importance that it deserves. According to Evans, an information-based thought is governed by a conception of its target that is the result of a belief about how the world is which the subject has because he has received information (Evans 1982: 121). He adds that as far as perceptual demonstrative thoughts are concerned, their governing conception is determined simply by the content of the perception. He admits that the information link may not be functioning well so long as it provides an effective route to the object (Evans 1982: 179). This requirement is not satisfied when there is too much error in the perceptually-based beliefs that the subject forms on the basis of the informational link and which ground the guiding conception of his attempted thought. Seeing a garden shed as a pink elephant is to host an inadequate conception of the target which, in turn, prevents a subject from entertaining a sufficiently clear idea of the object. In such cases, Evans says, "there is some inclination to say that the attempted thought lacks a content" (Evans 1982: 197).

This said, it has to be emphasized that, besides some few scattered hints, Evans provides no detailed account of what it is for a guiding conception to be adequate. This is certainly a lacuna in his account. But what this lacuna shows is that Evans's account is incomplete. Not that it is wrong, as Montague instead claims. Is there a way in which this lacuna could be filled in a way which is consistent with Evans's claim that we can have direct non-inferential access to ordinary external objects?

3. How to avoid the pitfalls of the sense-datum theory

I believe that what Evans meant by having an adequate conception of the target was staying in perceptual contact with it. Moreover, I believe that, for Evans, merely staying in an informational contact with something was not sufficient for perceptual contact. What is lacking in Evans's official doctrine is however an account of what it is for a subject to entertain an adequate conception of a thought's target. My suggestion is that in order to provide such an account, Evans would have had to assign to conscious experience a far more important role than he did. He stresses that the information must be consciously possessed by the subject (Evans 1982: 158), but what he meant by this was that the information must be poised to be used for the direct rational control of thought and action. We can say, by resorting to Block's terminology, that Evans only considered the access aspect of conscious experience, almost neglecting its phenomenological side. What was needed was instead an account of how the phenomenology of a conscious experience must be in order for a subject enjoying such an experience to be in perceptual contact with an object. The phenomenal character of an experience is what accounts for how things appear to the subject undergoing the experience. Not any possible way of appearing is compatible with the subject's standing in perceptual contact with an object. Some distorsions are tolerable (as when a red object appears orange or a round object appears elliptical), but other are not (as when what is in fact a woman appears as a rock, to take one of Evans's example). I do not think it is possible to provide a clear cut demarcation here between acceptable and unacceptable cases. What is required is that there is a sufficiently good match, as Montague (2016: 144) claims, between how things appear and how things actually are. Ways of appearing are experiential manners of presentation of something (not to be confused, because of their subjective nature, with Fregean *Sinne* whatever their reading may be), and manners of presentation are adequate if they provide an experiential route to the object, that is if they provide awareness of it. I am not perceptually aware of a woman if I entertain a "rocky manner of presentation" of it, no matter whether the causal source of what is phenomenally presented to me is actually a woman.

The picture that would result by integrating these considerations within Evans's original account is the following:

i. the subject must stand in an informational link with something (the thought's target);
ii. the subject must be able, on the ground of that link, to form an adequate conception of the thought's target (where a conception counts as adequate iff it provides the subject with awareness of the target);
iii. the subject must be able, on the ground of that conception, to form a sufficiently clear idea of an object (an idea that singles that object out from any other object).

Evans's original internal constraint is (iii). What I am claiming is that a correct account of the internal constraint ought, at least[2], to incorporate something like (ii). If (iii) provides the epistemic side of the internal constraint, (ii) provides its phenomenological side. Since (ii) is not explicitly present in Evans's official presentation of his view, I agree with Montague when she claims that Evans's original account is, as it stands, phenomenologically inadequate. I think that this lacuna has its source in Evans's at-

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[2] Actually I think that also the epistemic side of the constraint should be revised in so far as it puts too strong a requirement on a perceptual demonstrative thought homing in on an object.

tempt to avoid the pitfalls of the sense-datum theory which, in his view, was responsible for Russell's inadequate conception of the notion of acquaintance. The fact that Evans stripped Russell's notion of acquaintance of any phenomenological import prevented him from providing an adequate account of the converse notion of presentation. He tried to account for it in terms of objective modes of presentation (ways of thinking of the objects informationally grounded). But objective modes of presentation are not enough to capture the notion of presentation in its full sense. What is left out is the phenomenal side of presentation, which is accounted for instead by "subjective manners of presentation". But could Evans have filled this lacuna, along the lines I have indicated, without abandoning the idea that perceptual based thoughts are about ordinary external objects in a direct, non-inferential way?

In my view, what Evans should have avoided was to conceive of what is phenomenally present in the subject's conscious experience as an entity with which the subject is related and that possesses the properties that things appear to have. It is true that conscious experience has the structure of "something" being given to a subject. But as Nida-Rümelin rightly claims in my view "when we talk about what is phenomenally present to a subject we thereby describe the subject's intrinsic, non-relational properties" (Nida-Rümelin 2011: 353). I therefore think that a non-relational account of experiential manners of pres-

entations would have enabled Evans to avoid the errors of sense-datum theory. According to this proposal, my perceptual demonstrative thought "that F is G" homes directly on its object in virtue of (i) receiving information from it which (ii) enables me to enjoy an experience with an F-ly phenomenal character that makes me aware of the object, so as to be able, on that ground, (iii) to form an idea of it as a mind-independent entity in the objective world. *Pace* Russell, phenomenal presence is no obstacle for direct acquaintance with worldly objects.

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Similarity, Sincerity, and Style: Richard Eldridge on Rule-Following and Conceptual Consciousness

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Abstract

Similarity and associated notions like difference, distance, agreement, and regularity -- all of which Baker and Hacker dismiss as "the background preconditions that *as a matter of fact* make [grammatical/conceptual structures] possible" -- made rule accordance one of Wittgenstein's most pressing frustrations in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Following Richard Eldridge, I will take this frustration to be about what it means "to possess a concept;" and I will understand the possession and application of concepts to be a function of how it is we "see connections." Many of Wittgenstein's interpreters take "practice" to be the end of philosophical inquiry into rules and concepts. By contrast, it is my basic position that in the context of the *Philosophical Investigations*, "practice" is primarily a tool by which to engage with and articulate the difficulties surrounding similarity and etc. -- not the site of their explanation or even a means for their dissolution.

This paper will argue that it is similarity and associated notions like difference, distance, agreement, and regularity -- all of which Baker and Hacker dismiss as "the background preconditions that *as a matter of fact* make [grammatical/conceptual structures] possible" -- which made rule accordance one of Wittgenstein's most pressing frustrations in the *Philosophical Investigations*. (Baker et al. 2009: 214)

Following Richard Eldridge in his book *Leading a Human Life: Wittgenstein, Intentionality, and Romanticism*, I will take this frustration to be about what it means "to possess a concept;" and I will understand the possession and application of concepts to be a function of how it is we "see connections." (Eldridge 1997: 199) Many of Wittgenstein's interpreters -- inclusive of Baker, Hacker, and Eldridge -- take "practice" to be the end, rather than the beginning, of philosophical inquiry into rules and concepts. By contrast, it is my basic position that in the context of the *Philosophical Investigations*, "practice" is primarily a tool by which to engage with and articulate the difficulties surrounding similarity and associated notions like difference, etc. -- not the site of their explanation (as it is for Baker and Hacker) or even a means for their dissolution (as it is with Eldridge).

How are concepts bounded? What justifies their bounds? How do they construct similarity and difference? Wittgenstein recommends we approach these questions by reflecting upon how we have learned concepts, in what language-games and with what examples. (PI: 77) Doing so has led many interpreters, including Baker, Hacker, and Eldridge, to conclude that bounds -- the sites of similarity, difference, etc. -- are set in our practices, and that these practices are, themselves, rule-bound. (Baker et al. 2009: 152, 155; Eldridge 1997: 225, 233)

They take Wittgenstein's position on rule-following and concept possession to be the following: Just as "anything -- and nothing -- [could be] right" when it comes to concepts that can be understood in terms of family resemblances, like "good" in ethics and "beautiful" in aesthetics, so, too, do accord and conflict with a rule appear to dissolve if any action can be interpreted as an instance of rule-following. (PI: 77, 201) Wittgenstein resolves this by making the same move in §202 as he does in §77, albeit appealing more explicitly to the notion of a practice and anticipating the rest of the *Philosophical Investigations'* sections on private language -- "'following a rule' is a practice" because the final arbiter of whether or not we have followed a rule is if we have performed the action that (as a matter of

"[public justification]") accords with it. (Baker et al. 2009: 127) This suggests that whether we have correctly applied a concept or followed a rule, and so can be said to have understood it, is a function of our ability to "continue" -- a mathematical series, a conversation, a musical performance, etc. So, we may conclude our anxieties about rule-following and concept possession are unfounded given the robustness of the practices to which they are tied.

But this is not the end of the conversation for Wittgenstein. After §77, he muses about the relationship between descriptions, examples, and definitions, anticipating his rule-following discussion in §82 ("What do I call 'the rule according to which he proceeds'?"); and after §201, he moves onto discuss intelligibility, similarity, regularity, and, once more, the nature of example, culminating in his claim in §241 that humans agree "not in opinions, but … in form of life." The commonality here is, as I suggested at this paper's outset, a philosophical interest in similarity, difference, distance, regularity, and agreement -- the same questions surrounding rule-accordance and concept possession resolved at a level where their "background preconditions" are glimpsed briefly through the lens of our practices. How, then, does Eldridge's practice-based account of rule-following and conceptual consciousness accommodate Wittgenstein's interest in the stuff of seeing connections?

Eldridge reads the *Philosophical Investigations* as a "dramatic enactment," wherein it is a function of "[the] protagonist seeking to articulate the terms for full human self-command and self-expression" by "continually [imagining] and then [criticizing] routes towards the achievement of expressive freedom." (Eldridge 1997: 6, 7, 15) For Eldridge, the *Philosophical Investigations'* protagonist yearns for an understanding of "human intentionality and conceptual consciousness" that will give her certainty in her "self-presentations" without becoming dogmatic, nihilistically skeptical, or indifferent as a consequence. (Eldridge 1997: 6, 7) That certainty is the mark of one's expressive freedom.

This creative interpretation takes its cues from Stanley Cavell, who describes a kind of philosophy that can only "express, as fully as [it] can, [a] world," and in that expression "attract our undivided attention to our own." (Eldridge 1997: 5) Eldridge treats the *Philosophical Investigations* as an exemplar of this style. On my understanding of Eldridge, its anxieties about one's self-understanding and -expression, one's understanding of others and one's re-

ceptivity to their own expression, all converge around the theme of sincerity -- an unconscious trust in the authenticity of one's experiences with another person.

Against this backdrop, Eldridge holds that the connections that constitute rule-following and conceptual consciousness alike can only obtain and be maintained in practices that are thoroughly social, wherein we are able to exercise our "natural capacities to extend rules in certain ways" because they present us with "a plurality of occasions [for] rule-accordant performance." (Eldridge 1997: 219, 224) He grants that these connections are "grammatical or logical," but the "articulation" of our natural capacity (to learn or to create these connections -- Eldridge never specifies) depends upon "accommodation and resistance within [ourselves and] with others." (Eldridge 1997: 233, 237) An account that attempts to explain *how* these grammatical/conceptual/logical connections are so by reference to our "disposition," a "formula in consciousness," "intuition," or -- as Baker and Hacker do -- by postulating an "internal relation" between rule and concept, action and application, misses the point entirely: "Nowhere else [other than in one's expression within a social practice] is one's life with thinking and language either discernible or existent." (Eldridge 1997: 223, 227)

While I am more sympathetic to it, and to Eldridge's project in general, I do not find his account a philosophically convincing alternative to Baker and Hacker's. This is because the coherence of Eldridge's account, like Baker and Hacker's, depends upon a theoretical abstraction -- internal relations in Baker and Hacker's case, and a nebulous natural capacity or power in Eldridge's.

For Eldridge, this natural capacity is what catches the patterns present in social practice by which we learn to follow rules and apply concepts. But it cannot, as he has presented it, do further explanatory work in the way of describing how it is we learn language or go beyond our existing rules and concepts. Explicit treatment of such a capacity (and an attendant emphasis on sociality) is missing from Baker and Hacker's exegesis; I suspect this is at least in part because the "background constancies of the natural world and our interactions with it" that this capacity picks out play "no role in explanations of meaning" for Baker and Hacker. (Baker et al. 2009: 212)

But precisely this is the strength of Eldridge's interpretation. His "natural capacity" and its relationship to our social practices is a poor explanatory substitute for the internal relations that are at the heart of Baker and Hacker's account of rule-accordance and concept possession, as his conception does not do much better at addressing the problems he identifies in Baker and Hacker's. But it also does not permit Eldridge to dismiss questions about similarity, difference, etc., as irrelevant to philosophical investigation into conceptual consciousness, like internal relations allow Baker and Hacker to do. These questions are certainly relevant on Eldridge's interpretation, as *something* must account for our perceptive and creative capability to compare, contrast, and combine concepts, much less to follow rules. It is just that the "natural capacity" he posits as that *something* serves only to emphasize this fact, not to explain (or to evoke something about) it.

What *exactly* is to be explained, or evoked, that is denoted by Eldridge's "natural capacity?" Threaded through the issues Eldridge identifies with Baker and Hacker's account is an anxiety about style -- one's recognizably original approach to rule-bounded activities. Eldridge discusses it briefly as something that is "not expressible independent of [a spontaneity to particular social routines and the] routes of identity" our practices offer. (Eldridge 1997: 234)

He suggests it leads naturally to the feelings of "remainder or reserve of oneself" that, in turn, motivate our philosophical inquiry into rule-following and conceptual consciousness as they relate to our expressive freedom, or our confidence in our sincere self-presentation. (Eldridge 1997: 234) On my reading of Eldridge, it is impossible to escape this conflict between sincerity, on the one hand, and style, on the other. How is it that we express ourselves when we follow rules and apply concepts, and how is it that these expressions are understood, that we can be *sure* they have been understood?

These questions are neither answered/avoided (as they might be on Baker and Hacker's account) nor silenced (as they might be on Eldridge's) by simply appealing to our practices. Every example Eldridge gives of a rule that cannot be accommodated by Baker and Hacker's account is one where what is fundamentally at issue is one's style -- i.e., grading papers or writing, playing chess, participating in a sport, mastering a musical instrument or giving a performance, etc. (Eldridge 1997: 209)

These examples are far more complex than the paradigmatically Wittgensteinian cases of rule-following and concept possession that interpreters like Baker and Hacker focus on, i.e. reading a signpost or correctly continuing a mathematical series. They are practices in Eldridge's thoroughly social sense, and their complexity invites us to consider a multitude of topics related to style -- expertise; genius; creativity; standards for success and failure; theory construction, mastery, and application, etc. Eldridge's mistake is that he takes these practices to speak for themselves on the tension between style and successful rule-following or concept application, and does not describe this tension in further detail. Predictably, he shares this with Baker and Hacker, who claim that it is enough to "take the point of view of the particular practice" when evaluating the application of concepts, without further elaboration. (Baker et al. 2009: 147)

This tension is related to Eldridge's other issues with Baker and Hacker's account. It is present in the "ongoing adaptation and improvisation" involved in one's learning how to successfully follow a rule, manipulating or extending its bounds, and defining adequate performance. It underlies the same anxiety about rule determination when it comes to one's understanding of situations the mere appreciation of which require some familiarity or intimacy, such as taste (ex., given my experience, what makes a piece of music good?) or forming judgments of others (ex., in light of how and what I know about him, is my friend's behavior justified?). And it is, of course, the essence of Eldridge's point about the *Philosophical Investigations*' form: What makes Wittgenstein's stylistic deviation from the norm acceptable philosophy?

Despite the enormity of the literature on the *Philosophical Investigations*, issues about similarity, difference, distance, agreement, and regularity in his work remain underexplored. I have described one way in which they surface in Baker, Hacker, and Eldridge's accounts, i.e. in anxieties about sincerity and style, both of which are functions of, but not determined by, our shared practices.

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Sellars' Kritik an Wittgenstein über das Problem von inneren Episoden

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Abstract

Sellars ist der Meinung, dass „innere Episoden" eine Erweiterung der öffentlichen Sprache seien, und daher seien absolute „innere Episoden" nicht möglich. Nach seiner Konzeption erlernt man die Ausdrücke, ihren Kontext und ihre Verwendung durch öffentliche sprachliche Vorgänge, und daher gebe es nichts Gegebenes wie z. B. Sinnesdaten oder innere Episoden, die nicht durch öffentliche Prozesse gebildet seien, und daher seien sie nicht absolut privat. In dieser Hinsicht kritisiert er die Konzeption, dass man Wissen auf nicht-inferentielles Wissen aufbaut, z. B. Wissen aufgrund von unmittelbaren Erfahrungen erzeugt, weil für ihn ein solches Wissen nicht möglich ist.

Sellars behauptet, dass selbst Wittgenstein, der gegen die Idee der inneren Episoden war, noch in die Falle des gegebenen logischen Raums fällt, als er am Anfang der „*Philosophische Untersuchungen*" Beispiele von einer primitiven Sprache gibt.

Sellars übt eine radikale Kritik an den inneren Episoden als unmittelbare Erfahrung von etwas Gegebenem und versucht zu zeigen, dass sie öffentliche Prozesse voraussetzen. Die Sprache spielt dabei eine wichtige Rolle. Ein Satz kann nach Sellars eine berichtende Rolle oder eine Behauptungs- (Bestätigungs-) Rolle haben. Ein Beispiel dafür ist der Satz: „Ich habe Zahnschmerzen". Wenn der Satz in der ersten Person verwendet wird, dann ist er ein berichtender Satz. Wenn aber der Satz in der dritten Person verwendet wird: „Er hat Zahnschmerzen", dann bekommt der Satz eine behauptende Rolle. „Ich habe Zahnschmerzen" ist für Sellars keine unmittelbare Erfahrung oder Empfindung. Zu sagen „Ich habe Zahnschmerzen" setzt voraus, dass man die Verwendung der Ausdrücke „ich", „habe" und „Zahnschmerzen" und die Kombination dieser Ausdrücke in einem Satz und den entsprechenden Kontext zuerst erlernt.

Sellars gibt auch das Beispiel des Satzes „Das ist rot". Für ihn ist dieser Satz keine unmittelbare Erfahrung. Denn um zu sagen oder um zu erkennen, dass etwas rot ist, muss man zuerst erlernt haben, wie man das Wort „rot" verwendet bzw. etwas über die Farben gelernt haben. Und das ist noch nicht alles. Man muss auch erlernt haben, wie man Gebrauch von der ostensiven Definition macht, bzw. wie man auf etwas zeigt und wie ein Zeigen interpretiert wird.

Nach Sellars ist nicht nur die Fähigkeit zu wissen, dass man zum Beispiel Schmerzen hat, erworben, sondern auch die Fähigkeit, Schmerz zu empfinden; sie setzt einen komplexeren Vorgang der Begriffsbildung voraus (Sellars 1997: 20). Für Sellars gibt es keine absolute Privatheit, da es keine unmittelbare Erfahrung gibt und die sogenannten privaten Empfindungen, das private Denken, die öffentliche Verwendung der Sprache voraussetzen (Rosenberg 2007: 156). Was aber Sellars von Wittgenstein unterscheidet, ist, dass er eine private Sprache noch zulässt, wenn auch nicht als absolute Privatheit. Diese relative private Sprache, Erfahrungen, würde dann eine öffentliche Sprache voraussetzen, welche zuerst erlernt werden müsste, damit eine relative private Sprache möglich wäre. Wittgenstein dagegen lässt keine private Sprache zu, sei es relativ oder absolut. Sellars lässt es zu, dass es private Episoden bzw. innere Episoden geben kann, diese setzen aber die öffentlichen Gegenstände oder Sprache voraus (Sellars 1997: 105).

Um das besser zu erklären, erfindet Sellars einen Mythos, den er den Mythos von Jones nennt. In diesem Mythos geht Sellars davon aus, dass Jones eine Sprache erlernt, welche nur öffentlichen Bezug hat. Nach und nach wird Jones' Sprache erweitert bis hin zur berichtenden Rolle, in der Jones anderen von inneren Episoden berichtet.

Dass ich privilegierten Zugang zu mir selbst habe, ist nach Sellars nur ein Teil der Grammatik des Wortes „ich", welches im anderen Teil die öffentliche Sprache voraussetzt (Triplett; Devries A. 2000: 177). Anders gesagt ist es nur ein Teil, der zur inneren Episode gehört, und der andere Teil gehört zur öffentlichen Sprache. „Innere Episoden" sind nach Sellars keine unmittelbare Empfindung, sondern vielmehr eine Erweiterung oder Anreicherung der öffentlichen Sprache bzw. eine neue Redeweise.

Sellars' Kritik richtet sich gegen die Idee von inneren Episoden als nicht-inferentiellem Wissen, d. h. von inneren Episoden als einer Art von Wissen, das direkt mit Tatsachen zu tun hat. Deswegen kritisiert Sellars Sinnesdaten–Theorien, welche die Daten der Sinne als direktes bzw. unmittelbares Wissen über die Gegenstände annehmen (Snowdon 2009: 108). Nach Sellars konzipiert der Sinnesdaten-Theoriker die Empfindungen als eine Form des Wissens, und gleichzeitig besteht er darauf, dass Einzelgegenstände direkt empfunden werden (Sellars 1997: 17). Wenn nach dem Sinnesdaten-Theoretiker aber unser inferentielles bzw. epistemisches Wissen auf nicht-inferentiellem bzw. nicht-epistemischem Wissen beruhen soll, könnte man meinen, dass es dadurch indirekt aus unmittelbaren Erfahrungen gewonnen wird. Nach Sellars ist dieser Versuch, epistemisches Wissen auf nicht-epistemisches Wissen zu reduzieren, ein Fehlschluss und sogar ein „naturalistischer Fehlschluss", den man aus den Begründungsversuchen einer Ethik kennt, indem man eine normative ethische Regel „soll" auf eine Tatsache „ist" zu reduzieren bzw. damit zu begründen versuchte.

Nach Sellars beinhaltet die traditionelle Konzeption von Sinnesdaten die Idee, dass es innere Episoden gibt, die durch unmittelbare Erfahrung zustande kommen und daher keinen Lernprozess erfordern. Wenn man diese inneren Episoden als nicht-inferentielles Wissen konzipiert, wären das dann die Grundlagen für jedes weitere Wissen (inferentielles Wissen). Beispiele von diesen inneren Episoden wären: Farbempfindungen wie Grün oder Rot, Klangempfindungen u.a. Manchmal wurde nach Sellars das Empfinden von Sinnesdaten mit dem Bewusstsein

gleichgesetzt, was nach Sellars irreführend ist, denn um die Empfindung „rot" zu haben, muss man vorher über den Begriff „rot" verfügen, was aber nicht in Betracht gezogen wurde durch die traditionelle Philosophie, in der meistens die Empfindung von etwas Rotem durch ein Bewusstsein von etwas Rotem erklärt wurde, als wäre in unserem Bewusstsein die Verwendung des Wortes „rot" bereits vorhanden.

Nach Sellars darf das Empfinden der Sinnesdaten nicht als nicht-epistemische Gegebenheit angenommen werden, weil auch das Empfinden von Sinnesdaten einen Lernprozess und eine komplexere Begriffsbildung voraussetzt. Zum Beispiel bei einem Kind: Kann ein Kind etwas Rotes empfinden, ohne vorher das Empfinden des Roten zu lernen bzw. etwas Rotes wahrnehmen zu lernen? Das Kind muss noch lernen, in welchem Kontext eine ostensive Definition stattfindet, damit es das Zeigen nach der Erwartung richtig interpretieren kann und damit man auf etwas Rotes zeigen kann. Und dieses Lernen geschieht durch Hilfe anderer anhand der Sprache. Und Sellars geht noch weiter: Für ihn enthalten solche Sätze auch propositionale Inhalte, die eine propositionale Behauptung beinhalten. Beispiel dafür ist: „X scheint für John grün zu sein." Dieser Satz enthält nach Sellars einen propositionalen Inhalt, der eine Zuschreibung macht und eine Bekräftigung enthält. Schon der Satz „Jones sieht, dass x grün ist" enthält einen propositionalen Inhalt, der eine propositionale Behauptung beinhaltet und eine Bekräftigung dieser Behauptung. Folglich können diese Sätze wahr oder falsch sein, und damit wendet man auf eine Erfahrung (zum Beispiel des Sehens) die Konzeption von Wahrheit an. Hier will Sellars die Konzeption von Erfahrung (zum Beispiel des Sehens) als etwas Unmittelbares in Frage stellen und andeuten, dass sie öffentliche Prozesse beinhaltet. Den Erfahrungen werden Behauptungen zugeschrieben, und diese werden bekräftigt oder nicht (Sellars 1997: 50). Und diese Zuschreibung findet direkt oder indirekt durch eine öffentliche Sprache statt (Sellars 1997: 44).

Es gibt auch nach Sellars' Philosophie kein Bewusstsein von einem logischen Raum außerhalb der Sprache oder vor dem Erwerb der Sprache (Sellars 1997: 65). Teil des logischen Raums ist zum Beispiel, dass man den Sprechenden als eine Person betrachtet, die sich von physikalischen Gegenständen unterscheidet, und außerdem eine Welt mit physikalischen Gegenständen, die Farben haben und in Zeit und Raum existieren, voraussetzt. Sellars behauptet, dass selbst Wittgenstein, der gegen die Idee der inneren Episoden war, noch in die Falle des gegebenen logischen Raums fällt, als er am Anfang der „*Philosophische Untersuchungen*" Beispiele von einer primitiven Sprache gibt. Sellars redet von dem Beispiel Wittgensteins im Paragraphen 8 der *PU*, in dem ein Mann einen anderen mit dem Befehl „d-Platte-dorthin" auffordert, eine Platte zu nehmen. Nach Sellars macht Wittgenstein einen Fehler, weil er den Lernenden einer Sprache konzipiert, als hätte er auch von vornherein das Bewusstsein eines logischen Raums oder zumindest ein primitives oder fragmentarisches Bewusstsein eines logischen Raums, in dem der Lernende noch nicht die Unterschiede zwischen den Elementen dieses logischen Raums beherrscht. Aber gerade diese Voraussetzungen von einem fragmentarischen logischen Raum, wie zum Beispiel, dass man zwischen Person und physikalischen Gegenständen unterscheidet u. a., müssen nach Sellars ebenfalls noch durch einen öffentlichen Prozess erlernt werden.

Sätze wie „Das ist rot" oder „Das ist grün" erhalten ihre Glaubwürdigkeit traditioneller Weise aus der Beobachtung, und analytische Sätze wie „2 + 2 = 4" haben eine interne, intrinsische Glaubwürdigkeit, die nach der traditionellen

Philosophie von logischen Beziehungen abhängt. Und es wird angenommen, dass es nichtsprachliche Episoden gibt, die auch als bewusste Episoden konzipiert werden, die ihre Glaubwürdigkeit dann auf die Sprachebene übertragen. Es ist die Annahme, dass es eine Ebene gibt von nicht-inferentiellem Wissen, bzw. eine Art von Wissen, welches kein weiteres Wissen voraussetzt und daher die Grundlagen für alles andere Wissen ist und Glaubwürdigkeit besitzt (Sellars 1997: 69).

Analytische Sätze würden glaubwürdiger wirken, wenn man sie auf korrekte Weise formulieren würde, und Beobachtungssätze wie „Das ist rot" könnten auch falsch sein, auch wenn man sie (die Sätze) auf korrekte Weise formuliert, wegen der logischen Eigenschaften von empirischen Sätzen. Mit anderen Worten: Ein Beobachtungssatz kann grammatikalisch richtig sein, aber das sagt nichts über seinen Wahrheitsgehalt aus. Und damit hätte man nach Sellars die Lösung gefunden, um die Autorität der empirischen Sätze zu erklären: Um empirische Sätze auf korrekte Weise zu formulieren, müsste man die Regeln von „dies", „ist" und „grün" befolgen. Was aber nach Sellars noch nicht genug ist, weil man auch eine Konzeption eines logischen Raums, u.a. aus einer öffentlichen Sprache, noch erlernen müsste.

Die Verwendung des Worts „Bericht" im normalen Sprachgebrauch und in der Erkenntnistheorie ist verschieden. „Bericht" wird im normalen Sprachgebrauch nach Sellars sowohl im Sinn von Konstatierung als auch im Sinn von Handlung verwendet, und Wittgenstein konzipiert nach Sellars „Bericht" als Ausführung einer Handlung. Sellars macht darauf aufmerksam, dass eine „Handlung" richtig sein kann, aber die Konstatierung zugleich falsch, oder umgekehrt, die Konstatierung kann richtig sein und die Handlung falsch (Sellars 1997: 72). Daher sollte man zwischen Konstatierung und Handlung unterscheiden. Sonst kann man nach Sellars zu der Annahme kommen, dass die Autorität eines Beobachtungsberichts in der Art liege, wie man eine Regel befolgt (Sellars 1997: 73). Anders gesagt: Ein Beobachtungsbericht wäre richtig, wenn ich eine Regel z. B. des Berichts richtig befolge (zum Beispiel, ganz präzise zu berichten). Und noch weiter: Nach Sellars wäre man gezwungen, die Konstatierung als eine Vorstufe des Berichts anzunehmen bzw. als ein Bewusstsein, dass es eine bestimmte Sinneswahrnehmung, z. B. rot oder grün, gibt. Damit würde die Autorität der Konstatierung auf nichtsprachlicher Ebene gemacht und auf die sprachliche Ebene übertragen, und so wäre, wenn man eine sprachliche Handlung korrekt ausführt, die Konstatierung auch korrekt. Als wäre eine Beobachtung selbstbeglaubigend und würde durch nichtsprachliche Episoden erfolgen, welche dann auf die sprachliche Ebene übertragen würde - Was aber nach Sellars nicht stimmt und Teil des Mythos des Gegebenen ist, welchen er kritisiert.

Nach Sellars hängt die Autorität des Berichts bzw. des Beobachtungswissens von der Person ab, die den Schluss ziehen kann, um z. B. zu sagen „Das ist grün" muss die Person die dafür nötigen Worte und ihre Verwendung kennen, bestimmte Bedingungen der Wahrnehmung kennen. Eine Person ist für Sellars wichtig, weil sie diejenige ist, die eine Aussage, einen Bericht ermöglicht durch das Schließen einer Verbindung zwischen einem Ausdruck und einem anderen, oder einem Ausdruck und einem Gegenstand usw. Nicht nur die Person des Berichtenden ist wichtig, sondern auch die anderen, die der Schlussfolgerung des Berichtenden folgen können. Damit die anderen dem Schluss des Berichtenden folgen können und den Bericht anerkennen können, müssen sie auch die Voraussetzungen erfüllen, dass sie die Verwendung der nötigen Wörter kennen, bestimmte Bedingungen der Wahrnehmung, u. a.

Das heißt nach Sellars, dass die Person, die den Satz „Das ist grün" berichtet, über das Wissen verfügt, welches es ermöglicht, zum gegebenen Zeitpunkt zu erkennen, dass X ein verlässliches Symptom von Y ist. Um dem Problem des *regressum ad infinitum* zu entgehen, sagt Sellars, dass die Einzeltatsachen wichtig für die Richtigkeit bzw. die Autorität des Berichts „Das ist grün" sind, die dem Berichtenden zum Zeitpunkt des Berichts vorliegen, die unter bestimmten Bedingungen ein verlässliches Anzeichen für das Vorliegen z.B. eines grünen Gegenstands sind, damit die anderen seinen Bericht anerkennen können. Aber er braucht nicht im gegenwärtigen Augenblick über die Anzeichen für das Vorliegen der Einzeltatsachen Bescheid zu wissen, die für den gegenwärtigen Augenblick als Anzeichen für die Existenz des grünen Gegenstandes dienen. So will Sellars das Problem des *regressum ad infinitum* lösen.

Anhand der Beschreibung der anderen in einer öffentlichen Sprache kann man nach Sellars zu der Selbstbeschreibung gelangen, indem man für sich selbst dieselben Kriterien verwendet, die man verwenden würde, wenn man eine andere Person beschreiben würde. Daher kann man von dem Satz „Er denkt, dass p" zu dem Satz gelangen „Ich denke, dass p". Dieser Satz gewinne eine berichtende Rolle, da man zu der Annahme komme, dass man einen Zugang zu den eigenen Gedanken und Empfindungen habe, was den anderen nicht möglich sei, den privilegierten Zugang. Dieser privilegierte Zugang aber setze einen langen Prozess des Erwerbs der Wörter der öffentlichen Sprache und der gegenseitigen Beobachtung von offenem Verhalten voraus, sodass der privilegierte Zugang zu seinen eigenen Gedanken ein Teil des Gebrauchs der Wörter der öffentlichen Sprache wie „Gedanken", „privilegierter Zugang" u. a. sei. „Innere Episoden" sind aber an sich noch kein öffentlicher Beleg, oder mit anderen Worten, im Beispiel mit den Zahnschmerzen: Die innere Episode Zahnschmerzen ist kein öffentlicher Beleg für die Richtigkeit meines Berichts. Der öffentliche Beleg für diese innere Episode kann dann nur ein offenes Verhalten sein, z. B. dass meine Backe dick und geschwollen ist. Auch das ist Bestandteil der Verwendung dieser Wörter (Sellars 1997: 107). Der Berichtende braucht in seinem Bericht keine äußeren Belege aufzuführen oder eine Beobachtung seines offenen Verhaltens zu machen. Die Autorität seines Berichts aber hängt von den offenen Belegen oder dem Verhalten ab.

Sellars kritisiert die Konzeption von inneren Episoden als etwas Privatem, das man durch unmittelbare Erfahrung kenne und das daher etwas Gegebenes sei. Für ihn kann es private Episoden nur auf einer zweiten Stufe geben, weil sie die öffentliche Sprache voraussetzen und daher nicht absolut privat sein können, wenn, dann nur relativ. Zur Voraussetzung von inneren Episoden und Sinnesdaten gehören nach Sellars die öffentliche Sprache, das Erlernen eines logischen Raums, die Verwendung und Interpretation der ostensiven Definition, und daher können sie nicht privat im strengeren Sinn sein.

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Kritik des auditiven Relationalismus

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Abstract

Dem auditive Relationalismus gemäß sind Laute wie Töne, Geräusche, usw. als etwas zu verstehen, dem seine Existenz nur aufgrund des Bestehens einer Relation zu einem wirklichen oder möglichen Hörer zukommt. In meinem Beitrag möchte ich zeigen, dass diese Auffassung in ihren verschiedenen Varianten nicht plausibel machen kann, von dem zu handeln, was man gewöhnlich unter Lauten usw. versteht.

1. Einleitung: Was besagt der auditive Relationalismus?

In seinem Buch *The Red and the Real* führt Jonathan Cohen (2011) die Unterscheidung zwischen relationalistichen und nonrelationalistischen Positionen in Bezug auf die Farben ein. Relationalistische Positionen sind solche, welche die Farben als existentiell abhängig vom Bestehen einer Relation zu möglichen Beobachtern ansehen. Nonrelationalistische Positionen sehen sie als nicht in dieser Weise von Beobachtern abhängig an. Relationalistische Positionen können dem Subjektivismus zugeordnet werden, insofern sie beinhalten, dass Farben geistabhängig sind.

Ich möchte diese Unterscheidung nun auf den Bereich der Laute übertragen. Laute sind dem auditiven Relationalismus nach von möglichen Hörern abhängig. D. h. etwas kann nur ein bestimmter Laut sein aufgrund einer Relation zu einem möglichen Hörer. Die Frage, anhand derer sich entsprechende Positionen des auditiven Relationalismus unterscheiden lassen, ist nun, welches das zweite Relatum dieser Relation sein soll.

2. Der distale Relationalismus höherer Ordnung.

Die nach John Locke (2008, Buch II, Kap. 8) am nächsten liegende Antwort auf diese Frage ist, dass die Quellen der jeweiliges Laut in ihrer Beziehung zu den möglichen Hörern existentiell verantwortlich sind (vgl. Cohen 2010). Der Knall eines herunter gefallenen Tabletts erschallt also nur aufgrund einer Relation zwischen dem aufprallenden Tablett und einem möglichen Hörer. Diese Position hat drei Probleme.

Erstens, nach dieser Position kommt auch dem jetzt gerade in völliger Ruhe im Küchenschrank befindlichen Tablett der Laut des Aufprallens zu. Laute sind demnach schlicht die klanglichen Potentiale, die einem Objekt zukommen und welche einmal aktiviert werden könnten oder eben nicht. Zwar ist es normal von Lauten zu sprechen, die gerade niemand hört. Dabei ist gemeint, dass ein Laut in einem Bereich um die Quelle für einen möglichen Hörer hörbar wäre. Bei der hier kritisierten Position hingegen wird angenommen, dass ein Laut „seiner Quelle" zu jedem Zeitpunkt unhörbar zukommt.

Zweitens, nach dieser Position kommt einer Lautquelle jeder Laut, den sie potentiell erzeugen könnte, stets zugleich zu, also eine nicht abzählbare Anzahl an Lauten. Schließlich ist ja nicht nur das Aufprallen gerade ein Laut des Tabletts oder sein abgespült werden, sondern jede mögliche lautliche Variation, die verursacht werden könnte, sofern er mit etwas im Universum reagiert. Also auch der Laut des mit einem Bunsenbrenner geschmolzen Werdens, des Zusammenstoßes mit einem schnell fahrenden Zug oder des Eintauchens in einen ausbrechenden Vulkan kommt dem Tablett, das unbenutzt im Schrank liegt, jetzt gerade zu.

Drittens, es ist nicht klar, inwiefern dem Laut eine zeitliche Abfolge zugesprochen werden kann, wenn diese Position zutrifft. Denn es sind Ereignisse wie das Zerbrechen eines Glases oder auch Dinge wie Büchern, denen auf verschiedene Weise ein zeitlicher Verlauf zugesprochen werden kann. Doch der Zerbrechlichkeit eines Glases oder der Disposition des Buches, bei schlechter Lagerung in einem feuchten Keller, zu verrotten, sind nicht selbst etwas, dem man Zeitlichkeit zuschreiben kann. Natürlich kann man sagen, dass manche Bücher höherer Qualität sich viel langsamer verfärben würden als Bücher mit niederer Qualität. Aber dann spricht man von einer Disposition, die auch in Bezug auf zeitliche Abläufe beschrieben werden kann, nicht von einer selbst zeitlich verlaufenden Disposition.

3. Der distale Relationalismus niederer Ordnung

Diese drei Probleme kann man umgehen. Man kann meinen, dass es eine andere Disposition der Quelle ist, die mit dem entsprechenden Laut zu identifizieren ist. Der Laut ist demnach nicht identisch mit der Disposition höherer Ordnung, unter bestimmten Bedingungen bestimmte Lauterfahrungen in bestimmten Hörenden auszulösen. Vielmehr ist er identisch mit der Disposition niederer Ordnung, in einem bestimmten Zeitraum aufgrund bestimmter Bedingungen (u. a. bestimmten kausalen Anregern) bestimmte Lauterfahrungen in bestimmten Hörenden auszulösen. Diese Position löst die drei obigen Probleme, besitzt aber drei eigene.

Erstens, wir sprechen nicht davon, außer in sehr speziellen Idiomen, dass Dinge Laute haben oder besitzen. Man kann einzelnen Orgelpfeifen oder ganzen Musikinstrumenten sowie verschiedenen Tieren in bestimmten Hinsichten bestimmte Laute zuschreiben. Aber bei praktisch allen Dingen, die keinen für sie typischen Laut haben, sprechen wir nicht davon, dass sie irgendeinen Laut haben.

Zweitens, es ist ganz üblich von Lauten unabhängig von ihren Quellen zu sprechen. Es ist sogar oft der Fall, dass uns die Quelle eines Lautes nicht interessiert oder uns gänzlich unbekannt ist. Zwar wollen wir uns in sehr vielen Fällen grob der Quelle versichern. Aber selbst dann können wir uns zuerst auf den einzelnen Laut beziehen und dann schauen, bei was es sich um seine Quelle handeln

könnte. Eine solche Bezugnahme auf Laute ohne die Bezugnahme auf ihre Quellen ist etwas, das bei typischen dispositionalen Eigenschaften wie wasserlöslich oder biegsam sein nicht möglich ist.

Drittens, Laute können sich unabhängig von ihren Quellen bewegen. Meistens bewegen sich Laute mit ihrer Quelle; etwa, wenn man von der Parkbank aus ein Gespräch zweier Spaziergänger hört, welches sich von links nach rechts mit ihnen bewegt. Aber es gibt auch Bewegungen von Laute versetzt zu ihren Quellen; etwa bei einem Echo oder einem startenden Flugzeug. Auch dies legt nicht nahe, Laute als Dispositionen ihrer Quellen zu behandeln, da bei einer Disposition nicht klar ist, was es heißen soll, dass sie sich unabhängig von ihrer Quelle bewegt, oder dass sie sich überhaupt bewegt.

4. Der spatiale Relationalismus

Eine in aktuellen Debatten weitaus häufiger zu findende Position sieht die Laute nicht als Dispositionen, sondern als relationale Dinge oder Ereignisse an. Diese Position löst alle sechs der obigen Probleme, da sie Laute nicht als dispositionale Eigenschaften ihrer Quellen begreift. Prominent vertreten wird diese Position von Roger Scruton (1999, Kap. 3; 2011; Kap. 2), sie findet sich zudem auch bei Adam Pautz (2014) und Moreland Perkins (1983). Doch auch diese Position hat zwei Probleme.

Erstens, es ist nicht so, dass wir Sätze über Laute gewöhnlich auf deren Hörer oder mögliche Hörer relativieren. Behauptungen wie „Von hier hört man es kaum noch." oder „Von hier hört es sich so und so an." enthalten üblicher Weise keine solche Relativierung. Wenn überhaupt könnte man Behauptungen wie „Für hier hört es sich so und so an." oder „Ich höre das ganz anders." in einer solchen Weise deuten. Aber solche Sätze stehen unqualifizierte Aussagen über Laute gegenüber. Genauer gesagt verhalten sie sich derivativ zu ihnen. Wir können nicht angeben, dass sich etwas für jemanden anhört, ohne dabei auch zu sagen, wie es sich für ihn anhört. Und bei dieser Angabe nutzen wir die normale Sprache zur Beschreibung von Lauten. Wenn sich der Motor eines Autos für Martin komisch anhört und für Georg nicht, dann heißt das, dass er sich für Martin, nicht aber für Georg wie ein Motor anhört, der komisch ist, also einen Defekt aufweist. Selbst in einem Satz wie „Der Motor hört sich komisch an, ich weiß aber, dass er in Ordnung ist." ändert sich nichts an diesem Verhältnis.

Man kann nun diese Position modifizieren, indem man sagt, dass ein Laut der Art x zu sein, nichts Anderes ist, als die Möglichkeit eines Teiles des Raumes, normalen Hörern unter normalen Bedingungen auditiv in der Weise x zu erscheinen. Doch dann fragt es sich, was normale Bedingungen und normale Hörer hier bedeuten soll. Offenbar sind sie doch die Personen, die die Laute gerade hören, wie sie sind, und die Bedingungen, unter denen man die Laute so hört, wie sie sind. Doch diese Antwort steht dem Relationalisten nicht offen, da es für ihn keine Art und Weise geben kann, wie ein Laut unabhängig von dessen möglichen Hörern ist. So kann der Relationalist auch nicht erklären, warum wir überhaupt von Lauten in unserer Umgebung sprechen.

Zweitens, unter den Annahmen des Relationalismus ist nicht plausibel zu machen, wie man einen Unterschied zwischen einem erfolgreichen und einem missglückten Hören eines Lautes treffen soll. Eigentlich kann ein konsequenter Relationalist einem Satz wie „Ich hörte das Konzert sehr gut, aber sie hörte es hinter dem Vorhang nur verzerrt." keinen Sinn zuschreiben. Schließlich liegen hier

zwei Hörerfahrungen vor und für den Relationalisten gibt es keine Wirklichkeit hinter dieser Erfahrung. Wenn wir also festgestellt haben, dass sich das Konzert für sie so und so und für mich so und so angehört hat, dann gibt es keine Rechtfertigung dafür, danach noch eine dieser Erfahrungen als weniger adäquat oder sonst defizitär zu beurteilen, obwohl wir das im Alltag problemlos tun können und in so einem Fall meistens auch würden.

Anders ausgedrückt, wenn einem Abschnitt des Raumes der Laut zugesprochen werden soll, welcher ein Hörender an dieser Stelle hört, dann sind solche Wahrnehmungsaussagen generell zutreffend, sofern sie aufrichtig sind. Denn alle aufrichtigen Aussagen darüber, wie jemandem etwas erscheint oder wie es sich anhört, können nicht falsch sein, da sie ja nur subjektive Eindrücke beschreiben. Was der Eindruck nahelegt kann hingegen vollkommen falsch sein. Doch diese letztere Ebene steht dem Relationalisten anscheinend nicht offen.

Möchte der Relationalist sich diese Ebene öffnen, also sagen, dass es nicht erfolgreiche Wahrnehmungsversuche gibt, dann benötigt er ein Kriterium dafür, was ein erfolgreiches Wahrnehmen eines Lautes ist. Es steht ihm nicht die Lösung des Nonrelationalisten offen, nach der ein erfolgreiches Hören eines Lautes darin besteht, dass gehört zu haben, was da war.

Jonathan Cohen (2007, S. 341f.) schlägt ein solches Kriterium vor. Demnach sind solche Wahrnehmungen nicht veridisch, bei welchen sich der Hörende über die eigene Verfasstheit oder die eigenen Wahrnehmungsbedingungen irrt. Fehler liegen also nicht in der Aufrichtigkeit der Aussage begründet, sondern in deren Hintergrundannahmen über sich selbst und die Wahrnehmungsbedingungen. Doch ist es nicht möglich, diesen Irrtum wirklich im Einzelnen zu beschreiben. Man müsste unter Nutzung dieses Kriteriums zum Beispiel beschreiben können, dass der Hörende glaubt, etwas unter normalen Bedingungen zu hören, obwohl er es in Wahrheit unter abnormalen hört. Und eine solche Redeweise steht dem Relationalisten nicht offen, da es nach seiner Auffassung keinen Sinn ergeben kann, von abnormalen Hörbedingungen zu sprechen, unabhängig von einem weiteren Kriterium dafür, wann man etwas erfolgreich hört und wann nicht.

5. Relationen zu was?

Der auditive Relationalismus kann in keiner seiner möglichen Varianten wirklich nahelegen, dass er eine Antwort auf die Frage, was die Laute sind, gibt. Denn wenn seine Vorschläge dafür, was man als einen Laut verstehen soll, so sehr von unserem normalen Verständnis davon, was ein Laut ist, abweicht, dann gibt einem das einen guten Grund, zu vermuten, dass hier von etwas anderem gesprochen wird. Niemand würde wohl leugnen, dass man davon sprechen kann, dass Laute üblicher Weise bei Hörenden in einem philosophisch-technischen Sinne Hörerfahrungen auslösen kann oder dass Hörende an diesem Ort dies und das hören dürften. Aber es gibt keinen guten Grund, diese Redeweisen als typische Redeweisen über Laute zu verstehen oder neben diesen nicht auch die üblichen Redeweisen über die Laute, wie sie unabhängig von ihren wirklichen oder tatsächlichen Hörern sind, zu berücksichtigen.

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Sind die *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* esoterisch? Zu einer Bemerkung Stanley Cavells

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Abstract

Wo wir in der Philosophie auf Formen sinnen, die einem zunächst nicht hinlänglich ausbuchstabierten Problem erst Bedeutung verleihen, dort haben wir uns gegen Forderungen des vorwegnehmenden Planens philosophischer Projekte sperrig zu verhalten. Diesem Gedanken möchte ich dadurch Sinn geben, dass ich den Begriffen des Planens und Kartographierens ein Stück weit nachgehe.

> „Ich schreibe also eigentlich für Freunde
> welche in Winkeln der Welt verstreut sind."
> (MS 109: 206, aus einem Vorwort-Entwurf vom 6 Nov. 1930)

Stanley Cavells Zugang zu Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie steht unter einer eigentümlichen Prämisse. In der Einleitung zu *The Claim of Reason* heißt es:

> Wie die großen Werke zumindest des vergangenen Jahrhunderts sind die Philosophischen Untersuchungen logisch gesehen esoterisch. Das heißt, Werke dieser Art neigen dazu, ihre Leserschaft in Eingeweihte und Nichteingeweihte (und noch dazu jedes ihrer Mitglieder) zu spalten, folglich schaffen sie die besondere Unerfreulichkeit eines Kultes -im besten Fall als spezifisches Heilmittel gegen die besondere Unerfreulichkeit der Indifferenz oder der intellektuellen Promiskuität indem Beschränktheit durch Beschränktheit bekämpft wird – und folglich fordern sie einen Schock der Bekehrung um ernsthaft rezipiert zu werden. (Cavell 2006: 29)

Damit gibt Cavell eine recht erstaunliche Charakterisierung von Wittgensteins Hauptwerk seiner Spätphilosophie. Begriffe wie ‚esoterisch' oder ‚Bekehrung' sind in der Philosophie recht ungewöhnlich. Doch ich denke, dass Cavell hier einen wichtigen Aspekt in Wittgensteins Werk anspricht. Im Folgenden möchte ich zwei Fragen im Zusammenhang mit Cavells These nachgehen:

1. Inwieweit hängt Cavells Charakterisierung der PU als ‚esoterisch' mit Wittgensteins generellem Konzept von Philosophie zusammen, insbesondere mit seiner Behauptung, es könne keine philosophische Theorie bzw. Thesen geben?

2. Welche Bedeutung hat in diesem Zusammenhang die Rede vom ‚*Schock der Bekehrung*', der nach Cavell notwendig ist, um die PU ernsthaft zu rezipieren?

Auf eine dritte damit zusammenhängende Frage, nämlich wieweit diese Charakteristik von Wittgensteins Philosophie mit seinem Stil, seiner spezifischen Art zu schreiben zusammenhängt, kann ich hier nicht näher eingehen. Ich verweise dazu insbesondere auf die Arbeiten von Alois Pichler (Pichler 2004) und Majorie Perloff (Perloff 1996).

1. Esoterik und Philosophie

Zunächst zur ersten Frage. Unbestritten ist wohl, dass Cavells Worte von der besonderen ‚Unerfreulichkeit eines Kultes' auf Wittgenstein in sehr ausgeprägter Weise zutrafen und wohl bis heute zutreffen. Um hier nur einen Zeugen als Beispiel zu nennen, zitiere ich Wasfi Hijab, einen aus Palästina stammenden Mathematiker, der 1945 nach Cambridge kam, um Philosophie zu studieren. Hier traf er auf Professor Wittgenstein und studierte einige Jahre bei ihm, trotz aller wohlmeinenden Warnungen, die man ihm mitgegeben hatte:

> Braithwait was my first supervisor. … After accepting my first assignment as part of my dissertation, he exhorted me not to shift to Wittgenstein as supervisor. As then there would be no dissertation. His prophecy was correct, but his advise came too late. After my first lecture with Wittgenstein I was fit only to sit at his feet and learn from his wisdom. (Hijab 2001: 313)

Hijab tauchte viele Jahre später, die er brauchte um sich von der „Überbelichtung" durch Wittgenstein zu erholen, plötzlich und unangekündigt 1999 am Wittgensteinsymposion in Kirchberg auf und berichtete von seinen Erinnerungen an Wittgenstein. Er beschreibt Wittgensteins Wirkung auf seine StudentInnen als überwältigend. Hier wird allerdings auch ein Widerspruch sichtbar: Die bedingungslose Anhängerschaft von Wittgensteins StudentInnen steht in diametralem Gegensatz zu seiner eigenen Einschätzung. In den *Vermischten Bemerkungen* heißt es etwa:

> Kann ich nur keine Schule gründen, oder kann es ein Philosoph nie? Ich kann keine Schule gründen, weil ich eigentlich nicht nachgeahmt werden will, jedenfalls nicht von denen, die Artikel in philosophischen Zeitschriften veröffentlichen. …Es ist mir durchaus nicht klar, daß ich eine Fortsetzung einer Arbeit durch Andere mehr wünsche, als eine Veränderung der Lebensweise, die alle diese Fragen überflüssig macht. (Darum könnte ich nie eine Schule gründen.) (VB: 118)

Wittgensteins Philosophie ist kein theoretisches Lehrgebäude und lässt sich bestenfalls als spezifische Methode des Philosophierens vermitteln. Ich möchte in diesem Zusammenhang an einen frühen Artikel von Erich Heller anknüpfen, in dem er sich mit ähnlichen Fragen beschäftigt und folgende Unterscheidung zwischen zwei Typen von Philosophen einführt:

> There are philosophers which, however difficult they may be are in principle easy to teach and to learn… This is true of Aristotle, or St. Thomas Aquinas, or Descartes, or Locke, or Kant. Such philosophers are like mountains: you climb to their tops or you give up; … But this is not so with Plato, or St Augustine or Pascal, or Kierkegaard, or Nietzsche. Their philosophies are like human faces on the features of which are inscribed, disquietingly, the destinies of souls, or like cities rich in history. … The trouble with Wittgenstein's thinking is, that it sometimes looks like Descartes; you believe you can learn it as you learns logic or mathematics; but it almost always is more like Pascal's you may be quite

sure you cannot. For to understand it on its own level is as much a matter of imagination and character as it is one of 'thinking' ". (Heller 1978: 90,91)

Wittgenstein selbst vergleicht die Sprache mehrfach mit einer alten verwinkelten Stadt (PU: 18, 203, MS 132: 200; Z: §121) und sieht die Aufgabe des Philosophen in Analogie zu einem Führer durch eine unübersichtliche Stadt (VGM: 50). Es ist wohl nicht zufällig, dass Wittgensteins engste geistige Verwandte in der letzteren Gruppe zu finden sind, die allesamt in Cavells Sinn als „esoterisch" gelten können.[1] (Und hier ist man auch an den Gegensatz von links- und rechtshemisphärischem Denken erinnert; vgl. Ornstein 1974.)

Wittgensteins Philosophie ist in weiten Zügen ein Nachdenken darüber, was Philosophie eigentlich ist; d.h. welches ihre Aufgabe und die ihr eigene Methode ist, - was sie leisten kann. Und gerade in dieser Neubestimmung ihrer Aufgabe liegt ein wesentlicher Teil seiner Innovation. In Wittgensteins später Philosophie geht es um Klarheit, sogar um „vollkommene Klarheit" (vgl. PU: 133), aber gerade *nicht* über den Umweg einer philosophischen Theorie, sondern durch das Sichtbar-Machen von verborgenen Aspekten.

Wittgenstein sieht vor allem die Orientierung der Philosophie an den Naturwissenschaften als verhängnisvoll an:

Philosophen haben ständig die naturwissenschaftliche Methode vor Augen und sind in der unwiderstehlichen Versuchung, Fragen nach der Art der Naturwissenschaften zu stellen und zu beantworten. Diese Tendenz ist die eigentliche Quelle der Metaphysik und führt den Philosophen in vollständiges Dunkel. Ich möchte hier sagen, dass es niemals unser Anliegen sein kann, irgendetwas auf irgendetwas zurückzuführen oder irgendetwas zu erklären. Philosophie ist wirklich ‚rein deskriptiv'. (BBB: 39)

Der Traum einer Philosophie, die auf wissenschaftlicher Basis systematisch fortschreitet beherrscht zumindest seit Kant die Philosophiegeschichte. Diese Vorstellung verbindet etwa Denker wie Bertrand Russell mit so unterschiedlichen Philosophen wie Edmund Husserl. Sein programmatischer Aufsatz „Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" erscheint 1910, Russells „On Scientific Method in Philosophy" 1914. Wittgensteins Kritik daran wird bereits in seinem Kriegstagebuch von 1915 deutlich:

Es ist eine Hauptkunst des Philosophen, sich nicht mit Fragen zu beschäftigen, die ihn nichts angehen. Russell's ‚Scientific Method in Philosophy' ist geradezu ein Rückschritt von der Methode der Physik. (MS 102: 82r, vom 1.5.1915)

Für Wittgenstein kann sich die Philosophie nicht an den empirischen Wissenschaften orientieren, denn es geht ihr weder um neue Entdeckungen noch die Errichtung theoretischer Lehrgebäude:

Die falsche Auffassung, gegen die ich mich in diesem Zusammenhang kehren möchte, ist die, daß wir auf etwas kommen könnten, was wir heute noch nicht sehen, daß wir etwas ganz neues finden können. Das ist ein Irrtum: In Wahrheit haben wir schon alles, und zwar gegenwärtig, wir brauchen af nichts zu warten. Wir bewegen uns im Bereich der Grammatik unserer gewöhnlichen Sprache. (Vorlesungen 1930-35: 183)

Dieser Vorwurf trifft auch Wittgensteins eigens Frühwerk, den TLP, wie er etwa in einem Gespräch mit Mitgliedern des Wiener Kreises ausführt („Über Dogmatismus", vgl. WWK: 182). Ab 1929 versucht Wittgenstein sich von dieser Art der Philosophie, die er als ‚dogmatisch' brandmarkt, radikal zu lösen. Er insistiert darauf, dass Philosophie sich nur mit dem beschäftigt, dass wir alle schon wissen. Es geht dabei um eine Art von alltäglichem Wissen, auf das wir uns momentan nicht besinnen können, das wir nicht überblicken oder missverstehen, weil wir es unter einem irreführenden Blickwinkel betrachten.

Darin liegt ein radikal neues Verständnis von Philosophie, das tatsächlich einen *Schock der Bekehrung* erfordert, ein Umdenken, zu dem Philosophen wie Bertrand Russell oder auch Karl Popper nicht bereit waren. - Exemplarisch kommt dieser Gegensatz in der legendären Konfrontation von Popper und Wittgenstein am 25. Oktober 1946 im Moral Science Club zum Ausdruck. In seinem Vortrag mit dem Titel „*Gibt es philosophische Probleme?*" vertrat Popper die Meinung, dass es genuin philosophische Fragen und auch Antworten also Theorien gibt, was Wittgenstein heftig bestritt, – wobei ein berühmter Schürhaken eine legendäre Rolle spielte (vgl. Edmonds, Eidinov 2001). Wie Cavell pointiert herausstellt, blieb auch Russells Verständnis von Philosophie grundsätzlich traditionell. Er – Russell – beklagt etwa, dass die Philosophie heute die Verbindung zur modernen Naturwissenschaft verloren habe:

Philosophers from Thales onwards have tried to understand the world. I cannot feel that the new philosophy is carrying on this tradition. (Russell 1959: 230)

Cavell entgegnet im Geiste Wittgensteins:

But philosophers from Socrates onward have (sometimes) also tried to understand themselves, and found in that both the method and goal of philosophizing. (Cavell 1962: 89)

Wir sind hier an Wittgensteins Bemerkung erinnert, einer sei umso weniger groß, je weniger er sich selbst kennt, und dass gerade aus diesem Grund wissenschaftliche Berühmtheiten wie Freud, Spengler, Kraus, Einstein in Wahrheit nicht groß sind.[2]

2. Der „Schock der Bekehrung"

Ich komme auf Cavells Formulierung vom „*Schock der Bekehrung*" zurück. Noch einmal ein Zitat aus einem Artikel über den bereits erwähnten Wasfi Hijab:

Wittgenstein, Hijab now reflects, destroyed his intellectual foundations, his religious faith and his powers of abstract thought. The doctorate abandoned, for many years after leaving Cambridge he put all thought of philosophy aside and took up mathematics again, Wittgenstein, he says, was 'like an atom bomb, a tornado – people just don't appreciate that', (The Guardian, 21.11.2001)

Auch nach Gilbert Ryle ging es Wittgenstein darum, seine SchülerInnen zu bekehren. „Wie Sokrates war er bemüht, seine Schüler zu bekehren. Er war ein Eremit, ein Asket ein Guru und ein ‚Führer'." (Ryle 1971: 259)

Eine der tiefgründigsten Antworten Wittgensteins auf die Frage nach der Aufgabe der Philosophie lautete, dass Philosophie uns lehren kann, Aspekte der Wirklichkeit zu se-

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[1] Vgl. dazu: „Wenn ich nicht ein richtigeres Denken, sondern eine [andere| neue] Gedankenbewegung lehren will, so ist mein Zweck eine 'Umwertung von Werten' und ich komme auf Nietzsche, sowie auch dadurch, daß meiner Ansicht nach, der Philosoph ein Dichter sein sollte." (MS 120: 145r 23 Apr, 1938)

[2] „Je weniger sich Einer selbst kennt und versteht, um so weniger groß ist er, wie groß auch sein Talent sein mag. Darum sind unsre Wissenschaftler nicht groß. Darum sind Freud, Spengler, Kraus, Einstein nicht groß." (MS 130: 240, 1 Aug, 1946)

hen, die gerade auf Grund ihrer Alltäglichkeit und Gewöhnlichkeit normalerweise verborgen bleiben (PU: 129). Neue Aspekte in uns allen längst Bekanntem zu sehen erfordert einen Perspektivenwechsel. So erlangt der Begriff des Aspekt-Sehens, wie ihn Wittgenstein insbesondere in der Philosophie der Psychologie, ein Fragment (PU: XI 111) entwickelt, zentrale Bedeutung. Wenn wir als Kinder darauf abgerichtet wurden, ein Bild als Ente zu sehen, so übernehmen wir dies zunächst automatisch und alternativlos. Vielleicht bleibt es für uns immer eine Ente. Erst wenn es gelingt, uns von eingelernten, vorgegebenen Sichtweisen zu distanzieren, ist es möglich, dass ein neuer anderer Aspekt plötzlich ‚aufblitzt', einer der aber immer schon da war, vor unseren Augen verborgen:

> Der Philosoph sagt ‚Sieh die Dinge so an!' …" Worin besteht es, daß der Philosoph etwas ᾿sieht'? Darin, daß ihm die rechte grammatische Tatsache einfällt, das rechte Bild, d.h., das Bild, das die Dinge in unserm Geist ordnet, sie leicht zugänglich macht und den Geist dadurch entlastet. (Das Bild welches den Wust der Papiere in unserm Geist in Ordnung bringt.)

> Was würde es nützen, wenn der Philosoph für Andere verborgene, Tatsachen ᾿sähe'? Die Andern würden dadurch ja nicht klarer. (MS 120: 143; vom 13 Apr, 1938)

Wittgensteins Philosophie will also nicht mehr sein als eine Einladung: ‚Sieh die Dinge so an!', nicht aber ein dogmatisches: ‚Die Dinge sind so', oder gar: ‚…sind notwendig so'. Philosophie kann uns eine bestimmte Art des Sehens lehren, so etwa wie wir die Ähnlichkeit zwischen zwei Gesichtern erkennen (PU: xi 111). Jemand anders mag die beiden Gesichter genauso klar sehen wie ich, aber er erkennt ihre Ähnlichkeit nicht. Ich kann sie ihm auch nicht beweisen; ich kann den anderen nur dazu einladen, sie zu erkennen. In genau dem Sinn ist Wittgensteins Philosophie esoterisch, und der Ausdruck vom ‚Schock der Bekehrung' entspricht einem radikalen Aspekt-Wechsel bezüglich der Aufgabe und dem Ziel der Philosophie[3].

3. Resümè

Wenn Wittgensteins Philosophie ihrer Intention nach einer Einladung entspricht „*Sieh die Sache so an!",* so sind zwei Reaktionen darauf möglich:

- Man kann der Einladung zu folgen, um nach einem Schock der Bekehrung zu einer ernsthaften Rezeption seiner philosophischen Ideen zu gelangen; (und hier müssen wir uns die Frage gefallen lassen „Warum soll das, was wir hier tun ‚Philosophie' genannt werden?" (BBB: 100))

- Oder man ist zu diesem radikalen Perspektivenwechsel nicht bereit. Dann aber bleibt die eigentliche Intention von Wittgensteins Philosophie unverständlich. Bertrand Russell kann als bekanntes Beispiel dafür gelten. In seiner intellektuellen Autobiographie heißt es. „ *I have not found in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations anything, that seems to be interesting …"* (Russell 1959: 60). Für Cavell hingegen sind sie das *größte Geschenk der Philosophiegeschichte* (Cavell 2006: 26).

Diesem Gegensatz entspricht Wittgensteins Beteuerung: „Ob ich von dem typischen westlichen Wissenschaftler verstanden oder geschätzt werde ist mit gleichgültig, weil er den Geist in dem ich schreibe doch nicht versteht".(MS 109: 206 vom 6 Nov, 1930). Das ist auch der Sinn des

eingangs zitierten Mottos. Wittgenstein schreibt für jene wenigen, über die Welt verstreuten Freunde, die bereit sind, seiner Einladung zu folgen. Und genau in diesem Sinn ist Wittgensteins Philosophie esoterisch. Das Grundgefühl für einen kleinen Kreis Gleichgesinnter und GEGEN die dominierenden geistigen Tendenzen seiner Zeit zu schreiben, formuliert Wittgenstein immer wieder. Etwa im Vorwort zu den Philosophischen Bemerkungen:

> Dieses Buch ist für jene geschrieben, die seinem Geist freundlich gegenüberstehen. Dieser Geist ist ein anderer als der des großen Stromes der europäischen und amerikanischen Zivilisation, in dem wir alle stehen. Dieser äußert sich in einem Fortschritt, in einem Bauen immer größerer und komplizierterer Strukturen, jener andere in einem Streben nach Klarheit und Durchsichtigkeit … (VB: Vorwort, November 1930)

Haben wir den Geist von Wittgensteins Denken heute verstanden?

Ich schließe einem von Wittgensteins faszineirenden Bildern, das Wasfi Hijab überlieferte, - es findet sich in keinem von Wittgensteins Manuskripten:

> Demnach verglich sich Wittgenstein selbst mit dem Anführer einer Gruppe, die in eine Burg mit unzählig vielen verschlossenen Toren eindringen will. Die Schlüssel liegen zwar alle bereit, doch der Anführer muss sie erst sortieren. Seine Zeit ist begrenzt und so gelingt es ihm nur einige wenige Tore zu öffnen. Auf die restlichen müssen sich die Nachfolger konzentrieren. Doch diese vergessen ihre Aufgabe. Ein Teil von ihnen strömt eilig durch die wenigen offenen Tore ein, bis sich diese unvermittelt wieder schließen. Der andere Teil bleibt draußen. Diesseits und jenseits der Mauern – Gefangene. (Kanterian 1999: 32)

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[3] Zur Unterscheidung von Gestalt-Aspekten – wie dem Hasen-Entenkopf – und „tiefen Aspekten" vgl. Schmidt 2016.

Can Plants Perceive?

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Abstract

Can plants perceive? It is obvious that they are sensitive to various external stimuli, and that they respond to these stimuli in highly complex ways. But can they perceive in the more demanding sense of forming sensory *representations* of their environment? In this paper, I argue that the answer to this question is 'probably not'. Under the plausible assumption that perception in the demanding sense requires perceptual constancies, we can show that well-understood paradigm examples of sensory systems in plants do not qualify as genuine perceptual systems. In order to do so, however, we have to move beyond the textbook definition of perceptual constancy towards a more thorough theoretical conception of this phenomenon. Hence, despite the fact that plants cannot perceive, they may help us to gain a better understanding of what perception is.

1. Introduction

In recent years, many biologists have ascribed to plants the ability to "perceive" their environment (Wu & Baldwin 2010: 2), and some have even characterized them as being able to "see" (Chamovitz 2012: 9), or as possessing "plant vision" (Baluška & Mancuso 2016: 729). Is this just overblown rhetoric, or is plant perception a real phenomenon?

Of course, if we do not distinguish between perception and mere sensitivity to external stimuli, then the issue is trivial. It is obvious that plants are sensitive to many different types of external stimuli and react to them in quite complex ways. If this is sufficient for perception, then plants are clearly capable of perceiving their environment. Likewise, if sensitivity to certain properties of light is sufficient for vision, then the reality of plant vision is undeniable.

In this paper, however, I will assume that there *is* an important distinction between genuine perception and mere sensitivity, i.e. between systems that produce *perceptual states*, which can be correct or incorrect (and thus have correctness conditions or *intentional content*), and systems that produce *mere sensory states* which lack any semantic properties. Moreover, I will assume that the difference between perceptual systems and mere sensory systems can be analyzed as the difference between sensory systems that exhibit *perceptual constancies*, like e.g. size constancy, color constancy or motion constancy, and sensory systems that do not (for elaboration and defense of this position, cf. Burge 2010, 2014).

Once we make these assumptions, the question of whether there is genuine perception in plants becomes a substantive one. What is more, it becomes a question that is, to some extent, empirically tractable: in order to determine whether plants can perceive, we simply have to investigate whether their sensory systems exhibit perceptual constancies. As we will see, however, empirical research is not enough: some theoretical groundwork is needed in order to successfully execute this strategy.

2. Why There (Probably) Is No Plant Perception

What are perceptual constancies? Here are two typical general characterizations from the literature:

> In general, […] a constancy occurs when our sense of the distal stimulus remains roughly the same in spite of changes in the proximal stimulus. (Matlin & Foley 1997: 102)

> A better formulation [for characterizing perceptual constancies; PS] is 'a capacity to perceptually represent some given attribute […] as that attribute, […] under significant differences in proximal stimulation'. (Burge 2014: 488)

In line with these characterizations, we can say e.g. that a sensory system exhibits *size constancy* if it (normally) generates representations that represent same-sized objects as having the same size, despite significant differences in proximal stimulation, i.e. despite the fact that the size of an object's retinal image differs greatly, depending on the distance of the object. The same is supposed to hold, mutatis mutandis, for all other perceptual constancies.

On such a conception of constancies (which I will call the 'textbook conception'), it may well seem that the sensory systems of plants *do* exhibit perceptual constancies. Take the Venus flytrap, for instance. This plant possesses a well-known mechanism for catching insects. There are, at the top of each of the plant's leaves, two terminal lobes, which form a kind of trap. Six 'trigger hairs' are protruding from the surfaces of both lobes. If an insect touches two or more trigger hairs within a time span of 20 seconds, then the trap snaps shut and the insect is caught (cf. Forterre et al. 2005).

This case can be described as follows: there is an internal state of the plant, the 'prey signal' (consisting of at least two action potentials generated within a time span of 20 s), which normally indicates the presence of prey, and which is generated under significant differences in proximal stimulation – differences with respect to *how many* trigger hairs are touched, *which* specific trigger hairs are touched, *in what order* they are touched, etc. As long as we are prepared to treat the internal state as a representation (e.g. as a representation of prey), it seems that the Venus flytrap qualifies as possessing the capacity to perceptually represent a given attribute (e.g. prey) under significant differences in proximal stimulation.

Proponents of the textbook conception can try to avoid this consequence in three ways. First, they can simply deny that the internal states in question are genuine representations. In the present context, however, this is not an option, since our general strategy is to determine whether sensory systems are perceptual, i.e. representational, by investigating whether they qualify as exercising perceptual constancies. Hence, to argue that a system does not qualify as exercising a perceptual constancy because it does not produce representations is to get things backward. Secondly, proponents of the standard conception can deny that the variations in question are 'significant'. But without a (rough) criterion for determining whether or not variations in proximal stimulation are significant, such a position is very unsatisfactory.

There is also a third option, however: proponents of the textbook conception can hold that perceptual constancies should always be understood as constancies with respect to a certain *determinable* property. This is not stated explicitly in the formulations cited above (or in most formulations found in psychology textbooks), but it is a plausible way of supplementing them. After all, constancies are standardly specified as constancies for determinable properties like size, color, motion, shape, etc. Hence, it is plausible to construe a constancy as a capacity (i) to represent *a range of determinates* (e.g. a range of particular sizes) of a certain determinable property (e.g. size), and (ii) to represent *each* of those determinates under significant variations in proximal stimulation.

This move excludes the sensory system of the Venus flytrap from the realm of systems that exhibit perceptual constancies. It is clear that we cannot describe the system as representing several different determinates of a determinable, since the system invariably registers *the presence of prey somewhere on its terminal lobes*, without differentiating between different kinds of prey, or different positions of the prey on the lobes.

However, plants possess other sensory systems that are not excluded by this move. Consider, for instance, the sophisticated defense systems of plants (Wu & Baldwin 2010, Vos et al. 2013). Often, these systems generate different responses to different kinds of attackers, and they differentiate between those attackers on the basis of different kinds of proximal cues. To keep things simple, let us suppose that a particular plant responds differently to three different types of insect herbivores (A, B, and C). Let us suppose further that the plant's defense system identifies these insect types through (a) chemical differences in their oral secretions (cf. Wu & Baldwin 2010: 3) and (b) different 'patterns of mechanical wounding' that arise from differences in their feeding behavior (cf. Wu & Baldwin 2010: 5). *Prima facie*, we can describe this plant as representing different determinates (insect types A, B, and C) of a single determinable (insect herbivore), and that it represents each of those determinates under significant variations in proximal stimulation (for instance, we can say that it represent the presence of insect type A when it is affected by a certain chemical substance, when a distinctive pattern of mechanical wounding is detected, or when both types of proximal stimuli are present).

So, should we accept that plants have sensory systems that exercise perceptual constancies, i.e. that plant perception is a real phenomenon? I do not think so. On a more thorough theoretical conception of perceptual constancies, it quickly emerges that even the sophisticated defense system described above does *not* qualify as exercising a constancy. This is not the place to develop the conception in detail (I do so elsewhere, cf. Schulte MS), so

I will present it only it outline, which suffices for our purposes.

According to the conception I am proposing, a perceptual constancy is characterized by three features. First, it is a capacity to perceptually represent several determinates of a certain determinable F (the 'target determinable' or 'target variable'), and to represent each of those determinates under significant differences in proximal stimulation. Secondly, these differences in proximal stimulation must be *systematic* in the sense that (a) part of the proximal stimulus (the 'key proximal variable') carries information about the target determinable in conflated form and (b) another part of the proximal stimulus (the 'auxiliary proximal variable') carries information about certain variable perceptual conditions. Thirdly, the sensory system must, in the course of producing representations of the F-determinates, *disentangle* the conflated information carried by the key proximal variable, using the information carried by the auxiliary proximal variable. In short, a perceptual constancy for F is a capacity for generating perceptual representations of F-determinates by virtue of an information disentanglement mechanism.

As an example, consider the following simple mechanism for size perception (which is probably very similar to the mechanism present in frogs and toads, cf. Ingle 1998). Suppose that there is a sensory mechanism that takes as inputs the values of two proximal variables: (i) retinal image size, i.e. the size of the image that an object projects onto the retina, and (ii) the tension of the muscles involved in lens accommodation, i.e. the tension of the muscles which flatten or thicken the lens (or, in frogs and toads, move the lens backward and forward) in order to produce a sharp image on the retina. In this case, retinal image size can be described as the key proximal variable: it contains information about object size in conflated form, since retinal image size depends on the size *and the distance* of the perceived object. Furthermore, the tension of the relevant eye muscles serves as an auxiliary variable: the tension necessary to produce a sharp image varies, depending on the distance of the perceived object, so this variable is a *distance indicator*. Hence, it can be used to disentangle the information contained in the key proximal variable. Suppose, finally, that the sensory mechanism is carefully calibrated so as to generate different internal states (and, *via* those states, different behavioral reactions) in response to different object sizes. What this sensory mechanism exhibits, I submit, is a simple form of size constancy.

To be sure, many cases of perceptual constancy are much more complicated, involving the interaction of multiple proximal variables and modes of information processing, but I contend that those cases also fit the general pattern I have sketched here (cf. Schulte MS). The important point is: if the proposed conception of constancies is on the right track, then defense systems in plants like the one considered above do *not* qualify as exercising constancies. What is lacking, in the first instance, is the *systematic proximal variation* characteristic of genuine constancies: while it is true that one determinate of the relevant determinable, say an insect of type A, may give rise to different proximal stimuli under different circumstances (e.g., it may release typical chemicals in one situation and inflict a typical wounding pattern in another), these stimuli are not such that they can be separated into a part that carries information about the insect type A in conflated form, and another part that carries information about perceptual conditions. And since the proximal stimulation cannot be separated into those two parts, there can be no mechanism that disentangles conflated information. Hence, the plant's de-

fense mechanism, complex though it may be, does not exhibit a true perceptual constancy.

3. Conclusion

Sensory systems in plants are intricate and complex. In this paper, I have investigated two paradigmatic cases, a prey-catching system and a defense system. Despite the considerable sophistication of these systems, I have argued that they do *not* qualify as exhibiting genuine perceptual constancies. As far as I can see, the same holds for all sensory systems in plants that have been studied in any detail.

Recently, Baluška & Mancuso (2016) have proposed that certain parasitic plants are capable of visually perceiving the shapes of the leaves of their host plants. If they are right, then this might constitute an example of genuine perceptual constancies in plants. However, Baluška & Mancuso have not provided any hints as to the internal information-processing mechanisms underlying this kind of shape perception – mechanisms which, it seems, would have to be radically different from any of those that are known to be present in plants –, so their proposal remains highly speculative. Since it has also been heavily criticized by other scientists (e.g. Gianoli 2017), I think we should be rather skeptical of their claims.

Hence, my tentative conclusion is that, as far as we know, there are no perceptual constancies in plants. While plants are highly sensitive to all kinds of different external stimuli, and respond to them in highly specific ways, they do not exhibit the kind of information-processing that is characteristic of genuine perception.

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Aspect Perception and Immersion in Virtual Reality

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Abstract

The goal of this paper is to bring philosophical theorizing about perception into the context of the virtual reality (VR) computer/language game. Wittgenstein's analysis of aspect perception will be applied to the concept of virtual reality immersion. Wittgenstein's puzzle of seeing-as – when we can see that a picture-object has not changed, and yet we can see it differently, will then be dissolved in the VR computer/language game. As a conclusion, technology will be treated as a kind of language that allows us to redefine our epistemological concepts. Accordingly, the concept of "immersion" will be understood as a grammatical rule that enables us to distinguish between the terms "reality", "augmented reality" and "virtual reality" without making serious ontological commitments.

Although the late Wittgenstein spent a lot of time investigating perception and aspect perception in particular, he did not reach any satisfactory results. It also seems that many contemporary philosophers, avoiding various representationalist clichés, have given up on the endeavor to introduce and vindicate any general theory of perceptual knowledge. At the same time, however, users, designers and sellers of digital technologies ardently and successfully play language games which are interwoven with computer games (hence further "language/computer games") and in which the concept of "perception" is taken for granted. This paper is particularly focused on the virtual reality (VR) language/computer game which centers around the expression "immersion". The general goal is to examine whether more and more intuitive and immersive computing platforms and digital sharing of visual experience can tell us something new about the nature of our perceptual knowledge; and whether a philosophical analysis of perception can help us understand properly the phenomenon of VR immersion. The specific goal is to find out if Wittgenstein's puzzle of aspect seeing may be dissolved by playing the VR language/computer game.

1. Wittgenstein's puzzle of aspect perception

When Wittgenstein analyzes perceptual recognition or seeing-as in his later writings (1946-1949) he focuses on the paradoxical phenomena that he calls "change of aspect", "aspect-dawning" or "noticing aspect". (A selection of these writings was published as Wittgenstein 2009: §§111–366.) The puzzle can be summarized as follows: when we look at a puzzle picture-object, such as the paradigmatic Necker cube or Jastrow's duck-rabbit head, we can see that it has not changed, and yet we can see it differently. (Comp. §113) Wittgenstein devoted much of his efforts to dissolve the paradox because he evidently thought that aspect perception was ubiquitous in our whole visual perception: "We find certain things about seeing puzzling, because we do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough." (Wittgenstein 2009: §251)

Wittgenstein even contemplates the occult and madness in connection with seeing something as something else, namely when we recognize a drawing as a portrait of NN and exclaim that it is Mr. NN; in other words – we see a bit of paper with black lines on it and take it for a human. (Wittgenstein 1980: I, §965) Furthermore, there is something occult not just about seeing-as but about seeing in general: "'Seeing the figure as...' has something occult,

something ungraspable about it. One would like to say: 'Something has altered, and nothing has altered.' – But don't try to explain it. Better look at the rest of seeing as something occult too." (Wittgenstein 1980: I, §966)

Although Wittgenstein did not aim to propound any theory of perception but rather to deal with the puzzle, his fragmentary analyses have brought some positive results. Let's focus on such findings which revolve around the central ascertainment that aspect perception or seeing-as involves both seeing and interpreting.

First, various aspect perceptions differ according to the degree of thought involvement: "…there are aspects which are mainly determined by thoughts and associations, and others that are 'purely optical', these make their appearance and alter automatically, almost like after-images." "…one could distinguish between "purely optical" aspects and "conceptual" ones." (Wittgenstein 1980: I §970; II §509)

Second, seeing is a state and it has its duration, while interpreting or thinking is an action: "Do I really see something different each time, or do I only interpret what I see in a different way? I'm inclined to say the former. But why? — To interpret is to think, to do something; seeing is a state." (Wittgenstein 2009, §248; 1980, II §546)

Third, unlike seeing, when interpreting we form hypotheses which may be verified or falsified: "Well, it is easy to recognize those cases in which we are interpreting. When we interpret, we form hypotheses, which may prove false. — 'I see this figure as a ... ' can be verified as little as (or only in the same sense as) 'I see a bright red'. So there is a similarity in the use of 'see' in the two contexts." (Wittgenstein 2009, §249; comp. 1980, II §547)

Fourth, there is a linkage between aspect perception and imagination: "The aspects of surface and base. What would a person who is blind towards these aspects be lacking? – It is not absurd to answer: the power of imagination." (Wittgenstein 1980: II §507-8)

Fifth, in noticing aspect we perceive an internal relation between objects: "The colour in the visual impression corresponds to the colour of the object (this blotting paper looks pink to me, and is pink) – the shape in the visual impression to the shape of the object (it looks rectangular to me, and is rectangular) – but what I perceive in the lighting up of an aspect is not a property of the object, but an internal relation between it and other objects." (Wittgenstein 2009, §247)

2. Virtual reality computer/language game

A considerable increase in the computing power of up-to-date digital technologies enables us to generate spectacular virtual environments and interact with them in real time. It is remarkable that, like Wittgenstein's seeing-as, these immersive computing platforms with VR headsets that are based on exact programs and well defined rules, have "something occult, something ungraspable" about them. It seems that users of virtual reality play computer/language games which are on the verge of madness and that the immersion into virtual reality is an occult and puzzling gimmick in which "something has altered, and nothing has altered". (For examples see VR systems such as Oculus Rift, HTC Vive, Sony PlayStation VR etc.)

Generally, virtual reality can be defined as "a scientific and technical domain that uses computer science and behavioural interfaces to simulate in a virtual world the behaviour of 3D entities, which interact in real time with each other and with one or more users in pseudo-natural immersion via sensorimotor channels." (Fuchs 2017: 10)

The "behavioral interface" consists of sensorial (visual, audio, tactile etc.) interfaces, which inform the user about changes in the virtual world; motor interfaces (joystick, data glove, movement tracker etc.), which inform the computer about the user's motor actions; and sensorimotor (force feedback) interfaces, which work in both directions. "Real-time" interaction means that the user does not perceive the time lag between his action taken on the virtual environment and its sensorial response. The immersion is called "pseudo-natural" due to sensorimotor biases that are created in a virtual world.

A transposition of the "perception, decision, action loop" of human behavior into an interactive virtual environment is then called the "fundamental principle" of virtual reality: The user acts on a virtual environment by means of motor interfaces. These actions are transferred to a calculator which interprets them as requests for a modification of the environment. The calculator assesses the changes to be made in the environment and sensorial reactions to be transferred to sensory interfaces. Nevertheless, there are still two main constraints inherent to virtual environment: sensorimotor discrepancies and latency. (Fuchs 2017: 11-12)

The visual interface, mostly a VR headset, is always used and seems to be a cardinal component in present-day VR systems. A VR headset offers four additional capacities over a screen: large horizontal and vertical fields of vision; stereoscopic vision in the entire binocular field of vision; high graphic resolution using all the performances of monoscopic and stereoscopic acuities; and gaze immersion granting the virtual scene being seen in any direction. The eventual visual immersion is impressive, although the quality of most available VR headsets is poor in comparison with human vision (the average pixel density is about 16 ppd; the average horizontal/vertical field of view is about 120∘/100∘, though desired FOV is 210∘/140∘). (Fuchs 2017: 55-67)

In the virtual reality discourse, the principle of immersion can be analyzed by means of "the hierarchical 3-level model": First, on the physical level as sensorimotor immersion. Second, as cognitive immersion where a symbolic image of the action or of the perception is offered to the user instead of sensorimotor behavior and knowledge. Third, as functional immersion where the user is to be immersed into a given task or become a part of the functionality. (Fuchs 2017: 12-17)

3. Immersing Wittgenstein into virtual reality

In order to achieve our initial goal, i.e. to examine whether Wittgenstein's puzzle of seeing-as can be dissolved in the VR language/computer game, I propose to consider the concept of immersion to be an analogy to aspect perception and to apply Wittgenstein's analyses to it. Thus, VR immersion as something involving both seeing and thinking can be further probed in terms of paraphrases of Wittgenstein's five findings:

First, various immersions differ according to the degree of thought involvement: We could distinguish between sensorimotor immersions that are "purely optical" and occur automatically and cognitive or functional immersions that are "conceptual" and determined by thoughts and associations.

Second, seeing in the VR headset is a state that has its duration which can be set or measured, while interpreting or thinking is an action which takes place in cognitive and functional immersions.

Third, unlike seeing, when interpreting in a virtual environment we form hypotheses which may prove to be false: In some cases we have to correct our interpretations of what we see to get immersed in some kind of functionality. But sometimes "I can see this virtual object as a…" can be verified as little as "I see a bright red".

Fourth, there is a linkage between immersion and imagination: What would a person who is not able to experience immersion in VR be lacking? — It is not absurd to answer: the power of imagination.

Fifth, in state of immersion we perceive an internal relation between virtual and real objects: The color and the shape in the virtual environment correspond to the color and the shape of the real object, the virtual object looks rectangular to me, and is rectangular. But what I perceive after getting immersed is not a property of the virtual object, but an internal relation between it and the real object.

Now let's also rephrase the original puzzle in compliance with the above mentioned findings: When we look by means of a VR headset at a virtual object, we can see that it has not changed, and yet we can see it differently, i.e. as a real 3D object. Is there any difference between the latter and the original Wittgenstein's puzzle?

On the one hand, one can answer that this whole analogical shift only pushes the riddle to arm's length. "Something occult" still remains inherent to our perception regardless whether we use a VR headset or not. Virtual reality doesn't bring anything new for investigation of perception in comparison with illusions, hallucinations or dreams.

On the other hand, one can argue that technology makes a difference because creating a virtual environment and making it interact with the user enables us to grasp the core of the puzzle – i.e. seeing the virtual object as a real 3D object with its duration in time, in terms of exact programs and algorithms. Hence, technology enables us to elucidate the puzzle by means of comprehensible language.

In this sense, programing languages in the background of VR systems allow us not only to formulate rules governing the VR language/computer game but also to dissolve the puzzle of aspect perception in such game. This puzzle dissolution proceeds in accordance with the Wittgensteinian dictum which claims that "the only way to deal with the puzzle is to get someone to see it is not a puzzle".

Digital technology of a VR system is to be considered as a representation of "what is seen", and as such it is the answer to the Wittgenstein's question about the criterion of our visual experience: "What is the criterion of the visual experience? What should the criterion be? A representation of 'what is seen'. The concept of a representation of what is seen, like that of a copy, is very elastic, and so together with it is the concept of what is seen. The two are intimately connected." (Wittgenstein 2009: §§146-7)

Moreover, also Wittgenstein's five findings about aspect perception can then be captured by means of programing languages because they enable us: first, to differentiate between purely optical and cognitive immersions; second, to define the time period in which a virtual object is seen as a real one without stimulating any action or reaction; third, to verify our hypotheses about what we have seen in virtual reality by means of finite descriptions; fourth, to determine the desired power of imagination on a scale and to set virtual environment accordingly; fifth, to externalize internal relations between virtual objects and real ones.

In conclusion, we can treat technology to be a kind of language, or more precisely to be a grammar, which allows us to redefine our epistemological concepts. And only in this sense, technology can become immersive or invasive enough to penetrate our body and hit the mind. Accordingly, we may understand the concept of "immersion" as a grammatical rule that enables us to distinguish between the terms "reality", "augmented reality" and "virtual reality" without making serious ontological commitments.

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What's Trivial about Relative Value?
Wittgenstein's *Lecture on Ethics* Reconsidered

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Abstract

This paper explores Wittgenstein's conception of relative value in *Lecture on Ethics.* It argues that the category admits of three different interpretations, each of which suggests a distinct criticism of absolute value, but none of which renders relative value judgments trivial.

This paper considers Wittgenstein's distinction between relative and absolute value. It argues for three claims. First, Wittgenstein's notion of absolute value cannot be understood absent some contrastive notion. Second, taking relative value as the contrast, Wittgenstein's discussion of relative value admits of three distinct interpretations, each of which suggests a distinct criticism of absolute value. Third, none of these interpretations yields the conclusion Wittgenstein desires—that relative judgments, in virtue of being relative, are therefore trivial (i.e., lack normative, ethical content).

I. The Problem

The distinction between relative and absolute ethical judgments is central to Wittgenstein's *Lecture on Ethics*. The distinction is supposed to mark the boundaries of ethics—and of sense. Yet, it is not clear what absolute judgments, for Wittgenstein, consist in, so it is not clear what boundary Wittgenstein aims to draw. Consider the first substantive claim that Wittgenstein makes about absolute judgments: "although all judgments of relative value can be shown to be mere statements of facts, no statement of fact can ever be, or imply, a judgment of absolute value" (5-6).[1] This statement draws a comparison between relative judgments, which are factual, and absolute judgments, which are not. The difference, though, is purely negative – he tells us what absolute statements are *not*, not what they are. The remainder of the text poses similar problems. Wittgenstein characterizes absolute judgments variously: as about "intrinsic" value (10) or as "supernatural" or "sublime" (7) in character. These terms are suggestive, but lend little substance. For this reasons, it is worth trying to isolate a more robust notion of absolute judgment. In order to do so, we need *some* contrasting notion. The natural choice is relative value.

II. Relative Value Interpreted

How, then, should we conceive of relative value? Any interpretation must meet three constraints. First, Wittgenstein makes clear that approaching some standard is essential to a statement being a relative one: "the word good in the relative sense simply means coming up to a certain predetermined standard" (5). Second, every relative judgment is a "mere statement of facts"—that is, describes a state of affairs. Third, while relative statements might *appear* evaluative, "the essence of the difference" between relative and absolute judgments is that relative statements can "be put in such a form"—that is, analyzed—such that

they "los[e] all the appearance of a judgment of value" (6). Wittgenstein thinks that this is a consequence of the former claim, evidenced by the "therefore" between the claims.

Thus, relative value statements are judgments which, despite their evaluative appearance, are not evaluative but merely factual *in virtue of the fact that* they make reference to some standard. These three criteria merely constrain interpretation; they do not yet amount to one. Yet, Wittgenstein's text suggests three different interpretations of relative value, each of which yields a distinctive criticism of absolute value. However, none can vindicate Wittgenstein's claim that *a* "characteristic misuse of our language [which] runs through all ethical…expressions" (9).

The Desire Interpretation

Consider Wittgenstein's first example, which consists of a pair of short dialogs (5):

A: You play (tennis) pretty badly
B: I know, I am playing badly, but I do not want to play any better
A: Ah then that's alright

A: You are behaving like a beast
B: I know I behave badly, but I do not want to behave any better
A: You *ought* to want to behave better.

"You play pretty badly" is a relative judgment. The statement is intended as a criticism –'shouldn't you play *better*?' The player's response renders charge inert: since he does not want to play any better, the charge lacks force. What makes the relative use evaluatively empty is the agent lacks *the desire* to play better—the standards of tennis initially appealed to do no work. The second dialog should be read in this light: despite the agent's lack of desire to behave well, the rebuke "you *ought* to want to behave better" seems a fitting response. What makes this statement "absolute" is that the use is not relative to *the desires of the agent*. Wittgenstein emphasizes this particular kind of non-relativity by using "*ought* to want to" rather than "ought to".

Other parts of the text can be read similarly: e.g., Wittgenstein writes that the statement "the right road" used relatively means that "This is the right way you have to go if you want to get to [a certain destination] in the shortest time" (6). Construing the point in this way suggests a particular way of understanding Wittgenstein's criticism of absolute value:

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[1] All references are to (Wittgenstein 1965) unless otherwise indicated.

[T]he absolute good, if it is a describable state of affairs, would be one which everybody, independent of his tastes and inclinations, would necessarily bring about or feel guilty for not bringing about. And I want to say that such a state of affairs is a chimera. No state of affairs has, in itself, what I would like to call the coercive power of an absolute judge (7).

I interpret this passage as a thesis about the logical connection between the good and motivation: if there were an absolute good, one would be *necessarily motivated* to bring about (compare Olson 2014, 64-67). However, no state of affairs is intrinsically motivating; states of affairs are *motivationally neutral*. Absolute values are therefore nonsensical because the state of affairs they aim to express is impossible.

Put this way, Wittgenstein's argument shows similarities with contemporary ones. Bernard Williams distinguishes between internal and external reasons. According to Williams, statements that A has a reason to ϕ are always internal: relative to A's "subjective motivational set." Reasons statements which are not so relative are "false, or incoherent, or really something else misleadingly expressed" (Williams 1981: 111). One might put the point, as David Wiggins, has in Kantian terms, "The thing Wittgenstein's book of the world cannot record is the inherence anywhere of some good or evil that is categorically good or evil, a good or evil whose claim upon us is not conditional upon our adoption of some purpose, indeed not conditional at all" (Wiggins 2004: 373-4). Understood thusly, the point is that there are only hypothetical, and no categorical, imperatives.

There's a problem with this interpretation, however: it makes Wittgenstein's category of relative value is compatible with *genuinely* normative statements. One can see this by comparing the criticism that Wittgenstein makes here to an argument by Philippa Foot (1972), who defends the idea that morality is a system of hypothetical, rather than categorical, imperatives. Foot thinks the motivation for the categorical view lies in the claim that "moral considerations necessarily seem to give reasons for acting to any man" (Ibid). However, she argues that this view is indefensible, for there are no such reasons. Rather than reject all moral reasons, however, Foot suggests that one can accept the idea that they are hypothetical imperatives. Thus, "moral judgment have no better claim to be categorical imperatives than do statements about matters of etiquette" (Ibid: 312). Far from suggesting this undermines morality, Foot concludes that one can recognize the *contingent* nature of moral reasons, without generally undermining their force or authority for us.

Foot's view is controversial (she later abandoned it). My point is not to endorse it. Rather the point is that the desire interpretation seems *compatible* with Foot's claim that, even if morality is a matter of hypothetical imperative, those imperatives might nevertheless be *genuinely normative*. Read in this way, Wittgenstein's criticism is open to the following response: one could deny the implausibly strong claim that moral discourse is (or must be) absolute. They might simply be relative. But relativity is not triviality. Seen through this lens, Wittgenstein only arrives at his claim that all ethical discourse is nonsensical on an implausible assumption. Absent a defense of that assumption, the conclusion that all moral discourse is nonsensical does not follow.

The Attributive Interpretation

Consider a different way to characterize relative judgments, which draws inspiration from Wittgenstein's remark that the "word good in the relative sense simply means coming up to a certain predetermined standard" (5). One might extrapolate the idea by appealing to the distinction between predicative and attributive adjectives. The distinction, introduced by Geach (1956), concerns the *logical* roles different adjectives play. An adjective is predicative just in case the predication "is an A B" divides logically into "is a B" and "is A": e.g., "X is a red book" entails "x is red" and "x is a book"; thus, "red" is predicative. Attributive adjectives do not so divide: "X is a big flea" does not entail "x is both big" and "X is a flea", but only that x is big *qua* flea. "Big" modifies the way in which X is *a something*.

Geach argues that good and bad are attributive adjectives. One can meaningfully assert that Julia is good person, or note that Jim's behavior is bad, because, in so doing, one cites a determinate respect in which her behavior is good or bad. But saying that something is good *period* is meaningless, in the same way that saying that something is simply big, without qualification, is meaningless. Geach draws on the distinction to argue that certain common philosophical uses of the term "good" are simply nonsense. His target is Moore who held that ethical judgments predicate a simple, non-natural property – goodness – of states of affairs. For Geach, there is no such thing as being good *full stop*.

Some (e.g., Lazenby 2006: 20) have applied this interpretation to Wittgenstein. Doing so is quite natural. Wittgenstein, like Geach, has G.E. Moore in mind. Moreover, the interpretation explains Wittgenstein's examples: e.g., it captures the difference between "x is a good pianist," and "x is an absolutely good state of affairs." The later statement may be "absolute" because it does not cite any determinate respect in which something is good, but simply asserts that it is good, *period*. It is nonsense because a sign in the proposition, namely, "good", lacks meaning.

Yet this interpretation faces a similar problem: it seems to allow for genuinely normative statements –for example, statements about character evaluation. There are determinate respects in which one might predicate goodness of a person (for example, by noting that they possess certain virtues). Geach explicitly allows for these kinds of uses. Wittgenstein, however, wants to disallow such statements. He suggests that phrases like "this is a good fellow" (9) express an absolute, rather than a relative use. Since such statements are normative, and since nothing in the attributive/predicative distinction rules them out, the interpretation fails to vindicate the claim that all ethical statements are nonsense.

The Standards Interpretation

Wittgenstein claims relative judgments are relative to certain kinds of *standards*. Yet, there are several ways in which a statement may be relative to a standard. One way, considered above, is that ethical terms like "bad" may be attributive. But another way concerns their being some objective criteria for the assessment of some statement. If I say "you play tennis badly," that statement is true if you fail to meet certain standards of adequacy in your play (consistently returning the ball, e.g.).

Understood in this way, relative judgments might be evaluative judgments with come with certain *objective criteria* for their assessment. These standards can be of two sorts. First, a standard can be an external or "arbitrarily

predetermined". Which road is right depends on external facts about where someone wants to go. There is no such thing as a "right road" absent such facts. Second, such standards might be constitutive: e.g., providing a seat in appropriate circumstances is constitutive of what it is to be a "good" chair.

This suggests an interpretation of Wittgenstein's criticism. Absolute value statements make *no reference* to standards whatsoever, constitutive or external. Instead, they simply assert that things are good, absent some criteria for assessment; that is, absent a clear account of the statements truth conditions. This would certainly explain why Wittgenstein thinks absolute judgments are mysterious. If I say that "X is the right road," and that statement comes with no particular standard for assessment, the claim seems empty or indeterminate. "Right relative to *what*?" one might retort. The problem with absolute statements is that they fail to assign any criteria for assessment at all.

This interpretation again faces the same problem: many genuine normative claims are relative to certain standards in this sense. Take Wittgenstein's example: "You're behaving like a beast". The utterance might be true relative to some set of standards that exist in a community for what constitutes appropriate behavior. Used in one way, such a statement might simply make a descriptive claim about whether someone's behavior does or does not approximate those standards. Used in another way, however, the statement makes a normative claim – you *ought to* behave better. That claim is relative to a set of standards—the standards in the community—but may nevertheless have normative force because those standards are binding. A similar point has been made by moral relativists (Harman 1996). Thus, the fact that it involves some kind of relativity seems beside the point.

III. Conclusion

I have argued that Wittgenstein's notion of relative value admits of three interpretations. None, however, can support the claim that all relative statements are therefore trivial. On each, a statement can be both relative and retain its normative force. If this is so, the category of relative value cannot be leaned on to support Wittgenstein's central claim: that all (genuinely) ethical statements are nonsensical.

This suggests that, if Wittgenstein has an argument for that claim, relative value is a red herring for understanding it. Wittgenstein does have such an argument. As I've argued elsewhere (Sharp 2016), it depends on two claims: (1) language can only express natural facts; (2) natural facts are necessarily non-evaluative. These premises are difficult to defend in hindsight and Wittgenstein himself later abandoned (1). But, this central argument is not the only argument contained in Wittgenstein's lecture. Wittgenstein's discussion of relative value, although it does not entail his intended conclusion, remains philosophically interesting and anticipates contemporary discussions. Wittgenstein's fraught discussion of relative value thus perhaps merits more sustained critical attention.

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Goethe and Wittgenstein on the Perception of Color

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Abstract

The influence of Goethe on Wittgenstein is by now well established. This influence is especially to be noted in Wittgenstein's later work *Philosophical Investigations* and *Remarks on Color.* In this paper I wish to focus on a neglected area of commonality, the overlap in their ways of doing philosophy. I will focus on their work on the perception of color in Wittgenstein's *Remarks on Color* and Goethe's *Farbenlehre.*

The influence of Goethe on Wittgenstein is by now a well-established idea in the study of Wittgenstein and the influences on his thought. This influence is especially important from his "middle period" to his late work, specifically *Philosophical Investigations* and *Remarks on Color.* As Brian McGuinness writes in his important study of the early and middle work of Wittgenstein: "To say what Ludwig admired in Goethe would almost be to say what he found remarkable or worthwhile in life, so many are the themes and attitudes from Goethe that recur in his thought." (McGuiness 1988: 34)

As an example of this connection, we compare these two passages:

Goethe: "Someday someone will write a pathology of experimental physics and bring to light all those swindles which subvert our reason, beguile our judgment, and what is worse, stand in the way of practical progress. The phenomena must be free once and for all from their grim torture chamber of empiricism, mechanism, and dogmatism. They must be brought before the jury of men's common sense"

Wittgenstein: "Today in case we actually discovered two seeds which we could not distinguish but one produced a poppy and the other a rose we should look frantically for the difference---but in other circumstance we might give this up—give up looking for a difference. This would be a tremendous thing to do, as great as recognizing indeterminacy. We would no longer look for the difference and so we would no longer say there must be a difference." (W 1938)

These passages exhibit a fundamental similarity between these two thinkers. They both are anti-metaphysical. They both recognize the danger of imposing an interpretation on nature or language. Finally, they both start with everyday phenomena.

For both, the search for an "essence" behind what we see is misguided. Such a search is merely speculation that can lead nowhere. In *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein pointedly writes:

When philosophers use a word - 'knowledge, 'being', 'object' 'I' 'proposition' 'name' and try to grasp the *essence* of the thing one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language game which is its original home? - What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.(PI: 116)

Couldn't this also be called the jury of common sense? Most importantly for this paper I note that both Goethe and Wittgenstein employ a seldom used "showing" method of doing philosophy. They do not offer a comprehensive philosophical vision and then show how reality can be seen in this light.

Rather, both philosophers let the phenomena appear as they are with only what we can call "attention pointers" as a guide. The philosopher does not tell you what to see. He helps you to see what he believes is there to be seen.

Let us then use Wittgenstein's references to Goethe in *Remarks on Color* as a basis for examining Goethe's *Farbenlehre.* I make the following observations.

I. The Title

At III: 125 of his *Remarks on Color,* Wittgenstein says this about Goethe's work:

Goethe's theory of the origin of the spectrum isn't a theory of the spectrum that has proved unsatisfactory. It is really not a theory at all. Nothing can be predicted by means of it. It is, rather, a vague schematic outline of the sort we find in James psychology. There is not an *experimentum crucis* for Goethe's theory of color.

In a moment we shall see a passage from Goethe that mirrors this observation from Wittgenstein. For now, we should pause at the outset to observe how the translation of "Farbenlehre" as "theory of color" misdirects us at the outset of our study of Goethe's work.

Referring to Goethe's text as a "theory of color" directs our attention to a search for "tests" of such a theory that simply do not exist. Wittgenstein goes right to the heart of the problem. Since Goethe is not presenting a theory no tests are needed or desired. Seen this way the hunt for tests is a bit like "hunting for the snark" in Lewis Carroll's famous tale. In my view "farbenlehre" is best translated "concept of color."

II. Phenomenological Starting Point

Whether and to what extent Wittgenstein had direct knowledge of what we now call the "phenomenological" movement of the early decades of the 20th century is a matter for specialists. But we can say with confidence that in his last works he was certainly employing a method that allowed the phenomena of life and language to come into view without a theoretical overlay distorting the appreciation of the phenomena.

In the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein writes. "A simile that has been absorbed into the forms of our language produces a false appearance and this disquiets us.

'but this isn't how it is, we say', yet this is how it has to be." (PI: 3) The phenomena contradict the theory. As such, the understanding of the phenomena must avoid being distorted by a theory.

Again, from the *Philosophical Investigations* "when philosophers use a word 'knowledge', 'being', 'object', 'I' 'proposition', 'name'—and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used this way in the language game which is its original home? —What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use." (PI: 116) The "every day" use is what appears as phenomena in ordinary speech.

Goethe's study of nature was controversial in much of the 19th century primarily because he rejected the materialist, mechanistic view of nature that was prominent in the enlightenment. His study of nature emphasized an intimate encounter by the student with nature itself. As David Seamon writes: " only in the 20th century with the philosophical articulation of phenomenology do we have a conceptual language able to describe Goethe's way of science accurately." (Seamon/Zajonc 1998: 34).

Goethe frequently referred to his method as "delicate empiricism" which, for him, meant prolonged exposure to the object through direct, not mediated, exposure. "It is a calamity that the use of experiment has severed nature from man, so that he is content to understand nature merely through what artificial instruments reveal and by so doing even restricts her achievements." In another place Goethe writes "Nature herself must be present to the reader, either really or by the help of a lively imagination." Can we not see here something akin to Wittgenstein's focus on ordinary language as distinct from specialist jargon in technical fields?

The phenomena of actual nature around us are more complex than any representation. Goethe makes this point in describing the colored plates that are placed at the end of the German edition and in the middle of the English translation.

"The plates which generally accompany works like the present are thus a most inadequate substitute for all this. A physical phenomenon exhibiting its effects on all sides is not to be arrested in lines or denoted by a section…in many cases, however, such diagrams represent mere notions. They are symbolical resources, hieroglyphic modes of communication which, by degrees, assume the place of the phenomena and of nature herself and thus rather hinder than promote true knowledge" (Goethe 2014: XXIII)

III. Aversion to Abstract Theory

It is well known that, especially from his middle period to his last works, Wittgenstein was a critic of "grand theories" such as those of Aristotle or Hegel. Unless we have clarity about the concepts embedded in and employed by the theory, such a theory, whatever it is, can only distort the reality that lies right before us.

Perhaps the best place to see his problems with grand theory is precisely in his *Remarks on Color.* Here are some representative passages:

Lichtenberg says that very few people have ever seen pure white. So do most people use the word wrong then? And how did he learn the correct use? He constructed an ideal use from the ordinary one. And that is not to say a better one, but one that has been refined

along certain lines and in the process something has been carried to extremes. (RC I: 3)

The difficulties we encounter when we reflect about the nature of colors (those which Goethe wanted to get sorted out in his Theory of Colors) are embedded in the indeterminateness of our concept of the sameness of color. (RC I: 56)

The indefiniteness of the concept of color lies, above all, in the indefiniteness of the concept of the sameness of colors, i.e. of the method of comparing colors. (RC III: 78)

A natural history of colors would have to report on their occurrence in nature, not on their essence. Its propositions would have to be temporal ones. (RC III: 135)

Goethe's *Farbenlehre* begins almost exactly at this same place. In the second paragraph of the preface to the first edition in 1810 Goethe writes:

Indeed strictly speaking it is useless to express the nature of a thing abstractly. Effects we can perceive and a complete history of those effects would, in fact, sufficiently define the nature of the thing itself. We should try in vain to describe a man's character but let his acts be collected and an idea of his character will be presented to us. (Goethe 2014: 726)

Earlier I quoted Wittgenstein saying that Goethe's "theory" is "not really a theory at all." Here Goethe makes this point clear. Goethe was doing something fundamentally distinct from Newton. Goethe saw what Newton missed, the complexity of the phenomenon of color perception in human experience. The path beyond Newton begins with a phenomenology of color perception.

In fact, Goethe claims that the ascendency of Newton's *Optics* in the understanding of color has "impeded" an inquiry into the "phenomena of color." As he writes in a very unexpected place:

"A great mathematician was possessed with an entirely false notion on the physical origin of color. Yet owing to his great authority as a geometer, the mistakes which he committed as an experimentalist long became sanctioned in the eyes of a world ever fettered in prejudice. "(Goethe 2014: 726)

IV. Showing

Both Wittgenstein and Goethe employ a "method" that is entirely appropriate, even preferable, in the phenomenological tradition but which is a decidedly minority position in the history of thought.

This is the method of showing. Most philosophers in the west are system builders; they construct a schema in which all parts connect together in a supposedly coherent whole. Every part of reality has a place in such a system. In short they are "tellers". They tell us how the world around us is to be viewed in the system they have built. Though their systems are vastly different Aristotle, Hume and Hegel are classic systematic thinkers who "tell" us how to understand the world around us.

Plato, Wittgenstein, and some parts of other thinkers who use dialogues are showers. These thinkers point our attention to features in the world on which we can reflect. They invite us to see what they believe is there to be seen.

Perhaps the most often used systematic way of looking at the world is mathematics. Yet Goethe rejects mathematics as a way of understanding nature.

It will be universally allowed that mathematics, one of the noblest auxiliaries which can be employed by man, has, in one point of view, been of the greatest use to the physical sciences. But that by a false application of its methods it has, in many respects been prejudicial to them (Goethe 2014: 724)

Rather, "the investigator of nature …should form to himself a method in accordance with observation, but he should take heed not to reduce observation to mere notion, to substitute words for this notion and to use and deal with these words as if they were things." (Goethe 2014: 716) As he writes elsewhere "actual observation should, above all, be the basis" of thinking about color. (Goethe 2014: 740)

In the first parts of *Farbenlehre* Goethe is using the method of showing the complexity of color perception. He makes observations about optical phenomena that any reader can examine for himself. It requires no mathematics, instruments, or specialized training. For example, "If we look at a dazzling colorless object, it makes a strong lasting impression, and its after-vision is accompanied by an appearance of color" (Goethe 2014: 7) The ordinary reader can do this and see if Goethe is correct.

It is somewhat more obvious that Wittgenstein employs a method of showing, especially in his later works. One of the best places to see this approach at work is in *Remarks on Color.* Some examples:

If the psychologist teaches us "there are people who see" we can then ask him: "and what do you call people who see?" The answer would have to be: People who behave so and so under such and such conditions. (RC I: 88)

When we are asked 'what do red, blue, black. white mean? We can, of course, immediately point to things which have these colors, but that is all we can do: our ability to explain their meaning goes no further. (RC III: 102)

Can we, then, describe to the sighted person what it is like to see? But we can certainly explain to him what blindness is i.e. we can describe to him the characteristic behavior of a blind person. (RC III: 279)

Conclusion

The connection between Goethe and Wittgenstein is much closer than some commentators have noted. Of course there are differences. But the overlap in method is deep and is especially noted in *Farbenlehre* and *Remarks on Color.* They neither one are theorists on a grand scale, they both focus on the phenomena of ordinary life and language. They both employ the method of showing as distinct from telling the reader what the point must be. Further study of the overlap in Goethe's other works and in Wittgenstein's works from his middle period will shed more light on this relationship.

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Wittgenstein's Passionate Perception of the World

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Abstract

Starting from von Wright's remark that Wittgenstein's seriousness of character sprang from a passionate heart, I will focus on the aspects of passion and suffering as obvious in Wittgenstein's personal remarks. Besides, I will show how his passionate nature influenced his way of perceiving the world and of writing philosophy – as reflected in a never-ending process of looking at the objects of his philosophizing, along with an obsessive search for finding the adequate way of grasping and putting them into language.

> "My ideal is a certain coolness. A temple providing a setting for the passions without meddling with them."
> (CV: 4e)

In his Biographical Sketch about Wittgenstein, G.H. von Wright wrote:

> It seems to me that there are two forms of seriousness of character. One is fixed in 'strong principles'; the other springs from a passionate heart. The former has to do with morality, and the latter, I believe, is closer to religion. Wittgenstein was acutely and even painfully sensitive to considerations of duty, but the earnestness and severity of his personality were more of the second kind. (von Wright 1980: 32)

Starting from these remarks, I will focus on Wittgenstein's passionate perception of the world, as reflected both in his philosophical manuscripts and in his personal, mostly coded remarks, along with the aspect of suffering.

Seriousness from a passionate heart

As early as in the coded part of the wartime Notebooks 1914-1916, Wittgenstein emerges as a rather emotional than as the austere person suggested by his philosophical remarks. His passionate nature can be observed in many ways and finds its reflections in an extremely serious way of striving for utter honesty and truthfulness, both with respect to his personality, as well as to his approach towards writing philosophy. As a result, he was doomed to suffering, so to speak – suffering because of the limits of language, and because of his apparent failure to solve his moral as well as his philosophical problems – problems which elude verbal and scientific explanation. Consequently, we can observe an obsessive search for "salvation" in his struggles in order to find the "redeeming word".

Soon after Bertrand Russell had met Wittgenstein in 1911/12, he saw in him "the ideal pupil", one who "gives passionate admiration with vehement and very intelligent dissent." (Monk 1990: 43) Again and again Russell uses the word "passion" with regard to Wittgenstein, e.g.: "It is a rare passion and one is glad to find it." Or: "He has more passion about philosophy than I have; his avalanches make mine seem mere snowballs." (Ibid.: 43)

And von Wright observed that Wittgenstein was not at all what one would call a typical scholar of "cool objectivity" and "detached meditation", but that he "put his whole soul into everything he did." (von Wright: 32)

As to the various forms of the concept, Wittgenstein's passion can be said to be both intellectual and emotional, embracing his entire person. It can be seen in connection with his enthusiasm for in whatever he was involved – be it writing or discussing philosophy or listening to music, reading something that captured him, looking at the beauties of nature or regarding objects of art. Thus, his perception of the phenomenal world can be called a passionate one – even with regard to the so-called banal und apparently common little things most people do not consider worth being paid attention to (cf. PI: §129).

Paul Engelmann, one of the first persons who came to understand the underlying ethical concern of the *Tractatus*, wrote that "Wittgenstein was the most passionate person" he had ever met and that through this acquaintance he "realized the truth of Bettina von Armin's words: 'Passion is the only key to the world'". (Somavilla 2006: 150) And Engelmann considered the *Tractatus* to be "almost the only great philosophical work that was conceived in passion." (Ibid.: 151)

Wittgenstein's enthusiastic nature can be observed in his philosophical investigations, where he fervently analyses every object from various perspectives thus discovering again and again new aspects. In his examples of aspect-seeing in the course of the later years, his philosophizing emerges as a dynamic process of what I would call constant wondering at the variety of aspects to be discovered in the objects of his attention. "To wonder is to think", he remarks, thus hinting at the connection between rational and intuitive approach both indispensable for his passionate way of philosophizing. This sensitive awareness of everything around him did not only lead to creativity in his work, but was also bound to lead to suffering.

Notebooks 1914-1916

During the war Wittgenstein obviously wanted to separate his personal entries from his philosophical ones, even though there are striking similarities as to several issues such as the limits of language in view of the "ineffable". In fact, these reflections first occur in code, before Wittgenstein treats them in the context of his philosophical entries. E.g., the famous sentence at the end of the *Tractatus* finds its first expression in code: „What cannot be said, *cannot* be said!" (MS 103: 7.7.16)

In general, one can say that the coded remarks circle around personal, ethical, frequently moral and religious problems. However, they sometimes contain philosophical issues, as well. Above all, they reveal Wittgenstein's passionate nature which I consider most important for the understanding of not only his personality, but also of his way of writing philosophy.

Even though it is problematic to order all of Wittgenstein's coded entries according to a common level, I dare say that they were not written at random, but they are to be seen as a specific type of text in his oeuvre, where they hold a special position within the context of his philosophy. They combine both reflections of Wittgenstein as a person and Wittgenstein as the philosopher in their own specific way – not only by a different script, but also by characteristics of style, by a specific "tone".

In Wittgenstein's coded entries we can observe a constant struggle with his feelings, i.e., a struggle with any emotional drives which he equates with sensuality. In his striving for the spiritual, Tolstoy's *Gospel in Brief* meant a great deal to him: „Again and again I tell myself the words of Tolstoy: ",Man is weak in the flesh, but <u>free</u> in the spirit.' May the spirit be inside of me!" (MS 101: 12.9.14)

The more threatening he feels the atmosphere surrounding him, the more refuge he finds in his philosophical work, thus in the spiritual. Horrified by the rude behaviour of his companions, he decides to bear everything in patience instead of fighting against them. To contemplate, to think – to regard matters in a quiet, even stoic manner is what he is striving after. To lead a life dedicated to the spirit means both to continue his philosophical work and to elevate himself upon the mundane and sensual. He wishes to become indifferent to the difficulties of the outer life and to enjoy the good hours of life as blessings – to regard "the amenities of life" merely as "so many graces of fate", as he notes in the philosophical part of the wartime diaries. (MS 103: 13.8.16) – in connection with his thoughts of the justification of a so called happy life – reflections obviously influenced by his reading of Dostoevsky, who saw the pursuit of a happy life as the purpose of existence.

Gradually, Wittgenstein's reflections on ethical and religious matters begin to become a topic in his philosophical entries, as well. Whereas in the first parts of the philosophical entries one can observe pantheistic and mystical tendencies reminiscent of Schopenhauer and Spinoza, the personal and coded entries reveal an increasing tendency towards a personal God. The thought of living in harmony with the world – or, with an alien will – seems to be influenced by Schopenhauer; Wittgenstein's tendency to accept his life and fate in a devout and stoic attitude, is reminiscent of Spinoza's deterministic world view. In fact, being daily confronted with death, Wittgenstein sees this as an opportunity to become a better person – something he was longing for all his life.

Due to his passionate way of perceiving everything with which he is engaged, his philosophical work seems to become part of his wartime surroundings so that he notes: "I besiege my problem" (MS 101: 24.10.1914), or: "I've desperately stormed the problem" (MS 102: 31.10.14)

The term "redeeming word" first occurs in the coded part of the Wartime diaries and must be seen in the context of both his philosophical and personal, moral struggles.

It has to be mentioned that several thoughts first occur in the coded part of the *Notebooks* and only later – in 1916 – are introduced into the philosophical part. Thus, it becomes obvious what kind of philosophy Wittgenstein himself seemed to need in borderline situations such as those of the war, and how these thoughts eventually influenced his philosophical work. While in earlier years, he was above all preoccupied with the problems of language and their correct logical analysis, his reflections on language problems gradually turn to a level that lies beyond the issues to be treated in the world – according to Wittgenstein's words, a level lying outside the world of facts, and,

since this sphere belongs to the metaphysical, it cannot be verbalized and thus not be explained rationally (cf. TLP: 6.41).

In my opinion, he brought those reflections – often labelled as Wittgenstein's mystical thoughts – into his philosophical work in order to emphasize their different nature in contrast to his purely philosophical entries, all the while hinting at their significance *within philosophy*. While in the *Tractatus* these remarks are written in normal script – thus to be viewed as part of the whole – they nevertheless differ with regard to content and style. And, as is well-known, Wittgenstein hinted both in his foreword and on other occasions, at the importance of these thoughts.

Confronted by the nearness and thus fear of death, the tone of his writing, amidst logical analysis of complicated operations of propositions, is suddenly interrupted by the following remark: "Man cannot make himself happy without more ado. Whoever lives in the present lives without fear and hope." (NB: 14.7.16) Thus it becomes evident how the philosophical topic of "living in the spirit", devotion to the present as well as the stoic submission to fate, are all rooted in his wartime experience.

Later period

In his diary entries of the later period, Wittgenstein's philosophical work continues to be of major importance and he regularly reports about progress, stagnation or failure in his movements of thought and in his ability to express them in words. Often he experiences the difficulties not only in his treatment of philosophical problems, but also as concerns language – its various possibilities on the one hand and thus options of alternatives, and its limits on the other hand. As a result, Wittgenstein all too often finds himself in a struggle with language. The term of the redeeming word occurs again – now mainly in connection with his philosophizing: "The task of philosophy is to find the redeeming word." (MS 107: 114)

Wittgenstein desperately fights to get on and to alter not only expressions and formulations, but also his position in view of a problem. In his obsessive and passionate search for finding the adequate expression in order to present his philosophical thoughts, he continually rejects, deletes what he has just written and tries to find ever new ways and possibilities: "In philosophizing it is important for me to keep changing my position, not to stand too long on *one* leg, so as not to get stiff. [...]" (CV: 32e)

Being aware of the variety of aspects of every phenomenon, he does not cease to hint at various perspectives of perception thus leading us to sharpen our philosophical power of sight. In his approach toward the objects of his philosophizing one can distinguish between a rational and discursive one, and an intuitive and emotional one. Whereas in connection with his remarks about wonder and change of aspect, Wittgenstein maintains that to wonder is to *think*, in connection with his reflections about family resemblances he pleads for the aspect of *looking* at – "don't think, but look!" (PI: §66) And in various further examples he emphasizes an intransitive way of approach instead of a transitive one, thus favouring a non-rational, non-verbal approach which nevertheless can be understood, just as gestures, music, poetry and art in general can convey. These possibilities lie on a different level than the strictly philosophical discourse of, say, the *Tractatus*. However, they play an important role in Wittgenstein's later understanding of philosophy and are related to his ethical and aesthetic concern.

Whenever Wittgenstein cannot work, he feels to have no right to live (MS 107: 155). According to his willingness to endure everything happening to him in stoic silence, he notes: "Go on working and leave it to fate" (MS 118: 34v). Often, though, he complains about his sinking ability to treat philosophical problems – his fear of losing his "philosophical power of sight". (MS 118: 93v)

He condemns himself because of his fear of death and misfortune – a fear he considers as a wrong view of life, as already discussed in the philosophical notebooks of the First World War. To face hardship, illness and death in a stoic and heroic manner is what he is striving for – an attitude characterizing the life of the happy man in contrast to the unhappy one who is but prisoner of his individual and egoistic needs and drives and unable to elevate himself beyond the mundane.

In order to write truthfully, Wittgenstein demands to step down into one's depths, even if it hurts. Acute self-introspection and thus insight and acceptance of one's weaknesses and sins, is indispensable in order to become modest and fight vanity, whereas to lie to oneself has negative effects on one's writing style or any other style in art, literature, or architecture, as "style" has to be orientated *sub specie aeternitatis* (cf. DB: 28).

In his fear of a decline in his work and in a general fear of the future, he frequently uses metaphors of nature – this above all during his stay in Norway, where the darkness and melancholy of the long winter seems to encroach upon his inner state: "In my soul there is winter (now) like all around me. Everything is snowed in, nothing turns green & blossoms" (DB: 196), or: "My thoughts go as slowly as if they had to wade through deep snow." (MS 157a: 62v) Again, the inner and the outer seem to melt with one another, as a result of his sensitive awareness of his surroundings.

As already during the First World War, he continues to fight any sensory drives. Reminiscent of Pythagoras' words "No one is free, if he cannot command himself", Wittgenstein states: "One <u>cannot</u> speak the truth; – if one has not yet conquered oneself. One <u>cannot</u> speak it – but not, because one is still not clever enough." (CV: 41e)

In later years, though, he comes to realize the necessity of emotions, of passion – this above all with respect to moral and religious aspects. In these fields, he is convinced that rational considerations are bound to fail – a conviction actually determining his approach towards these topics in philosophizing from its beginnings. But whereas in the philosophical entries he consequently avoids any treatment of these problematic issues, his personal and coded remarks reveal a passionate involvement and never-ceasing circling around these topics – in a way contrasting sharply to his rational and sober arguing as obvious in his philosophical and more analytical disputes. "'Wisdom is grey.' Life on the other hand & religion are full of colour." (CV: 71e)

In 1940 until 1941, Wittgenstein is pondering upon giving up his position and doing another work. He feels more dead than alive and wonders how he has lost his ability to comprehend and investigate, what in former times he was able to grasp and have a clear view of. Again, his conclusion is one of a stoic and brave attitude: "You have to swallow the bitterness as if it were sweet!" (MS 163: 5) He is well aware that he suffers due to his passionate nature – in his own words, due to the fact that he is "highly inflam[m]able" (MS 131: 66).

The aspects of love and passion become increasingly important to him, in fact, they seem to dominate whatever intellectual matters and achievements had played a major role in his life before. There are several entries containing metaphors full of colour – also with regard to religious issues. In his failure to grasp the ineffable in terms of language and philosophy, he refers to the powers of the heart instead of the intellect.

But if I am to be *really* redeemed, – I need *certainty* – not wisdom, dreams, speculation – and this certainty is faith. And faith is faith in what my *heart*, my *soul*, needs, not my speculative intellect. For my soul, with its passions, as it were with its flesh & blood, must be redeemed, not my abstract mind. (CV: 38e)

We are reminded of Pascal, who, despite his rational and mathematical knowledge, emphasized the logic of the heart – "le logique du coeur". Logical considerations give way to the sentiments of the heart, mathematical certainty to a certainty that has nothing to do with rational thinking, but is derived from the heart.

Still, Wittgenstein cannot avoid being involved in spiritual matters on a philosophical level, even though being aware of the impossibility to approach them through the intellect:

„To get rid of the torments of the mind means getting rid of religion", he notes in 1937 (DB: 192) – thus expressing the interaction of both issues being at the centre of his thought.

Conclusion

In view of Wittgenstein's ideal of austerity – of "coolness", as quoted before –, and reading his diary entries, it seems obvious that despite his aspirations to achieve this ideal, he did not really succeed in coming to terms with his passions. However, his passionate nature was indispensable for doing philosophy in the sense of being the motor of his fervent way of treating philosophical problems – whether language problems or human problems in general – along with his passionate approach toward the „existence of the world", expressed in an attitude of wonder and ethical commitment.

Thus, Wittgenstein's passionate nature cannot only be seen in connection with his personality, but also in connection with his very way of philosophizing – this not only with regard to his enthusiastic and obsessive, never-ending process of examining the objects of his reflections – be they natural phenomena or fictitious examples – , but also with regard to his style of writing which is of an intensity hardly found elsewhere. Wittgenstein's relationship to philosophy was a passionate one – passionate in his ceaseless search for answers to philosophical problems, in his acute observation of the world surrounding him, in his treatment of language, in his devotion to spiritual matters and at the same time passionate in his distanced attitude towards questions beyond the sphere of language and science – his uncompromising decision to avoid metaphysical speculations within the field of philosophy.

His coded remarks reveal that this lifelong passionate search all too often led to feelings of restlessness, loneliness and despair up to the verge of madness. Obviously he did not attain the final state of peace of mind he was longing for all his life, and which he considered the goal of the philosopher (cf. CV: 50e).

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Weisen der Vergegenwärtigung.
In der Sprache der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*

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Abstract

Wittgenstein begnügt sich nicht damit, *über* Beobachtung und Wahrnehmung zu schreiben, sondern gestaltet auch durch eine Reihe von Stil- und Schreibverfahren seinen Text so, dass dieser die Bedeutung von Beobachtung und Wahrnehmung veranschaulicht und konkretisiert. Insbesondere anhand der im Text zahlreichen deiktischen und performativen Wendungen führen die *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* dem Leser das Hier und Jetzt seines Lesens vor Auge. So machen sie ihn ständig der Gegenwärtigkeit bewusst, die sicherlich eine wesentliche Komponente jeder Wahrnehmung und jeder Beobachtung ist. Diese ‚Weisen der Vergegenwärtigung‘ sind es, denen ich in folgendem Vortrag nachgehen will.

Gegenwärtigkeit ist sicherlich ein wesentlicher Bestandteil sowohl von Wahrnehmung als auch von Beobachtung. Was man wahrnimmt, was man beobachtet, das ist zunächst die Sache selbst – die Sache so, wie sie gegenwärtig vor mir steht – in der Nähe und Gleichzeitigkeit, die Sinneswahrnehmung erst ermöglichen. Eine ähnliche Nähe, eine vergleichbare Aktualität und Gegenwärtigkeit weist auch der Text der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* auf: „Laß es dir […] *auffallen*, daß es so etwas gibt wie unser Sprachspiel" (PU: II, xi), schreibt Wittgenstein. Weiter fordert er: „Führe dir die Mannigfaltigkeit der Sprachspiele an diesen Beispielen, und anderen, vor Augen." (PU: 23) Es geht nicht darum, dass wir etwas Neues entdecken, sondern dass wir uns die sprachlichen Gegebenheiten, die ohnehin da sind, „vor Augen führen", dass wir sie uns *vergegenwärtigen*. „Die für uns wichtigsten Aspekte der Dinge", schreibt Ludwig Wittgenstein weiter, „sind durch ihre Einfachheit und Alltäglichkeit verborgen. (Man kann es nicht bemerken, - weil man es immer vor Augen hat.) […] Es sei denn, daß [uns] *dies* einmal aufgefallen ist." (PU: 129)

Wittgenstein begnügt sich aber nicht damit, zur Aufmerksamkeit zu mahnen, sondern gestaltet seinen Text auch so, dass dieser den Leser allein schon durch die literarische Form zur Aufmerksamkeit anleitet. Der ausgeprägt deiktische und performative Charakter führt dem Leser ständig das Hier und Jetzt seines Lesens vor Augen. Er wird beständig daran erinnert, dass das Lesen des Textes im konkreten Präsens seiner jetzigen, gerade erlebten Situation geschieht. Die Bedeutung von Beobachtung und Wahrnehmung wird also nicht nur behauptet, sondern durch wiederkehrende Stil- und Schreibverfahren indirekt verstärkt, veranschaulicht und konkretisiert. Diese Verfahren bilden die genannten „Weisen der Vergegenwärtigung", denen ich im folgenden Vortrag nachgehen will, um anschließend die Frage zu stellen, wir Gegenwart verstanden werden muss, wenn sie durch diese sozusagen indirekte – weil stilistische – Art der Darlegung hervorgerufen werden soll.

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

„Lass es dir, führe dir", formuliert es Wittgenstein in den eben genannten Zitaten: Die Imperativ-Form ist der explizite performative Sprechakt *par excellence*. Im Imperativ ist die Äußerung sogleich eine Handlung. Der auffordernde, „Direktiv" genannte Sprechakt übt auf den Angesprochenen eine Wirkung aus, indem er ihn nötigt, das Gebot auszuführen. Wittgenstein, der zehn Jahre vor Austin schrieb:

„Worte sind auch Taten" (PU: 546), hat sein Buch mit unzähligen Imperativen versehen: „Denk(e) dir" (mit den Varianten „Denke an", „Denke daran, wie", „Denke du wärst…), „Frage dich", „Fragen wir uns", „Betrachte", „Nimm an", „Schau", „Sage", „Vergleiche", „Stell dir vor", führen jeweils Beispielsituationen an und fordern den Leser auf, sich in diese hineinzuversetzen. So schreibt Wittgenstein etwa: „Mach diesen Versuch: sag die Zahlenreihe von 1 bis 12. Nun schau auf das Zifferblatt deiner Uhr und lies diese Reihe." (PU: 161)

Im imperativischen Präsens wird der Leser in seiner Gegenwart unmittelbar angesprochen und aufgefordert, einen „Versuch" zu „machen". Mit vier Imperativen werden die Anweisungen aufgereiht („mach", „sag", „schau", „lies"). Die Kürze der Satzteile und die Einfachheit des Satzbaus (vier Hauptsätze) verdeutlichen, dass das Wichtigste hier nicht ist, was *geschrieben* ist, sondern das, was daraus *gemacht* wird. In seiner Knappheit lässt der Text dem Leser den Raum und die Zeit, die imaginierten Szenen zu konkretisieren, ja die Anweisungen zu befolgen. Dabei führt der Leser idealerweise nicht nur einen Versuch durch, sondern führt dieses Experiment an sich selbst durch – gleichsam einen Selbstversuch. Es wird ihm ein Spiegel vorgehalten, wodurch er dazu gebracht wird, sich seines eigenen Handelns bewusst zu werden.

Unter den Direktiva, den auffordernden Sprechakten, findet sich auch die Interrogativform: Performativ ist jede Frage insofern, als ihre bloße Äußerung den Angesprochenen zum Antworten auffordert. „Eine Frage – kann man sagen – ist ein Auftrag" (Z: 695; nach Binkley 1973: 71), schreibt Wittgenstein in den *Zetteln*. Bekanntlich sind die Interrogativformen in den *Untersuchungen* allgegenwärtig, allein im ersten Teil des Textes bedient sich Wittgenstein 1100 Mal des Fragezeichens![1]

Ich zitiere eine knappe Formulierung, die aus einer Aneinanderreihung von Fragen besteht: „‚Warum glaubst du, daß du dich an der heißen Herdplatte verbrennen wirst?' - Hast du Gründe für diesen Glauben; und brauchst du Gründe? (PU: 477) Freilich kann man diesen Fragen auch einen Gehalt entnehmen, denn sie enthalten sozusagen beiläufig Anregungen zum Nachdenken. Aber man darf sagen, dass der Kern der Bemerkung im Fragen besteht. Die rasche Folge von Fragen erweist sich als überaus effektiv: Bevor der Leser den Sinn dessen erfassen kann, was er hier liest, wird ihm deutlich, dass er gleichsam mit

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[1] Gegen 45 in einem vergleichbar langen Textteil aus der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*.

Fragen bombardiert wird, ja diese ihm aufgedrängt werden.

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Performative Ausdrücke in der Art jener zahllosen Befehle und Fragen haben die Besonderheit, die *Einstellung* des Sprechers entschieden in den Vordergrund zu rücken, denn gerade durch den Ausdruck seiner Einstellung – nämlich seines Wunsches – vollzieht der Sprecher den Akt des Befehlens oder Fragens. Anders als in der neutral berichtenden Aussage ist im performativen Sprechakt der Sprecher ausdrücklich anwesend, er ist sozusagen sichtbar. Fragen oder Befehlen geschieht in der unmittelbaren Adressierung eines *Ich* an ein *Du*.

Diesen Punkt möchte ich im Folgenden vertiefen und den Gebrauch der Deixis in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* ausführlich darlegen. Deiktisch sind jene Ausdrücke, die „*weder auf einen Begriff noch auf eine Person [weisen]*", erklärt Émile Benveniste. „Worauf also verweist *ich*?", fragt Benveniste weiter, „[a]uf etwas sehr Eigenartiges, das ausschließlich sprachlich ist: *Ich* verweist auf den individuellen Diskursakt, in dem es ausgesprochen wird, und bezeichnet dessen Sprecher. Es ist ein Wort, das nur in [einer] Diskursinstanz identifiziert werden kann […] und das nur eine aktuelle Referenz besitzt."(Benveniste 1974: 291, übersetzung angepasst) Diese Referenz liegt außerhalb der Sprache in der aktuellen Situation des Sprechers, der durch das Deiktikon auf sie „zeigt".

Das Vorhandensein des deiktischen *Ich*, das in herkömmlichen Philosophietraktaten weitgehend fehlt,[2] ist sicherlich die erste Besonderheit, die dem Leser der *Untersuchungen* auffällt. Der Ich-Erzähler ist allgegenwärtig (1250 Okkurrenzen in Teil I[3]). Häufig spricht dieses *Ich* den Leser direkt an oder findet sich in der direkten Rede knapper Zwiegespräche. Da aber diese Szenen nur minimal als Dialoge markiert sind (höchstens ab und an durch Zeilenumbrüche, Gedankenstriche oder Anführungszeichen), vermischt sich tendenziell der wiedergegebene Dialog mit der direkten Adressierung des Lesers, sodass der Text den Gesamteindruck hinterlässt, das „*Ich*" in Anführungszeichen unterscheide sich kaum von einem *Ich* ohne Einführungszeichen. Hervorgehoben wird die Präsenz dieses *Ich* durch zwei spezifische Verfahren: 1. Im Rahmen der Frage nach der „privaten Erfahrung" sieht Wittgenstein einen kategorialen Unterschied zwischen dem *Ich* (z. B. „ich habe Schmerzen") und dem *Er* („er hat Schmerzen"). 2. Da er anhand von Sprachspielen und Fiktionen arbeitet, unterzieht er zudem die eigenen Sprach- und Denkgewohnheiten subtilen Analysen. Ausdrücke wie „Ich bin versucht zu denken" oder „ich bin geneigt zu sagen" sind zahlreich. Lassen Sie mich dies an Abschnitt 391 veranschaulichen, in dem diese Art von Analyse zur Selbstanalyse wird:

> Ich kann mir vielleicht auch vorstellen […], jeder der Leute, die ich auf der Straße sehe, habe furchtbare Schmerzen, verberge sie aber kunstvoll. […] - Und wenn ich mir das nun vorstelle, - was tue ich; was sage ich zu mir selbst; wie sehe ich die Leute an? […] Ich schaue etwa Einen an und denke mir […]. Wenn ich das tue, sagt man etwa, ich stelle mir vor, ... (PU: 391)

Dass die Inszenierung des ‚ich' Sagenden zuletzt darauf zielt, den Angesprochenen einzubeziehen und ihn selbst zur Selbstanalyse zu animieren, zeigt folgende Passage:

„Wenn ich zu mir selbst sage: ‚Ich werde doch geführt' - so mache ich etwa eine Handbewegung dazu, die das Führen ausdrückt. - Mach eine solche Handbewegung […] und frage dich dann […]." (PU: 178)

Der Übergang vom *Ich* zum *Du* ist nahtlos. Um sich dies zu verdeutlichen, sind Benvenistes Arbeiten zur Personendeixis hilfreich: „Ich benutze *ich* nur dann", schreibt er, „wenn ich mich an [ein *Du*] wende […]. Diese Bedingung des Dialogs ist es, welche die *Person* konstituiert, denn sie impliziert umgekehrt, daß ich zu einem *Du* werde in der Anrede desjenigen, der sich seinerseits als *Ich* bezeichnet." (Benveniste 1974: 289) Diese grundlegende Polarität machen die *Untersuchungen* explizit: Das deiktische *Du* als alter ego wird parallel zum *Ich* behandelt und dadurch wird dem Leser nahegelegt, sich selbst *tatsächlich*, d.h. gegenwärtig als dieses *Ich* zu betrachten.

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Neben der Personendeixis fällt in den *Untersuchungen* auch die Raumdeixis auf, die durch Einfügung graphischer Elemente besonders eindringlich ist. Zur Raumdeixis gehören Adverbien wie ‚hier' oder ‚dort', aber auch die Demonstrativpronomina ‚dies' und ‚das', wenn sie so verwendet werden, dass sie auf konkrete räumlich Gegenstände verweisen. Nun ist es eine Eigenart der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*, dass sie ‚dies' und ‚das' deiktisch verwenden – und nicht wie üblich in wissenschaftlichen Texten anaphorisch, d. h. zum Rückverweis auf vorangehende Textstellen vornehmen. Das mag folgendes Beispiel veranschaulichen: „Eine Erklärung dessen, was ich meine, wäre etwa eine Zeichnung und die Worte 'So ungefähr hat der Boden ausgesehen'. […] - Also waren genau *diese* Gräser und Blätter, in diesen Lagen, dort?" (PU: 70)

In der direkten Rede wird der Leser gefragt, ob dies-da-auf-der-Zeichnung diesem „dort" entspricht. Wittgenstein inszeniert somit den Sprecher, wie er unmittelbar vor dem Leser spricht und dabei auf bestimmte ganz konkrete Teile der Zeichnung zeigt: man bekommt wirklich „*diese* Gräser und Blätter, in diesen Lagen" vor Augen geführt.

Ähnlich ist im nächsten Zitat das demonstrative ‚das' in der direkten Rede mit allen drei Indikatoren der ego-hic-nunc-Origo als das, „was ich jetzt hier habe" unmittelbar gegenwärtig: „[…] ob *das* Schmerzen sind, was ich jetzt hier habe, das weiß ich nicht" (PU: 288) Besonders interessant ist dabei, dass Wittgenstein die Deixis durch ein typographisches Verfahren betont: „*dies*" und „*das*" erscheinen kursiv[4]. Wie Baker in „Italics in Wittgenstein" vermerkt, betrachtet Wittgenstein „das Symbol ‚*dies*' als zusammengestellt […], als bestehend aus der Äußerung des Fürworts ‚dies' *zusammen mit der Geste* des Hinweisens […]; es ist sozusagen teilweise Konkret, hier beinhaltet das Sprechen […] auch eine Handlung des Körpers." An anderen Stellen wird die Kursivierung sogar zusätzlich durch einen Pfeil ergänzt. „[D]er Pfeil steht [dann] offenbar für die *Geste* des Hinweisens auf etwas."(Baker 1999: 198.) Kursivierung und Pfeil betonen nicht nur theoretisch, dass „Sprechen Teil einer Tätigkeit" (Baker 1999: 198) ist: Sie gestalten den Text auch so, dass der Leser in seiner Lesetätigkeit direkt angesprochen wird; dadurch wird ihm idealerweise sein Umgang mit der Sprache – hier in Gestalt der Sprache der *Untersuchungen* – bewusst.

Von Hand gezeichnete Pfeile finden sich auch in den *Untersuchungen*, wenn auch nicht in Kombination mit einem Demonstrativum. Überhaupt ist es ein sehr avantgardistischer Zug des Buches, dass der Verlauf des Textes

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[2] In der Subjektphilosophie begegnet man dem ‚Ich' als Begriff, aber es handelt sich dort um ein normales Substantiv und nicht um das deiktische *ich*.
[3] Gegen 280 im Textabschnitt der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*.

[4] Insgesamt 19 Male in Teil I der PU.

immer wieder durch Bilder unterbrochen wird: Gesichter, Würfel, Tafeln... Diese verstreuten Bilder wiederholen und unterstützen den Akt des Zeigens unter Miteinbeziehung des außersprachlichen Kontexts, der die Deixis mitträgt. Ein Text mit eingefügtem Bild kommt zwangsläufig – sei es ausdrücklich oder implizit – einem Akt der Bezugnahme gleich. So überrascht der Gebrauch des Demonstrativums „dieser" in den folgenden Beispielen nicht:

> ,*Paßt* dieser Fleck● in seine weiße Umgebung? (PU: 216)

> Von einem beliebigen Schriftzeichen – diesem etwa ⊃ᅵ – kann ich mir vorstellen, es sei ein streng korrekt geschriebener Buchstabe irgendeines fremden Alphabets. (PU: II, xi)

Der Textfluss bricht an dieser Stelle ab und der Sprecher zeigt auf etwas. Dabei haben wir es nicht mit einer Textstelle zu tun, auf die einfach anaphorisch verwiesen würde. Vielmehr handelt es sich hier um etwas, das im Text steht, ohne selbst Text zu sein. Fleck im Buch, Handschrift gegen Druckschrift: Außertextuelles dringt in den Text ein. Gleichermaßen trifft dieses Merkmal der Außertextualität, wenn auch nicht überall in der soeben dargelegten überdeutlichen Form, für alle Bilder der *Untersuchungen* zu. Erlauben Sie mir ein drittes Zitat, das in eine ähnliche Richtung geht:

> Nun schau auf das Zeichen ▣ und laß Dir dabei einen Laut einfallen; sprich ihn aus. Mir fiel der Laut ›U‹ ein […]. (PU: 166)

Das deiktische *ich* macht deutlich, dass der Erzähler die Übungen, die er seinem Leser anbietet, selbst vollzogen hat. Dabei lässt Wittgenstein geschickt den Verdacht aufkommen, dass er selbst es ist – also der inszenierte Autor-Erzähler –, der das Zeichen gerade geschrieben hat. Wittgenstein vermittelt bewusst den Eindruck, der Leser würde dem Schreibakt unmittelbar beiwohnen.

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Dieses letzte Beispiel verdeutlicht besonders gut, dass das Präsens *die* Zeit par excellence der *Untersuchungen* darstellt. Das Buch ist vorwiegend im ‚aktuellen Präsens‘ geschrieben, dem ‚echten‘ Präsens, das die Handlung als zeitgleich mit dem Sprechakt wiedergibt. Der Grund hierfür liegt in den Beschreibungen der jeweiligen Beispielfälle, die in der Sprechgegenwart zu verorten sind. So beispielsweise in jener Szene, die den Leser zum Nachdenken anleitet: „Der Sessel denkt bei sich selber: ...." (PU: 361)

Da Wittgensteins Beispiele sich zudem häufig auf die Personen *ich* und *du* beziehen, münden sie, wenn in der Gegenwart inszeniert, oft in einen Dialog oder eine Adressierung. Etwa hier, mit vielen Indikatoren der Zeitdeixis: „Ich will mich an eine Melodie erinnern und sie fällt mir nicht ein; plötzlich sage ich ‚Jetzt weiß ich's!‘, und singe sie." (PU: 184) Vier ein- und zweisilbige, in aller Einfachheit in vier Hauptsätzen nebeneinander gestellte Verben umreißen vier Momente einer kleinen Szene, die sich vor unseren Augen abzuspielen scheint. Ein Satz in direkter Redewiedergabe fügt sich ein; das deiktische „jetzt", durch „plötzlich" und durch Ausrufezeichen verstärkt, festigt den

intendierten Eindruck: Augenblicklichkeit ist das, was Wittgenstein hier vermitteln will.

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Die Gegenwart ist in der Definition aller Deixis sowie aller enthalten. Hier liegt der gemeinsame Nenner der „Weisen der Vergegenwärtigung". Der Imperativ, die Frage, die direkte Rede finden allesamt im Präsens statt; die Deiktika beziehen sich auf *anwesende* Personen oder auf Dinge, die sich in der *aktuellen* Umgebung befinden. Die Gegenwart ist die einzige wirklich erlebte Zeit, und genau auf dieses Erleben kommt es Wittgenstein an, denn die Untersuchung soll vom Leser selbst durchgeführt werden.

Gegenwart als wirklich erlebte Zeit und nicht, wie üblich in der Philosophie, eine objektiv stehende und letztendlich zeitlose Gegenwart allgemeingültiger Ideen: dies ist der Gegenwartsbegriff – der sich aus der Stilanalyse ergibt. Lehrreich ist in diesem Zusammenhang, dass der Ausdruck „gegenwärtig sein" in den *Untersuchungen* fast ausschließlich im kritischen Kontext vorkommt. Denn Wittgenstein lehnt in Bezug auf sein Verständnis der Sprachmechanismen die Hypostasierung der Vorstellung ab; ihm zufolge gibt es neben dem Wort keine statische, etwa im Gehirn „gegenwärtige" Vorstellung. Gerade gegen diese Gegenwart als gegenwärtiges Vorhandensein, gegen dieses Präsens als Präsenz, führen die „Weisen der Vergegenwärtigung" eine Gegenwart vor, die ihren Sinn nur *in actu* bekommt. Mit den Deiktika, erklärt Benveniste, „[bietet d]ie Sprache in gewisser Weise ‚leere‘ Formen an, die jeder Sprecher bei der Ausübung des Diskurses sich aneignet und die er auf seine ‚Person‘ bezieht". Das „Präsens besitzt […] als zeitliche Referenz nur eine sprachlich gegebene: der Zusammenfall des beschriebenen Ereignisses mit der beschreibenden Diskursinstanz. […] Darin liegt der, obgleich sich niemals auf dieselben Ereignisse einer objektiven „Chronologie" beziehende, doch ewig ‚präsente‘ Augenblick, weil er bei jedem Sprecher durch die jeweilige Diskursinstanz, die sich darauf bezieht, bestimmt wird." (Benveniste 1974: 293.) Desgleichen sind die mit Sprechakten und Deiktika gespickten *Untersuchungen* für jeden einzelnen Leser immer nur in Bezug auf sich selbst als Leser verständlich, denn die Deiktika ergeben als sprachlich „leere Formen", die sie sind, erst dann einen Sinn, wenn der Leser sie mit seiner jeweiligen außersprachlichen Situation auffüllt. Die Gegenwart, die sie schaffen, ist eine durch jeden Leser neu unternommene Vergegenwärtigung, eine Aneignung der Gegenwart.

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Eine philosophische Untersuchung des Perspektivenbegriffs

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Abstract

Dem Begriff der Perspektive wurde bisher, trotz seiner umfangreichen und bis in die Antike zurückreichenden sprachlichen Verwendung, erstaunlich wenig explizit philosophische Beachtung zuteil. Diesen Umstand möchte ich zum Anlass nehmen, um eine kurze Übersicht über die Verwendung und Bedeutung des Begriffs der Perspektive zu erarbeiten. Eine sehr etablierte Meinung scheint zu sein, dass man Perspektiven *einnehmen* kann. Ich werde begründen, warum ich diese Annahme für widersinnig halte.

1. Ein erstes Verständnis

Die mit dem Begriff der Perspektive zusammenhängenden Begriffe der Perspektivität und des Standpunktes werden alltagssprachlich weitgehend synonym verwendet. Im englischsprachigen Raum wird neben ‚perspective' und ‚perspectivity' vor allem der Begriff ‚point of view' gebraucht. Sehen wir uns eine zeitgenössische Definition aus dem *„Collins English Dictionary"* an, dann können wir drei verschiedene Bedeutungsweisen ausmachen (vgl. Collins English Dictionary 2012)[1]:

(1) Eine Position, von der aus jemand oder etwas beobachtet wird,
(2) ein mentaler Sichtpunkt oder eine mentale Einstellung, und
(3) eine mentale Position, von der aus eine Geschichte beobachtet oder erzählt wird: der allwissende Standpunkt

Diese Vielfalt der Bedeutungen hat sich aus bereits in der Antike verwendeten Begriffen herausgebildet. Eine der wenigen Untersuchungen zum etymologischen Bedeutungswandel des Begriffs der Perspektive lässt sich in Wilhelm Köllers Buch „Perspektivität und Sprache" finden, in dem er Objektivierungsformen in Bildern, im Denken und in der Sprache analysiert. Wie er feststellt, hat der Begriff der Perspektive zunächst etwas mit visuellen Wahrnehmungsprozessen zu tun, was sich in obiger Definition aus dem *Collins English Dictionary* in Punkt (i) widerspiegelt; er dient aber heute auch als Basisbegriff in allen Geisteswissenschaften und Redeweisen, die sich mit der Struktur der Sinnbildung beschäftigen (vgl. Köller 2004: 6), was sich auch in der oben angeführten Definition in den Punkten (ii) und (iii) ausdrückt. Während sich Punkt (ii) auf innere Erfahrungsprozesse bezieht, wird in Punkt (iii) auch auf die Erzählperspektiven der Literatur oder Bildhaften Künste Bezug genommen.

2. Kleine philosophische Begriffsgeschichte

Wortgeschichtlich geht der Begriff aus dem lateinischen „perspicere" zurück, was in etwa mit „genau sehen" oder „gewiss wahrnehmen" übersetzt werden kann, wodurch deutlich wird, warum bis ins Zeitalter der Renaissance das Wort „perspectiva" die Lehre des *richtigen*, *genauen* Sehens bezeichnete. Wie Köller weiter ausführt, brachte wohl aber erst der Maler Albrecht Dürer im Kontext seiner Studien zu zentralperspektivischen Darstellungsweisen eine

weitere Bedeutungsversion in Umlauf, die sich im Begriff der Durchsehung niederschlug und die Namensgebung des im 17. Jahrhunderts entwickelten Fernrohrs, dem „Perspektiv", erklären könnte. Dieser Bedeutungswandel erfährt damit zugleich eine Erweiterung des Bedeutungsbereichs vom visuellen Bereich auf eine erweiterte Raumorientierung und geistige Wahrnehmungsprozesse (vgl. Köller 2004: 6), ein „geistiges Hin- und Durchsehen", was sich auch im Namen der ersten europäischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 1603 in Rom, der *Academia dei Lincei* bzw. Akademie der Luchsartigen (oder Luchsäugigen) ausdrückt. (Vgl. Hebestreit 2015: 15)

Die Analogie zwischen dem Sehvorgang und der Struktur kognitiver Vorgänge lässt sich bereits ab der Antike nachzeichnen. Neben den Vorsokratikern wie Heraklit, Empedokles, Demokrit, Leukipp und Parmenides haben auch später Platon und Aristoteles den Begriff der Perspektive v. a. an die visuelle Wahrnehmung gekoppelt. Beispielsweise hält Empedokles ein inneres Licht in den Augen für möglich, das die Gegenstände von sich heraus anstrahlt, während Demokrit und Leukipp für die Augen nur eine passive Rolle annehmen, in die die von den Originalen losgelösten Bilder eindringen können. (Vgl. Köller 2004: 13) Einen revolutionären Gedankengang hatte bereits Parmenides, der neben den unsicheren, gar irreführenden, Perspektiven der Erscheinungen eine Perspektive des Verstandes einführte, von der aus die Wirklichkeit an sich „wahrgenommen" werden könnte. Diese Überlegung haben viele bedeutende Philosophen wie Platon, Aristoteles und die meisten Vertreter der westlichen Philosophie aufgenommen und weiterentwickelt. (Vgl. Campos/Gutiérrez 2015: 7)

Die Licht- und Durchblicksmetaphorik etablierte sich von da ausgehend für die Kennzeichnung kognitiver Phänomene bzw. als Leitmetapher für Denken und Theoretisieren, und ist uns über das Mittelalter, die Renaissance und Neuzeit bis heute in den verschiedensten Phrasen wie etwa „Licht der Vernunft", „Klarheit des Denkens" oder „Aufklärung" erhalten geblieben. (Vgl. Köller 2004: 12): Zum Beispiel hob Descartes in den *Meditationen* die grundlegende Rolle der Vernunft hervor, die als ein „inneres Suchen" verstanden und „eingesehen" werden kann. Aus dem Sichtpunkt bzw. der Perspektive des Subjektes sollte sich ein objektives Erkennen über die Welt ergeben. (Vgl. Descartes 1941/2009, Campos/Gutiérrez 2015: 9) Auch Kant unterscheidet in seiner *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* zwischen einer erkennbaren Welt der Erfahrungen und einer objektiven Welt an sich, über die wir nichts *direkt* wissen können. Diese transzendentale Welt lässt sich nur durch kritische Reflexion, Vernunftgebrauch und unter Zuhilfenahme der empirischen Erkenntnisse verständlich machen.

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[1] Eine ähnliche Herangehensweise wählten auch (Perner/Brandl/Garnham 2003).

Viel später hat Nietzsche die Perspektivität als Ausgangskriterium verstanden, von der aus die Wirklichkeit konstituiert wird: *Jeglicher* Wahrheitsbezug sei subjektabhängig, da dieser nicht nur Resultat der Interpretation von Sinneseindrücken und Erkenntnissen, sondern auch Ausdruck des subjektiven Wertempfindens sei. (Vgl. Hofmann 1994: 45f.) Nietzsches Begriff der Perspektive ist damit radikal subjektivistisch. Dass diese Sicht nicht auch radikal relativistisch ist, begründet Hofmann in Nietzsches Forderung zur Ausbildung von Toleranz und zu einem verfeinerten Gespür für andere Perspektiven, wodurch diese graduell einsichtig werden würden. Eine *objektive* Perspektive oder *einzig wahre* Wirklichkeit gibt es demnach nicht. (Vgl. Hofmann 1994: 48, 53, 58)

Ein Beispiel der Beschäftigung mit dem Begriff der Perspektive aus der Gegenwartsphilosophie lässt sich u. a. in den Arbeiten von Wittgenstein ausmachen: Im *Tractatus* vertritt Wittgenstein die Meinung, dass das Subjekt nicht zur Welt gehört, sondern die Grenze zur Welt ist (vgl. TLP: 5.632). Es lässt sich nur durch das Gesehene auf ein sehendes Subjekt schließen, womit „die ‚Welt meine Welt ist'." (Vgl. TLP: 5.633-5.641). Auch in den Philosophischen Untersuchungen sieht er die Bezugnahme auf die Welt als relativistisch: Bedeutungen ergeben sich ausgehend von einer Lebensform aus der Verwendung des jeweiligen, situativen Sprachspiels. Dass er diese Bezugnahme als subjektiv einzuschätzen scheint, deutet sich auch im Blauen Buch an:

Die Idee ist hier, daß sich derselbe Gegenstand vor seinen und vor meinen Augen befinden mag, daß ich jedoch nicht meinen Kopf in seinen stecken kann (oder meinen Geist in seinen, was auf dasselbe hinausläuft), damit der *wirkliche* und *unmittelbare* Gegenstand meines Sehens auch der wirkliche und unmittelbare Gegenstand meines Sehens wird. (BBB: 98)

Was gesehen wird, ist das im Gesichtsfeld Befindliche, nicht das Auge selbst: „Wenn irgendetwas gesehen (wirklich *gesehen*) wird, dann bin immer ich es, der es sieht." (BBB: 98)

Historisch läuft der begriffliche Bedeutungswandel vom genauen Sehen zur subjektbezogenen Sichtweise mit der gedanklichen Abkehr von absoluten Wissensansprüchen und teleologischen Beschreibungen der konstruierten Endzwecke zu einem neuen Umgang mit Wissen über Naturzusammenhänge und der Frage nach der prinzipiellen Erfahrbarkeit von der Welt *an sich* unter der Betonung einer Welt *für uns* einher. Dieser Umstand ergibt sich auch unter Rückgriff auf die sich neu erschließenden Erkenntnismöglichkeiten, was sich ausgehend von philosophischen Überlegungen zur Welt als ein Abwenden von substanzontologischen Erklärungen hin zu funktionsontologischen Überlegungen begreifen lässt: Die Möglichkeit verlässlichen Wissens durch Einnehmen der „richtigen" Relation zu den Wahrnehmungsgegenständen unter Annahme einer festen Welt der Gegenstände mit erkennbarem Wesenskern und einer dahinterliegenden Ideenwelt wich zunehmend einem hypothetischen Denken und operativen Experimentieren, die die Anschauung selbst als nur relationsabhängiges Werkzeug zur Hervorbringung von Wissen diskutieren, wodurch Wahrnehmungsveränderungen als Perspektivenveränderung und nicht als Dingveränderung interpretiert wurde. (vgl. Köller 2004: 18f.)

Perspektivität *scheint* damit als Grundgegebenheit menschlicher Wahrnehmungsmöglichkeiten gelten zu können, da eine Perspektive immer von einer vom Subjekt aus wahrgenommenen raumzeitlichen und geistigen Position heraus *eingenommen* werden kann, wodurch ein Wahrnehmungsgegenstand durch die jeweilige Bezugnahme

als Wahrnehmungsinhalt konstituiert werde. (Vgl. Köller 2004: 9)

3. Perspektive als Repräsentation von Wahrgenommenem

Einen ähnlichen Perspektivenbegriff bieten Perner/Brandl/Garnham, die die Repräsentation als grundlegende Verständnisbasis von ‚Perspektive' annehmen: Alle Definitionen von Perspektive scheinen nämlich zumindest in irgendeiner Weise darauf zu referieren, *wie* bestimmte *Objekte* repräsentiert werden: „how they are *drawn*, how they *appear* to be, or what *mental view* is taken from them." (Perner/Brandl/Garnham 2003: 356) Das veranlasst sie zur allgemeinen Definition der Perspektive als „a way something is represented in a representational medium", womit nicht nur der Bezug auf unmittelbare Objekte, sondern auch auf Bilder, Aussagen, mentale Zustände oder jedes andere repräsentationale Medium gemeint sein kann. (Perner/Brandl/Garnham 2003: 357) Diese Definition impliziert, dass nichts repräsentiert werden kann, ohne auf eine *bestimmte Weise* repräsentiert zu sein. Eine Perspektive ist damit abhängig von dem Ziel und dem jeweiligen Standort, von dem aus jemand eine Perspektive hat. In diesem Sinne steht der Beobachter zum Objekt in einem gewissen zielgerichteten Bezug, wobei die Perspektive beschränkt, (i) *welche* Gegenstände gesehen werden können, und (ii) *wie* die Objekte dem Beobachter erscheinen. Unterschiedliche Repräsentationen können dann zu unterschiedlichen Annahmen über die beobachteten Objekte führen. (Vgl. Perner/Brandl/Garnham 2003: 256-259) Die Relativität der Perspektive ergibt sich damit nicht aus dem, *was* beobachtet wird, sondern von der Position, aus der etwas beobachtet wird. Das ist interessant, weil Perner/Brandl/Garnham damit wie auch Campos/Gutiérrez (2015) anzudeuten scheinen, dass eine bestimmte Perspektive prinzipiell *einnehmbar* ist.

4. Das Einnehmen und Haben von Perspektiven

Auf einer viel grundlegenderen ontologischen Ebene gibt es notwendige Bedingungen, die für die Perspektive unerlässlich sind, und deren Bedeutungen im Begriff der Perspektive enthalten sein müssen. Unumstößlich scheint die Annahme zu sein, dass es eine Perspektive im selbst schwächsten Sinne, als individuelle Sicht auf die Welt, nur geben kann, solange es eine Inhaberin dieser Perspektive, ein Individuum, gibt. Dieses Individuum ist natürlich raumzeitlich eingebettet, was bedeutet, dass es immer nur von einem raumzeitlichen Standpunkt aus eine Perspektive haben kann. Heutzutage wird „einen Standpunkt/Sichtpunkt haben" und „eine Perspektive haben" nicht immer genau getrennt. Dieser Unterschied ist aber wichtig, beziehen wir uns mit dem Ausdruck „eine Perspektive haben" doch auf das Erlebte und nicht auf uns selbst als Erlebende.

Wenn es zumindest um die ontologische Bestimmung des Begriffs der epistemischen Perspektive geht – wo er sich also auf den Wahrnehmungsvorgang bezieht – hat also immer *jemand* eine Perspektive *auf etwas* zu einer *bestimmten Zeit* an einem *bestimmten Ort*, was den Ausdruck als mindestens vierstelliges Prädikat ausweist. Dasselbe könnte man aber auch behaupten, wenn er sich auf die phänomenale Einstellung bezieht, wenn also jemand eine Sichtweise über oder von etwas zu einer bestimmten Zeit an einem bestimmten Ort hat – wobei die beiden letzten Akzidenzien in diesem Sinne meistens eher neben-

sächlich sind, da man ein und dieselbe Ansicht immer wieder haben kann, unabhängig davon, wann man sich wo befindet.

Eine ähnliche Unterscheidung stellen auch Campos/Gutiérrez vor: Einerseits beziehe sich der Begriff auf das mentale bzw. phänomenale Erleben (z. B. das Haben einer Einstellung, Überzeugung, eines Gedanken oder Gefühls), andererseits bezieht er sich auf den epistemischen Zugang zur Welt. Anders als eben von mir angedacht, meinen sie allerdings, dass es „points of views" unabhängig von einem Inhaber, also objektiv an sich, geben kann: In diesem Falle synonymisieren sie den Begriff mit „Sichtpunkt", „Standpunkt" oder „Ausblick". (Vgl. Campos/Gutiérrez 2015: 2f.) Diese Sicht hat natürlich Auswirkungen auf die Vorstellung über die Struktur einer Perspektive: Während nach der ersten Bedeutung eine Perspektive erst *durch den Inhaber* einer solchen konstruiert wird, konstituiere sich eine Perspektive gemäß der zweiten Bedeutung über ein Modell über *Raum* und *Zugang*. (Vgl. Campos/Gutiérrez 2015: 17) Gemäß letzterer Bedeutung wäre eine Perspektive prinzipiell einnehmbar und nicht subjektabhängig, weil die dafür relevanten Voraussetzungen der Platzierung („placement") und Zugänglichkeit unabhängig vom Subjekt bestehen. Diese Bedeutung verteidigen Campos/Gutiérrez, was sinnvoll erscheint, insofern wir unter einer Perspektive einen Standpunkt begreifen. Selbstverständlich kann man dann verschiedene Perspektiven qua Standpunkte einnehmen, sei es epistemisch, also als ein raum-zeitlicher Ort, von dem aus man etwas betrachten kann, oder phänomenal, etwa als Gedanke oder Überzeugung, gemeint. Dabei wird aber das Betrachtete oder Gedachte nicht zur Perspektive qua Wahrnehmungserlebnis. Eben letzteres scheint mir aber für ein umfassendes Verständnis des Begriffs der Perspektive unumgänglich. Denn können wir wirklich verstehen, was mit Perspektive gemeint ist, ohne jemanden anzunehmen, der oder die sie *haben* kann? Eine Perspektive kann man meiner Meinung nach nur von einem Standpunkt aus haben, der prinzipiell von jedem eingenommen werden kann, was aber nicht bedeutet, dass dann jeder, der das tut, auch dieselbe Perspektive haben wird. Eine Perspektive ist damit nicht mit einem Standpunkt gleichzusetzen: Man kann sie nur haben, nicht einnehmen. Eine Perspektive erfordert aber notwendigerweise einen raumzeitlichen Standpunkt, und die Einnahme eines raumzeitlichen Standpunktes führt notwendigerweise zu irgendeiner Wahrnehmung im Individuum, also einer (vorrangig visuellen) Perspektive auf die Welt, die hinsichtlich ihres Wahrnehmungsinhaltes subjektiv, hinsichtlich ihres raumzeitlich einmaligen Erlebnisvorkommnisses eines Subjekts aber objektiv ist. Sie ist allerdings nicht objektiv oder intersubjektiv im Sinne einer *prinzipiellen* „Einnehmbarkeit". Phänomenal verstanden, als das Haben einer Einstellung, einer Überzeugung usw., ist die Perspektive subjektiv hinsichtlich des qualitativen Vorkommnisses im Subjekt, objektiv im Sinne eines Type-Verständnisses des Inhalts dieser Einstellung, der Überzeugung usw. sowie intersubjektiv im Sinne der Vermittelbarkeit der Bedeutung dieser Einstellungen, der Überzeugung usw.

5. Begrenzung des Begriffs der Perspektive auf die Erste-Person-Perspektive

Die erste Person begegnet uns zunächst grammatikalisch im Selbstbezug durch den Ausdruck des Personalpronomens „ich". Dieser Selbstbezug wird zwar gemeinhin als Ausdruck von Subjektivität betrachtet, *was* damit aber genau bezeichnet wird, was also der Bedeutungsgehalt des Ausdrucks „ich" ist und ob dieser auf etwas referiert, ist

philosophisch umstritten – darum soll es mir an dieser Stelle aber auch nicht gehen.

Wie sich herausgestellt hat, geht die Erste-Person-Perspektive stark mit der Bedeutung des Ausdruckes „subjektiv" einher, was sich durch die Art des Zugangs erklären lässt. Wenn die obigen Überlegungen zum Begriff der Perspektive richtig sind und eine solche als das individuelle *Haben* einer Wahrnehmung oder phänomenal verstanden als das *Haben* einer Einstellung, eines Gefühls usw. verstanden werden kann, dann müsste streng genommen jeder individuelle Bezug auf die Welt oder umgedreht jede Repräsentation der Welt für uns subjektiv sein: Wir kommen nicht aus uns heraus und können nicht anders auf die Welt Bezug nehmen, als mit unseren Sinnen. Für alle anderen Bezugnahmen wie etwa die eines objektiven Beobachters, wie es unter der sogenannten „Dritte-Person-Perspektive" postuliert wird, scheint die Bezeichnung „Perspektive" in diesem Sinne unangebracht. Diese Privatheit der Erfahrungen, der Umstand, dass *wir* genau *diese* Erfahrungen haben, lässt uns jeden individuellen Bezug zur Welt als einen *besonderen* charakterisieren. Die Erste-Person-Perspektive zeichnet sich demnach also nicht unbedingt durch den Gegenstandsbereich aus, auf den die Perspektive Bezug nimmt, sondern in der *Besonderheit der Bezugnahme* auf den Gegenstandsbereich. Das trifft insbesondere auf den persönlichen Zugang zu den mentalen Zuständen zu.

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Communicating Perceptual Content: Marty's Doubts

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Abstract

This paper presents the relation between meaning and perceptual content in Anton Marty. For Marty, meaning is (partly) understood in terms of the content of mental acts. Yet perceptual content never constitutes the meaning of linguistic expressions. Communication requires the utterer and the speaker to grasp *the same* content. To this extent, meaning is always conceptual. However, Marty admits that we can talk of what we perceive, but must do so via *concepts of intuitions*. Such concepts comprise indexicals and intentional verbs: e.g. "this, that I see". The meaning of indexicals is understood in terms of definite descriptions, which are conceptual. Thus, what is *given in perception* is never *given in language*.

1. Introduction

Can perceptual content form the meaning of linguistic expressions? The orthodox Brentanian answer is "no". This position is not developed by Brentano himself, but by his "Minister of Linguistic Affairs", Anton Marty. For Marty, what language communicates must be "common" and, thus, conceptual. Indeed, external perceptual content varies infinitely, and language could therefore never express its many nuances. As regards internal perceptual content, the distinguishing and individuating feature of mental acts, namely the soul, is never noticed. So, although internal perceptual content differs from one person to the other, its explicit content is general. Yet Marty claims that we can talk of our perceptual content, but via "concepts of intuition", which use indexicals and intentional verbs, e.g. "this, that I see". For Marty, the meanings of indexicals are definite descriptions, which are conceptual. In this paper, I present and evaluate Marty's views.

2. Language in Marty: the General Picture

Drawing on a Brentanian framework, Marty (1908) develops a philosophy of language strongly depending on psychology. He admits two senses of "meaning". The first, "meaning in the broad sense", anticipates Grice's intentionalist semantics. For Grice, sentence-meaning is understood in terms of utterer-meaning and utterer-meaning in terms of utterer-intention, this intention being to induce a specific mental act in the hearer (Grice 1957; Grandy and Warner 2013). Similarly, for Marty, the meaning of a sentence equates the intention of the utterer to induce a certain mental act in the hearer. This mental act is meant to be *the same* as the one the utterer makes manifest in uttering the sentence. For example, by saying "Husserl is an analytic philosopher", the utterer makes it manifest that he is judging 'that Husserl is an analytic philosopher' and wants the hearer to perform this very same judgment. The meaning of the sentence "Husserl is an analytic philosopher" lies in the utterer's intention that the hearer perform the judgment in question. The second sense of meaning, "meaning in the strict sense", is objective: the meaning of a sentence is the content of the mental act that the utterer makes manifest and wants to induce in the hearer. For example, the meaning of the sentence "Husserl is an analytic philosopher" equates to the state of affairs 'Husserl is an analytic philosopher'. For Marty, the "content" of a mental act, despite its subjectivist connotations, is not something *in the mind*, but something outside, which corresponds (when it exists) or would correspond (were it to exist) to the mental act. Marty follows Brentano's division of mental acts into presentations, judgments and emotions. Presentations are mere thinkings, without any existential commitment or evaluation, and their contents are objects. Judgments either acknowledge or deny an object. The contents of judgments are states of affairs. Finally, an emotion is the liking or disliking of an object, and it has "states of values" as contents.

3. Presentations…

Marty distinguishes between perceptual and conceptual presentations. Perceptual presentations (*perzeptive Vorstellungen*), also referred to as "intuitive" (*anschauliche*), have concrete, individual content. These contents are either physical, e.g. "the white surface of paper extended in front of me now", or psychic, e.g. "the judgment, love, hate, etc., taking place in me now". Memory and imagination exploit this intuitive material, either reproductively or productively. Conceptual presentations are general. They are acquired by abstraction, e.g. 'white thing', or by analysing abstract objects, e.g. 'coloured thing'. Conceptual presentations can be combined into "synthetic presentations". The synthesis can either be general, e.g. "something white – smooth – nice smelling", or identify one single individual, e.g. "founder of the peripatetic school". Marty's synthetic individual presentations are definite descriptions. Conceptual contents, including synthetic presentations, are "incomplete", since they present one or many things via *some* of their properties. The content of a conceptual presentation (e.g. 'founder of the peripatetic school', 'white thing') is its "object in a strict sense", whereas what instantiates the content (e.g. Aristotle, all white things) is the "object in the broad sense" (1908: 433-40, 448-50; 1910: 53-4).

4. …as Meanings

According to Marty, language serves above all to make manifest and induce judgments and emotions, not presentations. Yet the contents of judgments and emotions are made up of the contents of presentations. For example, the judicative content 'that Husserl is an analytic philosopher' is made up of the presentational contents 'Husserl' and 'analytic philosopher'. Thus, when one makes manifest or induces judgments or emotions, one cannot but make manifest and induce presentations at the same time. Judicative and emotional meanings include presentational meanings.

For Marty, linguistic expressions can clearly have conceptual content as meaning. Note that according to Marty, whereas conceptual content is the *meaning* of a linguistic

expression, the thing or things that instantiate the content is what the expression "*names*" (*nennen*) (1908: 448-50).

Can perceptual content form the meaning of a linguistic expression? Marty's answer is "no". Anticipating some Wittgensteinian concerns, Marty holds that what is communicated by language must be "common": language is not private, but is a "common possession" (*Gemeingut*). He refers to Aristotle's statement in the *De interpretatione* (16a6-7) that the mental representations of which words are signs are "the same for all". The idea is that the utterer wants to induce in the hearer *the same* act and content as the one he makes manifest by using the linguistic expression, and that communication is achieved once this precise mental act has been triggered (1908: 433; 1918: 105-6; 1918a: 133; 1940: 116-7). Why, therefore, can perceptual content not allow for this?

In Marty's opinion, physical phenomena can differ qualitatively *ad infinitum*: there is an infinite number of the most specific species of colours, shapes, sounds, etc. Thus, if we treat the content of our external perception as the meaning of our linguistic expressions, we could not expect the hearer to perform *the same* mental act as the one we are expressing. The content of the hearer's mental act would not be directed toward the same qualitative feature. To this extent, "we could never fully understand each other", we would only have a "possibility of approximate comprehension". What then do we communicate? Marty's answer is: "conceptual content", which makes abstraction from these infinite qualitative nuances (1908: 433-4; 1940: 116-7; 2011: 37, 110-1).

As regards psychic phenomena, Marty holds that they acquire their distinctive qualitative feature and their individuation through the soul: every mental act has an individual soul as a substantial bearer, and this substance is qualitatively distinct for each person. However, we fail to notice the peculiarity of our soul. Indeed, one can only grasp the peculiarity of something if one comes to be acquainted with a different item of the same kind, or if the thing in question changes. Yet our soul is the only one to which we ever have access and it remains unmodified. Thus, even if our internal perceptual content is qualitatively and individually distinct from that of anyone else, given that we fail to discern our soul's peculiarity, we only capture general mental acts. But then, we can simply not use something else than abstract and, thus, conceptual content when talking of our mental life (1908: 433-4; 2011: 35).

5. Concepts of Intuition

Even if perceptual content cannot form the meaning of our linguistic expressions, Marty admits that one can refer to such content, or "name" it (*nennen*), via "concepts of intuition", e.g. "this, that I see" (1918a: 134-5; 1920: 64 n. 2). Concepts of intuition for inner life may have the form: "this, that I internally perceive". For Marty, in "this, that I see", the "this" does not have as its meaning the content of my current seeing, but a definite description. Indeed, Marty has a descriptivist theory of indexicals. As we said above, a definite description, in Marty's terms, is a synthesis of concepts which presents a unique object. The description which constitutes the meaning of the indexical depends on context, understood in a broad sense, including gestures made by the utterer, as well as the beliefs of the utterer and hearer with respect to the object. Beyond their meaning as definite descriptions, indexicals also evoke a general presentation in the hearer: e.g. for "this", the general presentation is "that which is in front of the utterer". How-

ever, according to Marty, this general presentation is not the meaning of the indexical, but it helps the hearer, along with context, to give a meaning to the indexical (1908: 439 n. 1, 500 n. 1). Examples for the meaning of "this" when used for external perception would be: "the colour of the bicycle in the garden" or "the bell of the ice-cream truck".

6. Evaluation

I would like to point out two problems in Marty's claim that external perceptual content cannot form the meaning of linguistic expressions.

According to Marty, intuitive content is individual. One perceives instances of the most specific species of colours, shapes, sounds, etc. Such instances are individuated by their spatial position (2011: 90, 104-5). When one makes abstraction of this location, the result is already a concept, namely a concept of a most specific species. However, following Marty's own reasoning, this concept still cannot be communicated, since its qualitative feature is one among an infinity of species. Thus, Marty's statements would appear to be imprecise: he should have said that neither intuitive content or conceptual content help communication, as long as the conceptual content is *a most specific species* of colour, shape, sound, etc. In other words, Marty appears to be committed to the claim that we only communicate via *generic concepts* of objects of perception.

Another problem with Marty's account is that an utterer and a hearer present at the same place could seemingly share the same perceptual content, a specific colour, shape, sound, etc. But then, what would prevent them from using it as a meaning? Marty appears to hold that even in this case, for example when two persons see the same thunder, intuition does not constitute the meaning of linguistic expressions (1918a: 131-4). He provides no argument, but his idea might be that a language like this is possibly restricted to a small community, namely the people who are or have been acquainted with the specific colour, shape, sound, etc. in question, whereas language should extend far beyond such a community. Even in this small community, this process of word formation could not be systematised, since it would entail the production of a new word every time a new perceptual content is communicated. Finally, another potential argument, that Marty only suggests (1908: 449 n. 2), but which is found in Husserl (1984: 550), is that two persons never share exactly the same perceptual content, given differences in perspectives and physiological constitutions. Following this line of thought, the infinite variation of perception would be due not only to features of the things, but also of the perceivers. Besides, perceptual content would be perspectival, and concepts of intuition would become concepts of perspectives, e.g. "that which appears to me right now in this or that way", as Marty himself briefly suggests.

Marty's views on communication of inner perception also have some shortcomings. The implicit content of this perception, which is individual, is indeed perceptual, whereas its explicit content, which is abstract, is conceptual. However, it seems problematic to hold that the noticed content of an act could be, say, of another "intentional nature" (i.e. perceptual *vs.* conceptual, etc.) than its unnoticed content. The solution here would probably either be to renounce the unicity of inner perception, by dividing it into two acts, an act of perception strictly speaking and a conceptual presentation, or to hold that inner perceptual content is general. However, this last solution would force Marty to

abandon his claim that perceptual content, being non-general, cannot be communicated.

Finally, following Marty's account of concepts of intuition, even indexicals referring to perceptual content have conceptual content as their meaning. To this extent, one could say that Marty's position creates a gap between perception and language: meaning is never perceptual. However, it should be emphasised that this position does not forbid thought to be justified by perception. Indeed, according to Marty (1920), thought does not depend on language and notably is not linguistically structured. Rather, language depends on thought, in the sense that it is made to make manifest and induce thoughts. Thus, the fact that perceptual content cannot form the meaning of linguistic expressions does not prevent thought from relying on perception. In Marty's view, thought can be perfectly justified by perception. As he affirms, the perception of thunder can be the "motive" (*Motiv*) for the judgment 'there is thunder' (1918a: 132).

7. Conclusion

Despite some shortcomings, Marty has an interesting position on the relation between meaning and perception. Meaning (in the strict sense) is understood in terms of *common* content. The content of perception is not common, or at least not sufficiently, and cannot constitute the meaning of linguistic expressions. Only conceptual content can play this role. Thus, what is *perceptually given* is never *linguistically given*. However, this position does not prevent thought to be justified by perception: insofar as there is independence of thought with respect to language, perceptual content is perfectly capable of motivating judgments.

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The Extended Cognition Thesis in the Service of Direct Perception – A Critical Survey

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Abstract

In the paper, the role of the extended cognition thesis in the debate on direct perception will be analyzed. In particular, the focus will be on the dynamic system theory which is recognized as providing the criterion of the extended cognitive system. The identification of an extended cognitive system with the dynamic system is used by Anthony Chemero to argue in favor of direct perception. The object and agent of perception jointly constitute a dynamic system, hence the former is directly present within the agent's cognitive system. This argument is undermined by Orestis Palermos' remark that the object of perception cannot constitute a dynamic system with the agent, for it does not stand in appropriate mutual relationship with the agent's perceptual system. The present paper attempts to provide a possible solution to this concern. Palermos' argument misses its target if the object of perception is recognized not as an external entity independent of the agent's cognitive system, but as an affordance.

I. The extended cognition thesis – the dynamic systems approach

Active externalism presented by Clark and Chalmers in the article "The Extended Mind" proposes two key theses: The Extended Cognition and The Extended Mind. In the present paper, I focus on the former, as only the Extended Cognition Thesis could be explained in terms of the dynamic system theory. Clark's formulation of this thesis, which is useful for my present purposes, reads as follows: "the actual local operations that realize certain forms of human cognizing include inextricable tangles of feedback, feed-forward and feed-around loops: loops that promiscuously criss-cross the boundaries of brain, body and world. The local mechanisms of mind, if this is correct, are not all in the head. Cognition leaks out into body and world" (Clark 2007: 165). Hence, the extended cognition takes place when some environmental elements are properly coupled with the agent's internal cognitive mechanisms: "In these cases, the human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right" (Clark/Chalmers 1998: 8). Clark defines this interaction in terms of "continuous reciprocal causation": "CRC occurs when some system S is both continuously affecting and simultaneously being affected by activity in some other system O" (Clark 2008: 24). Active externalism faces serious objections, the most important of which are known as the 'causal-constitution' fallacy, and the 'cognitive bloat' concern (Adams/Aizawa: 2001). Without going into details, they indicate the lack of a criterion distinguishing cognitive processes from all the others. In the attempts to identify such a criterion, some proponents of extended cognition resort to the tools of the dynamic systems theory. One of those scholars – Orestis S. Palermos – suggests treating the continuous mutual interactions between the agent and the external artifact not only as a sufficient but indeed necessary condition of extended cognition (Clark 2007, 2008). This definition is precisely formulated in terms of the mathematical theory of dynamical systems.

In loose terms, two or more systems form a single dynamical, coupled system only if one of the system's inputs originates from another system's outputs, and vice versa. The proponents of explaining extended cognitive systems in these terms often evoke the example of a blind agent coupled with a tactile visual substitution system (Beer 1995). The agent's actions and the information from the visual substitution system affect one another in a mutual, coupled way. Such an interaction is very effective, for it gives rise to new systemic properties (quasi-visual experiences) and behavior that cannot be performed by any part of the coupled system individually. Such mutually coupled systems should not be confused with systems that are only causally, unidirectionally dependent. In this latter case, one system's effects constitute the other system's inputs, yet the effects of these inputs do not affect, in a direct way, the first system. In other words, there is only a one-way causal interaction which explains the behavior of each system taken individually, in terms of distinct inputs and effects. Phenomena such as sunlight, ambient temperature, a phonebook, or a notebook affect the agent's behavior, yet these effects have no direct impact on those environmental phenomena. Said inputs may influence the agent's behavior but do not form a coupled system with the same. As far as coupled systems are concerned, environmental inputs which affect the agent's behavior are partly determined by the agent's own activity, and vice versa. Hence, it is impossible to determine distinct inputs and effects from one system to another (Palermos 2014). Mutual interaction gives rise to new systemic properties that cannot be explained and predicted in terms of the properties of the particular elements of the system. This is the reason why the concept of a coupled system is indispensable. The mutual interaction, or "feedback loop" criterion, provides the way of distinguishing cognitive processes from non-cognitive ones, and as such, protects the extended cognition thesis against the 'causal-constitution' fallacy, and the 'cognitive bloat' concern. To recapitulate: whenever one's cognitive internal processes interact with some environmental elements on the basis of ongoing mutual interactions, we are presented with an extended cognitive system.

II. The dynamic system theory in the service of direct perception

Anotony Chemero – one of the leading proponents of the radical embodied cognition thesis– uses the dynamical system theory to argue in favor of direct perception. However, Orestis Palermos points to a serious problem with this argument. After presenting Chemero's line of thinking and Palermos critique, I will show that under certain assumptions reminiscent of the enactivist perspective, Palermos remark misses its target.

Chemero recognizes radical embodied cognition as a variety of extended cognition, but points out that contrary to nonradical embodied cognition, his position is immune to "antiextention arguments" (Chemero 2009). The reason is that radical embodied cognition explains cognitive processes in terms of the dynamical system theory which enables its representatives to reject representationalism lying in the core of the critique evoking the 'causal-constitution' fallacy and 'cognitive bloat'. Hence Chemero, similarly to Palermos, uses the dynamical system theory to reject arguments against extended cognition, albeit doing so in a distinct manner. Specifically, while Palermos formulates the desired criterion of the extended cognitive process, Chemero goes on to argue that information processing which takes place in a coupled system composed of the agent and her perceived environment, cannot employ computation over representations. Why is that? Chemero notices that explaining the agent's perceptual activity in terms of its representations leads to the claim that it is the represented environment, and not the environment itself, that is part of the cognitive system (Chemero 2009). When coupling to the environment is achieved via representations, the danger of the coupling – constitution fallacy is significant, for the fact that a representational system is coupled to the environment does not imply that the environment is partly constitutive of the system (Adams/Aizawa: 2001). The system could be isolated from the environment because it is the representation of the environment, rather than the environment itself, that drives the cognitive system. The case is very different when one recognizes the agent and his environment as a unified, coupled, non-decomposable system, whose behavior cannot be explained in terms of the properties or functions of its individual elements. Under this condition, the coupling constitution fallacy does not occur, as the agent is part of a single cognitive system formed jointly with the given environmental element. The agent does not represent an object in her environment, for this object is already present within the extended, dynamic cognitive system. Chemero employs this argument to enforce his claim about direct perception. Since the agent and the object of perception constitute a single dynamic cognitive system, there is no need for the agent to represent the object, as it is already directly present within the extended cognitive system: "Perception is always a matter of tracking something that is present in the environment. Because animals are coupled to the perceived when they track it, there is never need to call upon representations during tracking" (Chemero 2009: 115). There is, however, a serious concern regarding this argument which could altogether undermine the idea of direct perception.

Palermos notices that Chemero misunderstands the nature of continuous mutual interactions that give rise to dynamic, coupled systems. Such relations arise only out of cooperative feedback loops between interacting parts. According to Palermos, there is no such coupling between the object of perception and the perceiving subject. The relation between the object and the perceiver is unidirectional, the agent's perceptual behavior does not change the object of perception in any way that would in turn affect him as well. There are no feedback loops present in the case of perception (Palermos 2014). Should this indeed prove correct, Chemero, in arguing in favor of a coupled system composed of the agent and object of perception, commits the very coupling-constitution fallacy that he hopes to avert. The object of perception is casually and unidirectionally related to the agent, hence it cannot constitute his cognitive system. Palermos points out that if Chemero's reasoning were correct, almost everything that the agent interacts with could be recognized as a part of

his cognitive system, which is the very gist of the "cognitive bloat" critique.

III. The object of perception as perceived directly – an anti-realist answer to the Palermos' critique

Palermos' critical note cast a serious doubt on whether one could justify the direct perception thesis in terms of the dynamic systems theory. It is, however, valid only under the assumption that the object of perception is an external, real, self-standing entity, for if it is to stand in a unilateral and casual relation vis-à-vis the agent, it must be external to her cognitive system and independent of the same. However, in light of radical embodied cognitive science, this assumption is not necessarily at all obvious. Chemero's antirepresentationalism is motivated by Gibson's theory of visual perception and affordances. Without going into details, Gibson rejects the view that the purpose of visual perception is the internal reconstruction of the three-dimensional environment from two-dimensional inputs. Perception is not equivalent to mental gymnastics, but rather a direct noninferential, noncomputational process wherein information is gathered, or picked up in active exploration of the environment: "When I assert that perception of the environment is direct, I mean that it is not mediated by retinal pictures, neural pictures, or mental pictures" (Gibson, 1979: 147). The function of perception, as understood by Gibson, is to guide behavior. Hence, if perception is direct, all the necessary information for adaptive behavior must be contained in the environment itself. Opportunities for behavior which are directly perceived by the agent are called affordances. Affordances are determined and constrained by the agent who perceives the same because different agents have different abilities and interact with their environment in different ways.

Chemero agrees with Gibson, that perception is direct, which means that it is noninferential, and as such does not involve mental representations. What the agent perceives are not external, independent objects, but affordances shaped by the agent himself. Even though Chemero himself rejects antirealism and adopts the perspective of entity realism, radical embodied cognitive science, which he favors, is strongly rooted in anti-realist ideas. In "The Embodied Mind" - a pioneering work on radical embodied cognitive science, Varela, Thompson and Rosh argue that all animals are coupled to the world that is determined by the nature of their sensorimotor systems, which in turn influence their behavior, and so on. Animals and the objects they perceive are nor separate, they form one coupled cognitive system composed of elements which strictly limit and determine each other (Varela/Thompson/Rosch 1991). Consequently, given the differences in the activities of animals of different species, the affordances they perceive could be widely divergent, or even contradictory. If affordances are everything that the agent perceives, the position becomes antirealistic, at least in its epistemological aspect. Even if we could assume that an agent-independent external world does exist, we would still not be justified in believing that our perceptions, thoughts, and theories are accurate reflections of the same. As I have already mentioned, Chemero rejects antirealism. He applies entity realism to affordances as theoretical entities using Hacking's entity realism (Chemero 2009). Nevertheless, he adjusts this position with the radical embodied view on perception as presented by Gibson and the authors of "The Embodied Mind". This view is based on the assumption that the agent and the affordances perceived by her constitute a dynamic system. Accordingly, Palermos'

critique loses its force. Chemero understands the nature of the relations between elements of a dynamic system correctly. An object of perception is not an independent, objective entity, but an affordance standing in a mutual dynamic relationship with the agent's cognitive system. Hence, Chemero does not commit the coupling-constitution fallacy, for the object of perception is not unidirectionally causally related to the agent, but rather, it is present within the extended cognitive system as such.

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ciate that the Paleolithic man could have had essentially a different attitude toward the perception of pictures than modern humans (Malafouris 2013; Malafouris and Renfrew 2010). The standard interpretation treats discovered Paleolithic artifacts as evidence for symbolic activity of early humans tacitly questioning the enactive and direct relation between agent and perceived artifact. As far as the movie case is concerned, the attempts to undermine the credibility of the story about audience reaction is based on similar assumptions. The story is contested, because random interpretation inscribed in our culture treats picture perception as an essentially symbolic and representational process. From this point of view it seems highly improbable that normal people can be seduced by a moving image to such an extent that they scream or run away from it.

3. Ecological vs. constructivist approach to perception

One can expect that the debate about picture perception, which took place in the middle of the twentieth century may shed light upon the interpretational problems around mentioned cases. Ecological psychology developed by James J. Gibson supports the claim that the ability to understand pictures as entities referring to other objects in reality is biologically grounded. According to Gibson's theory of direct perception light reflected by the perceived object is always available to the observer at a particular point and therefore has a unique structure termed as an *optic array* (Gibson 1971, 1986). The *optic array* directly represents the features of the perceived surface, but it changes according to the position of the observer relative to the perceived object. Although features of the *optic array* change, there are limitations in its variability. The invariant features of manifold optic arrays consist *visual information* delivered by the perceived object (Gibson 1986). John M. Kennedy subsequently applied Gibsonian theory and defined a realistic picture as such a configuration of lines and colors that delivers *visual information* about the layout of surfaces in the biological environment. The basic ability to identify objects exhibited on the realistic picture is claimed to be independent of learning and socialization (Kennedy 1974). The claim that pictures are meaningful for people, who are not trained in picture perception is known as the resemblance theory (Costall 1997).

According to Alan Costall serious objections against resemblance theory can be raised from the perspective of constructivist theories of perception (Costall 1997). Goodman for instance, makes two conceptual arguments against the resemblance theory. First, he argues that re-

semblance is an insufficient condition of recognition of pictorial representation, because there is no such thing as an 'essential copy'. There can be many types of resemblance depending on the skills of the painter as well as applied mapping conventions. According to constructivists, since pictorial meaning is built on the picture-reality resemblance and the relation of resemblance is in fact arbitrary, the ability to understand pictures is socially constructed. Goodman's second argument for the conventional construction of the resemblance is based on the distinction between resemblance and representation. He argues that resemblance is a symmetrical relation while representation is not. It means that "a portrait and its subject resemble one another, yet only the portrait, not the subject, serves as the representation" (Costall 1997: 59). Constructivists conclude that a picture consists of arbitrary and often ambiguous marks linked to the real objects due to cultural conventions and resemblance is a special case of these conventions. Can those two approaches contribute to the issue of Paleolithic picture perception? (Goodman 1968)

4. Material engagement theory and the dual nature of picture perception

In order to answer this question, the introduction of Material Engagement Theory (MET) is necessary. Although the constructivist and the ecological approaches to picture perception are usually treated as contradictory with one another I will use MET to show that on a more fundamental level both stances share the same inherent assumptions hindering the interpretation of cave paintings perception. Thus, we need a broader perspective on the problem of picture perception, one which is delivered by MET.

MET is a framework developed in cognitive archeology devoted to reinterpreting the standard approach to material culture (e.g. early tools, cave paintings). Mainstream camps in archeology take an archeological record as a hallmark of pre-existing cognitive skills. For instance, in the debate on human behavioral modernity, technological innovations of early humans (c. 40-50,000 years ago) are explained in terms of cognitive or cultural skills, prior to those innovations, such as abstract thinking, planning and the ability to create and use symbols (Nowell 2010). Simply speaking the material residues of early humans are taken as markers of their intelligence. Malafouris challenges this way of thinking and argues to interpret tools as a basic factor enabling the emergence of intelligent behavior. He aims at "turning around the traditional view of archeological evidence as the secondary visible product of some pre-existing invisible cognitive skill" (Malafouris 2013: 229). This change in interpretation is grounded in theoretical and methodological considerations regarding the proper unit of analysis of human behavior developed in distributed cognition (Hutchins 1995). Malafouris applies distributed cognition to justify the claim that studies based solely on internal states are insufficient to account for full blooded human cognition. Therefore, instead of assuming that the material artifacts are simply epiphenomena of intellectual work of their creators, Malafouris poses a question on how higher-level conceptual skills are co-constituted by manual exploitation of those external artifacts.

Debate on the creation and the perception of marks and pictures by Paleolithic humans is a special case of the discussion about the emergence of cognitively and behaviorally modern humans. According to Malafouris (2013, 183–84) most archeologists takes for granted that marks, such as those discovered in Blombos Cave (South Africa), make up of a sufficient proof for established representational be-

haviors among people living around 50 – 75,000 years ago. MET convincingly criticizes this approach to perception and the use of early marks by analyzing the criteria used to decide whether a discovered piece of a rock is made intentionally and possesses a symbolic character. In order to decide whether a piece of a rock was prepared intentionally archeologists reconstruct the process of their creation using microscopes and X-ray analysis. This reveals for example that the surface of the engravings discovered in the Blombos Cave were smoothed out before the actual act of engraving. Moreover, the depth of incisions and degree of their intersections suggests that they were created deliberately. Malafouris claims that, although intentional character of an artifact can be taken as necessary condition for its representational function, it is not a sufficient condition. Moreover, in order to justify the claim that Blombos Cave ochre engravings had referential meaning for its user, we need more than just demonstrating long lasting continuity of technique and style of its creation. Finally, proving that the engravings did not fulfill any pragmatic function cannot stand as an evidence of its symbolic or representational character. Therefore, archeology needs to reorient its research questions: "The interesting question to ask first might not be 'What the Blombos cave incisions mean as carriers of some symbolic message from the past?' but instead 'What did the activity of mark making do for the ancient mind?'." (Malafouris 2013: 190)

An analogous problem of interpretation is inscribed in the debate on the perception of more elaborate forms of early human activity. For instance, looking at the paintings of rhinoceroses from the Chauvet Cave (France, c. 30 000 years ago) we immediately interpret it as a representation of real rhinos. The iconic resemblance between the picture and the real animal forces us to automatically believe that the picture is a representation of external reality. Phenomenological analysis reveals however that there is a duality inherent in the episodes of picture perception. It is possible in the process of picture perception to conceptually differentiate between (a) the identification of the content (i.e. the recognition of rhinoceroses present on a wall in the Chauvet Cave) and (b) the recognition of the fact that the image refers to a depicted object (i.e. an actual live rhino). Nevertheless, during real experience of picture perception both aspects of perception are immediately united and this unification leads to treat them as a one act.

What does it mean for the attempt to reconstruct Paleolithic picture perception? Malafouris puts it this way: "the moment we look at the drawing of the rhinoceroses from Chauvet we have already identified it as an image. It is already a *picture of* something – that is, a representation" (Malafouris 2013: 198). Socialization in the environment saturated by pictures and representations makes us blind for this dual nature of pictures, namely the division between identification of the content of a picture and the identification of the picture as a representation. When picture perception is considered we may easily ask about its meaning, because we assume that their nature is to represent, and at the same time ignore their non-representational functions. Malafouris claims that we need to abandon this representational bias in thinking about Paleolithic picture perception and rather than ask "What does the pictures represent?" we should ask "What do pictures do"? His argument against the representational character of Paleolithic picture perception is based upon the claim that it is highly improbable for people living 30 000 years ago to have already developed symbolic consciousness, which could enable them to treat pictures as if representing something beyond the thing depicted.

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Malafouris stresses that "it is one thing to ask what it means to see a rhino on the wall of Chauvet; it is another thing to ask what it means to see a rhino as a *representation* of a rhino". Although MET draws a distinction between, on the one hand mere perception of picture content and on the other hand - the conscious perception of picture as a picture proper, the problem remains however, how to describe the picture perception independently of symbolic consciousness? The developmental processes of differentiation between symbol and reality which takes place among children between 18-24 months of age described by Piaget can shed some light on the nonrepresentational experience of pictures (Piaget and Inhelder 1969). The studies of interaction with pictures among children younger than 18 months old revealed that "they respond to realistic pictures as if they were three dimensional objects" (DeLoache, et al. 2003: 117). This is manifested in children's grasping and touching gestures directed towards perceived pictures. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that the perception of cave paintings could be essentially similar to that of picture perception displayed by the children under 18 month.

5. Representational bias in ecological and constructivist accounts

Malafouris argues that the modern familiarity with pictures as representational media constraints the ability to reconstruct how pictures were perceived in the Paleolithic because archeologists made a representational fallacy, i.e. they unconsciously attribute modern awareness of the distinction between sing and reality to early man. It seems that the problem of representational bias haunts the debate between the ecological and the constructivist's approaches. Neither the constructivist approach nor the ecological psychology clearly distinguishes between the identification of the pictorial content of an image and the recognition of a picture as an representation of a depicted object. The lack of this distinction introduces the genuine ambiguity between experience of the content and the awareness of a picture's representational relation to outside world. This ambiguity in turn leads to the representational bias in the interpretation of picture perception.

It may seem that the constructivist approach is in concord with critical analysis developed by Malafouris since it assumes that the ability to recognize the resemblance requires learning. Goodman argues that any picture can in principle represent any other thing, that is why resemblance is not biologically grounded. While the main question in the constructivist camp is how does resemblance vary depending on cultural context, it does not undermine the assumption that pictures essentially possess a representational character. According to MET in case of Paleolithic pictures this latter assumption can be called into question. As argued in the previous section such an ap-

proach may lead to misinterpretation of early picture perception due to the attribution of modern habits to the Paleolithic mindset, at the dawn of symbolic culture. An analogous representational bias can be found in the ecological approach to picture perception. The resemblance theory regards the identification of things, which are not present, as an innate capability based on objective perceptual similarities between the image and its reference.

6. Summary

The debate between constructivists and ecological psychologists displays the representational bias identified by MET in the social sciences. Both the ecological and the constructivist approaches silently assume that referential relation between picture and reality is inherently inscribed in picture perception. Since proper understanding of Paleolithic picture perception requires clear distinction between the dual aspects of picture perception, neither ecological nor constructivist approach is capable of explaining early human experience with pictures.

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A Serious Man and Attitude: The Coen Brothers as Wittgensteinian Filmmakers

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Abstract

The Coen Brothers have directed a number of films with Wittgensteinian themes, but particularly 'A Serious Man' tackles philosophical worries associated with philosophy of religion and philosophy of mathematics. These philosophical worries can be traced back into Ethan Coen's Bachelor's thesis on the Late Wittgenstein's philosophy, which makes some interesting points on its own. By comparing these academic arguments to the film's version of dealing with the same problems it can be shown how the film's more mature treatment of the same themes takes a Wittgensteinian form.

In Ingmar Bergman's films, God famously remains silent. In *A Serious Man* (USA 2009), directed by the Coen Brothers, on the other hand, the question of whether God remains silent or constantly speaks in riddles, signs and wonders, remains open to the viewers to decide throughout. The film offers the story of Larry Gopnik who is both a professor of mathematics and a practising Jew based in the Minneapolis area in 1967. We meet Larry while he awaits a notification on whether he gets tenure, and another, by his doctor, on whether he might have some intestinal illness that might be cancer. During this time, his wife wants a divorce in order to get married to another man, for which Larry is supposed to pay. This might be taken to be a modern retelling of the Book of Job, addressing the question: "Why does God allow bad things to happen to good people?"

However, it is not clear that Larry is indeed such a 'good person'. He regularly repeats the sentence 'I have done nothing' as if to plead his own innocence, but it is not clear in how far his very passivity is a vice on its own. The film presents such ethical questions without giving a clear answer.

In the following paper I am interested in the question of how the film takes up a number of philosophical themes that Ethan Coen already discussed in his Undergraduate Thesis at Princeton University in 1979. I will claim that the film develops some of these themes further, and will argue that the film's narrative structure and filmic style can be considered Wittgensteinian. I will make this argument in three steps: First, I will summarise the argument made by Ethan Coen in 1979. Secondly, I will discuss Wittgenstein's notion of 'attitude' as presented by Coen and will highlight how Coen's argument here reaches some problems that his film deals with. And thirdly, I will discuss how these lose ends of this argument reappear in the film, made thirty years later.

1. Ethan Coen on Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion in 1979

Ethan Coen's Undergraduate Thesis on *Two Views on Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy* is interested in logical paradoxes in the fields of philosophy of religion and philosophy of mathematics. The thesis critiques texts by Wittgensteinian philosophers such as John Wisdom and Michael Dummett, in order to argue that these 'epigones' fall short of Wittgenstein's more radical and at the same time more subtle approach.[1] It is impossible to fully retrace the argument made in the thesis here, but Coen particularly takes issue with those parts of Wisdom's and Dummett's arguments in which they all-too-quickly assume to have resolved their problems. I will only discuss Coen's views on Wisdom and philosophy of religion, and especially Coen's attacks on any tendency towards relativism. Coen's criticism first deals with attempts of using Wittgenstein's philosophy to argue that 'anything goes', and he addresses some forms of quietism and relativism that he, Coen, particularly disagrees with:

> Wittgenstein's statement: "Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a "proto-phenomenon". That is, where we ought to have said, this language-game is played" (PI §654) can easily become a slogan for the most uninformative sort of philosophical okayism.' (Coen 1979: 5)

Coen criticises Wisdom of failing to see the danger of falling into such 'okayism'. He acknowledges that Wisdom at least attacks the 'notion of disjoint realms' between science and religion, by which Coen means the notion that science and religion cannot at all talk to each other, nor understand each other. This is, according to Coen, a 'poisonous picture' that is 'popular [...] among many of Wittgenstein's epigones'. (Coen 1979: 5) The problem seems to be that the philosopher is here too quick and eager to give religion exception from having to justify their views as rigorously as philosophy or science. Wisdom attempts to solve this by arguing that scientific and religious talk are different language games but with similar focus. Coen agrees with Wisdom that it makes sense to look at religious talk in contrast to empirical statements such as scientific talk. However, Coen objects to Wisdom eventually emphasising the parallels between religion and science as similar 'attempts to come at the truth' (Coen 1979: 21). Wisdom argues that these 'attempts' belong to a family, and that one might use one member of the family to throw 'light on the character of the other members of that vast family' (Coen 1979: 21). To this, Coen responds:

> My fundamental complaint with Wisdom is that he is ever-ready to regard a parallel in expression as a sign of a parallel in fact. He is more eager to fudge distinctions for the sake of a pleasing assimilation than he is to do justice to the messy facts. (Coen 1979: 22)

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[1] The texts discussed by Coen are: John Wisdom *Paradox and Discovery from 1970,* John Wisdom *Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis from 1969, and* Michael Dummetts *Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics from 1968.*

For Coen, to take religious talk to offer something parallel to science is a mistake in the first place: 'If religion looks like science (or can to some extent be made to), it looks like bad science.' (Coen 1979: 16) According to Coen, Wittgenstein's concept of family-resemblance is also misused by Wisdom, insofar as supposedly Wittgenstein *generally* uses family resemblance to make fine distinctions, rather than emphasising similarities, which appears to be an overly quick dismissal (Coen 1979: 21).[2] More fundamentally, the problem is that Coen would like to say that the religious person would not accept that their views are related at all to philosophical pictures that might be arranged in perspicuous presentation at all, fearing that their views would become subject to relativism in the process, as I will discuss in the next section. I will challenge this assumption, using the notion of *attitude* that Coen introduces but does not develop more fully, and I will then show how *A Serious Man* also goes beyond it.

2. Wittgenstein's notion of 'attitude' and Coen's appropriation of it

As outlined, Coen argues that in many cases, disagreements between believers and non-believers do not ultimately result from factual disagreements at all, and therefore misunderstandings between them are not disagreements on facts and reasons – and so they are not a matter of exchanging one picture of the facts with another – but ultimately, they originate from disagreements on *attitudes*:

> But there is a great difference between deciding that certain familiar facts have this sort of face, and having an attitude toward the facts that is an attitude toward this sort of face. The decision is posterior to reasons; it is made on account of them. The attitude is prior to reasons (which is not to say that it is prior to causes); the reasons are cooked up on account of it. (And there is the difference between what we call "reasons" and what we call "rationalization".) (Coen 1979: 13)

In order to illustrate this, Coen engages with an example quoted by Norman Malcolm:

> Wittgenstein imagined a tribe of people who had the idea that their slaves had no feelings, no souls--that they were automatons--despite the fact that the slaves had human bodies, behaved like their masters, and even spoke the same language. Wittgenstein undertook to try to give sense to that idea. [...] So what could it mean to say that they had the idea that the slaves were automatons? Well, they would *look* at the slaves in a peculiar way. [...] They would discard them when they were worn and useless like machines. If a slave received a mortal injury and twisted and screamed in agony, no master would avert his gaze in horror or prevent his children from observing the scene, any more than he would if the ceiling fell on a printing press. Here is a difference in 'attitude' that is not a matter of believing or expecting different facts. So in the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein says, "My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the *opinion* that he has a soul" (Coen 1979: 10)

Coen is interested in this example because it outlines a case of disagreement that cannot be settled with reference to reasons, and therefore there can be no argument: 'why

do I say that it is "logically impossible" for me to persuade him? Well, the premise is that the tribe member will agree with everything that I say about the slave except that he has a soul.' (Coen 1979: 10) Therefore, the problem lies in the angle from which Wisdom addresses the problem of religious and scientific dialogue. It goes wrong by assuming that the believer is a kind of 'primitive philosopher advancing primitive philosophical or quasi-scientific theories about the nature of the world. But that gives a distorted picture of religious life. Rather, Wittgenstein wants to say, the religious believer has a picture which is for him always in the foreground, according with which his attitude towards the world is arranged.' (Coen 1979: 14f) This is the point at which Coen criticises Wittgenstein for failing to see that 'his relativism would appall [sic!] the believer'. (Coen 1979: 19) For Coen, the fundamental and inevitable clash between the Wittgensteinian philosopher and the believer has to come about when the believer insists on the authority of their picture and their attitude as the one and only correct picture and attitude. (Coen 1979: 19) Here, I believe, the mistake lies in Coen remaining overly attached to the notion that it matters in philosophy to have the 'correct' picture, namely a sceptical one. Coen's discussion of attitude offers a way beyond this, but Coen does not follow up on it.

The very point of assembling different examples, different pictures as different objects of comparison – the point of putting them next to each other and organise them in different ways – is neither to claim that they are all equally 'correct' nor that correctness does not matter (which would be relativism). Instead, I would argue that what this method deals with are confusions that arise from a compulsive *attitude* towards the picture I am attached to. Therefore, as a first step, not the picture needs changing, but the attitude. Once the picture no longer holds me captive, then there will not even be a need to attack the picture any more (no iconoclasm or relativism), it merely gets rotated to its proper place as an object of comparison, like a lens, that makes a particular way of looking explicit. Of course, Coen is right that in such a way certain pictures might fall away because they turn out to be useless, but clinging to a particular picture would not be an act of faith at all, according to Wittgenstein: 'Religious faith & superstition are quite different. The one springs from *fear* & is a sort of false science. The other is a trusting.' (CV p. 82; MS 137: 48b, 4.6.1948)

Here, Wittgenstein makes the distinction between superstition and faith precisely along the lines of different attitudes, which could also be described as different motivations for taking a particular position. In changing one's attitude, one does not necessarily change one's position. If faith, for Wittgenstein, is about an attitude of trusting, and not about facts at all, then the attitude towards the pictures of religious language must also be one of trust. Insofar as an attitude of trust is the starting point, there seems to be a general openness to giving up any *unsustainable* claims to be 'right'. In this way, Wittgenstein's distinction between the attitudes of faith and superstition addresses Ethan Coen's objection that a believer would be afraid of Wittgenstein's perspicuous presentation because it might lead the believer to give up the generalising claims of authority of their picture. Indeed, such a letting go of claims of authority seems possible as an effect of using Wittgenstein's method, but the attitude of trusting that characterises faith seems perfectly open to philosophical questioning.

Ethan Coen moved from academic philosophy considering the authority of such pictures to the making of moving pictures. Thirty years after his Bachelor thesis, he returned, together with brother Joel, to the same themes of

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[2] I would point Coen in the direction of Oskari Kuusela's discussion of Wittgenstein's use of examples as 'simple objects of comparison' that allow to see *both* similarities *and* dissimilarities between a philosophical model and actual cases, but I cannot make this argument here in detail, (cf. Kuusela 2008: 124-126).

uncertainty, metaphysics in religion and mathematics, and the relevance of attitude in the film *A Serious Man*.

3. The prologue of *A Serious Man*

In order to conclude my argument, I will shortly look at the opening scene of *A Serious Man*. This scene offers a highly condensed presentation of some of the key issues of the film and can be used to explain the style of storytelling that is employed throughout the film. The relation between this scene and the rest of the film remains ambiguous. It takes part on another continent (Eastern Europe, not the USA where the rest of the film is set), in another time (possibly the 19th century, not in 1967 when the rest of the film is set), and in a notably different, much darker aesthetic style, invoking filmic conventions for fairy tales and horror films. There are three characters in the scene: Friendly and trusting Velvel, his anxious and superstitious wife Dora, and the Reb Traitle Groshkover who might or might not be dead. As the scene unfolds, we learn that Velvel, who arrives home after travelling through the snowstorm with his horse, has received help by the Reb Traitle Groshkover. Velvel's wife Dora tells Velvel that she has heard that Reb Traitle has died three years ago. Therefore, she is convinced that Velvel has met a *Dybbuk*, an undead spirit from Jewish folklore.

Fig. 1: Dora stabs something in a bucket, as Velvel arrives home.

The scene includes a discussion of what signs or evidence there are for the argument that Reb Traitle Groshkover is undead or alive. But it's impossible to decide which narrative holds up based solely on the scene, and this clearly characterises the uncertainty that will shake the characters in the rest of the film as well.

Fig. 2: Reb Traitle Groshkover arrives with an ambiguous look on his face: Stern or smiling?

Later on, Dora will stab Traitle and claim that he is 'unharmed', which supposedly proves that he is a Dybbuk. Traitle only then starts bleeding and asks Velvel to judge for himself if he, Traitle, is a Dybbuk, or whether it is not her, Dora, who is possessed by evil spirits. Then he leaves, exclaiming: 'One knows when one is not wanted'.

Fig. 3: Reb Traitle Groshkover, having been stabbed, leaves into the night.

To sum up: The opening scene can be seen in at least two ways, which are built into the scene and identified with the two main characters. Seen with Velvel's wife, the scene becomes about a pious Jewish family haunted by an evil and ultimately striking back at it. Seen with Velvel, who calls himself a 'rational man', his wife has stabbed and potentially murdered an innocent man out of unfounded prejudice. The scene itself does not deliver conclusive evidence one way or the other, but allows the viewers to investigate the way in which perception and attitude depend on another. Perhaps more importantly, the scene also opens the question of what the consequences of either attitude are in dealing with uncertain situations, which action one takes, and how decisions are made.

4. Conclusion

As we have seen, *A Serious Man* presents a story about faith and superstition by presenting a number of scenes that show characters dealing with everyday versions of the sort of worries that Ethan Coen already dealt with in his Bachelor Thesis. The film goes further than the Thesis in avoiding to explicitly take sides. While the Thesis tries to make the case against religious belief both as an attitude and as a number of nonsensical pictures of how things are, the film simply presents scenes of human interactions as objects of comparison. The scenes can be compared to each other and to actual worries about doing the right thing in uncertain situations and seeking divine guidance. The film, like the Thesis, and arguably like Wittgenstein, questions available pictures of how facts can be organised, but this does not amount to relativism, quietism, or 'okayism'. The film does this without making generalising claims, and instead presents the case to the viewers to work through for themselves. In this way the film challenges preconceptions, putting pressure on the inconsistencies of dogmatic – and, I would add, *fearful* – attitudes.

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Young Wittgenstein's Account of the Will, Action and Expectation

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Abstract

This paper focuses on young and "middle" Ludwig Wittgenstein's reflections on nature of will, action and expectation. It is argued that if empiricist lines of thought in Wittgenstein's work are followed he appears to consider imperative sentences as near-identical or even reducible to sentences expressing expectations. Firstly, Wittgenstein's account of imperative sentences (commands) will be established; thereupon an investigation into the preliminary structure of obeying command will be undertaken as the basis of further discussion. In following paragraphs, we will analyze Wittgenstein's view on the relation of act to will, briefly discussing the concept of will itself. To conclude the paper is a discussion of the nature of expectation and its fulfillment. Wittgenstein's philosophical development is briefly alluded to only where relevant to the discussion.

1. Introduction

Wittgenstein's transition from *Tractatus* to *Philosophical Investigations* and later philosophy is usually characterized by his realization of the diversity of language, contrasting with his efforts in *Tractatus* to make all varieties of language conform to a single form. In *Tractatus* Wittgenstein developed a picture theory of propositions that almost exclusively dealt with indicative propositions, however he almost entirely neglected other types of sentences.

Philosophical Remarks, written between February 1929 and April 1930, has been viewed as the capturing of a part of a slow process of transition from the picture theory of *Tractatus* to his later philosophy, facilitated by analysis of other types of sentences such as commands and prescriptions. Although Wittgenstein wrote here: "The idea that you 'imagine' the meaning of a word when you hear or read it, is a naïve conception of the meaning of a word" (PR 58), he still believed that at least some aspects of picture theory are correct beyond doubt. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein didn't regard picture theory as an outright confusion: "Yet the naive theory of forming-an-image can't be utterly wrong" (PR 58). When he discussed details of semantics of sentences, imperative and other non-indicative types of sentences seemed particularly puzzling to him at this point.

Wittgenstein attempted to find a new way to approach imperative propositions through indicative ones – he recognized a connection between descriptions and commands because "Every instruction can be construed as a description, every description as an instruction" (PR 59). Descriptions can be thought of as "instructions for making models" (PR 57). Conversely, every instruction somehow contains a description of the desired state of the world. Unless the instruction is understood, the action cannot be performed.

Kenny asserts that it's quite intuitive to think of commands as being only slightly different from indicative statements (Kenny 1973: 120-1); just as Wittgenstein said: "A proposition *shows* how things stand *if* it is true" (TLP 4.022) one may say: "A command *shows* how things stand *if* it is obeyed". Therefore, the considerations presented in *Philosophical Remarks* are not incompatible with picture theory of the proposition, but can even be thought of as aligning with it. Nevertheless, Kenny observes that a command also communicates something else: "it *says that* they should so stand". So, while indicative proposition and command both contain a description of the state of affairs, command also "contains" something else – an imperative or prescriptive element. Frege, who introduced assertion-sign to his concept script to mark indicative element, also acknowledged this previously (Frege 1879).

While picture theory of propositions explains the descriptive part of command, the nature of imperative element is outside its scope. Furthermore, in *Philosophical Remarks* Wittgenstein discusses the nature of command in detail and says: "Understanding a command before you obey it has an *affinity* with willing an action before you perform it." (PR 58, added emphasis). Use of the word "affinity" here is not clear and provokes further debate. What is the relation between "understanding a command" and "willing an action"?

Taking an analytical course from the original meaning of these concepts, it appears that *obeying a command* implies *performing an action* (unless one is prevented from doing so by external circumstances). Moreover, *performing an action*, even because of a command, presupposes *willing it*. And *willing an action* in turn presupposes *understanding of command*. The concept of understanding a command can be split into two distinct aspects: a) understanding a description of state of affairs "depicted" by content of command, and b) understanding a sentence as a command, i.e. understanding an imperative element of a command.

It subsequently appears possible to reconstruct the general structure of "obeying a command" to the following sequence of "events":

1) person A *pronounces* a command to perform the action X to person B;
2) person B *understands* the command to perform the action X;
  a. person B *understands* a description of state of affairs "depicted" by content of command;
  b. person B *understands* a sentence as a *command*, understands imperative element of a command;
3) person B *wills* the action X;
4) person B *performs* the action X;
5) person A *recognizes* that the action X was performed.

Such description resembles seminal passages from the beginning of *Philosophical Investigations* (PI §2). Those paragraphs will not be analyzed here as the research focus is on earlier Wittgenstein works, yet it is significant that Wittgenstein here avoids (at least until §20) describing the interaction between a builder A and an assistant B as giving commands and obeying them. It is clear that at this point of his philosophical development Wittgenstein does

not endorse a sequential view of command and obey as described above.

2. The action and the will

Wittgenstein discusses relation of *will* to *action* previously in *Notebooks*, where he (under the influence of Schopenhauer) states: "The fact that I will an action consists in my performing the action, not in my doing something else which causes the action", so he concludes: "willing is acting" (NB 88). Wittgenstein believes that the will is not some separate mental phenomenon that can be differentiated from an action. Willing something is not an internal event preceding another external event such as an action. There is no causal relationship between the will and the action: "The act of the will is not the cause of the action but is the action itself." (NB 87). Returning to the reconstruction of the structure of obeying a command, it is evident that events 3 and 4 are conflated.

Simultaneously, Wittgenstein feels the need to emphasize that will (identified will action) is something different from experience: "The act of will is not an experience" (NB 89). Strikingly, it is exactly the opposite of the views he holds later in *Philosophical Investigations*: "Willing too is merely an experience" (PI §611). Hacker believes that these positions form the horns of a dilemma through two conflicting ideas: one Schopenhauerian, the other empiricist (Hacker 2000: 209). According to this view the empiricist tradition is linked with the ideas of R. Descartes, T. Hobbes, J. Locke and D. Hume, and culminates in the works of W. James, who claimed that our "consciousness is in its very nature impulsive" and that "our sensations and thoughts are but cross-sections (…) of currents whose essential consequence is motion" (James 1890: 526). James states that there is no difference between all these mental phenomena – sensation, thought and will are "currents" of our mind, which naturally produce external motion.

If we accept this interpretation, then Wittgenstein's philosophical development can be characterized as traversing from the Schopenhauerian concept of will to an empiricist one. Many examples from *Philosophical Investigations* seem to illustrate (PI §617) that Wittgenstein believed at the time of writing that willing is merely something that happens to us (Hacker 2000: 210).

While Wittgenstein's position within *Philosophical Investigations* can be contrasted with the position demonstrated at some places in the *Notebooks*, it must be noted that Wittgenstein's discussion of will in *Notebooks* (and *Tractatus*) is not clear. Wittgenstein at one point also adopts an even more Schopenhauerian stature: "The will is an attitude of the subject to the world. The subject is the willing subject" (NB 87). However, in other places his approach to will resembles a stoic one: "I cannot bend the happenings of the world to my will: I am completely powerless. I can only make myself independent of the world—and so in a certain sense master it—by renouncing any influence on happenings" (NB 73).

3. Imperative element of a command

What then constitutes event 2b – the imperative element of a command? Wittgenstein says: "Since, for it to be possible for an expression to guide my hand, it *must* have the same multiplicity as the action desired" (PR 57). Does this mean that apart from "multiplicity of a description" of a state of affairs, there is also (higher) "multiplicity of instruction" of how to achieve this state of affairs? Initially, it might seem like viable alternative: someone may understand a

description of the state of affairs that comprises the content of the command perfectly well, however they may not know (understand) how to achieve it.

The issue with this interpretation is that even if the subject does not know how to achieve the state of affairs described by a sentence, they may be perfectly aware of this sentence functioning as a command and so having imperative force. The imperative element of a sentence is the "things should so stand!" component attached to a description of affairs.

It also seems that at the time of writing *Philosophical Remarks* Wittgenstein was somehow puzzled by the relation of event 2 to event 3 due to the declared affinity between "understanding a command" and "willing an action". He also acknowledges: "the problem of *understanding* language is connected with the problem of the *Will*" (PR 58, added emphasis).

4. Turn to expectation

In search for a solution to this problem, Wittgenstein shifted his interest to the concept of expectation. It is undeniable that expectation is connected to imperative sentences on many levels. Referring back to the aforementioned scheme of issuing a command: a person A *pronounces* a command X (event 1) and subsequently *expects* that some future event fulfilling the command X – an action of person B, will occur (event 4). If person B *understands* the command X of person A (event 2) then he comprehends that person A *expects* him to perform an action fulfilling command X (event 4).

Kenny notes that B. Russell concurrently investigated the problem of expectation in his book *Analysis of Mind*, and some of Wittgenstein's notes in *Philosophical Remarks* confront Russell's position (Kenny 1973: 123). Russell wrote: "Suppose I am believing, by means of images, not words, that it will rain. We have here two interrelated elements, namely, the content and the expectation. (…) Exactly the same content may enter into memory "It was raining" or the assent "Rain occurs". The difference lies in the nature if the belief feeling" (Russell 1921: 250). Wittgenstein's position was comparable with Russell's concept of expectation – expectation consists of a content and "expectative element" that he called at same places "looking for": "Expecting is connected with looking for: looking for something presupposes that I know what I am looking for, without what I am looking for having to exist" (PR 67, 70). Content of "expectation of *p*" must comprise a description of *p*: "Could we imagine any language at all in which expecting p was described without using 'p'?" (PR 69)

Also notable is that expectation is in many places described by Wittgenstein as an activity – looking for, searching or preparing: "To *look for* something is, surely, an expression of expectation. To paraphrase: How you *search* in one way or another expresses expectations (…) If I expect to see red, then I *prepare* myself for red" (PR 70, author's emphasis). Similarly, Russell in *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits* (1948) explicitly connects animal expectation with a "savage" movement: ''A cat will watch for a long time at a mousehole, with her tail swishing in savage *expectation*; in such a case, one should say (so I hold) that the smell of mouse stimulates the "idea" of the rest of what makes up an actual mouse'' (Russell 2009: 89, added emphasis).

5. Fulfillment of expectation

How then does Wittgenstein understand the fulfillment of an expectation? If a person A *pronounces* a command X (event 1) how does she later establish that the command was fulfilled (event 5)?

According to Wittgenstein, there is at first the expectation of X – i.e. an activity similar to "looking for X", then there is an event X, that fulfills the expectation. But Wittgenstein emphasizes that there is no third element to this picture: "The fulfilment of an expectation doesn't consist in a third thing happening which you could also describe" (PR 65). Wittgenstein contrasts this exposition with Russell's conception that in addition to these two elements there is also third: the *recognition* (PR 63). Action fulfilling the expectation cannot be recognized because it cannot be confronted with it. It does not stand side by side with expectation but it replaces it: "I cannot confront the previous expectation with what happens. The event that replaces the expectation, is a reply to it." (PR 67). Subsequently it can be viewed once more that events 4 and 5 from our scheme are conflated.

It is not surprising that for Wittgenstein "it is essential to a command that we can check whether it has been carried out" (PR 312). Command draws similarities with expectation in this respect. This is also the reason behind Wittgenstein's consideration of command as "Throw it [dice] infinitely often" nonsensical (PR 312).

By following empiricist-stoic lines of thought in Wittgenstein, it is clear that he appears to consider imperative sentences as very similar to sentences expressing expectations. It has previously been observed that at times Wittgenstein approves the Schopenhauerian concept of subject as essentially "willing subject" whose essential attitude to the world is the will (NB 87). Nevertheless, he also claims with similar force that "The world is independent of my will" (NB 73, TLP 6.373). This in turn reduces human will to just expectation. Such a description – the human being as an essentially willing subject but at the same time completely powerless, immersed in a world completely independent of one's will, depicts a deeply tragic human situation.

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On Doubting and Imagining

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Abstract

The goal of this paper is to investigate the role of imagining as a foundation for doubting in Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*. In this paper I argue that imagining alternatives to existing situation within a language game is what underlies doubting. In my paper I distinguish between imagining within a game and imagining a new game. The former one is referring to doubting in Wittgensteinian sense since it provides alternatives within the existing game struggling to be the true one. In contrast imagining a new game cannot be identified with doubting since it requires reimagining the hinge foundation of the game or the life form.

To know, Wittgenstein says, means "to perceive an outer event through visual rays which project it as it is into the eye and the consciousness" (OC: 90). By contrast, certainty and doubt "show how our imagination presents knowledge, but not what lies in the bottom of this presentation" (OC: 90). Roughly speaking, imagination organizes our knowledge. In this paper I would like to argue that imagination underlies our ability of having doubt and being certain, since it provides us with an ability to think of alternatives within the existing language game as well as to make up an alternative game with new doubts and certainties.

According to Wittgenstein if we imagine facts otherwise as they are, certain language-games lose some of their importance while other become important (OC: 63). That also means that certain doubts lose their intelligibility while other become intelligible. Indeed, if we imagine a world where normal dogs fly instead of walking, when we see a dog walking, we doubt its ability to fly: for example it might have broken his wing? In a normal world doubting dog's ability to fly just doesn't make sense.

We are free to use our ability to imagine situation different from the existing, even under the condition of "lacking of doubts" (OC: 4). There are no doubts I have a brain, but I can imagine the situation of being a zombie with an empty skull. It seems that we can imagine a lot of possible alternative scenarios, although there is no reason to doubt the situation as it is. But does imagining alternatives to undoubtable statements mean speaking of the same form of life and the same language game?

As I am sitting in my room writing this paper there is no doubt that gravitation works here since all things in my room lie still in their place instead of floating around, which I can fully imagine in case I'm an astronaut on a space station. Does imagining this situation equal to having a doubt about gravitation in my room? No, because imagining that means making up a new form of life or a new language game absolutely different from the current one. Imagination just presupposes identifying grounds for doubting in doubtable situations, but it is not an act of doubt itself in situations which are fundamental, undoubtable and unimaginable in the frame of the current language game.

On the other hand, does doubting presuppose imagining of alternative facts? I suppose yes. If a book started floating in the middle of a room, I would probably doubt the gravity intension and that is imagining an alternative explanation which fits best to the existing situation. Imagination seems to be necessary to identify grounds for a doubt and its possible consequences.

This paper will focus on imagination as a foundation for all essential aspects of doubting in Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*.

Grounds for doubts

A feature which seems to be essential for doubt according to Wittgenstein is having reasons for doubting, as it follows from the following quote: „But what about such a proposition as "I know I have a brain"? Can I doubt it? Grounds for doubt are lacking!" (OC: 4) When grounds are missing, it seems not rational, nor intelligible to doubt something. By contrary to have no doubt according to Wittgenstein implies the situation when "the expression of doubt would be unintelligible" (OC: 10). What does it mean: grounds for doubts are lacking? According to Wittgenstein it happens, when "everything speaks in favor and nothing against it" (OC: 4). Therefore grounds for doubts are something which speaks against your belief. Someone who doubts whether the Earth had existed for 100 years might have a scientific doubt. Having a scientific doubt means imagining the falsifying situation and that probably suggests discovery of a proof which undermines the existing scientific evaluation of the age of the Earth. On the other hand, there could be a philosophical doubt, which is completely different (OC: 259).

In his article "Defending common sense" Malcolm distinguishes two kinds of doubts: an ordinary one and a philosophical one. He demonstrates that a philosophical doubt cannot be a particular example of a doubt in an ordinary sense. According to him, philosophical doubting occurs only in case when there are no grounds or reasons for doubt and there isn't a question whether so and so is true (Malcolm 1949: 204). Malcolm puts as an example of doubting situation when we doubt whether something is tree and suggests that philosophical doubting takes place if only we see a tree clearly enough and there is no doubt if it is a tree in an ordinary sense. An absence of reasons for doubting in case of a philosophical doubt means there is no "investigation" which would provide a proof to stop doubting. There is no mode of inquiry, which is appropriate to conduct, in order to become certain on regard of a philosophical issue. In addition, since there are no grounds for doubts, there are neither grounds for an alternative situation or fact within the language game.

"I doubt there is a high wall" implies a certain procedure which would provide the proof of its existence following the statement. It can be uttered by a burglar who is trying to get to someone's garden unseen. Finally after discovering the wall, he would say: "Too bad. There could have been just a fence like in the others neighbor gardens." Expecting

a fence on the place of a wall is imagining an alternative within the game. That is not a situation when a philosopher has a chance to doubt. Only in case of seeing a high wall clearly in front of you with a possibility to touch it or to lean back on it, it is a good chance to conduct philosophical doubting. Doubting existence of a wall, its height or length in this case implies doubting our ability to perceive generally. The only imaginable alternative here is non-existence of the world or serious malfunctions of our perception which is quite unimaginable.

According to Pritchard, Wittgenstein by his late notes is trying to show us that the "puzzle that is arising out of entirely natural epistemic moves, in fact trades on philosophical picture that is very different from our normal epistemic practices" (Pritchard 2016: 67). In my opinion imagining alternatives within a language game is one of these normal epistemic practices. Like Rollins you can object by saying that there is nothing like normal use or normal epistemic practice, otherwise one could say that "inductive reasons are not reason or that cats aren't animals" (Rollins 1951: 229). It probably depends on your philosophical view on categories, but according to this logic one would say that a stuffed cat is an animal too.

Localization

"When things are clear, there is no need to say them," this is a probable reaction of Moore's observer reacting on his utterance "I know this is a tree" while both of them are watching the tree closely (Malcolm 1949: 215). Malcolm puts an example of someone walking right up to the tree and beginning to pick apples from it. If you say to the picker: "It's obvious that this is a tree", your listener wouldn't probably understand what you are trying to say to him. It's certainly a different situation when you see an object from a great distance and you are not sure whether it's a tree or an electric stanchion. After a while you finally make out branches and utter: "It's obvious that this is a tree." While the former speaker seems to doubt the existence of a tree without any intelligible reasons and in a general manner, the latter has his reasons which are rooted in particular situation with regard on its particular conditions. Pritchard distinguishes two kinds of rational evaluation: localized that occurs in everyday epistemic context and globalized one, which is employed by skeptics. According to Wittgenstein all rational doubts are essentially "local" in a sense they take place relative to fundamental, so called "hinge" commitments which are immune to rational evaluation (OC: 341-343).

Pritchard calls this an "undercutting" treatment of the skeptic problem (Pritchard 2016: 67). By that he means that local evaluations preclude the possibility of global ones. For instance we can't think of whether to get the chair repaired or not if we doubt the chair's existence. In other words a local doubt can be only conducted if a global one is absent. An example of local evaluation in an everyday situation and a global one doubting world's existence or perception functioning seem to be just two polarized cases, but is "global" doubting possible case at all? It seems that imagination, similarly as doubt, is profoundly "local" since it's relative to the framework of a language game. Try to imagine a local situation where doubts could occur? It's quite simple. Now try to imagine a "global" situation when one doubts existence of external world? It seems that doubting here isn't relative to any situation and it makes no difference what situation is imagined. Imagination and doubting don't make sense in a "global" way. For instance, it can't be even imagined that there are no physical objects at all (OC: 35).

What makes language games so powerful? According to Wittgenstein certainty is a part of logic and game description that's why doubting makes sense only when certainty is a ground of a game. Doubt itself rests only on what is beyond doubt (OC: 519).

Indeed, couldn't we live without being certain of at least something? Imagine the situation you are an orphan which is introduced to his mother after many years and when you look at her, you say: "I doubt this is my mother". "How do you know?" there would be a possible reaction. Your doubting the identity of your mother can only take place if you know something about her that doesn't fit the woman you are introduced to. It's also plausible you rely on genetics when you see your possible mother's appearance which is absolutely different from yours. In this case you are certain of the inheritance principle. But in a situation when you know nothing of your mother and the mother-to-be seems very similar to you, is it intelligible to doubt or even not to doubt this statement? Doubting implies imagining possibilities, it must be grounded in certainty which cannot be reimagined without changing the whole game. For example you are certain of your hair's color, that's why you compare your hair to your mother's hair. For someone to be able to carry out an order there must be some empirical fact about which you are not in doubt (OC: 519).

Struggle

In OC 92 Wittgenstein notes that "one is sometimes convinced of the correctness of a view by its simplicity or symmetry". On my reading Wittgenstein suggests here a certain comfort being rooted in a conviction. As Wittgenstein metaphorically describes: "We believe, so to speak, that this great building exists, and then we see, now here, now there, one or another small corner of it" (OC: 276) and later: "I am comfortable that that is how things are" (OC: 278). "Comfortable certainty", as Wittgenstein calls it, refers to the framework, background, "which is buried beneath our language, deep in our lives" (Wolgast 1987: 159). By contrary there is a "struggling" certainty which is constantly under the fire of doubting, questioning, inquiring and reimagining.

In many cases "struggling beliefs" become hinges, for instance in case of a smoker denying risk of cancer. It happens when one day you just can't imagine yourself to be a non-smoker. There are also "hinges" which are fundamental for one form of life, although they could sound absurd or irrational to another one. An example is a belief in some tribes that people can affect the weather or control the wind. Also there seems to be plenty of arguments against it, for members of a tribe it could be beyond the doubt. As Wittgenstein stresses it is "something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were as something animal" (OC: 359). Similar thought is provided by Malcolm: „The absence of doubt can be called instinctive because it isn't learned, and because it isn't the product of thinking." (Malcolm 1982: 15)

Children in Wittgenstein's opinion do not learn that things exist, instead they learn how to handle those things, and their existence is undoubtable for them (OC: 476). When a child learns language, it learns at the same time what is to be investigated and what is not, Wittgenstein concludes. Indeed you can hardly find a child playing a game in which chairs don't exist. On the other hand almost every child game is based on alternating of thing's function, for example imagining that chairs are a train. Imagining means investigating possibilities in a game, which provides a great number of scenarios struggling to be certain.

Conclusion

In this paper I've presented imagination as an indispensable condition for doubting. While my inquiring I've distinguished between imagining within a game and imagining a new game. The former one is referring to doubting in Wittgensteinian sense since it provides alternatives within the existing game struggling to be the only true one. In contrast imagining a new game cannot be identified with doubting since it requires reimagining the foundation of a language game or life form.

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The Presentativity of Perceptual Experiences

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Abstract

As is well known, direct realism on perception claims that we straightforwardly perceive objects and properties of the world. In this paper, I will try to show how the phenomenological datum according to which perceptual experiences have a presentational character can be explained in direct realist's terms both for perceptions (both veridical and nonveridical) and for hallucinations. This prompts me to drop the naive realist account of the datum. It also lets me see the presentational character and the (singular) representational content of perceptual experiences as independent.

1. The phenomenological datum, a problem with it, and some possible solutions

As Crane and Craig maintain (2017), the phenomenology of our perceptual experiences provides us with an interesting datum, the *openness* claim. According to this datum, not only the objects of such experiences are given to us as mind-independent items, but also the *phenomenal character* of such experiences gives such objects to us as present (i.e., as being out there) in a way responsive of such a presentness: unlike imagination, one cannot modify at will what one perceives. Phenomenologically speaking, therefore, the *presentational character* of a perceptual experience contributes to its phenomenal character; in that experience, objects are *felt* as present. Thus, it also contributes to the *mode* of such experiences, i.e., to what kind of mental states such experiences have. Since in thoughts objects are not felt as present, presentness tells perceptual experiences from thoughts.

According to direct realism, we straightforwardly perceive objects and properties of the world. Now, a problem with the above datum immediately arises for a direct realist. How can nonveridical perceptual experiences – illusory experiences, hallucinatory experiences – be presentational, if the worldly sensible properties those experiences apparently mobilize are not instantiated out there? Either I see a green wall as yellow, or I straightforwardly hallucinate a yellow wall. In both cases, the sensible property of *being yellow* is not instantiated: either because another such property, *being green*, is instantiated, or because no such property is instantiated. Then, how can the uninstantiated property be given in my experience as being out there?

Clearly enough, the problem arises for any theorist on perception, but it is particularly pressing for a direct realist. For an *indirect* realist on perceptual experience solves it by saying that the sensible properties in question are indeed instantiated, yet not by a worldly object but by a mind-dependent object, i.e., what one immediately senses and in virtue of which one may indirectly perceive a worldly object: a sense-datum. Indeed, it is because of this problem that the indirect realist may convincingly appeal to the so-called Phenomenal Principle:

(PP) If it sensibly appears to one to be something that possesses a certain sensible property, then there is something of which one is aware that possesses that property.

For (PP) naturally leads to her solution to the problem in terms of mind-dependent objects as instantiating the relevant sensible properties.

As is well known, indirect realism is full of independent problems. So, one might try to go in the other direction and radicalize direct realism in terms of a *naive realist* account of the datum. Naive realism sticks to the stronger thesis that we straightforwardly perceive objects and properties of the world *as they are* in the world. Thus, it may provide two intertwined solutions to the problem. First, as to perceptual illusions, the naïve realist may say that some, perhaps all, perceptual illusions are *veridical* experiences; they indeed veridically grasp objective properties yet of a different kind from worldly properties (Fish 2009). Second, as to hallucinations, the naïve realist may say that hallucinations, and perhaps some perceptual illusions as well, are not presentational experiences; thus, they constitute a different kind of mental states from perceptions. Two variants of the second solution are available. Hallucinations are not presentational either because i) by not being related with worldly sensible properties, they have no presentational character hence no phenomenal character either (Fish 2009), or because ii) they just make as if they were as presentational as veridical perceptual experiences are, by being parasitic or dependent on the latter experiences with respect to their phenomenal character (Martin 1997, Nudds 2013).

In what follows, by scrutinizing why such naïve realist solutions do not seem to be viable, I will try to show how the aforementioned phenomenological datum can be explained in mere direct realist's terms both for perceptions (veridical, nonveridical) and for hallucinations.

2. The problem of illusion

As Fish (2009) says, there are three different kinds of perceptual illusions, which displace themselves along a line going from the more objective to the more subjective: a) *physical* illusions (e.g. a stick seen as bent in water) b) *optical* illusions (e.g. grasping the Müller-Lyer figure) c) *cognitive* illusions (e.g. mistaking a rope for a snake). I will try to show that the first naive realist solution may work both for a) and b), but not for c).

With respect to the a)-cases, in seeing a straight stick as bent, a green wall as yellow, a round coin as elliptical etc., a naïve realist may say that one does not experience the uninstantiated worldly property, but rather another *objective* property of a different kind. This property may be: a *situation-dependent* property (a relational property involving environmental factors, e.g. light refraction) (Schellenberg 2008, Fish 2009), or a *look* (the stick, the wall, the coin have the looks that paradigmatically bent things, paradigmatically yellow things, paradigmatically elliptical things respectively possess) (Martin 2010, Kalderon 2011),

or even a *mind-dependent* property (an outline shape, the solid angle traced to the object's contours from a certain point of view; an occlusion size) (Hopkins 1998, Hyman 2006).

Some such solutions also apply to the b)-cases, e.g. the 'look'-solution: the Müller-Lyer figure has a look that figures whose lines are paradigmatically different in length possess. Yet no such solution applies to the c)- cases. While mistaking a rope for a snake, I ascribe the rope a 'snakish' look – what paradigmatic snakes possess – that the rope does *not* possess, for the rope actually possesses another look, a 'ropish' look – what paradigmatic ropes possess – which I grasp once I recover from the illusion. Thus, as to c-) cases the original problem arises again: how can we account for the presentness of an illusory experience if the objective property it supposedly mobilizes is not instantiated?

Granted, the naïve realist has a reply. Cognitive illusions are perceptual experiences that only suffer from a conceptualization problem – in our experience, we first conceive something as a thing of a kind *K*, then (once freed from the illusion) we reconceive it as a thing of another kind *K'*. Thus, reconceptualization does not affect the phenomenal character of that experience (Fish 2009).

Yet although this reply may work in some cases, it does not work in the snake/rope case. For here, a phenomenal change occurs between the 'before' (the misrecognitional) and the 'after' (the recognitional) stage of the experience (indeed, we no longer experience fear because we are phenomenally affected by the recognition).

Thus, appealing to all such properties (situation-dependent properties, looks, mind-dependent properties) does not explain the *illusoriety* of a perceptual experience. The problem of how an illusory perceptual experience can be presentational remains.

Here comes my suggestion as to how a direct realist may face this problem without espousing naïve realism. To begin with, regardless of their veridicality, perceptions are *presentations* of instantiated worldly sensible properties because the latter properties are manifested in the sensory features of those perceptions that affect their phenomenal character (Smith 2002). Sensory features are the properties of such experiences that are *manners of presentation* of those worldly properties. Moreover, again regardless of their veridicality, perceptions are qualified in their *mode*, in their being the kind of mental states they are, by their being caused by existing worldly objects (Recanati 2007). Thus, no similarity between their sensory features and the instantiated sensible properties they present must occur. Thus, both a veridical perception, say of a green wall, and a nonveridical perception, say of that wall again yet as being yellow, are presentations of the same instantiated sensible worldly property, *being green* in this case. Yet that property is respectively presented in different manners, via the different sensory features such experiences possess. These features determine different phenomenal characters for such perceptions, respectively *being green** and *being yellow** (Peacocke 1983).

Clearly enough, such sensory features qualify the phenomenal awareness (Block 1995) of such perceptions; they can even be attended to in an indirect way. Yet they are not objects of awareness, for they do not contribute to the aboutness of such phenomenally aware experiences. Thus, this account is no indirect realism in disguise.

3. The problem of hallucination

I may now assess the original problem with respect to hallucinations. Let us reconsider the second naïve realist solution to that problem, in particular its first variant, the *'no phenomenal character'-solution*. This variant adopts a *relational* conception of phenomenal character: having for an experience a phenomenal character amounts to its being acquainted with certain *instantiated* worldly sensible properties constituting its presentational character. As a consequence, a hallucination has *no* phenomenal character, it simply has the same cognitive effects as the corresponding indiscriminable perception (Fish 2009).

However, this variant hardly works. Since as to a perfect hallucination we may not realize that the experience we took to be a perception is a hallucination, it is implausible that that experience originally yet erroneously seemed to have a phenomenal character. Moreover, this solution implausibly equates a hallucination with a zombie perception, which is by definition cognitively identical with the corresponding experienced perception yet, unlike a hallucination, is a perception of an existing worldly object.

The second variant, the *'parasitic phenomenal character'-solution*, seems definitely better than the first one. For in holding that hallucinations just make as if they were as presentational as veridical perceptual experiences are, it still ascribes such hallucinations a phenomenal character.

Yet it presupposes a hardly justifiable dependence of hallucinations on perceptions. *Pace* Martin (2006), hallucinations do not stand to perceptions in the same relationship fiction stands to reality. Fiction may depend on reality, both ontologically and epistemically: not only fiction presupposes reality, as a way of modifying it or its representation (Husserl 1970), but also one cannot represent a fictional world unless one has already represented the real world. Yet hallucinations do not exhibit either dependence on perceptions: one's first perceptual experience may be hallucinatory and if Cartesians are right, all perceptual experiences may turn out to be such. Granted, one may say that hallucinations are the bad cases whereas perceptions are the good cases of perceptual experiences. In order to say so, however, one must postulate a shared function that only perceptions satisfy, thereby pointing to a common factor between perceptions and hallucinations that may be hard for a naïve realist to swallow. Moreover, it is generally not the case that bad cases depend on good ones. As the history of technology abundantly shows, bad artefacts do not depend on good ones.

Granted, one might differently justify the second variant by saying that the very notion of presentation is *causally* based. For one might then say that, unlike perceptions, hallucinations present no sensible worldly properties. For since in the hallucinatory case such properties are uninstantiated, they can cause no feature in the phenomenal character of the experience.

Yet why must one invoke that notion, rather than say that, unlike thoughts, *qua* perceptual experiences all such states are *presentational* ones (Searle 2015)? Presentation has merely to do with the fact that a property manifests itself in the perceptual experience; even with respect to the actually existent and causally determinant object of a perception, not all its relevant properties are so manifested (in particular, those properties that are instantiated in occluded parts of that object, Noë 2004).

By appealing to a noncausal notion of presentation, one may then say that hallucinations are presentations of worldly sensible properties via their sensory features as

manners of presentation. Simply, unlike perceptions, the sensible worldly properties the sensory features of hallucinations present are not fixed by a causal, but rather by a similarity, relationship. Unlike an illusory experience of a green wall as yellow, a hallucinatory experience of a yellow wall presents yellowness, not greenness, the property that is more qualitatively similar to the sensory features that hallucination instantiates. Thus, there is no determination route from manners of presentation to presented properties: the sensory feature of *being yellow** may present both the worldly sensible property of *being green* (in an illusion) and the worldly sensible property of *being yellow* (in a hallucination). Yet this noncausal fixation depends on the fact that, unlike the perception mode, the hallucination mode is not qualified by its being caused by existing worldly objects, since in its case no such things are easily available. Thus, the phenomenological datum from which we started, the openness claim, may be ultimately justified for all perceptual experiences.

One may wonder whether the claim that even a hallucination presents worldly sensible properties entails a definitely not trivial consequence; namely, that it has an object of the *same* metaphysical kind as a perception, a *concrete* object, i.e., an object that *may* exist (Cocchiarella 1982, Priest 2016[2]), yet something that, unlike the object of a perception, does not actually exist.

In the framework of direct realism, some have already claimed that both perceptions and hallucinations have ordinary objects, existent and nonexistent respectively (this idea traces back to Thomas Reid; see Butcharov 1994, Smith 2002, Priest 2016[2]). Yet a direct realist may defend the two claims independently. For *pace* Smith (2002), unlike mind-dependent objects such as sense-data, the concrete merely possible object of a hallucination does not exemplify the worldly sensible properties it is ascribed in a hallucination. For since they are existence-entailing, those properties are uninstantiated. Something that is hallucinated to be yellow is not yellow, for *being yellow* entails *to exist*. Indeed, this direct realist does not commit to (PP), but to a weaker version of it:

(PP*) if it sensibly appears to one to be something that possesses a certain sensible property, then there is something of which one is aware that *seemingly possess* that property.

If a direct realist allows that hallucinations to have concrete yet merely possible objects, another consequence rather ensues. Although three qualitatively identical perceptual experiences sharing their *presentational* character – a veridical perception, an illusory perception, a hallucination – also share their *predicative* content, their whole singular *representational* contents do not supervene on that char-

acter. For the *objectual* parts of such different contents are different, the first two involving different concrete existent objects, the last one involving another concrete yet nonexistent object. E.g., three yellowish experiences are respectively a veridical perception *that O is yellow*, an illusory perception *that O' is yellow*, a hallucination *that O'' is yellow*.

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Designed for Pickpockets.
The Ecological Approach to Perception in (A)social World

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Abstract

Our purpose is to sketch a theoretical framework for the research on sociocultural dimension of perception, including so-called abnormal cases. Integration of some findings in ecological psychology and in design literature can be useful in cognitive studies on human–artifact interactions in society. We claim that the question what it is like to be a pickpocket is also a question about cognitive structure of his material and social environment, including the role of affordances. We have decided to use movies by Robert Bresson to show some aspects of cognitive engineering of acting people.

1. Enculturating the Concept

At the beginning of 2017 in answer to the question which scientific term or concept ought to be more widely known, the philosopher and cognitive scientist Daniel Dennett pointed to the term *affordances*, which probably astonished some of his readers. In his opinion, this term has a promising future, although many people who use it "seem to have a diminished appreciation of its potential" (Dennett 2017).

Our purpose is to sketch a theoretical framework for the research on sociocultural dimension of perception, including so-called abnormal cases. Integration of some findings in ecological psychology and in design literature can be useful in cognitive studies on human–artifact interactions in society. We claim that the question what it is like to be a pickpocket is also a question about cognitive structure of his material and social environment.

We think that the concept of affordances can play a more important role in research on perception. Presently, however, the potential of the concept is difficult to assess, since the situation in which its functions can be described, colloquially speaking, as "schizophrenic". Let us briefly describe this.

On the one hand, the concept of affordances is a key concept in ecological psychology, where it still stimulates new research. It has been coined and described by the perceptual psychologist James J. Gibson, and subsequently developed and modified by a range of theorists and researchers (see Dotov, Nie, de Wit 2012: 28-39). Somewhat generalizing, one can say that Gibsonian affordances are relational action possibilities provided for the acting agent by objects in his/her environment. They are what a given environment "offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill." (Gibson: 1979: 127) In this light, the perceiving of affordances is a process of perceiving not value-free, but value-rich ecological objects.

This concept has some limitations, such as restricting the mentioned relation to the agent-object dyad, independent of any society and cultural experience (Costall 2012: 85-93). Despite this, Gibson's theory has resulted in a number of thought-provoking and valuable studies. These include, among others Harry Heft's study on relation between the concept of affordance and intentionality in perception occurring in meaningful, sociocultural human world (Heft 1989), as well as some later studies on interpersonality of affordances in cooperation, the role of the social context in the perception of objects, human (body)

affordances, and the role of affordances in "behaving with others" (see, for example, Richardson, Marsh, Baron 2007; Constancini, Sinigaglia 2012; Rączaszek-Leonardi, Nomikou, Rohlfing 2013).

Important account of the concept of affordances in everyday activity has been provided by Alan Costal, who describes the so-called canonical affordances in context – as established and widely agreed use-meanings of things. We ought to try to understand the objects "within a network of relations not only among different people, but also a 'constellation' of other objects drawn into a shared practice." (Costall 2012: 92). We think that it seems to be in line with cognitive ecology, in particular with the concept of cultural ecosystems of human cognition, of dynamic webs of cultural regularities in which we and our practices are immersed (Hutchins 2014).

However, the term *affordance* also has a parallel life: it has proved to be very influential in theories and practice of design, human-computer interaction (HCI), and other related areas. The concept was introduced in these fields by the cognitive scientist and theorist of design Donald Norman. For him, this term "refers to the perceived and actual properties of the thing, primarily those fundamental properties that determine just how the thing could possibly be used." (Norman 1988: 9) As Joanna McGrenere and Wayne Ho emphasize, the important difference between Gibson's and Norman's accounts is that in the first case affordances are action possibilities, while in the second one affordances are both the action possibilities and the way of conveying these possibilities or making them visible to the agent. For Gibson, affordances exist independently of agents' experience and of socio-cultural context, whereas for Norman they are couples with the agents' past knowledge and experience, not relative to the species (McGrenere, Ho 2000: 181). Norman distinguishes perceived and real affordances (Norman 1999: 39-40). Moreover, he emphasizes the significance of emotions in perception. In general, all our actions and interactions in the world are coupled with emotions, also unconscious. They make us smart, allow decision making. So, it is not possible to have design without emotional components (Norman 2004: 6-13).

In the context of design and HCI, one should pay attention also to the contribution of William Gaver. He describes the so-called apparent affordances: a given object is easy to use when these affordances match its intended use; otherwise, they suggest a different action than that for which the thing is designed. In general, Gaver distinguishes perceptible affordances and hidden affordances

as well as false affordances (strictly speaking, it is not affordance itself that is false, but the information) (Gaver 1991: 80-81; McGrenere, Ho 2000: 183).

Jonathan Maier and Georges Fadel discuss affordance-based methods for design. They describe positive and negative affordances of designed artifacts. "[D]esigners must be careful to design desired positive affordances without introducing harmful negative affordances" (Maier, Fadel 2009: 22) They also introduce category of artifact–artifact affordance (Maier, Fadel 2009: 23).

As we have tried to demonstrate above, a proper study on the role of affordance in the socio-cultural context would require, on the one hand, insightful knowledge of human–artifact, human–human, and human–artifact–others interactions, and on the other hand, a perspective of cognitive ecology. It would require integrating certain findings of ecological account of perception and theory of design, as well as methods of psychology and cognitive ethnography.

So far, the most important findings for us are: (1) Our environments are structured, and their structures are meaningful to us, value-rich. (2) We are (like being) designed to pick out relevant information from our environment = we perceive affordances: relational action possibilities. (3) There is a relation between affordances and intentional acts. (4) Affordances are couple with the agent's past knowledge and experience, as well as with his/her emotionality in relation both to people and artifacts. (5) Cultural affordances are also depend on constellations of other objects and cultural practices. (6) Affordances can be shared: we perceive some (most?) of them together with other(s), *behaving with*, sometimes in cooperation. (7) One can distinguish the existence of affordances from their being perceived, as well as divide them into perceptible, hidden and false affordances. (8) Objects have positive (potentially beneficial to the user) affordances and negative (potentially harmful) affordances. On the other side, there is no need to undertake problems of direct perceiving or Gibsonian antirepresentationalism in this paper.

2. What Is It Like to Be a Thief?

Neuroscience has little to say about this due to its methodological individualism, while real-life ethnography has a limited field of action. However, there is an interesting study by Susana Martinez-Conde and Stephen L. Macknik. The authors write, among others, about techniques of pickpockets: "The neuroscientific underpinnings of these maneuvers are unknown, but our research collaborator […], a professional pickpocket, has emphasized that the two kinds of motions are essential to effectively misdirecting the mark" (Martinez-Conde, Macknik 2008; see also Yeager 1990).

For our purposes, film analysis can in some cases be one of the good research tools. In general, movies are not our object of study, but a kind of filter for some possible real-life situations.

We have decided to use movies by Robert Bresson for certain reasons. The director shows somebody hiding their activity from a group, as well as antisocial or simply non social behavior. At the same time, Bresson maintains aloofness and emotional distance between the viewer and the film. Actors appearing in his movies are non-professional, their acting is minimalist, almost without expression, as if passive. As a result, we get something like action schemes, "emotionally discolored" moving images. This ascetic expression corresponds well with the situation

of the film characters who often act in hiding or other asocial situations. The mentioned minimalist acting is perfectly visible in the film *Balthazar* (1966) thanks to the contrast between the natural behavior of a donkey named Balthazar (the only convincing "actor" in the film) and inert people devoid of humanity. Balthazar's vulnerability stimulates tenderness in children and then in wronged woman, whereas the same animal often affords cruelty for most of adults.

More varied and dynamic interactions take place in *A Man Escaped* (1956). Fontaine, a prisoner preparing his escape, has at his disposal a modest bed, linen sheet, pillow, tin can, metal spoon, and a wooden door. He gradually and cautiously transforms fragments of these things into tools useful for escape, using their affordances in an atypical manner. At the same time, he has to hide his actions from the guards as well as from his fellow inmate.

Yet the most interesting and complex example of human–environment interactions is shown in *Pickpocket* (1959). In the film, we can observe a young thief Michele, training his skills which are antisocial – but need a society. For us this is a great show of cognitive engineering of the pickpocket craft.

Is our social world designed for honest and law-abiding people, or for a multifaceted society? Anyway, other kinds of people can perceive and use some "hidden" features of this world for their own purposes. Of course, we all perceive some affordances together, but not necessarily in cooperation, as we have different intentions. As we remember, a well-designed artifact possesses certain positive affordances beneficial to the target group of users, and it does not possess certain negative affordances. However, our hero is often focused on these undesirable properties of things or constellations of things, like space between clothes, slipperiness of wallets, a newspaper that forms a screen, a crowd in the subway or in the street, and, of course, the possibilities offered by his own hand. Thereby, Michele successfully uses perceptible affordances, hidden affordances and false affordances in his "craft", and at the same time constantly pretends to be "behaving with others", thus hiding his true intentions. Therefore, there is a constant tension between focusing on own action and managing others' perception.

In the context of the mentioned theories, some questions arise that are beyond our preliminary analysis. Is the pickpocket's perceived world structured in a different way? How does he manage others' perception? Which artifacts (including places) are "well designed" from the point of view of pickpockets? What kind of "users" are they? (Of course, we assume that designers do not cooperate with thieves.)

3. Summary

The purpose of the short article was to sketch a theoretical framework for the research on sociocultural dimension of perception. We think that the integration of some findings in ecological psychology, including the concept of affordance, and in design literature can be useful in cognitive studies on human–artifact interactions in society. It should be noted that the sociocultural role of affordances becomes more complex when we undertake analysis of cases of asocial behavior. We tried to show that the question what it is like to be a pickpocket is also a question about cognitive structure of his environment.

Movies seem to be good vehicles to explore the various dimensions of perception in the society. It coincides with

the ecological research on cognition (see, for example, Anderson 1998). We have decided to use movies by Robert Bresson to show some aspects of cognitive engineering of acting people.

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Concepts Old and New: How Conceptual Change Explains Meaning-Making and Identity-Formation

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Abstract

Wittgenstein's later work provides valuable insights into how concepts gain meaning and the conditions under which they change. Without foundational principles to rely upon, it is our continuous interaction in language-games which helps to explain how the concepts and norms that shape our forms of life are established, perpetuated or challenged through our use of language. Practices and our lived experiences, then, take center stage in understanding the formation of norms and normativity – as well as our individual and collective identities within shared language-games.

Wittgenstein's later work provides valuable insights into how concepts gain meaning and the conditions under which they change. Without foundational principles to rely upon, it is our continuous *inter*action in language-games which helps to explain how the concepts and norms that shape our forms of life are established, perpetuated or challenged through our use of language. The frequent teaching and learning references in Wittgenstein's work after 1930 are central to understanding how we become initially inaugurated into the practices and experiences that function to create contingently stable meaning (Weber 2015). Practices and our lived experiences, then, take center stage in understanding the formation of norms and normativity – as well as our individual and collective identities within shared language-games.

In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein provides a seemingly simple example to describe how one comes to understand a new concept in the absence of prior foundations:

> How do I explain the meaning of 'regular,' 'uniform,' 'same' to anyone? — I shall explain these words to someone who, say, only speaks French by means of the corresponding French words. But if a person has not yet got the *concepts*, I shall teach him to use the words by means of *examples* and by *practice* (PI: 208).

Under investigation here is how the very concept of a *norm* is taught to someone anew. Adding a second layer to this examination, Wittgenstein's selection of words ('regular,' uniform,' and 'same') is far from happenstance: they are purposeful and point us to the process of establishing similarity and difference between one case and the next. But unlike in the process of translating from one language to another (which presumes existing concepts that can act as a foundation for establishing analogous meaning), Wittgenstein directs our attention to the situation in which we must learn *new* concepts. On my reading, he uses the language of teaching precisely because we all (at least at one point) managed to learn new concepts without reference to prior ones and this process of creating contingent stability precisely reflects our general condition of meaning-making. Lastly, this quotation places a methodological emphasis on practices and examples as the mechanisms for the explanation and teaching of new concepts. Despite its seeming simplicity, Wittgenstein has embedded within this example major aspects of his later thinking: concept formation, learning, and experience.

Practices, as opposed to foundational principles, then, take on a central importance in Wittgenstein's thinking, but he also cautions us against retroactively assessing the processes we have undergone and elevating particular practices into generalizable explanatory principles. Even the famous opening passage of the *Philosophical Investigations* places us directly into this debate about which practices provide reliable foundations for the development of concepts. Wittgenstein begins by positing Augustine's description of language, which relies on the practice of naming and a picture of language where "every word has a meaning" (PI: 1). But he does so in order to challenge us to investigate whether the practices that Augustine identifies as fundamental really are able to explain how we come to understand norms and the strictures of the language-games that we play.

Augustine's description of how he learned language relies on the names of concrete objects which he comes to understand by having an elder articulate a word while simultaneously motioning toward said object. The implication is that Augustine associated the word uttered with the object, and thus he has entered the ranks of humans that are able to forge meaning between language and the world around them. However, Wittgenstein makes the point that Augustine's picture of language identifies a practice as central which is peripheral at best; pointing and naming describes only a "narrowly circumscribed region" of what language can do or how it is used (PI: 3). Language as such cannot be described as 'connecting' particular words to particular objects, and we likely do not emerge from the condition of having *no* concepts at all by simply observing someone making a sound and pointing. Normativity, Wittgenstein is telling the reader, is a trickier business than this. It is by being taught new concepts via example and practice, by being players of various language-games, by teaching others and learning new ones, that we forge and re-forge the associations between the words we use and the forms of life in which we live. Norms and their use emerge from the interwoven web of these practices and shape our ability to judge and discern how to create meaning and act in other language-games.

Stanley Cavell, in explicating the importance of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, makes a similar point about the centrality of shared practices that build into norms and function as non-foundational bases for our interactions:

> We learn and teach words in certain contexts… Nothing insures that this [learning] will take place…That on the whole we do is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of humor and of significance and of fulfillment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when

an appeal, when an explanation – all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls 'forms of life.' Human speech and activity, sanity and community, rest upon nothing more, but nothing less, than this (Cavell 2002: 52).

Cavell elegantly points out the myriad practices, habits and modes of acting – but also our implicit shared *judgments* about these – that forms the binding context in which we learn to understand concepts and our larger world. Wittgenstein's rejection of previous schemas of meaning reveals that 'meaning' can no longer be grounded in a stable referent or the correspondence between words and objects in the world. Instead, the effect of our linguistic use is dependent on a social and political context in which mutual interaction, power and negotiation may well engender meaning.

Philosophers and political theorists have taken up Wittgenstein's discussion about learning concepts in order to explore the relationship between language and community, between individual and group. For Hanna Pitkin in *Wittgenstein and Justice*, our use of language bridges our unique personal position with that of the larger community; language, then, implicates our self-identity and belonging in political groups. Pitkin writes:

Language has dual aspects: it is our means for self-expression, for articulating our unique individuality; yet at the same time it is what we have in common with other members of our community, what makes us like them and binds us to them. As a consequence, language lies at the heart … – central to almost every theoretical issue in social and political study (Pitkin 1972: 3).

The balance between our own uses of language and the communally binding, and yet ever-changing, public features of language are at the core of Pitkin's interests in reading Wittgenstein with political questions in mind. She also traces how this balance implicates our search for a grounded conception of a political community that does not have recourse to ultimate foundations. Put another way, Wittgenstein offers a compelling description of our human condition as being in the midst of a multitude of language games and their attendant forms of life, yet without reference to ultimate certainty or inviolable foundations. Despite this, meaning exists, as does our capacity to judge and potentially to alter those very conditions.

But how or when do concepts or the attendant language-games change, or does Wittgenstein doom us to a static analysis of unchanging language-games and forms of life? Close reading reveals a handful of remarks in Wittgenstein's work about how the grammar of language-games and forms of life come to be combined in new ways, how new words and concepts gain traction and what effect that might have on our shared discourse and communities of meaning (Weber 2013). Most simply put, Wittgenstein says that "a language-game does change with time" (OC: 256). By bringing this together with other clues, one gets a fuller picture of the mutating qualities of concepts and language-games, which itself points to our collective or individual roles within them and their function in defining the conditions for political judgment.

Wittgenstein's unique stance on how our concepts can and do change is highly relevant to understanding the role of language in shaping political community (and the moments when that community seems to be unraveling). Pitkin raises questions about identity-formation and the socio-political relations that arise when we consider the interactions of speakers in a language-game. Her discussion of the role of language in relation to community in Wittgen-

stein's work provides a useful linkage between my reading and political concerns more broadly. In contrast to Pitkin, more philosophically-oriented scholars, such as Saul Kripke, have even gone so far as to evaluate the suitability of community consensus itself as a bedrock for establishing truth conditions or a stable referent for meaning (Kripke 1982). These two approaches to community and its function in Wittgenstein's work is relevant to understand the function of intersubjective meaning and the relationships between the players of language-games.

In Pitkin's explication of Wittgenstein's conception of language, she points out the two visions of language that his stance holds in a delicate balance. Allow me to quote her at length:

On the one hand, Wittgenstein seems to stress nominalistic, individualistic, even relativistic themes: each child learns and interprets language regularities for himself; any rule or principle needs to be interpreted; words must always be capable of projection into new and unexpected contexts; concepts are fragmented and often their grammar has inconsistent implications; and since what is 'in the world' depends very much on our concepts, the world itself shares these qualities. Yet, on the other hand, Wittgenstein …also stress[es] that there are mistakes in using language; that words do have meaning that can be looked up in a good dictionary; that not just any new projection of a concept will be acceptable; that not just any excuse will be appropriate; that we can't say just anything at any time and in any context; that it is not merely up to each individual what his words mean; and that in a significant sense we all live in the same, continuing, objective world, and our real activity in that world is what underlies and shapes our concepts (Pitkin 1972: 194).

Pitkin here paints a schematic but complex picture of Wittgenstein's novel approach to language; an approach that permutes two countervailing views that she identifies as the subjective (within oneself) and objective (in the external world) grounding for meaning. Pitkin's framing is one that is densely packed with an aggregative set of binary concepts. Associated with the subjectivist approach is nominalism, individualism and relativism, which in turn raise questions of solipsism and whether language-games perhaps devolve into self-isolating enclaves that do not have the capacity to speak across ever-encroaching boundaries. Pitkin does not provide a similar set of ideological 'isms' for the objectivist approach, perhaps in part because the binary pairings of the subjectivist concepts are often in dispute. Objectivism, depending on its defenders, could be associated with anything from communitarianism, where community consensus grounds meaning, to absolutism, where meaning is functionally settled by decree. (Alternately, one could ally objectivism with realism, where meaning exists 'in the world' first and foremost.) And from there, a plethora of subsidiary associations for each major branch can be elucidated. The point to all of this schematic work, however, is to show first that Wittgenstein occupies a unique position *between* (or even apart from) this schema and thus provides a relevant alternative in discussions of these concepts, and secondly that Wittgenstein's position on language quickly shades into political territory.

Wittgenstein's stance, then, is that meaning emerges from a complex interplay between an individual's unique acquisition of language-games and the wider community whose collective use tends to homogenize the meaning of words. Put another way, for Wittgenstein, we simultaneously rely on common agreements about which linguistic

uses have meaning (and what they mean) in the language-games we inhabit, while also relying on our own idiosyncratic uses of words and their meanings that we have accrued via personal experience and the vagaries of the learning process. Pitkin paints this bind between the two themes as the bind between an individual and that person's larger context or community. As she points out, Wittgenstein recognizes both of these features of how concepts and linguistic use acquire meaning and does not see them as contradictory or as one having any logical priority over the other. We are always stuck between ourselves and the larger context in which we operate. When the political concepts surrounding us start to be challenged or are undergoing significant changes, we find ourselves constantly tarrying between our own conceptions and the shifting ground of our contexts. This can induce a kind of vertigo, but one that Wittgenstein tells us cannot be ameliorated by seeking refuge in external or internal referents. Instead, concepts old or new are always changing, and so are we right along with them.

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Observability and Unobservability

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Abstract

The paper discusses different stages beginning with observable facts via different degrees of observer-invariance to indirect and partial observability. Finally, important cases of unobservability are described in science and in religion.

1. Observability

Observation is planned, i. e. goal directed and selected perception of facts (events, processes, phenomena) that is guided and interpreted by the present knowledge about the respective domain and results in (observational) data. These facts contain or refer to "things" or "objects" which – in a derived way – are called perceived or observed things or objects. An event is an occurrence of a change in space-time or a change in time (as in the case of psychic change) that is regarded as a unit for some reason and that lasts for a short time interval. A process is an ordered sequence of events; a phenomenon is an event or process for some subject. A perception is a phenomenon of a human subject having sensory experience.

What is observed is rarely the fact itself and rarely the thing or object itself referred to by the fact. An astronomer does not perceive the complex facts of a star explosion, a meteorologist does not watch the formation of ice crystals in a cloud nor does a politician perceive a social process.

What is observable is usually only a small fraction of the facts under investigation. Therefore, what can be accepted is only the following methodological principle: What has been observed with the help of competent means is a sufficient reason for a preliminary hypothesis about some physical or psychic reality. On the other hand, claims like observability is a necessary condition for the existence of some entity, or observability is a sufficient condition for the existence of some entity are both too strong and incorrect. As Bunge says: Observable facts are ice-berg-like, they are just documents suggesting or confirming the existence of more interesting facts behind (see Bunge 1967: 158).

2. Observer-Invariance

Observable facts are observer-invariant iff all observers come to the same result about some specific property of the observable fact.

From Einstein's Theory of Relativity we have learned that there is neither a designated observer, nor are there completely rigid measurement instruments, nor is there an absolute frame of reference. In short: there is no universal observer-invariance. Thus one important task for sciences is to proceed according to methodological rules which help to achieve *enough* observer-invariance in order to get reasonable and reliable data and to continue research.

In Classical Mechanics, observer-invariance (OI) is satisfied because of the assumption of universal time and simultaneity. For inertial systems, i. e. in SR (Special Relativity) OI is satisfied because the Lorentz-Transformation corrects the wrong preconditions of Galilean Invariance. In GR (General Relativity) OI is only locally satisfied in regions where there is a Minkowskian light-cone structure.

Because of the rotating subsystems OI cannot be defined for the universe as a whole (see Mittelstaedt 2008; Mittelstaedt/Weingartner 2005: section 9.3.1.).

In other domains OI is satisfied to a higher or lower degree. In medicine (radiology) there exists statistics concerning the interpretation (diagnosis) of X-ray pictures. X-ray pictures of bones have a high degree, whereas those of lungs have a low degree of OI. If the observed fact is a text, a special type of observer might be a translator. Then the question is to what degree different translations, say into English, from a Greek text (say the dialogues of Plato or the metaphysics of Aristotle) differ. Or what degree of OI is present when different conductors interpret Mozart's Jupiter-Symphony? In this case, an individually coloured interpretation that deviates from the average of OI might even be preferred. In other cases, a whole net of methodological rules have the task to keep OI on standards as high as possible. This is the case concerning important ("crucial") experiments in natural science. But also concerning translations of the Bible from Hebrew (Old Testament) and Greek (New Testament) or Latin (Vulgata) into any natural language. Moreover, Christian exegetics has developed such a set of methodological rules during centuries at least concerning the statements and norms of the Christian Creed and its moral commands.

3. Partial and Indirect Observability

The only directly observable magnitudes in astronomy are star brightness and the angle subtended at the telescope by two celestial objects. All other magnitudes, in particular *distances* and *masses* are inferred with the help of the theories and the above mentioned measurable magnitudes: If the calculation of the mass M of a galaxy is done by Newton's laws of motion and of gravitation then M is much too small to attract the millions of stars of the galaxy enough in order not to fly apart, despite the great rotational velocity observed, i. e. the theoretical predications are inconsistent with the observation of the rotational velocity. To avoid this inconsistency, three options have been proposed:

1 Newton's laws are incorrect; at least for galaxies thousands of light years away.
2 The stars in the galaxy are in fact flying apart.
3 The mass difference is due to (so far) unobserved or unobservable *dark matter*.

A proponent of 1) is Milgrom with his "Modified Newtonian Dynamics" which corrects Newton's law such that the gravitational strength is growing at sizable distances (see Milgrom 1983). Most astronomers and astrophysicists however find the first two options unacceptable, such that the dark matter choice is widely assumed.

However, there might be a fourth option: that the usual equation applied for calculating the mass M of galaxies consisting of millions of stars which is taken from the two-body situation is incorrect. It is the equation $M(r) = rv^2/G$ (where r is the radius, v the rotational velocity of the n-body system, i. e. galaxy and G the gravitational constant). Since this equation reduces the million-body problem to a collection of two-body systems the mass calculation might very well be incorrect (see Saari 2015a, 2015b). In this case we don't need an unobserved or unobservable dark matter.

4. Unobservability

In science, in everyday life and in religion we are confronted with the following situation: observable facts suggest or refer to unobservable facts that are unobservable causes. In other words: the observable fact is interpreted as the effect of an (so far) unobserved or principally unobservable cause.

4.1. So far Unobserved or Technically Unobservable Causes

The history of physics is full of cases of that sort: In 1931 Wolfgang Pauli predicted the existence of a new elementary particle, the neutrino in order to explain the spectrum of the electron and positron without violating the principles of the conservation of energy and of momentum. Experimental verification: indirect 1950, direct 1956, today also in the ICE-CUBE of the Antarctic (see Halzen 2016).[1]

Higgs and Englert postulated 1964 (in Physical Review Letters, August and October; Higgs has sent his paper earlier to Physics Letters where it was refused as not physically relevant) a heavy elementary particle, the Higgs-Boson, the existence of which is needed according to the Glashow-Salam-Weinberg-Theory of weak interaction as a cause for the production of the masses of bosons and for the symmetry-breaking when calculating the gauge symmetry. The heavy particle ($125 \cdot 10^9$ EV) was discovered July 4, 2012 at the LHC of CERN. Higgs and Englert received the Nobel Price for it in 2013.

From the effects of crystallographic diffraction, by using light with a certain known wave length, one can conclude that there exists a certain structure of atoms in the substance investigated. This was an essential point for the discovery of the Double Helix by Watson and Crick. However, this structure was unobservable in the sense that it exceeded the resolving power of the microscope. That means that the kind of unobservability was at least partially a technical matter here. "Partially" because it is in part also a principal matter, since very small objects may be destroyed by the light rays needed to see them.

In medicine it is very often the case that what is observed are the symptoms, but what is searched for are the (so far) unobserved or – in case of psychic causes – the unobservable or the very indirectly observable causes.

In 1976 Harald zur Hausen published the hypothesis that cancer of uterus-throat is an infection with the virus *humanen papilloma*. Nobody believed him since the general view of medical research was that no kind of cancer is caused by a virus infection. For the hypothesis and its confirmation Hausen got the Nobel Price in 2008. Since several 100.000 women (over the world) have this infection it

would have been better if more research could be done earlier to confirm the hypothesis and develop vaccines.

4.2. Principally Unobservable Causes

In all the cases discussed so far, the hidden cause for the observed fact was not unobservable in principle but was discovered later and could be observed – even perhaps in a very indirect way.

But there are cases where the cause for the observed effect is unobservable in principle. This can be so in science and in religion. In astronomy the black hole is unobservable in principle, not just technically unobservable; and in religion the "object of religion" or the creator of the world is unobservable in principle at least for our present life. In both cases observable facts are interpreted as effects of some unobservable cause. Observe that causes are here necessary conditions for the effects and consequently effects are sufficient conditions for some cause.

4.2.1. Astronomy

In 1975 Laplace postulated that a celestial body of sufficient size could not send light rays because its strong gravitational force on the light rays would hinder them to get off. Laplace presupposed both, Newton's theory of gravitation and his corpuscle theory of light. Consequently, such a celestial body would be unobservable; but unobservable in principle since it would not only swallow up all light rays that try to escape it but also all other light rays coming in of other stars. Thus Laplace postulated the existence of *black holes*.[2]

The star HDE 226868 having a mass of 30 times and a diameter of 25 times of that of the sun is revolved by an unobservable satellite having half of its mass and a diameter of only 50 km. That such an unobservable satellite must exist is sure, but about its structure and its properties we have only consistent hypotheses which suggest that it must be a black hole. What can be observed and measured in the case of the big star HDE 226868 is that the big star is disturbed in its spherical shape in such a way that the shape is forming a top from which matter is sucked away in the direction of the unobservable black hole. These are the observable facts from which astronomers infer with the help of the physical theories of gravitation and movement (of Newton and Einstein) that there must exist a black hole as an unobservable cause with a certain mass and density. As noted above, that kind of unobservability is of a principal kind: Arriving light is swallowed up and its own light rays that are escaping from the surface are then bent more and more back towards the black hole. These light rays can reach at most the Schwarzschild-radius beyond which no light can escape.

4.2.2. Religion

In a way similar to astronomy the observable facts of the world are interpreted in religion as effects of an unobservable existing cause. Since the observable facts show that the world (universe) is extremely huge, extraordinarily complex and very sophisticated on every level from the non-living things via the living things up to man, one infers that the unobservable cause has to be extremely intelligent and powerful. The strategy of inferential argumentation concerning the existence of unobservable causes in science and in religion has similarities and differences that can be described as follows.

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[1] Francis Halzen is principal investigator of the ICE-CUBE experiment.

[2] The paper in which Laplace published this important conjecture appeared in the unknown German journal „Allgemeine geograohische Ephemeriden", Weimar 1799. English translation in the appendix of Hawking-Ellis (1973).

Similarities:

- Both argumentations, those in science and those in religions, are from the existence of the effect to the existence of a cause.
- The effects are observable and scientifically describable; the scientific description is not only used in science but can be used also in religion. Moreover, the observable effects can be understood as the effects of some cause also by uneducated people.
- The effects are understood as a sufficient condition (reason) for a suitable cause that is a necessary condition for the observable effects.[3]
- What is searched for is an explanation for the observable effects by assuming a suitable cause with the properties that are necessary for producing the effects.[4]
- The object which is the necessary existing cause for the observable effects is unobservable.
- The kind of unobservability is not of a temporal or technical kind, but of a principal nature.

Differences:

- The unobservable object which is the necessary existing cause for the observable effects
  - belongs to this world (universe) or is a *immanent cause* of it (science);
  - does not belong to this world (universe) or is a *transcendent cause* of it.
- The observable and scientifically describable effects of the unobservable cause
  - are only parts of this world (universe) (science);
  - are both parts of this world (universe) and the world (universe) as a whole (religion).

It has to be remarked however that there are some cosmological theories that aim as searching for a cause of the whole universe. In this sense we can count this to a further similarity.

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[3] It is interesting to notice that Thomas Aquinas defines the cause of the world which he tried to prove in his *Five Ways* as a necessary condition of the effect: "To take away the cause is to take away the effect" (Aquinas 1981: I, 2, 3; second way, see also Weingartner 2010: 64f). God as a sufficient cause would rule out all contribution and cooperation of creatures (i. e. evolution) and would be incompatible with man's free will and existing moral evil.

[4] The idea of God as an explanation for the universe has been worked out in detail by Swinburne (1991) and (2011).

Typen von Top-Down-Effekten. Welche Top-Down-Effekte auf die visuelle Wahrnehmung können Fälle kognitiver Penetration sein?

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Abstract

Die Debatte über kognitive Penetration der visuellen Wahrnehmung hängt von der Interpretation unterschiedlicher Top-Down-Effekte in den Kognitionswissenschaften ab. Hier werden konzeptuell Typen von Top-Down-Effekten unterschieden, von denen nur einer Fälle der kognitiven Penetration enthalten kann. Diese allgemeinen Typen können nützlich sein, um Forschungsprojekte zu planen und Forschungsbefunde zu interpretieren, wenn es um die Feststellung kognitiver Penetration geht.

1. Einleitung

Penetrieren high-level-Kognitionen die visuelle Wahrnehmung? Und, gegeben der Fall, lassen sich die beiden mentalen Systeme noch klar und sinnvoll unterscheiden? Die Klärung eben solcher Fragen stellt eine der Hauptaufgaben einer psychologisch informierten Philosophie dar.

Diesbezüglich lassen sich zwei verschiedene Strömungen innerhalb der Kognitionswissenschaften identifizieren: die New-(New-)Look und die ‚Joint-in-Nature' Strömung. Die New-Look-Strömung (e.g. Bruner und Postman) sowie ihre kontemporäre Neuformulierung in der New-New-Look-Strömung (e.g. Lupyan) verstehen visuelle Wahrnehmung als kognitiv penetriert, i.e., die Verarbeitungsprozesse der verschiedenen Wahrnehmungssysteme können derart von high-level-Kognitionen beeinflusst werden, dass eine logische Relation zwischen beiden besteht (Pylyshyn 1999). Kognitive Penetration kann alternativ auch als direkter Effekt vom Inhalt der Kognition auf den Inhalt der Wahrnehmung verstanden werden (Block i.V.), welcher – sofern er global auftritt – die Trennlinien zwischen Kognition und Wahrnehmung verschwimmen lässt. Die ‚Joint-in-Nature'-Strömung hingegen, welche hier Ansätze wie die von Firestone und Scholl (2016) und Block (i.V.) bezeichnen soll, beharrt darauf, dass es einen sinnvollen und explanatorisch wichtigen Unterschied zwischen Kognition und Wahrnehmung gibt. Solcherlei Zugänge verpflichten sich in irgendeiner Form der Annahme der *informationalen Verkapselung*, welche besagt, dass Verarbeitungssysteme der Wahrnehmung keine oder nur begrenzt Informationen aus anderen kognitiven Systemen heranziehen können (Fodor 1983). Gibt es informationale Verkapselung, so ist kognitive Penetration eingeschränkt oder ausgeschlossen.

Viele der zentralen Aussagen beider Strömungen basieren auf unterschiedlichen Interpretationen von Top-Down-Effekten der visuellen Wahrnehmung, weshalb der Prüfung der Forschungsmethodologie ein ausgezeichneter Stellenwert zukommt. Da bisher v.a. inhaltsspezifische Typen von Top-Down-Effekten identifiziert wurden (e.g. Firestone & Scholl 2016), aber einige solcher Effekte aus theoretischen Erwägungen keine kognitive Penetration nachweisen können, ist es hier daran gelegen, konzeptuell allgemeine Top-Down-Effekttypen zu unterscheiden. Somit sollen theoretische Voraussetzungen für die Interpretation von Top-Down-Effekten als kognitive Penetration diskutierbar werden.

2. Typen von Top-Down-Effekten

Im *sensu lato* sind mit Top-Down-Effekten Einflüsse von high-level kognitiven Zuständen auf die Erstellung von visuellen Perzepten gemeint. Im *sensu stricto* hingegen betreffen Top-Down-Effekte das Ausmaß der funktionalen Unabhängigkeit des Wahrnehmungsinhalts von high-level-Kognitionen (Firestone & Scholl 2016: 3) und damit das Ausmaß der kognitiven Penetration.

Trotz der breiten und uneinheitlichen Verwendungsweise des Begriffs von Top-Down-Effekten lassen sich mindestens zwei konzeptuell unterschiedliche Typen derselben identifizieren: *Abfolgeeffekte* und *Extern-Intern-Effekte*. Diese Effekttypen sollen im Folgenden inhaltlich charakterisiert, anhand von Fallbeispielen diskutiert und bezüglich ihrer Klassifikation als Fälle kognitiver Penetration evaluiert werden.

Abfolgeeffekte

Erstens lassen sich Top-Down-Effekte identifizieren, bei welchen ein früherer Verarbeitungsprozess einen späteren Verarbeitungsprozess beeinflusst (Prä-Post-Effekte), oder ein späterer Verarbeitungsprozess einen früheren Verarbeitungsprozess beeinflusst (Post-Prä-Effekte). Abfolgeprozesse treten auf, wenn Wahrnehmungsinhalte selektiert werden oder, wenn Wahrnehmungsinhalte einer postperzeptuellen Verarbeitung zugeführt werden. Mit Pylyshyn (1999) beeinflussen Kognitionen den Output der visuellen Wahrnehmung als Abfolgeeffekte in Form der *präperzeptuellen Aufmerksamkeitsallokation* und der *postperzeptuellen Verarbeitung* (ebd.: 341).

Prä-Perzeptuelle Aufmerksamkeitsallokation

Nach Pylyshyn (1999: 353) filtert Aufmerksamkeit gesuchte Signale und blendet Störsignale aus, was u.a. zur Stimulusidentifikation dient. Da die Aufmerksamkeitsallokation häufig direkt durch Intentionen gesteuert werden kann, indem bestimmte Objekte, Eigenschaften oder Orte attendiert werden, wurden Wahrnehmungsphänomene, wie sie u.a. bei ambigen Figuren auftreten, als Fälle von kognitiver Penetration interpretiert. Betrachtet man beispielsweise einen Neckerwürfel (*Abbildung* 1), so scheint es möglich durch bewusste Steuerung der Aufmerksamkeit zwischen den verschiedenen Wahrnehmungsvarianten zu wechseln.

Abb. 1.: (a) Neckerwürfel. (b) und (c) helfen bei der Disambiguierung, indem Tiefencues hervorgehoben werden. Abbildung nach Kornmeier & Bach (2015).

In vielen Fällen beeinflusst Aufmerksamkeit das verarbeitete perzeptuelle Material, nicht aber die Verarbeitung des Materials selbst (Firestone & Scholl 2016: 13-15). Es konnte sowohl für den Neckerwürfel (Toppiono 2003) als auch für andere ambige Figuren gezeigt werden, dass die Wahrnehmungsvariantenwechsel durch perzeptuelle Prozesse erklärbar sind. Welche Wahrnehmungsvariante bei einem Neckerwürfel dominiert, hängt davon ab, welche Ecke des Würfels attendiert wird. Dies lässt sich als Fall von monokularer Rivalität beschreiben (Block i.V.: 16).

Rivalitätsphänomene beruhen auf dem Wahrnehmungsmechanismus der Adaption. Bei Adaptionseffekten (Block i.V.: 6-17) steigen die Schwellen für die Aktivierung von Neuronen, die für die Wahrnehmung bestimmter Eigenschaften zuständig sind. Folglich treten relativ zu den adaptierten Eigenschaften andere Eigenschaften prononcierter auf, was in der Wahrnehmung mehrdeutiger Kippbilder wie in *Abbildung 1* dazu führen kann, dass Wahrnehmungsvariantenwechsel zwischen (b) und (c) sich bei fortwährender Darbietung ständig wiederholen.

Außerdem beginnt die perzeptuelle Disambiguierung bei Neckerwürfeln bereits 120ms nach Stimuluspräsentation in den ersten Stufen der visuellen Verarbeitung, noch bevor intentionale Aufmerksamkeitssteuerung möglich ist (Kornmeier & Bach 2015).

Auch wenn die Aufmerksamkeitsallokation intentionsgesteuert möglich ist, können Aufmerksamkeit und Intention methodisch dissoziiert werden (e.g. durch Induktion von *attentional-load* oder durch Konstanthalten von Intention bei variierenden Aufmerksamkeitsloci). Besteht der Zusammenhang zwischen Intention und Aufmerksamkeitsallokation lediglich in einer zeitlichen Kontiguität, genügt dies nicht, um auftretende Wahrnehmungseffekte als kognitiv penetriert zu klassifizieren. Auch wenn die Intention den aufmerksamkeitsinduzierten Wahrnehmungsphänomenen vorausgeht, bewirkt sie diese nicht und unterscheidet sich so nicht maßgeblich von Fällen, in denen absichtlich ausgeführte Augenbewegungen den Input der visuellen Wahrnehmung verändern (Firestone & Scholl 2016: 13-14).

Post-Perzeptuelle Verarbeitung

Nicht in allen Fällen von Wahrnehmungsphänomenen ist es unmittelbar klar, welche Eigenschaften gesehen werden und über welche Eigenschaften aufgrund post-perzeptueller Verarbeitung des Wahrnehmungsmaterials geurteilt wird. So wurde der Effekt, dass Distanzeinschätzungen sich vergrößern, wenn ein schwerer anstatt eines leichten Balles auf ein Ziel geworfen wird, derart interpretiert, dass die *wahrgenommene Distanz* abhängig von der aufzuwendenden Anstrengung des Wurfes ist (Witt et al. 2004).

Da die Anstrengung der Probanden scheinbar direkt den Wahrnehmungsinhalt beeinflusste, wurde dieser Effekt als Fall von kognitiver Penetration der visuellen Wahrnehmung interpretiert.

Allerdings können derartige Effekte ebenfalls erklärt werden, indem aufgrund von high-level-Kognitionen (e.g. Wissen), die post-perzeptuell auf das Wahrnehmungsmaterial zugreifen, unterschiedliche Urteile gefällt werden: Die Zielentfernung kann unverändert wahrgenommen werden; es wird lediglich ein unterschiedliches Urteil über sie abgegeben. Tatsächlich konnte gezeigt werden, dass Anstrengungseffekte auf Distanzeinschätzungen verschwinden, wenn die Distanzmaße mit Fragen nach der visuellen Distanz erhoben werden, und nur dann auftreten, wenn nicht-visuelle, kognitive Faktoren miterhoben werden (Woods et al. 2009). Unter Verwendung von Forschungsdesigns, die angemessen zwischen Wahrnehmung und post-perzeptueller Verarbeitung unterscheiden, kann dieser Effekt als Effekt auf ein Urteil verstanden werden. Somit qualifiziert er nicht als Fall von kognitiver Penetration.

Außerdem lassen sich Wahrnehmungsprozesse und post-perzeptuelle Urteile anhand von optischen Illusionen konzeptuell unterscheiden: Selbst wenn man um den Sachverhalt einer Müller-Lyer-Täuschung weiß und bewusst urteilen kann, dass beide Linien gleich lang sind, verschwindet der Wahrnehmungseffekt nicht.

Fazit

Insofern Abfolgeprozesse als Fälle von prä-perzeptueller Aufmerksamkeitsallokation oder post-perzeptueller Verarbeitung zu verstehen sind, lassen sie sich nicht als Fälle von kognitiver Penetration klassifizieren, da einmal der Input und einmal der Output der Wahrnehmung beeinflusst wird. Weder die Wahrnehmungsprozesse selbst noch die Wahrnehmungsinhalte werden auf eine direkte Weise verändert. Fälle von prä-perzeptueller Aufmerksamkeitsallokation können als Prä-Post-Abfolgeeffekte verstanden werden, in denen intentional gesteuert Eigenschaften, Orte oder Ereignisse attendiert werden, anschließend aber unbeeinflusst von der Intention perzeptuell verarbeitet werden. Die Fallbeispiele ambiger Figuren – insbesondere des Neckerwürfels – lassen sich als Rivalitätsphänomene erklären. Fälle von post-perzeptueller Verarbeitung können als Post-Prä-Abfolgeeffekte verstanden werden, in denen Wahrnehmungsmaterial nachträglich von high-level-Kognitionen verwendet wird, die Wahrnehmungsprozesse selbst aber unbeeinträchtigt ablaufen. Das Fallbeispiel der anstrengungsabhängigen Distanzeinschätzung kann als nicht-perzeptueller Urteilseffekt erklärt werden.

Extern-Intern-Effekte

Extern-Intern-Effekte sind Top-Down-Effekte, bei denen ein mentales System durch ein anderes, externes menta-

les System beeinflusst wird. Freilich ist nicht jede Beeinflussung zwischen mentalen Systemen ein Top-Down-Effekt, dennoch umfasst dieser Typ einige zentrale Wahrnehmungsphänomene der Kontroverse um kognitive Penetration.

Diesbezüglich lassen sich konzeptuell zumindest zwei Varianten von extern-internen Einflüssen unterscheiden: *systeminterne Effekte und systemexterne Effekte.*

Systeminterne Effekte

Bei den im hier verfolgten Sinn relevanten systeminternen Effekten beeinflussen sich funktional weitgehend unabhängige Subsysteme innerhalb des visuellen Wahrnehmungssystems.

Ein zu Veranschaulichungszwecken geeignetes Wahrnehmungsphänomen betrifft die Figur-Grund Segregation (*Abbildung 2*). Hierbei handelt es sich um global-lokale Top-Down-Effekte, da die Wahrnehmung globaler Aspekte eines Stimulus Einfluss auf die Wahrnehmung lokaler Aspekte desselben Stimulus nimmt (Pylyshyn 1999: 343-344, 353). Genauer gesagt ist die Wahrnehmung der Formen als Figur oder (Hinter-)Grund abhängig von globalen Eigenschaften der Abbildung. Welche globalen Eigenschaften es sind, die die Wahrnehmung der lokalen Eigenschaften bestimmen, wurde in sogenannten Gestaltprinzipien festgehalten (siehe e.g. Todorov 2008).


Abb. 2.: Figur-Grund Segregation. A zeigt die Konturen einer aufrecht stehenden Frau, B die der auf dem Kopf stehenden Frau und C eine durchmischte Variante verschiedener Segmente der Frau. Abbildung nach Block (i.V.: 72).

Nach den für *Abbildung 2* relevanten Gestaltgesetzen sollten dunkle, geschlossene, symmetrische, größtenteils konvexe Formen, die umschlossen von Ihrer Umgebung und kleiner als andere Formen sind, präferiert als Figuren wahrgenommen werden. Dennoch wird die schwarze Form nur in B und C als Figur wahrgenommen, in A allerdings als Grund (Block i.V.: 70-75). Diese Befunde wurden u.a. als Beleg für einen Top-Down-Effekt von Sinnhaftigkeit auf den Wahrnehmungsprozess der Figur-Grund-Segregation im Sinne der kognitiven Penetration interpretiert (Lupyan 2017: 12-13).

Block (i.V.: 71-75) liefert einige Gründe, weshalb es sich hierbei nicht um einen echten Fall von kognitiver Penetration handelt. Erstens genügt eine einzige Darbietung einer neuartigen, sinnlosen Form, um diese in folgenden Testdurchläufen bevorzugt als Figur und nicht als Grund wahrzunehmen (Peterson & Lampignano 2003). Zweitens werden bekannte Formen bevorzugt als Figur wahrgenommen, unabhängig davon, ob die Probanden wissen, was sie sehen (Peterson & Gibson 1993). Auch nach explizitem Hinweis darauf, dass C eine durchmischte Variante der Silhouette der Frau aus *Abbildung 2* A ist, wird die weiße Form in C nicht bevorzugt als Figur wahrgenom-

men. Der erste Befund spricht gegen einen Einfluss von Sinnhaftigkeit und für einen Einfluss von Bekanntheit der Stimuli, wohingegen der zweite Befund gegen konzeptuelle, bewusste Einflüsse und für nicht-konzeptuelle, unbewusste Einflüsse spricht. Drittens zeigen psychopathologische Studien zum perirhinalen Kortex, einem Areal, das perzeptuelle Konfigurationen repräsentiert, dass Probanden mit geschädigtem perirhinalen Kortex die weiße Form in C in gleichen Maßen wie in A als Figur wahrnehmen (Banerse et al. 2012). Viertens treten in dem low-level-Areal V2 der visuellen Wahrnehmung bei gesunden Probanden Präferenzeffekte für die weiße Form in C als Figur auf. Hierbei tritt die konfigurationsunabhängige Bekanntheitspräferenz im perirhinalen Kortex ausschließlich im linken Gesichtsfeld auf, wohingegen die Präferenzeffekte für lokale Eigenschaften in V2 lediglich im rechten Gesichtsfeld auftreten. Die lokale Störbarkeit und die Lateralisierung der Effekte sprechen gegen Effekte der Sinnhaftigkeit und für Effekte innerhalb der visuellen Wahrnehmung.

Folgt man also Blocks Argumentation, reihen sich die global-lokalen Effekte der Figur-Grund-Segregation als Rivalitätseffekte unter paradigmatische Fälle von Wahrnehmungsphänomenen, bei denen Top-Down-Effekte systemintern und ohne kognitive Penetration auftreten.

Systemexterne Effekte

Systemexterne Effekte bezeichnen den Einfluss verschiedener mentaler Systeme aufeinander, sofern beide nicht Subsysteme desselben mentalen Systems sind. Beeinflussen high-level-Kognitionen das visuelle Wahrnehmungssystem in diesem Sinne, so handelt es sich auch im *sensu stricto* um kognitive Penetration.

Eines der meist diskutierten Fallbeispiele betrifft die bildliche Vorstellung. Nicht nur teilt diese viele neuronale Mechanismen mit der visuellen Wahrnehmung (e.g. Howe & Carter 2016), sondern sie kann auch mit dieser integriert werden (Brockmole et al. 2002). Präsentiert man Probanden zwei 5x5 Punktegitter mit jeweils 12 dargestellten Punkten, die übereinander gelegt genau einen fehlenden Punkt aufweisen, so können die Probanden den fehlenden Punkt unterschiedlich akkurat auswählen, abhängig von der Zeitspanne zwischen den einzelnen Gitterdarbietungen. Beträgt die Zeitdifferenz der Gitterdarbietungen 0-50ms, so sind die Probanden beinahe zu 100% akkurat. Bei 100ms Zeitdifferenz sinkt die Genauigkeit etwa auf 50% und die Probanden behalten nur noch 4 der 12 Punkte des ersten Gitters. Während des Anstiegs der Zeitdifferenz auf 1000-1500ms verbessert sich die Genauigkeit wieder auf etwa 90% und hält sich dort konstant bis zu einer Zeitdifferenz von etwa 5000ms.

Die hohe Genauigkeit bis 50ms sowie die niedrige Genauigkeit bei 100ms Zeitdifferenz können wahrnehmungsintern vermittels des visuellen Puffers erklärt werden. Der Genauigkeitsanstieg ab etwa 1000ms deutet allerdings auf eine Integration des mentalen Bildes mit der visuellen Wahrnehmung des zweiten Punktegitters hin (bei 1000ms benötigen Probanden nur noch 300ms, um einen Punkt auszuwählen; es muss daher kein weiteres mentales Bild erstellt werden) (ebd.).

Diese Befunde wurden als Fälle von kognitiver Penetration interpretiert (Block i.V.; Howe & Carter 2016), bei denen high-level-Kognitionen (bildliche Vorstellungen) direkten, inhaltsspezifischen Einfluss auf den Inhalt der Wahrnehmung nehmen (Integration des mentalen Bildes mit der visuellen Wahrnehmung). Derlei Interpretationen wurden e.g. von Firestone und Scholl (2016, R4.1.4.) angegriffen, da damit nicht gezeigt sei, ob man die mentalen Bilder

sieht oder sich ihrer nur *bewusst ist*. Außerdem unterscheiden sich bildliche Vorstellung und visuelle Wahrnehmung durch Eigenschaften wie ihre Lebhaftigkeit, Verarbeitungsgeschwindigkeit und Stimulusabhängigkeit.

Unabhängig davon, ob solche systemexternen Befunde als Fälle von kognitiver Penetration interpretiert werden oder nicht, sind derartige Interpretationen bei diesem Typ von Top-Down-Effekten prinzipiell zulässig.

Fazit

Insofern Extern-Intern-Effekte als systeminterne Effekte zu verstehen sind, lassen sie sich nicht als kognitive Penetration klassifizieren. Das Fallbeispiel der Figur-Grund-Segregation zeigt, dass solche Effekte bekanntheitsabhängig, nicht-konzeptuell, unbewusst, lokal störbar und lateralisiert sind – alles das spricht gegen kognitive Penetration durch Sinnhaftigkeit. Vielmehr sind sie als Rivalitätsphänomene zu verstehen und somit innerhalb des visuellen Wahrnehmungssystems erklärbar. Handelt es sich bei extern-intern-Effekten allerdings um systemexterne Effekte, so ist es prinzipiell möglich, sie als kognitive Penetration zu klassifizieren. Brockmoles (et al. 2002) Fallbeispiel der bildlichen Vorstellung zeigt, dass mentale Bilder mit der visuellen Wahrnehmung integriert werden können, sodass die resultierende Repräsentation aus kognitiven Anteilen der mentalen Bilder und perzeptuellen Anteilen der visuellen Wahrnehmung besteht, weshalb es sich im *sensu stricto* um kognitive Penetration handeln könnte. Diese Interpretationsweisen wurden wiederum von Firestone und Scholl (2016) kritisiert. Entscheidend ist allerdings, dass eine sinnvolle Debatte über den Status als kognitive Penetration ausschließlich innerhalb des Top-Down-Effekttyps der systemexternen Effekte möglich ist.

3. Konklusion

Top-Down-Effekte von high-level-Kognitionen auf die visuelle Wahrnehmung lassen sich konzeptuell in die Typen der Abfolgeprozesse und der Extern-Intern-Prozesse unterteilen. Abfolgeprozesse gliedern sich in Prä-Post- und Post-Prä-Effekte, welche beide keine Fälle von kognitiver Penetration sein können. Extern-Intern-Effekte gliedern sich in systeminterne und systemexterne Effekte, von denen nur systemexterne Effekte als Fälle von kognitiver Penetration in Frage kommen.

Die vorgeschlagenen allgemeinen Typen von Top-Down-Effekten können dazu dienen, Experimentalstudien im Vorhinein so zu planen, dass systemexterne Effekte gefunden werden können. Für die Theoriebildung sie nützlich, um zu klären, bei welchen Top-Down-Effekten sinnvolle Debatten über deren Status als kognitive Penetration überhaupt möglich sind.

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Perception in Kant, McDowell, and Burge

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Abstract

Kant sometimes compares human beings with animals and angels and grants human beings a middle position. But contrary to what one might expect, his transcendental philosophy does not apply well to animals or angels. The question of whether we share perception with animals has no good answer in his system that has to be taken as a single piece and does not allow for introducing steps of empirical, real developments. Differently from Kant, McDowell does compare human beings with animals, but he is not a transcendental philosopher and his attempts to find support in Kant are problematic. Although McDowell says that concepts go "all the way out" and Kant says the categories go "all the way down," which sounds similar, Kant talks of a priori categories, not empirical concepts. Burge is definitely not a transcendental philosopher like Kant. Up front he strongly relies on empirical studies, especially animal perception. Nevertheless, his quest into mental content introduces first-person perspectives that have a metaphysical flavor, and this makes - at least to me - comparisons with Kant tempting again.

The Problem in Kant

In the act of perceiving we are doing something. We are not just passive. Our eyes move, and so do our hands when we touch, feel, and handle an object. Seeing is always seeing-as, hearing is always hearing-as, and they depend on our use of language and our communicating with each other. But is seeing therefore always conceptual? How much do concepts play into perception? Are they always involved? The answers to these questions will of course depend on what we mean by "concepts." Kant has a theory of concepts. For him imagination (*Einbildungskraft*) plays a mediating role between what he calls "intuition" (*Anschauung*) and "concept" (*Begriff*). But how exactly does this work? How free is imagination from concepts, and how much is it guided by them? Kant was certainly aware of the fact that perception is active. Thus he wrote in a footnote of the first *Critique* (1781): "Psychologists have hitherto failed to realise that imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself. This is due partly to the fact that that faculty has been limited to reproduction, partly to the belief that the senses not only supply impressions but also combine them so as to generate images of objects. For that purpose something more than the mere receptivity of impressions is undoubtedly required, namely, a function for the synthesis of them" (A 120). Thus for Kant, receptivity alone does not do it. Synthesis is required. But what kind of synthesis would that be?

Kant famously said that intuitions without concepts are blind. Now perception is usually not blind, which is no wonder, because perception is more than intuition. Perception (*Wahrnehmung*) is by definition "appearance with consciousness" (*Erscheinung mit Bewusstsein*, A 120). It involves consciousness. We may be willing to accept that appearance without consciousness – appearance that is not even potentially conscious – may be called "blind," and "nothing to us," as Kant also says. But what are we buying into when we say that consciousness is involved? What are we buying into when we understand this within the Kantian framework? Will this lead us all the way to Kant's notion of "apperception" with its "original synthetic unity"? Will it lead us to accept the deduction of the categories? The categories are of course not just any concepts. They are *a priori* concepts, and even as such of a special sort. They are not empirical, such as the concept of a chair, or the concept of a bird. When we see something as something, for instance as a chair, the empirical concept of a chair will be involved. But what can we say about the Kant-ian *a priori* categories? When we do not know what a chairs is, we will see it as something or other, or we will at least try to do so. In this way I think the categories will be involved already, in seeing it as a physical object and this, one can argue, involves the categories. But what happens when a bird or infants sees the chair? Will the categories be involved in such cases? That would seem odd. Or are they involved to some kind of degree, or only some of them?

I think that what Kant says about perception is meant for human perception and does not easily apply to perceptions that birds or infants have; the Kantian notion of perception does not work this way. It is more restrictive and more demanding. The *Critique of Pure Reason* talks about perception that rational beings like us have, not about animal perception. Kant at places goes up to angels, but he avoids going down to non-human animals or infants. The reason for this is two-fold, I think. On the one hand he is interested in the higher faculties, such as reason and the understanding. He wants to establish the understanding on firm grounds (in the *Analytic*), and at the same time he wants to limit it (in the *Dialectic*) to avoid confusion. This endeavor reaches far, too far for animals to matter. On the other hand, and this is the second reason I have in mind, Kant is interested in *a priori* justification (*Geltung*), not in the empirical development (*Genesis*), be it development *in* the agent (how experience develops), or *of* the agent (how an agent evolves or develops). He considers rational beings, healthy and grown-up human beings, as we might say.

But many passages in the first *Critique* do read like some kind of empirical description of how experience and cognition develop in time and in agents. This is particularly visible in the Deduction of the categories of the first edition, the so-called "A-Deduction." Kant there describes a development that starts with appearance, becomes perception, and ends up being cognition. He talks of a "three-fold synthesis," which comes in stages and steps: apprehension, reproduction, and recognition. It then seems that concepts, and also the categories, enter only in the last step: recognition. Reading things in this way, one could try to make connections between the first two steps on the one hand, apprehension and reproduction, and perception in animals or infants, or dreams we have, on the other. But I think this will not fit the first *Critique*, because this book is not meant to be read as an account of some kind of empirical genesis, as Kant explicitly says. I think the first steps, contrary to what the readers might think on first

blush, are *not* meant to be complete and self-subsistent. It looks as if they were, but they are not. Apprehension and reproduction, as meant in Kant, do not constitute some kind of perception that can be considered as real and existing independently of the categories. They do not lead to an actual perception of a chair that we have, or to a perception an animal might have.

There are two reasons for this that must be understood in combination. First, what we see, or otherwise perceive, is not chaotic. This is just a fact. Second, the categories must fit to whatever the first steps provide. Otherwise they would not be applicable. Thus the world is already ordered in perception, and it is ordered according to the categories.

Apprehension and reproduction thus lead to representations that are already ordered according to the categories. Here I mean not just the categories of quality and quantity, but also those of causality. The world as it appears is already causally ordered. This is true even when we do not think and just look around. The apple falls down. It does not fly up into the sky. Causality is not added in a second step to something that is already there, such as the perception of a falling apple, even if the A-Deduction seems to suggest this.

McDowell and Kant

Now John McDowell in *Mind and World* has argued against Gareth Evans, who suggested that we think of perception, or perceptual states, or perceptual experiences, as "informational states" with "non-conceptual content" upon which judgments can be based (Evans 227). McDowell's position against Evans is that "one's conceptual capacities have *already* been brought into play, in the content's being available to one, before one has any choice in the matter" (McDowell 11). In other words, "the impressions on our senses that keep the dynamic system in motion are *already* equipped with conceptual content" (ibid.). McDowell tries to draw on Kant. But there is a fundamental difference between these two philosophers, which McDowell is not pointing out. Kant is thinking of *a priori* categories, while McDowell is, as far as I can see, thinking of empirical concepts.

If we think of the Kantian categories and do so from the point of view of transcendental philosophy, we have a point in asking why perception already presents a world that is ordered according to the categories. This is because we do not take it for granted that the world itself is already so ordered. So why should perception be so ordered? Transcendental philosophy argues that it is via the categories as conditions of the possibility of experience that the objects of that experience are so ordered. Then, in a second step, we can argue that this consideration carries over to the objects of perception, as I have indicated above. We then have a point in demanding that the categories go "all the way out" (McDowell 69), that is all the way out to perception and its objects.

Now McDowell talks of concepts going "all the way out," but he does not have *a priori* concepts in mind. As far as I can see, McDowell does not take the position of Kantian transcendental philosophy. But if we do *not* take that transcendental position and think instead of the world in itself from a realist (a transcendental realist Kant would say) point of view, as being ordered independently of our experiencing it, I see no reason why not to accept the idea that perception presents a world in an ordered way *without* the Kantian categories, or any other concepts, being involved and going "all the way out." Hence I see no reason to reject Evan's picture.

The point then is that McDowell *would* have a point and could lean on Kant, if he accepted Kant's transcendental philosophy and thought of the *a priori categories* going "all the way out." But as far as I can see this is not what he does. And he will *not* have a point, if he thinks of *empirical* concepts, which I think is what he does.

Now how should we understand Kant's talk of perception? I think that he introduces perception and synthesis in a *didactic* way and that this has often not been understood. He does not want to confront the reader up front with his idea that the categories go "all the way down to appearances" (A 125), as he says, and as we might put it parallel to McDowell's dictum that concepts go "all the way out." Instead, he develops his arguments in a way that begins with more ordinary and common-sense notions of perception and synthesis, so that it reads as if it were a description of some kind of genesis and temporal development from perception to cognition. I believe Kant thinks that in this way, starting with common-sense notions, he will not put off the reader but win him and lead him gradually to the insight that these common-sense notions need to be modified from a transcendental point of view. The reader will realize, so Kant hopes, that the categories must be involved "from the start," that is, that there is no perception without them. This then is not the ordinary notion of perception. If other creatures do not have the Kantian categories at their disposal, they will not have that kind of perception either. We then also cannot say that we share perception with animals or infants. That might leave us dissatisfied, but I think this is how it is.

This reading of mine is not a generally accepted one. In the German Kant scholarship, I believe Peter Rohs (2001) would not subscribe to it, whereas Hansgeorg Hoppe (1998) might. The problem of how the categories should be understood regarding perception is an old one that for instance Vleeshauwer (1936), Paton (1936), and Beck (1978) have already discussed.

Burge and Kant

Instead of going into the text of the first Critique and argue for my reading of Kant as introducing terms in didactic ways (for this see Wenzel 2005), I rather like to say something about Tyler Burge and Kant. Bringing Kantian considerations into contemporary discussions has always been tempting to me. But it is often very problematic. Burge is not a transcendental idealist. He is a realist, a "transcendental realist" Kant would say. As I understand him, he believes that the world is structured and ordered independently of our experiencing it. It is so structured in itself. Now the point of his "anti-individualism" is that our mental states are what they are *dependently* on the world outside, the world around us. The content of our mental states depends on this environment and also on other people. This dependency extends beyond the here and now into the past and the future. Not everything that is part of an individual's mental state is directly accessible to that individual. This is crucial for Burge and something we do not find in Kant. Sometimes others know better and can spell out aspects of the mental content of that individual's mind that this individual cannot spell out. We can also apply this consideration to ourselves. But then we cannot spell out those details. We cannot spell out what we cannot spell out. We are not Baron von Münchhausen. But at least we can realize that we depend on others and the environment in subtle ways regarding our mental states and their contents. Importantly, this applies to perception and perceptual mental states already. It works already without language, pre-linguistically.

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Differently from Burge, Kant is a transcendental idealist and thinks he can offer an explanation for why the world is ordered the way it is, especially why there is a necessity to causality. He offers such an explanation by relying on the categories, which are derived from our logical functions of judging that are in turn tied to language. Where language comes from is not explained or even problematized. These categories then go all the way through to perception, in fact all the way to appearance (*Erscheinung*), as we have seen. But the argument depends on language and judgment. Burge's argument does not. Simply put, Kant thinks top-down, Burge thinks bottom-up.

For both, Kant and Burge, there is something very basic that works in perception already. In Kant it is the role the categories play in our having representations. For Burge it is the role the environment plays, including our interacting with it, other people, the past, and the future. In Kant, the categories are *a priori*. They are subjective conditions that make objectivity possible. They are often understood, or misunderstood, as being "inside" of us and projected outside. In Burge, the environment is empirical. It offers infinite detail and makes our mental states possible. It is understood as being "outside" of us. After all, it is called an environment. Both inside and outside understandings have to be taken with a grain of salt, because the categories are also part of the objects outside of us, and the environment is, at least partly, part of us, because it partly constitutes our mental states. We are more outside from the start than one might think.

Both also talk of "affection" in perception. But following Kant, we cannot say anything about what affects us if we abstract from time and space and the categories. Abstracting from these, we are left with the thing in itself that we cannot say anything about. Now Burge simply has no such theory of categories and does not think about the world considered independently of them, or beyond them. What matters to Burge is that we can say something about what affects an individual and determines its mind also by going beyond what that individual can make explicit to itself, or by itself. But that does not contradict Kant. It has nothing to do with Kant's thing in itself. In Burge's anti-individualism it is merely important that when considering an individual's mental states there is a way of realizing that there is something that is part of that state and that goes beyond that individual's knowledge and is also not to be found within that individual's brain.

A basic difference between the two is that Kant relies on what he calls "elements," namely time, space, and the categories, and that he relies on them to build a system. Kant offers a more constructivist picture, but it might also appear to be more closed. Burge relies on no such transcendental elements and he does not develop any such system. In his view, Kant over-intellectualizes things. What might be worse, some philosophers after Kant have over-intellectualized things even without being transcendental philosophers.

Here is another way of comparing the two. Burge does not believe in the mind-body or mind-brain identity. Our mental states go beyond our brains and beyond our bodies. The mind cannot be reduced to the brain, nor can it be reduced to behavior. This is part of his anti-individualism. In Kant things get more complicated when we ask such questions. Brain and body are objects in space and as such they are objects "outside us" (*außer uns*, A 22/ B 37). To be more precise, we "represent" (*vorstellen*) them as outside of us. Kant understands "*außer uns*" logically as being different from us. In Kant all reflection goes through representation, not so in Burge. Transcendentally we do not have any location in space. But maybe empirically we do? This seems problematic for the following reason. We cannot be identical to our brains or bodies, because we represent them as "outside of us," that is, we represent them as being different from us. If we were our brains, we would be mistaken in so representing them. But then again, what if we are mistaken? Thus one might arrive at the view that Kant's transcendental philosophy leaves this as an open possibility. Maybe we are our brains and we mistakenly represent ourselves as being different from them.

Kant also uses the word "*Gemüth*," which is usually translated as "mind," and here things get complicated again. He says: "By means of outer sense, a property of our mind [*Gemüth*], we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all without exception in space" (A 22/B 37). The brain would be such an object that we present as being "outside us." Might it be possible that this mind (*Gemüth*) is the brain? An answer to this question is not obvious. But even if the mind is the brain, *we* are not our brain, at least if we are not mistaken in so representing it, because we represent it as "outside of us."

For both Kant and Burge, statements of mind-brain identity theorists such as Paul Churchland, who says that Leibniz did not know how to see thoughts in the brain, as he did not know how to see them in a mill, because he, Leibniz, did not have the insight of modern neuroscience (Churchland 192), would fall victim to criticisms. Certainly we today know more now about the brain than Leibniz did. But Burge would say that Churchland forgets about the neuroscientists and what it took for them to learn how to individuate brain states. It took an environment. For a neuroscientist to have ideas about the brain requires more that the brain of that neuroscientist. Churchland does not think deep enough, Burge might say. Kant on the other hand would say that the brain is an object *for us*, or at least that we represent it as an object for us, which requires time and space and the categories as subjective conditions of experience. Abstracting from these conditions, the brain will be a thing in itself about which we cannot say anything. But *not* abstracting from them will lead us into transcendental philosophy. What we know about the brain will depend on the conditions of experience and on our representing the brain to us as an object outside of us. Hence again, we are not our brains, unless we are mistaken in so representing them. Thus adopting transcendental philosophy seems to undercut the mind-brain identity thesis.

Might Kant also say that these requirements of experience undercut Burge's views about externalism? Burge relies on the environment and thinks of it as being ordered independently of our experiencing it. But Kant's categories might still fit. It is just that in Burge's picture they do not come first and play no necessary, *a priori*, and constitutive role. Burge does not go the Kantian way. He assumes the environment and not the categories. Thus, Burge's view seems more compatible with Kant in comparison with Churchland's view, because he simply does not make the mind-brain identity claim that Paul Churchland is making.

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A Note on Rhees, the *Bemerkungen über Frazers "The Golden Bough"* and *Über Gewißheit*

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Abstract

This paper calls attention to and outlines Rhees' suggestion to publish Wittgenstein's *Bemerkungen über Frazers "The Golden Bough"* together with *Über Gewißheit* in connection with the first German edition of the latter with Suhrkamp in 1970. The presentation of Rhees' proposal and its outcome is based on the correspondence between Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright, and on material found in Rhees' literary estate. The paper illuminates Rhees' work as one of the executors of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass*.

1. Introduction

Rush Rhees was never entirely satisfied with his edition of Wittgenstein's *Bemerkungen über Frazers "The Golden Bough"*. From the time of their discovery in 1962 (MS 110,177-299), 1964 (MS 143) and 1966 (TS 211,313-322), Rhees sought to elucidate the content of these remarks and their place in Wittgenstein's *oeuvre*. Shortly after their first publication in *Synthese* in 1967 – an edition that was rather hastily arranged and prepared – Rhees began an in-depth study of the material. Two years after the publication of a revised version of the *Bemerkungen* in English translation, in *The Human World* in 1971, Rhees wrote to Luciano Foà: "I have now omitted certain passages from the text of the Bemerkungen über Frazer. And I have added (in footnotes) fuller quotations from the Golden Bough […]. I am enclosing a copy of the text as I would publish it now" (24 July 1973). In early 1976, three years before the bilingual so-called *Brynmill* edition, Rhees wrote to Frank Cioffi saying that, if the *Bemerkungen* were to be published again, he would include "the remark in the middle of page 244 of Synthese, and also the remark about two thirds down page 251 – although I think this should not go in that place" (26 February 1976). Prior to the 1973 letter to Foà, Rhees had also abandoned a plan to publish the *Bemerkungen* together with *Über Gewißheit*.

Rhees' enduring dissatisfaction with the three publications can be attributed, not least, to his resistance to the idea that the remarks "should be published by themselves – since this would give rise to queer sorts of misunderstandings" (14 February 1963). For Rhees, the remarks are concerned primarily with the philosophy of language, rather than with anthropology, history, or the philosophy of religion. Rhees emphasises: "Wittgenstein mentions religion in his introductory remarks, but as part of his general discussion. […] We could say he wrote partly from an interest in the 'mythology in our language'" (RFG 18). Prior to the first publication of the *Bemerkungen* in *Synthese* in 1967, a number of editorial approaches were considered, all of which would have focused on and elucidated the philosophy of language aspect. The idea was to publish the *Bemerkungen* in conjunction with other manuscripts. But after discovering that Wittgenstein had included his MS 110 remarks on Frazer in TS 211, where they featured as "separated in a definite way from the rest of the text, but within the general paging" (21 March 1967), Rhees abandoned the various ideas he and von Wright had discussed, deciding instead to publish the material as a separate article. The occasion for this was the planned and imminent publication of *Philosophische Grammatik*. In Rhees' view, the *Bemerkungen über Frazers "The Golden Bough"* would then illustrate one of the many *Denkbewegungen* leading up to the insights in *Philosophische Grammatik*. But even after the publication of the *Bemerkungen* in *Synthese*, Rhees did not abandon his wish to see them published alongside other texts. At some later date! It was a wish that was never fulfilled.

In the following, I shall sketch one of the attempts Rhees made to realise this wish. Rhees started his initiative a few years after the first publication of the *Bemerkungen* in 1967. This he did in connection with the work on the first edition of *Über Gewißheit* for Suhrkamp in 1970. My account of Rhees' ideas brings together several narratives, one about Rhees' reflections on the content of the *Bemerkungen*, one about his ideas concerning how the material should be presented, one about certain editorial decisions relating to the publication of *Über Gewißheit* with Suhrkamp in 1970, and one about the way the trustees of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* dealt (in this case) with a proposal concerning the form and content of one of Wittgenstein's posthumous publications.

The following sketch is based on the correspondence between Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright, today in the keeping of the Finnish National Library and the von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives, Helsinki, and the Richard Burton Archives, Swansea.

2. The suggestions

In parallel with the final preparations for the publication of *Philosophische Grammatik* in the summer of 1969, Siegfried Unseld, the director of the German publisher of Wittgenstein's work, Suhrkamp, suggested that *Über Gewißheit* should be published as a single-language German edition. The text had already been published by Basil Blackwell earlier the same year as the now familiar bilingual edition. The Suhrkamp edition would contain a short preface, and in June, Rhees asked von Wright whether he would be prepared to write it. What Suhrkamp wanted was "a small and comparatively inexpensive" book that gives an impression of Wittgenstein's late thought. Rhees wrote to von Wright that Unseld "wanted to know whether this was a work [OC] from which people who bought the volume would get something, even if they had not studied the other writings of Wittgenstein". And he added: "I was more hesitant here, but I said I thought very many would (assuming that they had some interest in philosophy)." "It seemed to me that people could get something out of it who would not have the equipment or the patience to tackle the Tractatus or the Untersuchungen" (18 June 1969). It

was decided they should go ahead with the publication, and following a meeting between Rhees and von Wright in Cambridge in November 1969, Rhees reluctantly agreed to prepare a "Vorwort". During their meeting, von Wright read some of Rhees' notes on *On Certainty*. A short while later, Rhees wrote to von Wright: "I was grateful but surprised by your remarks on the stuff I had jotted down for Unseld on Über Gewißheit. I will try to make it into some sort of Einleitung; but I almost invariably fail: and when people depend on me I let them down" (12 November 1969).

Early in the new year, Unseld came with a new suggestion: to publish Wittgenstein's *A Lecture on Ethics* together with *Über Gewißheit*. Following a meeting with Unseld in March, Rhees wrote to von Wright and Anscombe: "Unseld suggested printing this [LE ("in Franz Wurm's German translation")] in the same volume with Über Gewißheit. At first I thought it incongruous. On second thought, I was inclined to think it as a good idea" (5 March 1970). Unseld's idea, Rhees continued, was that the volume should "be one that may introduce Wittgenstein to a wider circle of readers than the volumes printed so far can. And the Lecture on Ethics is more 'gemeinverständlich' than anything else Wittgenstein has written" (5 March 1970). Rhees is open to the suggestion and draws attention to "the letter to Ficker which speaks of the Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung, and says 'der Stoff wird Ihnen ganz fremd erscheinen. In Wirklichkeit ist er Ihnen nicht fremd, denn der Sinn des Buches ist einer Ethischer'." Perhaps a corresponding parallel could be emphasised in connection with the late thought. In his letter to von Wright and Anscombe, Rhees makes the point that: "That letter cannot be applied like that to the remarks of Über Gewißheit. But I had thought that if I could add to the sogenannte Vorwort which I have written, and which I have sent you, – if I could add to this a sketch of changes in his way of discussing ethics between the time of the Lecture and the time of these last remarks, using perhaps some of the material which I did include as an appendix to the Lecture, and if possible bringing it up more closely to 1951 – then the volume containing the Lecture and the remarks on Gewißheit would be a better introduction to Wittgenstein's ways of thinking than either of them alone could be. In particular, I should welcome a corrective to the idea that his views on ethics can be understood without seeing them in relation to his views on logic or philosophy" (5 March 1970).

Thus Unseld's suggestion to include *A Lecture on Ethics* presents an opportunity to trace a line of development in Wittgenstein's thought that would constitute, in part, a clarification of his "views on ethics", in part an introduction to his late philosophy, and in part an introduction to central themes in *Über Gewißheit*. Rhees is enthusiastic about the suggestion, but at the same time a little hesitant. At the end of his letter, Rhees adds: "So I am now, on the whole, in favour of the idea. Maybe you think it is haywire" (5 March 1970). Rhees considered the matter further. And as an outcome of his seminar on *On Certainty*, which had just begun in Swansea, and of his efforts to "see connexions" and "find *intermediate cases*" in Wittgenstein's late work, Rhees believed he now recognised a hitherto unnoticed early treatment of themes that would later become central to Wittgenstein's thought in *Über Gewißheit*. He contacted Anscombe and von Wright with some urgency. In the early evening of 10 March 1970, each received a telegram from Rhees. It said: "propose including between ethics Lecture and certainty / notes on frazer pages 234 to 242 and 247 to 252 many / reasons for this if you object please signal otherwise proceeding / rhees" (10 March 1970).

3. The replies

The suggestion to include an abridged version of *Bemerkungen* in the edition of *Über Gewißheit* was Rhees' own. He saw a possibility to publish the *Bemerkungen* together with other manuscripts, which was Rhees' original plan for publication. He had a variety of reasons for the suggestion. To Rhees' mind there were a number of "connexions" between the *Bemerkungen* and *Über Gewißheit*. Immediately after the publication of the *Bemerkungen* in 1967, Rhees began to study them in detail, taking the *Synthe*se edition as his basis. He undertook a final phase of this work in the years 1971–1975, concurrently with his seminars on *Über Gewißheit*, in which he insisted that the questions Wittgenstein discusses go back as far as 1930. In his thorough analysis of the *Bemerkungen*, Rhees points out "certain connexions" between these and the very late remarks. For example, he writes: "ad Frazer […] Connexion between (certain of the ideas in) Über Gewissheit. […] Weltbild: Das Characteristische des primitiven Menschen ist das er nicht aus Meinungen handelt" (7–9 January 1971). And: "ad Frazer // In certain contexts, perhaps, we can say Darstellung – portrayal // p.239 //A man's shadow, his image or reflection (e.g. in water) …. / (cf. the words 'ghost' and 'shade')" / "… in short /that/ everything that a human being observes round and about him year in, year out … should play a role in his thinking (his philosophy) and his customs (practices), goes without saying – this is what we really know (contra Frazer) and what is interesting." // cf.: "Die eigentlichen Grundlagen seines Forschens fallen dem Menschen gar nicht auf …" // "Grundlagen seines Forschens": cf Weltbild in Über Gewißheit." (11 February 1971).

Anscombe's response was prompt and direct. She called Rhees by phone and rejected the suggestion he had made in his telegram. *Über Gewißheit* should be published on its own. Rhees was dismayed by this categorical rejection. He wrote to von Wright: "In any case, there was no opportunity to discuss the proposal for the volume. Probably discussion would not have achieved anything" (19 March 1970). Shortly before, von Wright had told Rhees of his reservations about including *A Lecture on Ethics* in a publication, and he now repeated his misgivings in connection with Rhees' latest proposal. *Über Gewißheit* should be published without any accompanying texts. Rhees wrote to von Wright: "Elizabeth was more emphatic in her veto of the suggestion that the Ethik Vortrag be printed with Über Gewißheit remarks. And I telegraphed Unseld to drop the idea. I am sorry to have put you to extra trouble" (19 March 1970). But Rhees was annoyed. He felt that Anscombe and von Wright had not listened to his suggestion, that they had been unwilling to consider his arguments, on the one hand, for his accommodating attitude to Unseld's suggestion, on the other for his own proposal to include the *Bemerkungen*. One of the reasons for this reluctance was Anscombe's and von Wright's assumption that the remarks in *Über Gewißheit* constitute a relatively well-defined and continuous treatment of a certain set of themes. Rhees was sceptical about this assumption. He had criticised it on earlier occasions, maintaining that their "Preface" in *On Certainty* was "misleading" in that it placed too much emphasis on this assumption, thereby "prevent[ing] people from recognizing the constant connexions between these remarks and his [Wittgenstein's] earlier discussions" (18 June 1969).

Rhees told von Wright about the impression Anscombe's rejection of his suggestion had made on him, and carefully repeated his reservations about Wright's and Anscombe's assumptions and decision. Rhees wrote:

I did have the impression that she had not seen the case there <u>could</u> be for including the Ethik Vortrag and the Bemerkungen über Frazer. But this 'impression' may be quite wrong. She feels strongly that the remarks 'On Certainty' (I am not altogether happy about the title, but I cannot think of another) – that these remarks should appear by themselves. Sometimes I have wondered if she does not look on those remarks as much more abgeschlossen than (I believe) they are. (19 March 1970)

4. The reasons

But what were Rhees' reasons for suggesting the inclusion of the *Bemerkungen*? What did Rhees have in mind? These questions can be answered by paying careful attention to Rhees' "Vorwort" to *Über Gewißheit* and to a letter he wrote to von Wright in March 1970. In the "Vorwort" he starts by arguing that Wittgenstein's references to G.E. Moore in the remarks do not mean that we can regard *Über Gewißheit* as "ein Stück Polemik". Wittgenstein mentions Moore's so-called "Erfahrungssätze" because, he believes, "sie spielen alle eine eigentümliche Rolle in unserem Sprechen und Denken" and that an investigation into this role "führt zu einem besseren Verständnis der menschlichen Sprache, des Denkens und des Sprachspiels". Rhees then reiterates Wittgenstein's well-known grammatical observation concerning Moore's erroneous use of the phrase "I know ...", in connection with the specific "empirical propositions which we affirm without special testing; propositions, that is, which have a peculiar logical role in the system of our empirical propositions" (OC 136). The so-called "hinge propositions", which "stand fast for me" and which are not linked to any kind of verification or refutation (OC 234), and which constitute the "scaffolding" of our thoughts. These are the "hinges" on which our acting and language turn. Collectively, these sentences form a system, or entirety, which the child, so to speak, "swallows [...] together with *what* it learns" (OC 143). Rhees emphasises that these experiential sentences, which we "swallow", constitute a system that we take for granted. "Sie bilden nicht eine Hypotese." This system reflects a "Weltbild", in other words, a horizon of self-evident things that we take for granted and which form the foundation and background of the language, a world-picture the individual could never invent for himself, but which he learns as a child. "I say world-picture and not hypothesis, because it is the matter-of-course foundation [die selbstverständliche Grundlage] for" our acting, thinking etc. (OC 167). For the same reason, we cannot penetrate behind the world-picture here with the aim of verifying or justifying it: "it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there – like our life" (OC 559). It would be meaningless to seek to verify a world-picture. A world-picture "is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false" (OC 94). Rhees adds that another of Wittgenstein's concerns in *Über Gewißheit* is to describe "wie es wäre, wenn zwei Völkern mit radikal verschiedenen Weltbildern in Berührung kämen". Rhees includes the quote: "Supposing we met people who did not regard [being guided in my actions by the propositions of physics] as a telling reason. Now, how do we imagine this? Instead of the physicist, they consult an oracle. (And for that we consider them primitive.) Is it wrong for them to consult an oracle and be guided by it? – If we call this 'wrong' aren't we using our language-game as a base from which to *combat* theirs?" (OC 609)

Although there is no direct reference to the *Bemerkungen* in the foreword, Rhees' comments can be linked to the early remarks on Frazer. In his notes on Fra-

zer's *The Golden Bough* Wittgenstein is similarly concerned to establish "ein bessere[s] Verständnis der menschlichen Sprache, des Denkens", and to explore the "inherited background" in the language of magic and religion. And in these early remarks, Wittgenstein also points out that the forms of action and the world picture of the magician are not rooted in reasons. "<u>Weltbild</u>: 'Das Charakteristische des primitiven Menschen ist das er nicht aus <u>Meinungen</u> handelt.'" And finally, Frazer's account of magical and religious actions can be perceived as an illustration of the situation when "two principles [world-pictures] really do meet which cannot be reconciled", when "each man declares the other a fool and heretic" (OC 611). Wittgenstein writes in the *Bemerkungen*: "What narrowness of spiritual life we find in Frazer! And as a result: how impossible for him to understand a different way of life from the English one of his time!" (RFG 31). In short: *Über Gewißheit* is stimulated by interests that were already in evidence in the early 1930s.

In direct response to Anscombe's and von Wright's rejection of his suggestion, Rhees wrote again to von Wright. This time he presented some of his "many reasons" for wanting to include *A Lecture on Ethics* and the *Bemerkungen* alongside *Über Gewißheit* – the same reasons alluded to in his telegram. Rhees draws attention to the way the remarks in *Über Gewißheit* "point to discussions outside these remarks". One example of an overlap is *Philosophical Investigations* Part IIxi: "What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – *forms of life*." And Rhees adds: "The <u>Bemerkungen über Frazer</u> are a discussion of the <u>Bildhaftigkeit der Sprache</u> or of <u>Sprache als Darstellung</u>. They show that the question 'Why do people perform this and that form of ritual?' is one form of asking: 'Why do people speak?' [...] What is important is: that when something deeply disturbing happens; or when people are alive to what is constantly there and constantly crucial in their lives – birth, death, illness, madness, the change of the seasons ... ; then people do speak, or do carry out some sort of Darstellung. – To ask 'Why?' is to weaken the impression of what happens. Compare: Someone's friend is killed, and he sings a lament. 'Why?' Die Sprache muss für sich selbst sprechen. Der Ritus muss für sich selbst sprechen." Rhees' emphasis on "an absolute sense" of a word as adduced by Wittgenstein in *A Lecture on Ethics*, and the mention of "the experience of seeing the world as a miracle" – and, one might add, "the experience of feeling <u>absolutely</u> safe" no matter what happens – are examples of things that we take for granted, and which make up the "background against which I distinguish between true and false" (OC 94). Rhees ends his letter: "Elizabeth's point was: that if the <u>Lecture on Ethics</u> were in the same volume, it could only be something 'tacked on' to <u>Über Gewißheit</u>. I wonder." (19 March 1970)

5. The reaction

Rhees' suggestion to include *Bemerkungen über Frazers 'The Golden Bough'* in the German edition of *Über Gewißheit* was rejected by Anscombe and von Wright in March 1970. So too was Unseld's suggestion to include *A Lecture on Ethics*. Moreover, in May, Unseld rejected Rhees' "Vorwort" to *Über Gewißheit*. The following June, Rhees wrote to von Wright that Unseld "thinks this Einleitung sich 'doch zu sehr an einen ausgesuchten Fachkreis richtet', and he does not want to print it with this volume which is appearing in a series not directed to any Fachkreis." Rhees adds: "I suppose he is right. I fear that Wittgenstein's own remarks in the book will not be as intelligible to the general reader as Unseld wants them to be. But I hope I am wrong about this." *Über Gewißheit* was

published later in the year with the now familiar "Vorwort" by Anscombe and von Wright from the bilingual edition. Rhees' criticisms of their wording remained unheeded.

Rhees' reaction to the dismissal was admirable. He extended and deepened his analysis of the *Bemerkungen*, his work taking the form of a detailed exegetic commentary on the *Synthese* edition. He continued this research until 1975, by which time it filled some 350 handwritten and typed pages. This material is now in the keeping of the Richard Burton Archives at Swansea University. Rhees' lecture on "Religious Belief. Ritual and Myth" at King's College in March 1974, his well-known article "Wittgenstein on Language and Ritual" from 1976, and his Tübingen lecture from April 1977 are all outcomes of this immense work.

In the summer of 1970, Rhees received a request from a colleague who was in the process of launching a new journal, *The Human World*, "devoted to the discussion on criticism of various aspects of learning and culture". The colleague wanted to publish an English translation of the *Bemerkungen*. Rhees wrote to von Wright: "One of the graduate students in the German Department at Swansea did a translation, which is tolerable, although it would need some corrections. I would undertake to put right any howlers in it, although I could not make it into something really good. […] The translation, or an improvement on it, could be published elsewhere later on" (30 July 1970). Thus, following the abandoned plan for a publication, Rhees became involved in a new, separate publication of the *Bemerkungen*. But he did not exclude the possibility of a third edition at a later date. In the summer of 1971, the *Remarks on Frazer's 'Golden Bough'* appeared in *The Human World*. The text differs from that of the *Synthese* edition and is accompanied by a more extensive "Introductory Note". In this Rhees builds directly on his rejected "Vorwort" to *Über Gewißheit*. He emphasises that, in the

Bemerkungen Wittgenstein is already giving serious thought to what "belongs to the foundations", a theme alluded to in the *Bemerkungen* with the words "everything a man perceives year in, year out around him". Rhees adds: "Wittgenstein was writing about this 20 years later in his remarks *On Certainty*. His conception there of the 'world picture' (*Weltbild*) in which we live and think and act contains developments not thought of in the remarks on Frazer" (RFG 21-22).

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The Non-Perceptual View and an Alternative Theory of Hallucinations

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Abstract

The non-perceptual view has had a strong impact on the philosophy of perception and when coupled with the possibility of hallucinations, it opens an easy route to rejecting relationalism. Relationalism as a theory of perceptual states is typically dismissed on the grounds that its commitment to a common factor is incompatible with the non-perceptual view of hallucinations. But if an illusionist theory of hallucinations is tenable, then the non-perceptual view of hallucinations is not a view that relationalists about perception must accept. An alternative illusionist theory of hallucinations allows us to maintain that hallucinations do involve perceptual contact with the surroundings. We have little reason to think that any of our basic observations about hallucinations establish that hallucinations are independent from their surroundings. Nor is this established by the fact that hallucinations do not systematically vary with the surroundings.

Hallucinations as part of the errors of perception are interesting cases, since they occur in a situation where there is no perceptual contact with the objects of the surroundings. However, the subject who is hallucinating experiences objects and properties, even when there are no appropriate objects to be related to. When a subject perceives their mind-independent surroundings, then it is intuitive to think of perception as constitutively involving a conscious and sensory relation between the subject and the surroundings. We can call this relation perceptual contact. Perception is, at least primarily, a matter of perceptual contact with worldly objects, where a worldly object is a particular object or event that is part of the material and mind-independent world. This would be a relational view of perception. Relationalism as the theory of perception simply generalizes the intuitive characterization of perception to all perceptual states, which is a widely accepted as: the property of a perceiver being in a perceptual state is identical to the property of a perceiver being in perceptual contact with some worldly objects. It preserves a common sense view of perception and it provides a common factor treatment of perceptual states. In this sense, the view carves a middle way between disjunctive relationalism and common-factor representationalism, and so combines their appealing features.

Philosophers typically distinguish hallucinations not only from perception, but also from illusions. Unlike hallucinations, which are thought to 'cut us off' from our surroundings, illusions are typically thought to be cases of misperceiving that involve perception, albeit in a distorted manner. If perception puts us in contact with the surroundings, and hallucinations cut us off from them, then hallucinations cannot involve perceptual contact with the surrounding objects, and are thereby not cases of perception. We can call this widely accepted view, which separates hallucination from perception in this way, the non-perceptual view of hallucinations: Hallucinations do not involve (and are thereby not cases of) perception.

The non-perceptual view has had a strong impact on the philosophy of perception. When coupled with the possibility of hallucinations, the view opens an easy route to rejecting relationalism. In addition, the view is implicit in a central disagreement within the contemporary philosophy on perception, between common factor and disjunctive views of perceptual states and it has shaped our extant theories of hallucination.

Consider the debate between disjunctive and common factor views of perceptual states (Haddock et al. 2011). These views disagree on whether all perceptual cases are similarly constituted. Disjunctivists deny that all cases share a fundamental characterization, while common factor theorists accept this. But the way these strategies have been deployed makes sense only if we assume the truth of the non-perceptual view. Disjunctivists are typically seeking to preserve a common sense relational view of perception (Martin 2006; Brewer 2011). Since they accept the non-perceptual view, they think that hallucinations do not involve perception, and so reject relationalism as a theory of all perceptual states. But to preserve relationalism about perception, they separate their characterizations of hallucination and perception by appealing to a disjunctive metaphysics. Like disjunctivists, common factor theorists also accept the non-perceptual view. Without that commitment, common factor theorists could easily accept relationalism for all perceptual states, as that would be the most straightforward common factor theory. Relationalists about perception would have little reason to oppose them if they did, since both views would preserve the common sense picture of perception.

Next consider the non-perceptual view's impact on contemporary theories of hallucination. If we assume the non-perceptual view then any theory of hallucinations must begin with denying some feature of perception in hallucinations, rather than adding further components to perception. Some views deny the relationality of hallucinations. Kennedy (2013) argues that since the concept of phenomenal character does not 'cut perceptual states at the joints', relationalists can accept that hallucinatory states possess their character through the possession of a non-relational property. Others accept that hallucinations are relational, but deny that they involve relations to worldly objects. Instead, hallucinations are thought to relate us to extra worldly objects, objects other than the ordinary particulars of the mind-independent world.

Must we accept the non-perceptual view of hallucinations? I will argue that we need not. The contemporary received view assumes that misperception compromises perception in two fundamentally distinct ways. While illusions involve perception, hallucinations do not. This view shapes contemporary debates, but if we turn to the early modern period, we see a different way of understanding misperception. The early moderns did not sharply distin-

guish between cases of illusion and hallucination. As such, both cases were thought to show that we are not in perceptual contact with ordinary worldly objects, but with intermediaries. For instance, both Descartes' evil demon case (which is a case of hallucination) and Hume's argument from illusion were thought to establish that we do not have direct experience of the mind-independent world.

If we call the early modern view hallucinism for treating illusions as contemporary philosophy treats hallucinations, we can call the alternative illusionism, since it treats hallucinations as illusions are currently treated. Both are monist theories of misperception, but illusionism rejects the non-perceptual view. Whether we accept illusionism as a monist theory of misperception or not, we can accept an illusionist theory of hallucination, on which hallucinations involve perceptual contact with the surroundings, and are thereby cases of perception.

Illusionist theories of hallucination might not be common or intuitive, but they have received more attention recently from relationalists. At least three philosophers have adopted illusionist views of varying strength. Alston (1999) considers that hallucinations involve relations to the empty space in which a hallucination is located, to the air in that location, or to one's own brain. Watzl (2010) argues that we should accept an illusionist theory for all hallucinations. Raleigh (2014) has argued that causally matching hallucinations should be understood as involving perceptual contact with our surroundings. In addition, both Chalmers (2005) and Gallagher and Zahavi (2012) have defended philosophical views that suggest an illusionist treatment of envattment cases.

We could employ Watzl's (2010) smooth transition argument, to show that all hallucinations are constituted in the same way as veridical perception. At least two observations lend plausibility to the idea that harder cases of hallucination can be analysed as other cases can. First, it may be argued that different cases are similarly constituted because hallucinations of different types are phenomenally indistinguishable. Just as common factor theorists think that the indistinguishability of veridical and hallucinatory states makes a case for accepting a common core to perceptual states, so the illusionist can take the indistinguishability of different hallucinations to lend plausibility to the idea that they share a common factor. Since easier cases are relational, so are harder ones. (Raleigh: 2014) This strategy, however, has two shortcomings. One is that hard cases might not be phenomenally indistinguishable from easier cases. Another is that the inference from phenomenal indistinguishability to a common factor has often been rejected by disjunctivists.

But even without appealing to phenomenal indistinguishability, it is reasonable to think that different types of hallucinations lie on a single continuum, and that there are no differences in kind between them. For example, Fish (2009) thinks that pure hallucinations do lie on a continuum with other cases. While Fish (2009) does not infer a similarity of constitution from the existence of a continuum, Watzl (2010) does. Watzl (2010) argues for a uniform analysis of hallucinations by way of defending a relationalist picture, on which all perceptual states involve perceptually attending to particular, spatiotemporally located, material objects and events. Against the argument from hallucination, he develops a 'smooth transition' argument which extends the treatment of veridical cases to hallucinatory ones.

The smooth transition argument establishes that different perceptual states are alike, but when coupled with relationalism about perception, it entails that hallucinations

involve perceptual contact with worldly objects. The argument proceeds through four basic types of scenarios, arguing that there is no non-arbitrary line one can draw between adjacent cases (Watzl 2010: 243):

Type 1: cases of being perceptually related to a tomato.

Type 2: cases of being related to objects that are qualitatively identical to a tomato. These range from ordinary solid objects (e.g. a wax tomato), to exotic objects such as light projections or perceptible magnetic fields.

Type 3: cases of being related to 'diffuse' objects, objects with parts located in different places, but arranged in such a way (with the help of lenses, prisms, and other light dispersing objects) so as to appear as a single object, a tomato, before one.

Type 4: cases of being related to progressively closer stimuli, first moving closer to the retina, then becoming direct stimulations of the retina, and finally penetrating the perceiver's body and becoming direct stimulations of various inner parts.

If no non-arbitrary line can be drawn between adjacent cases, then it cannot be that some states relate us to worldly objects while others do not. The difference must therefore lie in what we are in perceptual contact with, not in whether or not we are in perceptual contact. What we call hallucinatory cases are just cases that relate us to worldly objects that are unusual in certain ways. Watzl focuses on extending the analysis of veridical cases to hallucinatory ones, rather than the analysis of some hallucinatory cases to others. When we consider these scenarios, it is clear that the first three involve ordinary perceptual contact, albeit with unusual worldly objects. When we turn to the fourth type, we see that the cases in this category conclude by introducing a new type of perceptual contact, one that takes place between the perceiver and an object internal to the perceiver's body. Watzl accepts these internal objects because he rejects 'the externality principle', which states: If you are perceptually attending to an object or event, then that object or event is part of your external environment. (Watzl 2010: 253)

In defense of his rejection, Watzl writes: "As the smooth transition argument shows there is no clear line between what is external to the subject's body and what is inside her body. Is, for example, the vitreous humor (the clear gel inside the eyeball) internal or external to the subject's body?" (Watzl 2010: 254) Watzl is right to point out that what counts as external to the subject's body is somewhat arbitrary for a certain range of objects. One might still think there are clearly internal cases and clearly external ones, but all Watzl's argument needs is some internal objects we can perceptually attend to, since these can serve for different hard hallucinations. Watzl is also right to reject the externality principle itself, as it is not clear why one should think that we are unable to perceptually attend to objects that are internal to the body, and perhaps also internally generated by the body. At least two examples come to mind: seeing one's eyelids, which are internal to the body; and seeing phosphenes, which are internal to our visual apparatus, and in some cases generated internally. (Davis et al. 1976)

Hallucinations might possess a sensory phenomenal character that differs from that of perception (e.g. they might have the sensory character we associate with imagining, memory, or dreaming) and so might not be indistinguishable from perception, or they might present us with objects that perception cannot present e.g. they might pre-

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sent objects with contradictory properties, as is thought to happen in the waterfall illusion.

An alternative illusionist theory of hallucinations allows us to maintain that hallucinations do involve perceptual contact with the surroundings. We have little reason to think that any of our basic observations about hallucinations establish that hallucinations are independent from their surroundings. That what we hallucinate is inappropriate to the surroundings does not establish a lack of perceptual contact. Nor is this established by the fact that hallucinations do not systematically vary with the surroundings. And finally, even the hardest cases of hallucinations do not establish this.

If an illusionist theory of hallucinations is tenable, then the non-perceptual view of hallucinations is not a view that relationalists about perception must accept. Relationalism as a theory of perceptual states is typically dismissed on the grounds that its commitment to a common factor is incompatible with the non-perceptual view of hallucinations, but the illusionist theory shows that this quick dismissal is premature. Intuitively hallucinations put us in contact with things that are 'not there' in a way that perceptions and illusions don't. Hallucinations are also taken to be private in a way perceptions are not. The arguments here make it plausible to think that hallucinations are relational, but they do not explain how, or by virtue of what, hallucinations differ from perceptions. Moreover, various features of hallucinations remain mysterious.

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Intentionality, Generality and Grammatical Space

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Abstract

The later Wittgenstein's treatment of intentionality is characterised by a rejection of mental representation and by a focus on grammatical rules like 'the thought that *p* is the thought made true by the fact that *p'*. This has been criticised for being an incomplete and therefore insufficient conception of intentionality, because it does not account for cases in which a general expectation is fulfilled by a specific event that was not foreseen: the thought that *p* can be fulfilled by the fact that *q*. Although this argument has been shown to be problematic, I want to take it as a starting point to think in a different direction: Wittgenstein considered generality a serious problem, which is related to the concepts of infinite possibility and indefiniteness that are central to his later philosophy. Mainly discussed in mathematical contexts, they can help us to better understand intentionality too.

Intentionality and Generality in Wittgenstein's manuscripts

Shortly after I had read the MSS 105-112, I came across an argument between Tim Crane and Peter Hacker about Wittgenstein's account of intentionality. Their papers touch many issues that occur in those manuscripts, but sometimes their interpretations differ from how I had read the respective passages and sometimes I felt that important remarks that belong to this topic were missing. Instead of attacking either of the authors, I would rather like to take up some of their ideas, compare them with what I have found in the manuscripts and emphasise a neglected aspect of the problem of intentionality in Wittgenstein's writings.

Crane, who is an acknowledged expert in philosophy of mind but not primarily a Wittgenstein scholar, restricts himself to the publications *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Philosophical Grammar*, and *Philosophical Investigations*; he does not take into account the manuscripts where the problems occur in a broader context. This and slight differences in the use of central concepts naturally provoke objections from a Wittgensteinian perspective. However, I do think that his arguments can be an interesting challenge and inspiration for Wittgenstein scholars who sometimes tend to think in a very idiosyncratic *Gedankenkreis*. I am tempted to say about Crane what Wittgenstein says about Augustine: that what he says is important for us "because it is a view by a man who thinks naturally and clearly and who does certainly not belong to our special way of thinking" (Wi4: 10). Reacting to what he finds in the publications, Crane comes up with a reasonable objection to the puzzling claim that the connection between thought and world is merely a grammatical matter. I basically agree with Hacker's answer to this objection, but I find it very brief and it misses an aspect that I regard important: Crane's argument raises the issue of generality in propositions and this was indeed a great problem for Wittgenstein in the 1930s as is clearly visible in the manuscripts of that time. After briefly discussing the two papers and their arguments, I will look at the pertinent remarks in the manuscripts and try to expose the role generality plays in Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality.

Crane's objection and Hacker's answer

In contemporary philosophy of mind, intentionality is understood as "the mind's direction on its objects" (Crane 2010: 88, quoting Brentano); the concept occurs in Wittgenstein's writings as "the harmony between thought and reality". It is a central problem in his philosophy at all stages even though he does not use the word intentionality[1]. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein tackles the problem with the idea that thoughts are logical pictures of facts. Hacker points out what is not adequately appreciated in Crane's presentation of the picture theory: that a picture represents a *possibility* and thereby remains the same picture whether the thought is true or false. This enabled Wittgenstein to solve the "Platonic" problem of non-existent intentional objects: if thinking is always thinking of something that exists, then he who thinks falsely seems to think nothing, and hence not to think at all. That "one can *think* what is not the case" may be a truism for common sense (PI: 95), but it poses a challenge to any account of intentionality: how can the mind relate to something that does not exist? Wittgenstein's answer in the *Tractatus* is: the thought is a picture and shares with reality the possibility that its elements are arranged the same way as the objects are arranged in reality: the logical form. Another metaphor which neither Crane nor Hacker mention is that of "logical space" in which possible situations are determined by "logical coordinates". This idea is intimately connected with the picture theory and serves a similar purpose by providing a way to deal with *all* possibilities – in logic nothing can be "merely possible" (TLP: 2.0121) – and to represent what is not the case by understanding a proposition and its negation as complementary regions in logical space (Pilch 2017: 18ff.).

Wittgenstein's later account of intentionality centres on the agreement between thought and fact, but it also occurs in various other forms with similar structure: a wish and its satisfaction, an order and its execution, an expectation and its fulfilment all seem to be problematic cases of intentionality where the mind's object does not (yet) exist. Wittgenstein's growing scepticism towards mental representation drives him away from the picture theory towards his new method of grammatical investigation. He argues that intentionality is a purely grammatical issue and not, strictly speaking, a relation between thought and reality: "Like everything metaphysical the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language" (PG: 162). Grammar is in a sense self-contained, autonomous. The only connection between an expectation and its fulfilment is that they are grammatically related: "It is in language that an expectation and its fulfilment make con-

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[1] He does use the word "Intention", but not in the technical sense used in phenomenological discourses. It rather oscillates between the concepts of "Absicht" and "Meinung" which are, of course, related with the wider problem of intentionality.

tact" (PI: 445). Crane takes this as a reduction of intentionality to mere rules of signs like "the expectation that *p* is the expectation that is fulfilled by the fact that *p*". The only "harmony" here is the occurrence of *p* in both expressions. The same words are used in the expression of an expectation and in the description of the fact which fulfils the expectation.

However, we can easily think of a case where an event fulfils an expectation even though we did not expect exactly *this* event. "The expectation that *p* can be be fulfilled by the fact that *q*, where *q* and *p* are not the same fact". Crane illustrates his objection with an example: if I expect the postman bringing my mail, but I do not know that Mr Smith is a postman, then the event of Mr Smith bringing my mail is a surprise for me; I did not expect it and yet it fulfils my expectation. Hence, Crane suggests to distinguish between the object of expectation and how the subject thinks of this object. Since these can be different things, Wittgenstein's account of intentionality is incomplete and hence insufficient (Crane 2010: 99ff.).

Hacker's reply to this objection is that the case described by Crane is indeed no case of intentionality. Wittgenstein's treatment of intentionality is intimately connected with his idea of internal relations, meaning a relation without which the object cannot be thought. A wish cannot be described without knowing what would satisfy it. This distinguishes Wittgenstein's account from a causal theory of meaning. If wish and fulfilment were related causally, *externally*, this would mean that whatever makes my wish cease could be called its satisfaction: a punch in the stomach ceases my appetite, so this must be what I have wished for (Wi2: 197). That we sometimes do not know what we wish for is not a matter of ignorance but of indecision and does not speak against Wittgenstein's account of intentionality (Hacker 2013: 182).

In the *Tractatus* internal relations are determined by logical form, later by grammatical rules such as "the expectation that *p* is the expectation that is fulfilled by the fact that *p*". In the case of Mr Smith the postman, Hacker argues, there is no internal relation and hence no intentionality. One cannot predict the event that Mr Smith brings the mail from the expectation that the postman brings the mail. But once the information that Mr Smith is a postman is given, there is an internal relation and an intentional connection. Hacker quotes Wittgenstein's remark that the order to "leave the room" can be obeyed by jumping out of the window and that in this case "a justification is possible even when the description of the action is not the same as that given by the command" (Wi3: 310). The "justification" consists in the information that jumping out of the window is a way of leaving the room – and thus the problem is solved, Hacker seems to think; he does not say much more on this issue, except for making fun of Crane's final remark where he postulates a form of "representation without interpretation" to account for the cases Wittgenstein's grammatical account cannot handle[2].

Generality

Although Crane probably meant something else, I find his concluding remarks quite instructive. For they obviously lead us to the rule-following considerations in the *Investigations* where Wittgenstein expounds the tension between

a finite number of examples and a general rule that somehow foreshadows the individual applications. It struck me that neither of the interpreters mentioned the problem of generality, although Crane could have gone in this direction from his remark that how the subject thinks about the object of expectation is a *type* of state-of-affairs. "Any event that belongs to this type will be an event which fulfils the expectation, and may therefore be called the object of the expectation" (Crane 2010: 101). The problem is: how can a general statement be related to a specific instance at all? The problem is not solved by stating that once the missing rule is supplied, the intentional connection is clear. The question is how an internal relation *can* be established between Mr Smith bringing the mail and my expectation of the postman bringing the mail. Why can I not make a justification so that my expectation is fulfilled by the milkman bringing the milk? That a "justification is possible" is not a solution, but stands in need of clarification.

Elsewhere, Wittgenstein says that each possibility has to be foreseen by logic ("there is no logical surprise") and that "in space" this possibility does not consist of a definite number of discrete possibilities (Wi2: 244). In the early 1930s, Wittgenstein uses the space-metaphor a lot, sometimes – as with logical space in the *Tractatus* – to illustrate the idea of possible locations as representations of intentional objects, sometimes to highlight differences between grammatical spaces. In the *Investigations* he says that the agreement between thought and reality consists in this: "that if I say falsely that something is *red*, then all the same, it is *red* that it isn't. And in this: that if I want to explain the word 'red' to someone, in the sentence 'That is not red', I should do so by pointing to something that *is* red" (PI: 429). It is true that this expresses, again, the idea of pictoriality (Hacker 2013: 171), but it can also be seen in the context of grammatical spaces: using the words "this is red" we are operating in "colour space" where we can refer to the "place" of red, even though nothing is red in reality, and the negative proposition is internally related to the negated. Likewise, expectation and fulfilment have to be in the same space (Wi2: 292).

Space even in a less metaphorical sense has properties which resemble Crane's postman example. If I say that a point is located in an interval between A and B, I do not foresee all possible locations in that interval and yet I am not surprised by any actual location of the point. To say that a circle is in a square does not anticipate an infinite number of locations within the square, but it does express an infinite possibility. Wittgenstein's treatment of generality and infinite possibility is a large topic, but it is clear that it is not to be understood as an infinite disjunction of discrete objects. It would also be wrong to say that such a general statement is indefinite because it does not speak of the individual cases; after all it is not clear what perfect definiteness in this sense could mean because an infinite list is unthinkable. Crane is right in saying that the sense of my expectation of the postman bringing the mail is "perfectly definite" (Crane 2010: 102) and yet it is true that it does not explicitly foresee Mr Smith bringing the mail or any other specification of the expectation. The statement defines, as it were, a region in a space which allows for an infinite possibility, one instantiation being Mr Smith bringing the mail. "Grammar gives language the right degree of freedom" (Wi2: 193). Instead of spaces and co-ordinates, later Wittgenstein would rather speak of games and rules. But a certain vagueness in the rules does not prevent a game from being a game (PI: 100). To accept this kind of indefiniteness in the rules, "not a difficulty of the intellect, but of the will has to be overcome" (Wi4: 214). No mental representation is necessary to do this.

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[2] To be fair, Hacker's paper is very instructive in its earlier sections where he shows that a lot of confusion is caused by an unclear conception of the differences between facts, events, complexes and objects. Indeed, Wittgenstein discusses the fact-complex distinction at length in the manuscripts before he makes the remark about "leaving the room" (Wi3: 302ff.).

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Picture versus Language: An Investigation on Wittgenstein's Mathematical Generality

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Abstract

Although Wittgenstein writes more on mathematics than on any other subject, it has been thought for a long time that his philosophy of mathematics 'does not contain much gold'. The vagueness in significant notions of his philosophy of mathematics, such as 'mathematical proof', 'surveyability', 'mathematical generality' etc, might be the most important reason for this criticism. However, in my viewpoint, these terms could be understood in a better way, if one does not examine them independently, but considers them as different expressions to deliver one single idea, i.e. distinguishing what are the real problems of mathematics and what are the problems of our language. In this paper, I shall examine Wittgenstein's arguments on the 'prose/calculus' distinction, generality and 'proof as a picture of experiment', to find the internal relation between them, which might help us to get closer to Wittgenstein's idea on philosophy of mathematics.

In WVC, Wittgenstein writes: "it is very important to distinguish as strictly as possible the calculus and this kind of prose. Once people have become clear about this distinction all these questions, such as those about consistency, independence, etc., will be removed" (WVC: 149). It can be seen from this remark how important Wittgenstein believes the distinction between calculus and prose to be. It seems that for Wittgenstein, the use of natural language in mathematics is the reason for the problems in mathematics, such as consistency. Although Wittgenstein does not give a clear definition of what he means by 'this kind of prose', the following remark in PG might help us to understand what he intends to clarify:

> If you want to know what the expression "continuity of a function" means, look at the proof of continuity; that will show what it proves. Don't look at the result as it is expressed in prose, or in the Russellian notation, which is simply a translation of the prose expression; but fix your attention on the calculation actually going on in the proof. The verbal expression of the allegedly proved proposition is in most cases misleading, because it conceals the real purpose of the proof, which can be seen with full clarity in the proof itself. (PG: 369)

This argument clearly indicates that the prose, which Wittgenstein intends to eliminate from calculation, not only means the verbal expression, but also includes Russell's formal language. As for Wittgenstein, what Russellian notation distinguishes from verbal language is merely the 'form of language', which is not essential. In this sense, if 'prose' is what Wittgenstein is trying to eliminate, the criterion for this 'prose' should not be the 'form', i.e. natural language, formal language, etc., but the role it plays in the proof. In a later remark in PG, Wittgenstein mentions the opposite case as well: 'In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning; even when it doesn't look like that because we seem to be using words to talk about mathematical things. Even these words are used to construct an algorithm.' (PG: 468) One can see that Wittgenstein allows ordinary language to appear in calculus, as long as it functions as a part of the proof, rather than as 'talking about the proof', and in this case, the verbal expression is not the kind of 'prose', which Wittgenstein takes to bring confusion.

But why does Wittgenstein insist that in most cases prose is misleading? The answer is implied in Wittgenstein's lengthy remark in PG, which in my view, can be summarized as an attack on 'using prose´ to make any kind of mathematical generality. To make his viewpoint easy to understand, Wittgenstein gives us a simple example: (A) "perhaps all numbers have the property e", which is a typical ordinary language prose. Wittgenstein indicates that one might feel it is natural to translate this sentence into (B)'ε(0). ε(1). ε(2) and so on', which seems to be a logical product. However, he then emphasizes that it is actually not a logical product. For Wittgenstein, the problem here is that there is a strong inclination to believe that indeed in this case we cannot check every particular case included in 'and so on', but it is due to our human weakness but not because it is logically impossible. In fact, in PG, Wittgenstein reflects that his early idea that 'the general proposition (∃x).φ(x) as a logical sum even though its terms cannot practically be enumerated' was wrong (PG: 268). And for Wittgenstein in the period of writing PG, the impossibility of verification here is not 'physical impossibility', but 'logical impossibility'. Moreover, he also believes that the reason we confuse 'logical impossibility' with 'physical impossibility' is the use of expressions like 'infinitely many', as when we use terms like 'infinitely many', we consider infinity as a very large number, which has the essence of a number in finite, while in fact infinity is not a large number. And in this sense, Wittgenstein claims that we do not really understand the grammar of 'and so on', and that it should be different from the one of the finite. That is to say, the confusion between 'physical impossibility' and 'logical impossibility' is a result of our ignorance of 'using two different grammars, the grammar of the finite and the grammar of infinity, in one proposition'.

If 'mathematical generality in prose' were not permitted, one might want to ask what Wittgenstein's ideal mathematics, a mathematics made up by 'pure mathematical proof' without any prose, would look like? The following remark can be seen as implying an explanation: "A proof in mathematics is general if it is generally applicable. You can't demand some other kind of generality in the name of rigor. Every proof rests on particular signs, produced on a particular occasion. All that can happen is that one type of generality may appear more elegant than another." (PG: 454) Clearly, one idea Wittgenstein intends to underline is that it is the diversity of grammars in these particular mathematical proofs that is worth investigating. And the inclination of focusing on generality might stop us from gaining an insight into each individual proofs. This is because though there could be a variety of ways of general-

izing mathematical proofs, expressed in different types of language, none of them could be proved as the 'only legitimate generality' or the one that is superior to the others. Hence, this kind of generality is in fact not that general. Indeed, there is nothing wrong for Wittgenstein to say we should be paid more attention to the individuality of a proof. But the problem is if we are not allowed to articulate the meaning of a proof, how can we be sure that we know where this proof can be applied? Or in other words, how can justify that a proof is generally applicable?

In order to find an answer, it is necessary that we examine directly Wittgenstein's remarks on 'what is a mathematical proof'. Based on Wittgenstein's anti-realist standpoint, there is no eternal truth in mathematics, and saying that a mathematical proof is true in one mathematical system means it can be proved in this system. Moreover, proof gives the meaning of a mathematical proposition. Therefore, for Wittgenstein, proof is the most significant concept in mathematics, which must be clarified. However, his notion of proof is far from clear. The two most important points that he emphasizes are:

- A proof is not an experiment, but a picture of an experiment, and

- a proof should be surveyable.

In RFM, Wittgenstein writes:

"Proof must be capable of being taken in" really means nothing but a proof is not an experiment. We do not accept the result of a proof because it results once, or because it often results. But we see in the proof the reason for saying that this *must* be the result.' What *proves* is not that this correlation leads to this result-but that we are persuaded to take these appearance (pictures) as models for what it is like if….(RFM III-39)

What Wittgenstein wants to say with this remark seems to be something like this: the essential distinction between an experiment and a proof is that when one carries out an experiment, one is not sure what result it might lead to, while on the other hand, by accepting something as a proof, one believes it is not contingently valid, but it will always be valid. In other words, if 'experiment' is the process of searching for the correct way that can lead to a correct result, having a proof means we believe we have found the right way that will *always* lead to a correct result. And once we accept a proof, we 'harden' it into a rule, a paradigm for future use. As Wittgenstein stresses, it is the fact that 'we are persuaded' that is of great significance. That is to say, we must examine the mechanism that a proof convinces us that it is generally applicable. Here, we can see that for Wittgenstein the proof itself has the ability to show the generality.

Obviously, for Wittgenstein, the generality of a proof is not effable, which means that this generality can only be represented by the calculus itself. In my viewpoint, this also explains why Wittgenstein emphasizes that a proof must be 'surveyable'. Apparently, when something is surveyable, no verbal expression is needed. In fact, many commentators, including Dummett, Shanker and Crispin Wright strived to find out what exactly Wittgenstein means by surveyability, which leads to discussions on whether it is the length of a proof or the syntax of a proof that should be surveyable. However, as I read Wittgenstein, it is more likely that Wittgenstein does not have a clear idea about what the criteria for 'surveyable' are, or how we can verify whether a proof is surveyable or not. Rather, 'surveyable' is only a term he uses to describe those things that we do not need to verbally express in order to understand them.

Hence, what he means by 'surveyability' is nothing but that 'the generality of a proof should be found in the proof itself but not in the prose'. In this sense, trying to find a clear definition of Wittgenstein's 'surveyability', or asking 'what a surveyable proof should look like' might lead us into the wrong direction.

However, it remains veiled why for Wittgenstein, the proof itself, as a picture of experiment, can do a better job in speaking for itself that it is generally applicable than ordinary language or formal language can? And do we need some sort of intuition to be convinced by a proof, or in other words, to know that a proof is surveyable? As Wittgenstein has criticized the intuitionist view that we need intuitions to make decision in mathematics, one can imply that intuition might not be a word he would use to explain our acceptance of a proof. However, if, as Wittgenstein suggests, one can be convinced that a proof is generally applicable by merely looking at the proof, without any criteria that can be articulated, it seems that what is happening is indeed something like a mathematical intuition. Although Mark Steiner gives this kind of intuition another name: physical intuition, which is different from an intuitionist version of intuitions, Wittgenstein's mathematical intuition is physical, i.e. we act without thinking, physical intuition is still a form of intuition. However, in my reading of Wittgenstein, the reason that pictures provide us the correct generality is that pictures are able to show the internal relation that exists in a proof, while linguistic generality cannot show us this internal relation.

The best example to illustrate this internal relation is the one Wittgenstein uses to explain why proof is the picture of experiments in RFM. Wittgenstein suggests that imagine there are 100 marbles, and we number them from 1 to 100, then we line them up into ten rows, with 10 marbles in each row and leave a big gap in the middle of each row (RFM I-36), so we have something like the this:

row 1   □□□□□ □□□□□

row 2   □□□□□ □□□□□

     …

row 10   □□□□□ □□□□□

Wittgenstein says that if this process is filmed, the layout that has been filmed is not an experiment anymore. I think his idea here is that by doing various experiments on laying out the 100 marbles, this is an effective way of a line-up that can give us immediate knowledge that there are 100 marbles without counting; which means, in this picture, the fact that there are 100 marbles is surveyable to us. For Wittgenstein, what makes this layout surveyable, while others may be not so, is not mathematical intuition, but something we learned from empirical regularities, i.e. experiments.

Conclusion

To give a theory is never the aim of Wittgenstein's work in philosophy of mathematics. What he strives to do is to distinguish the job of mathematicians and the job of philosophers. Therefore, in my viewpoint, Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics should not be read in the same way as other philosophers, whose aim is to say something about mathematics. Wittgenstein's approach is the other way round, i.e. what he intends to do is to eliminate what should not be said and done to mathematics, and leave what should be said and done to mathematicians.

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Unconscious Perception and Perceptual Knowledge

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Abstract

It has been objected recently that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported hypothesis that unconscious perception is possible. Because epistemological disjunctivism is plausible only in conjunction with naïve realism (for a reason I provide), the objection reaches it too. In response, I show that the unconscious perception hypothesis can be changed from a problem into an advantage of epistemological disjunctivism. I do this by suggesting that: (i) naïve realism is consistent with the hypothesis; (ii) the contrast between epistemological disjunctivism and epistemic externalism explains the difference in epistemic import between conscious and unconscious perception.

Epistemological disjunctivism is an alternative to internalist and externalist accounts of perceptual justification. According to it, conscious perception P affords the subject S an opportunity to acquire factive and fully reflectively accessible rational support R for S's perceptual belief that ϕ. Had S instead experienced an hallucination H subjectively indistinguishable from P, whatever S's rational support for the belief that ϕ would have been, it would have been weaker than R. Does this claim gain or lose plausibility if coupled with naïve realism? On the one hand, naïve realism corroborates the epistemic difference between P and H by introducing a metaphysical difference between them: P is constituted by the mind-independent object, H is not. On the other hand, the conjunction of epistemological disjunctivism and naïve realism inherits controversial commitments of the latter. Those, it might be argued, include a denial of an empirically well-supported hypothesis that unconscious perception is possible (Berger & Nanay, 2016; Block & Phillips, 2017). In response, I show that naïve realism reinforces epistemological disjunctivism with respect to both conscious and unconscious perception.

First, I spell out what I think is the best available formulation of epistemological disjunctivism, and explain why it is implausible without the support of naïve realism (section 1). Second, I suggest a small tweak to the formulation of naïve realism so as to make it compatible with the unconscious perception hypothesis (section 2). Third, I show that the contrast between epistemological disjunctivism and epistemic externalism can be used to account for the difference in epistemic import between conscious and unconscious perception (section 3).

1. Epistemological disjunctivism and naïve realism

Epistemological disjunctivism has been delineated in various ways. Because I am unable to survey them all here, below I set forth only the one I prefer. That said, my approach to unconscious perception is, at least in principle, available on other expositions of epistemological disjunctivism as well.

When the subject S (i) consciously sees the object O, (ii) has the concept of O, and (iii) brings O under that concept, S sees that ϕ (where ϕ equals "That is O"). The fulfilment of the (i-iii) conditions suffices for perceptual knowledge because seeing that ϕ is a specific way of knowing that ϕ. Importantly, perceptual knowledge is recognitional, not evidential, i.e. perceptually knowing that ϕ consists in recognizing what one sees, not in basing the belief that ϕ on 'perceptual evidence'. Justification enters the picture only when S is required to provide a reason for her belief that ϕ. In paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge, S can meet this requirement because she knows that ϕ and she knows that she sees that ϕ, i.e. she is in possession of factive and fully reflectively accessible rational support R for her belief that ϕ. S's overall evidence for ϕ is not limited to the true perceptual belief "That is O", as it consists of the totality of S's knowledge. Still, R would be unattainable without the fulfilment of the (i-iii) conditions.

This formulation of epistemological disjunctivism can be traced in works of Alan Millar (see e.g. Millar, 2010), albeit Millar prefers 'traditional direct realism' over naïve realism (Millar, 2007). Contrary to Millar, I suggest reading the condition (i) above through the lens of naïve realism. Why? Consider a genuine visual perception P of the object O by the subject S and a corresponding hallucination H by S's counterpart S*, where H is indistinguishable from P by introspection alone. Naïve realism is the only currently available theory of perception which denies that the phenomenal characters of P and H are qualitatively identical. On naïve realism, the phenomenal character of P is partially constituted by O. Thus, only under naïve realism is what S is aware of incompatible with O not being around. Conversely, if naïve realism was false, what S is aware of would be consistent with O not being around. This, in turn, would contest the idea that P furnishes S with an opportunity to acquire factive and fully reflectively accessible rational support for her belief that ϕ. Therefore, the plausibility of epistemological disjunctivism depends on the plausibility of naïve realism.

Craig French (French, 2016) argues that formulating epistemological disjunctivism in terms of *seeing things* instead of *seeing that ϕ* enables one to account for the factivity of perceptual justification without incurring any substantive commitments in metaphysics of perception. The problem is that French brackets issues concerning reflective accessibility. Consequently, his proposal collapses into a defence of epistemic externalism (i.e. the view that perceptual warrant is externally grounded, yet not fully reflectively accessible). By contrast, it is essential to epistemological disjunctivism that R is *both* factive and fully reflectively accessible. And when the latter condition is also taken into consideration, it turns out that the plausibility of epistemological disjunctivism varies widely depending on which theory of perception is assumed.

2. Naïve realism and unconscious perception

Naïve realism construes perception as a direct relation between the subject and the mind-independent object. Perceptual relation explains both the qualitative character and the epistemic import of conscious perception in the following way: the properties of the mind-independent object *just are* the properties that constitute the phenomenal character of perception (see e.g. Brewer, 2011; Campbell, 2002; Martin, 2009).

The critics infer from this that naïve realism renders perception as conscious by definition, which amounts to contradicting well-established empirical science (see e.g. Berger & Nanay, 2016; Block & Phillips, 2017). This poses a problem for epistemological disjunctivism as well: if naïve realism is rejected, (i) it becomes difficult to substantiate the claim that the subject can have factive and fully reflectively accessible rational support for her perceptual beliefs, and (ii) it is unclear how the epistemological disjunctivist could account for epistemic import of unconscious perception.

The best strategy for the naïve realist is to accept the possibility of unconscious perception by allowing for perceptual relations without phenomenal character. On this proposal, perception is relational no matter whether it is conscious or not. It is relational because it has the mind-independent object among its constituents. Whether being in such relation results in the subject being conscious of the object is a further question. The difference between conscious and unconscious perception can be explained in terms of their respective relata, namely their subjects and their objects.

Although this formulation of naïve realism is certainly unorthodox, it should be noted that neither of the main motivations of naïve realism is undermined simply by accepting the unconscious perception hypothesis. Some of them, e.g. arguments from fine-grainedness (Brewer, 2011) and transparency (Martin, 2002) of experience, concern phenomenology of perception, which is something that unconscious perception lacks by definition. Hence they remain unaffected by the possibility of unconscious perception. By the same token, they are insufficient to establish naïve realism as a general theory of perception.

However, not all arguments for naïve realism appeal to phenomenology. Charles Travis' (Travis, 2013) argument to the conclusion that the idea of perceptual content is incoherent applies equally to both conscious and unconscious perception, thereby undermining the objection (see e.g. Block & Phillips, 2017; Nanay, 2014) that positing perceptual representations is indispensable to account for unconscious perception.

Another argument for naïve realism rests on the claim that the subject is not infallible with respect to the phenomenal character of her own experience (Martin, 2009). This point actually gains support from empirical evidence for unconscious perception. For such evidence consists of numerous cases in which subjects make incorrect judgements concerning the kind of mental state they are in (they report not perceiving the stimulus despite perceiving it).

Finally, the possibility of unconscious perception does not undermine John Campbell's argument that only naïve realism properly explains how perceptual consciousness makes demonstrative thought and reference possible (Campbell, 2002). Unconsciously perceiving O and employing the relevant concept is necessary but insufficient to enable the subject to demonstratively judge that "That is

O". To suffice, perception has to be conscious. Suppose O is F, i.e. a kind of thing that people can perceive only unconsciously. Even if we could report our experiences of F-things, 'this would evidently be a case in which none of us had the slightest idea what we were talking about' (Campbell, 2002: 223). Still, unconscious perception, if it exists, presumably can and does influence the way the subject behaves, thus suggesting that it provides the subject with some epistemic import.

3. Conscious vs. unconscious epistemic import

I suggest that the difference in epistemic import between conscious and unconscious perception should be explained in terms of the contrast between epistemological disjunctivism and epistemic externalism.

In experimental practice, the conclusion that the stimulus was perceived unconsciously is drawn from the observation that the subjects report no consciousness of the stimulus, and yet perform a task that requires perception of the stimulus with above-chance accuracy. Epistemic import of unconscious perception, i.e. unconscious perceptual warrant, is what enables the subject to perform at this level of accuracy despite being unaware of the stimulus. Epistemic import of unconscious perception is thus severely limited, and can be assessed only *post hoc*, by showing that the subject's behaviour was different than it would have been had no perception happened. This can be understood along the lines of epistemic externalism, i.e. the view that perceptual warrant is externally grounded, yet not fully reflectively accessible. Namely, unconscious perceptual warrant is externally grounded because unconscious perception is relational, yet not reflectively accessible because unconscious perception lacks phenomenal character.

Does it mean that one can unconsciously see that ϕ, thereby acquiring perceptual knowledge that ϕ? Assuming that justification is not necessary for perceptual knowledge, unconscious perceptual warrant might seem sufficient. But granting this would be precipitant. To see why, compare three mushroom pickers:

(A) John sees that there is a parasol mushroom before him, and knows that he sees that because he has just checked by moving the mushroom's ring back and forth on its stalk.

(B) Henry sees that there is a parasol mushroom before him, yet he does not know that he sees that, for had it been a death cap, he would still have thought it is a parasol mushroom.

(C) Ned unconsciously sees a parasol mushroom.

According to the view sketched in section 1, the epistemic difference between (A) and (B) concerns justification. In (A), John not only knows that there is a parasol mushroom before him, but he can also justify his belief that this is so because he knows that he knows. In (B), Henry knows that there is a parasol mushroom before him because he sees what in fact is a parasol mushroom and correctly recognizes it as such, yet he is unable to rule out that it is a death cap. In (C), Ned does not know that there is a parasol mushroom before him.

Since Henry is epistemically lucky, ascribing knowledge to him is controversial. I think he knows because what he sees *is* what he thinks he sees, which, *ceteris paribus*, grants him a free meal. If what he sees *was not* what he thinks he sees (a death cap), that meal would cost him a

liver failure. This is what distinguishes perceptually knowing from not knowing. That what Henry sees *could have easily not been* what he thinks he sees is irrelevant because it does not decide whether a liver transplant will be needed.

Still, (C) is epistemically weaker from (A) and (B) even if Henry does not count as knowing. In (B), Henry behaves just like John; to distinguish between (A) and (B) we would have to ask John and Henry about the death cap possibility. Only then would the difference between their epistemic standings become evident. By contrast, if we asked Ned the same question, he would not even know what are we talking about, as he is unaware that there is a parasol mushroom in the vicinity. If Ned was a real mushroom gourmet, unconsciously perceiving a parasol mushroom could increase his saliva secretion, and make him prone to walk in the mushroom's direction. But assuming that Ned lacks any further knowledge about this situation, that is all unconscious perception can afford him. Even if it might prompt mushroom-related thoughts in Ned's mind, those would not be about that particular parasol mushroom because he is not conscious of it.

Given all that, unconscious perceptual warrant is best characterized as limited to affecting the subject's conscious thought and behaviour in a manner that makes her prone to think about what she is conscious of in some ways rather than another, or to react to what she is conscious of in some ways rather than another. Such influences are not instances of perceptual knowledge. For knowledge entails success, whereas unconscious perception only makes success more probable.

4. Conclusion

In the final analysis, the possibility of unconscious perception does not create a problem for the conjunction of epistemological disjunctivism and naïve realism. On the contrary, it provides a contrast that highlights the epistemic import of perceptual consciousness. It is against the background of unconscious perception that we can see and appreciate the epistemic import of perceptual consciousness, which is precisely what both epistemological disjunctivism and naïve realism were designed to emphasize.

Acknowledgments

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