

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Meaning Is More than Essence

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Abstract

Ludwig Wittgenstein (PI 1953) can be seen as proposing a shift from the explanatory paradigm propagated by the early analytic philosophers like Frege (1918, 1948), Russell (1910, 1912) and even himself (TLP 1922), to the paradigm of understanding. The emphasis of the former paradigm upon a universal underlying logical form, by virtue of which the words in language essentially come to have meaning, can be interpreted as upholding the idea of Platonism. The explanatory model focuses on the question 'how words acquire meaning?' while the understanding model focuses on the question 'how do we understand the meaning of words.' While the former follows the scientific method which is explanatory in nature, the latter emphasizes on how we understand (and not explain) the meaning of words in language when we use them in a context to meet a communicative need such that communication between interlocutors is successful. We can analyze this shift from essentialism in the light of Wittgenstein's discomfort with the way in which the existing traditional theories of language aim for generality and thereby consider language as an object of theorization and explanation. This paper examines how this discomfort seen in later Wittgenstein indicates a shift away from meaning Platonism.

1. Introduction

Meaning Platonism can be defined as a theory that maintains that a general term has meaning by virtue of its association with an abstract entity. Individual instances of that general term convey meaning because of this association. Wittgenstein (BBB 1969) maintains that there has been a usual tendency among the philosophers of language to uphold that all the entities that fall under a general term must share a common property. This tendency can be seen as reflecting the notion of meaning Platonism. For example, all activities to which the general term 'game' applies essentially share a common property (of say, *gameness*). Furthermore, there is an emphasis on the idea that one that is able to grasp a general term such as 'chair' comes to possess a general picture of a chair, as opposed to pictures of particular chairs. So, when she learnt the meaning of the word chair, in the process she was shown different chairs in order to produce an idea in her which is a general image of a chair. Understanding a term then seems to be like grasping a general picture with properties and features common to all particular chairs. Thus, this gives way to the view that meaning of a word is the corresponding object or image correlated to it. Further, it is also argued that a general term may be general but still it has to be clear and unambiguous. That is to say, every general term such as 'chair' corresponds to its precise general image consisting of all the common features of particular chairs. But Wittgenstein argues that a general term is a general term. It is not precise but ambiguous. The term 'chair' need not necessarily be correlated to a general image or a thing, by virtue of which it has a precise meaning. The term 'chair' can come to have not one but a variety of meanings depending upon its usage in different given contexts in different times. Any word in language can in fact accommodate a multiplicity of meanings within its ambit. This line of thought drifts away from the theory of Platonism which the formalists seem to adhere to. The analytical scope of this paper consists in exploring the shift that can be interpreted in Wittgenstein from 'the explanation-based approach' to 'the understanding-based approach' to meaning. We can see how such a shift reflects a movement away from Platonism.

2. Analyzing the Shift

Traditionally, general theories explaining the world have been held in high regard and as a result, language, in *general*, and philosophy, in particular, has been trapped within the same paradigm. This paradigm, often called as the scientific paradigm, aims at universal causal relations to explain all phenomena in nature. This kind of a scientific trajectory attempts to provide an explanation in terms of a single cause ('what is the *cause of* x?'). When we apply this reductionist approach to language, the central question, 'what is meaning?' becomes, 'what is the *cause of* the genesis of meaning'. Thus, the question is answered in terms of a common logical form or an essential structure which is responsible for the genesis of meaning (essentialism). Following this, the formalists such as Frege, Russell and early Wittgenstein emphasize on the necessity for universality. This universality promotes regularity and calculability and can be seen as an omission of differences. Thus, the formalist tradition in Philosophy of Language focuses on a common logical form of language (essence) that could hold for all languages; and which is shared with the world. For example, in the TLP it is argued that the smallest unit of language, proposition aRb reflects the logical form of facts (things in the world which are in relation to one another in a determinate way). It is argued that there is an isomorphism between the proposition and fact by virtue of a common logical structure between the two (PI 1953: §114).

This craving for generality in explanation is a hangover of Plato's theory of forms where objects in the sensible realm are beautiful because all of them share and are copies of the form of beauty which exists in realm of forms. Wittgenstein deconstructs this idea that meaning is derived from some hidden explanatory structures (logical form). The prevalent tendency of believing in a single common essence (of *chairness*) that enables an object ('a thing to sit upon') to become a member of a class ('chair'); leads one to see the commonalities and ignore the differences. However, this focus on commonality leads one to omit the particularities of each individual chair-object. Each individual chair can be unique and there may be differences between these chairs. For example, a chair, may or may not have side handles; can have back rest of different lengths and shapes; can have four legs, or can have one bar attached to some small rotating wheels so on and so forth. In language, such variations are ignored when the meaning of a word is explained in terms of its common logical form and we look at it as mere 'general structure of a chair'. The concept of family resemblance which is often interpreted as emphasizing on commonality and universality in the PI (Baker & Hacker: 1983) can be rather seen as a criticism of formalism and an attack on the emphasis on essences. So, instead of looking at general term 'chair' applying to the various particular chairs by virtue of a common shared property or essence such that all chairs form

a 'family' where the members of the family share something common with each other; we are to look at it as a term that can accommodate the particularities of each individual family member who may or may not share common features. Wittgenstein suggests that understanding a composite picture of a family which has all the common features of all family members doesn't enable one to understand each family member. In fact, the composite picture does not have anything like a general meaning which corresponds to it. Wittgenstein holds that under the rubric of scientific method, the explanatory theory that we arrive at applies only to a composite picture. It cannot aptly describe each individual member of the family of language and the way language is used. For example, a general picture of chair does not itself take care of the differences that different chairs that are used, may have. Thus, his concept of family resemblance acknowledges this tendency to look for generality and ignore differences. It also establishes the anti-formalistic and anti-essentialist notion of meaning as spatial and temporal (in a context). Family resemblance is to be understood not as a theory of universality but rather as a general description.

According to the formalists, the meaning of a word is definite and complete, by virtue of its given (atemporal and apriori) logical form. However, according to Wittgenstein's anti-essentialist approach in the PI, the meaning of a term is definite in the present time; nonetheless, it is not fixed ad infinitum. The flexible boundaries of a word allow the possibility of the word to accommodate new meanings within its ambit with respect to the context of its use. So, in any denotative meaning of a word there is a finality and completeness, not by virtue of a common ontological property but because that meaning (response) suffices to satiate the communicative demand of the context in that moment. For example, the word 'x' can have a definite meaning y at time t1 in a context of use c1 such that it is able to fulfill the communicative demand generated by and in c1 at that point in time. However, this does not limit the contours of the word 'x' ad infinitum. The word can have a variety of meanings other than y, in a different contexts of use (say, c2, c3…) at different moments in time (t2, t3…); such that it is able to meet the communicative demands in the respective contexts. Thus, Wittgenstein suggests that in meaning of a term, there can be no commonality or regularity but only certain 'resemblances'. One cannot predict beforehand (prior to considering the context of use) how language evolves. His notion of family resemblance can be seen as arguing for and celebrating the possibility of ambiguity and vagueness in ordinary language. There are no fixed boundaries of exactness but only 'rough approximations'. (BBB 1969)

Wittgenstein therefore argues that a term does not have a fixed meaning but a multiplicity of meanings. A word can denote not by virtue of a common ontological predicate shared by all members but it *means* by virtue of the elastic boundary of its signification such that it can accommodate a variety of significations. This elasticity changes and is determined by the 'context'. Form of life is the given context in which language users are situated. The context generates certain communicative demands. Meaning of words is then to be understood as a *response* to this need. A word has meaning when it is needed within a form of life to satiate a communicative demand. Hence, this approach assumes a teleological form. This need is shared between language users who speak a common language and therefore are situated in the same form of life. Just like the formalists assume an apriori propositional function, the approach in PI assumes that the language users are thrown in a given form of life. The given-ness of form of life implies that it cannot be talked about in terms of 'being' but only in terms of 'becoming'. This form of life is not constant; rather it has a possibility to change and evolve. Therefore, the communicative needs, grounded in the form of life, can also change. Since, the language games played by language users can change, words can be added to or removed from the language game. Further, the contours of language (or a word) itself can expand or shrink in order to accommodate the various communicative demands that can arise in the form of life in which language users are situated. For example, certain words in English language no longer have a particular sense they earlier had and have come to acquire new meanings; some have become obsolete as they no longer meet a certain communicative demand. Thus, meaning in fact becomes a product of utility in a given context and to understand a language is to understand its use in a given form of life. People who do not take part in that form of life would not be able to make sense of those words. For example, painters can have different names for different shades of a colour such as, crimson, vermillion, scarlet, ruby etc. for different shades of red.

Now, considering that language is the basis of philosophy, the shift of paradigm in language implies a complete reconceptualisation of the activity of philosophizing itself. Traditional philosophy seems to be trapped within the scientific domain which looks for a universal theory based on a causal relation that can explain all phenomena. In PI, Wittgenstein goes on to argue that philosophy does not *explain* but is purely *descriptive* in nature. Descriptions (purposive descriptions) lead to understating and understanding pertains to the connections between things. (PI 1953: §122) Philosophy being descriptive in nature cannot alter the context, communicative demands in a context, use of words or their meanings. It can only describe. (PI 1953: §124) It cannot provide any foundations or theory. Our language is not an experimental ground to find something 'hidden'. What we are required to do is to see how different words are used in different concrete contexts such that we can understand the meanings of words.

3. Conclusion

We have seen that the views propounded by formalists in general are explanatory in nature. They have been largely inspired by science so the aim of those theories is to *explain* how the words come to have meaning. In PI and BBB, Wittgenstein suggests that there are better modalities to understand meaning than merely a scientific or causal approach that aims towards a single principle which can provide an explanation. When we as language users talk about ordinary language which we use, we are more concerned with how we come to *understand* the meaning of the words. Voicing his discomfort with the scientific approach of the theorists of language, Wittgenstein argues that craving for generality leads to a craving for theory which is a craving for explanation. We can interpret Wittgenstein as arguing in favour of the understanding aspect rather than the explanatory aspect propagated by formalists. Wittgenstein in PI maintains that we understand meaning of words through the context and this context is determined by the form of life in which both the persons (language users) communicating to each other participate. Thereby, context determines the usage of the words. It does so by providing us a 'need' and in order to fulfill this need, we generate usage. The emphasis is upon how the words are 'used'. This paradigm shift from cardinality of propositional function to cardinality of need (from explanation to understanding) is regarded as a major event in Analytic Philosophy in the twentieth century.

In conclusion, we may say that Wittgenstein is not seeking to attack any one particular theory of meaning. He attempts to

show that an object-centric theory of language propagated by the denotative theorists, gives us a very primitive idea of language which cannot meet the contemporary communicative needs of the present. The account of how language is learnt which the traditional theory upholds, seems to be quite distant from how we actually use language. What he is advocating is a change of perspective from language as an object of theorization (paradigm of explanation) to language as an object of description (paradigm of understanding). Thus, he writes in the first passage itself of PI, "Explanations come to an end somewhere" (PI 1953: §1) Thus, the picture of the activity of philosophizing also changes from a mere abstraction to an 'anthropology of language' characterized by providing participatory descriptions which apply to concrete contexts. Interpreting Wittgenstein in this light as seen from the discussion above, we see that the view on meaning is shifting its focus away from essentialism, generalization and such shades of Platonism.

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Zu Ursprung und Bedeutung des Spielbegriffs in Wittgensteins Spätwerk

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Abstract

Der Begriff des Sprachspiels und des Spiels im Allgemeinen im Werke Wittgensteins wurden bereits sehr viel diskutiert. Ich möchte es jedoch von einer neuer Seite beleuchten, welche meistens ignoriert wird, manchmal wird sie sogar explizit als irrelevant abgelehnt. Spielen beinhaltet in der alltäglichen Sprache häufig auch Unernst, manchmal auch das Launische oder sogar Tückische. Diese Aspekte lassen sich auch in Wittgensteins Auffassung von Sprache und in seiner philosophischer Methode beobachten und das schon in dem Vorwort zu den *Untersuchungen*. Ich unterstütze meine These, dass diese Aspekte bei einer konsequenten Interpretation nicht ignoriert werden können, durch den Hinweis auf die Erörterung des Spiels von Wittgensteins Gesprächspartner Schlick, welcher das Spiel vor allem wegen seiner Zwecklosigkeit thematisierte. Dieser Aspekt zeigt auch, wie sehr sich Wittgenstein von Pragmatikern wie Rorty unterscheidet, welche sich auf ihn doch gerne berufen. Schließlich zeige ich, wie die besprochenen Aspekte des Spielens durch die Philosophie Eugen Finks klarer gemacht werden können, dessen Philosophie viele überraschenden Gemeinsamkeiten mit Wittgenstein aufweist. Wittgensteins Abneigung gegen Theorienbildung in Philosophie wird durch die neuen Aspekte des Spieles auch neu gedeutet.

Sprachspiel und Sprachspiele. Im Singular oder im Plural, der Begriff des Sprachspiels hat sich längst als ein ganz zentraler in Wittgensteins Werk etabliert und wurde von seinen Interpreten intensiv diskutiert. Ich möchte es von einer besonderen Seite beleuchten, nämlich von der des Unernstes. Ich frage also, inwiefern konnte Wittgenstein mit dem Ausdruck *Sprachspiel* Unernst andeuten? Ist die Sprache irgendwie unernst? Oder soll man sie unernst oder spielerisch verstehen oder vielleicht mit ihr umgehen? Damit meine ich nicht, dass er das, was er in Philosophischen *Untersuchungen* schreibt, nicht ernst nimmt. Mehrmals suggeriert er aber, dass die Sprache in sich etwas Unernstes und Spielerisches, manchmal aber auch Tückisches an sich hat. Ich werde Beispiele von Wittgensteins Äußerungen anführen, die diese Vermutung bestärken. Danach belege ich, dass diese Merkmale vom Wittgensteins Werk durchaus auch im Denken von Moritz Schlick eine wesentliche Rolle spielen. Und Schlick war ein ganz wichtiger Gesprächspartner Wittgensteins. Schließlich zeige ich, wie ein Vergleich mit der Philosophie von Eugen Fink diese Interpretation noch weiterführen kann, da Fink ganz explizit jene Züge des Spiels philosophisch thematisierte, welche ich als implizit im Wittgenstein vorhanden unterstelle. Zuerst wende ich mich aber einer kurzer einleitenden Betrachtung des Unernstes bei Wittgenstein zu und überlege warum dieser Zug eher wenig von den analytischen Interpreten Wittgensteins hervorgehoben wird.

1. Spiel und Sprachspiel bei Wittgenstein

Das Spielerische an Wittgenstein wird üblicherweise nicht besonders betont, viele Forscher scheinen implizit eher die Annahme zu machen, dass dieses Element für Wittgenstein irrelevant ist. Anthony Kenny ist da aber relativ explizit:

But the comparison of language to a game was not meant to suggest that language was a pastime or something trivial. (Kenny 1973: 163)

Zwar will ich nicht ganz genau alles, was in diesem Zitat steht, umkehren, dennoch bemühe ich mich zu zeigen, dass es sich in diesem Fall um eine sehr einseitige Interpretation handelt. Und um eine, die unnötigerweise ganz interessante Blickpunkte verschließt.

Was will Wittgenstein denn nach Kenny und ähnlich gesinnten Autoren sagen wollen, wenn er über Sprachspiele spricht? Ganz wichtig soll für ihn der Punkt gewesen sein, dass die Sprache ein normatives Phänomen ist. Man könnte dann theoretisch einfach von Systemen von Sprachregeln sprechen, wie es etwa David (Lauer 2014) vorschlägt. Das ist sicher ein wichtiges Motiv, welches dann viele weitere Philosophen inspiriert hat, die Sprache mehr in den relevanten gesellschaftlichen Kontext zu setzen. Erwähnen wir unter vielen anderen etwa Robert (Brandom 1994), welcher in dieser Hinsicht Wittgenstein viel verdankt. Dennoch bleibt die Frage hängen, warum sich Wittgenstein doch dieser und nicht anderer Terminologie bedient hat, warum spricht er also von Sprachspielen? Zwar ist Sprachspiel eine ganz attraktive Formulierung, aber ich sehe nicht ein, warum Wittgenstein auch etwas terminologischer Eleganz nicht opfern konnte, wenn ihm etwa ein Ausdruck wie *System von Regeln* treffender vorkäme. Und es wäre sicher merkwürdig, Wittgenstein eine Terminologische Lässigkeit zu unterstellen. Ich stimme also auch weiter mit Lauer überein, dass wir für diese Terminologie weitere Gründe suchen sollen.

Welche Hinweise können wir denn bei Wittgenstein und insbesondere in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* finden, dass ihm tatsächlich um das Spielerische gehen konnte? Zuerst noch eine kleine Erklärung, um welche Merkmale es mir geht. Zum einen geht also um eine Tendenz, etwas vorzugeben, tatsächlich eine Rolle zu spielen oder eine Maske zu tragen. Dazu kommt etwas Unterhaltsames, aber wohl auch etwas Tückisches hinzu. Mehrere Merkmale können da relevant sein, aber schon mit diesen werden wir bereits fündig, und das schon in dem Vorwort zu den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*, (PU 1953, Vorwort). Dort lässt Wittgenstein die Sprache vor allem als tückisch erscheinen.

Wittgenstein gibt ja zu, dass er sich sein Buch anders vorgestellt hat. Allem Anscheine nach wollte er ein mehr konventionelles Werk der Nachwelt hinterlassen. Den *Untersuchungen* gebricht es aber, zumindest *prima facie,* an Eindeutigkeit und Klarheit. Jedoch ließen sich seine Gedanken nicht in eine Richtung zwingen. Die Endgestalt der *Untersuchungen* entspricht dem, was Wittgenstein über die Sprache herausgefunden hat. Nämlich, dass sich kaum Endgültiges herausfinden lässt. Wichtig ist hier auch der Vergleich der Sprache mit einem Labyrinth im Paragraph 203 der *Untersuchungen*. Man geht durch die Gassen der Sprache in eine Richtung und kennt sich aus, dann geht man an demselben Ort in eine andere Richtung und kommt sich plötzlich verloren vor. Hier sehen wir das Tückische. Die Sprache spielt mit uns. Und genauso hat sie auch mit Wittgenstein gespielt, wie er im Vorwort zugibt.

Es scheint, dass Wittgenstein durchaus bereit ist, der Sprache spielerische Züge zuzusprechen. Auf einer weiteren Ebene kann man dann genauso sagen, dass sein Umgang mit der Sprache etwas von diesen Zügen behält. Es ist ja nur folgerichtig, falls man die Sprache als spielerisch erkennt, mit ihr auch spielerisch als Philosoph umzugehen. So findet Wittgensteins Leser in seinem Spätwerk kaum irgendwelche bestimmte Antworten auf die Fragen, die die Philosophie beschäftigen. Natürlich kann man ziemlich richtig sagen, dass für Wittgenstein die Bedeutung irgendwie mit dem Gebrauch gleichgesetzt wird. Genau genommen, verweigert aber Wittgenstein auch in diesem Falle eine ganz deutliche Aussage, indem er präzisiert, dass sich die Bedeutung durch den Gebrauch in einer großen Klasse von Fällen, nicht aber in allen Fällen erklären lässt. Er liefert folgerichtig keine Thesen, geschweige denn eine Theorie über Sprache oder etwas anderes, obwohl er es ursprünglich vielleicht so haben wollte. Er ließ die Sprache tatsächlich auf sich zu und entdeckte, dass sie durch eine theoretische Auffassung verfälscht würde. Man wäre dann eben ihrem spielerischen Charakter nicht gerecht.

Noch vor Wittgenstein hat sich aber mit dem Spiel Moritz Schlick intensiv beschäftigt. Jener Moritz Schlick, welcher eine zentrale Figur für den Wiener Kreis war und welcher auch eine wesentliche Rolle bei Wittgensteins Rückkehr zur Philosophie und deren Entwicklung zu dem Begriff des Sprachspieles spielte. Jetzt sehen wir zu, welche Bezüge zum Motiv des Spiels sich in Schlicks Werk feststellen lassen.

2. Schlick über das Spiel – Inspiration für Wittgenstein?

Als eine der Schlüsselfiguren des Wiener Kreises pflegte Schlick regen Austausch mit Wittgenstein. Ich möchte hervorheben, dass die Problematik des Spiels Schlick besonders am Herzen lag. Das kann nicht nur zur Hypothese führen, dass Schlick Wittgensteins Interesse am Spiel geweckt hat, oder am wenigstens eine der wichtigen Anregungen darstellte. Schlicks Auffassung vom Spiel kann weiter ein neues Verständnis der Spielthematik bei Wittgenstein hervorrufen.

Schlick betonte nämlich eben den etwas unernsten und tatsächlich spielerischen Charakter des Spielens. In seinem Aufsatz „Vom Sinn des Lebens" (zu finden in (Schlick 2008)) erfüllt dabei das Spiel keine kleinere Rolle als die des Sinnes vom Leben. Wodurch verdient das Spiel solche Auszeichnung? Dadurch, dass es keinem Zwecke diene, oder vielmehr seinen Zweck in sich selbst trägt. Das unterscheidet das Spiel von allen anderen Tätigkeiten, die auf die eine oder andere Weise als Arbeit bezeichnet werden können.

Die Thematik des Spielens taucht in Schlicks Werk jedoch viel früher auf und prägt mehrere seiner Texte. Bereits in Vorarbeiten zu seinem Buch *Lebensweisheit* aus dem Jahr 1907 kann man lesen: „Hier haben wir ein Wort, auf das man eine ganze Philosophie/Weltweisheit aufbauen könnte. Die Philosophie des Spiels!" (zitiert nach Schlick 2008: 91) Erste Anregung zur Beschäftigung mit dem Spiel hat Schlick durch die Lektüre von Schillers Briefen über die ästhetische Erziehung bekommen, nämlich an der Stelle, wo Schiller sagt, dass der Mensch erst dort wirklich Mensch ist, wo er spielt. Noch in den zwanziger Jahren hatte Schlick vor, ein Buch mit dem Titel *Welt als Spiel* zu schreiben (Schlick 2008: 92). Dieser Titel erinnert besonders an das Werk von Eugen Fink, von welchem noch Rede sein wird.

Wenn Wittgenstein die Sprache als Sprachspiel oder Gefüge von verschiedenen Sprachspielen auffasst, dann meint er damit, glaube ich, auch die Tatsache, dass die Sprache für sich selbst steht und nicht als ein Mittel zu irgendwelchem Zweck zu verstehen ist. Trotz der Hervorhebung des Gebrauchs der Sprache und der allgemein pragmatistischer Prägung von Wittgensteins Spätwerk, soll man der Versuchung widerstehen, ihn auch als einen Utilitaristen zu sehen. Das unterscheidet ihn von Pragmatisten wie Rorty, welche sich auf ihn dennoch gerne berufen. Wie auch Cora (Diamond 2021) betont, trotzt aller Gemeinsamkeiten, gibt es eben diesen wichtigen Unterschied, welcher klarer vor unsere Augen tritt, wenn wir auch Schlicks Erörterung vom Spiel berücksichtigen. Man sollte aber noch weiter gehen, wenn man die Wichtigkeit des Spiels für Wittgenstein begreifen will. Nämlich zu Eugen Fink.

3. Fink und Spiel als Weltsymbol

Ist die Wichtigkeit vom Spiel für Schlick vielleicht etwas überraschend, so hebt Eugen Fink das Spiel und Spielen in seiner Philosophie ganz explizit hervor. Sein zentrales Werk heißt ja *Spiel als Weltsymbol* (vgl. Fink 1960). Dieser Titel verrät schon viel über den Inhalt des Buches, das Spiel wird tatsächlich als Symbol und Schlüssel zur Begegnung mit der Welt gesehen.

Finks Werk ist freilich erst nach Wittgensteins Tode entstanden und als Schüler Heideggers steht Fink in einer ganz unterschiedlichen Tradition als Wittgenstein. Auch bezieht er sich zu Wittgenstein kaum explizit. Seine Auffassung vom Spiel ist nichtsdestoweniger faszinierend und kann uns helfen, das Spielerische in Wittgenstein richtiger zu verstehen.

Fassen wir jetzt die Kernpunkte von Finks Verständnis des Spiels zusammen. Spiel beginnt für Fink, ähnlich wie für Schlick, dort, wo die Verfolgung der Ziele und Zwecke aufhört. Das Spielen kann zum Beruf werden, etwa bei professionellen Sportlern, es kann auch viele nützliche Funktionen haben, am wenigstens ruhen wir beim Spiele aus. Tatsächlich spielt man aber nur, wenn man des Spieles selbst wegen spielt. Somit unterbricht man das Eilen hinter den Zwecken, die in der Zukunft liegen, und deswegen kann Fink behaupten: „Das Spiel schenkt Gegenwart." (Fink 1957: 18) So gelangen wir zum Innehalten und erleben uns in gewissem Sinne in unserer Ganzheit. Diese Ganzheit lässt uns dann im Spiele die Welt erblicken, nämlich als Ganzes und in sich Geschlossenes. Alles, was uns begegnet, begegnet uns in der Welt, welche dadurch immer vor uns steht. Deswegen wird sie aber so leicht übersehen. Wegen allen den Dingen in der Welt verfehlen wir die immer präsente Welt. Sehr ähnlich stellt Wittgenstein fest, dass sich immer Teilaspekte der Sprachspiele vordrängen und dadurch und das Ganze, in welches sie gehören, nicht erblicken lassen.

4. Das Ganze und das Unsagbare

Unterschiede zwischen Fink und Wittgenstein kann man ohne viel Mühe sicher viel finden. Ich möchte mich aber auf Gemeinsamkeiten oder am wenigstens Ähnlichkeiten konzentrieren. Obwohl die Ausdrucksweise Finks stark metaphysisch anmutet, betont er, dass seine Philosophie keine Theorie über die Welt liefert. Auch im Spiel erfahren wir nichts Neues, also bekommen wir keine weitere Informationen. Vielmehr sehen wir, was wir eher immer wussten, was aber eben durch seine grosse Bekanntheit kaum noch beachtet wurde. Das trifft sich sehr wohl mit Wittgensteins antitheoretischem Ansatz, welcher seine Philosophie schon seit dem Tractatus begleitet und in seinem Spätwerk noch verschärft wird. Bekanntlich glaubte er, dass Philosophie keine Thesen aufstellen soll.

Durch einen anderen Zugang können wir aber dennoch das Zentrale, sei es die Sprache bei Wittgenstein, oder die Welt bei Fink, erfassen. Wir begegnen ihnen beim Spiel, bei dem Zu-

schauen, welches Wittgenstein mit dem Denken kontrastiert. Und das in der Gegenwart, die uns das Spiel schenkt. Im Falle Wittgensteins ein Spiel mit der Sprache. Dieses Spiel offenbart dann eben das Ganze, welches sich, wie Wittgenstein schon im Tractatus moniert, nicht aussprechen lässt. Zwar scheint Wittgenstein im Umgang mit dem Ganzen, welches im Tractatus mit dem Mystischen schon verbunden war, in seinem Spätwerk noch scheuer umzugehen, dennoch spricht er bereits am Anfang der *Untersuchungen* im (PU 1953: §7) von dem Ganzen der Sprache mit allen sie begleitenden Handlungen.

Liegt das wahre Wesen der Sprache, beziehungsweise der Welt in unmessbaren Tiefen verborgen? Besonders Finks Rede von den Masken, welche zum Spielen gehören, kann das suggerieren. Bei einem Spiel geben wir typischerweise vor, etwas anderes zu sein. Wie bereits kleine Kinder, die Polizisten spielen. Dennoch ergänzt Fink auch, dass hinter den Masken so gut wie nichts zu entdecken ist. Genauso ist es bei Wittgenstein. Der Sprache können wir direkt zuschauen, nur müssen wir uns von den sie verschleiernden Theorien befreien. Das geschieht aber eher nicht durch einen endgültigen Akt der Enthüllung, sondern muss stehts getan werden, in dem wir ständig die philosophische Therapie durchmachen. Es hat etwas von einem Ritual an sich und Rituale führt Fink als Paradebeispiele des Spieles an. Die Rituale können uns in eine Extase versetzen, bei welchen wir meinen, endlich das Wesentliche zu begreifen. Genauso kann es gehen, wenn einem die Schuppen von den Augen fallen, wenn im Rahmen philosophischer Therapie ein philosophischer Vorurteil als solcher entlarvt wird. Aber bei aller Extase müssen die Rituale wie auch die philosophische Therapie dennoch immer wiederholt werden, weil wir immer wieder vergessen, Spielerisch zu bleiben. Und so übersehen das Naheliegende und Wesentliche, gerade weil es so nahe liegt.

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Wittgenstein and Derrida – What is Driving Deconstruction

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Abstract

Wittgenstein and Derrida share a deconstructive approach insofar as both try to show that metaphysical statements depend on a rationally arbitrary curtailment of linguistic practices. Similar strategies of argumentation can be found in Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* and Derrida's *The Gift of Death*. Both philosophers furthermore see deconstruction not only as a project which frees us from metaphysical illusions but also a project which is guided by ultimate or absolute ethical values. Their underlying ethical attitudes and values, however, seem to be different. Derrida wants to give room to the various "darker" and "lighter" shades of the complex and paradox play of "Being". Wittgenstein wants to overcome "darkness" and achieve a "bright" and harmonious ethical existence. The different ethical attitudes of Derrida and Wittgenstein are in the background influencing the process of deconstruction and therefore the further question is raised how this affects the validity of Wittgenstein's and Derrida's philosophical results.

There is a striking tension between how Wittgenstein and Derrida describe their own projects and how they are regularly understood by others. Ratzinger (2005), who fears a dictatorship of relativism, claims that Derrida's project of deconstruction is a rejection of all "valid values". Derrida, however, is committed to the undeconstructability of justice and explicitly claims: "Deconstruction is justice" (Derrida 1992: 15). Wittgenstein is characterized as a thinker who proposes a "reductive view of moral judgements" (Hyman 2004: 8) by allegedly claiming that belief in moral duties is "*nothing but* a passionate commitment to a system of reference" (Hyman 2004: 7). Wittgenstein, however, both in early and late writings characterizes ethical values as *absolute values* and further describes his own philosophizing as driven by such ethical values. In his *Lecture on Ethics* Wittgenstein describes ethical statements as "absolute judgement[s] of value" (LE 1993: 39). In a letter to Ludwig von Ficker, Wittgenstein stresses that his thinking about logic is driven by ethical concerns (see Engelmann 1967: 143–144). Three years before his death Wittgenstein noted: "Is what I am doing in any way worth the effort? Well only, if it receives a light from above. […]If what I write really has value, how were anyone to steal the value from me? If the light from above is *lacking*, then I can in any case be no more than clever." (CV 1998: 66) In other words: Both Wittgenstein and Derrida refer to ultimate or absolute values which drive their projects – yet their ways of philosophizing are seen as relativistic.

The charge of relativism, even if ultimately a misrepresentation, is of course not a random accident. Both thinkers try to deconstruct false ideals – which has been noted by interpreters such as Staten (1984), Glendinning (1998) and Stone (2000). Wittgenstein and Derrida try to deconstruct the appearance of metaphysical necessity where they identify none. If the aim of deconstruction is not destruction but a positive or constructive ethical aim, the question arises if Wittgenstein and Derrida share the same aim. Do they have the same vision of justice and ethics?

1. Metaphysical ideals as false idols

There is a certain argumentative strategy both philosophers employ. They point towards a pre-philosophical variety of how language works and then point out that metaphysicians *forget* the variety and focus only on one or a few of those aspects. In other words: Based on a primal variety of language-forms metaphysicians privilege only certain language-forms *without having compelling and coherent reasons to do this* – thereby making their philosophical moves arbitrary.

2. Wittgenstein: Ultimate justification as a false idol

In *On Certainty* Wittgenstein shows that as language-users in the world we practically make a distinction between at least three types of valid propositions: *(1) Propositions which need to be justified by evidence, (2) propositions which could be justified by evidence and (3) propositions which in principle cannot be justified by evidence.* The first type are *knowledge-claims*. If a language-user claims to know that water snakes live in the Grunewald-forest or that the distance between the Earth and the Moon is roughly 400.000 kms, then they need to be able to produce evidence for their claim – otherwise it is a pseudo-knowledge-claim. The person making the knowledge-claim about the snakes thus would have to lead another to the spot in the forest where they can see the snakes with their own eyes, show photographs of the snakes, explain how they derived the existence of the snakes from the marks the snakes left or something along those lines. The second type are epistemic belief claims. A person might say "I believe that water snakes live in the Grunewald forest" and not need to produce evidence. Linguistic practice allows for the possibility to utter a belief without having to be transparent about how it came about. But those epistemic belief claims *could in principle* be verified or falsified on the basis of evidence and thus turn into regular knowledge-claims. The third type are *grammatical propositions* such as "Physical objects exist", "I am a human being", "Babies do not fake laughter", "12 x 12 = 144", "The world exists", "The world is more than 50 years old". They are the background which makes knowledge-claims and belief-claims logically possible. Understanding the proposition "There are water snakes in the Grunewald forest" presupposes an understanding of the existence of the world and of the existence of physical objects – it is not clear what a person could *mean* by "water snake" if they do not mean an animal which lives in this world and is – insofar as it has a body – a physical object. However, these propositions cannot be grounded in evidence which is *more secure than the propositions themselves*. You can point to a snake and say "Snakes exist. Snakes are physical objects. Thus physical objects exist" and thus *formally derive* the existence of physical objects but the existence of snakes is not more secure than the existence of physical objects – since the meaning of "snake" depends on the meaning of "physical object". I can point to my passport and reason "According to my passport I am a German citizen. Only human beings can be German citizens. Thus I am a human being." but the validity of the passport is not more secure than my being human. Grammatical propositions can be "technically" derived from other propositions for show – but these either are less secure or

equally secure but never more secure. "[A]ny proposition can be derived from other ones. But they may be no more certain than it is itself." (OC 1975: 1) Ultimately no knowledge is gained due to the derivation. Grammatical propositions cannot be authentically grounded in evidence. An authentic grounding requires that the evidence is more secure than that which it is evidence for. Since propositions which can be grounded in evidence do rely on grammatical propositions, these are the ungrounded basis of all practical reasoning and inference. The philosophical transgression of the metaphysician consists in his demand that grammatical propositions should have justifications, too. The metaphysician then either gives pseudo-explanations by trying to ground our grammatical propositions ultimately in sense-data, Platonic forms, Kantian categories or the like or he ends up in skepticism – he initially demands metaphysical explanations, then correctly sees the proposed metaphysical explanations as pseudo-explanations which prove nothing and finally ends up in skepticism. The therapy Wittgenstein suggests is that the metaphysician should overcome his idolatry. He should acknowledge the different primal forms of propositions and not *rationally arbitrarily* demand that grammatical propositions conform to the form of knowledge-claims. Grammatical propositions are necessarily *trusted* and necessarily not *proven*. "[A] language-game is only possible if one trusts something." (OC 1975: 509) The grammatical propositions mentioned above are pretty much shared universally among those that identify each other as human beings. Some grammatical propositions which structure the lives of speakers and cannot be grounded in more secure evidence – such as "God exists", "There will be a Final Judgement", "Good reasons are those which natural sciences such as physics provide" – are not shared universally but are only affirmed in certain communities. According to Wittgenstein you cannot prove them based on evidence but they have different existential values. Different life forms can be perceived as more or less harmonious and therefore be accepted in practice. The experience of harmony has not the force of objective evidence since one group of speakers might reject as sick and misguided that which some community experiences as harmonious. Wittgenstein notes: "[S]omewhere I must begin with […] a decision." (OC 1975: 146) He suggests that "knowledge is related to a decision" (OC 1975: 362) in the sense that one has to affirm or negate a language-game without having grounds for that. "[T]he language-game is so to say something unpredictable. […] [I]t is not based on grounds." (OC 1975: 559)

3. Derrida: Ultimate justification as a false idol

In *The Gift of Death* (1995) Derrida discusses the possibility of grounding ethical linguistic practices. He contrasts the idea of being responsible *before a particular other* and being responsible *before a general group of others*. In the Biblical story Abraham is ordered by God to sacrifice Isaac. God is the particular other, before whom one is responsible, who approaches one with a terrible singular demand. Isaac represents the other others before whom one is responsible, too and the sphere of general – potentially universal – ethical rules. According to Derrida there is always a tension between the demands of the singular other and the demand of general ethics. Lacking a rationally binding rule for making a decision every person is faced with the decision of privileging the particular other or the other others. "I am responsible to anyone (that is to say, any other) only by failing in my responsibility to all the others, to the ethical or political generality. And I can never justify this sacrifice" (Derrida 1995: 70). The linguistic practice thus is full of tension that can never be resolved. Metaphysicians try to resolve the tension by privileging the general and downplaying the particular. However, this philosophical act of privileging the general is itself the very groundless leap of faith similar to the specific leap of faith of deciding to sacrifice Isaac or not. It does not provide a coherent way out of the *aporia*. According to Derrida we have to endure and acknowledge the tension. This can be connected to his general deconstructive approach: The aim is to bring hidden tensions to light, to reveal downplayed aspects of linguistic practices and thus provide "justice". But now it emerges that Derrida himself seems to privilege a certain controversial view of justice. Justice seems to be something like giving space to any other or to any concept so that they can unfold. But since the demands of all the particular others are in tension and not in harmony with another and since concepts imply aspects of opposite concepts, justice can never be realized (someone or some concept always has to be cast in the dark and suppressed) but only be approximated by taking turns in deciding what to suppress and what to give space to. Therefore Derrida can claim that deconstruction is the best candidate for justice and furthermore that deconstruction itself cannot be deconstructed.

Like Derrida Wittgenstein stresses the impossibility of calculating or ultimately justifying an ethical decision or any linguistic practice. In *Force of Law* Derrida even suggests that his own thinking ventures into a "Wittgensteinian direction" (Derrida 1992: 14) when he notes that discourse cannot justify itself. Wittgenstein, however, does not embrace Derrida's "pessimism" that life in principle is full of tension and problematic. Wittgenstein writes: "The fact that life is problematic means that your life does not fit life's shape. So you must change your life, & once it fits the shape, what is problematic will disappear" (CV 1998: 31). Like Derrida Wittgenstein identifies the necessity of a leap of faith towards a specific linguistic practice but Wittgenstein does not see the impossibility of a harmonious form of life which genuinely *fits* the mold of one's own life which is harmoniously connected with those other lives. Wittgenstein's general philosophical approach is continuous with this ethical stance which denies irreducible unclarity: He aims for "complete clarity" (PU 2001: 133) which would be achieved by a "*a clear view* of the use of our words" (PU 2001: 122).

In order to grasp the contrast between Derrida and Wittgenstein one might compare two (religious) attitudes. There is the attitude of asserting *the primacy, purity and attainability of the good* which is expressed by people such as Plato and classical Christian thinkers. Then there is the attitude that life is necessarily a complicated mix of dark and light expressed by for instance the later Heidegger (who grasps Being as both concealing and unconcealing), psychoanalysts such as Freud and Jung who see the psyche as fundamentally driven by irreducible tensions or movements such as Manichaeism.

Derrida's ethical aim can be seen as a certain *fullness* – acknowledging Being in its "lighter" and "darker" aspects in order to maintain an ever evolving play of the various shades of Being. Wittgenstein's ethical aim, however, is the *overcoming of darkness* and the realization of a perfectly "bright" existence in this world.

4. Conclusion

Wittgenstein and Derrida both focus on (a) the impossibility of grounding linguistic and ethical practices in an ultimate metaphysical justification and (b) the consequent need for a leap of faith when adopting a specific practice. Therefore they deconstruct metaphysical ideals. However, their deconstruction is furthermore driven by two different ethical attitudes. Since the ethical attitudes cannot be grounded it would have to be Derrida's leap of faith to focus on the tension-filled interplay of

opposites and Wittgenstein's leap of faith to focus on finding a non-metaphysical ungrounded harmony. The question that now arises and cannot be addressed in this paper is: If deconstruction is driven by absolute ethical ideals and at least those two ideals are defended – how do you have to understand the genesis of those ideals and how do they impact the validity of deconstructive projects?

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Soul, not Mind. Wittgenstein, with Plato Lurking in the Shadows

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Abstract

The paper adds some comments to the later Wittgenstein's conception of the soul. While he touches upon the issue of the soul in connection with debates on the body and mind (inner-outer) and on behaviourism, I lean towards those who read it independently, as exploring a key concept in understanding what makes life a *human life,* i.e. one in which the dimension of *morality* features centrally. This interpretation would bring Wittgenstein close to Plato; some Wittgensteinian philosophers (such as Rhees or Gaita) offer readings of the two philosophers along analogous "ethical" lines. The distinction between the mind and the soul reveals itself clearest in the context of the difference between what is deteriorating for the mind (mental health disorders) and what is deteriorating for the soul. Disorders of the soul appear to be problems of *life*, often with moral stakes. Possible interpretations of the nature of addiction offer an example of comparison.

Wittgenstein's remarks about the soul or psychic life are often read in the context of the opposition inner-outer. In this sense, Wittgenstein is trying to contribute to roughly the same debate as advocates or critics of behaviourism: do people have minds apart from bodies? Are their minds localised? Do they have contents? Is people's outward behaviour a visible expression of their thoughts, motivations, intentions, emotions, which are "inside"?

While some picture Wittgenstein as a philosopher friendly to behaviourism (cf. Gier 1982; Graham 2009), the exact meaning of this proximity requires caution. Too easily we may succumb to the temptation to read Wittgenstein as contributing to the dualism vs. monism debate. I believe that this would conflate his remarks about the *soul* with perhaps related but in general differently oriented issues of *mind* and mental contents. I will rely on authors reading Wittgenstein's remarks about the soul in a distinctly "Platonic" way. There may not be an objective influence, but rather a like philosophical spirit, especially in questions related to morality and human life.

1. Wittgenstein, soul, and mind

A much-quoted remark (PI 2009: II, §22) reads: "My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul." Wittgenstein is refusing to play the game of metaphysical behaviourism here. He is not interested in whether there is a certain something that people have – perhaps in their heads. The talk about the soul relies on contexts where we *relate* to others in certain ways. That we deal with a soul is not an isolated independently formed conjecture. We have here a cluster of primitive attitudes of a "reactive" or "participant" character (Strawson 1962), a matter of unreflected "feeling about and acting towards" others (Cockburn 1990: 6). We are angry with another person, we long for her words, we care about what she thinks, also because *it is her who thinks* that (unlike the way we care about what our route planner thinks). These attitudes have very different "contents"; that (or *whether*) the other has a soul is a way of describing what all the attitudes in this heterogeneous family have in common, what they are like.

Winch (1987) points out that for Wittgenstein, the key difference between beliefs and attitudes is that beliefs and attitudes simply do not, "grammatically", relate to the same kinds of objects. That we relate to each other differently from treating an automaton is not because we have certain beliefs about each other. We have *particular* beliefs *about* other people's souls ("Only a man with a rotten soul could have hit the child as he did!") because we adopt those foundational attitudes. Moreover, Winch suggests, while we certainly have beliefs about particular states, situations, or qualities of people's souls and their lives – "I believe she is unhappy" –, we can hardly "believe" in the same sense that someone has a soul. We say "I believe she is unhappy" in a situation in which our interlocutor, or ourselves, *may not* be aware of the person's unhappiness, or may misinterpret her behaviour, confusing for him/ourselves. It seems difficult to imagine analogous situations where what is at stake would be whether she has/is a soul at all.

Wittgenstein expands his comment about attitudes by saying, equally famously, that "[t]he human body is the best picture of the human soul" (PI 2009: II, §25), and, less famously, that "[i]nstead of 'attitude toward the soul' one could also say 'attitude toward a human'" (LW II: 38). The second quotation explains Wittgenstein's refusal of "opinions". Can one be of the *opinion* that the other is a human? (Other than in sci-fi.) What would it be like? The soul is not something the presence or absence of which is stated *after* an inquiry; it simply is at play whenever anything human is at play. Making sense of *human* encounters requires taking into account attitudes towards souls.

Wittgenstein's position shares some elements with classical post-war rejections of dualism – Dennett's functionalism or Davidson's anomalous monism. Dennett, too, refuses to search for another "thing" that "is there" apart from the body. Talking about the mind takes part in describing a *relatable* bodily being. Something of this is captured by Dennett's Wittgensteinian example highlighting the difference between "we – just me and my dog" and "we – just me and my oyster", or "my truck". He says: "When I address you, I include us both in the class of mind-havers." (Dennett 1996: 4) That is, by addressing you, I ascribe a mind to you; not: based on ascribing a mind to you, I can address you as a "you". (Notably, though, Dennett's concern is with *minds*.)

Davidson (2004) argues that while we can talk about bodies and about minds, this is principally a difference of *vocabularies* applied in the same place. By applying the "vocabulary of agency" (Ramberg 2000), we are not positing an extra entity apart from (human) bodies: we use a conceptual tool appropriate for talking about motives, reasons, ideas – all that makes human behaviour *agency*. Without accommodating propositional attitudes, or the concept of truth, our descriptions of human agency are impossible; while biology or similar disciplines can do away with them.

These analogies show that Wittgenstein's account of the soul does not necessarily indicate extravagant anthropology – its elements point in directions similar to established figures in the philosophy of mind. In many respects, though, Wittgenstein stands far from Dennett and Davidson; for example, he is not interested in advocating for naturalism.

2. Plato and soul

I would like to stress the differences between the talk of *mind* and the talk of *soul*. The mind features prominently in discussions of perception, consciousness, knowledge, representation, or embodied action. The talk of the soul is indispensable for concerns of *moral* or spiritual nature.

Man is a minded being just as many animals are (in many more of them the debate can be intelligibly conducted). With souls, this seems to differ. Wittgenstein accompanied his remark about attitudes by a comment concerning the fact that people often consider the soul *immortal,* and act accordingly. He does not bind himself to a metaphysics of a discorporate mind. The immortality of the soul is not a matter of whether the respect in which living beings are functioning and conscious (Dennett) exists independently of a mere body.

Wittgenstein's framing refers back to Platonic and Christian intuitions about the soul. The background can be seen in the Platonic question: whether the soul is harmed or destroyed in the same sense or by the same causes that harm or destroy the body. I will not deal with Plato's positive doctrine of the existence of immortal souls. I am more interested in the moral aspect of his conception of the immortality of the soul, more directly relevant for reading Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein's student Rhees touches, in his commentary to Plato, upon the specific character of the talk of the soul: "The chemical changes of the body at death […] do not tell you what has 'left' the body. They do not tell you what it is to be alive, or to feel joy or sorrow, to strive or to be dejected or to capitulate, or to love or triumph. There may be special bodily or chemical changes that accompany all these […] But if we have understood these bodily changes, we have not understood what joy or sorrow or love or thinking are" (Rhees 2004: 80). Whereas naturalised functionalist philosophers of mind *are* legitimately interested in the relevance of the bodily chemical processes for the *mental events* of thinking or being in love.

Plato's point (in Rhees' reading) is that the soul need not fear the death of the body. The (functionalist, emergent) mind can be considered something that can perish, through causes that lead to the death of the body, too. The soul is not *anything that perishes through such causes*. Yet, souls *can* become better or worse, they *can* suffer. However, the reasons differ: the soul is "that which the body loses through moral degradation," says Rhees (2004: 94) arguing that the only thing that can destroy the soul is its own evil, with reference (probably) to *The Republic* (I, 610a). This may not do justice to Plato's own position; for he advocates for the indestructibility of the soul, which for morally degraded souls results in afterlife suffering (e.g. *Phaedo* I, 113d–114c). However, Rhees' reading of Plato can make sense of Wittgenstein's own comments; especially of the way in which Winch or others elaborated on these cursory remarks.

Our bodies *are* pictures of our souls, but "[t]he soul *accounts for* the life and actions of the body in a way in which the bones and the sinews do not" (Rhees 2004, 80). The condition of the soul makes our lives good or bad, but in a sense different from our health, as it features in the current, typically naturalised conceptions of welfare. Mind and its health are what keeps a man properly working; but goodness is not an external product/purpose for the moral endeavours of the soul, as the person's proper functioning could be considered the product/purpose for healthy workings of the mind. Rhees (1997: 259f) explains it thus: the soul is not a hitherto-unanswered question of biology (while mental health and mental processes are questions already (partially) answered), it is not a question for biology at all. The soul is not a "something" *based on which* "I have certain responsibilities or I am capable of good and evil – […] having such responsibilities is a part of what is *meant* by having a soul […] [a]nd similarly with 'being capable of good and evil'."

Certainly, one is disadvantaged in one's prospect of the good life if one is severely cognitively impaired and/or suffers from a chronic and devastating mental health condition; but at least in some respects, the functioning mental capacities are an *instrumental* prerequisite. For the good life as such does not consist in functional cognitive skills (but has more directly to do with love, friendship, family life, meaningful profession, religion, etc.). The soul is connected to being a good person much more intrinsically. Not only does being a good person require a non-degraded soul, having a non-degraded soul simply is what being good means. (Cf. Winch (1972: 172) about morality having no other independent purpose than itself; or Rhees (1999: 233f) about the course of life and what makes it good or bad; or Gaita (2006: ch. 11) about the key Platonic *and* Wittgensteinian distinction between what's necessary (for a noble life, in an Aristotelian sense) and what is good, therefore vital for one's soul.)

The Platonic aspect of Wittgenstein's account of the soul might thus point in this direction: The soul is not a function of the organism, while the mind, in a sense, is. The mind can be healthy similarly to the body; the health of both is conducive to the organism's overall condition. When something is wrong with the soul, it is not a matter of its "health", but rather of the person's integrity. A mental disorder differs from a disorder of the soul. A mental disorder is a health disorder. Mistaking a disorder of the soul for a mental (health) disorder prevents us from seeing important things in the life of the afflicted person clearly. A disordered soul transforms one's life in a different way (opens space for non-approving pity, for instance). The degradation of one's soul can take the shape of failing to do justice to others as human beings. The soul can also be lost, or "sold", in ways in which the mind cannot. Attitudes towards a soul are attitudes towards someone whose life it makes sense to understand as tragic or comic, be it for her own sake or others' sake.

3. Coda: addiction

An example for illumination: the thing called "addiction". Drug-related problems are interpreted in many different ways, by philosophers, too. Among the common ways of looking at addiction which often obscure more than illuminate is characterising it in terms of health, e.g. as "a mundane health problem that should be treated scientifically" (Beyerstein's (2020) fascinating newspaper article about Jordan Peterson). Or locating it in the breakdown of will or of one's cognitive capacities (as an incapacity to see what drug use leads to). (I am criticising these conceptions at length elsewhere: Beran 2019.)

However, to the extent that there is a difference between the consumption (even regular and frequent) of a drug and a drug problem, it consists in the latter being a more complex problem one has with oneself and one's life. Without blaming any-

one for their addiction, it is important to see that it is a problem different in nature, not "simply happening" to you in a way in which a physical health problem (Covid-19) or a mental health problem (schizophrenia) happens to you. It needs to be treated differently. There are the needs of an ailing soul, needs of a spiritual kind, at play here, though the problem no doubt very often grows out of roots that are also of a social, economic, or cultural nature. And we can also see here that harms done to one's soul may be irreversible in ways not depending on the reversibility or manageability of the harms which one's physical or mental health suffered. For harms to one's soul are often harms done to others.

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Wittgensteins übersichtliche Darstellung und Hegels spekulative Philosophie

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Abstract

Warum beginnt Wittgenstein ausgerechnet im Herbsttrimester 1931 sich für die übersichtliche Darstellung zu interessieren? Und was genau versteht er unter diesem Terminus, der augenscheinlich eng verknüpft ist mit einer Wende in der Perspektive auf seine eigene Philosophie? Diese beiden Fragen werden anhand von verschiedenen, zum Teil bisher noch unveröffentlichten Quellen aus dem Studienjahr 1931–1932 untersucht und insbesondere auf den Kontakt Wittgensteins mit der spekulativen Philosophie Hegels und deren Vermittlung über die Vorlesungen C. D. Broads im selben Trimester zurückbezogen.

„Die übersichtliche Darstellung vermittelt das Verständnis, welches eben darin besteht, daß wir die ‚Zusammenhänge sehen'."
(Wittgenstein 1945)

„Alles gehört zu allem. (Ich glaube, so etwas hat Hegel gemeint.)"
(Wittgenstein 1946)

Ein Terminus, welcher in Wittgensteins Nachlass regelmäßig wiederkehrt, ist derjenige der *übersichtlichen Darstellung*. In einer Maschinenschrift vom 1. Januar 1945 (TS 227a: 88) findet sich dazu eine Überlegung, welche später in den §122 der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* eingegangen ist. In ihr weist Wittgenstein eindrücklich auf die grundlegende Bedeutung der *übersichtlichen Darstellung* für die Charakteristik der eigenen philosophischen Methode:

> Der Begriff der übersichtlichen Darstellung ist für uns von grundlegender Bedeutung. Er bezeichnet unsere Darstellungsform, die Art, wie wir die Dinge sehen.

Und er erläutert dort auch die Funktion dieser Darstellungsform: „Die übersichtliche Darstellung vermittelt das Verständnis, welches eben darin besteht, daß wir die ‚Zusammenhänge sehen'. Daher die Wichtigkeit des Findens und des Erfindens von *Zwischengliedern*." Die Geschichte der *übersichtlichen Darstellung* lohnt eine nähere Untersuchung, ermöglicht sie doch eine gewisse Einsicht in Wittgensteins Methode – und erhellt zugleich, wie er selbst über diese Methode denkt.

Die Entdeckung des Begriffs der *übersichtlichen Darstellung* als Bezeichnung für die Methode der eigenen Philosophie könnte in das Herbsttrimester 1931 gefallen sein – jedenfalls nicht später, da Wittgenstein schon in der Maschinenschrift 212, datiert auf den 1. Januar 1932, eine Kapitelüberschrift wählt, welche er kurz darauf in das sog. *Big Typescript* übernimmt und die auch schon weitgehend der Bestimmung der übersichtlichen Darstellung in den späteren *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* entspricht. Diese Kapitelüberschrift lautet: „Methode der Philosophie: die übersichtliche Darstellung der grammatischen| sprachlichen Tatsachen. Das Ziel: Durchsichtigkeit der Argumente. Gerechtigkeit." (TS 212: 1134; TS 213 (BT) §89: 414)

Bemerkenswert ist, dass Wittgenstein in der Entdeckung der *übersichtlichen Darstellung* offenbar auch einen Bruch zumindest mit einem Teil seiner früheren Auffassungen aus der Zeit des *Tractatus* erkennt. In diesem Sinne schreibt er schon am 20. November 1931 in einem Brief an Moritz Schlick, dass sich seine Vorstellung von den Elementarsätzen und Gegenständen im *Tractatus* inzwischen als fehlerhaft erwiesen habe, und dass der Hauptunterschied zur früheren Auffassung im Finden einer *übersichtlichen Darstellung* bestehe:

> Nebenher: alles oder doch das Meiste was ‚Elementarsätze' & ‚Gegenstände' betrifft hat sich mir als fehlerhaft erwiesen & mußte gänzlich umgearbeitet werden. […] Vielleicht der Hauptunterschied zwischen der Auffassung des Buches & meiner jetzigen ist, daß ich einsah, daß die *Analyse* des Satzes nicht im Auffinden verborgener Dinge liegt, sondern im *Tabulieren*, in der *übersichtlichen Darstellung*, der Grammatik, d.h. des grammatischen Gebrauchs, der Wörter. Damit fällt alles Dogmatische, was ich über ‚Gegenstand', ‚Elementarsatz' eben gesagt habe. (Zitiert nach Pichler 2004: 86)

Aus diesem Grund wurden in der Forschung gerade in Bezug auf die konkrete Bedeutung der *übersichtlichen Darstellung* ausführliche und zugleich sehr unterschiedliche Überlegungen angestellt. Dies wird besonders deutlich, wenn man auf die unterschiedlichen Übersetzungsversuche blickt, welche die *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* im Laufe der Zeit erfahren haben. In die Übersetzung eines philosophischen Begriffs geht regelmäßig auch ein Teil der jeweiligen besonderen Vorstellung ein, welche sich der Übersetzer von diesem Begriff macht. So wählte bspw. Elizabeth Anscombe für die *übersichtliche* Darstellung in ihrer Übersetzung von 1953 den *Terminus perspicuous representation*, während Peter Hacker und Joachim Schulte sich – offensichtlich vor dem Hintergrund eigener Überlegungen (vgl. Baker/ Hacker 1983: 295) – genötigt sahen, dieses für die Auflage von 2009 zu *surveyable representation* zu korrigieren. Weitere Übersetzungen der *übersichtlichen Darstellung* führten bspw. zu *clear representation, overview* oder *survey* (vgl. Pichler 2004: 181, Fn. 100).
Die Beobachtung von Wittgensteins eigenem Begriffsgebrauch in den von ihm auf Englisch gehaltenen Seminaren in Cambridge führte Alois Pichler dazu, vorzuschlagen, dass vielmehr der Terminus „synoptic view" besonders geeignet sei,

> die methodische Rolle, welche Wittgenstein seiner Philosophie und dem Begriff der übersichtlichen Darstellung in den *Untersuchungen* zuerkennt, einzufangen. (Pichler 2004: 182)

Eine von vielen Quellen, die dies bestätigen, findet sich bei George Edward Moore, welcher als regelmäßiger Teilnehmer der Seminare später an die *außergewöhnliche Vielfalt der Illustrationen und Vergleiche* erinnert, mit denen es Wittgenstein im Seminar gelungen sei, eine *übersichtliche Darstellung* – nämlich einen „synoptic view" – zu geben: „I cannot possibly do justice to the extreme richness of illustration and comparison which he [Wittgenstein] used: he was really succeeding in gi-

ving what he called a ‚synoptic' view of things which we all know." (Moore 1954: 5)
Bemerkenswert ist dabei, dass Wittgenstein auch in Moores Erinnerungen ausdrücklich darauf hinweist, dass es missverständlich wäre, anzunehmen, sein Interesse gehe in erster Linie auf die Analyse – was dagegen wichtiger sei, sei die *übersichtliche Darstellung* der analysierten Sachverhalte:

> In this connexion he [Wittgenstein] said it was misleading to say that what we wanted was an ‚analysis' […] I imagine that it was in this respect of needing a ‚synopsis' of trivialities that he thought that philosophy was similar to Ethics and Aesthetics. (Moore 1955: 27)

Mit dieser offensichtlichen Transformation in Wittgensteins Denken sind mindestens zwei drängende Fragen verbunden, nämlich erstens: Warum beginnt Wittgenstein ausgerechnet im Herbsttrimester 1931, sich für die *übersichtliche Darstellung* bzw. den „synoptic view" zu interessieren? Und zweitens: Was genau versteht er unter diesem Terminus und was macht die augenscheinlich damit verbundene Wende in der Perspektive auf seine Philosophie aus?

An anderer Stelle (vgl. Berg 2021: §29) habe ich bereits ausführlich erörtert, wie Wittgenstein gerade in dieser Zeit in seinem Seminar die Inhalte einer Vorlesung diskutiert, welche sein Kollege Charlie Dunbar Broad zeitgleich in Cambridge über sein Modell der verschiedenen Methoden in der Philosophie hält, und ich hatte sogar dafür argumentiert, dass Wittgenstein an diesen Veranstaltungen selbst teilgenommen haben könnte. Die Idee ist ungefähr diese: Wittgenstein besucht im Herbsttrimester 1931 gemeinsam mit seinen Studenten die Vorlesung Broads, um deren Gehalt anschließend in seinem eigenen Seminar kommentieren und beurteilen zu können. (Vgl. Lee 1980: 74)

Broad beginnt die bewusste Vorlesung also im Herbsttrimester 1931, und gibt zum Einstieg auch gleich eine für sein Denken besonders wichtige Unterscheidung zwischen den beiden wesentlichen Methoden, welche allgemein für die Philosophie charakteristisch seien: „I will begin at once with what seems to me the most important division, viz. the division into what I call Critical and what I call Speculative Philosophy." (Broad EP: 1)

Und er erläutert diese Unterscheidung genauer, indem er für die Philosophie drei wesentliche Aufgaben differenziert. Da ist zuerst die *Analyse* abstrakter Konzepte und zweitens die *Kritik* grundlegender Thesen oder Propositionen – beides spielt sich noch auf der Ebene von Broads „critical philosophy" ab. Die Ebene der „speculative philosophy" geht nun drittens darüber hinaus mit dem Versuch eines „synoptic view", einer *übersichtlichen Darstellung* der „Reality as a whole":

> When all problems that are really scientific and not philosophic are cleared out of philosophy what remains for philosophers to do? (1) It remains to discover, analyse and clear up the more abstract concepts which are common to several or to all the sciences. (2) To elicit, state clearly, and criticise the fundamental propositions which are assumed by several or by all the sciences. And (3) to try to get a *synoptic view* of all the various facts which are believed to be known at the time, and to try to suggest some general theory of the nature of *Reality as a whole* which does justice to them all. (Broad EP: 40–41)

Nach den Notizen John Kings zu urteilen, der im darauffolgenden Seminar Wittgensteins Überlegungen notiert, scheint diese Unterscheidung für Wittgenstein unproblematisch, wenn er Broads Aussagen kurz zusammenfasst: „Broad divided Philosophy into Critical and Speculative (terms which explain themselves) […]" (Lee 1980: 71). Dabei differenziert Broad für die *spekulative Philosophie* noch eine deduktive von einer dialektischen Methode, und es wird deutlich, dass er bei letzterer vor allem an Hegel denkt:

> However, two methods have been used by Speculative Philosophers. These may be called the Straightforward Deductive Method and the Dialectical Method. The former is used by Spinoza and Leibniz, and the finest modern example of it is probably to be found in McTaggart's Nature of Existence. The latter was elaborated and used by *Hegel*, and few other philosophers have employed it, though I understand that there are traces of it in the Neoplatonists Plotinus and Proclus (Broad EP: 29).

Für seine Studenten im Seminar fasst Wittgenstein Broads Einsichten zum Wesen der spekulativen Philosophie Hegels und der dialektischen Methode mit folgenden Worten zusammen:

> Broad said that Speculative Philosophy had two methods. The deductive which started with certain fundamental self-evident propositions and proceeded to deduce further propositions about reality, and the dialectical which he describes as the *Hegelian method of examining contradictions, their relations and resolution*. (Lee 1980: 73)

Da auch die folgenden Überlegungen Wittgensteins nach Kings und Lees Seminarmitschriften inhaltlich und zeitlich mit der Vorlesung Broads zusammenfallen, ist zu vermuten, dass sie direkt durch Broads bzw. Hegels spekulative Philosophie und deren synoptischen Anspruch inspiriert sind:

> What we find out in philosophy is trivial; it does not teach us new facts, only science does that. But the proper *synopsis* of these trivialities is enormously difficult, and has immense importance. Philosophy is in fact the *synopsis* of trivialities" (Lee 1980: 25). Oder: „Our difficulty is that our intellectual discomfort is not removed until we have a *synopsis* of all the various trivialities. If one item necessary for the *synopsis* is lacking, we still feel that something is wrong (Lee 1980: 33).

Auch viel später hat sich Wittgenstein in Bezug auf Hegel vor allem an die Bedeutung des synoptischen Zusammenhangs der philosophischen Einzelgegenstände erinnert. Noch in einem Notizbucheintrag vom August 1946 denkt er in diesem Sinne an Hegel, wenn er notiert:

> Ja, man könnte auch so fühlen: ‚Es gehört alles zu allem.' (Interne und Externe Relation) Verrücke ein Stück und es ist nicht mehr, was es war. Dieser Tisch ist dieser Tisch nur in dieser Umgebung. Alles gehört zu allem. (Ich glaube, so etwas hat Hegel gemeint.) (MS 131: 154)

Bemerkenswert ist auch, dass Broad in seiner Vorlesung (vor Wittgenstein) den Wert der spekulativen Philosophie eher nicht über deren konkrete Ergebnisse bestimmte, z.B. über das entwickelte Hegel'sche System oder Hegels philosophische Werke – diese waren in Cambridge seit Moores *Nature of Judgement* (Moore 1899: 176–193) ohnehin in Ungnade gefallen –, sondern eher über die besonderen Konsequenzen der synoptischen Perspektive: „It seems to me that the value of Speculative Philosophy is not in its conclusions (results) but in its collateral consequences." (Broad EP: 41) Und diese *kollateralen Konsequenzen* hatte Broad schon mindestens seit 1924 (mit seinem Text *Critical and Speculative Philosophy*) über den

Effekt bestimmt, den der „synoptic view" für die besondere Perspektive eines Philosophen auf die Welt bzw. deren Wirklichkeit hat:

> It seems to me that the main value of Speculative Philosophy lies […] in the *collateral effects* which it has, or ought to have, on the persons who pursue it. The speculative philosopher is forced to *look at the world synoptically,* and anyone who does not do this at some time in his life is bound to hold a very narrow and inadequate idea of Reality. (Broad 1924: §17)

Oben wurden bereits die Gründe genannt für Alois Pichlers Vorschlag, die *übersichtliche Darstellung* in den englischen Ausgaben von Wittgensteins Werken mit dem Terminus „synoptic view" zu übersetzen. Mit den Überlegungen zu Wittgensteins *Comments on Broad* scheint nun aber auch umgekehrt einiges dafür zu sprechen, dass die *übersichtliche Darstellung* bei Wittgenstein genau dasjenige bezeichnet, was Broad mit dem „synoptic view" als das wesentliche Interesse der spekulativen Philosophie Hegels charakterisiert hatte. So gesehen wäre die *übersichtliche Darstellung* wiederum Wittgensteins eigener Übersetzungsversuch des Terminus „synoptic view" ins Deutsche. Dafür spricht nicht nur der Kontext von Wittgensteins Gebrauch dieses Terminus, sondern auch der Umstand, dass sich im Gesamtwerk Wittgensteins an keiner einzigen Stelle eine wörtliche Übertragung des „synoptic view" mit *synoptische Sicht* o. dgl. findet.

Und nicht zuletzt findet sich in einer Notiz Wittgensteins vom 1. November 1931 auch eine englische Reformulierung dessen, was er in Broads (englischsprachiger) Vorlesung unter dem Begriff „synoptic view" verstanden haben könnte:

> I can't give you a startling solution which suddenly will remove all your difficulties. I can't find one key which will unlock the door of our safe. The unlocking must be done in you by a difficult *process of synoptizing certain facts*" (153b: 30r–30v). Und wenig später folgt der Versuch, eine deutsche Entsprechung zu finden, die den Gehalt dieser Broad'schen Überlegung vermitteln kann: „Das philosophische Problem ist ein Bewußtsein der Unordnung unsrer Begriffe & durch ordnen derselben zu heben. (MS 153b: 34r)

Broads „synoptic view" wird hier als philosophischer „process of synoptizing certain facts" refomuliert und im Deutschen als das *Ordnen unserer Begriffe* schon im Sinne einer *übersichtlichen Anordnung* charakterisiert – beides im Kontext eines konkreten Beispiels (MS 153b: 34v) dieses philosophischen Ordnens und In-eine-Übersicht-Bringens der Begriffe, welches auch später im § 89 des *Big Typescript* mit der *übersichtlichen Darstellung* übertitelt ist („Methode der Philosophie: die übersichtliche Darstellung der grammatischen| sprachlichen Tatsachen. Das Ziel: Durchsichtigkeit der Argumente. Gerechtigkeit.")

Um nun zusammenfassend den Antworthorizont für die beiden Fragen (1.) nach dem Kontext von Wittgensteins Entdeckung der *übersichtlichen Darstellung* im Herbsttrimester 1931 und (2.) nach ihrer besonderen Bedeutung für den methodischen Status der eigenen Philosophie zu skizzieren, kann noch einmal daran erinnert werden, dass Wittgenstein in Broads Vorlesung gleich zu Beginn des Herbsttrimesters – also ungefähr Mitte Oktober 1931 – auf dessen Unterscheidung der philosophischen Methoden in eine *kritische* und eine *spekulative* aufmerksam wurde. Dabei hatte Broad die *spekulative* Philosophie mit Hegels *dialektischer Methode* in Zusammenhang gebracht und über deren Interesse an einem „synoptic view" charakterisiert. Wittgenstein hatte daraufhin in seinen englischsprachigen Seminaren die Bedeutung des „synoptic view" auch für die eigene Methode des philosophischen Ordnens der Begriffe herausgearbeitet und in privaten Notizen Versuche einer Reformulierung dieses Terminus erprobt („process of synoptizing certain facts"). Spätestens am 20. November mit seinem Brief an Schlick hatte er sich dann zu seiner eigenen Übersetzungsvariante des „synoptic view" als *übersichtliche Darstellung* entschieden – einen Begriff, den Wittgenstein schon zum Ersten des Folgejahres als „von grundlegender Bedeutung" bestimmt, da er „unsere Darstellungsform [bezeichnet], die Art, wie wir die Dinge Sehen."

Die besondere Bedeutung der *übersichtlichen Darstellung* ist dabei verbunden mit ihrer Genese in Broads Vorlesungen zur spekulativen Philosophie Hegels und in den Seminaren Wittgensteins mit ihren *Comments on Broad*. Und wie Broad in seiner Vorlesung die spekulative Philosophie gegen das *analytische* Interesse der *kritischen Philosophie* bestimmt hatte, bestimmt nun Wittgenstein die *übersichtliche Darstellung* (gegenüber Moore und Schlick) im Kontrast zu bestimmten Vereinseitigungen einer rein *analytischen* Philosophie und kritisiert damit sogar einen Teil seiner eigenen früheren Überzeugungen:

> […] it was misleading to say that what we wanted was an, analysis' (Moore 1955: 27).

Dabei ist festzuhalten, dass Broad den Wert der spekulativen Philosophie nicht über ihr Resultat (das wäre eine einzelne Philosophie) bestimmt, sondern über die besonderen (kollateralen) Konsequenzen, welche sie für denjenigen Philosophen hat, der nach ihr verfährt. Nach Broad ist der spekulative Philosoph geneigt, die Welt synoptisch zu betrachten – und jeder, der dies nicht irgendwann in seinem Leben tue, bleibe zwangsläufig einer sehr engen und unangemessenen Idee der Wirklichkeit verhaftet (vgl. Broad 1924: §17).

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Chess as a Language: The riddle of Translating 'Übersichtlichkeit' in PI §122

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Abstract

Chess is a language on its own right. Wittgenstein understood and used it extensively as such. Thus, any attempt to fully grasp Wittgenstein's philosophy of language without assuming this presupposition is incomplete. All available translations of his works from German to other languages should be thoroughly reviewed in light of this approach. For instance, for the discussion and understanding of Wittgensteinian Übersichtlichkeit we suggest assuming it as a general overview ("vision general de conjunto" in Spanish) rather than as plain overview, synoptic view, perspicuity or surveyability. There are striking differences between the Spanish, English, French, Italian and Portuguese translations of PI §122. Section 2 deals with the translations of Übersichtlichkeit and related terms. Section 3 offers a comparison between Wittgenstein's Übersichtlichkeit and Plato's synopsis following the account of Argentinean philosopher Roberto Rojo in (Rojo 2010). Starting from *The Republic, Laws XII and Phaedrus,* he identifies convergence points between Wittgensteinian Übersicht and Platonic synopsis. Section 4 contains our attempt to show the convenience of assuming our thesis of chess as a language in Wittgenstein's theory of meaning in order to enhance the comprehension of the concept of Übersichtlichkeit. We argue that conceiving chess as a language enables an ample comprehension of concepts such as synopsis, synoptic view or synoptic representation (as Übersicht has been translated) from an epistemic and cognitive perspective. The extensive, recurrent use of examples drawn from chess by Wittgenstein is a fact that tends to be either overlooked or mistaken by Wittgensteinian scholars that lack the knowledge of the game. The study of the endgame during the training of a novice/intermediate player in the fundamentals of the game – for instance, the theme of the opposition – is an attempt to provide the apprentice with something he lacks firsthand: an Übersicht, a general overview of the game – the knowledge of the horizon the game is eventually advancing towards. The result is the understanding of the grammar of chess, which allows for a criterion to decide how and when to apply rules of strategy and to integrate them with tactics.

> Die Regeln der Schachtechnik bedeuten für unser Spiel das, was die Regeln der Grammatik für die Sprache bedeuten. In seiner Muttersprache aber hat man die Krücken der Grammatik nicht nötig, an ihre Stelle tritt das Sprachgefühl, der Schatz der im Unterbewußtsein gesammelten Erfahrungen. (Reti 1932: 153)

1. Introduction

Chess is a language on its own right. Wittgenstein understood and used it extensively as such. Thus, any attempt to fully grasp Wittgenstein's philosophy of language without assuming this presupposition is incomplete. All available translations of his works from German to other languages should be thoroughly reviewed in light of this approach. For instance, for the discussion and understanding of Wittgensteinian *Übersichtlichkeit* we suggest assuming it as a *general overview* ("vision general de conjunto" in Spanish) rather than as plain *overview, synoptic view, perspicuity or surveyability*. There are striking differences between the Spanish, English, French, Italian and Portuguese translations of PI §122. Section 2 deals with the translations of Übersichtlichkeit and related terms. Section 3 offers a comparison between Wittgenstein's *Übersichtlichkeit* and Plato's *synopsis* following the account of Argentinean philosopher Roberto Rojo in (Rojo 2010). Starting from *The Republic, Laws XII* and *Phaedrus*, he identifies convergence points between Wittgensteinean *Übersicht* and Platonic *synopsis*. Section 4 contains our attempt to show the convenience of assuming our *thesis of chess as a language* in Wittgenstein's theory of meaning in order to enhance the comprehension of the concept of *Übersichtlichkeit*. The approach that draws on chess has already been used with similar –though not quite the same– purposes in (Bermúdez 2006) and (Bermúdez, Campis and Orozco 2018). This time, we argue that conceiving *chess as a language* enables an ample comprehension of concepts such as *synopsis, synoptic view or synoptic representation* (as Übersicht has frequently been translated) from an epistemic and cognitive perspective.

The extensive, recurrent use of examples drawn from chess by Wittgenstein is a fact that tends to be either overlooked or mistaken by Wittgensteinian scholars that lack the knowledge of the game. The study of the endgame during the training of a novice/intermediate player in the fundamentals of the game –for instance, the theme of the *opposition*– is an attempt to provide the apprentice with something he lacks firsthand: an *Übersicht,* a *general overview* of the game –the knowledge of the *horizon* the game is eventually advancing towards–. The result is the understanding of the *grammar of chess,* which allows for a criterion to decide how and when to apply rules of strategy and to integrate them with tactics.

Comparative chart of some terms in *Philosophical Investigations* §122

	English		
Term	**PI (1953) Anscombe**	**PI (2009) Anscombe, Hacker & Schulte**	
übersehen	"to command a clear view"	"to have an overview"	
Übersichtlichkeit	"perspicuity"	"surveyability"	
übersichtliche Darstellung	"perspicuous representation"	"surveyable representation"	
	Spanish		
Term	**PI (1986) García & Moulines**	**PI (2017) García & Moulines**	**PI (2017) Padilla Gálvez**
übersehen	"ver sinópticamente"	"ver en su totalidad"	"ver perspicuamente"
Übersichtlichkeit	"visión sinóptica"	"visión de conjunto"	"perspicuidad"
übersichtliche Darstellung	"representación sinóptica"	"exposición panorámica"	"re presentación perspicua"
	Italian	**Portugese**	**French**
Term	**PI (1967) Trinchero**	**PI (1994) Montagnoli & Carneiro Leão**	**PI (2004) Dastur, Élie, Gautero, Janicaud & Rigal**
übersehen	«vedere chiaramente»	"dominar uma visão clara"	« avoir une vue synoptique »
Übersichtlichkeit	«perspicuiti»	"disposição clara"	« caractère synoptique »
übersichtliche Darstellung	«rappresentazione perspicua»	"exposição de conjunto"	« représentation synoptique »

Table 1. Translations of *Übersichtlichkeit* an related terms. *

PI § 122	
Edition	**§ 122**
Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953) Original text	Es ist eine Hauptquelle unseres Unverständnisses, daß wir den Gebrauch unserer Wörter nicht übersehen.—Unserer Grammatik fehlt es an Übersichtlichkeit.—Die übersichtliche Darstellung vermittelt das Verständnis, welches eben darin besteht, daß wir die ‚Zusammenhänge sehen'. Daher die Wichtigkeit des Findens und des Erfindens von Zwischengliedern. Der Begriff der übersichtlichen Darstellung ist für uns von grundlegender Bedeutung. Er bezeichnet unsere Darstellungsform, die Art, wie wir die Dinge sehen. (Ist dies eine ‚Weltanschauung'?)
Philosophical Investigations (1953) G. E. M. Anscombe	A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words.—Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases. The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?)
Ricerche Filosofiche (1967) Mario Trinchero	Una delle fonti principali della nostra incomprensione è il fatto che non vediamo chiaramente l'uso delle nostre parole. – La nostra grammatica manca di perspicuità. – La rappresentazione perspicua rende possibile la comprensione, che consiste appunto nel fatto che noi 'vediamo connessioni'. Di qui l'importanza del trovare e dell'inventare membri intermedi. Il concetto di rappresentazione perspicua ha per noi un significato fondamentale. Designa la nostra forma rappresentativa, il modo in cui vediamo le cose. (E', questa, una 'visione del mondo'?)
Investigaciones Filosóficas (1986) García & Moulines	Una fuente principal de nuestra falta de comprensión es que no vemos sinópticamente el uso de nuestras palabras.— A nuestra gramática le falta visión sinóptica.— La representación sinóptica produce la comprensión que consiste en 'ver conexiones'. De ahí la importancia de encontrar y de inventar casos intermedios. El concepto de representación sinóptica es de fundamental significación para nosotros. Designa nuestra forma de representación, el modo en que vemos las cosas. (¿Es esto una 'Weltanschauung'?)
Investigações Filosóficas (1994) Mario Montagnoli & Emmanuel Carneiro Leão	Uma das principais fontes de nossa falta de compreensão é que não dominamos com uma clara visão o uso de nossas palavras. – Falta à nossa gramática uma disposição clara. Uma exposição de conjunto transmite a compreensão, que consiste exatamente em "ver conexões". Daí a importância de se achar e de se inventar conectivos. O conceito de exposição de conjunto tem para nós um significado fundamental. Ele designa nossa forma de exposição, a maneira de vermos as coisas. (É isto uma "visão do mundo"?)
Recherches Philosophiques (2004) F. Dastur, M. Élie, J. L. Gautero, D. Janicaud & E. Rigal	L'une des sources principales de nos incompréhensions est que nous n'avons pas une vue synoptique de l'emploi de nos mots. — Notre grammaire manque de caractère synoptique. — La représentation synoptique nous procure la compréhension qui consiste à « voir les connexions ». D'où l'importance qu'il y a à trouver et à inventer des maillons intermédiaires. Le concept de représentation synoptique a pour nous une signification fondamentale. Il désigne notre forme de représentation, la façon dont nous voyons les choses. (S'agit-il d'une « Weltanschauung » ?)
Philosophical Investigations (2009) G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker & J. Schulte	A main source of our failure to understand is that we don't have an overview of the use of our words. a Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in 'seeing connections'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links. The concept of a surveyable representation is of fundamental significance for us. It characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?)
Investigaciones Filosóficas (2017) A. García & C. U. Moulines	Una fuente principal de nuestra falta de comprensión es que no vemos *en su totalidad* el uso de nuestras palabras [145]. —A nuestra gramática le falta la visión de conjunto. —La exposición panorámica produce la comprensión que consiste justamente en 'ver conexiones'. De ahí la importancia de encontrar y de inventar eslabones intermedios. El concepto de exposición panorámica es de fundamental importancia para nosotros. Designa nuestra forma de exposición, el modo como vemos las cosas. (¿Es esto una 'concepción del mundo'?)
Investigaciones Filosóficas (2017) Jesús Padilla Gálvez	Una fuente principal de nuestra falta de comprensión es que no vemos el uso de nuestras palabras perspicuamente. —A nuestra gramática le falta perspicuidad. —La re presentación perspicua facilita la comprensión que consiste efectivamente en que nosotros 'veamos las conexiones'. De ahí la importancia de encontrar y de inventar conexiones intermedias. El concepto de re presentación perspicua es de fundamental importancia para nosotros. Designa nuestra forma de representación[146], el modo como vemos las cosas. (¿Es esto una 'cosmovisión'?)

Table 2. Translations of §122. **

2. How are we to understand and translate Wittgenstein's Übersichtlichkeit? *

There is no consensus on how to translate *Übersichtlichkeit* and related terms into other languages (see Table 1* and 2**). This is not just a mere linguistic, translational debate, but an epistemic one as well. The differences between the translations give rise to the question on the effect they have on the comprehension of the concept.

A fair amount of literature in German, English and Spanish has been devoted to the discussion of *Übersichtlichkeit* and related terms. Table 1 resumes the different terms employed in English, Spanish, Italian, Protuguese and French. The Italian (1967) translation follows Anscombe (1953) completely; Padilla Gálvez (2017) also seems to do so. The latter differs in the translation of *übersehen* for the sake of unity, presumably. On the other hand, The Spanish version of 1986 and 2017 by García & Moulines are different from each other, perhaps reflecting further enhancement of their comprehension of the concepts. The latter, together with the Portuguese translation, lacks of unity in the terms employed. The French version appeals to the adjective synoptic combined with other terms to cope with the task of offering a translation.

3. Platonic antecedents of Wittgenstein's *Übersicht*: Rojo's account of Platonic *synopsis*

Regarding Plato's *Laws*, Rojo identifies that "the dialogue expressly highlights the role of synopsis in the sense that behind the knowledge acquired in isolation there is the requirement to bring it together in a *general overview* (σύνοψη) of the relations (σχέσεις) that exist with the objects and 'the nature of being'" (Rojo 2010: 131). This is consistent with the idea of having a *perspicuous representation* –for us, a *general overview*- as stated in PI: §122 (1953): "A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'."

He also claims that in *Phaedrus* 265c "the synopsis serves more than one function: to bring into unity –as in the case of the definition– the scattered knowledge in order to achieve the required clarity of discourse" (Rojo 2010: 132). For him, the appearance of *synopsis* in this Platonic dialogue yields to the elucidation of the relationship between rhetoric and dialectics. As stated in *Republic 537c:* "For he who can *view things in their connection* is a dialectician; he who cannot, is not." (Rojo 2010: 134) [The Spanish translation (Pabón y Fernández 1969) refers to "having an *overview*" in opposition to Hamilton's translation of 1961].

Rojo further affirms the coincidence between Wittgensteinean *Übersicht* and Platonic *synopsis* claiming that both terms refer to "the omnicomprehension of a total view, proper of philosophy" (Rojo 2010: 136). For him, Plato considers that *synopsis* secures the comprehension and clarity of discourse, just as in PI §122 where Wittgenstein discusses the idea of what is *übersichtlich*. It is in this sense that Rojo considers along with Wittgenstein that we face the same difficulties –in philosophy (a general comprehension of problems)– when we lack a *synoptic view* as when we try to find our way around, but lacking a map. Although there are many coincidences between *synopsis* and *Übersicht* for him, he also finds a key difference: Plato's *synopsis* leads to a *transcendent vision*, whereas Wittgenstein conceives what's *übersichtlich* as an *undivided totality*.

4. *Übersichtlichkeit* and Chess

> The average player believes that the difference between him and a master lies in the number of moves ahead they can calculate […] More important, however, is the ability of the expert to play logically, i.e., to base his game on certain ideas. For in chess, as in other fields, ideas are a means of organizing thought. A game between two amateurs is sometimes a hodgepodge of a hundred distinct ideas which have no relation to one another […] Master's games are much more unified; indeed, one test of a great game is that it should be a *coherent* unit, in some sense, from start to finish. (Fine 1945)

The fact that there are more than 50 references to chess in PI serve as an indicator of the prominent role of it as one of his favorite resorts when it comes to make his points clear be it for language or many other subjects. For instance, Gerrard (2018) relies upon chess to explain Wittgenstein's position in the philosophy of mathematics (his view of the concept of number). We provided other examples in Bermúdez (2006) Bermúdez *et al.* (2013) and Bermúdez, Campis and Orozco (2018).

We now propose a possible further specialized deepening use of chess focused on the complex concept of *übersichtlichtliche Darstellung*. In Section 1, we advanced the importance of teaching the endgame and basic mates while training a novice/intermediate player in the fundamentals of the game. This, again, is a resource to provide them with a notion of the *horizon* towards which the game always heads, i.e., a *general overview*. Let's now examine an example of a basic ending of a game based upon the promotion of the pawn:



Figure 1. Promotion of the pawn.

In this situation, if the novice player ignores this matter and lacks a *general overview* of the game (an *Übersicht*), he simply cannot achieve victory. To be precise: if the player ignores the procedure (in this case, *opposition*), he simply will not be able to achieve the objective: to turn the pawn into a queen or a rook in order to checkmate.

Let's consider an elemental checkmate as another example:



Figure 2. Elemental checkmate

In this case, this is the minimum material that is required to produce a checkmate. Again, elemental checkmates are taught to the novice as an indispensable resource to achieve his comprehension of the ultimate goal of the game. This is the *horizon* of the game. This is true not only for humans, but also for contemporary chess playing computational programs, regardless of their kind.



Figure 3a and 3b. Lack of *Übersicht*.

Our third example illustrates the lack of an *Übersicht*. In a game during the *World Youth Chess Championship 1987 - U14*, the blacks mistakenly resigned in a position that would lead to draw. Grand Master Pal Benko –a world-class expert in endings– documented it in an article for *Chess Life* (Dec. 1987: 69). Figure 3a illustrates the moment of the resignation. The black player could not see a position that would come up a dozen of moves ahead. Figure 3b shows perpetual check. Here we can see the key role of "seeing connexions", "the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases" (PI: §122). The problem experienced by the black player is a result of not being able to see the connections between the rule of draw by perpetual check and the previous sequence of moves. Not being able to integrate the information available to him into a single unit, the black player sees no other path than giving up. That is, he could not clearly see the horizon of the game.

Let's examine a fourth example of promotion of the pawn in the middle game:



Figure 4: promotion of the pawn

This position taken from a rapid chess game illustrates another instance of promotion of the pawn to queen in the middle game. The key to win for the player with the white pieces consists in the compensation of the loss of the queen with the promotion of the pawn to a new queen. If the player with the white pieces lacks an *Übersicht*, a *general overview*, he cannot produce the combination that leads to victory.

There are thousands of examples in chess that show the prominent role of the *Übersicht*. Also, in order to be able to make sense of some extraordinary moves (castle, *en passant* and promotion), it is indispensable to possess this kind of *general overview*. Some clear and interesting examples are in (Mednis 1983), where the idea of a *general overview* is very explicit. Mednis discusses how to get to the endgame in the minimum number of moves while also obtaining the most favorable possible conditions. He also explains the best routes in given specific situations. Unsurprisingly, he appeals to *master games* as the examples provided for his explanations. The goal of the book is to supply the chess student with a general comprehension of the endgame, thus, helping the reader to progress in the continuing task of achieving a general, *general overview* of the game.

5. Final remarks

Let's get back to the very telling epigraph of section 4. What is true for chess players, as stated by Fine, is also true for other fields: the level of comprehension and expertise in any given field is directly related to the fact of a subject having the respective specific *Übersicht* related to the particular discipline. It is not related to partially integrated knowledge (or even to a *partial overview*), but rather to possessing the faculty of achieving a *general overview*, which in turns drives one's performance on that field. Rojo correctly identifies the similarities between the Platonic concept of *synopsis* and *Übersicht*, what, in our view, shed some light on what Wittgenstein understood by it. We herewith would also go further to affirm that relying upon the *understanding of chess as a language on its own right* makes the concept even clearer, just as Wittgenstein happened to have actually intended by his intensive, recurrent use of chess. Meaning and the adscription of it to words, phrases, pictures and images come all out clear as a dynamic, changing activity that is directly linked to the ability to integrate isolated pieces of knowledge into a unified picture (a "coherent unit", as Fine refers to the characteristic of a great game of chess) that might change with time. Or to be precise, to integrate knowledge while approaching towards a horizon.

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Ludwig Wittgensteins Verwendung der Musiknotation in MS 154, MS 156B und MS 157A. Ein Interpretationsvorschlag

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Abstract

Bisher galt die Musikskizze aus dem Manuskript 154 als Wittgensteins einzig erhaltene Musiknotation, wobei es weitere Musiknotationen gibt: In MS 154, MS 156b und MS 157a notierte Wittgenstein insgesamt sechs kurze Musikskizzen, die kompositorisch unbedeutend erscheinen, in Verbindung mit seinen (musik-)ästhetischen Bemerkungen jedoch untersuchenswert sind. Eine Kontextualisierung dieser Musikskizzen mit Wittgensteins Bemerkungen über die Musik legt ein vertieftes Verständnis nahe: Wittgenstein verwendet die Musiknotation in seinen Manuskripten, um Bemerkungen zur Musikästhetik (Dur-Moll Harmonik, Kirchentonarten, Anton Bruckner) ebenso wie sprachlogische Konzepte (Variation und Wiederholung, Aspektsehen als Aspekthören) außersprachlich zu illustrieren. Die Analyse zeigt somit auch Wittgensteins Reflexionen über die Grenzen des Sagbaren.

1. Einleitung

Insgesamt finden sich in Wittgensteins Manuskripten sechs bislang im Wesentlichen unbekannte musikalische Skizzen (MSs 154, 156b und 157a). Es handelt sich jeweils um kurze Einschübe in die handschriftlichen Aufzeichnungen. Mit vergleichsweise sorgfältiger Notenschrift hält Wittgenstein melodische Themen fest. Die Linien der Notensysteme sind freihändig gezogen, die Notate begrenzen sich auf zwei Notenzeilen und enthalten maximal acht Takte. Als musikalisch avancierter Laie konnte Wittgenstein diese Notate vermutlich freihändig, ohne Nutzung eines Instruments, niederschreiben.

> Im Folgenden beschreibe ich Wittgensteins Musikskizzen als musikalisch notierte Illustrationen verschiedener (musik-)ästhetischer Bemerkungen. Ich begrenze mich auf drei Musikskizzen: MS 154: 25r, MS 156b: 21r und MS 157a: 17av.

Wittgenstein verwendet die Musiknotation in seinem Nachlass nicht in der üblichen Weise Musik schriftlich festzuhalten, um sie aufführbar zu machen. Ihm geht es zunächst darum, eine klangliche Vorstellung, also gedachte Musik, darzustellen, einen musikalischen Gedanken als Musik zu notieren (MS 154). Weiterhin verwendet er die Notationsweise, um bestimmte sprachliche Bemerkungen musikalisch zu illustrieren. Für alle Musikskizzen Wittgensteins gilt, dass er die Musiknotation nicht in der üblichen kompositorischen Weise verwendet hat. Statt (des Versuchs) eine Melodie oder ein abgeschlossenes Stück zu komponieren, das musikalisch realisiert werden soll, verwendet er dieselbe Notation, um das Beispiel eines musikalischen Ausdrucks innerhalb seiner Manuskripte zu geben. Er notiert einen musikalischen Gedanken als Musik. Diese Verwendung der Musiknotation ist mit einer Bleistiftzeichnung vergleichbar, die einerseits als künstlerisches Mittel, andererseits als Illustration geometrischer Angaben genutzt wird. Oder –mit einem Beispiel Wittgensteins- unsere Sprache zum Dichten oder als Informationsmittel verwendet wird: „Das Sprechen der Musik. Vergiss nicht, daß ein Gedicht, //wenn auch// obgleich in der Sprache der Mitteilung abgefaßt, nicht in einem Sprachspiel der Mitteilung verwendet wird." (MS 134: 77).

Meine Interpretation ergibt sich aus der Verbindung von Wittgensteins Musikverständnis und seiner Suche, Sinnvolles über den ästhetischen Ausdruck auszusagen und zu notieren: Wittgenstein versteht die grammatische Struktur der Musik als sprachanalog („Man kann auch vom Verstehen einer musikalischen Phrase sagen, es sei das Verstehen einer Sprache." (MS 137: 28b), „Wer Noten lesen lernt lernt die Grammatik einer Sprache." (MS 156b: 7v), „Beim Klavierspielen nach Noten macht man Gebrauch von einer Sprache." (MS 132: 119), die es der Musik ermöglicht, einen sprachlichen Ausdruck zu evozieren oder zu kommunizieren („Wagners Motive könnte man musikalische Prosasätze nennen. Und so, wie es 'gereimte Prosa' gibt kann man diese Motive allerdings zur melodischen Form zusammenfügen […]." (MS 163: 34r-v). Auf der anderen Seite, so Wittgenstein, trage auch die gesprochene Sprache musikalische Elemente: „In der Wortsprache ist ein starkes musikalisches Element. (Ein Seufzer,) der Tonfall der Frage, der Verkündigung, der Sehnsucht, alle die unzähligen *Gesten* des Tonfalls.)" (MS 134: 78). Weiterhin zeigt Wittgenstein, dass der Sinn einer musikalischen Phrase nur durch sich selbst und nicht durch die Sprache repräsentiert werden kann. Der musikalische Ausdruck kann sprachlich nicht umfassend beschrieben werden, sondern wird erst durch die Wiederholung des musikalischen Abschnittes verständlich: Die Musik sagt sich selbst aus („'Der Eindruck (den diese Melodie macht) ist völlig unbeschreibbar.'– Das heißt: eine Beschreibung tut's (für meinen Zweck) nicht; Du mußt die Melodie *hören*. (MS 162b: 59r), „Das musikalische Thema sagt mir sich selber." (TS 235: 2).

Um über die Musik zu schreiben, verwendet Wittgenstein deshalb in den Manuskripten neben sprachlichen Aussagen auch die Musiknotation. In TS 219 weist er zudem auf seine Suche nach einer Notationsweise hin: „Möglichkeit einer Sprache, die immer gesungen wird, und die also mit einem Notensystem geschrieben werden muß." (TS 219: 10).

In dem Diktat an Schlick (TS 302) erweitert Wittgenstein den Gedanken, die schriftliche Kommunikation mit Musiknotationen zu verbinden und bezieht sich auf die dadurch entstehende Ausdrucksveränderung des zu kommunizierenden Inhalts. Das hier vorgestellte Verständnis der musikalischen Notate als Ansätze zu einer solchen Ausdruckserweiterung kann sich auf dieses Zitat stützen. Wittgenstein spricht nicht etwa davon, einem Brief ein Musikstück beizulegen, sondern mittels einzelner Leitmotive die Sprache eines Briefes mit einem bestimmten Ausdruck zu versehen:

> Man kann nun einwenden: die Überzeugung läßt sich nicht erheucheln, wohl aber der Ausdruck. Nehmen wir an, der Mensch sänge seine Rede. Man schriebe etwa einen Brief nie in Worten allein, sondern mit der Begleitung von Notenzeilen. Könnte nun nicht die einen Satz begleitende musika-

lische Phrase die Überzeugung sein, die Herzensmeinung? „Aber hier kann man sich doch offenbar verstellen. Denn man kann singen, was man will, aber nicht meinen, was man will." „Aber warum nimmst du an, man könne singen, was man will? Nehmen wir denn auch an, man könne mit genau dem richtigen Ausdruck singen und sich dabei verstellen?" (TS 302: 23)

Vor diesem Hintergrund schlage ich eine neue Lesart des sogenannten Kompositionsversuchs in MS 154 vor und knüpfe an Katrin Eggers Untersuchung *Ludwig Wittgenstein als Musikphilosoph* an, in der erstmals Elemente der Musikskizze MS 154 auf philologische und philosophische Konzepte Wittgensteins bezogen werden.

Im Anschluss beschreibe ich die Musikskizze MS 156b: 21r als musikalische Illustration des Aspektwechsels und der Kirchentonart. Die Musikskizze aus MS 157a: 17av, hier der letzte Abschnitt, illustriert schlussendlich Bemerkungen des Wechsels der Dur-Moll Harmonik und spiegelt Wittgensteins Überlegungen zu Anton Bruckner wider.

2. MS 154: 25r: gedachte Musik

Wittgenstein notiert in MS 154 drei Takte einer tonalen Melodie im Violinschlüssel und kommentiert seine „Komposition" mit: „Das wäre das Ende eines Themas, das ich nicht weiß. Es fiel mir heute ein als ich über meine Arbeit in der Philosophie nachdachte & mir vorsagte: „I destroy, I destroy, I destroy –" (MS 154: 25r). Wittgenstein betitelt die Skizze („Leidenschaftlich"), er verwendet Dynamikangaben, einen durchgehenden triolischen Rhythmus und mehrere mehrstimmige Akkorde. Das erste Motiv wird als tonale Variation im zweiten Takt wiederholt, im letzten Takt wird eine kurze Sechzehntelbewegung achtmal wiederholt. Man erkennt hier, dass Wittgenstein, wohl aufgrund seines Studiums von Symphoniepartituren, einige Kompositionsregeln kennt (bspw. das Auflösen von Leittönen) und die Untersuchung der motivisch-linearen Entwicklung präferiert, statt die des akkordisch-vertikalen Aufbaus.

Eggers verbindet in *Ludwig Wittgenstein als Musikphilosoph* musikalische Elemente der Skizze mit linguistischen Elementen Wittgensteins. Einerseits zeigt sie, dass Wittgenstein die Musikskizze MS 154, wie auch zahlreiche philosophische Bemerkungen, mit einem „etc. etc." schließt. Andererseits bezieht sie das Kompositionsprinzip der Wiederholung von variierten Elementen (vgl. Eggers 2011: 15) das sich in allen Musikskizzen findet- auf die allgemeine Methodik Wittgensteins Nachlassstruktur. Die Struktur weist die Wiederholung und damit Neukontextualisierung variierter Bemerkungen innerhalb der Manu- und Typoskripte auf. Eggers zitiert hierzu die Vorlesungsmitschrift von Alice Ambrose, in der Wittgenstein die Wiederholung als „ein Mittel zur Erforschung [von] Verbindungen" (Nedo 1983: 393, vgl. Eggers 2011: 16) nennt. In MS 105 spricht Wittgenstein in einem codierten Eintrag von der Notwendigkeit dieser Methodik:

> *Meine Art des Philosophierens ist mir selbst immer noch* […] *neu, & daher muß ich mich so oft wiederholen. Einer anderen Generation wird sie in Fleisch & Blut übergegangen sein & sie wird die Wiederholungen langweilig finden. Für mich sind sie notwendig.* (MS 105: 46)

Auch zur Beschreibung seines Musikverständnisses weist Wittgenstein in zahlreichen Bemerkungen auf die Prinzipien der Variation und Wiederholung hin. In einem Brief an seinen Volksschullehrerkollegen Rudolf Koder erläutert Wittgenstein 1930, dass ein Musikstück erst durch das wiederholte Spielen vertraut und verständlich wird:

> Die einzige Möglichkeit ein Musikstück kennen zu lernen ist doch die: Du spielst es & merkst dabei deutlich, daß Du die & die Stellen noch ohne Verständnis spielst. Du kannst nun entweder auf diese Stimme (in Deinem Inneren) nicht weiter hinhorchen & das Stück verständnislos wie früher spielen, oder Du horchst auf die Stimme, dann wirst Du getrieben, die betreffende Stelle wieder & wieder zu spielen & quasi zu untersuchen. (Alber 37, Wittgenstein an Koder [zw. 25.10. u. 14.11.1930])

In MS 132 beschreibt er die variierte Wiederholung eines musikalischen Abschnittes als Teil der Aspektwahrnehmung:

> Man könnte sich in der Musik eine Variation auf ein Thema denken, die, etwa ein wenig anders phrasiert, als eine ganz andere Art der Variation des Themas aufgefaßt werden kann. (Im Rhythmus gibt es solche Mehrdeutigkeiten.) Ja, was ich meine, findet sich wahrscheinlich überhaupt immer wenn eine Wiederholung das Thema in ganz anderem Licht erscheinen läßt. (MS 132: 162)

Die Wiederholung einer variierten Thematik, die einen Aspektwechsel ermöglicht, finden wir in den Takten 1–2 von MS 154 und in MS 157a: 17av: Dort stellen die Takte 4–8 eine Moll-Variante der Thematik der ersten vier Takte dar. Den Wechsel von Dur auf Moll beschreibt Wittgenstein auch in MS 173: „Ein & dasselbe Thema hat in Moll einen andern Charakter als in Dur, aber von einem Charakter des Moll im Allgemeinen zu sprechen ist ganz falsch." (MS 173: 69r-v)

Betrachten wir erneut die Musiknotation in MS 154 in Kontextualisierung mit Wittgensteins Bemerkungen über den Umgang mit inneren klanglichen Musikvorstellung, leuchtet nun eine neue Lesart der Musikskizze auf. Es handelt sich bei der Musikskizze nicht um einen (missglückten) Kompositionsversuch einer Melodie, sondern um Wittgensteins Versuch eine spezifische Klangvorstellung zu notieren, *die nicht aufgeführt oder realisiert, sondern nur gedacht werden soll.* Das erkennt man beispielsweise an dem durchgehenden Triolen-Rhythmus, den Wittgenstein auch auf die Pausennotationen (Takt 1 und 2) bezieht. Eine Pause triolisch aufzuteilen, lässt sich nur erklären, wenn man die Pause lediglich denken soll. Eine rhythmische Aufteilung einer Pause in der Musik verändert den realen Klang nicht, da die Pause ein Schweigen der Musik darstellt. Meines Erachtens ist dies die einzige Erklärung der notierten „3" oberhalb der Pausenzeichen. Dass es sich um eine *Dreischlags-Pause* handeln könnte, wäre angesichts des ansonsten durchgehenden triolischen Rhythmus fernliegend. Es gibt mehrere Bemerkungen Wittgensteins, die für ein solches Verständnis einer bloßen Klangvorstellung sprechen. Hier beschreibt er die Tätigkeit des Vorstellens von Musik und die Reflexionen über die mögliche Klangfarbe von gedachten Tönen:

> *Wenn ich mir Musik vorstelle, was ich ja täglich & oft tue so reibe ich dabei – ich glaube immer – meine oberen & unteren Vorderzähne rhythmisch aneinander. Es ist mir schon früher aufgefallen geschieht aber für gewöhnlich ganz unbewußt. Und zwar ist es als würden die Töne meiner Vorstellung durch diese Bewegung erzeugt.* (MS 118: 71v, codiert)

> (Wie man manchmal eine Musik nur im inneren Ohr reproduzieren kann, aber sie nicht pfeifen, weil das Pfeifen schon die innere Stimme übertönt, so ist manchmal die Stimme eines philosophischen Gedankens so leise, daß sie vom Lärm

des gesprochenen Wortes schon übertönt wird und nicht mehr gehört werden kann, wenn man gefragt wird und reden soll.) (MS 107: 268)

Wie ist es aber wenn ich Dir sage: »Stell Dir eine Melodie vor«. Ich muß sie mir ‚innerlich vorsingen'. Das wird man ebenso eine Tätigkeit nennen, wie Kopfrechnen. (MS 136: 9a)

Unterscheidet sich etwa ein vorgestellter Ton von dem gleichen wirklich gehörten durch die Klangfarbe?! (MS 108: 230)

3. MS 156b: 21r: Kirchentonart – Aspektsehen/-hören

In MS 156b: 21r notiert Wittgenstein eine weitere Musikskizze. Er schreibt zwei vollständige 4/4-Takte mit einem vorausgehenden Viertelauftakt und verwendet Tempo- („Langsam") und Artikulationsangaben (*Marcato*). Wittgenstein notiert keinen Notenschlüssel. So kann der musikalische Abschnitt unterschiedlich realisiert werden, da eine Tonhöhe erst durch den Kontext eines Notenschlüssels definiert wird. Es handelt sich also um ein musikalisches Kippbild. Werden die Takte im Bassschlüssel gelesen, ergibt sich eine klangliche Schlüssigkeit, die einem barocken Motiv ähnelt. Die Takte stehen dann in der Tonart C-Dur. Wird die Figuration im Violinschlüssel gelesen, handelt es sich um eine Melodie in der Kirchentonart äolisch auf 'a': Die Melodie beginnt mit dem akzentuierten 'a' und kreist auch weiterhin um diesen Ton; ebenso stimmt die Verwendung der Halbtonschritte mit dem Kirchenmodus überein. Wittgenstein nennt die Kirchentonarten mehrmals in seinem Nachlass, um unterschiedliche Systeme in der Ästhetik abzugrenzen: „Verstehen der Kirchentonarten. Verstehen einer chinesischen Darstellung." (MS 156a: 56r).

Das System der Kirchentonarten, als Vorläufer der Dur-Moll-Tonalität und der Atonalität, bildet als grammatisches Konstrukt aufgrund seiner spezifischen Regelsystematik, ein eigenes Sprachspiel. Eine Zuhörerin, die mit der Dur-Moll-Tonalität vertraut ist, kann musikalische Abschnitte, beispielsweise einer klassischen Klaviersonate, systematischen Funktionen zuordnen (Aspektwahrnehmung). Für dieselbe Aufgabe bezüglich eines Stücks in einer Kirchentonart, müsste die Zuhörerin die systembildenden Regeln erst neu lernen (vgl. Bossart: 27): „Was geschieht wenn wir lernen den Schluß einer Kirchentonart als Schluß zu empfinden?" (MS 115: 28) Ob Wittgenstein bei der Notation der Takte auf MS 156b: 21r an diese Unterscheidung gedacht hat, bleibt offen.

4. MS 157a: 17av: Bruckner-Analogie

Als letztes Beispiel verwende ich die interessante Musiknotation in MS 157a: 17av. Erneut erscheinen die Takte als keine grandiose musikalische Idee: Wittgenstein notiert in einem einstimmigen Notensystem acht Takte im Violinschlüssel mit der vorgeschriebenem 4/4-Taktbezeichnung und der Ausdrucksanweisung „langgezogen". Die Phrase besteht aus der Wiederholung von zwei gebrochenen C-Dur- und zwei gebrochenen c-Moll-Akkorden: Die acht Takte unterteilen sich in ein jeweils zweitaktiges Motiv. Dieses erklingt zweimal in C-Dur und mit der Verminderung des Tons 'e' in ein 'es' (Takt 5) moduliert die Harmonie nach c-Moll. Auch hier finden wir das kompositorische Prinzip des Wiederholens und Variierens und den Dur-Moll-Wechsel. Letzterer wurde bereits oben als Aspektwechsel genannt. Das Ausschlaggebende der Musikskizze liegt in Wittgensteins Verwendung der Angabe „langgezogen". Es handelt sich um eine Anspielung an den österreichischen Komponisten Anton Bruckner; die Verwendung der deutschen Bezeichnung „lang gezogen" wurde von Bruckner geprägt. Anhand von Taktart, Rhythmik (Punktierung) und der Ausdrucksangabe kann ein Vergleich gezogen werden zu einem Abschnitt des ersten Satzes der neunten Symphonie Bruckners: Ab Takt 487 spielen die Geigen eine ähnliche Phrase und Bruckner hat die Angabe „lang gezogen" notiert (9. Symphonie d-Moll, 1. Satz, Takte 487 – 492). Wir wissen, dass Wittgenstein sich spezifisch zu der neunten Symphonie geäußert hat („Die Brucknersche Neunte ist gleichsam ein Protest gegen die Beethovensche geschrieben & dadurch wird sie erträglich, was sie sonst, als eine Art Nachahmung, nicht wäre." MS 120: 71v). Es stellt sich jedoch die Frage, warum Wittgenstein einen brucknerischen Klang notiert und kein direktes Zitat aus einer Symphonie übernimmt. Es scheint, als möchte Wittgenstein verschiedene Überlegungen zur Musik in seinem Nachlass musikalisch notieren. Eine solche Verwendung der Musiknotation dürfte im Rahmen der Arbeitsnotizen eines Philosophen oder einer Philosophin einzigartig sein.

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Abbilder:



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

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

MS 157: 17av, (**http://wittgensteinsource.org/BFE/MS-157a,17av_f**)

The Logic of Moral Motivation in Mencius

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Abstract

In a famous passage in Mencius' Book 1A7, Mencius tries to make a king feel compassion for his people and take better care of them. He explains the difference between what one can and what one cannot do, and argues that there is a categorial difference between action and the ability to act. Contemporary Western philosophers would say this is the problem of weakness of will. Part of Mencius' argumentative strategy is to get the king personally involved. The paper presents and discusses Mencius' way of arguing with reference to Wittgenstein.

"What can be shown, cannot be said."
Wittgenstein, *Tractatus* 4.1212

"My life is my argument."
Albert Schweitzer

Mencius (*Mengzi*, 孟子) was a philosopher of the fourth century BC and a follower of Confucius. His dialogues are witness to his skills in argumentation, for instance when he tries to influence rulers for the better. I will focus on such a dialogue with King Xuan of Qi (齊宣王) in *Mencius* 1A7 and analyze his argumentative techniques. Mencius not only uses metaphors and analogical reasoning. He also argues *ad hominem*, which turns out to be important in this case. He appeals to the king's personal experiences, because he does not just want to give a theoretical argument. He has a practical aim. He wants to move the king to act in a certain way. He wants the king not only to see and understand something, but also to make him act on what he sees and understands. Just as there is a difference between ought and is, there is one between ability and action. The king has the ability but maybe he will not act on it. This point is explicitly discussed in the dialogue. Today, and in Western terms, we would say it is the problem of "weakness of will." But this is not the way Mencius phrases it. He does not talk of a "will" at all.

I will show that examples play a double role in the dialogue. Mencius gives examples, and in the end, he wants the king himself to be an example. I think that Mencius believes that as the examples move the king, so the king will move the people. This, I think, is a hidden strategy that Mencius pursues in the dialogue.

Exemplarity in teaching has often been emphasized in Chinese traditions. There is something called "*shen jiao*" (身教), teaching through your body, i.e. teaching by being a model for others to emulate and follow. It is teaching by showing instead of saying. Wittgenstein in the *Philosophical Investigations* also uses examples, because sometimes showing is better than saying. For Wittgenstein, too, this is a way of teaching. But in Wittgenstein it is still more theoretical. His aim is to make us look more closely at individual examples in order to see the complexities and not jump to abstract theorizing too quickly. In Mencius the aim is more practical. He wants the king to be a better king by being more compassionate with his people.

In the following, I will present and discuss the dialogue with King Xuan to illustrate the points I have been making. I will use and sometimes slightly change Lau's 1970 translation

Mencius asks the king whether he may tell him about "becoming a true king," to which the king replies: "How virtuous (*de*, 德) must a man be before he can become a true king?" (Lau 1970: 9). Mencius replies: "He becomes a true King by taking good care of his people. This is something *no one can stop*." (p. 9)

The last sentence can be understood in three different ways. First (1), Mencius' goal is to motivate the king to take good care of the people. Taking good care of his people is up to the king. Nobody "can stop" him from doing it. The problem is that there is no guarantee that the kink will actually do it. Mencius will therefore later introduce an argument by analogy to back this up. Second (2), if the King takes good care of his people, he will be a "true king." Nobody "can stop" this either, because it is a logical consequence of the definition of a true king. A good king is by definition a king who takes good care of his people. Third (3), at the end of the dialogue, Mencius says that if he is a true king, then the people will voluntarily obey his orders. They will "find it easy to follow him" (p. 13), as Mencius says. This is something Mencius believes in. He believes it is natural that the people will then follow him. This is also is something nobody "can stop" from happening.

Thus, there are three things that "cannot be stopped": (1) If the king decides to do it, he can do it. (2) If he does it, he will be a true king. (3) If he is a true king, the people will follow him. The first needs motivation. The king must be motivated to decide to do it. The second is a logical implication. The third is a natural fact. All but the first are general, abstract, and logical. But the first one needs additional work. The king needs to be motivated. Mencius therefore develops an argument that is not abstract, but involves the king personally.

When the king asks: "can (*ke yi*, 可以) someone like myself take good care of his people?" Mencius replies: "yes, you can (*ke*, 可)." The king presses Mencius further, asking: "How do you know that I can (*ke*, 可)?" Later there will be a general discussion about what one can and cannot do, which will be about classification (p. 11). But first, Mencius tries to get the king personally involved by reminding him of an event the king himself has witnessed.

The king once saw someone leading an ox to be sacrificed. He saw the ox and felt compassion for it. He therefore ordered the ox to be replaced by a lamb. The King admits to Mencius: "I could not bear to see it shrink with fear, like an innocent man going to the place of execution" (p. 10). Mencius asks the king whether he had the ox replace by a lamb because a lamb is cheaper than an ox, which the king denies. But the king does not right away know of a better explanation. He laughs and says: "What was really in my mind, I wonder?" Mencius sug-

gests that the king did so because he had actually seen the ox but had not seen the lamb, to which the king agrees. The point of this argumentative move was to make the king recall an emotional experience and an act he performed. There was something he could do and actually also did. He has the ability to feel compassion and he used it.

Now Mencius involves the king in a general discussion about what one can and cannot do. One cannot lift 700 kg, but one can lift a feather. If one does not lift the feather, it is not because one lacks the ability but because one makes no effort. One has the strength, but does not use it. Mencius concludes: "Hence your failure to become a true king is due to an *inaction* (*bu wei*, 不為), *not* to an *inability* to act *(fei bu neng*, 非不能)" (p. 11). The king asks: "What is the difference in form between inaction (*bu wei*, 不為) and inability (*bu neng*, 不能) to act?" Mencius then gives another example to illustrate the difference and concludes that the king is making a category mistake if he says he cannot help his people. Failing to help his people belongs to the category (*lei*, 類) of not lifting a feather and not to the category (*lei*, 類) of not lifting 700 kg. The former is a case of inaction, the latter of inability. Mencius talks of the importance or correct categorization also in other places (2A2, 6A7, and 6A12).

Mencius thinks it is natural that we take care of our parents. He wants the king to extend (*tui*, 推) his compassion (*en*, 恩) for his parents to the people. He does not talk of "will" or even "free will." He talks of "using strength" (*yong li*, 用力) when lifting objects, of "using eyes (*yong ming*, 用明) when seeing objects, and of "using compassion" (*yong en*, 用恩) when helping others. Using or not using compassion belongs to the category of lifting or not lifting a feather.

As a matter of fact, the king has shown compassion for animals. He could do that. Now Mencius wants him to extend this compassion to his people. He can do that, too.
It is not a question of ability, but a failure of using it. Today, in the West, we would say this is the problem of "weakness of the will" (Nivison 1996: 87–90). Acting on good reason does not follow automatically. Mencius at another place (6 A15) distinguishes between outer and inner motives. When we are hungry and find something to eat, we will eat. It is an instinct. But even though we know what is good, we do not always act on it. Mencius says that it requires "thought" (*si*, 思), attendance, and cultivation.

We thus can summarize the argumentative structure in the following way. First, there is a difference in category between inactivity (*bu wei*, 不為) and inability (*bu neng*, 不能). Second, acting on compassion belongs to the category of activity and inactivity. Third, the king acted on compassion when seeing the ox. The people are like the ox. They labor for the king. Mencius makes the king recall his experience with the ox. This third argumentative move is *ad hominem*. It works according to the saying that "showing once is a better than saying a hundred times." The king recalls having seen something outside, namely the ox, and having "used" something inside, namely his compassion. This I think is Mencius' way of trying to move the king to overcome, as we might say today, his "weakness of will." It is Mencius' way of giving support to the first part of what "cannot be stopped," namely an action that is up to the king.

On the one hand, Mencius argues generally about what one "can" do and what "cannot be stopped." On the other hand, he gets the king emotionally involved by making him recall his experience with the ox. Combining the two argumentative moves, Mencius hopes to reach his goal.

But of course, there is no guarantee that this works. Weakness of the will cannot easily be overcome by an argument. As there is a gap between "ought" and "is," so there is a gap between "ability" (*neng*, 能) and "act" (*wei*, 為). At least Mencius made the gap and the difference in category (lei) clear to the king. Roughly speaking, Confucians like Mencius believed in the morally good in us and gave arguments supporting this belief and the idea of extending it from family members to all people. Seeing that this is insufficient, legalists and Confucians like Xunzi believed that we also need external force and rules of law. Taoists did not believe in either but believed in what they called "nature" (*ziran*, 自然).

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Wittgenstein and Frege's "Der Gedanke": Figuring the Resentment

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Abstract

In this paper, I propose an explanation of Wittgenstein's animated resentment towards Frege's essay "Der Gedanke" as reflected in their correspondence. The natural explanation of Wittgenstein's resentment reflected in Frege's letter goes by appealing to the content of "Der Gedanke" – most notably Frege's criticism of and Wittgenstein's sympathy for idealism. I place their correspondence into a broader context and argue that an alternative explanation is possible, and that the resentment reflected in the letter should not be treated as something primarily caused by something in the content of "Der Gedanke" but rather by Frege's criticism of the Tractatus in his earlier letters.

1.

Even prior to the 1988 discovery of Frege's letters to Wittgenstein, in which he addressed (among other) Wittgenstein's criticism of "Der Gedanke", it was well known from Geach (1977: vii) that "in the last months of his life" Wittgenstein maintained that essay "was an inferior work – it attacked idealism on its weak side, whereas a worthwhile criticism of idealism would attack it just where it was strongest" and that "he had made this point to Frege in correspondence". In Wittgenstein's (now lost) 19.III.1920 letter to Frege, the objection was set forth in terms of Frege not grasping "deeper grounds of idealism" (Frege 2011: 65), while Wittgenstein does precisely that – "acknowledge a deep and true core in idealism" (Frege 2011: 67), which apparently represents its strong side that somehow eluded Frege. "Deeper grounds" here came down to the underlying *logic* of idealism – its meaning and its consequences. As such, the standpoint summarised in Frege's letter is in accordance with Wittgenstein's 1915–1916 notebook entries (e.g., NB 1979: 49, 82, 85), and corresponding sections in the Tractatus (5.6–5.641).

At the time Geach made the recollection public, it was already known from Scholz's list of Frege's (subsequently destroyed) *Nachlass* that Wittgenstein criticised "Der Gedanke" in his 16.IX.1919 letter to Frege (Frege 1976: 168) – the letter in which, as it turned out, he acknowledged the true core in idealism. So, Wittgenstein criticised that essay in at least two letters and, given the timeframe of his testimony to Geach, it is likely that Wittgenstein's attitude towards it is also reflected in his 1951 remark that "[y]ou cannot assess yourself properly if you are not well versed in the categories. (Frege's style of writing is sometimes *great*; […]" (CV 1980: 87). This remark implicates that for Wittgenstein Frege's style of writing was sometimes *not* great and "Der Gedanke", being "an inferior work", would be an obvious candidate; in fact, the only one which we know of. If the same attitude undermines both comments from 1951, the *style* of writing should be understood in terms of someone's doing philosophy the right way. Attacking a conception "on its weak side" does not count as a case of that and, presumably, would leave it undefeated (Reck 2002: 24; McGuinness 2012: 29; Floyd 2011b: 102–103).

Looking at their earlier correspondence, Frege (2011: 49) anticipated in his 15.X.1918 letter Wittgenstein "will probably not agree with it ["der Gedanke"] entirely". But, if Frege really meant this and did not just wrote it as an empty statement of modesty, he could have in mind only Wittgenstein's pre-war departures from his views, of which none had anything to do with idealism: Perhaps Wittgenstein's disagreement with his conception of truth (Frege 1976: 266), or with his commitment to *drittes Reich* entities (McGuinness 1990: 84), or with his identification of facts with true thoughts, not Russellian facts (Frege 1984: 368), or with his conception of assertion (NB 1979: 103). (For a further discussion, see Künne 2009: 54ff.) In his 2.XIII.1916 notebook entry, Wittgenstein wrote that his "work has extended from the foundations of logic to the nature of the world" (NB 1979: 79). Frege knew him well from his "foundations of logic" period (1911–1913), and from Frege's preserved earlier letters to him (1914–1918), nothing indicates Wittgenstein even once communicated particular philosophical thoughts to him during the four war years (although he did report him several times, he was doing philosophy and finishing the manuscript), let alone a thought about his rediscovered interest for idealism, which would surely not pass unnoticed in Frege's replies.

So, Wittgenstein's criticism of "Der Gedanke" on the ground of Frege not grasping "deeper grounds of idealism" and, accordingly, fighting against it in an inappropriate way, came as a surprise to Frege, as it is evident from his (2011: 65) remark, "I believe that I understood that you yourself do not hold epistemological idealism to be true". Frege knew from their earlier discussions that Wittgenstein embraced Russellian facts (McGuinness 2012: 36), and embracing such entities stands in clear opposition to idealist tendencies. Frege's apparent astonishment also suggests that in his initial (16.IX.1919) criticism of "Der Gedanke" Wittgenstein was far less direct when it came to idealism than in his latter letter (addressed in Frege's 3.IV.1920 letter). And only after being faced with Wittgenstein's latter criticism of the essay, in which Wittgenstein's idealist inclinations must have come to the fore, Frege "noticed from an earlier letter of yours [Wittgenstein's] that you [Wittgenstein] acknowledge a deep and true core in idealism" (Frege 2011: 67).

In addition to not grasping deeper grounds of idealism, Wittgenstein also accused Frege for not fully appreciating shortcomings of ordinary language for the demands of logic due to certain disturbances of "psychologico-linguistic origin" (Frege 2011: 65). The way Frege set forth them in his letter, it is tempting to see the two objections as parts of Wittgenstein's single train of thought concerning Frege's take on idealism (Floyd 2011b: 97; McGrath 2019: 161). However, it is far from clear that is the case. Although it is hard to tell what exactly Wittgenstein objected in the second case, Frege's recapitulation of this objection more naturally connects to parts of "Der Gedanke" *preceding* his consideration of idealism. In particular, it seems related to Frege distinguishing levels of sentence's content of which thought is but one, pragmatic ingredients another (Frege 1984: 356–357). Künne (2009: 38) notices that in his 16.IX.1919 letter Frege connects Wittgenstein's explanations with the part of "Der Gedanke" where pragmatic components

of sentence's content are considered. So, it might be that Wittgenstein had that letter in mind when he later wrote about shortcomings of ordinary language. But then, in Frege's last letter we find traces of two separate objections to Frege of which only one strictly concerns his take on idealism.

2.

Frege's letter also suggests that Wittgenstein took his treatment of idealism in "Der Gedanke" *personally* and wrote his 19.III.1920 letter accordingly. If so, Frege's letter reveals not only something of *what* Wittgenstein resented to this essay, but also something of *how* he expressed the resentment. The letter starts with Frege (2011: 65) writing, "Many thanks for your letter of March 19! Of course I do not take offense at your frankness. But I would like to know which deeper grounds of idealism you think I have not grasped." I consider the "Of course I do not take offense at your frankness" part particularly interesting. To my ear, it suggests Wittgenstein in the preceding letter must have been over the line in his reaction to the extent he felt the need to apologise (and in fact did apologise) to Frege. In addition, unlike in his previous letters where Wittgenstein (as it seems) provided explanations intelligible to Frege (2011: 57, 59; McGuinness 2012: 103), Frege now writes as if Wittgenstein was not fully articulated and was thus having hard time "to find out what you [Wittgenstein] have in mind". And that Wittgenstein might have taken what Frege wrote *personally* is also supported by his later characterisation of Frege's letters as ones "whose contents are, however, purely personal and not philosophical" (in a 1936 letter to Scholz (Frege 2011: 73)). But, as a number of commentators observe (Floyd 2011b: 83; Künne 2009: 35; Reck 2002: 10), given the content of Frege's 1919–1920 letters, it is hard to agree with Wittgenstein on that, especially if "personal" is taken as opposing "philosophical".

Conceding these points about Frege's letter makes it natural to look on Wittgenstein's objections to "Der Gedanke" and his accompanying attitude towards idealism in the light of *how* his 19.III.1920 letter was written: That he wrote it the way he did *because* he appreciated and Frege underestimated idealism. I disagree with that and propose that Wittgenstein's criticism of "Der Gedanke" and his accompanying take on idealism should be divorced from the apparent way he expressed himself in the letter. In fact, I want to propose two things: Firstly, Wittgenstein's resentment reflected in Frege saying "Of course I do not take offense at your frankness" is *not* to be explained in terms of Wittgenstein's discontent with Frege's attack on idealism in "Der Gedanke". Secondly, the resentment in question *is* to be explained in terms of the stance towards the manuscript of the *Tractatus* Frege took in his earlier letters, in particular the one of 30.IX.1919. Thus, it is *not* the content of "Der Gedanke" that made Wittgenstein resentful, but rather something having nothing to do with Frege's treatment of idealism in the essay.

One thing that supports the negative thesis is the fact that "Der Gedanke" does not really contain something particularly new, already not contained in Frege's writings known to Wittgenstein before 1919, most notably *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*. McGuinness (1990: 79, 270) characterises Wittgenstein's relation to that work using the phrase "his beloved *Grundgesetze*" and notes Wittgenstein's capacity to recite from memory its "glorious" preface. Thus, Frege's take on idealism could not have come to Wittgenstein as something so surprising that would by itself explain his reaction. Indeed, in the preface of *Grundgesetze*, when criticising psychologism, one finds Frege saying, "Everything leads thus into idealism and therefore, as an unavoidable consequence, into solipsism" (Frege 2013: XIX). Given that Frege does not use the term "idealism" in "Der Gedanke", it is likely that Wittgenstein reads this essay having the preface of *Grundgesetze* in mind.

Another thing that supports the negative thesis is the fact that Wittgenstein read and criticised "Der Gedanke" way before he wrote his resentful 19.III.1920 letter, and so the assumed tone of this latter letter could hardly be explained by his sudden realisation Frege was attacking idealism inappropriately. As a matter of fact, recall that Wittgenstein addressed the issue of idealism already in his 16.IX.1919 letter. It is also interesting that Wittgenstein has focused on Frege's attack on idealism whereas Frege's plea for realism that follows it is considerably weaker (see Künne 2009: 37). Assuming it was *not* something in the content of "Der Gedanke" that caused Wittgenstein's tempered reaction, what was it? As I already hinted, I believe the main reason lies in Frege's attitude toward the manuscript of the *Tractatus* displayed in his 30.IX.1919 letter. Nothing Frege wrote before that could account for Wittgenstein's reaction: Indeed, we know some things about Wittgenstein's reaction to these earlier letters, and nothing of what we know suggests it was as nearly temperament as his 19.III.1920 reaction. Reconstructing the relevant events of the last few months of 1919 no doubt supports that.

3.

Wittgenstein's 19.III.1920 letter was his last one to Frege and the only one which we know of *not* found in Frege's *Nachlass* (Frege 1976: 268). In his 3.IV.1920 reply, Frege stimulated further discussion and was hoping for answers to his queries concerning both his "Der Gedanke" and Wittgenstein's own views, but the correspondence did not continue after it – partly because of Wittgenstein's disappointment with Frege's reaction and partly because his interests in meantime radically changed (now directed toward his teaching career rather than the *Tractatus* matters). Around that time, as it is evident from his letter to Russell (McGuinness 2012: 121), Wittgenstein's earlier enthusiasm for publishing the manuscript ("*Now* more than ever I'm burning to see it in print", he wrote to Russell on 12.VI.1919 (McGuinness 2012: 93)) was gone. Whether Wittgenstein knew when he wrote his 19.III.1920 letter that it will be his last one to Frege or it just happened to be so is hard to tell. Perhaps a line from his letter to Russell written the very same day is suggestive: "I'm no longer in any condition to acquire new friends and I'm losing my old ones. It's terribly sad" (McGuinness 2012: 116). If Wittgenstein felt his friendship with Frege was lost, he might have seen at that time his 19.III.1920 letter as the last one to Frege. Frege's 3.IV.1920 reply Wittgenstein subsequently received, which contained questions that were surely not stimulating to him, could only reinforce his decision.

Nothing in Frege's last letter, however, shows he realised from Wittgenstein's letter that he was ending the correspondence. That is why Frege in it posed a number of challenges to Wittgenstein and was clearly expecting answers. Given the fact that we came to know of Wittgenstein's 19.III.1920 letter to Frege only upon the 1988 discovery of Frege's letters (with a reference to it) and that Wittgenstein's letter was not found in Frege's *Nachlass*, it is possible (although less probable) that Wittgenstein in fact did answer Frege's 3.IV.1920 letter and that it was Frege who for some reason quit the correspondence. Be it as it may, the question remains: How come that Wittgenstein's 1920 letter(s) were not in Frege's *Nachlass*? Could it be that Frege toss it (them) away because he found it (them) of no permanent value, not worthy of "a thinker to be taken rather seriously" (Frege 2011: 61)? Another explanation of the end of the correspondence would be this: In a letter to Wittgenstein

in 1932, W. H. Watson asked him to supply information about Frege (McGuinness 2012: 198), to which Wittgenstein replied, "[Frege] was when I first met him in 1911 about 60 and Professor at Jena and died about 1922" (McGuinness 2012: 199). If this accurately represents Wittgenstein's belief about Frege's death, the following might have happened: After the episode with "Der Gedanke", and after his initial resentment and general perturbation settled, and he started to think about these matters again in the early 1920ties (Engelmann 1967: 39; McGuinness 2012: 143–145), Wittgenstein did not revive the contact with Frege because he thought Frege died earlier than he in fact did.

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Wittgenstein's Early Work as a Precursor: Cellular Information as the Clue to Our Human Way of Life

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Abstract

The heady period of the development of mathematics and physics at the turn of the 20th century and during the stretch of human expansion that also produced the difficulties of WWI and WW2, gave the world radically different theories of how mathematics works and how physics works. For example, one striking diversity appeared at the Second Conference of the Epistemology of the Exact Sciences, held at Königsberg in 1930 and jointly sponsored by the Vienna Circle and Berlin Circle, with the important papers of Gödel, Hilbert, Heyting and Waismann's presentation "The Nature of Mathematics: Wittgenstein's Standpoint". This early work allowed Wittgenstein a developing mathematics which distinguished between set theoretic totalities and Wittgensteinian systems. Elsewhere (2014/2019; 2015a/2015b) I have argued for a systems approach to Wittgenstein's philosophy. A similar congress in Copenhagen in 1936 focussed on causality and quantum physics with Bohr, Heisenberg and Dirac. In Cambridge, the intellectual developments of Russell, Turing and Ramsey were challenged by Keynes, Hodgkin and Huxley. I present work which shows that Wittgenstein respected uncertainty and non-linearity as crucial essentials of human ways of life.

1. Introduction

Wittgenstein's thinking and writing of the early 1936–38 version of the *Philosophical Investigations,* MS 142 and the transition to TS 221, was influenced by concerns to counter Turing's set-theoretic arguments. Indeed, even in the earlier TS 213 we find questions about what it is to think and if there could be an artificial thinking. However, by the 1970s and 1980s Nano and Quantum were envisaged as cooperating enablers to eventually create a physical system computer along Turing Machine models.

Within this model nanotechnology and quantum mechanics are constructed along linearity. And this is a closed shop. Anything that does not fit linearity is viewed either as negatively chaotic or not significantly known to allow a robust linear description of human thought. Much of AI is based on this paradigm. Thus, any aspect of a precursor role to Wittgenstein in his mathematical ideas would be interesting because it takes us right up to the present shift we are beginning to see in current 21st century nano and quantum research which embraces non-linearity. This is particularly interesting because we know that Wittgenstein said that it would take at least 100 years for his work to be understood.

2. The Linearity Group: Russell, Turing, Gödel, Ramsey

Russell sets out in his early 20th century mathematical theory which left room for his version of the significantly known even though there is no way of medically, at any present that a human might progress to, to be that which establishes the infinite as actual. I have argued elsewhere that Wittgenstein embraces the potential infinite rather than the actual infinite within his mathematics. Russell presented what he considered as the correct idea of the "medically impossible" as the human inability to find the actual infinite itself as distinct from the erroneous idea that the actual infinite itself could not exist. Rather, it must be that the actual infinite is a Platonic form which the enlightened human grasps as an essential part of living the good life.

At this sharp point there is not the difference between Russell and Gödel/Turing that is often attributed. For even though Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem created an *Entscheidungsproblem* which could be seen as disarming the full axiomatic and type-theoretic aspects of Russell and Whitehead, Russell's own 1908 early vision is Platonic in significant ways that emerge later as Gödel's Platonic hierarchy of forms.

Furthermore, through another close Cambridge contemporary and supervisor of Wittgenstein, we can look at associated ideas of probability. Ramsey's theory of probability captures a related approach by arguing that probability must be couched in terms of risk, with the minimum odds at which one is prepared to take that risk the absolute bedrock of probability. On this view, future improvements might be able to linearize our perceptions, and keep rationality within the strict bounds of a type of formalism. In addition, Wittgenstein's criticism of Ramsey's conception of infinity which "presupposes that we were given the actual infinite and not merely the unlimited possibility of going on" (PR: 173; TS 209: 90; MS 106: 115) extends to Ramsey's theory of probability and its characterisation of taking risks: all are of the same intellectual root: a closed shop model, i.e. it is set-theoretic and linearly forecast.

This same approach is further expanded, much later, by Yukalov and Sornette (2009) who argue that even while quantum theory does account for decisions under uncertainty, as uncertainty abates (interference weakens) from perhaps more information or a change in circumstance, the agent's behaviour reverts to the classical rational utility pattern. This type of argument is also used in the sciences: that the unfathomable complexity of today will be the known of tomorrow. Russell also used this argument in questions about infinity.

As another example, if we want to understand climate shifts we by and large rely on linear broad global information. However, there is now a new tendency to explore non-linear local information for forecasts for the obvious reason that if you think of the planet as systemic and inter-related at depth level, then you have to characterise local interactions which can be jumps rather than the global continuity referenced by Darwin.

3. Uncertainty and non-linearity through a different Cambridge lens: Keynes, Hodgkin and Huxley

Interestingly, Keynes sets a completely different tack. I argued (2019) that Knight (1921) and Keynes (1921) believed there was a fundamental difference between risk and uncertainty. The former, risk, involves events with known odds, while the latter, uncertainty, involves unknown or even unknowable odds. Ramsey (1931) and de Finetti (1937), as well as von Neumann

and Morgenstern (1947) assumed that individuals seek to maximize their expected utility. Thus risk is regularly summarized on this paradigm as the minimum odds at which one is prepared to take that risk. Without much effort, we can see that a linear way of argumentation is central to these thinkers. On this view, as Ellsberg (1961) argues, "[…] for the rational man all uncertainties can be reduced to risk".

Both Wittgenstein and Keynes distrusted frequentist theories of probability, with Keynes (1921: 368), on the basis of Leibniz, stating: "Although nature has her habits, […]they are general not invariable." Wittgenstein took this position even further by cautioning repeatedly against any serious reliance on the 'causal nexus'. And if we look at Wittgenstein's seeds example, he allowed full range to a non-Newtonian action at a distance as a systemic explanation of the possibility of the unexpected outcome – reminiscent of the mutation, the quantum jump in Bateson's and Keynes' terms – underscoring the uncertainty of the rose necessarily following from the rose seed.

Beginning in the 1930s an alternative approach began – which would later capture a Nobel prize in biological-physics – with the scientists Hodgkin and Huxley, both at Cambridge when Turing, also at Cambridge, was forging his *Entscheidungsproblem* reply and Machine-learning models. The lengthy, delicate and painstaking observation of the squid from 1938–1952 produced a revolutionised view where rather than the current of the membrane acting as the mover of change in the cell's membrane, as had been thought by the scientist world, it was simply a much more concentrated and complex situation of communication within the system.

Firstly, it is prudent to point out that the non-linearity that is used in our discussion is of greater significance than that of quantization steps produced in many micro-chip developments, particularly from the widespread analogue to digital conversions. To begin with linearity as the bedrock which is then augmented/transformed into a 'quantized non-linearity' is very much like the normalisation procedures in descriptions of the universe, and, as we have already looked at, the re-structuring/normalisation of uncertainty into risk in what is considered a rationalistic probability.

Hodgkin and Huxley, however, presented the world with an understanding of how things work *pre-linear*. Or rather, put better, they discovered that non-linearity is the essential of nature/biology – not linearity. It is the beginning, and the way of communication at a very sophisticated level. Hodgkin and Huxley created a differential equation with four state variables that change in time, being the first to combine mathematics and biology, but this must be non-linear because what they saw could not be solved analytically in which one must be choosing one aspect at a time on its own and then stringing it onto the argumentative structure. Nor was a strong change in current sufficient to capture the subtlety of their biology. They began to view non-linearity as the mover of life.

4. The mover of life: Systems that learn from themselves

The idea of rationality, certainty-risk models and maximization of utility as a unit for describing humans has fuelled the 20th century, even to the extent that early quantum mechanics were probabilistic along the same plan. Many of the European mathematicians and physicists who migrated, such e.g. as von Neumann and Gödel, brought with them a strong linearity, mathematical Platonism and a way of description which is external, i.e. pictures a system from the outside. On von Neuman's work the game player is omniscient, anticipates every contingency, learns nothing during the game, and in physics there are highly efficient purposive organisational elements.

However, a problem which occurs is not only that the description/theory of communication is external and a different system could become more accurate with more knowledge – similar to the belief that the increase of knowledge makes the shift from uncertainty/no risk to rational probabilistic risk possible – the externality means that the system does not – is not able – to learn from itself. And this is greatly important to later quantum and nano theory. Indeed, we could have missed 'self-recognition' and 'self-assembly', those supra-qualities that are evidenced in biology (and are blazing through late contemporary nano-science development).

To think – if indeed we consider ourselves to be a part of nature – that we are best characterized along the Turing model binary or even the extended early quantum position of 4 q-bits manipulation, is too dull. In the Hodgkin-Huxley model the cell membrane acts as a capacitator for the interaction of a collection of elements in which we cannot think of polarization, push and pull, as the accurate description of the squid's formation and survival, nor possibly of ours either. Cellular information as a way of life and its depolarization along the channels of interaction and enabling are the truth.

A question that is percolating from our discussion is, which biology are we? Turing and 20th and 21st century followers give one answer. Hodgkin and Huxley, also at Cambridge along with Wittgenstein at Trinity have alerted us to another.

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Variations of Intuitionistic Revisionism

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Abstract

I survey different versions of the argument against applying the law of the excluded middle to infinite domains. Customarily taken as the intuitionistic criticism, there are in fact many distinct versions of the argument given by different proponents of the issue, such as Michael Dummett, Hermann Weyl (by an argument shared with Wittgenstein), and Erett Bishop. As part of comparing their respective merits, I ask how they manage to justify the principle of induction.

1. Introduction

It is well known that intuitionists reject classical reasoning over infinite domains. But their arguments against it are not homogenous throughout different proponents of the issue and they yield further philosophical and technical differences down the line. I will differentiate three types of intuitionistic revisionism and compare their respective merits. Hereby, I will focus on the proposals by Dummett, Weyl (by an argument shared with Wittgenstein), and Bishop.

From the outset, the intuitionistic position differs from a finitistic one in that it allows for theories whose truth requires infinite domains (which a finitist rejects). What the intuitionist contests is, rather, the way we reason with them. Classically understood, the truth of a generalization flows from the independent conjunction of all the individuals of its domain. The three mentioned authors object that this way of justifying (and in one case even construing) general claims, unproblematic as it is for finite domains, does not support infinite ones. But they differ in what they consider to be the precise problem. Their objections are:

1. Classical laws for generalizations over infinite domains-*lack epistemic warranty* (Dummett).

2. There is a complete *lack of sense* attributed to generalizations over infinite domains in the usual sense (Weyl, Wittgenstein).

3. By using classical reasoning, we lose the ability to make certain distinctions with respect to infinite domains and thus *lack means of differentiation* (Bishop).

Furthermore, while a finitist might also reject the principle of induction in arithmetic, the intuitionist would seek to accommodate it–and they may be measured by their success in that matter. In what follows I will consider these three arguments and inquire how they manage to this end.

2. Three versions of the intuitionistic argument

2.1. Dummett: Lack of epistemic warranty

The backbone of Dummett's criticism of classical logic developed in his 1978 paper *The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic* and repeated in the second edition of *Elements of Intuitionism* in 2000 is the aim to develop a molecular theory of meaning for the logical constants. Contrary to a holistic approach, where the meaning of any linguistic expressions is exclusively given by the way they interact with all the other expressions, a molecular theory of meaning entertains primitive or molecular expressions whose meaning is previously fixed, and rather *constitutes* the way they interact with other expressions.

To fix the meaning of those molecular expressions, Dummett requires an explanation of what it means for someone to use them correctly. The ability to correctly use an expression is understood as the ability to recognize when a sentence containing this expression can be asserted to say something true. Thus, one needs to account for how someone could have the knowledge of the truth that the sentence can be used to assert. The truth-condition of such a sentence therefore must be "one which [the speaker] is capable of recognizing as obtaining whenever it in fact obtains"(Dummett 2000: 259). This is the case when truth is coupled with a notion of proof as its condition, which is by its very nature finitistic and as such recognizable. In this way, truth is intimately connected to proof on the molecular account.

But if the truth of a universal generalization is coupled with proof, we lack the required guarantee to assert the law of the excluded middle when it comes to infinite domains.

> For an arithmetical statement involving the universal quantifier, there will be no guarantee that, if it is true, we shall be able to recognize its truth-conditions as fulfilled: not only do we not have any means to bring ourselves into a position to be able to recognize this, but, for all we know, the condition may not be one which any human being will ever be capable of recognizing as obtaining. (Dummett 2000: 261)

Thus, since there is no *guarantee* that we find either a general proof or a counterexample, the law of the excluded middle fails on *epistemic grounds*.

One thing should, however, be clear: Dummett's appeal to epistemic criteria does not challenge the idea that the generalizations still say something about a domain with infinitely many individuals; it is just that our ways of establishing such claims are scrutinized by epistemic means. The following position goes one step further and even rejects the idea of there being such a domain.

2.2. Weyl and Wittgenstein: Meaninglessness as utter lack of sense

In Weyl's brief conversion to intuitionism in 1921 we find a more radical claim than Dummett's. Weyl rejects the idea of going through all instances of an infinite domain not just on epistemic grounds:

> [T]his point of view of a completed run through an infinite sequence is nonsensical. I cannot get general judgements about numbers by looking at the individual numbers but

> only by looking at the essence of number [das Wesen der Zahl]. (Weyl 1998: 95)

In this quote, mentioning "nonsensical" must be taken literally. The second half of the quote might make it seem like Weyl's criterion of meaninglessness merely pertains to our inability to go through an infinite number of instances. That this is not the case can be seen from Weyl's following qualification that "god himself cannot make use of a different reason for deciding" (Weyl 1998: 97). A more detailed exposition of the same issue is given eight years later by Wittgenstein:

> Nor can you say, 'A proposition cannot deal with all the numbers one by one, so it has to deal with them by means of the concept of number,' as if this were a *pis aller*: 'Because we can't do it *like this*, we have to do it another way.' But it's not like that: of course it's possible to deal with the numbers one by one, but that doesn't lead to the totality. For the totality is only given as a concept. (PR: §124)

And he, too, adds a reference to God. Almost mockingly he writes: "'Can god know all the places of the expansion of π?' would have been a good question for the schoolmen to ask." (PR: 149)

All these remarks on God would not be understandable if the infinite is merely thought as epistemically inaccessible to us. God, who certainly is epistemically unrestricted, would surely not have *that* problem. Yet both, Weyl and Wittgenstein, deny that even God could go through infinitely many instances. The only feasible explanation for this is that there is *no such thing as* "going through infinitely many instances". Even a god cannot do something that is conceptually meaningless. In this respect "going through the extension of all the natural numbers" is like "coloring a concept" or "finding the difference between a hedgehog". It is a meaningless task.

This raises the question of whether the position of Wittgenstein and Weyl might not better be characterized as finitistic. While there is an ongoing debate with respect to Wittgenstein (and some evidence of him leaning towards finitisitc notions), Weyl, on his own account, seems to squarely belong to the intuitionist camp. This now presents the challenge of how he (and of course also Wittgenstein) can make sense of the meaning of a generalization if reference to the instances of a domain is no longer available. This will be addressed in the third section of the paper, when the consequences of these views are being considered.

2.3. Bishop: Meaninglessness as lack of differentiation

Erett Bishop's position is more lenient than the previous two. He does not flat out reject infinitary reasoning, but merely advocates a relocation of interest to the (constructive) mathematics of finite beings. For him,

> [t]here is only one basic criterion to justify the philosophy of mathematics, and that is, does it contribute to making mathematics more meaningful. It is not true that this criterion is commonly accepted. In fact, the philosophical criterion that most mathematicians prefer is that it enables them to prove more theorems and to be more secure about the theorems that they have already. (Bishop 1975: 508)

In this respect, Bishop too considers classical mathematics to lack meaning, but he takes this to be a *gradual* distinction rather than an absolute one.

His idea is the following. He first notes that to each theorem that the classical mathematician can prove, the constructive mathematician can associate one of their own. For instance, when the classical mathematician proves a statement A which involves infinitely many computations, the constructivist might prove a statement of the form "LPO? A", where LPO is the limited principle of omniscience. Now, however, Bishop points out that the corresponding constructivist statement has a richer internal structure, which can be further explained by the idea that the constructivist may look for the *minimal* C such that C ? A and in this way pinpoint the meaning of A in a much more precise way. The problem Bishop sees, then, is that classical mathematics blurs over such differentiations even to the extent that in some areas of mathematics it is impossible to draw them *systematically.* As an example, he mentions the distinction between computable and non-computable integers (Bishop 1975: 507). In this sense, meaninglessness is gradually incorporated into classical mathematics.

Bishop's argument directly involves the notion of the infinite, but its effective point can be extended beyond that. It is the idea that intuitionistic or constructive reasoning allows for differentiations that classical reasoning does not, leading e.g., to a strikingly different behavior of function spaces (cf. Bell 2014). But here, the infinite is only one ingredient in the overall argument and not its main driving force. Furthermore, the classical mathematician might equally reject this conception because it lacks certain equivalences that they cherish, and Bishop's argument provides no ground to decide between them. Thus, Bishop's idea of using a purely mathematical criterion for his revisionism is indeed less confrontational than Weyl's, Wittgenstein's and even Dummett's, but at the cost of losing some of its bite. One might even say it simply leaves the question of a philosophical justification of either view open.

3. Justification of induction

On Dummett's account, infinite generalizations are still generalizations over infinitely many individuals. There is just a lack of epistemic warranty to suppose that bivalence holds for them. Similarly for Bishop, there is no real change in meaning. For both, therefore, a universal statement can be considered true if there is a free variable proof for it, i.e. one can infer ∀xA(x) from a proof of A(x) for arbitrary x. Regarding the principle of induction, Bishop simply claims that it "carries complete conviction" (Bishop and Bridges 1985), and, granted that the natural numbers are given recursively, Dummett gives the following (simple) justification (cf. Dummett 2000: 9): Given that we have a free variable proof of A(x) –> A(x + 1) and a proof of A(0) one can then construct for any n a proof for any A(n) by applying the conditional n times. This procedure is a free variable proof of A(x) and hence by the above considerations one can infer ∀xA(x).

However, for Weyl and Wittgenstein the matter is not so straightforward. Since expressing generalizations via reference to instances is no viable option for them, the hitherto unproblematic notion of proof for arbitrary x also loses its meaning–which in turn affects the justification of induction. But is there an alternative way to understand infinite generalizations? Wittgenstein seems to approach this issue by taking its proof by induction itself to constitute the meaning of a generalization (cf. PG: 406). But this poses the danger of trivializing the case of justifying such generalizations. These troubles are further emphasized when we consider the negations of such statements. What is $\neg\forall x\,\phi\,(x)$ supposed to mean

when $\forall x \phi(x)$ is only meaningful when there is a proof of it by induction?

In Weyl, however, we find an intriguing alternative suggestion: the notion of laying in the *essence of a concept* (as quoted above). Weyl introduces this notion as far as the truth of these generalizations is concerned, but as far as we understand his remarks about God as implying that talk about an infinitude of instances is overall meaningless, his alternative suggestion must be understood as a first and foremost alternative to the meaning of such a generalization. That something lies in the essence of a concept can be uncovered via conceptual analysis rather than reasoning with respect to a certain domain. However, the difference between the two is not as large as one might think. The idea of laying in the essence of a concept should also be able to motivate the legitimacy of proofs by induction, namely as far as the principle of recursion is part of the concepts discussed. Weyl's remark that complete induction "cannot, nor need it be, further explained, for it is nothing but the mathematical basic intuition of the 'always one more'"(Weyl 1998: 100) can be understood along those lines. Weyl seems to understand the "basic intuition" of the "always one more" as giving the essence of the notion of natural number. In this sense, the variable x in A(x) indicates possible construction and not arbitrary existence in a domain. Unfortunately, Weyl's proposal is not completely worked out. In particular, he offers no account of how the negation of such a statement is to be understood. However, a recent systematic treatment of the issue by Øystein Linnebo has suggested an interpretation of such generalizations that makes them compatible with intuitionistic negation (cf. Linnebo 2022).

4. Conclusion

One can consider the difference between the three groups as a trade-off between motivation and consequences. While on Bishop's view we get a most pragmatic justification of constructivism that does not contradict classical mathematics (but merely seeks to elevate its meaning), he does not seem to avoid a possible deadlock situation. Weyl and Wittgenstein, on the other hand, launch (to my knowledge) the strongest conceivable objection against classically understood generalizations. But, for Wittgenstein at least, the consequences seem to be so dire that the overall position seems quite unattractive. Weyl provides an intriguing alternative to this, which, however, is not completely worked out on his account. In this light, Dummett seems to offer a compromise: our understanding of the infinite is not challenged, but our practice of ascribing truth values to generalizations over it is scrutinized on an epistemic basis.

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Symbolic Communication, Translatability, and Evolutionary Perspectives

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Abstract

Plato's *Cratylus*-dialogue examines whether names are "natural" or just a matter of "convention and habit" (Plato 1961). Saussure's doctrine of a principally arbitrary sound-meaning relation in the linguistic sign is in line with the second position. That doctrine is, however, confronted with the universal phenomenon of sound-symbolism and cross-modal correspondences (Spence 2011). Further results of our conceptual analysis: (i) The concepts of convention and habit admit, as already indicated in Peirce's definition of symbol (Peirce 1906: 495), natural origins and "natural dispositions". Which holds all the more for the development of viable concepts. (ii) Today's common concept of symbol as arbitrary sign appears as an amalgamation of Peirce (words are symbols) and Saussure (words are arbitrary signs). Note: Neither in Peirce nor in Saussure is arbitrariness a condition of symbol. – This amalgamation causes complications in the theory of language and language evolution (cf. Scott-Phillips 2015) which can be avoided if we view the word, and the symbol in general, as the sign that represents concepts and propositions. This concept may, moreover, explain why only symbolic expressions are translatable. They can be – "arbitrarily" – translated into other expressions of the same language (Peirce 1905) or another language, or even into another code and sense modality, as in spoken versus signed language, whose modes nonetheless realize iconicity in system-specific ways. The impact of this kind of flexibility on the evolution of language and further complex symbol systems, such as "picture language" (graphs, diagrams) and formal language, will be discussed.

1. Sound symbolism and the nature of the linguistic sign

In the first passages of famous *Cratylus*-dialogue (see Plato 1961), Hermogenes explains to Socrates that Cratylus considers names as "natural and not conventional", whereas he, Hermogenes, tentatively holds the opposite position. He insists, for instance, that a newly imposed name "is as good as the old: […] all is convention and habit of the users." Names of persons and of anything else are arbitrary, so to speak! In the still ongoing debate, Saussure's (1916) doctrine of the arbitrary, "unmotivated" nature of the linguistic sign corresponds to the latter position. In Peirce's explications of *symbol* we again encounter the terms "habit" (Peirce 1906) and "conventional" (Peirce 1908); but here the term "habit" is used as including natural dispositions (see below). "Cross modal correspondences" correspond to sound-symbolism (Spence 2011) and, I think, moreover to natural dispositions *sensu* Peirce.

In Peirce's trichotomy of the sign, the *icon,* the index and the symbol do not hold an equal status (Peirce 1946a [1904]): "An icon can only be a fragment of a completer sign. The other form of degenerate sign is to be termed an *index*." (p. 242) Thus, the symbol remains as the only potentially complete sign: A symbol, "if sufficiently complete always involves an index, such as an index if sufficiently complete involves an icon." (p. 256) As is the case in the linguistic sign: "Language and all abstracted thinking, such as belongs to minds who think in words, [are] of the symbolic nature. Many words, though strictly symbols, are so far iconic that they are apt to determine iconic interpretants /…/; that are *onomatopoetic*, as they say." (p. 243) And in his 1906 Monist article he explicates that the symbol is determined by its object "by more or less approximate certainty that it will be interpreted as denoting the object, in consequence of a habit [which term I use as including a natural disposition], when I call the sign a *Symbol*." (Peirce 1906: 495). *Habit*, I think, doesn't necessarily denote something established by *convention*, and neither *habit* nor *convention* implies arbitrariness.

Saussure's (1916) doctrine of the arbitrary, "unmotivated" nature of the linguistic sign, and of the sign in general, appears ten years after Peirce's 1906 Monist article. It reads, somehow, like an alternative program to Peirce, when he explicitly avoids the view of words as symbols on the ground that symbols are "never wholly arbitrary." And the nowadays common classification of the *linguistic sign* as "arbitrary symbol" appears as a rather strange amalgamation of two conflicting positions: If signs are arbitrary (Saussure's doctrine) and symbols a subclass of sign, then the symbol is arbitrary as well. Or, to illustrate another way leading to that mixture: Since words are symbols (Peirce) and words are arbitrary (Saussure), words are "arbitrary symbols". Actually, arbitrariness is neither in Peirce nor in Saussure a condition for the concept of the *symbol*; both authors are admitting iconicity in symbols!

Saussure uses the term "unmotivated" synonymously with "arbitrary" and emphasizes – apart from his central claim that the number of onomatopoetic words is much lower than usually assumed – that in some words the onomatopoetic sound is just an incidental result of their diachronic history, and that some other originally more or less onomatopoetic words have lost some of their original character, thus moving closer to the general nature of signs that are unmotivated. Bolinger (1949), in contrast, views a diachronic sound-meaning convergence as an argument for systematicity, and concludes: Not to see systematicity in the sound-meaning or form-meaning relation doesn't mean that it is absent.

But Saussure's proposal proved to be extremely persistent – despite criticism on grounds of its absolute failure to state methodological reasons (Ogden & Richards 1923); and despite experimental studies (Köhler 1929; Sapir 1929; Berlin 1994), field-studies (Lewis 2009), and corpus-linguistic studies (Blasi et al. 2016) providing empirical evidence for universal sound symbolism (cf. Spence 2011).

In Ogden and Richards (1923) the focus is on the meaning of words, and words are, as already in Peirce, classified as symbols. But the authors make a clear distinction between an external world, where they locate the symbol and its referent, and a mental world – whereas in Peirce any thought or interpretation is a sign when becoming the object of a subsequent interpretation. To him, a proposition is not only an external representation, but "that which is related to any assertion, whether mental and self-addressed or outwardly expressed, just as any possibility is related to its actualization." (Peirce 1905: 172, footnote 4). Ogden and Richards explicitly criticize

Saussure's theory, where the sign as a whole is made up of a concept and an acoustic image both of which are "psychical entities"; with the result "that the process of interpretation is included by definition in the sign!" (p. 5, footnote 2). Localizing the symbol in the external world, as in the famous semiotic triangle by Ogden and Richards (1923: 11), admits, *inter alia*, a conceptualization of *symbol* as external counterpart of concepts (Fenk 1994; 1997).

Peirce's explications of his trichotomy of the sign admits, moreover, a view of the *symbol* as the only multifunctional sign. And as the only sign that represents or denotes concepts or propositions it is the only translatable, or substitutable, or interchangeable sign – "translatable" also between different codes and sensory modalities, such as speech and sign language. This kind of flexibility finds a continuation in further ramifications, such as writing systems and "picture languages" (graphs, diagrams), and formal and computer languages. Different symbol systems realize iconicity in different ways, and in sign languages and ideographic writing systems iconicity may be more apparent than in speech and phonetic writing systems.

The classification of the *linguistic sign* as "arbitrary symbol" is obviously complicating the theory of language and of language evolution. In Givon (2002: 28f), the "shift from visual-gestural to auditory-oral coding" is associated with a "loss of iconicity ", with a "trend from more iconic to more symbolic signals", and with the "rise of abstract concepts". But being "more iconic" does not mean being less symbolic. Thus, there is no need to construe affinities, between iconicity on the one hand and visual communication and concreteness of concepts on the other. And there is no need for the assumption of "intermediate cases" (cf. Scott-Phillips 2015: 109) between the symbol and the icon. Onomatopoetic words, iconic gestures, and many characters in ideographic writing systems can simply be described as "iconic symbols".

2. Translatability and arbitrariness

The analysis of the essence of concepts of *symbol* leads to a proof that it is the predominant function of anything (of any "Perceptible") used as a symbol to represent concepts: one concept, or various concepts, as is the case in polysemy and homonymy. To be a symbol means that the respective perceivable sign attains its meaning through its reference to a concept, or to more than one concept.

To complement that conception: Given a certain mental concept or proposition as a relatively fixed point, the respective symbolic expression is translatable – in contrast to, e.g., a painting of a landscape; the painting can be described, but not translated. Which in turn explains why the meaning of a linguistic expression can be tied "arbitrarily" to different forms in a variety of sense modalities. A second kind of arbitrariness-claim is, however, only defined in negative terms ("*un*motivated"; "*non*-iconic") and has been empirically disproven in studies demonstrating the ubiquitous nature of sound symbolism. From an alleged condition for *symbolicity*, i.e. arbitrariness, only one facet can be maintained: This facet, i.e., translatability, applies to the linguistic sign, and can even be taken as further proof of the symbolic nature of the linguistic sign. With regard to the meaning of propositions, already Peirce (1905) takes recourse on translation: "The meaning of a proposition is itself a proposition. Indeed it is no other than the proposition of which it is the meaning: it is a translation of it." (p. 173) Translatability, as our new criterion for *symbol* and for the linguistic sign, must however be extended. Symbolic expressions, as external representations, can be "translated" in a variety of ways: (i) They can be translated into other symbolic expressions within a given language in a given sense modality: e.g. by synonymous terms, paraphrases, or definitions.

(ii) Within a given language, they can be translated into different sense modalities, e.g. from the auditory modality (speech) into the visual (signed or written), and vice versa.

(iii) Within that language, they can also be translated into different codes (Braille; Morse) that may again use different sensory channels.

(iv) And they can be translated from this given language into another language, e.g. from English to French and vice versa.
(v) Last but not least, linguistic expressions can be translated into specific pictorial formats and vice versa – provided that the respective format functions, through explicit convention and/or rule-based use, as a symbolic expression. Think of traffic signs, such as "Attention deer crossing" or "Beware of falling rocks": The red triangular frame generally signals some kind of danger, and the pictogram within that frame specifies the respective kind of danger.

Every kind of translation implies a change in the form-meaning relation. Such changes are, however, no argument for the doctrine of the arbitrary, unmotivated, non-iconic nature of the linguistic sign. The translation and the translated realize iconicity and systematicity in their specific ways.

Regularities and rules are required for the formation of concepts and habits, for the use of symbols, and for translations between them. Peirce proposes a close connection, or even equivalence, (a) between the meaning of a proposition, i.e., of a complex symbol, and a translation (or substitution) of that proposition (Peirce 1905: 173), and (b) between regularities (or rules) and the symbol. In his *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein proposes, with regard to logic, similar ideas in strikingly similar formulations: "What signifies in a symbol is what is common to all the symbols that the rules of logical syntax allow us to substitute for it." (§3.344); "These rules are equivalent to the symbols; and in them their sense is mirrored." (§5.514).

3. Evolutionary perspectives

Sound symbolism is assumed to play a substantial role in human language evolution. Let me list up some more or less direct and more or less speculative, evolutionary relevant consequences.

a) Sound symbolism can be conceived of a pre-linguistic matrix of iconicity in language. And onomatopoeia can be viewed as rooting in correspondences between sound symbolic universals and resonance properties of objects (Spence 2011).

b) Sound symbolism and cross-modal correspondences can be related to the "natural dispositions" mentioned in Peirce's 1906 definition of the *symbol*.

c) If one takes that definition seriously, there is no reason to exclude non-human primate calls (cf. Schlenker et al. 2016) from symbolic messages. To complement this: The capacity for concept formation is, as has long been known, not at all restricted to human beings.

(d) The mutual information in vocal and visible gestural patterns must have contributed – together with sound symbolism

(cf. Imai and Kita 2014) and maybe in "put baby down"-scenarios (Falk 2004; Jaynes 1976) – to the beginnings of phonetic components to become an autonomously functional mode.
e) The advantages of differentiation and translatability complement each other. The trend towards differentiations of techniques, enabled through the evolution of the hominid's predictive and "instrumental intelligence" (Tooby and DeVore 1987: 210), also affected techniques of communication and initiated further ramifications of complex symbolic communication, such as writing systems, graphs and diagrams, formal and computer languages.

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What is Wrong with the Private Language Argument

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Abstract

In what follows, I will present a strong but plausible interpretation of Wittgenstein's private language argument, followed by a counter-argument exposing its Achilles heel. The advantage of my counter-argument is that it refutes the most radical conclusions of the private language argument, like the denial of subjectivity or the impossibility of induction by analogy regarding other minds.

Maximizing its consequences, we can interpret Wittgenstein's so-called private language argument (PI: sec. 258, sec. 243–315) as follows. A language is a system of rules. But a rule should be interpersonally checkable. If this is not the case, it will be impossible to submit the rule to possible correction by other speakers. And if that is not possible, there will be no distinction between the act of following a rule and the mere impression of following it.

Inter-subjective rule checking is clearly possible in a *physicalist* language where designation rules relate words to cognitions of the presence of corresponding physical entities, to which any speaker can have observational access. Thus, suppose the designation rule has the form *E* ~> *N*, telling us that the presence of the E event *allows* the application of the name *N* to it. If *E* is a physical entity, referring to E2 as an instantiation of *E* after its instantiation as E1, and using the sign '=' to mean 'it is qualitatively identical', we can say that (E1 ~> N) = (E2 ~> N), given that we can inter-subjectively check the fact that E1 = E2. In the case of a phenomenalist language, however, we must produce designation rules that relate names to private phenomenal states, *which makes inter-subjective checking impossible*. Therefore, when E1 and E2 are private phenomenal states, we cannot know whether (E1 ~> N) = (E2 ~> N), since it is impossible to inter-subjectively check whether E1 = E2.

The mind-blowing conclusion of this argument is that a truly *phenomenalist* language is impossible, since there is no way to learn or establish its rules so that they can be corrected, which would allow us to distinguish them from simple appearances of rules – and "rules" that cannot be distinguished from appearances of rules cannot be called rules! A phenomenal language would be a private language, something which cannot exist. It is but a persistent illusion of both the common man and practically the entire philosophical tradition.

On the newly summarized argument, some issues need to be raised. The first is: in what sense should we understand the condition of rule publicity? A naïve suggestion is that a rule is only a rule if it has already been inter-subjectively checked. However, this is quite implausible. To highlight this point, suppose that a person has obsessive dispositions and that she has taught herself the rule of reading the license plates of all cars that overtake her own, not daring to share them with others. No one would say that this is not a rule, just because it has never been inter-subjectively checked, nor that it needs to be made public to be admitted as a rule.

Indeed, it is necessary to dig deeper to get to the foundations that underpin a non-trivial reading of the private language argument. The interpretative suggestion that leads us to such a reading is the following: the rules of private language are those whose inter-subjective checking is *impossible*. Invented personal rules can be inter-subjectively checked. Therefore, they are rules.

The next question concerns what kind of impossibility is considered when we say that a condition for a rule to be distinguishable from a mere impression of the rule is that its inter-subjective checking is possible? Is it *logical* or just *practical*? It definitely cannot be merely practical. To make this clear, suppose the existence of a scientific community in which a scientist named Lewen invents a device that changes our conceptions so that we cannot make certain observations of the external world without it, and that other scientists interested in the subject do not have access to the device. As a result, it becomes virtually impossible for them to check the observations made by Lewen himself. However, this mere contingent impossibility would not necessarily make them doubt their results.

To better examine the case, let us assume that, following Lewen's instructions, other scientists build similar devices, and that they can then check his descriptions of what he saw, each using his own device, but that, for whatever reason, they cannot make observations of each other's devices. Now, it would certainly not even occur to them that only because of the practical impossibility of inter-subjective checking of observations they should doubt Lewen's observations or think that they are not making observations of the same types of objects described by him. After all, they could rely on inferences by analogy, well-entrenched in a universe of things already publicly known and could reinforce their results through testimonies collected from each other. It may also be suggested that the same applies to our subjective phenomenal states, if the impossibility of verification is merely practical. In this case, although we cannot make them inter-subjectively, we can build *plausible hypotheses*. Just as other scientists can justifiably believe in Lewen's information about observations made using his instrument, due to their coherence with the knowledge they share from science and about the public world around them, we can also justifiably believe reports of internal phenomenal experiences dependent on subjectively assumed rules.

Considerations such as these lead us to conclude that the possibility of inter-subjective verification required for a rule to be admitted as a rule can only be a logical one. That is, a rule not subject to inter-subjective correction cannot be differentiated from an impression of a rule, if it is not at least *logically correctable* by a supposed linguistic community. This seems to me to be the crucial assumption with which the private language argument is supported: the assumption that the logical possibility of inter-subjective correction is a necessary condition for rules to be accepted as such. Indeed, this is an assumption that is at least implicit in Wittgenstein's remarks on private language. After all, this assumption was accepted by many other important philosophers of early analytical philosophy, among

them Frege (1892: 30), A.J. Ayer (1972: 196), and P.F. Strawson (1959: 97). And it has an undeniable verifiability ground: it is meaningless to speak of correcting the re-identification of a phenomenal mental state, because it is not logically subject to inter-subjective checking.

To justify this point, suppose that person A relates the sign 'pain' to the mental state of phenomenal order *x*. Suppose that person B somehow has his nervous system connected to that of person A, having access to the sensation of pain that occurs in the brain of A. Now, even if this happens, what is experienced by B is *not the same x* experienced by A, but instead a *phenomenal state y* that occurs in the brain of B. We cannot answer the question "*Is x = y*?" in the sense *of x* being qualitatively identical to *y*, because B can never know if A really referred to an x that is the same as *y*. Generalizing: if we could somehow enter another person's mind, the mental states we would experience would be *our own mental states about the mental states of the other person, and not their own states*. Therefore, it is logically impossible for one person to have the same mental states as another person. To paraphrase Wittgenstein: "If God himself penetrated our minds, he could not know what we are talking about" (PI, part II: 558).

Now, if this conclusion, which we can call the *principle of logical non-shareability of phenomenal states*, or PLNS, for short, is correct, it seems that the private language argument is supported, because our phenomenal language will be based on rules that for logical reasons can never be inter-subjectively checked. With this it seems that we have reached the cornerstone supporting the whole private language argument. If we can disassemble it, it'll be easy to take it down.

Let us now move on to the critical problematization of the argument. The basic problem is that closer examination shows PLNS is most likely false.

We can start by making an analogy with automatons. Suppose A and B are automatons like Grey Walter's *machina expeculatrix*, which feed on light, gaining experience of where it could be found. Let's say that automaton A can infer certain internal states dependent on automaton B's program, based on "observation" of the latter's behavior. Suppose A can later be connected to B's processor, checking this inference by reading B's program. Now, it is perfectly indifferent if this checking is done based on a reproduction of the functional states of automaton B in A's hardware, or, even easier to conceive, if this checking is done by A reading it *directly* on the hardware of automaton B. If it is so with automatons, why cannot it also be so among humans? Let's say, in a parallel example, that we could somehow have access to phenomenal mental states experienced by someone else. Now, there is simply no reason to think that when a person A* has the experience of the phenomenal internal state *x* of a person B*, she necessarily needs to experience an *internal state y* that is nothing more than perhaps A*'s subjective copy of B's mental state *x*. Why can't it be the case that persons A* and B* both share the same experiential content *x,* although interpreted by different subjects of experience, just as could presumably happen with automatons?

Against this possibility, an advocate of the private language argument may answer that the mental states we have do not seem introspectively separable from our own consciousness of having them. However, the thesis of the inseparability between the subject of experiential consciousness and the experienced phenomenal state may also be questioned. This happens to the extent that I can say that felt pain is one thing, but the Self that feels the pain is something else. It seems possible to make the following logical distinction:

1. phenomenal state, experiential content (sensation, emotion, qualia);
2. the self, the subject of experiential consciousness to which the experiential content is given (the conscious owner of those contents).

As such, the self, the subject of experiential consciousness to whom the experience is given is obviously non-shareable; but this does not mean that the phenomenal state that is conscious is so dependent on this subject that in principle it cannot be shared. If a logical distinction between phenomenal states (a) and their subjects (b) is possible, then empirical separation is at least logically possible, and with it also the sharing of phenomenal states.

We can add some psychological and even neuro-physiological considerations that suggest the sustainability of the distinction and its consequence.

Let's start with psychological considerations. We know that it is possible to be mistaken about sensations and feelings. A person can, when hypnotized, have a sense of pleasure, when he should be feeling pain; someone may think he hates a certain woman, when he actually loves her [...] Sensations and emotions are in these cases erroneously identified, suggesting that sensations and emotions are real phenomenal states that do not need to be considered as belonging to the subject of experiential consciousness as such, because if so he would not need to correct his judgment, and his recognition would be infallible.

But what about phenomenal content, as it is considered by the subject of experiential consciousness himself at the very moment when it is experienced? The answer is that this content may either prove to be different from that which appears to the subject of the experience, being therefore separable from the latter, or it can in no way prove incorrect, although in this case it is the result of a kind of stipulation. An example that demonstrates the first case is as follows. A person does not say, "I felt a toothache which was actually just the friction of the dentist's drill"; she says, "I *thought* I felt pain, but now, remembering the feeling, I realize it was really a feeling of friction". An example that demonstrates the second case is this: "I thought I felt pain, but now I realize that it was really a feeling of friction; however, as what I want to emphasize is what I reported or thought I felt at that moment, I allow myself to say that it could be called pain [...]" Here consciousness is infallible and logically inseparable from its phenomenal content, but at the price of an arbitrary decision.

These observations about the logical separability between experiential contents and subjects of experience seem to be vindicated by reflexive theories of consciousness such as those of D.M. Armstrong (1981) and D. M. Rosenthal (2005). According to these theories, to be aware of a mental state *x* is to have a second-order cognition of the mental state *x* itself, a cognition that itself remains outside the field of consciousness, unless it is subjected to a third-order cognition, and so on. If this idea is correct, then it is perfectly possible to share the mental state *x* without sharing the higher-order cognition that *x* is being experienced. Assuming that higher-order cognitions more properly belong to the subject of conscious experience than the mental states they represent, the consequence may also be that these latter states do not need to be logically private.

I also want to make a rudimentary neuro-physiological thought experience in favor of the logical shareability of phe-

nomenal states, taking the case of emotions as an example. It is well-known that although emotions are interpreted at the cortical level, their originating *locus* belongs to the limbic system. Thus, if persons A and B could somehow share the same emotion-producing *locus* (don't tell me how), it seems that they could share the same emotions while performing numerically different cortical interpretations.

In summary: if the phenomenal state and the subject of conscious experience are logically separable, as suggested by the few conceptual, psychological, and neuro-physiological considerations made so far, then the rules of phenomenal language are logically checkable in an interpersonal way, and the PLNS is false. Therefore, it does not seem plausible that phenomenalist language is logically private.

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Wittgenstein über Farben. Untersuchung von Goethes Einflüssen

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Abstract

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe wird von manchen Autor:innen als Vorbild für Ludwig Wittgensteins Manuskriptedition *Bemerkungen über Farben* gehandelt, da diese in ihrer Entstehungsgeschichte auf Goethe zurückzuführen seien. Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es nun ausgewählte Themenkomplexe durch Wittgensteins Farbbemerkungen hindurch zusammenzutragen und diese in Bezug zu Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, sowie anderen Denkern (Runge, Lichtenberg) zu setzen. Es soll demnach untersucht werden, ob Einflüsse Goethes in Wittgenstein methodologisch oder auch inhaltlich zu finden sind. Genauer betrachtet werden dazu die Farben Weiß, mit der Besonderheit des transparenten Weiß und Grün mit dem Sonderfall des rötlich Grünen. Herausgestellt werden kann, dass Goethes Einfluss auf Wittgenstein nicht überbewertet werden sollte und kaum über die Rolle eines Impulsgebers hinaus reicht. Wittgenstein stellt nicht wie Goethe eine Farbenlehre oder Theorie der Farben auf, sondern spricht sich klar für eine Grammatik der Farben aus.

1. Kurzinformationen zu „Bemerkungen über Farben"

Bemerkungen über Farben finden sich breit verteilt im gesamten Nachlass von Wittgenstein. In seinen postum veröffentlichten Manuskripten, editiert als *Bemerkungen über Farben* zeigt sich seine Auseinandersetzung mit diesem Themenkomplex in kompakter Form. Die Edition ist in drei Sektionen gegliedert, wobei die Erste aus 88 Bemerkungen besteht und entstehungsgeschichtlich fast ein Jahr nach der Niederschrift des umfassenden dritten Teils mit 350 Bemerkungen entstand. Den zweiten Teil von *Bemerkungen über Farben* bildet die Sektion aus 20 Bemerkungen, die in Wien 1950 verfasst wurden. Zu dieser Zeit besuchte Wittgenstein seine Familie und befasste sich dort im Januar desselben Jahres mit Johann Wolfgang von Goethes Buch *Zur Farbenlehre* (1810) (vgl. Lee 1999: 216f.). Mit der Zuwendung zu Goethe „he [Wittgenstein] may have been hoping to find of the original expression some ideas about colour that he had long been using to his own ends". (Lee 1999: 222)

In den folgenden Unterpunkten wird untersucht, was Wittgenstein beim Lesen von Goethe und anderen Gelehrten gefunden hat und wie er dies in seinen eigenen Schriften über Farben verarbeitete.

2. Weiß

„Weiß" nimmt unter den zu untersuchenden Farben bei Wittgenstein eine Sonderposition ein. Ihre problematische Natur bildet Ausgangspunkt für mehrere Bemerkungen, in denen auch auf Goethe namentlich Bezug genommen wird. Die erste Bemerkung der dritten Sektion bildet die mit einem Fragezeichen eingeleitete Aussage, dass Weiß in einem Bild stets die hellste Farbe sei (vgl. BÜF: III 1). Die Untersuchung dieser Ausgangsfrage führt direkt zu Goethe. Dieser wendet sich zunächst gegen Newtons physikalische Beobachtung, dass durch ein Prisma aufgespaltetes „weißes" Licht aus den Farben des Regenbogens zusammengesetzt ist. Goethe hebt hervor, das Weiß ist die hellste Farbe und kann daher nicht durch die Mischung anderer Farben entstehen (vgl. Vendler 1995: 379). Seiner Farbenlehre folgend ist sie die farbliche Vertretung für Licht und wird mit Tätigkeit in Verbindung gesetzt, während Schwarz gegenteilig mit Finsternis und Ruhe gleichgesetzt wird. Die anderen Farben sind dann zwischen diesen beiden Eckpunkten angesiedelt (vgl. Goethe 1981: 79f. und 87). In anderen Worten: Weiß ist für Goethe immer die hellste Farbe. Diese Betrachtungsweise gilt für Wittgenstein nur in bestimmten Fällen von „Weiß" (BÜF III: 132). So stimmt er Goethe zu, (i) wenn Weiß die hellste Farbe der Trikolore sein soll (BÜF: III 2) oder die Farbpalette nach der hellsten Farbe untersucht wird, (BÜF: I 2) aber nicht, (ii) wenn beispielsweise ein weißes Blatt Papier „seine Helligkeit vom blauen Himmel kriegt." (BÜF: I 2) Dann sei dieser als heller anzusehen als das Weiß oder auch wenn Schnee neben ein weißes Blatt gehalten wird und es dann eher grau erscheint (BÜF: I 5). Im ersten Fall handelt sich Wittgenstein zu Folge um „eine Art Farbmathematik": (BÜF: III 3) „It is a non-temporal proposition stating an internal relationship between the lightness of colours." (Horner 2000: 235) Der zweite Fall – indem er Goethe nicht zustimmt – betrifft eine zeitliche, kausale Aussage, welche die externe Beziehung in Bezug auf die Helligkeit von Körpern erklärt.

Direkt hinter der ersten namentlichen Erwähnung und der ersten Auseinandersetzung mit Goethe fällt der Name des Gelehrten Georg Christoph Lichtenbergs. Dieser setzte sich mit dem Begriff des „reinen" Weiß auseinander und fordert dessen genaue Erörterung. Wirklich reines Weiß existiert seiner Meinung nur „beym reinsten Sonnenlicht auf dem höchsten Punkt des Erdbodens", (Rothaupt 1996: 488) was dazu führt, dass kaum ein Mensch wirklich reines Weiß zu Gesicht bekommen hat. Auf diese Annahme verweist auch Wittgenstein und stellt die Frage an, ob wir dieses Wort dann falsch verwenden würden. Lichtenberg stellte diesbezüglich fest, dass wir, obwohl wir kein reines Weiß gesehen haben, wissen, was wir darunter verstehen. „Denn wir corrigieren unsere Empfindungen immer durch Schlüsse" (Rothaupt 1996: 488), die wir aber im Verlauf unseres Lebens kaum noch als solche wahrnehmen. Wittgenstein folgert aus dieser Annahme, dass Lichtenberg so aus „dem gewöhnlichen Gebrauch einen idealen konstruiert" (BÜF: I 3) hat, den man umgekehrt wiederum nutzen kann, um etwas über den tatsächlichen Gebrauch des Begriffes zu lernen (vgl. BÜF: I 4).

3. Transparenz

Obwohl das Grundproblem der Transparenz, insbesondere der Farbe Weiß, beim Lesen von Goethes Buch über Farben entsteht, ist es nicht auf ihn zurückzuführen: „Runge (in dem Brief, den Goethe in der Farbenlehre abdruckt) sagt, es gebe durchsichtige und undurchsichtige Farben. Weiß sei eine undurchsichtige Farbe." (BÜF: I 17) Dieser Behauptung des Malers Philipp Otto Runge geht Wittgenstein auf den Grund und schließt in den folgenden Bemerkungen Sprachspiele und Gedankenexperimente an, die zu beantworten suchen warum „etwas Durchsichtiges grün, aber nicht weiß sein kann" (BÜF: I 19) So wird gefordert sich einen roten durchsichtigen Körper vorzustellen und das Rot einfach durch Weiß zu ersetzen. Als

Quintessenz daraus verschwindet der Eindruck der Durchsichtigkeit (vgl. BÜF: III 24). Ein weiteres Beispiel hierzu ist die Tatsache, dass Dinge, die hinter einem transparenten Körper liegen, in dessen Farbe getaucht werden und dadurch verdunkeln. Würde ein transparent-weißer Körper ebenfalls verdunkeln, wäre weißes Glas eigentlich dunkles Glas (vgl. BÜF: III 192).

Zudem stellt Wittgenstein fest, dass es Schwierigkeiten mit sich bringt, wäre man angewiesen von einem durchsichtigen grünen Körper einen undurchsichtigen Körper der gleichen Farbe auszuwählen. Man würde das vorgegebene Muster eintrüben oder die Farbe als grünlicher annehmen (vgl. BÜF: I 24). Daraus lässt sich schließen, dass es doch Unterschiede gibt zwischen durchsichtigen und undurchsichtigen Farbkörpern, obwohl wir beide mit dem Begriff „grün" beschreiben. Diese Feststellung, bezogen auf das Problem des transparenten Weißes, heißt, dass wir durch Sehen eines undurchsichtigen Weißes nicht sicher auf das Aussehen und die Eigenschaften eines undurchsichtigen Körpers dieser Farbe schließen können. Es gibt demnach für Wittgenstein nicht durchsichtige und undurchsichtige Farben – die Farbwörter werden für beides gleichermaßen verwendet und im Falle von Weiß nur für den einen „Zustand". (Homer 2000: 225) Im Gegensatz zu Runge hält Wittgenstein zudem fest, dass die Durchsichtigkeit, beziehungsweise Undurchsichtigkeit, keine Eigenschaften der Farben sei, (BÜF: I 45) sondern eher, dass die Undurchsichtigkeit „‚internal' to the concept of white" (Lee 1999: 232) sei.

In der 21. Bemerkung zitiert Wittgenstein Runge mit drei Sätzen. Der letzte davon lautet: „Weißes Wasser wird man sich nicht denken können, was rein ist; so wenig wie klare Milch." (BÜF: I 21) Hier spricht Runge bereits aus, worin das Ursprungsproblem des transparenten Weißes liegt: man kann es sich nicht denken; in anderen Worten: man könnte es nicht beschreiben, weil man nicht weiß, was man sich vorstellen soll. (BÜF: I 23 und I 27) Die Unmöglichkeit eines transparenten Weißes liegt demnach in der *Grammatik* der Farbe – „the particular logic of this colour." (Horner 2000: 238)

4. Grün und rötlich Grün

Grün ist für Goethe eine Mischfarbe, ebenso wie Violett und Orange. Wittgenstein hingegen widmet sich bereits in der sechsten Bemerkung des ersten Teils der Farbe Grün und ihrer Position als primäre Farbe. Über Sprachspiele der Zuordnung und Mischung von Farbmustern wird in diese Problematik eingeführt (vgl. BÜF: I 6f.). Für ihn ist Grün eine Primärfarbe. Auf die Frage warum nennt Wittgenstein zunächst die Erfahrung und die Gewohnheit beim Anblick des Farbkreises, (BÜF: III 26) leitet dann jedoch über zur sprachlichen Logik der Ausdrücke, die Grün als Mischfarbe mit sich führt, „dann muß man z. B. auch sagen können, was ein leicht bläuliches Gelb heißt oder ein nur etwas gelbliches Blau. Und diese Ausdrücke sagen mir gar nichts." (BÜF: III 27) Grün kann ihm zu Folge daher nicht auf dieselbe Art und Weise gesehen werden wie Orange, als rötliches Gelb oder Violett, als bläuliches Rot. In anderen Worten: Grün kann man nicht mit dem Ausdruck „bläulichem Gelb" (Lee 1999: 226) gleichsetzen. Anzumerken sei zu dem Themenkomplex des Grüns abschließend die namentliche Erwähnung von Runge. Der Maler geht, ebenso wie Goethe, von drei Grundfarben aus. Wittgenstein schreibt ihm jedoch zu, dieses Auffassung vielleicht fallen zu lassen, hätte man ihn auf den Unterschied von Grün und Orange aufmerksam gemacht (vgl. BÜF: III 113). Goethe wird in diesem Zusammenhang nicht erwähnt.

Wittgenstein schließt der Untersuchung des Grüns die Frage nach der möglichen Existenz eines rötlich Grünen an. Moritz Schlick, der um diese Zeit eng mit Wittgenstein in Kontakt stand, schrieb 1930, dass Rot und Grün nicht kompatibel seien, da er noch nie ihr gemeinsames Auftreten beobachtet hätte (vgl. Mras 2014: 47). Eben dies widerlegt die Alltagserfahrung im Herbst mit der Betrachtung eines Blattes, das sowohl Grün als auch Rot ist. Ein solches könnte als rötliches Grün beschrieben werden. Warum beschreibt man diese Mischung aus den beiden Komplementärfarben jedoch nicht so? Das Auftreten von Rot und Grün am selben Ort ist in dem System von Sprache, welches wir für Farben benutzen, unmöglich: „Our use of those colour expressions blocks us from asserting certain sentences." (Hrachovec 2014: 83) Das Sprachspiel der Farben, welches wir erlernt haben, beinhaltet keine Werkzeuge um die Formulierung „rötlich-Grün" zu benutzen – wir besitzen keinen Begriff eines „rötlich-Grünen". In Wittgensteins Worten: das Lehren einer solchen Praxis ist nicht möglich (vgl. BÜF: III 122). Ein Bezug zum Maler Runge wird auch bei diesem Thema deutlich. Wittgenstein zitiert, wie dieser bereits schrieb, dass beim Vorstellen eines rötlich Grünen, „einem zu Muthe [wird] wie bei einem südwestlichen Nordwinde." (BÜF: I 21) Das Ziel der Untersuchung eines rötlich Grünen ist es dabei die „Funktion unserer Farbsprache(n), die Logik unserer Farbbegriffe in ein neues, helles Licht [zu] rücken." (Rothaupt 1996: 499)

5. Farbenlehre oder Logik der Farbbegriffe?

> Wir wollen keine Theorie der Farben finden (weder eine physiologische noch eine psychologische), sondern die Logik der Farbbegriffe. Und diese leistet, was man sich oft mit Unrecht von einer Theorie erwartetet hat. (BÜF: I 22)

In dieser Notiz Wittgensteins in *Bemerkungen über Farben* wird sowohl seine Grundabsicht der Bemerkungen, als auch seine Haltung gegenüber der Farbtheorie Goethes deutlich auf den Punkt gebracht. Eine Logik der Farben trägt weder eine erklärende noch eine vorhersagende Kraft in sich, die für wissenschaftliche Theorien von Nöten sind. Was bleibt ist einzig und alleine die Beschreibung, wie wir Menschen die Begriffe der Farben verwenden. Philosophische Probleme, wie das der Farbbegriffe eines ist, reichen „bis an die Wurzeln hinab" (BÜF: I 15), wie Wittgenstein schreibt. Die Auseinandersetzung mit ihnen durchdringt jegliche Ebenen des Lebens, wobei man stets gefasst sein muss, „etwas ganz Neues zu lernen" (BÜF: I 15).

Goethe selbst beurteilt sein Werk als dankenswert aus den Augen einer Philosoph:in, schließlich habe er die Phänomene bis zu ihrem Ursprung verfolgt und die Ergebnisse dieser Untersuchung in eine übersichtliche Ordnung zusammengetragen (vgl. Goethe 1981: 81). Eben in diesem Vorhaben des Ordnens sehen manche Autor:innen eine methodologische Verbundenheit von Goethe und Wittgenstein. Letzterer habe sich in seiner Vorgehensweise an ersterem orientiert, indem er sich (i) an Phänomenen ausrichten würde; (ii) um eine übersichtliche Ordnung dieser bemüht sei; (iii) sich nicht erkläre; (iv) Theorien skeptisch gegenüberstehe; (v) seine Erkenntnisse in Verhaltenskontexte einbände (vgl. Rothaupt 1996: 165). Wittgenstein äußert sich deutlich zu allen fünf Punkten: (i) es gibt keine Disziplin Phänomenologie (ii) Beobachtungen der Verwendung unseres Sprachgebrauches in übersichtliche Art und Weise darstellen zu wollen ist tatsächlich Wittgensteins Anliegen, um so „clarity about the way we actually use colour-language" (McGinn 1991: 435) zu schaffen, dies jedoch allein auf Goethes Vorgehensweise zurückzuführen erscheint zu forsch. (iii) Die Behauptung, Wittgenstein und Goethe würden Erklärungen unterlassen ist nicht wirklich tragfähig. Goethe erklärt viele seiner Argumente und Ideen ausführlich und, wie oben oftmals zitiert, rechtfertigt er sogar sein Vorhaben gegenüber

einzelnen Berufsgruppen. Wittgenstein versucht die Beziehungen zwischen den Farben nicht zu erklären, sondern führt über Sprachspiele und Gedankenexperimente an seine Ideen heran. (iv) Die weitgefasste Formulierung dieser angeblichen Gemeinsamkeit der beiden Gelehrten erlaubt keine Zustimmung: Goethe stand der physikalischen Theorie der Farben von Newton skeptisch gegenüber und Wittgenstein sprach Goethes Farbenlehre ab, eine Theorie zu sein. Sie sei nicht zu Vorhersagen in der Lage und demnach „eher ein vages Denkschema" (BÜF: I 70). (v) Goethes Bezug auf das Verhalten von Menschen zeigt sich beispielsweise in seinen Ausführungen zum Charakter und Wirkungsweise einzelnen Farben, während Wittgenstein, allein durch sein philosophisches Grundziel, klar die Sprachspiele aufzuzeigen in denen wir die Farben der visuellen Welt beschreiben, dies nicht ohne Verhaltenskontexte tun können (vgl. McGinn 1991: 442; Stroud 2014: 110f.).

Die Probleme und Schwierigkeiten die Goethe mit seinem Vorhaben Wittgenstein zufolge hatte, hat jeder, wenn er über das Wesen der Farben nachdenkt. Es gibt nämlich nicht *„einen* Begriff der Farbengleichheit […], sondern deren mehrere, miteinander verwandte." (BÜF: III 251) Der Fehler liegt demnach darin, nur von einer möglichen Beschreibung der Farben und ihrer Begriffe als der Richtigen auszugehen. Unsere Veranlagung die Grammatik der normalen Sprache idealisieren zu wollen, wird durch die Untersuchung der Farbenbegriffe offengelegt (vgl. McGinn 1991: 446).

6. Fazit

Goethes Einflüsse auf Wittgenstein und die Prüfung, ob er zurecht als Vorbild für Wittgensteins Bemerkungen zu Farben gesehen werden kann, kommt zu folgendem Fazit: Es sind weniger die Unterschiede der beiden in den Themenkomplexen, als die Abwesenheit von Goethes Namen bei den wichtigen inhaltlichen Anstößen: beim reinen Weiß wirkte Lichtenberg als Inspirationsquelle, die Transparenzgedanken kamen von Runge, ebenso wie die Verwendung von rötlich Grün. Dies lässt vermuten, „that Wittgenstein was disappointed with Goethe's ideas as he found them in 1950" (Lee 1999: 224f.) Was Wittgenstein direkt über Goethes Werk schreibt, scheint dieser Vermutung in Teilen zuzustimmen: „It's partly boring and repelling, but in some ways also very instructive and philosophically interesting." (McGuinness 2012: 475)

Es lässt sich daher schließen, dass Goethe weniger als Vorbild, sondern als Impulsgeber zu betrachten ist. Wittgensteins Gedanken zum Thema der Farben und ihrer Begriffe haben sich recht schnell von ihrer Inspirationsquelle entfernt und sind eigene Wege gegangen.

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A Note on Consistency and Platonism

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Abstract

Is consistency the sort of thing that could provide a guide to mathematical ontology? If so, which notion of consistency suits this purpose? Mark Balaguer holds such a view in the context of platonism, the view that mathematical objects are non-causal, non-spatiotemporal, and non-mental. For the purposes of this paper, we will examine several notions of consistency with respect to how they can provide a platonist epistemology of mathematics. Only a Gödelian notion, we suggest, can provide a satisfactory guide to a platonist ontology.

Is consistency the sort of thing that could provide a guide to mathematical ontology? If so, *which* notion of consistency suits this purpose? Mark Balaguer holds such a view in the context of platonism, the view that mathematical objects are non-causal, non-spatiotemporal, and non-mental. Balaguer's version of Platonism, *Full-Blooded Platonism* (FBP), is the view that "there are as many abstract mathematical objects as there could be–i.e., there actually exist abstract mathematical objects of all possible kinds" (Balaguer 2017: 381). He continues:

> Since FBP says that there are abstract mathematical objects of all possible kinds, it follows that if FBP is true, then every purely mathematical theory that *could* be true–i.e., that is internally consistent–accurately describes some collection of actually existing abstract objects. Thus it follows from FBP that in order to acquire knowledge of abstract objects, all we have to do is come up with an internally consistent purely mathematical theory (and know that it is internally consistent). (Balaguer 2017: 381)

Balaguer, here, wants to avoid the problem of explaining access to non-spatio-temporal reality. In the current philosophical-mathematical literature, this is known as Benacerraf's Problem (Benacerraf 1973). His strategy is to recast the target of mathematical knowledge; instead of committing to the claim that mathematical knowledge is about this or that *particular* mathematical structure, Balaguer suggests that it is about portions of mathematical reality carved out by consistent theories. But even if consistency, understood in some suitable way, can provide a guide to mathematical ontology, the task still remains to articulate just *which* reading of the notion is to serve this function. In this paper we explore more traditional and more liberal ways of understanding *consistency,* with an eye toward whether or not they can provide a guide for a platonist ontology.

There are many ways to understand consistency, some more standard and others more liberal. For the purposes of this paper, we will examine the following, which include admittedly more liberal, understandings of the notion of consistency:

Semantic
Syntactic
Folk Intuitions
Expert Intuitions
Brouwerian Construction
Gödelian Perception

The first two are indeed our standard understandings of consistency. The second two have to do with the intuitions of reasoners. The last two instead have to do with the abilities of agents. Only the last, we suggest, can provide a satisfactory guide to a platonist ontology.

Let us begin with the first understanding of consistency. What is meant by *semantic consistency*? We use this in the usual sense as existence of a model. As has already been pointed out by Balaguer in *Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics,* knowledge of consistency then would thus amount to knowledge of a model, which is already an abstract object (Balaguer 1998: 70). For this reason, the notion of semantic consistency cannot ground the possibility of knowledge of abstract objects in general. What kind of guide for ontology does semantic consistency grant us? Through knowledge of consistency, we obtain a collection of non-specified objects. That is, we know nothing about these objects except that they form a model of the theory in question. So, we can only use the existent structure we have arrived at to guide us to other structures, e.g. from the existence of a model of arithmetic, we may argue for a model of arithmetic that eliminates non-standard numbers. This view, as we will see, has the problem of justifying access to mathematical objects. We will return to this in our discussion of Gödelian Perception.

What about *syntactic consistency*? By syntactic consistency we mean the absence of a derivation of a contradiction. But perhaps we can say more. There are at least two types of syntactic consistency. The first being *external consistency*, by which we mean the inability of a logical system to derive a sentence and its negation. The second, call it *internal consistency,* is the sort of consistency we would express with, say, a Gödelian proof predicate. When we understand *formal knowledge of F* as the ability to prove *F* in a formal system, we already know that *formal* knowledge of internal consistency with a Gödelian proof predicate is impossible, by the second incompleteness theorem (Gödel 1951: 308–310). Admittedly, this argument may rely too heavily on the assumption of the use of a *Gödelian* proof predicate, as opposed to a non-standard one. But even if we have good reasons to choose a particular proof predicate, it will be only a theoretical representation of consistency insofar as its connection to the represented concept is justified.

What about *external consistency*? External consistency has to do with the sorts of symbols that can be arrived at by manipulating axioms with certain rules. We can reason very generally that either the axioms of a formal system are taken to be true or not. This is just Gödel's distinction between hypothetico-deductive and proper mathematics (Gödel's 1951: 305). If axioms of proper mathematics, as opposed to algebraic-like axioms, are taken to be true, then it would seem question begging to infer existence of platonic objects from their consistency, provided the platonist accept that the correctness of axioms has to do with the mathematical ontology itself. If axioms are not taken to be true, then there is no reason to think

they would be relevant to mathematical ontology as opposed to physical ontology, or anything else. But how can syntactic consistency guide a platonist ontology? A platonist who thinks that an axiom is true already assumes it describes properties of mathematical structures, so the knowledge of syntactic consistency of a set of axioms provides nothing not already assumed in the truth of the axioms. On the other hand, a platonist that does not think axioms are true will have no reason to establish a connection of consistent sets of axioms with mathematical structures.

Perhaps we might think of consistency in a different way. Balaguer suggests the Full-Blooded Platonist might make use of an alternative notion, with "[t]he main idea here [being] that 'consistent' is simply a *primitive* term. More precisely, the claim is that in addition to the syntactic and semantic notions of consistency, there is also a primitive or intuitive notion of consistency that is not defined in any platonistic way" (Balaguer 1998: 70). Balaguer suggests the Kreisel-Field view of intuitive consistency, that "the intuitive notion is related to the two formal notions [semantic and syntactic consistency] in analogous was: neither of the formal notions provides us with a *definition* of the primitive notion, but they both provide us with information about the *extension* of the primitive notion" (Balaguer 1998: 70). Nonetheless, even if there is a privileged intuitive notion of consistency that relates somehow to formal consistency, we need to say something more about *which* notion of intuitive consistency we have in mind.

One suggestion might be that the intuitive notion of consistency is the folk notion of consistency. The thought here might be that humans already seem to have a decent understanding of consistency. If we show students a sentence that they are able to parse, the view might be, they can reliably tell whether or not it is consistent (Balaguer 1998: 72). But again, it is not obvious that the folk notion of consistency should tell us anything about mathematical ontology. Why should it, after all? Should folk ideas of decent chess moves accurately tell us something about what actually is a winning move in the game? By analogy, we should not expect that a folk idea of consistency of mathematical statements should provide a guide to mathematical ontology.

A next suggestion would be to appeal to an expert's notion of consistency. The thought would be that intuitive consistency of the sort of thing that experts have in mind could perhaps provide a guide to platonistic ontology. But it would seem we value the expert understanding of consistency *because* they have antecedent understanding of the relevant objects, as opposed to a privileged access to consistency simpliciter. After all, to become a mathematical expert it is not sufficient to just acquire this special understanding *of consistency*. Instead, one must cultivate a special understanding *of mathematical objects*. It thus seems that what is doing the philosophical work here is the expert understanding *of mathematical objects*, as opposed to that *of consistency*. But then, we must ask: just what *is* this expert understanding of mathematical objects?

There is a Brouwerian notion of construction that is worth examining. Thinking of consistency more liberally, we see that this can be thought of as the intuitionistic correlate of consistency. And this, as we will see, was exactly the view of Brouwer. In his dissertation *On the Foundations of Mathematics* of 1907, L.E.J. Brouwer writes a reply to his interlocutor, the logician, who wants to emphasize the role of logical laws:

> The words of your mathematical demonstration merely accompany a mathematical construction that is affected without words. At the point where you announce the contradiction, I simply perceive that the construction no longer goes, that the required structure cannot be embedded in the given basic structure. And when I make this observation, I do not think of a principium contradictionis. (Brouwer 1975 [1907]: 73)

The thought here is that the primary phenomenon is that of construction; what can and cannot be arrived at in this way by an agent. Formal consistency and contradiction are just what the logician would tie to the possibility for a construction to proceed or be forced to stop. While the Brouwerian thought is fruitful, that (real) consistency is *constructability*, it is not in the context of platonism in the philosophy of mathematics. Constructed objects, from the platonist perspective, are but a particular non-exhaustible kind within the platonist ontology. More importantly, their construction is not thought of as their existence criteria even if a given platonist ends up concluding that every object is in fact constructable.

There is lastly a Gödelian notion of consistency, in the liberal sense that we have been making use of. It is like Brouwerian construction in that it has to do with the workings of the mind. It is unlike the Brouwerian notion in that it is the sort of thing suited for "concepts form[ing] an objective reality of their own, which we cannot create or change, but only perceive and describe" (Gödel 1951: 320). Kurt Gödel writes:

> [By platonism] I mean the view that mathematics describes a non-sensual reality, which exists independently both of the acts and [of] the dispositions of the human mind and is only perceived, and probably perceived very incompletely, by the human mind. (Gödel 1951: 323)

He has in mind the sort of platonism that we have been discussing, as a second world of non-sensual objects. He suggests that there is some faculty of the human mind that perceives this second world, albeit fallibly. He includes a quote of Charles Hermite (translated by Solomon Feferman and Marguerite Frank):

> There exists, unless I am mistaken, an entire world consisting of the totality of mathematical truths, which is accessible to us only through our intelligence, just as there exists the world of physical realities; each one is independent of us, both of them divinely created. (Gödel 1951: 323)

The passage of Hermite that Gödel invokes emphasizes the sort of intellectual perception mentioned earlier. Gödel articulates his view of mathematical perception or intuition further in "Is mathematics syntax of language? V" as follows:

> The similarity between mathematical intuition and a physical sense is very striking. It is arbitrary to consider "This is red" an immediate datum, but not so to consider the proposition expressing modus ponens or complete induction (or perhaps some simpler propositions from which the latter follows). For the difference, as far as it is relevant here, consists solely in the fact that in the first case a relationship between a concept and a particular object is perceived, while in the second case it is a relationship between concepts. (Gödel 1953/9: 359)

While obviously this is not *consistency* in the formal sense, it is closer to something like the informal understanding of consistency invoked by Balaguer. Such a view seems to have the advantages of the Brouwerian sort of consistency we put forth earlier, while being amenable to platonism. The thought is

that if an object is perceived in Gödel's sense, *then* we have justification for inferring the existence of a platonic object.

A natural objection to the Gödelian view is that it is epistemologically unattractive. It posits that humans have a faculty that somehow connects them to abstract objects. In the context of a Gödel-style response to Benacerraf's epistemological argument, Balaguer writes:

> [If one pursues this strategy,] then the claim will presumably be that humans are capable of somehow "leaving" the physical, spatiotemporal world and "accessing" the platonic realm and gathering information about what abstract objects are like. Most people who work in this area would say that this view is pretty implausible. Indeed, if you endorse a naturalistic, scientific view of the world (and of human beings), then the view probably seems extremely implausible. (Balaguer 2016: 723)

One might even think, as Balaguer argues, that *even if* we posit non-physical parts of human beings, we still ought to be cautious in positing a Gödel-style link between humans and abstract objects (Balaguer 2016: 723).

If the question about whether or not we want to take mathematical objects to be non-spatiotemporal, non-causal, and non-mental is open, then perhaps the need to posit a Gödelian epistemology provides cause for finding platonism unattractive. After all, if the only way we could reach abstract objects is with the above sort of epistemology, then perhaps we should just not posit these objects in the first place. To avoid reaching outside physical reality, Balaguer suggests an inert kind of platonism, where all that is possible indeed exists and every consistent mathematical theory is true of some portion of this inaccessible reality. In fact, this platonism has no explanatory advantage since all we can know about those structures is what is already given by their formal theories. He allows us to "save" platonism at the expense of platonism having any meaningful explanatory power.

While in the above context the counterintuitiveness of Gödelian epistemology works as a consideration against platonism, things are of course different if we antecedently assume that platonism is true and the world may be richer than can be described with a formal theory. If we begin from the belief in the existence of non-spatiotemporal, non-causal, and non-mental mathematical objects, it is not obvious that it is so implausible to posit a connection between those objects and reason. From the belief that this just is the sort of thing that mathematical objects are, we *should ask* what serves as a guide for our ontology. Here the Gödelian view seems much more attractive; if we are to posit abstract objects in the first place, what better way to access them than through a corresponding faculty of Gödelian perception?

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Socrates' Dream, *Logos*, and Elements in *Theaetetus*

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Abstract

In *Theaetetus*, Plato discusses the theory of Socrates' dream, in which knowledge is defined as true judgement with an account (logos) and elements are claimed to be both unaccountable and unknowable. Fine (1979) in "Knowledge and Logos in the *Theaetetus*" introduces two ways in which the meaning of logos can be understood, namely, the logosS and the logosK interpretations. According to Fine, something is knowable in the sense of logosS if there is a true statement of it and is knowable in the sense of logosK if it is analyzable completely into its constituting parts. This paper compares these two understandings of logos and argues that if we take a Tractarian view of the relationship between complexes and elements, then the ideas of logosS and logosK could be combined and give a more coherent interpretation of the theory in Socrates' dream. It will also be argued that in this model, the alphabetic letters should not be taken as genuine primary elements.

1. Introduction

The central subject being discussed in Plato's *Theaetetus* is the definition of knowledge. Throughout this dialogue, Socrates keeps playing his classical role of a "midwife", namely, someone who assists, typically in a dialectical manner, the promising minds of the youth in going through the pain and labor of philosophical deliberation in order to deliver their intellectual offspring. He urges the young Theaetetus, a clever student of Theodorus, to answer the question "What do you think knowledge is?" (Tht. 146c3). After his first three attempts to define knowledge as the collection of various subjects such as "geometry" or "the crafts such as cobbling" (146c9–10), as "simply perception" (151e3), and as "true judgement" (187c6–8) have all been criticized and rejected, Theaetetus then turns to the next proposal. He suggests that knowledge is "true judgement with an account (*logos*)" and that "true judgement without an account falls outside of knowledge" (201d1–2).

Those few paragraphs outline two critical features of the proposed theory: (1) a true judgment is knowledge if and only if it is accompanied by an account, and (2) a thing is knowable if and only if there is an account of it. But details of this epistemological thesis remain obscure, because Theaetetus fails to tell us what the word "account" means. In the Greek text, the word translated into "account" is "*logos*", of which the meaning may vary dramatically from "discourse" or "statement" to "definition" or "explanation", or even to "tally" or "list" with a financial connotation (Burnyeat 1990: 134). On the other hand, what remains equally unclear is the meaning of "thing". From the dim story told by Theaetetus, we do not know if the things to be known are objects (either physical or abstract), propositions, or states of affairs of the world.

Theaetetus confesses to Socrates that this theory is what he "once heard" from a man but "had forgotten" (201c9–10). Actually, his recollection is almost as fuzzy and remote as what we usually recall of a dream after waking up from it. To clear up the important details, Socrates tells a refined version of the theory, which he claims to have learnt from people in his own dream, and Theaetetus then confirms it immediately as telling the same story as his dream "in every respect" (202c6). Burnyeat (1970: 105) suggests that the image of dream in Plato's narration here is probably used to indicate the epistemic uncertainty of the proposal to be discussed. This observation is partly confirmed by Socrates' later rejection of this theory as the conversation goes. But that verdict can only be fairly evaluated after details of the proposed theory are carefully examined.

2. Socrates' dream

The question Socrates asks, to which Theaetetus fails to give an answer, is "how did he distinguish these knowables and unknowables?" (201d6–7). In Socrates' dream, such an answer is provided by drawing a metaphysical demarcation between **elements** and **complexes**. He starts by saying "the primary elements, as it were, of which we and everything else are composed, have no account" (201e1–3). On the other hand, he also says that "with the things composed of these, it is another matter. Here, just in the same way as the elements themselves are woven together, so their names may be woven together and become an account of something" (202b2–5). In sum, "the elements are uncountable and unknowable, but they are perceivable, whereas the complexes are both knowable and expressible and can be the objects of true judgement" (202b6–9). In this case, an "account" of a complex, according to Socrates, is "a complex of names" (202b6), and the idea of knowability is then reduced to a kind of analyzability in the sense that something is knowable if and only if it can be analyzed into its components. In other words, there is clearly an epistemic asymmetry between elements and complexes.

It is interesting to consider the extent to which we should take Socrates' words as literal. For example, when Socrates asserts that "the elements are unaccountable and unknowable, but they are perceivable" (202b6–7), does it suggest that all elements must be perceivable? If the answer is yes, then in what sense are they perceivable? It is correctly observed by Burnyeat (1970, 1990) that their perceivability should not be taken as a criterion for distinguishing the unknowables from knowables, as there is no way to suppose that the knowables (which are complexes like "we and everything else" being composed by the elements) are unperceivable. Then why does Socrates emphasize that the elements are perceivable?

Burnyeat's explanation of Socrates' emphasis focuses on the motivation behind the logic of narration. In saying that those elements are perceivable, Socrates is no longer numerating the differences between complexes and elements, but only trying to mitigate the potential worry from his audiences that "if elements are unknowable, we have no epistemic access to them at all" (Burnyeat 1990: 174). In this case, though an element cannot be known by itself, it nevertheless can be perceived "along with the complex it helps to compose" (Burnyeat

1970: 121). On the other hand, Sedley (2004: 158) reads these words in Socrates' story more literally and uses the claimed perceivability of elements as clear evidence for a materialistic interpretation. He argues that the elements should be understood as the material (instead of conceptual) components of the world, and then concludes that the theory presented here is a characterization of Presocratic reductionist theory of physics and its implication on epistemology.

3. Two interpretations of logos

In a later part of the dialogue, Socrates outlines three possible meanings of account (*logos*) that might be understood in Theaetetus' attempt at defining knowledge as true judgment with an account, though by the end all the three will be shown as unsatisfactory in providing a tenable definition of knowing. The three meanings are (1) "a kind of vocal image of thought"; (2) "the way to the whole through the elements"; and (3) "being able to tell some mark by which the object you are asked about differs from all other things" (208c5–10). But what concern us in Socrates' dream here are the first two options. The concept of *logos* can either be understood as declarative statements, or in the sense of defining something through listing its components. This ambiguity can be clarified better in a pair of modern terminologies defined by Fine as *logos*S and *logos*K. She differentiates between the two by suggesting that something is knowable in the sense of *logos*S if there is a true statement of it and is knowable in the sense of *logos*K if it is analyzable completely into its constituting parts (Fine 1979: 371).

Fine herself argues for the *logos*K-interpretation of Socrates' dream. This position is also advocated by Sedley who claims, without hesitation, that the usage of *logos* in this context is "to indicate an account which analyses a thing by listing its elements" (Sedley 2004: 153). Indeed, this interpretation is advantageous in explaining the epistemic asymmetry in Socrates' dream. Given that the complexes are composed of elements, they are knowable in the sense of *logos*K through listing their constituting parts. Meanwhile, the elements are unknowable simply because they are the endpoints of such analyses and cannot be further broken down into smaller units. For example, when Socrates asks Theaetetus to give an account of the letter S, the reply is "How *can* anyone give the letters of a letter? S is just one of the voiceless letters, Socrates, a mere sound like a hissing of the tongue" (203b3–5). It is in this sense that the alphabetic letters and especially their sounds should be considered elements, for they have no constituting parts and thus cannot go through further analyses.

However, a problem of this view lies in Socrates' later refutation of the theory, which is based on a constructive dilemma between (a) the complexes are merely their constituting parts, and (b) a complex is not just its constituting elements but a "single form produced by their combination" (203c6). If *logos*K exhausts the meaning of *logos*, then Socrates' rejection of the first branch of this dilemma becomes trivial. For, in that case, the claim "If a man knows the syllable, he must know both the letters" (203c9–10) would simply be false. Each process of analysis must stop somewhere, so there must be unanalyzable elements at the end of it. What is failed to be explained by the *logos*K-interpretation alone is that knowing the whole does not necessarily require knowing all its individual parts. For example, as Ryle suggests, "what is known or believed or told is what is conveyed by a sentence and not what is severally conveyed by its several words" (Ryle 1990: 31).

It might be tempting to think that Socrates' description of "an account being essentially a complex of names" (202b) is decisive in choosing between the *logos*K and *logos*S interpretations. However, that expression is just as ambiguous as the term logos. In ordinary language, the phrase "complex of names" may sound like compound nouns such as "bus stop" and "milk tea". Thus, it matches the "list" or "tally" connotation of *logos*K. On the other hand, however, we can also find a plausible explanation for this phrase that aligns with the *logos*S-interpretation with the help of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. In Socrates' dream, the account of a complex is formed by weaving together the names of elements "in the same way as the elements themselves are woven together" (202b3–4). This idea is clearly echoed by the Tractarian mirror structure between language and the world. In the Tractarian view, elementary propositions are "concatenation of names" (TLP 1972: 4.22), names refer to objects (TLP 1972: 3.203), and "configuration of objects in a situation corresponds to the configuration of simple signs in the propositional sign" (TLP 1972: 3.21). Accordingly, *logos*, which is defined as "a complex of names", can well be interpreted as a declarative statement.

4. Letters and elements

In Socrates' dream, letters and syllables are used as "original models" (202e4) to indicate the relationship between elements and complexes. But if we take the *logos*S-interpretation, then there emerges a difficulty in explaining the unknowability of letters. In that case, the claim that an element is unaccountable is equivalent to the claim that there is no true statement of it. Yet it would be quite absurd to suggest that no true statement of a letter can be made. For example, what is wrong with Theaetetus' statement "S is just one of the voiceless letters" (203b3–4)? Isn't it just a statement of the letter S?

One possible response, as elaborated by Burnyeat (1990: 156), is to distinguish between statements of something and statements about something. For example, the sentence "my cat is on the mat" is a statement about my cat but not a statement of it; what it is of is the state of affairs that my cat being on the mat. Thus, we do not have statements of the primary elements, though we still can have statements about them. This idea is also suggested in *Tractatus* as "objects can only be *named*. Signs are their representatives. I can only speak *about* them: I cannot *put them into words*. Propositions can only say *how* things are, not *what* they are" (TLP 1972: 3.221). In this sense, "S is one of the voiceless letters" is a statement about the letter S, but cannot be a statement of it, because it does not say what the letter S is.

But even if this theory works for the primary elements in general, it is still difficult to see how it applies to letters. What is the difference between "S is one of the voiceless letters" and "Socrates is one of the philosophers"? For Socrates clearly suggests that "we" (201e2) are composed of elements and thus are complex. If we cannot have a statement of the letter S, then it seems also implausible for us to have such a statement of Socrates. The difference between them is apparent in the *logos*K but not in the *logos*S interpretation.

Perhaps a plausible response is that letters are not genuine primary elements in *Theaetetus* just like they are not genuine Tractarian simple objects. In *Tractatus*, the objects are supposed to be "what is unalterable and subsistent" (TLP 1972: 2.0271), and this description clearly does not apply to either the written letters or their sounds. The single letters, I believe, are only used by Wittgenstein to indicate names in their standing in elementary propositions (TLP 1972: 4.24). In the same way, an alphabetic letter in Socrates' dream serves as a primary element only in its relation to the syllable containing it. The

analysis of a syllable stops at finding the letters of it, yet the letters may still be able to go through other analyses (for example, reducing its sound to the physical vibrations in the air).

5. Conclusion

The meaning of *logos* is obstruse and each of the *logos*K and *logos*S interpretations can only capture part of its essence. But by adopting a Tractarian view of elements, we can combine these two interpretations and take *logos* of a complex to be a concatenation of names, which is also a declarative statement. Though this may not be exactly what Plato had in mind, it nevertheless interprets the theory of Socrates' dream in a more coherent way.

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The Similarity Between Plato's And Wittgenstein's Notion Of The Absolute, Which Is Attained Through The Commonplace

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Abstract

Referring to the pursuit of intelligible values through the commonplace is a possibility in Plato and Wittgenstein. The main difference in viewpoint is that for Wittgenstein what really is cannot be indistinguishable from its meaning. This relationship between meaning and reality is no longer necessary, as it is for Plato. But the same relationship does not presuppose, for Wittgenstein, that what really is depends for its meaning on human mind. The true objects of knowledge will always remain outside our conceptual range. However, it is in the context of our social contacts, Wittgenstein avers, that language does provide a unifying factor beyond the diversity of views concerning what cannot be said about the unknown. Hence, our knowledge of what really exists in the realm of the intelligible has a vital relevance to our dealings with the everyday world, according to Plato.

1. Tools and Trends

We shall never access the real essences of things because we lack the exactness of criteria to succeed in so doing. This is true for Wittgenstein (Child 2001: 107–108). However, any causal similarities between things and our classificatory practices of enquiry, must provide standards of correctness (however inexact these may be) for this enquiry. This view of the ideal of truth can be expanded further: Whatever happens has to be understood in secular terms (VB 1980: 29). This does not contradict either Plato's objective treatment of the ideal or with Wittgenstein's (Child 2007: 252–272).

2. Differences and Common Background

Words can be taken as deeds (Blackburn 2001: 51). A proposition thus, according to Wittgenstein (Blackburn 2007: 134), is either true or false. This means that it must be possible to decide for or against it. However, this does not say what the grounds for such a decision are. That is why, Child states, in Wittgenstein's view there is no single standard of what a proposition means. I.e., there is no clear, non-arbitrary division between a sentence's meaning and other aspects of its use; between its literal meaning and the purpose of uttering it. Child (2011: 101) holds that Wittgenstein considers the literal meaning to be a philosopher's myth; hence Wittgenstein's non-realistic (Giouli 2019b) account of the world, to which Plato opposes. In Plato, laws and meaning of the world are given ab extra (Giouli 2012: 34–47), whereas in Wittgenstein (TLP 1961: 6.432; PI 1953: II, xi, 217), "*How* things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world […] If God had looked into our minds, he would not have been able to see there what we are speaking about".

Plato in *The Republic*, Z, 517 b-e, credits the advance of the mind from ignorance and illusion to pure philosophy with the difficulties that accompany this itinerary: "*The truth of the matter is, after all, known only to god* […] For what it is worth, the final thing to perceive in the intelligible region, and perceive only with difficulty, is the form of the Good; once seen, *it is inferred to be responsible for whatever is right and valuable in anything, producing in the visible region light and the source of the light, and being in the intelligible region itself the controlling source of truth and intelligence*". Laying claim, however, to the ultimate Form of the Good is by abstractions and similes.

Wittgenstein's resistance to adopting Plato's so-called dogmatism (Giouli 2019a) concerning the search for Truth can be easily seen (Blackburn 2006: 160–161, 136). Does this show that realism is reduced to a form of solipsism in the way Wittgenstein understands it? (Blackburn 2014: 21–22) Here, an emphasis (Child 2007) on Wittgenstein's essentially objective treatment of the order of events is of the utmost importance.

In order to be prepared to answer the above-mentioned question (Blackburn 2006: 136), we must take into account that Plato shows a curious unwillingness to press the issue of what is wrong with dogmatism. It is in the light of such evidence that we may trace the truth of the ideas (Child 2001: 107–108) that there is no tension between Wittgenstein's anti-Platonism and his naturalism. Causal similarities between things and our causal considerations in our classificatory practices of enquiry must provide standards of correctness for this enquiry. This is of value for both Plato and Wittgenstein. However, what we are left with when investigating the validity of these criteria remains in the realm of the logically impossible (not to say the inaccurate) also for both of them. Plato adds, in *Theaetetus* (201 e-202 d; 209 e-210 b) that we have no way of grasping the ultimate being nor of formulating propositions about it with exact verbal expression.

Plato in *Timaeus*, 52, answers the question on the nature of space, which provides a position for everything that comes to be. We look at it indeed, he maintains, in a kind of dream. This image is a moving shadow of something else and must needs to come into existence in something else to claim some degree of reality. Otherwise it will be nothing at all.

Is fact in Wittgenstein (Blackburn 2018: 21) not a locatable structure? That Wittgenstein makes a distinction between facts and objects, as Frege does, does not make this enquiry possible outside a well-defined set of conditions. But then how can we avoid a relativism which suggests that our models of enquiry are merely different, none of them being objectively better or worse than another? Wittgenstein certainly does not mean that we should settle for a relativism when "building" (Charles 2003: 103–126) models of social and intellectual values. This would imply that actions and judgements are merely different, none of them being objectively better or worse than another. We have to avoid a regress, according to Wittgenstein, whereby every belief requires a further background belief about what ought to be held given the first belief. The mistake (Blackburn 2001: 82) would be akin to holding

that behind every interpretation stands another, an idea rightly opposed by Wittgenstein.

"It is the *calculus* of thought that connects with extramental reality", Wittgenstein avers. He also maintains, "Language is for us a calculus…" since "I use the picture like the signs in a calculus…". He explains further such use regarding framing: "When someone interprets, or understands, a sign in one sense or another, what he is doing is taking a step in a calculus (like a calculation). What he *does* is roughly what he does if he gives expression to his interpretation". Still, even if we can discern at this point the variety of expressions of this interpretation, the rules of this interpretation do remain determined *ab extra* (PG 1974: VIII, 111; X, 140; I, 13. MS 113: 390–393), in Plato's way.

Identifying how these values function must be what one should aim for. Wittgenstein's dictum that words can be hard to say is again stressed (Blackburn 2001: 82), emphasing our inability to approach this realm. It seems entirely possible that there should be no better kind of language to use to do whatever it is that a religious practitioner is doing (Blackburn 2007: 16). Such an overall function of mind, expressing the good, however, is its real function, according to Wittgenstein, because it is the only possible one. Nevertheless, this is a basic evil, he confesses (Blackburn 2007: 130): a proposition is illustrated by a few commonplace examples, yet then people take it for granted that it applies generally (Blackburn 2001: 80, 77). We can further clarify this perspective (Blackburn 2018: 27) with Wittgenstein's own words regarding the light that dawns gradually over the whole.

3. Similarities

Wittgenstein maintains an existence beyond the human mind's range, in Plato's way (TLP 1961: 2.026; 2.027; 2.0271; 2.0272): "There must be objects, if the world is to have an unalterable form…The unalterable objects and the subsistent objects are one and the same…Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and unstable…The configuration of objects produces states of affairs". The same thesis is repeated in the *Investigations* (PI 1953: II, xi 196): "The expression of a change of aspect is the expression of a *new* perception and at the same time of the perception's being unchanged". The state of rest, in a Platonic sense, remains unchanged, not accessible to the human mind.

Wittgenstein states (PI 1953: I, 373) that grammar tells us what kind of object anything is –except in cases where the object belongs in the realm of the unknown; the logically impossible. Then it does not fall within our range of explanatory concepts. In the context of our social contacts (Giouli 2001; 2008) language provides a unifying factor beyond the diversity of views concerning what cannot be said about the unknown.

In Plato (*Epistle VII*, 344.6), the realm of the intelligible, is related to the world of everyday experience. Wittgenstein's response to this challenge includes common standards concerning what may or may not be done and said. To leave everything as it is –regarding our complete failure to ever utter the literal meanings of our propositions– is the only possible and proper use of those language games, according to Wittgenstein (PI 1953: I, 124. Burke 1995: 45, 47). Indeed, we cannot interfere with the actual use of language, according to Wittgenstein. Therefore, its description constitutes the only possible end of our enquires.

Similarities between the following passage in Tractatus and Plato's passages in Theaetetus can be observed (TLP 1961: 4. 011): "At first sight a proposition –one set out on the printed page, for example– does not seem to be a picture of the reality with which it is concerned. But neither do written notes seem at first sight to be a picture of a piece of music, nor our phonetic notation (the alphabet) to be a picture of our speech. And yet these sign languages prove to be pictures, even in the ordinary sense, of what they represent" in the way the combination of nouns proves to be the essence of reasoning. In both cases we cannot lay claim to attaining to what really is. Our true opinion accompanies its representation or its expression. We do not have pure understanding of the ultimate objects of knowledge. However, we can pursue and aspire to their true meaning. We could take Wittgenstein to depend on more abstract reasoning than Plato does. Both thinkers are well aware of things that cannot be done, of expanding fully our conceptual range (TLP 1961: 6.53) in the direction of the intelligible, of what really is.

4. Concluding Remarks

That objects are abstractions from the events in which they are realised (PB 1975: Foreword, November '30), is an idea easily seen in both thinkers. The more one expands one's conceptual equipment from the sensible to the intelligible (even if the human mind cannot grasp it fully), the more one is allowed possibilities of knowledge of the intelligible: the Form of the Good, for Plato and God for Wittgenstein (Giouli 1997). The main difference in viewpoint is that for Wittgenstein what really is cannot be indistinguishable from its meaning. This relationship between meaning and reality is no longer necessary, as it is for Plato. But the same relationship does not presuppose, for Wittgenstein, that what really exists depends for its meaning on human mind. The true objects of knowledge will always remain outside our conceptual range.

Put in Plato's way, the general form according to which the mind proceeds toward such an interpretation exists fixed and determined prior to it (McGuinness 1979: 171). However, "It is an incorrect idea that the application of a calculus to the grammar of the actual language lends it a reality *which it did not have earlier*" (PG 1974: 311). Wittgenstein also has indeed adopted a reasoning to move away from the sensible to the intelligible, the way Plato did (Giouli 2021).

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A Struggle against Bewitchment: Wittgenstein on Metaphilosophy of Mathematical Platonism

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Abstract

In this paper I ask about Wittgenstein's view on importance of character in contriving a philosopher. This question has much to do with Platonism, as Wittgenstein believed that there are certain pre-philosophical attitudes standing behind various positions, and since the one behind Platonism stands out exceptionally, he used Platonism as an example of an insincere position. I focus on a non-theoretical aspect of the stance claiming that there are abstract entities. I juxtapose it with Wittgenstein's criticism of Platonic thinking from *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* and *Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics*, where Wittgenstein did not give a theoretical argumentation, but strove towards showing the menace of dishonesty behind the view. I conclude that philosophy is construed here as a process of working on oneself, and on arbitrariness of one's philosophical propensities. According to Wittgenstein, a true philosopher has specific virtues of character, not mere intellectual excellence.

> You can't think decently if you don't want to hurt yourself.
> Wittgenstein to Malcolm (WC: 370)

On a couple occasions I heard Ray Monk being asked about the importance of Wittgenstein's life as a heuristic tool in understanding his thought. He has been consistently answering that there are philosophers like Kant, whose input can be, and sometimes should be, understood without an insight to their life and, on the other hand, there are some, whose character and life are of extraordinary significance when it comes to the meaning of their views (cf. Monk 2001: 3). Wittgenstein belongs to the second group. In this paper I shall generalize this statement and ask about Wittgenstein's view on the importance of character in contriving a philosopher. Platonism shall be shown as a view portraying certain vices of the character. Wittgenstein believed that there are some pre-philosophical attitudes standing behind various positions, and Wittgenstein used Platonism as an example of an insincere position stemming from some bad attitudes.

Platonism has made an immeasurable career in philosophy and there are various reasons for that. The elegance of realistic outlook in philosophy of mathematics, the noble orthodoxy of correspondence theories of truth in epistemology, or the straightforward explanation of metaphysics are only few of them. I shall however focus on a non-theoretical aspect of the Platonistic stance claiming that *there exist* robust metaphysical entities independent of perception. I shall focus on the crux of the Platonic inclination in philosophy and interpret it in terms of the possible pre-philosophical intuitions one can have. The crux of „Platonic thinking" is the idea that the transcendental realm really is there and it moreover makes sense to talk about it. It is the conviction that „the transcendental" is not a matter of mere speculation, but one has to treat it seriously, and so should include the proposition about its existence into the set of axioms of one's theory. I would like to construe Platonism in abstraction from the question whether it is correct or not, but rather ask about the kind of philosophizing it originates from. One might object that such enterprise is misguided, for how can we discuss a philosophical standpoint while at the same time disregarding its contents? My point is to fathom the motivation behind the conviction, hence my presumption is that there are certain extra-philosophical reasons which attract us to certain ideas.

So, putting the case of correctness of realism aside, where does the conviction described above come from? I suspect that the best way to find out is to ask a "felon". In introduction to *Principles of Mathematics* Russell says:

> Real life is, to most men, a long second-best, a perpetual compromise between the ideal and the possible; but the world of pure reason knows no compromise, no practical limitations, no barrier to the creative activity embodying in splendid edifices the passionate aspiration after the perfect from which all great work springs. Remote from human passions, remote even from the pitiful facts of nature, the generations have gradually created an ordered cosmos, where pure thought can dwell as in its natural home, and where one, at least, of our nobler impulses can escape from the dreary exile of the actual world. (Russell 1903: X)

A soul seeking order by any means and unable to find it in the actual world, yet unwilling to concede its inexistence, discovers it in the Platonic realm. There, not only is it possible to construct refined theories, but also the desire for harmony is satisfied. If we look at it from this perspective, such a realm bears an exceptional charm, which might attract minds that boast themselves as adamant in striving for objectivity. Now recall Hilbert's famous „No one shall expel us from the paradise that Cantor has created for us" from Hilbert. It might be regarded as a *credo* of a believer in such objectivity, as it goes beyond a mere utterance of a proposition through its authoritative tone. But where does such a belief stem from?

Wittgenstein coined a special word for the extra-philosophical or non-argumentational reason for which we sympathize with certain views, which appears in various places in the notes from his lectures (LFM 1976: 16, 140, 150) – namely "charm". It features things that we want to be the case, long to be the case or even that we need to be the case. He says that certain positions charm us to an extent that they can seriously influence our thinking (Citron 2019: 5). And, to the surprise of some, Wittgenstein diagnoses that one might have certain existential motivations even in abstract fields like mathematics:

> [sometimes] the main or sole interest is this charm which sets the whole mind in a whirl, and gives the pleasant feeling of paradox. If you can show there are numbers bigger than the infinite, your head whirls. This may be the chief reason [transfinite set theory] was invented. (LFM 1976: 16)

If we allow ourselves to fall under a spell of certain positions, we have to consequently admit of the existence of the extraor-

dinary entities with which those theories treat. But accepting such entities is ever more charming, and attracts us even stronger:

> There are propositions we all know, and propositions about exotic animals, which have a certain charm. If you have the idea that mathematics treats of mathematical entities, then just as some members of the animal world are exotic, there would be a realm of mathematical entities that were particularly exotic - and therefore particularly charming. (LFM 1976: 140)

Once on the comforting ground, thinking can be led by the spell even further. We can start to apply our aesthetically charming theory to itself (LFM 1976: 150). We begin to ask about the „charm" of the theory itself. This, Wittgenstein claims, could be the reason why Hilbert raised the problem of consistency of axioms of arithmetic and, going further, dubbed it the „most important question" of mathematics (Hilbert 1902: 447). Wittgenstein, on the other hand, believed that there is no fundamental problem of mathematics (BT, 2005 86: 301e) and dug deeper, asking about the drives underlying one's desire for the consistency proof. In *Remarks on Foundations of Mathematics* he reflects on the need of a mathematician for the proof of consistency:

> 'Only the proof of consistency shews me that I can rely on the calculus.'
> What sort of proposition is it, that only then can you rely on the calculus? But what if you do rely on it *without* that proof! What sort of mistake have you made? (RFM 1967, 84: 107e)

Indeed, no mistake at all. Wittgenstein wants us to change the *attitude* towards mathematics: to relinquish being in awe of it or stop approaching it with a quasi-religious frame of mind. He does not want to change the way how one treats the theory itself, but make her cease to think of it as of a sacred truth, and begin to treat it as a mere theory. That is because we, as thinkers, tend to find emotional comfort in the conviction that there is some certainty – that the theory really is consistent:

> A kind of order is introduced because one has fared ill without it. (RFM 1967, 83: 107e)

And the feeling of tranquilizing certainty is not the only cause for the crusade for doubtless truth. There are more humanly needs to it. We want to believe that our work is not without a reason, that we do not commit ourselves to gibberish and, maybe above all, that we shall not come across as idiots in front of others. Thus are those who seek for such a reassurance not

> […] like small children, that merely have to be lulled asleep? (RFM 1967, 78: 101e)

The question is not designed to ridicule such thinkers. Wittgenstein chose his metaphors with particular care (Drury 1996: IX), and, I believe, the characteristic of a child that is being highlighted here is his fearfulness. A child must be accompanied before falling asleep because of his fear of darkness - the darkness of a mistake, of contradiction, of inconsistency.

The reason for such insistence on the Platonic outlook Wittgenstein finds not in strength of philosophical arguments, but in the emotional need of its disciples for its correctness. As he remarked to Rhees:

> You can certainly expose and refute the Cantor business. You can knock the Cantor business sky high. But that won't prevent people from believing it and going on repeating it. Because it isn't for such reasons that they hold to it. (WPCR 2015: 61–2)

The attachment to Cantor's paradise is sometimes too strong, and arguments shall have no effect on people tied to it. But, according to Wittgenstein, such irrational attachment only strengthens the fear of uncertainty, submission of thinking and intellectual dishonesty. He hopes that it is the exposure of those murky characteristics of such view that can brighten the mind from cloudiness. He says:

> 'I wouldn't dream of trying to drive anyone out of this paradise.' I would try to do something quite different: I would try to show you that it is not a paradise – so that you'll leave of your own accord. I would say, 'You're welcome to this; just look about you.' (RFM 1967: 103)

The offer is quite harsh: one has to try and investigate for herself how confused and arbitrary their beloved creed is, and the reward is of no theoretical value. Nevertheless, the promise of being true to oneself – a little bit more decent a human being – is what should recompense the pain of purification. When one leaves the relaxing paradise, practicing mathematics *without* a proof of consistency, one at least acknowledges the possibility of being wrong. Wittgenstein admits that this change of attitude is the real difficulty of philosophy, not any great, essential problem in the intellectual sense (BT 2005, 86: 301e).

> [P]hilosophy require[s] a resignation, but one of feeling, not of intellect. And maybe that is what makes it so difficult for many. It can be difficult not to use an expression, just as it is difficult to hold back tears, or an outburst of rage. [What makes it difficult] is the antithesis between understanding the subject and what most people *want* to see. (BT 2005, 86: 300e)

And moreover, this purifying change cannot be achieved by discovering some kind of deep philosophical "truth", no philosophical argument can bring one to it. Rather

> The unlocking must be done in you by a difficult process of synoptizing certain facts. (BT 2005: 86, 300e)

This, according to Wittgenstein, is what should be the goal of philosophy, not some intellectual excellence. He stressed that the virtues of character are of greater importance to being a good philosopher than cleverness. He once said to Drury:

> the distinction between a philosopher and a very clever man is a real one and of great importance (Flowers 1999: 195).

What distinguishes a philosopher is cultivation of certain virtues of character, to which the "process of synoptyzing certain facts" should lead. But what is meant by this process that should lead one to greater clarity and help awaken from the Platonic spell? Wittgenstein notices that all of us have certain obscure, emotional drives when it comes to thinking, and that philosophy, in his conception, should primarily lead to uncovering such motivations. So the first step of that process would be to acknowledge that one indeed is under the influence of such a "charm". Real honesty is needed here. Continuing our process, we can only count on a subtle guidepost given in *Investigations:*

> The problems are solved, […] by assembling what we have long been familiar with. Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language. (PI 2009: 109)

Hence, viewing our presumptions that have accompanied us for a long time through the lens of a clear language gives the promise of perfectibility. But, since language is in itself a form of living, a clear language is no different from a clear life, therefore one has to view their beliefs through the honesty with which they approached their bewitchment. In this way, a true practice of philosophy reveals itself as the constant struggle against one's comfortable, yet willfully unconscious, dishonest inclinations.

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Family Resemblance and Context

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Abstract

When Wittgenstein introduces the notion of family resemblance in the PI, he claims that family expressions like 'games' are applied to things in a very particular way. Speakers do not point to some characteristics found in all games, but, instead, call a thing 'game' because it shares some characteristics with some other things already called 'game'. Contextualists like Charles Travis argue that this supports a contextual theory of meaning. According to Travis, when speakers point to different characteristics for calling something 'game', the meaning of 'game' varies in relation to the context it is used in (in relation to the different criteria used in different contexts). I argue against this interpretation. To do so, I introduce a distinction between the static meaning of a family expression at a fixed point in time and the dynamic extension of its meaning over time. The context of utterance is only relevant for the latter and not, like Travis needs to claim, for the former.

1. Contextualism and Family Resemblance

Contextualism may be characterised as the view that the meaning (i.e. the content) of any sentence depends fundamentally upon the context in which it is uttered. The same sentence can express different meanings in different contexts, that is if uttered by a speaker in different situations. Formally speaking, if the semantic properties of a sentence are those that remain stable across all utterances, then, according to contextualism, for any sentence, semantic properties alone are insufficient to determine its meaning (cf. Recanati 2004: 90–91). (Note that sentences that contain indexicals such as 'I' or 'here' are context-relative even for non-contextualists. Contextualists, however, claim that all sentences, even those that do not contain any such indexicals, are context-relative.)

Some contextualists take the late Wittgenstein to hold a similar view, arguing that certain arguments in the *PI* support contextualism (see in particular Travis 2006, for a critical discussion see Bridges 2010). For the present purpose, I shall focus on their interpretation of family resemblance. To understand how family resemblance may support a contextualist theory of meaning, let me briefly recapitulate the context in which Wittgenstein discusses family resemblances in the *PI*.

The notion of 'family resemblance' is introduced in order to explain the claim that the things we call 'language' have no one thing in common but bear many different kinds of affinities, and that we use the same term for all these phenomena due to these affinities (cf. PI 2009: §65). Family resemblance, in the context of the *PI*, is thus is foremost an "attack" (Glock 2017: 120) on essentialism, insofar there is, so one may interpret Wittgenstein, no simple set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the term 'language'. By means of an explanation, Wittgenstein asks the reader to look at the various things we call 'game', where one does not "see something that is common to all, but similarities, affinities and a whole series of them" (PI 2009: §66). For instance, some games are said to be played by multiple players (like chess), while others are not (like patience). Some, like competitive ball games, can be won or lost, while in others there is no winning and losing (like a child playing with a ball). These similarities are subsequently characterised as 'family resemblances', for the "various resemblances between members of a family – build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, and so on and so forth – overlap and criss-cross in the same way" (PI 2009: §67). (Notably, both aspects, the family 'members' not all having one thing in common and the various resemblances between them, are already present in the *Blue Book*, although here Wittgenstein explicitly discusses family resemblance as a counterpoint to a "craving for generality", cf. BBB 17.)

Travis and fellow contextualists take this passage to indicate that family expressions like 'game' (or 'language') take a different meaning in different contexts. It is claimed that, as long as speakers resort to different criteria (i.e., characteristics) for the same term in different contexts, the term is used to express a different meaning: "The idea of family resemblance […] is that different things would so count on different occasions for the counting [i.e. for game, language, etc.]" (Travis 2006: 59). The first part of this claim can be inferred easily from the examples given above: A speaker may resort to different criteria for calling a thing 'game', e.g. being played by multiple players, being entertaining, winning and losing, etc. (Note that in PI 2009: §164 Wittgenstein is also explicitly claiming that one resorts to different "criteria" when using the word 'read'.) It may even be the case that some things are called 'game' due to some characteristics that are incompatible with those of other games: chess is always played by more than a single player, whereas patience can only be played by a single player.

The problem with the contextualist interpretation consists of the second half of its claim. Using different criteria for the same term does not necessarily entail that the term's meaning has changed. To make this point, let me introduce a distinction between the static meaning of a family expression at one point in time and the *dynamic* extension of its meaning over time.

2. Family Resemblance: Statics

When Wittgenstein tells the reader "don't think but look!" (PI 2009: §66) at the various activities called 'game', he is asking for a *static* perspective (so to speak), in that he asks the reader to consider the various things that are *currently* (at time *t*) called 'game'. In doing so, one becomes aware of the various overlapping and criss-crossing similarities. Shortly after the remark quoted above, Wittgenstein hints at the conceptual structure he has in mind:

> "Why do we call something a 'number'? Well, perhaps because it has a – direct – affinity with several things that have hitherto been called 'number'; and this can be said to give it an indirect affinity with other things that we also call "numbers". And we extend our concept of number, as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre." (PI 2009: §67)

While it is difficult to spell out what exactly the relevant resemblances, similarities and/or affinities are, we may, for the present purpose simply accept 'resemblance' as a primitive notion (see, however, Bambrough 1960 and Campbell 1965 for attempts to define resemblances by means of shared properties or predicates, see Goodman 1972 for some critical comments). On a minimal interpretation, then, on the static perspective, we see a 'thread' of overlapping resemblances when looking at the things called 'game'. While not any two games directly resemble each other, they *indirectly* resemble each other via direct resemblances to other games (Baker, Hacker 2005: 212). For example, we may see that chess is played by multiple players just like handball. And handball is played with a ball, just like the child who is kicking a ball against a wall. And while the playing child has no direct resemblances to chess (say), both are indirectly connected by the direct resemblances to handball. (See Wennerberg 1967 for thoughts on direct and indirect resemblances.)

The upshot, now, is this: If we see this complex 'thread' of resemblances when looking at the things called 'game', we can say that 'game' also *expresses* this complex structure when applied to chess, handball, the playing child and so on. After all, Wittgenstein introduced family resemblance to explain the *negative* claim that 'language' has no simple essence that could be made explicit by a set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. He does *not* claim that 'language' does not express any other, more complex structure.

If, as the contextualists have it, the term 'game' were to express a different meaning in relation to its context of utterance, the complex structure of overlapping resemblance would also need to be different. In the examples that Wittgenstein discusses, this is not the case. If one calls chess 'game' due to it being played by two players and goes on to call patience 'game' due to it involving winning and losing, in both usages (i.e., in both contexts) the same underlying structure of overlapping resemblances can be found. This is even the case if the characteristics of the relevant things stand in stark contrast to each other. Consider ancient gladiator games. We may suppose that they were hardly entertaining for those forced to 'play', but still there are some resemblances to the child who is entertaining herself by kicking a ball around. Both may be said to be entertaining for those watching the players, for instance.

To summarise, if we follow Wittgenstein's suggestion to look at the resemblances between the things a family expression is applied to, we see a complex structure of overlapping resemblances. While speakers may at different times and in different contexts point to different parts of this structure by using different criteria for the same term, this does not imply that the term is used to express a different meaning. It can still be said to express the same, although complex, meaning.

3. Family Resemblance: Dynamics

The context of utterance may, however, be relevant when looking at the things called 'game' from a dynamic perspective, that is when investigating the conditions of calling some thing 'game' (or 'language', or 'number') that was *not* previously subsumed under this term. Wittgenstein already moves to this perspective at the end of the quote above when he talks about us "extend[ing] our concept of number, as in spinning a thread" (PI 2009: §67).

Such an extension should be possible along the lines of the complex structure of resemblances discussed above. Concepts with such a structure do not have any clear boundaries, so Wittgenstein (cf. PI 2009: §68). And we can deal with these unbounded structures fairly easily when giving explanations. For example, when explaining the meaning of 'game', we may describe some games and add "This and *similar things* are called 'games'." (PI 2009: §69, my emphasis).

However, although there are no clear boundaries, these concepts cannot be extended to anything. Calling an ordinary table 'game' would still be mistaken. Extending a family expression *F* to a new thing *a* requires that *a* somehow fits into the existing structure of *F*, i.e. that there are some overlapping resemblances between the things already called *F* and *a*. However, resemblances are clearly not sufficient to extend a family expression. Consider cases of violent street fighting. There may be some resemblances to games, say to competitive boxing, to running or to the things Wittgenstein calls "*Kampfspiele*" (cf. PI 2009: §66). Yet, we do not in our ordinary discourse call street fighting 'game'. (This is known as the problem of wide open texture, cf. Pompa 1967: 66 and Griffin 1974: 644–645.) To extend a family expression to new cases, the underlying resemblances, thus, need to be *relevant* or *recognised*. But this is more complex than it may initially seem.

In some cases, speakers may be able to choose between multiple competing family expressions to extend (e.g. 'game' and 'artwork') (Prien 2004: 18). In doing so, one may also point to dis-resemblances between the things already subsumed under a term (Williamson 1996: 87). The overall situation and background knowledge of the speaker may also be relevant (seeing the same painting in a gallery or in a kindergarten may have a great influence on calling it 'artwork', for example.) In any case, the decision is not only with the speaker, but their linguistic community also has a say in what use of a term becomes admissible (say, what extension is useful or practical) (Pelczar 2000: 501–508). I do not want to suggest that this list is in any way extensive. What I want to suggest is that, when looking at the dynamic development of family expressions, many things are to be considered (specific resemblances, speaker's knowledge and intention, her linguistic community, and so on). Since contextualists already subsume many of these considerations under the term 'context', one may claim that the dynamic *extension* of family terms is, in some broad way, influenced by its context. Yet, this does not imply that the static meaning of a family expression is relative to context. (Gert 1995 and Llewelyn 1968 claim that, on Wittgenstein's view, the overlapping resemblances between the things called by the same expression are a consequence of, and not a reason for, subsuming a thing under the term. I cannot discuss this point in detail here, but I take it that the argument above would be compatible with these interpretations.)

4. Conclusion

Contextualists take family expressions to express a context-relative meaning and point to Wittgenstein's remarks that suggest speakers may resort to different criteria, although they use the same term. I have argued against this interpretation. Wittgenstein can be taken to distinguish between a static and a dynamic view on family expressions. On the static view, one becomes aware of overlapping and criss-crossing resemblances between the things subsumed under a family expression. If the expression is applied to any of these things, even if due to different criteria, it can always be said to express the same, yet complex thread of resemblances (contra the contextualist's interpretation). On the dynamic view, one asks for the conditions to extend a family expression to things not already subsumed under it. Here, resemblances are not sufficient. Instead, I have suggested to consider the (broad) context of utterance

as informative for the decision if and how family expressions are extended.

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Wittgenstein on the Distinction between Assertoric Force and Propositional Content

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Abstract

It is common to distinguish between two components of an assertion: propositional content and assertoric force. One of the main arguments for such a distinction is related to the Frege Point. In the first section of this paper, I will illustrate this point and the corresponding Fregean model of judgment and assertion. I will show that it raises a serious philosophical challenge, which I call the Frege-Geach Challenge, to explain how the same content can appear in discourse now asserted, now unasserted. The distinction of force and content is a straightforward answer to this challenge and many philosophers take it to follow immediately from the Frege Point. Wittgenstein rejects the force-content distinction. In the second section, I will outline his linguistic argument against such a distinction from §22 of the Philosophical Investigations. This raises the question concerning how Wittgenstein is able to answer the Frege-Geach Challenge. In the third section, I will show that an answer to this question can be found in the course of Wittgenstein's reflections on Moore's paradox.

1. The Frege-Geach Challenge

In what follows, I will carefully distinguish two claims: the original claim Peter Geach called the Frege Point and the challenge this point raises, which I will call the Frege-Geach Challenge. I distinguish between these two claims because I think we can at least accept the challenge behind the Frege Point without thereby already accepting the force-content distinction, which is sometimes simply identified with this point. Here is what Geach calls the Frege Point:

> A thought may have just the same content whether you assent to its truth or not; a proposition may occur in discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and yet be recognizably the same proposition. (Geach 1965: 449)

By "proposition", Geach means "a form of words in which something is propounded, put forward for consideration" (Geach 1965: 449). A proposition for Geach is a sentence expressing a thought. Today, the word is used differently, and often interchangeably with the word "propositional content". To avoid confusion, I will generally use the word "proposition" the way it is used today and speak of "sentences expressing propositions" when referring to Geach's use. Silver Bronzo (2019) shows that Geach formulates the Frege Point on the level of thinking and on the level of speech. For the sake of simplicity, I will stay on the level of speech and talk about assertions, but I think that similar things could be said about judgment and belief.

The inference modus ponens is a good example to illustrate the Frege Point:

p
If p, then q
so, q

In this inference, the propositional content "p" appears twice: once freestanding in the first premise as asserted and once embedded in the second premise as merely supposed. If it were not the *same* propositional content in both premises, the inference wouldn't be valid. It would be a mere equivocation. It seems to follow from this that we need to distinguish two things: the mere propositional content "p" and the mental or linguistic act of endorsing it, which is called assertoric force. For this reason, many philosophers – including Geach – take the force-content distinction to follow immediately from the Frege Point. But this is too hasty.

As Irad Kimhi (2018: 39) shows, the Frege Point is first of all an observation concerning the way propositional contents appear as asserted and unasserted in different contexts. This observation poses a serious philosophical challenge:

Frege-Geach Challenge:	How to explain that the same propositional content can appear in discourse, now asserted, now unasserted?

The force-content distinction is a straightforward answer to this challenge. But there are other answers too, as we will later see with Wittgenstein. For the moment, I want to elaborate a little further the distinction between assertoric force and propositional content and the general philosophical framework that comes along with it, for it is this whole framework that Wittgenstein is arguing against.

Peter Hanks distinguishes between a taxonomic and a constitutive version of the force-content distinction. The taxonomic version "is the view that speech acts with different forces all share the same truth-conditional content", whereas the constitutive version "is the idea that there is nothing inherently assertive about the propositional content of assertions" (Hanks, 2015: 19). The focus of this paper is on the constitutive version of the distinction. Two points are related to this distinction. Firstly, if you assert the whole conditional "If p, then q", you thereby merely entertain the two embedded propositions "p" and "q". Entertaining is thought to be a force-neutral act of grasping a propositional content without asserting it. Asserting it is then thought to be a further act, something that is added to the mere force-neutral proposition. It follows from this that every assertion contains an act of merely entertaining a propositional content. Even if it is possible to grasp and assert a proposition at the same time, the two acts are still logically distinct and asserting a proposition therefore logically presupposes the act of grasping and entertaining it. The second point related to the force-content distinction is the thesis that propositional contents are the primary truth-bearers, i. e. that they are true or false independent of the mental or linguistic acts of judging or asserting them to be true. Rather, these acts can be evaluated as true or false only with respect to the propositions they are directed at. Following Hanks (2015: 12–20), I will

call this the Fregean picture of propositional content, which is characterized by the three points I have discussed so far:

A) The distinction between assertoric force and propositional content
B) A force-neutral act of entertaining a proposition as contained in every assertion
C) The proposition as primary truth-bearer

We can set aside the question whether Frege himself was a Fregean in this sense. In his late essay *The Thought: A Logical Inquiry* Frege seems at least to suggest such a picture when he writes that "two things must be distinguished in an indicative sentence: the content, which it has in common with the corresponding sentence-question, and the assertion" (Frege, 1956: 294).

2. Wittgenstein's linguistic argument against the force-content distinction

Wittgenstein calls the act of merely entertaining a proposition Frege's "assumption" and he exemplifies the Fregean picture in §22 of the *Philosophical investigations* by analogy:

> Imagine a picture representing a boxer in a particular fighting stance. Well, this picture can be used to tell someone how he should stand, should hold himself; or how he should not hold himself; or how a particular man did stand in such-and-such a place; and so on. One might (using the language of chemistry) call this picture a sentence-radical. Frege probably conceived of the "assumption" along these lines. (PI 2009: 22)

What Wittgenstein calls a "sentence-radical" is a sentence of the form "that such-and-such is the case". Such a sentence is thought to be a mere force-neutral expression of a proposition. Wittgenstein uses the analogy with the picture of a boxer to illustrate the taxonomic and the constitutive versions of the force-content distinction. A sentence-radical is thought to express the same proposition, independently of the way it is used in different speech-acts, for example, to ask, to assert or to hope that such-and-such is the case (taxonomic version). And it follows from this that there is nothing inherently assertive about a sentence-radical (constitutive version). Using such a sentence to assert something is a *further act*, which contains a Fregean assumption as its part, as Wittgenstein writes right at the beginning of the same paragraph:

> Frege's opinion that every assertion contains an assumption, which is the thing that is asserted, really rests on the possibility, found in our language, of writing every assertoric sentence in the form "It is asserted that such-and-such is the case". – But "that such-and-such is the case" is *not* a sentence in our language – it is not yet a *move* in the language-game. And if I write, not "It is asserted that . . .", but "It is asserted: such-and-such is the case", the words "It is asserted" simply become superfluous. (PI 2009: 22)

The problem with the Fregean picture is that a sentence-radical is not a sentence at all, not a move in a language game. As we know, part of the *Philosophical Investigations* is devoted to an argument against the view that words and sentences have meaning in abstraction of their concrete use in natural language. And there is no special or singular use of a sentence expressing a proposition, for example, its use in an assumption or as merely entertained, that gives such a sentence its meaning. As Wittgenstein writes in §23: "There are *countless* kinds; countless different kinds of use of all the things we call 'signs', 'words', 'sentences'" (PI 2009: 23).

There are many different things we can do with a bit of language of the form "that such-and-such is the case": we can assert it, hope it, assume it, question it, etc. This all contributes to its meaning. Such a bit of language does not express a constant sentence meaning in abstraction of its different uses. Rather, only in its concrete use does it become meaningful and only in relation to its use can we explain why such a sentence has a truth-value. Much more could be said here. For my purpose, it is enough to show that Wittgenstein draws a radical conclusion from this grammatical investigation: there is no such thing as a mere sentence-radical that has a meaning independent of its concrete use, for example to make an assertion. This is why I call it a linguistic argument against the force-content distinction, which needs to be distinguished from other related arguments like the problem of the unity of the proposition, recently discussed by Hanks (2015) and Soames (2014).

3. Wittgenstein's answer to the Frege-Geach Challenge

The conclusion that a sentence-radical is a mere illusion seems to have a problematic consequence: The sentence "p" is used in two different ways if it is used to make an assertion or to assume something. From this it seems to follow that it has two different meanings. But if it had two different meanings, Wittgenstein would be unable to answer the Frege-Geach Challenge and he would have to admit that the inference modus ponens is invalid. This would be a bad consequence.

Wittgenstein considers the relation between assumption and assertion in the course of his discussion of Moore's paradox in the second part of the *Philosophical Investigations*. If we abstract from this special context, we can use the following quotation as a hint concerning Wittgenstein's answer to the Frege-Geach Challenge:

> Even in the assumption, the pattern is not what you think. With the words "Assuming I believe . . ." you are presupposing the whole grammar of the word "to believe", the ordinary use, which you have mastered. – You are not assuming some state of affairs which, so to speak, a picture presents unambiguously to you, so that you can tack on to this assumption some assertion other than the ordinary one. – You would not know at all what you were assuming here (that is, what, for example, would follow from such an assumption), if you were not already familiar with the use of "believe". (PI 2009, part two: 196)

Again, Wittgenstein criticizes here the idea that there is a prior and meaningful act of merely entertaining a proposition – the Fregean assumption – to which assertoric force can be added. But in this quotation, Wittgenstein also says something positive about the way assertion and assumption are related to each other. Contrary to the Fregean picture, assertion is primary in the order of explanation: Only against the background of what it would be to assert something is it possible to understand what it means to assume something. Using sentences of the form "Suppose that p" presupposes an understanding of what it would be to assert that p. In a remark concerning the analogue case of a wish from the *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology,* Wittgenstein writes: "The child learns first to express a wish, and only later to make the supposition that it wished for such-and-such" (RPP 1980, vol. 1: 478). This is a very natural understanding of what it is to suppose or assume something.

This leads to a very different answer to the Frege-Geach Challenge than the Fregean one. Let me illustrate this answer again

with the example of the inference modus ponens. According to the Fregean, less is going on if a sentence "p" appears as embedded in the conditional "If p, then q" than if it appears freestanding and asserted. In the latter case, assertoric force is added. For Wittgenstein, however, it is the other way around. More is going on in the embedded case. We can only understand the non-assertoric use of a sentence "p" inside a conditional in relation to its primary use in the assertion that p. Hanks explains the conditional along these lines as a special context in which the element of force is "cancelled or overridden" (Hanks 2015: 92). With Wittgenstein, we can argue in a similar direction: That the sentence "p" expresses the same content in discourse – now asserted, now unasserted – has to be explained in light of the primary use of this sentence in the assertion that p. Only against this background can we understand the more complex case in which "p" is merely assumed but not asserted. However, I think Wittgenstein would disagree with Hanks that in such a case the aspect of force is merely cancelled. Indeed, it is still in view. The point is that you can understand what it is to assume that p only in light of what it would be to assert it. The practice of assuming something stands in an asymmetric relation to the practice of asserting something. You only understand *what you are doing* when you assume something in the light of *what you would do* if you would assert it. It is in this sense that the sentence "p" expresses the same content in its use as embedded in a conditional or freestanding as asserted, which guarantees the validity of the inference modus ponens. Or, in general, this is why the sentence "p" can be used to express the same content in discourse, now asserted, now unasserted.

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'Artikuliert' and 'gegliedert' in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*

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Abstract

In his Letters to C. K. Ogden concerning the English translation of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein suggests that 'artikuliert' (TLP 3.141, 3.251) and 'gegliedert' (TLP 4.032) should be translated as 'articulate' and 'articulated' respectively. He seems, nevertheless, willing to accept a translation that renders this distinction opaque if his suggestion is not viable in English (CCO 1971: 24, 27). This indicates that Wittgenstein considered this distinction relevant and yet did not believe that failing to grasp it would impair the understanding of the book. In this paper, I will provide an account of the distinction between 'artikuliert' and 'gegliedert' that explains Wittgenstein's (ambivalent) remarks. Appealing to how these terms are used in the *Notebooks 1914–1916*, I will argue that 'gegliedert' applies to any sign insofar as it can be a picture of a situation, whereas 'artikuliert' applies specifically to propositions, insofar as they conform to the Principle of Compositionality. According to this account, in order to characterize propositions as gegliedert, one must first endorse the claim that propositions are pictures of reality, which only happens in TLP 4.01. Thus, although subtle in light of the whole book, this distinction ensures the coherence of Wittgenstein's presentation.

1. Introduction

Wittgenstein's letters to Ogden regarding the translation of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (henceforth *'Tractatus'*) are of fundamental importance in understanding and translating the book. There, we find Wittgenstein's remarks concerning details that might have passed unnoticed. This is the case of the distinction between *'artikuliert'* (TLP: 3.141, 3.251) and *'gegliedert'* (TLP: 4.032):

> In the end of that prop[osition] [i.e., 3.141] couldn't one say "is articulate" instead of "articulated"? I didn't mean yet to say that the prop[osition] is articulated but I used the word "artikuliert" in the sense in which one might say that a man speaks articulate that is that he pronounces the words distinctly. Or do you in that case also say "articulated"? If so leave it as it stands if not you put "articulate".
>
> 3.251 About this prop[osition] please consider what I said about 3.141
>
> […]
>
> 4.032 Here "articulated" is right!
>
> (CCO 1973: 24, 27)

These comments show that Wittgenstein did not consider the distinction merely terminological. Yet, his willingness to adopt the most natural English translation shows also that he did not believe that failing to grasp it meant failing to understand the book. It is, thus, a peculiar distinction, important enough for Wittgenstein to ask Ogden to change it, but not so much that it should be kept at any cost.

In this paper, I will provide an account of this distinction that explains Wittgenstein's remarks above. I will argue that *'gegliedert'* applies to any sign insofar as it can be a picture of a situation, whereas *'artikuliert'* applies specifically to propositions (i.e., sentences with a sense). Saying that a proposition is *gegliedert*, therefore, presupposes that propositions are pictures (i.e., the *Picture Theory*), which is only stated explicitly in TLP 4.01. This explains the occurrence of both notions in the *Tractatus*, as well as the order by which they appear. I will start by addressing each notion separately, appealing to their first occurrences in the *Notebooks 1914–1916*. I will then consider them together in light of the Picture Theory.

2. Gegliedert

Wittgenstein's letters to Ogden show that he took 'articulated' to be an adequate translation of *'gegliedert'*, using 'articulate' for *'artikuliert'*. (This translation was adopted by Pears and McGuinness (TLP 1972: 3.141, 3.251, and 4.032).) In order to sharpen the contrast between both notions, I will provisionally adopt 'membered' as the translation of *'gegliedert'*. While less intuitive than other translations (e.g., 'segmented', TLP 1961: 4.032; PT: 4.072), it captures the biological echoes of *'gegliedert'* (which hint at a possible connection with Goethe's use of '*Glieder*' in "*Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen*" (1983: 156–157); see also Monk 1991: 303–304, 509–512.). The term *'gegliedert'* occurs only once in the *Tractatus*:

> 4.032 It is only in so far as a proposition is logically [membered] [logisch gegliedert] that it is a picture of a situation.
>
> (Even the proposition, Ambulo, is composite [zusammengesetzt]: for its stem with a different ending yields a different sense, and so does its ending with a different stem.)

The parenthetical remark suggests that being composite, i.e., having parts, and being membered are the same thing. This is also suggested in the *Notebooks*:

> 3.10.14
>
> The proposition is a picture of a situation only in so far as it is logically [membered] [logisch gegliedert]. (A simple–non-[membered] [ungegliedertes]–sign can be neither true nor false.)
>
> The name is not a picture of the thing named!
>
> The proposition only says something in so far as it is a picture!
>
> (NB 1961: 8)
>
> 5.10.14
>
> At any rate it is surely possible to correlate a simple sign with the sense of a sentence.—
>
> Logic is interested only in reality. And thus in sentences ONLY in so far as they are *pictures* of reality.

> But how CAN a SINGLE word be true or false? At any rate it cannot express the thought that agrees or does not agree with reality. That *must* be [membered] [*gegliedert*].
>
> A single word cannot be true or false in *this sense*: it cannot agree with reality or the opposite.
>
> (NB 1961: 9)

> Here, 's is membered' is equivalent to 's is not simple'. Since 's is not simple' is equivalent to 's has parts', which is equivalent to 's is composite', it follows that 's is membered' is equivalent to 's is composite'.

A sign's being membered is presented, both in the *Notebooks* and the *Tractatus*, as a necessary condition for it to be a picture of a situation. Although Wittgenstein focuses on linguistic forms of representation, this can be generalized to any sort of picture of reality. A simple example helps us see why. A blue dot on a piece of paper might *stand for* a blue book on a table, but it does not yet represent a situation; it is neither true nor false (TLP: 2.17). If I add a red dot to the left of it, standing for a red book also on that table, then my drawing can represent the situation described by 'the red book is to the left of the blue book', and is hence either true or false.

Pictures vary in degree of complexity and in their *pictorial form* (TLP: 2.17–2.171). A road map, for instance, represents a situation in a manner different from an architectural model. The pictorial form determines how signs (in this case, the map and the model) are membered. In order to represent a situation, however, their pictorial form must *also* be logical (TLP: 2.181–2.19). Signs must be logically membered (see McGuinness 2002: 68–72). 'Is *logically membered*' can, therefore, be seen as a general predicate applying to all pictures of situations, regardless of their specific pictorial form.

3. Artikuliert

In his letters to Ogden, Wittgenstein tries to clarify the meaning of '*artikuliert*' by alluding to a man who "speaks articulate" because "he pronounces the words distinctly". This suggests that for something to be articulate, it must have parts (i.e., be membered). In order to clarify this, let us turn to the two occurrences of '*artikuliert*' in the *Tractatus:*

> 3.141 A proposition is not a blend of words.–(Just as a theme in music is not a blend of notes.)
>
> A proposition is articulate [*artikuliert*].
>
> 3.251 What a proposition expresses it expresses in a determinate manner, which can be set out clearly: a proposition is articulate [*artikuliert*].

Tautologies and contradictions notwithstanding, declarative sentences express their sense (TLP: 3.34). Hence, we can read 3.251 as saying that having a *determinate* sense is a necessary condition for a sentence to have *a* sense. In other words, there is no such thing as an *in*determinate sense: if the sense of the sentence cannot be clearly determined, then it must lack one.

This point can be illustrated by the contrast between (a) 'The bank is 100m ahead' and (b) "'Twas brilling, and the slithy toves / Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:" (Carroll 1872: 21). (a) is ambiguous between (a1) 'the financial institution is 100m ahead', (a2) 'the margin of the river is 100m ahead' and–although in this case the speaker is not being cooperative–(a3) 'the financial institution or the margin of the river is 100m ahead'. The ambiguity of (a) does not, however, prevent it from having a determinate sense. When it is uttered, it means (a1), (a2), or (a3). Failing to decide between these is a psychological (maybe epistemic) phenomenon, not a semantic one. In the case of (b), on the other hand, we cannot even come up with a set of possible interpretations such as those presented for (a). There seems to be no non-arbitrary way of saying what the sense of this sentence *could be*. We must, therefore, conclude that it lacks sense.

Wittgenstein adds, still in 3.251, that "What a proposition expresses […] can be set out clearly". If the sentence has a determinate sense, it must be possible to say exactly what that sense is. The example above shows that this can be achieved by paraphrasing. Such paraphrasing presupposes that one part of the sentence can be replaced by another, helping "set out clearly" the sense of the whole. This, in turn, is dependent upon the assumption that the sense of the whole sentence is determined by the meaning of its parts and how they are related (TLP: 3.31), i.e., the *Principle of Compositionality* (see, for instance, Bronzo 2011). If a sentence has a determinate sense, therefore, its parts must be related in a way that conforms to the Principle of Compositionality. According to 3.251, 'is articulate' means 'has parts related in such a way that the sense of the whole is determined by its parts and how they are related'.

This account of '*artikuliert*' is in accordance with Wittgenstein's introduction of the term in the *Notebooks:*

> 29.1.15
>
> Language is articulated [*artikuliert*].
>
> (NB 1961: 40)
>
> [17.6.15]
>
> Is the representation by means of unanalysable names *only one system*?
>
> All I want is only for *my meaning* to be completely analysed!
>
> In other words the propositions must be completely articulated [*artikuliert*]. Everything that its sense has in common with another sense must be contained separately in the proposition. If generalizations occur, then the form of the particular cases must be manifest–and it is clear that this demand is justified, otherwise the proposition [*Satz*] cannot be a picture at all, of *anything*.
>
> (NB 1961: 63)
>
> [19.6.15]
>
> The component parts of the proposition must be simple = the proposition must be completely articulated [*artikuliert*].
>
> But now does this SEEM to contradict the facts?–
>
> For in logic we are apparently trying to produce ideal pictures of articulated propositions [*artikulierter Sätze*]. But how is that possible?
>
> (NB 1961: 66)

The account of '*artikuliert*' put forward above makes it easier to understand two important aspects of these remarks. First, the claim that "Language is articulated" can be understood as an

enouncement of the Principle of Compositionality. Indeed, no other workable reading seems forthcoming. Second, the connection between being articulate and having simple components can now be understood. If sentences were analyzable ad infinitum, one could never safely state that a certain sentence had parts related in such a way that the sense of the whole was determined by them. Thus, having a determinate sense is a sufficient condition for a sentence to be articulate, which in turn is a sufficient condition for it to have simple components. By transitivity, "The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement that sense be determinate" (TLP: 1972: 3.23).

4. Conclusion: 'Gegliedert, 'Articuliert' and the Picture Theory

What was said so far can be summarized as follows:

> Being (logically) membered is a necessary condition for a sign to be a picture of a situation.
>
> Being articulate is a necessary condition for a sentence to have (a determinate) sense.Knowing that, according to the *Tractatus*, propositions are pictures of reality (TLP: 4.01ff)– the Picture Theory–the difference between these claims might be overlooked. Yet, it is precisely the *Picture Theory* that explains the need for such distinction.

In the *Notebooks*, Wittgenstein introduced '*artikuliert*' while talking about pictures, but what he says there is independent of the Picture Theory. In TLP 3.141 and 3.251, not having yet claimed that propositions are pictures, Wittgenstein uses '*artikuliert*' to talk about linguistic forms of representation. In 4.032, on the other hand, having already stated the Picture Theory explicitly (TLP: 4.01), Wittgenstein can say that propositions are logically membered (*gegliedert*). Being (logically) membered is a more general property applying to all pictures; being articulate is a special case of being (logically) membered, which applies only to propositions. This account hence explains the ambivalent character of Wittgenstein's remarks to Ogden. Although subtle in light of the whole book, this distinction ensures the coherence of Wittgenstein's presentation.

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Was Wittgenstein a Fideist? A Reading of Thomas D. Carroll's Work

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Abstract

In this paper, I will present Thomas D. Carroll's view on the question of fideism in Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion. In his 2014 book *Wittgenstein within the Philosophy of Religion*, Carroll presents us with an analysis of the manifold questions regarding Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion within the literature of the field. One of his main concerns is the concept of fideism, and the association many philosophers make with Wittgenstein. For Carroll, a philosophical housekeeping is needed in order to clarify the confusions related to the meaning of that term. He proposes a contextual and hermeneutical reading of fideism: through a conceptual, context-oriented, historically sensitive, clarification it is possible to understand the true usefulness of the term in a philosophical investigation of Wittgenstein.

1. Fideism: the complexity of the term

One of the main arguments developed by Carroll is about the unclear definition that fideism has had along the years in the studies of Philosophy of Religion (Carroll 2014: 101). This messy starting point for the labelling of Wittgenstein is one of the major problems: how is it possible to label Wittgenstein as a fideist if the term itself is not clear and has different meanings for different schools? His suggestion is that we should take a context-oriented analysis to see how the term has evolved in its usage. For him, this contextual clarification is the key to solve the confusions over the meaning of the term (Carroll 2014: 101–102).

The first of three main problems regarding the term fideism is that it is used mainly pejoratively, and this kind of usage is not very fruitful for academic discussions (Carroll 2014: 102). Although one can find throughout history many different attempts to define the term, most of the time the concept is defined without paying attention to contextual nuances. What most of the usages have in common is a divergence with the catholic ideal of faith and reason hanging together perfectly (Carroll 2014: 106–107).

A second problem is related to the ahistorical character of the studies on fideism. Philosophers and theologians assume the term to be a general category that can be applied in different contexts, and can be seen in different historical moments (Carroll 2014: 107). This goes precisely against the hermeneutical and context-oriented reading that Carroll proposes. A third problem relates with the previous one: the historical complexity of the term does not allow for it to be moved from one context to another without some sort of conceptual entropy (Carroll 2014: 109).

2. Traditions of Fideism

Following Wittgenstein himself, Carroll proposes a plural view on the definition of fideism. He suggests we should take into account the variety of ways the term has been used, and the different meanings that had had. For him, attention to the contextual nuances and the historical particularities is the key to understand not only the complexity of the term itself, but its usefulness for a philosophical investigation. Carroll identifies six types of uses (Carroll 2014: 121): 1) Symbolo-fideism; 2) Criticism of Catholic traditionalism; 3) Criticism of Biblicism; 4) Criticism of anti-metaphysical philosophy and theology; 5) Conformist skeptical fideism; 6) Evangelical skeptical fideism. The first four represent categories that are actually used in religious debates, while the last two are only used by historians. Also 2) and 4), since they are pejorative terms, should be put aside for not being useful in an academic discourse. What Carroll concludes from his investigation into the traditions of fideism is that, once again, the lack of clarity regarding the term is liable to bring philosophical confusions (Carroll 2014: 122).

3. Skeptical Fideism – Popkin and Penelhum

Carroll makes reference to the work of Richard H. Popkin and Terence Penelhum, two historians of philosophy, for their contributions to the understanding of a phenomena that Popkin named skeptical fideism: the appropriation of ancient skeptical arguments in the service of Christian apologetics (Carroll 2014: 109). Their thesis goes back to when Catholics and Protestants, in mid-16th century, were debating the proper criteria for religious truth. They show that Catholics maintained that the criteria for "the rule of faith" should be the legal tradition of the Magisterium, while Protestants believed that it should be the individual to discover it in the Holy texts. Both sides accused each other of Pyrrhonism, and both of them have features of the categories of skeptical fideism that Penelhum brings to surface: conformist and evangelical. But all these categories have changed throughout time, and Carroll is focused precisely on that migration of meaning (Carroll 2014: 111).

4. Symbolo-fideism – Ménégoz and Sabatier

Continuing his project of developing a hermeneutical analysis of fideism, Carroll presents the work of two theologians who are of much importance for the genealogy of the term: Eugène Ménégoz and Auguste Sabatier. In the late 19th century, the French theologian Ménégoz proposed an articulation between the orthodox Lutheranism and the agnostic positivist philosophy of science. He is labelled as the first to have used the term "fideism" (Carroll 2014: 113). Together with Sabatier, they sought to build a path for Christianity after the Enlightenment by articulating it with the rise of science and historical criticism of the bible. Their theology is sometimes called symbolo-fideism to express Ménégoz' idea of salvation independent of belief and Sabatier's reflections on religious symbolism.

Their project relied on a proposal for historicizing the representations of faith in order for the Christian message to be adapted to a new environment. They advocated for a separation between moral and religion on one hand, and science on the other. The path for dealing with this religious crisis should rely on the protestant principle of sola fide (Carroll 2014: 115–117). Through this separation, both Ménégoz and Sabatier thought they would be able to accommodate faith and science, without damaging one or the other.

5. Fideism as an Interpretative Category: the case of William James and Soren Kierkegaard

Carroll identifies the beginning of the term "fideism" to be used as a tool to understand Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion with the work of Kai Nielsen in his 1967 paper "Wittgensteinian Fideism". For Carroll, to use this term without rigour and care is a mistake, and a contextual investigation into the subject can in fact show this. The usefulness of "fideism" as a hermeneutical category is dubious, when disconnected from the particular context in which is used. A context-sensitive investigation, Carroll argues, shows that Wittgensteinian fideism as gone a long way away from Wittgenstein himself (Carroll 2014: 122–123).

Wittgensteinian fideism is usually associated with the influence that William James and Kierkegaard (two thinkers that are usually labelled as fideist) had on Wittgenstein. But for Carroll, if there is an element of fideism in Wittgenstein this is due to James and not Kierkegaard (Carroll 2014: 124). James hold that people could decide between "live options", being constrained only by the "logical intellect" and historical, social and cultural forces. There is a space for passions within our epistemic lives, and these are what drives us when two equal hypothesis present themselves to us. The connection to other beliefs and values plays a decisive role. James pragmatism, Carroll argues, does not conceive the relationship between knower and reality as something static: on the contrary, truth happens to an idea, becoming true through events (Carroll 2014: 128). Although James never mentions the term fideism, Carroll sees possible to draw a line of connection between James and Sabatier's ideas, since he talks fondly of him in his work *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. But labelling James as a fideist in the negative usage of the term is a mistake, Carroll argues, since "religious beliefs are viable for the Jamesian only after one has thoroughly investigated what reason has to say about the beliefs in question" (Carroll 2014: 134).

The case of Kierkegaard demands us to be careful, Carroll states. For to take seriously a hermeneutical study of Kierkegaard's texts it is imperative one takes into consideration the rhetorical dimension of his work (Carroll 2014: 135). Carroll believes that the term fideism may be useful as a comparative category in some studies of Kierkegaard. However, inattention to hermeneutical differences between the usage of Kierkegaard's skepticism and subjectivism may lead to misreading his work as a defence of irrationality. His proposal his not to destroy objective reason, but to transcend it (Carroll 2014: 138).

After looking into the cases of Kierkegaard and James, Carroll concludes that the term "fideism" is not clear enough to be used as a label for their philosophy (Carroll 2014: 139). Nevertheless, he sees similarities in their thought with the work of the symbolo-fideists.

6. Wittgenstein

As it was stated before, Carroll identifies the beginning of the use of fideism to characterize Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion with the publishing of Kai Nielsen's "Wittgensteinian Fideism". Carroll starts by noting that the influence of James in Wittgenstein is not entirely clear. There are similarities between their ideas, but that does not mean that there is a traceable line of fideism from James to Wittgenstein (Carroll 2014: 141). There are, however, two big influences that can be immediately identified: the philosophical methodology and their shared view of authentic religiosity.

Carroll brings up Russell Goodman's study on the influence of James on Wittgenstein. Goodman argues that there is a symmetry between Wittgenstein's conception of pragmatism and what he later wrote in *On Certainty*. In his view Wittgenstein shares two themes with the pragmatists: the idea that not all empirical propositions play the same role and the view of an interconnection between action and thought (Carroll 2014: 141). But Carroll does not believe that this symmetry is enough to claim that there is a traceable influence of James pragmatism in Wittgenstein. Nevertheless, Carroll agrees with Goodman when he claims that one of the main reasons for Wittgenstein to like James philosophy was his approach: James philosophized as a human being. This is in deep connection with Wittgenstein's method of defusing philosophical problems by pointing to the misconceptions about the plurality and diversity of language (Carroll 2014: 141).

Similar remarks can be made about the influence of Kierkegaard in Wittgenstein. Although Wittgenstein was interested in questions of authenticity and sincerity of religious belief and practice, it is not clear to which extent these matters were brought up by his reading of Kierkegaard at an early age. There are remarks that are clearly influenced by his reading of the Danish philosopher but they are scarce in direct references (Carroll 2014: 142). Also, the passages from Wittgenstein's notes that address the Christian historical proof-game were published long after his philosophy of religion was labelled as fideist.

The only trace that could be found for a fideist reading of Wittgenstein, lies in the role of emotion in beliefs, since here Wittgenstein joins Kierkegaard, James and the symbolo-fideists (Carroll 2014: 144). But Carroll argues that it would not be completely unreasonable to drop the label if one does not have a careful attention to the historical meanings at stake. It can be a useful comparative category with other philosophers, though only when carefully contextualized and hermeneutically analysed (Carroll 2014: 145).

7. Conclusions

One of the main features of Carroll's work (and of his whole book) is his particular attention to context. His reading of Wittgenstein's philosophy, the perspicuity reading, is sustained by a careful hermeneutical work. This is his method and his proposed "solution" at the same time. From his analysis we can draw three main conclusions. First, there is a clear distinction between using the term "fideism" to designate a legit philosophical or theological school and using the term as a pejorative adjective. This is a categorical difference of the investigation itself. Second, the term has had a plastic meaning since it was first introduced. It is a fluid concept that has been used by different points of view, even opposite ones. This fluidity can enrich the concept semantically, but it doesn't help for a clear and serious usage of it in a philosophical investigation. Thirdly, Wittgenstein was a complex author, even somewhat opaque in some issues. But he was very clear in his message to draw our attention to the plurality of usages of language. This has to be taken into account if one wants to label his philosophy of religion as fideist. The term can have a useful comparative role in studying Wittgenstein within the history of philosophy, but this demands a rigorous hermeneutical treatment of it. The lack of clarity and the fluidity have to be faced through a careful historically-sensitive analysis that remains faithful to his attention to diversity. Only then one can find philosophical fruitfulness in combining "fideism" with Wittgenstein.

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Über mich und über dir – Das Über-ich als Beispiel zwischen Psycho- und Sprachanalyse

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Abstract

In Wittgensteins Beschäftigung mit der Psychoanalyse finden sich Ablehnung und Anerkennung nebeneinander. Sein Gebrauch einzelner psychoanalytischer Ausdrücke wird zum Anlass genommen, um Missverständnisse wie Verständigungsmöglichkeiten Wittgensteins mit der Psychoanalyse Freuds darzustellen. Eine getrennte Betrachtung von Methode und Forschungsgegenstand erweist sich dabei psycho- wie sprachanalytisch als nicht haltbar.

Geglückte und misslungene Verständigungsprozesse kommen nicht nur in einer Psychoanalyse vor. Beide haben auch Wittgenstein beschäftigt. Das ist ein erster Grund, weshalb es sich nahelegt, das Sprechen in einer Psychoanalyse mit Überlegungen von Wittgenstein zu verknüpfen und zu schauen, welche Missverständnisse und welche Möglichkeiten der Verständigung dabei auftauchen. Wittgensteins Überlegungen eignen sich zudem aus mindestens zwei weiteren Gründen für einen solchen Rahmen: Er orientiert sich in seiner Spätphilosophie – hierin dem theoretischen Vorgehen in der Psychoanalyse ähnlich – beispielhaft an Fällen (Flatscher 2002). Und bei Wittgenstein geht es wie bei Freud und der Psychoanalyse um nichts weniger als um ein wahrheitsbezogenes Zusammenspiel zwischen Sprachpraxis und theoretischer Einsicht.

Wittgensteins Ansichten zur Psychoanalyse waren bekanntlich „ambivalent" (Bouveresse 1991, Majetschak 2008). Er stand dem Gedanken verbreiteter sexueller Bedeutungen etwa von Traumbildern und -gedanken, wie sie in der Psychoanalyse angenommen werden, ebenso fern (vgl. LA 1968: 76ff.) wie den Bedingungen der Verifikation von Deutungen in einer psychoanalytischen Kur. Er kritisierte die Eindeutigkeit von Interpretationen in einer Behandlung und die Deutungshoheit der Behandler (vgl. ebd.: 81). Und auch seine prinzipiellen Einwände gegen die Psychoanalyse im Zusammenhang mit einer Verwechslung von Ursachen und Gründen bei Freud (vgl. beispielsweise ebd.: 85) waren nicht geeignet, psychoanalytische Ansätze für ihn besonders attraktiv zu machen. Das ist die eine Seite.

Wittgenstein war aber andererseits so beeindruckt von der von Freud erfundenen sprachbasierten Methode in der klinischen Praxis der Psychoanalyse, dass er Philosophie schließlich selbst als eine Form einer ähnlich angelegten, kritischen Therapie angesehen hat. Kroß (2007: 88 f.) etwa spricht von einer „Familienähnlichkeit" zwischen Wittgensteins Philosophieauffassung nach 1929 und Freuds Behandlungsmethode. Die Wittgensteinsche Verknotung zwischen Philosophie und Therapie steht im Hintergrund der folgenden Argumentation. In ihrer bisherigen Erschließung weniger berücksichtigt ist das eigentümliche Verständnis, das Wittgenstein von der Freudschen Psychoanalyse hatte. Er verwendete zentrale Begriffe wie das Über-Ich oder das Unbewusste in eigener Weise für seine Argumentationen. Und er dachte die Psychoanalyse Freuds mehr wie eine Reich'sche Widerstandsanalyse (Reich 1933). Im Zuge der Einbeziehung von Missverständnissen zwischen Wittgenstein und Freud zeigt sich schließlich, dass Wittgenstein mit seinem späten, einer psychoanalytischen Therapie nicht unähnlichen Vorgehen in der Philosophie auch Teile seiner eigenen prinzipiellen Bedenken gegen die Psychoanalyse unterläuft.

1. Über dir

Als Beispiel dient eine vor einem Jahr im Internet verbreitete Filmszene: Stellen Sie sich einen abgedunkelten Raum vor, in welchem sich im Vordergrund Ihres Gesichtsfelds ein Schreibtisch befindet, auf welchem neben einer Schreibtischlampe und einem Stempel ein großer ausgestopfter Reiher steht. Weiter hinten vor einer alten Bücherwand ist von der Seite ein sitzender Mann in einem großen Lederfauteuil zu sehen, im grauen Anzug, die Finger beider Hände vor der Brust überkreuzt. Die Kamera schwenkt hinüber zu einem, auf einer Bank sitzenden, ganz in Rosa gekleideten, ungefähr sechs Jahre alten Mädchen, während der Mann folgendes sagt: „Leonie, Du hättest den Teddy Deiner Freundin natürlich nicht zerschneiden dürfen. Aber Dein ES war wiedermal stärker als Dein ÜBER-ICH, oder?" „Ü-über mir?" fragt das Kind Leonie und schaut nach oben. „ÜBER-ICH", reagiert der Mann und unterstreicht dies mit einer dezidierten Bewegung seiner linken Hand. Aufmerksam schaut Leonie ihn an, bevor sie mit leicht triumphierendem Ton „Über dir!" sagt. Als der Mann nicht nachgibt, nochmals mit Bestimmtheit „ÜBER-ICH" wiederholt, sagt auch sie mit Nachdruck: „Über dir", während sie mit dem Zeigefinger der linken Hand über den Kopf des Mannes zeigt.

Mit Wittgenstein ließe sich hier zunächst ein ablehnender Impuls aufseiten des Kindes gegenüber dem Satz des Erwachsenen formulieren: „Ich weiss doch, wenn ich zornig bin, ich brauche es doch nicht aus meinem Benehmen lernen" (MS 133: 68). Doch das Kind im Film ist nicht trotzig. Es versucht zu verstehen, was ihm gesagt wird. Dabei illustriert es Wittgensteins Hinweis, dass sich Worte mittels einer Geste erklären lassen (MS 110: 123), was übrigens für eine psychoanalytische Behandlung, in der es um nichts als den Austausch von Worten geht (vgl. Freud 1926: 214), untypisch wäre.

2. Gleichsam wie ein Über-Ich

Die seltsame Rede von Es und Über-Ich wirkt unangebracht, für Nichteingeweihte wohl auch unverständlich. Auch Wittgenstein benutzt metapsychologische Ausdrücke wie das Über-Ich. Und anders als Leonie hat er sich dabei zunächst nicht mit diesem Ausdruck zu arrangieren versucht:

Ich schließe nicht aus dem, was ich sage, darauf was ich wahrscheinlich tun werde. Tue ich dies dennoch so wird man sagen, ich spreche, gleichsam wie ein Über-ich, ich habe eine geteilte Persönlichkeit, oder dergl.. Aber das ist nicht eine Erklärung meiner Redeweise, sondern nur der Ausdruck dafür daß man so für gewöhnlich nur über den Andern, nicht über sich selbst spricht (MS 133: 65).

Wittgenstein behandelt das Über-Ich der Psychoanalyse wie eine Instanz des Sprechens. Diese Instanz kann seiner Lesart zufolge im Sprechen zu laut werden, spätere Handlungen voraussagen und damit auch festlegen. Wittgenstein verwendet Freuds Ausdruck hier in doppelter Weise, ja subversiv: einerseits, um festzuhalten, dass Voraussagen über zukünftiges Handeln eines Sprechers für diesen nicht durch Rückschluss auf seine gegenwärtigen Äußerungen möglich sind und andererseits, um den metapsychologischen Ausdruck „Über-Ich" als Teil eines irrtümlichen Sprachgebrauchs zu kennzeichnen. Psychoanalytisch ist das Über-Ich nicht als eine Instanz des Sprechens definiert, sondern als „eine Stufe im Ich" (Freud 1923: 256). Die von Wittgenstein beschriebene ungewöhnliche Verquickung von Ich und Anderem lässt sich bisweilen nicht nur in pathologischen Entwicklungen, sondern auch in Resten eines kindlichen Transitivismus beobachten.

3. Sackgasse

Wittgensteins zitierte Bemerkung aus dem Manuskript von 1947 wird nicht weiterverwendet, fällt, so ließe sich psychoanalytisch formulieren, dem Über-Ich ihres Autors zum Opfer. Dank der Erschließung des Nachlasses ist diese erste Bemerkung zum Über-Ich zugänglich und bildet den atmosphärischen Hintergrund der zweiten Verwendung des Ausdrucks eine Seite später. Darin kommt Wittgenstein auf ein Thema zurück, das er einige Seiten zuvor aufgeworfen hat: Wie hängen der Glaube an einen bevorstehenden Regen und das Mitnehmen eines Regenschirms sprachlich zusammen? In einem von mehreren Versuchen greift Wittgenstein auch hier auf das Konzept des Über-Ichs zurück: „Mein Über-Ich könnte von meinem Ich sagen: "Es regnet, und das Ich glaubt es" und könnte fortfahren: ‚Ich wird also wahrscheinlich einen Schirm mitnehmen'. Und wie geht nun das Spiel weiter?" (MS 133: 66)

Es lohnt ein Blick auf die verschiedenen Versionen dieser Bemerkung. Im Faksimile-Manuskript (vgl. https://bit.ly/2wTkW5X) findet sie sich mit Tinte in folgender Form: „‚Es regnet & ich glaube es'. Das könnte mein Über-Ich von meinem Ich sagen, & könnte fortfahren: ‚Ich werde – oder sollte es heißen ‚wird' – also wahrscheinlich einen Schirm mitnehmen'." Wittgenstein führt hier wie in der unveröffentlichten Bemerkung das Über-Ich als Sprecher ein, der die Handlung des Ichs kommentiert. Und dann scheint Wittgenstein darüber zu stolpern, wie er das Ich aus dieser Perspektive verstehen soll – als der, der er ist, oder als eine Freudsche Instanz. Er entscheidet sich für das zweite. Deshalb schreibt er statt „Ich werde" grammatikalisch korrekt „Ich wird".

In einem nächsten Schritt schreibt er zu der Bemerkung im Manuskript mit Bleistift dazu: „Mein Über-Ich könnte von meinem Ich sagen: Es regnet & Ich glaubt es Mein [...] Und wie geht nun das Spiel weiter?" Das Über-Ich rückt an den Anfang der Bemerkung. Das Ich des Schreibers wird zu einer topischen Ichinstanz, aus „Ich werde" wird „Ich wird", aus „ich glaube" das seltsame „Ich glaubt". (Diese letzte Änderung wird übrigens in *wittfind* http://wittfind.cis.lmu.de nicht abgebildet.) Der Satz klingt am Ende so, als hätte Wittgenstein sich hier vor allem mit Freuds Modell von Es, Ich und Über-Ich beschäftigt. Denn es kommen nicht nur das Über-Ich und das Ich vor, sondern auch das Es, welches regnet. Anders als Leonie, die anfangs verständig bemüht scheint, dem Über-Ich irgendetwas abzugewinnen, und auch am Ende noch immer für ein „Über dir" plädiert, als werde sie getragen von dem Wunsch einer Integration des Unverständlichen, konjugiert Wittgenstein die Sätze systematisch um – als würde er sich lustig machen. Am Ende wirken die beiden Sätze zusammen vor allem nicht mehr brauchbar, können im Spiel nur noch als Hinweis auf eine Sackgasse gesehen werden.

4. Unbewusstes

Das Über-Ich kommt bei Wittgenstein nicht oft zum Zug. Das Unbewusste, genauer gesagt, die Eigenschaft „unbewusst", taucht sehr viel öfter in seinen Überlegungen auf. Ähnlich wie beim Über-Ich hat sich Wittgenstein einen eigenen Gebrauch des psychoanalytischen Ausdrucks angewöhnt. Unbewusst ist zunächst einmal, was nicht bewusst ist – wenn etwa von einer unbewussten Absicht (MS 131: 6f.) die Rede ist. Wittgenstein verwendet „unbewusst" aber auch als Synonym für „nicht gewusst" (MS 118: 71), wohl auch dort, wo er von einer unbewusst enthaltenen Voraussetzung (MS 108: 181) schreibt. Vor dem Ausdruck „unbewusste Seelenzustände" warnt er, denn „nichts wäre irreführender" (MS 116: 90f). Den psychoanalytisch ungewöhnlichsten Gebrauch vom Ausdruck „unbewusst" macht er dort, wo er von unbewussten Zahnschmerzen bei einem kariösen Zahn schreibt, der nicht wehtut (MS 156a: 3, auch MS 114: 30).

Freud betont, dass uns das Unbewusste nur als Bewusstes bekannt ist und fasst Verdrängtes als Teil des Unbewussten auf (vgl. Freud 1915: 264). Der psychoanalytische Begriff des Unbewussten wird aber vom Nicht-Gewussten wie vom Nicht-Wahrgenommenen klar geschieden. Anders als es Wittgenstein in seinem Verständnis der Freudschen Traumanalyse nahelegt (MS 136: 137), ist Unbewusstes – im Zusammenhang mit dem Traum der latente Gedanke – kein Palimpsest, auf welchem sich ein entzifferbarer Urtext findet (vgl. Freud 1900: 615). Das Unbewusste ist kein Ort, an welchem sich greifbar fixiert niedergeschriebene Bedeutungen sammeln. Sondern die Rede vom Unbewussten verweist auf einen dynamischen Kontext, der sowohl seine Entstehung wie den Umgang mit ihm betrifft: Freud sieht im Unbewussten eine psychische Repräsentanz der Triebe (vgl. Freud 1915: 276), die verknüpft ist mit der besonderen psychischen Arbeitsweise des Primärvorgangs (vgl. Freud 1915: 286). Bedeutungen, die unbewusst geworden sind, verschwinden unter neuen Bedeutungen (Freud 1924). Ihre Inskription, ihre Umschriften und ihre damit verbundene Verfügbarkeit unterliegen einer triebbestimmten Dynamik. Und auch jede Traumdeutung ist als sprachlicher Prozess Teil einer solchen Dynamik, deren Eigenheit es ist, dass die latente Bedeutung stets nur umkreist, niemals aber erreicht werden kann.

5. Warnungen

Wittgenstein nimmt eine Vielzahl metapsychologischer Rahmenbedingungen nicht in seine Verwendung des Ausdrucks „unbewusst" auf. Seine Warnung vor unbewussten Seelenzuständen ist Teil einer viel weiterreichenden Warnung, sich von Sprachausdrücken nicht in die Irre führen zu lassen. (Nebenbei sei angemerkt, dass ein theoriegeleitetes und insofern intellektualisierendes Reden über unbewusste Seelenzustände, über das Über-Ich oder das Unbewusste auch in psychoanalytischen Behandlungen nicht gepflegt wird.) Wittgensteins Warnungen Freuds Begrifflichkeit gegenüber sind – das zeigt das Beispiel von Leonie – nicht unberechtigt. Der populäre Umgang mit psychoanalytischem Vokabular führt schnell in unlösbar schwierige Situationen. Wittgenstein macht Freud explizit den Vorwurf, dass er solcherlei Vokabular erfunden und zur Verfügung gestellt hat:

Denk Dir eine Geisteskrankheit, in welcher man Namen nur in Anwesenheit ihrer Träger gebrauchen & verstehen kann. Freud hat durch seine phantastischen Pseudo-Erklärungen (gerade weil sie geistlich sind) einen schlimmen Dienst erwiesen. (Jeder Esel hat sie diese Bilder nun zur Hand, mit ihrer Hilfe Krankheitserscheinungen zu ‚erklären'.) (MS 133: 11)

An dieser Stelle klingt Wittgensteins zentraler Einwand gegen Freuds Theorie der Psychoanalyse an, nämlich die Verwechslung von Gründen und Ursachen (vgl. TS 213: 271), die er Freud zum Vorwurf macht und die Teil einer langwierigen Debatte über die Wissenschaftlichkeit der Psychoanalyse geworden ist. Freud ist freilich auch nicht zurückhaltend gegenüber der Philosophie, wenn er deren Vertretern unter anderem vorwirft, das Unbewusste als „etwas Mystisches, nicht Greifbares und nicht Aufzeigbares" zu sehen (Freud 1913, 406). Wissenschaft und Philosophie verortet Freud zwar auf einer gemeinsamen Linie, wirft der Philosophie aber vor, an der „Illusion fest[zuhalten], ein lückenloses und zusammenhängendes Weltbild liefern zu können, das doch bei jedem neuen Fortschritt unseres Wissens zusammenbrechen muß" (Freud 1933: 173). Methodisch wendet er gegen die Philosophie ein, dass „sie den Erkenntniswert unserer logischen Operationen überschätzt" (Freud 1933: 173).

6. Wie weiter?

Unter Bezugnahme auf Gordon Baker (2004) hat Stefan Majetschak (vgl. auch für das Folgende 2008: 48–51) sechs Parallelen zwischen Wittgensteins philosophischer Methode und Freuds psychoanalytischem Vorgehen beschrieben. Da ist zum einen Wittgensteins Gedanke, auch in der Philosophie Gleichnisse durch ihre Verbalisierung unschädlich zu machen (vgl. TS 302: 28), zum anderen Freuds und Wittgensteins gemeinsame Bevorzugung eines pragmatischen Vorgehens gegenüber der Ausarbeitung einer in sich geschlossenen Theorie. Weiters betonen beide die Notwendigkeit der Mitarbeit der Patient*innen respektive der Denkenden. Und Freuds wie Wittgensteins Ansatz bedarf der Deutungen, die nicht nur angeboten, sondern auch akzeptiert sein müssen, um wirksam zu sein. Auch den suggestiven Anteil, den Wittgenstein an der Psychoanalyse zwar abgelehnt (MS 158: 24), in einer Vorlesung schließlich aber auch für seine philosophische Methode reklamiert hat, finden wir bei Freud – da übrigens mit umgekehrtem Vorzeichen, hat Freud doch die Psychoanalyse gerade aus der Verabschiedung der auf Suggestion ausgerichteten Therapie der Hypnose entwickelt. Die sechste Ähnlichkeit schließlich, nämlich die, der Wittgenstein'schen Philosophie wie der Freud'schen Psychoanalyse eigenen Arbeit an den Widerständen, kann sich ebenfalls auf entsprechende Bemerkungen bei beiden Autoren stützen.

Die von Majetschak vorgeschlagene Trennung zwischen dem methodischen Vorgehen und dem Gegenstand der Untersuchung bleibt freilich fragwürdig. Zum einen waren Wittgensteins diesbezügliche eigene Einschätzungen nicht ganz eindeutig. In einer späten Briefstelle lobt er die wissenschaftlichen Errungenschaften der Psychoanalyse, stellt sie ihrer „gefährlichen und verdorbenen Praxis " gegenüber (vgl. Bouveresse 1991: 11, Majetschak 2008: 38f.). Zum anderen hat Wittgenstein sein eigenes Vorgehen ja angesichts seiner Schwierigkeiten mit Freuds Theorie entwickelt. Die Missverständnisse, die dabei etwa im Hinblick auf das Unbewusste oder die Konzeption des Über-Ichs bestehen, haben offensichtlich den dynamischen Prozess seiner Auseinandersetzung mit der Psychoanalyse nicht beendet, sondern im Gegenteil soweit befördert, dass Wittgenstein seine Methode der psychoanalytischen sogar nachgestalten wollte. Und schließlich richtet sich sein Vorgehen nicht auf die Reflexion theoretischer Konzepte, sondern auf die Eigendynamik konkreter und beispielhafter Anwendungen. Der theoretische Gegenstand verliert dabei etwas von seinem, in der von Wittgenstein kritisierten traditionellen Philosophie hohen Stellenwert. In der Psychoanalyse, in der Unbewusstes als eine unbekannte, unerforschte, einer triebbezogenen Eigenlogik folgende Region ernst genommen wird, lässt sich der Gegenstand theoretisch ebenfalls nicht fassen. Und so könnten Freud und Wittgenstein einander im Feld einer Konjekturalwissenschaft treffen, in welcher vor allem die Vermutung über das Objekt der Forschung wichtig ist.

Die psychoanalytisch wichtigste Frage für Leonie und ihren seltsamen Gesprächspartner stellt Wittgenstein, wenn er fragt, wie das Spiel weitergeht. In dem kleinen Film führt sie zu einer Überraschung: Über dem Mann taucht ein roter Pfeil auf. Wo Leonie das „Über-dir" vermutet hat, zeigt sich ein roter Schriftzug, mit dem auf einen Kinderpsychiatermangel hingewiesen wird. Die Szene diente als filmische Intervention in einer politischen Debatte. Mit einer Psychoanalyse hat sie gar nichts zu tun. Mit dem durch das Schriftinsert initiierten Aspektwechsel setzt sie allerdings in Szene, was Psychoanalyse und wohl auch Wittgenstein in vielen seiner Bemerkungen tun.

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Ludwig Wittgenstein und Frédéric Chopin

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Abstract

This contribution deals with an interdisciplinary Ludwig Wittgenstein research. Musical aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy are discussed in comparison with Frédéric Chopin. In Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* there are not many references to Chopin. There is one in Wittgenstein's handwriting, in MS 134, and the same is in TS 229, TS 245 and TS 233. It is the composer Josef Labor, who influenced Wittgenstein's relation to Chopin. – "Könnte man sich nicht denken, daß Einer der Musik nie gekannt hat & zu uns kommt & jemand einen nachdenklichen Chopin spielen hört, daß der überzeugt wäre, dies sei eine Sprache & man wolle ihm nur den Sinn geheimhalten." (MS 134: 39v, 29. 3. 1947)

Der philosophische Nachlass von Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Briefwechsel mit seiner Familie enthalten nur wenige Hinweise auf Frédéric Chopin und ebenso verhält es sich mit der Sekundärliteratur. Deshalb lohnt es sich, den seltenen Hinweisen auf Chopin in Wittgensteins Nachlass nachzugehen. Die einzige handschriftliche Erwähnung Chopins bei Wittgenstein findet sich in MS 134: 1947; maschinenschriftlich findet sich diese Bemerkung in TS 229, TS 245 und TS 233. Es ist der Komponist Josef Labor gewesen, der Wittgensteins Verständnis von Chopin geprägt hat. Dieser Beitrag hat jedoch nicht zum Ziel, das Verhältnis von Josef Labor zu Wittgensteins Mutter Leopoldine Wittgenstein und das von Josef Labor zu Ludwig Wittgenstein zu klären. Hierfür wären eigenständige Arbeiten erforderlich. Dieser Beitrag soll dagegen für eigene interdizplinäre Forschungsarbeiten zu Wittgenstein und Chopin anregen.

1. Die Notizen von David Pinsent

Die Tagebücher von David Pinsent, einem Freund Wittgensteins, enthalten nur zwei Erwähnungen Chopins, die beide zum Anlass von Besuchen musikalischer Konzertveranstaltungen 1912 und 1913 in Cambridge entstanden sind (Pinsent 1990: 43). Bela Szabados hat eines der Konzerte, am Samstag 12. April 1913, beschrieben, ohne dabei näher auf Chopin einzugehen (Szabdos 2014: 30).

2. Die Wittgenstein-„Familienbriefe"

David Pinsent war bei einem tragischen Flugzeugabsturz im Mai 1918 tödlich verunglückt. Danach hat Wittgenstein im Jahr 1918 die *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung* abgeschlossen. Zurück im Ersten Weltkrieg geriet Wittgenstein im November 1918 in italienische Kriegsgefangenschaft, aus der er im August 1919 entlassen wurde. Fast alle Briefe, in denen von Chopin und auch von Josef Labor die Rede ist, erreichten ihn während seiner italienischen Kriegsgefangenschaft.

Der seit seiner Kindheit blinde Komponist, Pianist und Orgelspieler Josef Labor war in Böhmen geboren und wurde von der Familie Wittgenstein großzügig unterstützt. Es war vor allem Wittgensteins Mutter Leopoldine Wittgenstein, der an Labors Wohlergehen gelegen war. Die Familie Wittgenstein hat außerdem die spätere Drucklegung von Labors kompositorischen Werken finanziert. Labor hat u. a. für Paul Wittgenstein, nach dessen Kriegsverletzung im Ersten Weltkrieg, drei Konzertstücke, Nr. 1, 2 und 3, für Klavier (linke Hand) und Orchester, komponiert (Kundi 1962). Labor war nicht nur ein wichtiger Komponist, sondern auch ein besonders namhafter Klavierlehrer, der bedeutende Komponisten wie, u. a., Arnold Schönberg unterrichtete (Wright 2005).

Der erste Brief stammt von Ludwig Wittgensteins Mutter Leopoldine Wittgenstein.

> Labor zu dem ich jetzt jeden Samstag Vormittag für ein Stündchen gehe – er hat sich das so ausgebeten – spielte mir das letzt Mal ein Chopin'sches *Impromptu* so herrlich vor, daß ich ganz ergriffen davon war. Er schickt Dir tausend Grüße; sein erstes Wort ist allemal die Frage nach Dir. (Leopoldine an Ludwig, 19. Mai 1919, *Gesamtbriefwechsel*)

Der nächste Brief ist von Ludwig Wittgensteins Schwester Hermine Wittgenstein.

> Übermorgen will mir Labor einen Chopin vorspielen den neulich Mama von ihm gehört hat und von dem sie ganz begeistert war, ich schreibe Dir das um Dir zu zeigen wie wohl er ist. (Hermine an Ludwig, 20. Mai 1919, *Gesamtbriefwechsel*)

Der folgende Brief von Hermine Wittgenstein ist nur eine Woche älter.

> Vor einigen Tagen war Labor hier und spielte ganz herrlich Bach und Chopin, er sagte selbst, dass er sich so besonders wohl bei uns fühle und dass das in seinem Spiel zum Ausdruck komme; Mama und ich waren die einzigen und ganz begeisterten Zuhörer, das machte es so stimmungsvoll. (27. Mai 1919, Hermine an Ludwig, 60f.)

Josef Labor (1842–1924) kannte Frédéric Chopins (1810–1849) Bewunderung für Johann Sebastian Bach (1685–1750), besonders für Bachs *Wohltemperiertes Klavier*, und für Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (1756–1791).

3. Die Notizen von M. O'C. Drury

Maurice O'Connor Drury, ein Freund Wittgensteins, der diesen 1929 in Cambridge kennen lernte und mit ihm zeitlebens in Verbindung stand, machte Notizen zu Gesprächen mit Wittgenstein; in einer auf das Jahr 1930 datierten Notiz heißt es:

> Wenige Tage später kam Wittgenstein zu mir und sah sehr niedergeschlagen aus. Er schaute so betrübt drein, daß ich ihn fragte, was passiert sei.
>
> *Wittgenstein*: Ich ging in der Stadt spazieren. Da kam ich an einer Buchhandlung vorbei, und im Schaufenster standen Bilder von Russell, Freud und Einstein. Kurz dar-

> auf sah ich in einer Musikalienhandlung Bilder von Beethoven, Schubert und Chopin. Als ich diese Bilder miteinander verglich, hatte ich das bewegende Gefühl, daß der menschliche Geist nur hundert Jahre gebraucht hatte, um einen derart schrecklichen Niedergang zu erleben. (Rhees, M.O'C. Drury 1987: 160f.)

Ray Monk verglich das Gefühl Wittgensteins mit einer Sichtweise Oswald Spenglers (Monk 2021); über Ray Monk nahm Marjorie Perloff ebenfalls auf Maurice O'Connor Drurys Notiz Bezug (Perloff 1996: 10); Monk und Perloff gehen jedoch nicht näher auf Chopin ein.

4. Die Erwähnung in Manuskriptband MS 134

Nach seinem freiwilligen Kriegsdienst während des Zweiten Weltkriegs, in den Jahren 1941–1944 im Londoner Guy's Hospital und im Forschungslabor in Newcastle, trat Wittgenstein im Jahr 1944 wieder sein Amt als Professor in Cambridge an. Er fühlte sich darin nicht wohl und beschrieb dies als „lebendig Begrabensein" (Malcolm 1961).

Am 28. März 1947 bereitete ihm, in MS 134, die Formulierung einer Bemerkung zu den Grundlagen der Philosophie einige Schwierigkeiten. Nach Korrekturen kommt es zur Unterbrechung der streng philosophischen Thematik. Stattdessen folgt eine Bemerkung zum Verständnis eines Satzes und wie Wittgenstein seine Sätze explizit gelesen wünscht.

> Manchmal kann ein Satz nur verstanden werden, wenn man ihn im *richtigen Tempo* liest. Meine Sätze sind alle *langsam* zu lesen.
> MS 134: 39rf., 28. 3. 1947

Dies ist die letzte am 28. März 1947 notierte eigenständige Bemerkung. Es folgt noch eine nachträgliche Korrektur, geschrieben zwischen jeweils zwei Schrägstrichen, zur Formulierung eines Teils der Bemerkung auf der Seite zuvor.

> //: Es kommen die rechten Beispiele nicht. //
> MS 134: 39V, 28. 3. 1947

Am 29. März 1947 notiert Wittgenstein in MS 134 die folgenden Bemerkungen, die einleitend als „Das Sprechen der Musik." gekennzeichnet sind, und die als eine Art Einheit zu lesen sind, da sie, ohne Leerzeilen, unmittelbar aufeinander folgen. Hier findet sich, im philosophischen Nachlass einzigartig, die Bemerkung zu Frédéric Chopin.

> 29. 3.
> Das Sprechen der Musik. Vergiss nicht, daß ein Gedicht, [obgleich] wenn auch in der Sprache der Mitteilung abgefaßt, nicht [in einem] im Sprachspiel der Mitteilung verwendet wird.
> Könnte man sich nicht denken, daß Einer der Musik nie gekannt hat und zu uns kommt und jemand einen nachdenklichen Chopin spielen hört, daß der überzeugt wäre, dies sei eine Sprache und man wolle ihm nur den Sinn geheimhalten.
> In der Wortsprache ist ein starkes musikalisches Element. (Ein Seufzer, der Tonfall der Frage, der Verkündigung, der Sehnsucht, alle die unzähligen Gesten des Tonfalls.)
> MS 134: 39v, 29. 3. 1947

Mit so unauffälliger wie selbstverständlicher Eleganz kommt im mittleren Absatz die Verbindung von Poesie, Musikalität und Philosophie in der Frageform zum Ausdruck, jedoch gerade ohne dass ein Fragezeichen zum formalen Abschluss des Satzes verwendet wird. Das Gesagte hält sich fast schwebend in einer in sich getragenen Nachdenklichkeit.

„Das Sprechen der Musik." (MS 134: 39v) erinnert indirekt bereits an eine Bemerkung über Josef Labor, die Wittgenstein, in MS 134, etwa zwei Monate später notiert.

> Denke dran, wie man von Labors Spiel gesagt hat „Er spricht".
> MS 134: 79v, 11. 5. 1947

Am 30. März 1947 notiert Wittgenstein, in MS 134, einige Bemerkungen, die nochmals die Themen des Vortages aufgreifen, doch besonders erwähnenswert ist die folgende.

> "Man suche nichts hinter den Phänomenen; sie selbst sind die Lehre." (Goethe.)
> MS 134: 40r, 29. 3. 1947

Noch am gleichen Tag des 30. März 1947 findet Wittgenstein, im Anschluss an die zitierte Bemerkung, zur streng philosophischen Gedankenentwicklung zurück.

5. Die *Zettel* und *Philosophie der Psychologie*

Die Chopin betreffende Bemerkung, von MS 134: 39v, hat Wittgenstein in das im Herbst 1947 entstandene Typoskript TS 229 diktiert, wo sie auf S. 396 die Nr. 1556 erhält. Das TS 229 ist als die Fortsetzung des Typoskripts TS 228 anzusehen. Das TS 229 enthält Bemerkungen aus MS 130–135 und im wesentlichen hat Wittgenstein hier die kompletten Manuskriptbände diktiert.

Das vermutlich 1947 oder 1948 entstandene Typoskript TS 245 stellt, neu paginiert, mit jedoch gleicher Nummerierung, eine textidentische Version des TS 229 dar. Es handelt sich also um keinen Durchschlag, sondern um ein neu getipptes Dokument. Die Bemerkung zu Chopin findet sich auf S. 285 mit der gleichen Nr. 1556. Hier findet sich eine maschinenschriftliche Korrektur des „jemand" in „jemanden" (TS 245: 285). Was Wittgenstein mit TS 245 zum Ziele hatte, ist schwer zu bestimmen, vielleicht eine neue Version einer anderen Zettelsammlung.

Das TS 233 ist als eine „Zettelsammlung" bekannt; was Wittgenstein mit dieser zu tun beabsichtigte, ist schwer zu bestimmen. Peter Geach habe die Nachlasskiste, so sagt man, versehentlich umgekehrt geöffnet, die Zettel fielen heraus und deshalb sei er so sehr um ein geordnetes Buch bemüht gewesen. Es handelte sich also bei TS 233 um kein Typoskript, sondern um eine teils mit Büroklammern zusammengeheftete Sammlung von unterschiedlichen Zettel, die vor allem von Durchschlägen aus TS 228, TS 229 und TS 232 stammen, aber auch frühere Bemerkungen aus den zwanziger Jahren enthalten.

Aus der „Zettelsammlung" TS 233 gelangte die Bemerkung zu Chopin durch Peter Geach in die *Zettel*; in der Suhrkamp-Werkausgabe der Schriften Wittgensteins von 1984 finden sich die *Zettel* in Band 8 (WA 8: 304). Die Bemerkungen erhielten hier jedoch zwei Nummern, Nr. 160 und Nr. 161. Der erste Absatz in TS 233: 35, am unteren Seitenrand, Nr. 160; nach dem ersten Absatz wurde der Zettel von Peter Geach für einen Seitenumbruch mit der Schere durchschnitten; der zweite Absatz, der die Bemerkung zu Chopin enthält, und der dritte Absatz, folgen in TS 233: 36, am oberen Seitenrand, Nr. 161.

Der erste Band der *Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie* wurde von Georg Henrik von Wright, Heikki Nyman und Elisabeth Anscombe herausgegeben. Der Text selbst gibt die Bemerkungen von TS 228 und von TS 229 wieder. Die Bemerkung zu Chopin findet sich hier auf Seite 162 f. und erhielt die Nr. 888; am Ende der Bemerkungen wurden in eckigen Klammern die Nummern angeführt, die die entsprechenden Bemerkungen in den Zetteln erhielten „ [Vgl. Z. 160, 161.]" (Z: 162f.). In der Suhrkamp-Werkausgabe der Schriften Wittgensteins finden sich die *Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie* in Band 7 (BPP: 162f.).

Katrin Eggers hat in ihrem Buch *Ludwig Wittgenstein als Musikphilosoph* (Eggers 2014) versucht, die Philosophie Wittgensteins mit der Bedeutung der Musik zu verbinden. Der vorliegende Beitrag versteht sich als eine Ergänzung zu Katrin Eggers musikwissenschaftlichen Ausführungen, denn auf Chopin ging sie nur wenig ein.

Als Wittgenstein im Manuskriptband MS 134, am 29. März 1947 von jemandem schrieb, „der einen nachdenklichen Chopin spielen hört", hat er damals an Josef Labor gedacht? Labor war zwar schon im Jahre 1924 gestorben, doch Labor war für Wittgenstein so wichtig, dass er in seinen spätesten Briefen um die Reproduktion einer Zeichnung von Hermine Wittgenstein bat, die sie von Josef Labor auf seinem Totenbett angefertigt hatte (*Familienbriefe*, Nr. 176, Nr. 178, S. 202f., 204).

Das Thema des Improvisierens ist hier nicht nur zufällig angedeutet. Chopin war ein Meister der Improvisation. Die Improvisation war, zu Chopins Lebzeiten, ungleich wichtiger und bedeutender für die klassische Musik, als sie dies heute ist. Hier eröffnet sich nun ein für die Musik wichtiger Aspekt des Vergleichs. Ist nicht Wittgenstein, vor allem seit seiner Rückkehr nach Cambridge 1929, ein großer Meister an philosophischer Improvisation, wie Chopin ein großer Meister an musikalischer Improvisation war?

Wittgenstein zog es nicht nach Paris und so war ihm die leidenschaftliche Hingabe an Polen, wie sie für Chopin kennzeichnend war, eher fremd. Hatte er aber nicht eine ähnliche Hingabe an Österreich, und vor allem an Wien? Wittgenstein sagte bekanntlich gerne „Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Brahms und Labor" hätten in Wien komponiert, und so stand er der „Wiener Klassik" sehr nahe (Monk 2021: 10).

Im der Publikationsgeschichte hat der Komponist Walter Zimmermann mit seinem Buch *Ludwig Wittgenstein. Betrachtungen zur Musik* (Zimmermann 2022) ein neues Kapitel aufgeschlagen, denn die Bemerkungen zur Musik kann man auf vielen Ebenen und Analogiestufen verfolgen; so hat die Bemerkung zu Chopin ein neues Medium gefunden.

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Moral and Religious Grammar

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Abstract

Wittgenstein considered both ethical and religious statements nonsensical. While this has been taken to imply the impossibility of their philosophical study, I will argue that his later conception of grammar allows for such studies as grammatical remarks on moral and religious practice. I will first consider an apparent tension between Wittgenstein's thoughts on grammar and ethics, brought out in recent years by a debate between Anne-Marie Christensen and Edmund Dain. I will then argue that, though the topic of ethics was seldom mentioned by Wittgenstein in his later career, his remarks on religion point to the viability of the grammatical study thereof, regardless of any changes to his views on value since the *Tractatus*. I will close by connecting these remarks to later developments in Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, particularly in the works of D. Z. Phillips, showing how such studies are independent of considerations of propositional sense or the delimitation of their areas.

1. The debate on moral grammar

The first view which I would like to consider is that proposed by Christensen (2018), that the criticisms of moral theory posed both by Wittgenstein and by broadly 'anti-theoretical' positions on morality – ranging from Baier and Williams to Diamond and Phillips – do not imply a rejection of moral theory outright, but leave open the possibility of descriptive, rather than normative, moral theories. While she attributes such a view to Amelie Rorty (2010) (Christensen 2018: 180–1), the influence of the differing readings of grammar by Baker and Hacker are also worth noting (id. 186–8; cf. PI: §664). From the former, she draws a notion of grammatical remarks as ultimately context-dependent and representative of particular philosophical aims and perspectives (Baker 2004: 77). From the latter, she takes the possibility of a positive reading of theories as 'surveyable presentations' of grammatical features, arguing that Wittgenstein's objections to theory targeted a model of general and hypothetico-deductive theories resembling those found in the natural sciences (Hacker 2013: 166).

Her conclusions may be divided into three points (2018: 189–90): that morality is a viable object of grammatical description; that an overview of these grammatical points could be presented as a theory; and, finally, that existing moral theories can be read as grammatical remarks in this way. I will focus on the first of these, as does the criticism of her position by Dain.

Moving on to the criticism of this idea of moral grammar by Dain (2018), I will start from some features of his general argument and position. His central claim is that Wittgenstein's views on ethics didn't change significantly throughout his work (Dain 2018: 9, 26–9), and that they consist in the notion that purportedly ethical statements are nonsensical under an austere reading of nonsense, no more 'attractive' – as claimed by Diamond (1991: 161) – than any other piece of nonsense, regardless of ethical intentions. His suggestion, to take a phrase from Ramsey (1931: 263), is that we cannot pretend "that it is important nonsense".

One particular piece of his argument is worth mentioning in that it suggests the analogy between ethics and religion on which I will elaborate below. Dain (2013: 5–6) sees the Tractarian claim that there are no ethical propositions as a development of the same idea – the non-accidentality of value (TLP: 6.41) – that leads to the rejection of a definition of good in Plato's *Euthyphro* (10a). An interesting issue stemming from this (Dain 2018: 15) is the apparent contradiction in that Wittgenstein would eventually adopt the Euthyphrean definition, in a conversation with Schlick: "[w]hat God commands, that is good. For it cuts off the way to any explanation 'why' it is good." (WVC: 115, in reply to Schlick 1939: 10–1). The contradiction is dissolved by when we take into account that the idea here wouldn't be that of proposing that the good can be defined, but of placing both in the same sphere of the unsayable, outside the world.

It is with this view of ineffability in mind that Dain wants to argue against a view such as Christensen's, which would seek to make way for ethical discourse through a later concept of grammar – though, as I will argue, his thesis doesn't contradict her first conclusion. His argument on this goes as follows (2018: 28–9): In the *Investigations* as well as in the *Tractatus*, there is no such thing as an ethical thought or proposition. However, an idea of moral philosophy as grammatical remarks, reminders of the uses of words (cf. PI: §§246, 251–2), could still be sustained, so long as it has no pretensions to say the unsayable. The issue then is: what uses of words do these remarks clarify? How do we have specifically moral propositions that need clarifying?

Thus, it is not against the possibility of this kind of grammatical remark, but rather a demand for a justification for this possibility, given that the statements are empty in content. We need, he claims, "to find some alternative way of understanding how there can be ethical forms of thought and talk for the later Wittgenstein at all, before we can make sense of the idea of rules of grammar in relation to those forms" (Dain 2018: 29). For the remainder of this discussion I will argue that, even under the assumption that Wittgenstein's position on value did remain fairly consistent, his later thoughts on practice, which would take root in the early thirties, allow for the clarification of the grammar of moral statements without accounting for respective forms of thought.

2. Religious grammatical remarks

So far, I have presented a debate about moral philosophy, and the possibility of studying the grammar of moral statements. I will now move on to some of Wittgenstein's remarks on religion, and his subsequent influence on the philosophy of religion, arguing that they offer some valuable insights to solve the conflict between those two positions. The starting point for this analogy between the moral and the religious is the nonsensicality of their alleged statements, asserted both in the *Tractatus* and repeatedly in Wittgenstein' s later career. However, while Wittgenstein seemed content to leave most talk of ethics behind after his "Lecture on Ethics", religion –

and, more specifically, religious grammar – would remain a recurring topic.

In reply to Dain, I will argue that Wittgenstein's open consideration of the possibility of grammatical studies of religion shows that this sort of inquiry is independent of establishing the possibility of those forms of thought. This is not to say that the later Wittgenstein changed his mind on the ineffability of value underlying ethics and religion. Rather, it can be understood as a result of a new emphasis on practice, where consideration of the underlying grammar of an existing practice becomes a distinct consideration from its propositional sense. I will further argue, in reply to Christensen, that the examples of grammatical remarks on religion put forward by Wittgenstein, while supporting the first point of her conclusion, still cast doubt on the possibility of a theory and, most of all, of a grammatical reading of existing theories. This is brought out by the contrast between traditional philosophy of religion and a specifically Wittgensteinian approach, as well as by the issues inherent to tracing any boundaries demanded by the notion of a theoretical overview, even if these are no objection to the possibility of philosophical and grammatical consideration on these topics.

In various later texts, Wittgenstein directly defends the possibility of a grammatical study of religion. This line of thought can be seen as early as 1930, in a passage that goes some way into establishing the shift represented by the increasing consideration of practice, starting from this period of contact with verificationism: "Obviously the essence of religion cannot have anything to do with the fact that there is talking, or rather: when people talk, then this itself is part of a religious act and not a theory. Thus it does not matter at all if the words used are true or false or nonsense" (WVC: 117). Here, we already see a distinction between the concern with "value that is of value" – still taken as inexpressible in religion as well as in ethics – and understanding religious practice as disconnected from explanatory, theoretical pretensions.

In later years, Wittgenstein would connect this idea of religious practice with one of grammar. We find a hint of this in the parenthetical remark in PI (2009), §373: "Grammar tells us what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar.)". This same point is further developed, and exemplified, in a remark published in *Zettel* (§717; TS 233b: IIIr): "'You can't hear god speak to someone else, you can hear him only if you are being addressed'. – That is a grammatical remark.". Not only is this notion of a grammatical remark used in the same sense as drawn by Christensen, it also greatly resembles the sense employed by D. Z. Phillips, who I will now discuss as developing this same line.

3. Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion

As far as interpretation of Wittgenstein goes, Phillips seems to engage little with these suggestions, besides arguing that this kind of grammatical approach to religion is also undertaken in the "Lectures on Religious Belief" (Phillips 1993: 61–6). In his *The Concept of Prayer*, Phillips arguably started and best exemplified a Wittgensteinian and grammatical approach to the philosophy of religion, based more generally on the approach to philosophical problems in the *Investigations*. His aim is to "leave everything as it is" (PI 2009: §§123–4; Phillips 1965: 1–3), bringing forward the grammar of religious practice. Though the work was written long before the interpretations of depth grammar by Baker and Hacker, he presents the concept as revealing internal and contextualized criteria for understanding an utterance as confused (Phillips 1965: 8–9), in a way that would seem to foreshadow Baker (2004: 77–81).

Phillips (1965: 9, 24) also saw the same descriptive, contextualized, and broadly anti-theoretical approach in Winch's *The Idea of a Social Science*, and, elsewhere, read it as a recurring theme in Winch's work as well as his own (1992: 61–2), holding for considerations on anthropology as well as those on religion and ethics. In this, both thinkers offer a key piece for my reply to Dain's call for a general understanding of the possibility of moral thought:

> The presumption of ethical theorists consists in laying claim to an ultimate criterion to determine the content of morality. […]. The importance of Winch's work is in showing that a readiness to wait on examples in discussion carries with it no presumption about such an ultimate criterion. (Phillips 1992: 69)

Applying this approach to the issue posed by Dain, we get at the view that a study of moral grammar does not require accounting for ethical thought and sense, or for a delimitation of morality as a specific topic, but rather the ability to name and work off of at least one example of a specifically moral practice, that is, to take to heart the attention to particulars suggested in the *Investigations*. As implied above with Wittgenstein's remarks on religion, the impossibility of grounding these practices in sensical propositions or thought has no bearing on this.

It is worth considering that a similar conclusion is presented by Cora Diamond, via Iris Murdoch: that, in ethics, there is a difficulty "in specifying the phenomena to be studied. Our moral judgements themselves shape our conception of the field of study." (Diamond 1983: 373). This issue, however, is not presented as a problem for reflection of moral issues, but as a suggestion that the task of delimiting the moral sphere should not be undertaken at all. Of course, the form and goals of such moral reflection differs greatly between these two pairs of authors, particularly on the matter of grammar (cf. Venturinha 2010: 393–4). Still, the common ground of attention to particulars and context, and an interest in the role of literature in moral thought, seems notable in all these authors.

My argument thus far has relied on a close analogy between ethical and religious thought and practice. In closing, I would like to consider a key dissimilarity that marks the limits of this analogy. Our philosophical culture is far more open to a descriptive account of religion than one of ethics: to 'leave religion as it is' is a sign of respect and a step towards pluralism, while to 'leave morality as it is' is considered a relativistic move, held in lower regard. Whether this move into relativism is so directly implied is up for debate: Phillips (1965: 9; 1993: 57, 77) has often argued that his approach to religion does not exclude criticism, and that careful analysis of depth grammar can provide for a distinction between what is rational and irrational within a set of practices. Numerous debates may be had on if this is enough; what I hope to have shown is that they should be separate from any demarcation of the areas of ethics and religion, or consideration of their propositional sense.

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Platonism of Nature and Cosmos: Was Kepler a Platonist or Rather a Pythagorean?

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Abstract

I present Platonic views of nature and the cosmos as expressed in the *Timaeus*, concentrating on elements or themes which, it appears, can also be found in views of Johannes Kepler: the use of regular polyhedra, the belief in a well-ordering divine agent, the conviction of an intimate relation between astronomy and harmonics. I discuss Kepler's polyhedra-model and questions of the number and distances of the planets, which were not only touched on by Plato, but also treated by the Pythagoreans. I comment on the topic of the *Music of the Spheres* (1619), where Kepler was closer to the numerical speculations of the Pythagoreans than to Plato. I add a recent view about the mathematical nature of reality. I conclude that Kepler, while indeed following up on general concerns of the ancient philosophers, cannot be considered anything like a full-fledged Platonist or Pythagorean, if only because he definitely abolished the distinction between celestial and terrestrial motion, between celestial and terrestrial physics.

1. Introduction

There are often more or less remarkable parallels between Plato's view of the cosmos and later
philosophical and scientific approaches or treatments of the physical world. To what extent can such later conceptions be considered as Platonist. As an outstanding example, we can consider Kepler's views. What will strike one quite immediately is that both Plato and Kepler use the regular polyhedra in their accounts of nature and the cosmos; also, that both believe that it was a Demiurge or God, who ordered the world in fair, if not harmonious ways; and also that both saw astronomy and harmonics as intimately geometrically or mathematically related. One can suspect, though, that certain elements in Kepler's views, like the idea of a Music of the Spheres, rather are Pythagorean. I discuss such commonalities and also differences, so as to get an answer to my title question.

2. Timaeus

What, then, is Plato's own approach to the physical world, as found in the Timaeus (Plato 360 B.C.E.)? In this dialogue, Timaeus, a perhaps fictitious rich citizen of a Greek colony in Southern Italy, gives a long philosophical presentation about the nature and creation of the cosmos.

An account of the changing physical world, as contrasted with the intelligible eternal world, can, according to Timaeus, only be a likely story. The universe must have a fair cause, a demiurge, who brings order into the chaotic preexisting substance, consisting of the shapeless four elements, mixed and constantly moving. He did this by imitating perfect eternal forms, reckoning with the only other factor, "necessity" in the sense of brute facts of nature. Since something intelligible is fairer than unintelligible creatures, he endowed the world with a soul.

The perceptible universe was fashioned by the creator by four elements, so as to render it proportioned. Since material bodies are visible and tangible, solid, there had to be fire and earth. A third and fourth element was needed as a bonding mean. So he placed water and air between fire and earth, and the material world was thus harmonized by proportion.

Now, Timaeus claimed that the elements consisted of minute particles. These have a certain depth and are bounded by plane surfaces. Every rectilinear plane is composed of isosceles or scalene right triangles, where the latter can form equilateral triangles. With such triangles, the demiurge constructed the building blocks of the elements in the form of regular convex polyhedra. Three of them are formed with equilateral triangles: the tetrahedron for fire, the octahedron for air, and the icosahedron for water. Isosceles right triangles yield the cube (hexahedron) as the shape for earth. The fifth possible regular polyhedron, the dodecahedron with pentagonal faces, the demiurge used as the form of the cosmos as a whole, also since in this way it could represent the twelve zodiac signs. Thus, the entire perceptible world is built from these five perfect polyhedra, the so-called 'Platonic solids'. They represent a maximum of symmetry and beauty.

Timaeus pointed out, furthermore, that the faces of four elements could be broken down into their component triangles, which could then be put together in various ways to form all kinds of physical matter. This idea is used to give explanations for numerous characteristics of matter, such as water's capacity to extinguish fire, for differences as between wine and oil, for material processes like burning, and for perceptual qualities like color.

The general background of this account is the defining metaphysical characteristic of Plato's philosophy, his postulation of a realm of Ideas or Forms. In contrast to the sensible world, Forms are perfect, eternal, unchanging, abstract, unique, and intelligible. According to most Plato experts, the Timaeus' triangles and regular solids are not Forms. They consider triangles, as well as numbers, as intermediary entities, as intermediate between Forms and the sensible world. This is so, because there are many, say, equilateral triangles or, say, 6's appearing in various different calculations; they are in that sense not unique. There is of course the Idea of a triangle, or the Idea of 6, just as there is the Idea of a man, or the Idea of justice, or the Idea of the good.

The view that mathematical entities are intermediaries fits in with Plato's view of the appropriate education that leads the student to a vision of the realm of Forms (a prerequisite of the philosopher-king). The studies of arithmetic, plane and solid geometry, astronomy and harmonics are for Plato essential preludes for advancing to dialectic, that is philosophy.

3. Planetary System

In his *Mysterium Cosmographicum* (1596), Johannes Kepler used the Platonic solids in his model of the solar system. This clearly is quite different from Timaeus's use of them for the microscopic composition of the world. Kepler was of course quite familiar with the Platonic associations of the regular solids with the classical elements. He also studied other kinds of solids, for instance stellated, star-like, solids. There is a slight commonality with the Platonic approach in that Timaeus used the dodecahedron macroscopically for the form of the world as a whole. And there is the geometrical commonality in that Kepler also describes the regular polygons in terms of their faces, triangles.

Kepler's model of the cosmos or, rather, heliocentric system consists of nested polyhedra. The idea of nested polyhedra seems to have been suggested by ornamental turnings of such nested polyhedra which were quite common at the time (Brecher 2011). Between the spheres of any two planets he placed a regular polyhedron: an octahedron between Mercury and Venus, an icosahedron between Venus and Earth, a dodecahedron between Earth and Mars, a tetrahedron between Mars and Jupiter, and a hexahedron between Jupiter and Saturn. Since there are exactly five regular polyhedra, Platonic solids, this fitting arrangement was for Kepler the explanation for the number of planets. He also endeavored to construct the model in such a way that the distances between planets could be determined and thus also explained.

The Pythagoreans as well as Plato had also treated the questions of the number of planets and their distances. In the creation story of the *Timaeus*, in the context of a still geocentric view, the World Soul gets divided into two circles, one of which gets subdivided into seven concentric circles corresponding to the seven planets of the time. The circles were ordered at distances from the earth corresponding to the seven numbers of the tetraktys, the harmonic numbers of the soul: 1 represents the distance to the Moon, 2 to the Sun, 3 to Venus, and so on. Plato, apparently, was not bothered by the glaring incorrectness of these relative distances. Yet, he is known to have pronounced as task for astronomers to account for the partly erratic motion of the planets in terms of perfect circles.

Given their numerological-spiritual metaphysics, the tetraktys was of special significance to the Pythagoreans. They prayed by it and swore secret oaths by it. A summation of the dots of the tetraktys results in the holy perfect number 10. Because of this requirement of perfection, so goes the suggestion, the Pythagorean Philolaus added a tenth planet, a Counter-Earth, in his astronomical system, in which all the heavenly bodies revolved around a Central Fire.

Today, we do not think any more that the number and distances of the planets should be given a principled, law-like, or intentional explanation; they rather count as historical accidents. Kepler realized that his polyhedra-model did not give a representation of the planetary distances that could numerically satisfy him. He kept searching further, and his further geometrical-mathematical investigations were successful. They resulted in general explanations of planetary motion, namely in the formulation of his first two planetary laws, the elliptical orbits and the area law.

4. Cosmic Harmony

The idea of Music of the Spheres or a Cosmic Harmony, usually considered to be inaudible though, was for centuries part of many views of the cosmos. The Pythagoreans thought that, because heavy fast-moving objects make noise, the planets should also make sounds, even if not audible. Their famous discovery that the pitch of tones of vibrating strings was determined by their lengths enabled them to concretize this idea numerically. So, the distance from the earth of a celestial body, which they took to be correlated with its speed, determined the tone it made. The relative distances then, for them, had ratios of consonances, which coincided with ratios given by the tetraktys. The distance between the sphere of the fixed stars and the earth gave the most perfect harmonic interval, the ratio 2:1, that is an Octave. Another one is the perfect Fifth, a ratio 3:2. In this way, the planets and stars produce harmonious sounds.

Plato, on the one hand, criticized the Pythagorean musical-astronomical conceptions for giving greater importance to ears in the place of the mind. On the other hand, he also speculated, qualitatively as it were, that, on the rims of the planet-carrying circles, Sirens were placed, accompanying the revolutions of the circles with uttering notes, and the concord of the eight notes produced a single harmony.

In his *Harmonices Mundi* (1619), Kepler offers a digression on the Pythagorean tetraktys, where he discusses the harmonic intervals encoded in this symbol: the Octave, or 2:1, the Fifth, or 3:2, and the Fourth, or 4:3, the main consonances represented in the the tetraktys. It seems that these considerations helped him in finding his Third Law. It can be formulated as follows: The square of the ratio of the periodic times of any two planets is precisely equal to the cube of the ratio of their mean distances from the sun. Kepler stressed that we have to do with an exact and essential ratio of 3:2 or 2:3, between the exponent of the square and cube.

Kepler also investigated and determined in which way the orbital motion of the planets could match musical harmonies. Yet he did so in a new manner, since his planetary orbits now were ellipses. He took the ratio of the maximum speed and the minimum speed of a planet as defining a harmony. For the earth, this is the ratio 16:15, which certainly is not a perfect consonance. Jupiter yielded a rather inharmonic proportion.

What Kepler accomplished in general was the break with, the abandonment of, the old almost sacrosanct distinction between the celestial and terrestrial realms. He started to look at the heavenly bodies with the eyes of a physicist, endeavoring to consistently apply terrestrial physics, including kinematic and geometry. This then meant that much of a perfect Harmony of the Spheres got lost. He went on to search for the real physical causes of planetary motion and speculated about a sweeping magnetic force emanating from the sun. This was not a successful idea. A successful explanation had to wait for Newton.

Kepler had no truck with a Platonic distinction between an intelligible realm of Ideas and the sensible world. What he in general had in common with Plato and other thinkers was the idea of a wise, benevolent Creator of the cosmos. He felt blessed for having been enabled to reveal God's geometrical plan for the universe. Discovering the laws of planetary motion was for him catching a glimpse of the thoughts of the Creator.

5. Coda

The success of mathematics in the description of the physical world is truly astonishing (cf. Kirschenmann 2018). What is the explanation? One more recent extreme proposal of an answer has been offered by Max Tegmark (2014), enriched with elaborate conceptions of multiple universes. He applauds Plato for realizing that reality is "more than meets the eye" (ibid., 8). Only, he thinks that the Universe is not *made of* mathematical objects, regular polyhedra, but that it is part of a single mathematical object. This idea that our Universe is in some sense mathematical, he says, goes back at least to the Pythagoreans. And it was asserted by Galileo, who stated that the Book of Nature was written in mathematical language.

Tegmark formulates his view as his "Mathematical Universe Hypothesis: Our external physical reality is a mathematical structure" (ibid., 254), including everything, also us humans. Many mathematicians adhere to a view called 'mathematical Platonism', holding that mathematical ideas exist objectively and independently of the human mind and also the physical world. In a sense, Tegmark's view is inconsistent with this Platonism, which implies for instance that the addition of real velocities is to be distinguished from a plain arithmetical addition and is thus not just a mathematical relation.

6. In Conclusion

We saw that certain general elements and themes of Platonic views of nature and the cosmos as expressed in the *Timaeus*, can also be found in views of Johannes Kepler: the use of regular polyhedra, the belief in a well-ordering divine agent, the conviction of an intimate relation between astronomy and harmonics. Some of them, like the last-mentioned conviction or related questions of numbers and distances of planets played also a role in Pythagorean thought. Yet, not surprisingly, Kepler cannot be considered anything like a full-fledged Platonist or Pythagorean. He does not belief in a Platonic realm of Ideas; he abolished the distinction between celestial and terrestrial motion, between celestial and terrestrial physics; he replaced celestial circular motion with planetary ellipses, which implied for him a non-Pythagorean Music of the Spheres.

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Wonder in Ancient Greek Epic Poetry and Philosophy, and in Wittgenstein, Dante and Giotto

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Abstract

In this essay, Ilse Somavilla's insights of "*Thaumazein* in Ancient Greek Philosophy and Wonder in the Writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein" (2005) are starting points for addressing the problem: "People nowadays think, scientists are there to instruct them, poets, musicians etc. to entertain them. That the latter have something to teach them; that never occurs to them." (Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value* 1998: 42). We engage the problem by exploring features of 'wonder' Wittgenstein shares with 'visible speech' in Dante Alighieri's (1265–1321) *Divine Comedy* and Giotto di Bondone's (1267–1337) Scrovegni Chapel murals.

1. Thaumazein in Ancient Greek Epic Poetry and Philosophy

> [D]espite Aristotle's appreciation of myths, [his] words reveal a preference for a rational view of the world. Hundreds of years later, Wittgenstein, tired of scientific progress, takes the other way round – the way from rational explanation back to pictures, metaphors, similes, gestures and the like – similar to myths (Somavilla 2005: 9).

Few topics have occurred more often than 'wonder' in the long history of debates over the tasks of philosophy, and of the arts. In the early Greek epics of Hesiod and Homer, terms for 'wonder' (*thauma, theaomi,* etc.) have connotations of nouns as well as verbs. Both see wonder as a crucial agency for seeing humility as a critical step towards illuminating aspects of the world otherwise eclipsed by hubris, and seeing grounds of true wisdom anew. As noun, *thauma* refers to things, events, or agencies, which elicit overwhelmed surprise, marvel, admiration, and awe (Somavilla 2005). As verb, *theaomai* concerns what people do – how they respond to agencies of wonder on multi-sensorial interfaces of seeing and knowing. Somavilla's study draws attention to long lasting trajectories of connotations of wonder:

- as a state of amazement, enrapture, astonishment, and awe, that can even eclipse everything except the agency that evokes it;
- but also, as impetus for experiences of puzzlement and doubt about the hitherto taken as 'self-evident' that enga- ge reason's capacities for critical questioning and creative innovation in means to see the world anew.

Pre-socratic philosophers, such as Thales of Miletus, and then Plato and Aristotle reinterpreted these connotations in relation to their arguments for rejecting "merely sensorial perception of the world" in favour of abstract rational thinking, and debates over *mythos, logos* and the tasks of philosophy (Somavilla 2005: 7–9). These arguments belong to the long history of traditions that have polarised, for instance, verse and prose, myth and history, imagination and reason, the true and the false, and art versus science. They figure amongst roots of the problem noted by John Hyman (2006: 2, 60) that "in the whole body of philosophical literature, from Plato to the present day, there are two main contending doctrines" on pictorial representations: one says that pictures represent an "object by copying its form and its colour" (but not its internal structures), the other – the 'illusion theory' – stresses impacts pictures have on people claimed to be susceptible to irrationality and superstition. These options have long impeded fresh perspectives on what is meant by taking art and science equally seriously.

> Whereas philosophers and psychologists are fascinated by illusion […], artists have more often said that they are interested in nature, reality, and truth […]. But when we discover how differently their intentions were realized in paint, the appearance of unanimity vanishes before our eyes. And this makes it tempting to dismiss these remarks as lazy repetitions of stock phrases, which a sophisticated art theory will debunk […]. This is the conclusion many philosophers have reached […]. I doubt whether any of this is right. (Hyman 2006: xviii).

But they are not the only options. Comparing 'wonder' in Wittgenstein with 'visible speech' in Dante and Giotto brings light to that these are not the only options for reflection on wonder, and the philosophical significance of the arts. Important alternatives show that: "In the world of image making […] the pictorial artists, even one who works in the tradition known as 'realism' or 'illusionism,' is as much concerned with the visible as the visible world […]. This […] may seem less paradoxical if we remind ourselves that painters have always claimed to present us with more than meets the eye" (Mitchell 1986: 39–40).

One of the most puzzling aspects of Giotto's wonderful murals in the Scrovegni Chapel is the 'realism' with which they picture such otherwise un-see-able things as mysteries recorded Scripture, and variously facilitate viewers' grasp of salient aspects and connections to their own forms of life. Dante and such proto-humanist scholars as Francesco da Barbarino (1264–1348) and Petrus Albano (1250–1316) are likely to have agreed (see, on Dante, Fortuna and Gragnolati, 1995). These scholars studied Platonist and Aristotelian perspectives on the dynamics of wonder and human capacities for critical reflection, styles of expression, and criteria for censoring some forms of poetic narrative and promoting morally valuable serious, reserved forms. But they developed new convictions concerning the tasks of art based on Latin translations of Ibn al-Haithan's (Alhazen's) (965–1040) De Aspectus (1998); and on topics of rhetoric, metaphor, and *ekphrasis* in Horace (65–8 B.C.E), Cicero (106–43 B.C.E.) and Quintilian (ca. 35–95 C.E.). Emphasis fell on art's tasks of facilitating prudent circumspection of and care (*Solicituda* – forethought, duty, responsibility) for otherwise invisible connections of past, future and contemporary sacred history (Frojmovič 2007).

2. Wonder (Puzzlement) and Perspicuous Representation

Somavilla's essay (2005: 5, 11–12) suggests that ancient Greek connotations of *thaumazien* can throw light on Wittgenstein's arguments for including human wonder about the "phenomenal world and the world beyond" amongst philosophy's key tasks, and his references to art's bearing upon those tasks. Wittgenstein ended the *Tractatus* (1922) by saying "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." This statement echoes that book's arguments concerning the limitations of writing and speaking (and logical propositions) for grasping and responding to the complexities of human experience. "Things that cannot be put into words […] make themselves manifest" – how the "miraculous" brings people together (TLP 6.52). Wittgenstein's frequently cited statement – "We find certain things about seeing puzzling because we do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough" plays diverse roles in addressing the problem in his *Philosophical Investigations* (PI 1958: 212). Put another way, in Wittgenstein (as in ancient Greek conceptions of *thaumazein*) wonder is a prerequisite for seeing the tasks of philosophy anew.

Wittgenstein never explicitly argued that wonder's philosophical significance had direct bearing upon art's pedagogical value. But his estimation of that value is suggested by many of his arguments concerning 'saying – showing', 'meaning – use', 'seeing aspects', and that philosophy's tasks should include deep and far reaching ("miraculous") change in what we "see things as" – in "forms of life."

> The expression of a change of aspect is the expression of a new perception and at the same time of the perception's being unchanged. I suddenly see the solution of a puzzle-picture. Before, there were branches there; now there is a human shape. My visual impression has changed and now I recognize that it has not only shape and colour but also a quite particular organization […]. My visual impression has changed; what was it like before and what was it like now (PI 1958: 196).

Stephen Palmié (2018: 12) has drawn attention to the proximity of Wittgenstein's (PI 1958: 123) saying, "A philosophical problem has the following form: I don't know my way around" ("Ich kenne mich nicht aus"); and argument for the need of new means to "*übersichtliche Darstellung*" For Wittgenstein (PI 1958: 122) "our grammar" (words) does not provide "perspicuous representation" into the "connections" or "family resemblances" of "aspects" of the world that enable us to "see anew." Interestingly, throughout the *Divine Comedy*, Dante compares deficiencies of verbal expression with the value of poetic and pictorial 'visible speech' for circumspection" into otherwise un-see-able "aspecto," "connections" and "resemblances" of profound significance.

3. Wonder and the Tasks of Art in Dante's Divine Comedy and Giotto's Scrovegni Chapel

In his extraordinary, *Storytelling in Christian Art from Giotto to Donatello* (2006), Jules Lubbock notes that for Augustine (354–430 AD) 'miracles' are signs coming from God, that seem to break laws of nature, and occur in a wide variety of forms. 'Miracles' puzzle – they concern seemingly humanly counter-intuitive realms – and are independent of human languages. With regards to forms, Augustine followed Plato in prioritising words – attending, especially, Scripture. But, in Augustine, words are only one way in which God communicated with humans – that is, words are only one type of 'sign' – and – miracles figure among the diversity of other forms such signs take. Augustine criticised responding only with awe without engaging in critical reflection on meanings and purposes. Critical reflection should proceed from anomie – puzzlement ("this is impossible – it cannot happen – but it is happening") – towards questioning (areas of aspect blindness) – towards struggling to comprehend and see the world, human existence and the sacred anew. Augustine distinguished four stages of human responses, which came to figure centrally in the ways in which artists pictured the miraculous together with responses on the part of people (as well as sacred beings) to sacred events. In these stages:

1. "the miraculous event arouses the senses … [amazement]
2. the senses arouse the mind … [puzzlement – doubt]
3. the mind in turn interrogates the miracle … [scrutiny]
4. [devotion] comprehending the nature of the invisible God, who is made manifest by the miracle" (Lubbock 2006: 12).

Augustine's treatment of pictures was sparse and largely negative (cf. Lubbock 2006: 12). By contrast, in letters that St Gregory's (540–604 AD) wrote to halt iconoclastic attacks on pictorial images in the Church, emphasis fell on that these are not to be worshipped themselves – or simply looked at (cf. Chazelle 1990). Images can render the more than meets the eye see-able, with the seriousness needed to guide spiritual comprehension. Dante introduced an Italian translation of Gregory's Latin into 'visible speech' (Lubbock 2006: 13) to characterise images (sculpture and painting) with this potential in his famous *Divine Comedy*. In the work's three books (*Inferno, Purgatory and Paradiso*) are about the journey of Dante as Pilgrim, which began when experiences of wonder (following the early death of his "divine" beloved Beatrice) made him puzzled about problems with his hitherto taken for granted assumptions about the world, and human spiritual capacities for participating in sacred realms and histories.

Put in Wittgenstein's (PI 1958: 123) terms: a pilgrimage in pursuit of answers to questions of extraordinary epistemic – spiritual importance begins with the experience: "I don't know my way around." In the *Divine Comedy*, that experience re-occurs in new forms at critical junctures of change in what the pilgrim sees things as. Dante's pilgrim stresses that he could not comprehend (correctly see) many things on his journey until he was able to "recognise" them in his memories of their portrayal, for instance, in friezes on the Pulpit of the Pisa Cathedral by Nicola Pisano (1220–1284), and in Giotto's frescos in Padua, where Dante was living when he wrote the *Comedy*. For Dante (and such proto-humanist contempories as Babarinoi and Albano), these artists' innovations in visible speech enabled people to see (experience) connections between past, future and present sacred history, which exceed imagination. For Dante, a key example was Giotto's portayal of the miraculous unfolding of the heavens in sacred history's future. Dante stressed that, although Scripture described this event as involving thoroughly unprecedented – humanly unimaginable qualities, rendering such qualities accessible to human experience figured centrally amongst key tasks of Giotto's 'verbal speech'.

Throughout the Scrivegni Chapel, there is pictorial evidence of the extent to which Giotto shared and discussed such convictions with proto-humanist contemporaries. The convictions Dante (as well as Babarino and Albano) held about how compelling mimesis can invite and foster viewers skills in interpreting meanings of sacred narratives. A marvelous example is in Giotto's *Last Judgement* mural. Above the shoulders of the *Resurrected Christ* in the centre – two very confident angels

in military style outfits are rolling back the heavens painted in magnificent blue. The angels roll back the heavens – like a cloth curtain – to reveal the *Last Judgement's* supposedly unimaginable events, processes, and results. Put another way, Giotto's innovations in 'visible speech':

- make considerable demands of viewers' participatory in terpretations;
- evidence convictions that art's tasks include picturing the miraculous (the more than meets the eye), and fostering the transformation of viewer responses (e.g., from wonder, to amazement, to scrutiny. to circumspect comprehension);
- are explicit in terms of showing that they are created by human hands, with the prudent reserve such serious narratives demand.

4. Concluding Suggestions

It would, of course, be a huge understatement to say that there are likely to be major differences between how Wittgenstein, Dante and Giotto might have addressed the question of what is meant by taking science and the arts equally seriously. But this does not detract from contributions such comparisons can make to fresh approaches to that question today. Future approaches might depart from considerations of connotations that ancient notions of wonder, and 'visible speech' in the arts share with arguments that:

> To observe is not the same as to look or to view […]. 'Look at this colour and say what it reminds you of. If the colour changes you are no longer looking at the one I meant […].' One observes in order to *see* more that we would have seen at first glance. (LWPP II 1992: 76e)

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Eine Kripkenstein'sche Auffassung unserer Erde über natürliche Arten

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Abstract

Im Zentrum desjenigen Bildes von Sprache, welches Ludwig Wittgenstein in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* zeichnet, steht die Einsicht, dass die Gegenstände unserer Rede wesentlich durch unsere Methoden ihrer Identifikation bestimmt sind. Demjenigen Bild zufolge, welches Saul Kripke in *Naming and Necessity* von insbesondere unserer Rede über natürliche Arten zeichnet, bestimmen dagegen umgekehrt die Gegenstände unserer Rede die Methoden ihrer Identifikation. Im Hintergrund von Kripkes Bild steht die Beobachtung, dass wir unsere Methoden der Identifikation von natürlichen Arten stetig verbessern, ohne jedoch, dass dabei unsere entsprechenden Ausdrücke ihre Gegenstände ändern. Vielmehr ist der Prozess der Verfeinerung unserer Methoden der Identifikation natürlicher Arten von der Untersuchung der Natur der dabei konstanten Gegenstände unserer Ausdrücke für sie geleitet. Ich versuche, diese Beobachtung in Wittgensteins Bild von Sprache einzupassen, indem ich in Auseinandersetzung mit Oswald Hanflings Kritik an Kripke eine Auffassung der Art unserer Verwendung von Ausdrücken für natürliche Arten skizziere, der zufolge die Verbesserung der Methoden der Identifikation ihrer Gegenstände erster Stufe durch konstante Methoden ihrer Identifikation zweiter Stufe geleitet ist.

1. Einleitung

Im Zentrum desjenigen Bildes von Sprache, welches Ludwig Wittgenstein in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* zeichnet, steht die Einsicht, dass die Gegenstände unserer Rede wesentlich durch unsere Methoden ihrer Identifikation bestimmt sind. Demjenigen Bild zufolge, welches Saul Kripke in *Naming and Necessity* von insbesondere unserer Rede über natürliche Arten zeichnet, bestimmen dagegen umgekehrt die Gegenstände unserer Rede die Methoden ihrer Identifikation. Im Hintergrund von Kripkes Bild steht die Beobachtung, dass wir unsere Methoden der Identifikation von natürlichen Arten stetig verbessern, ohne jedoch, dass dabei unsere entsprechenden Ausdrücke ihre Gegenstände ändern. Vielmehr ist der Prozess der Verfeinerung unserer Methoden der Identifikation natürlicher Arten von der Untersuchung der Natur der dabei konstanten Gegenstände unserer Ausdrücke für sie geleitet. Ich versuche, diese Beobachtung in Wittgensteins Bild von Sprache einzupassen, indem ich in Auseinandersetzung mit Oswald Hanflings Kritik an Kripke eine Auffassung der Art unserer Verwendung von Ausdrücken für natürliche Arten skizziere, der zufolge die Verbesserung der Methoden der Identifikation ihrer Gegenstände erster Stufe durch konstante Methoden ihrer Identifikation zweiter Stufe geleitet ist.

2. Wittgenstein über Sprache im Allgemeinen

Zu Beginn der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* stellt Wittgenstein zwei allgemeine Bilder von Sprache einander als Konkurrenten gegenüber. Ein entscheidender Unterschied zwischen diesen Bildern betrifft das begriffliche Verhältnis zwischen einerseits den Gegenständen, für die sprachliche Ausdrücke stehen – den Aspekten der Welt, über die wir mit ihrer Verwendung sprechen – und andererseits dem Gebrauch, den wir von ihnen machen; insbesondere der Art und Weise, auf die wir ihre Gegenstände identifizieren, bspw. mit ihrer Hilfe geäußerte Darstellungen auf Übereinstimmung mit der Wirklichkeit prüfen.

Nach dem oft so genannten Augustinischen Bild von Sprache, gegen das Wittgenstein sich wendet, verwenden wir sprachliche Ausdrücke auf gewisse Weise, *weil* sie für bestimmte Gegenstände stehen. So überprüfen wir demnach etwa Aussagen darüber, dass etwas rot ist, indem wir es anschauen, *weil* „rot" darin für eine Farbe steht. Nach Wittgensteins eigenem Bild stehen sprachliche Ausdrücke umgekehrt deshalb für bestimmte Gegenstände, *weil* wir sie auf bestimmte Art und Weise verwenden. So steht demnach etwa der Ausdruck „fünf" in Aussagen darüber, dass es fünf von einer Art von Ding gibt, deshalb für eine Zahl, *weil* wir sie überprüfen, indem wir die Dinge dieser Art zählen. Nimmt man als die Bedeutung eines sprachlichen Ausdrucks das an, was ihm als solchem wesentlich zukommt, was ihn zu dem sprachlichen Ausdruck macht, der er ist, so ist die Bedeutung eines sprachlichen Ausdrucks nach dem Augustinischen Bild der Gegenstand, für den er steht, und nach dem Wittgensteinschen die Art, auf die wir diesen identifizieren. (Vgl. PU 2006: §1)

3. Kripke über Ausdrücke für natürliche Arten

In *Naming and Necessity* argumentiert Saul Kripke für eine Augustinische Auffassung von Ausdrücken für natürliche Arten wie „Gold", „Wasser" und „Tiger". Dieser zufolge ist die Beziehung zwischen solchen Ausdrücken und ihren Gegenständen nicht wesentlich durch eine kanonische Art ihrer Identifikation vermittelt. Vielmehr ist die sich kontinuierlich verändernde Art, auf die wir die dabei konstanten Gegenstände solcher Ausdrücke identifizieren, deren Beschaffenheit verantwortlich.

Diese Auffassung wird Kripke durch zwei Gruppen von Beobachtungen bezüglich unserer Verwendungsweise von Ausdrücken wie „Gold" nahegelegt: Erstens hat sich die Art und Weise, auf die wir etwas als den Gegenstand von „Gold" oder entsprechender Ausdrücke in anderen Sprachen identifizieren, im Laufe mindestens der letzten zweitausend Jahre stark verändert: Wurde Gold früher vermutlich schlicht als verhältnismäßig schweres und weiches, gelb-glänzendes Metall identifiziert, so wird es heute als ein Stoff mit jeweils bestimmtem Gewicht, Schmelzpunkt und bestimmten Arten, mit anderen Stoffen zu interagieren, identifiziert. Am Grunde dieser wesentlich genaueren Methoden der Identifikation von Gold liegen seine im Periodensystem der Elemente dargestellten Eigenschaften; allen voran die, das Element mit der Ordnungszahl 79 zu sein.

Wir haben die alten Methoden der Identifikation von Gold zwar nicht völlig zugunsten der neueren aufgegeben, sondern behelfen uns im Alltag weiterhin damit, behandeln sie aber in wirklichen oder bloß möglichen Konfliktfällen als nachrangig gegenüber den neueren: Besteht etwas die alten Tests für Gold, die neuen aber nicht, so nehmen wir an, es sei kein Gold. Und hypothetische Szenarien, die unserer Welt in all ihren „oberflächlichen", das heißt mit mehr oder weniger bloßem

Auge erkennbaren Eigenschaften gleichen, in denen jedoch die Gesamtheit der verhältnismäßig schweren und weichen, gelb-glänzenden Substanz, die in unserer Welt aus dem Element mit der Ordnungszahl 79 besteht, aus dem Element mit der Ordnungszahl 80 besteht, beschreiben wir nicht so, dass Gold in diesen Fällen die Ordnungszahl 80 besäße; sondern vielmehr so, dass Quecksilber in diesen Fällen dieselben Oberflächeneigenschaften hätte, wie Gold sie tatsächlich hat. Umgekehrt beschreiben wir mögliche Szenarien, in der die Substanz mit der Ordnungszahl 79 alle Oberflächeneigenschaften von Quecksilber hat, nicht so, dass Quecksilber in solchen Fällen die Ordnungszahl 79 besäße; sondern vielmehr so, dass Gold in diesen Fällen alle Oberflächeneigenschaften hätte, die Quecksilber tatsächlich hat.

Mit Blick auf diese erste Gruppe von Beobachtungen bezüglich unserer Verwendungsweise von „Gold" und mit einer Auffassung von Sprache wie Wittgensteins im Hinterkopf liegt es zunächst nahe, anzunehmen, „Gold" müsse seine Bedeutung und seinen Gegenstand mit der jeweils kanonischen Art seiner Identifikation geändert haben. Das scheint jedoch Kripkes zweiter Gruppe von Beobachtungen nach zu urteilen nicht der Fall zu sein. Bei genauer Betrachtung unserer derzeitigen Verwendungsweise von „Gold" zeigt sich nämlich, dass wir tatsächlich annehmen, dass Gold weder seine Bedeutung, noch seinen Gegenstand zusammen mit unseren Methoden seiner Identifikation gewechselt hat: Wir identifizieren den Gegenstand des Wortes „Gold" und seiner Entsprechungen in anderen Sprachen in Sätzen, die zu anderen Zeiten oder in bloß hypothetischen Szenarien geäußert werden, nicht auf die in dieser Zeit oder diesen Szenarien gängige Weise, sondern auf die derzeit und tatsächlich beste: Aussagen bspw. der alten Griechen, die korrekt mit Hilfe von „Gold" übersetzt werden können, überprüfen wir, indem wir schauen, ob die Dinge, auf die sie das entsprechende Wort anwenden, zum Großteil aus dem Element mit der Ordnungszahl 79 bestehen oder nicht. In erstem Fall behandeln wir sie als bestätigt, im zweiten als widerlegt – ganz gleich, wie ihre eigenen Tests ausgefallen sind oder wären. Und selbst wenn es tatsächlich nie zu einem Konflikt zwischen alten und neuen Kriterien kommt, so wäre es doch möglich: Die oben beschriebenen verschiedenen Arten der Identifikation von Gold führen in bloß hypothetischen Szenarien, in der ihrer elementaren Struktur nach verschiedene Substanzen die Oberflächeneigenschaften von Gold teilen, oder das Element mit der Ordnungszahl 79 andere oder heterogene Oberflächeneigenschaften hat, zu radikal unterschiedlichen Ergebnissen. All diese Szenarien und die darin mit Hilfe von „Gold" oder entsprechenden Ausdrücken gemachten Aussagen beurteilen wir jedoch nach den derzeit tatsächlich gängigen Tests dafür, dass etwas Gold ist. Aber auch die derzeit besten Methoden der Identifikation von Gold halten wir nicht für definitiv für unsere Aussagen über Gold: Sollte sich in Zukunft herausstellen, dass es noch fundamentalere Eigenschaften der Substanz gibt, die wir heute über ihre Ordnungszahl identifizieren, die für diese verantwortlich sind, die aber nicht alles besitzt, was diese Ordnungszahl hat, so sind unsere derzeitigen Aussagen über Gold anhand dieser neuen Erkenntnisse zu beurteilen.

Diese beiden Gruppen von Beobachtungen zeigen zusammen, dass wir nicht annehmen, dass unsere Methoden der Identifikation des Gegenstandes von „Gold" definitiv für diesen Ausdruck sind und seinen Gegenstand bestimmen. Vielmehr nehmen wir umgekehrt an, dass der Gegenstand für den „Gold" steht, in allem Wechsel unserer Methoden seiner Identifikation derselbe bleibt und diese bestimmt: Der Prozess der Veränderung der Methoden der Identifikation des Gegenstandes von „Gold" ist durch unsere Untersuchung desselben geleitet, ist ein Prozess der zielgerichteten Entwicklung, der kontinuierlichen Verbesserung und Verfeinerung unserer Methoden der Identifikation ein und derselben Substanz durch deren Untersuchung. Diese zielt darauf, die wesentlichen Eigenschaften der Substanz zu finden, für die „Gold" steht, und schon stand, lange bevor wir auch nur eine Ahnung davon hatten, wie diese wesentlichen Eigenschaften beschaffen sein könnten; die Eigenschaften, die sie zu der Substanz machen, die sie an sich ist.

Es scheint von hier aus nur noch ein kleiner und nahezu unvermeidlicher Schritt zu den Annahmen zu sein, dass die Beziehung des Stehens Für zwischen „Gold" und der Substanz, für die dieser Ausdruck steht, gar nicht durch unsere Art seiner Verwendung vermittelt ist, und dass diese vielmehr umgekehrt vollständig der Substanz verantwortlich ist, für die „Gold" ganz unabhängig von ihr steht. (Vgl. Kripke 2019: 115–140 für die gesamte bisher gegebene Rekonstruktion.)

Diese Annahmen stehen aber in klarem Widerspruch zu Wittgensteins allgemeiner Zurückweisung der Augustinischen Auffassung von Sprache zugunsten seiner eigenen. Wer Wittgensteins Auffassung überzeugend findet, steht vor der Aufgabe, zu verstehen, wie unsere Verwendung von Ausdrücken für natürliche Arten anders als Kripkes Beobachtungen es zu implizieren scheinen doch in Wittgensteins allgemeines Bild von Sprache passen. Ein naheliegender Weg dahin ist es, die zweite Gruppe von Kripkes Beobachtungen anzuzweifeln. Diesen Weg wählt Oswald Hanfling, dessen Kritik an Kripke ich im folgenden Abschnitt betrachten möchte, um meinen eigenen Vorschlag zu motivieren.

4. Hanflings Kritik an Kripke

Hanfling ist überzeugt, dass Kripke sich irrt, indem er annimmt, der Gegenstand von „Gold" sei nicht wesentlich durch unsere Methoden seiner Identifikation bestimmt. Er leugnet weder die Beobachtung, dass eine Entwicklung unserer Methoden wie die oben skizzierte stattgefunden hat und wir die neuen, wissenschaftlichen Methoden als die im Konfliktfall entscheidenden behandeln. Noch leugnet er die Annahme, dass wir darin gerechtfertigt sind, „Gold" bei der Übersetzung antiker Texte zu verwenden und entsprechend anzunehmen, dass darin von annähernd derselben Substanz die Rede ist, über die auch wir reden, wenn wir „Gold" verwenden. Was uns seines Erachtens dazu berechtigt, ist jedoch nicht, dass „Gold" und seine Entsprechungen damals und heute exakt dieselbe Bedeutung oder exakt denselben Gegenstand haben. Das haben sie nämlich seines Erachtens nicht; sie haben beides mit den jeweils kanonischen Methoden der Identifikation von Gold geändert. Aber sie haben deshalb keine *völlig* neue, *völlig* andere Bedeutung bekommen: Die Entwicklung neuer Methoden der Identifikation des Gegenstandes von „Gold" ist sowohl historisch als auch ihrem Inhalt nach eine kontinuierliche und zielgerichtete. Die jeweils neuen Methoden sind auf Grundlage der jeweils älteren entwickelt worden um ungefähr denselben Gegenstand herauszugreifen und führen deshalb, so wie die Dinge tatsächlich stehen, in so gut wie allen Fällen zu denselben Ergebnissen. Das lässt es so scheinen, als würde der Gegenstand nicht durch die jeweils kanonische Methode seiner Identifikation bestimmt, dieser Schein trügt jedoch. (Vgl. Hanfling 2000: 222–243, insbesondere 228–231. Siehe auch PU 2006: §§353–4 für einen ähnlichen Gedanken.)

Auch wenn ich diese Argumentation sehr überzeugend finde, so scheint sie mir Kripkes zweite Gruppe von Beobachtungen allzu leichtfertig vom Tisch zu wischen: Insbesondere wird sie der Beobachtung nicht gerecht, dass wir die Aussagen bspw.

der alten Griechen über Gold nach unseren Kriterien evaluieren zu dürfen annehmen und damit, dass der Gegenstand nicht bloß ungefähr, sondern eben doch exakt derselbe geblieben ist. Darin äußert sich, dass wir annehmen, dass die Veränderung des Begriffs des Goldes nicht bloß darauf gerichtet ist, seinen Gegenstand ungefähr konstant zu halten, sondern vielmehr darauf, den Gegenstand besser zu erfassen; dass sie also auf die Natur des Gegenstandes gerichtet und von ihrer Untersuchung geleitet ist. In diesen Annahmen mögen wir tatsächlich falsch liegen, aber begrifflich unmöglich scheinen sie auf den ersten Blick nicht zu sein.

Wessen es mit Blick auf diese Defizite von Hanflings Kritik bedarf, ist eine Auffassung des Prozesses der Verbesserung der Methoden der Identifikation des Gegenstandes von „Gold" als von einer dabei konstanten Regel geleitet, die diesem Prozess die Richtung auf ein und denselben Gegenstand weist. Eine solche möchte ich im Folgenden skizzieren.

5. Skizze einer Kripgensteinschen Auffassung der Verwendung von Ausdrücken für natürliche Arten

Der Vorschlag, den ich im Lichte der bisher angestellten Überlegungen machen möchte, lautet wie folgt: Unsere Verwendung von Ausdrücken für natürliche Arten wie „Gold", ist nicht nur durch unsere wechselnden Methoden der Identifikation ihrer Gegenstände erster Stufe geleitet, etwa als verhältnismäßig schweres und weiches, gelb-glänzendes Metall oder als Element mit der Ordnungszahl 79. Darüber hinaus folgen wir gleichbleibenden Methoden zweiter Stufe für den potentiell unendlichen Prozess der Verbesserung und Verfeinerung unserer Methoden der Identifikation des Gegenstandes von „Gold" erster Stufe. Diese Methoden zweiter Stufe bestimmen den Gegenstand von „Gold" sozusagen als Fluchtpunkt des besagten Prozesses, nämlich als Träger derjenigen Eigenschaften, die fundamental kausal verantwortlich für diejenigen seiner Eigenschaften sind, über die wir ihn derzeit identifizieren: Dass etwas aus einem verhältnismäßig schweren und weichen, gelb-glänzenden Metall besteht, ist ein weniger fundamentales und im Konfliktfall deshalb nachrangiges Kriterium dafür, dass es aus Gold besteht, als dass es aus dem Element mit der Ordnungszahl 79 besteht, weil diese Eigenschaft von Gold für jene kausal verantwortlich ist. Und sollte sich herausstellen, dass es eine Eigenschaft des Gegenstandes von „Gold" gibt, die für seine Eigenschaft, die Ordnungszahl 79 zu besitzen, kausal verantwortlich ist, so ist sie wiederum ein fundamentaleres Kriterium dafür, dass etwas aus Gold besteht, als seine Ordnungszahl und trumpft diese im Konfliktfall.

Allgemein lassen sich Methoden der Identifikation von Ausdrücken für natürliche Arten zweiter Stufe daher ungefähr wie folgt als Regeln für die Auffindung und Hierarchisierung von Methoden erster Stufe formulieren: Ist der Besitz einer Eigenschaft G ein Kriterium für eine natürliche Art N, so ist der Besitz einer Eigenschaft F ein fundamentaleres und also im Konfliktfall entscheidendes Kriterium für N als der Besitz von G, wenn F eine Eigenschaft von N ist, die kausal dafür verantwortlich ist, dass N gewöhnlich G aufweist.

Diese Auffassung erklärt in Wittgensteins Bild von Sprache erstens, warum die Bedeutung und der Gegenstand von „Gold" im Wechsel der kanonischen Methoden seiner Identifikation gleich bleiben: Der Prozess dieser Veränderung ist durch ein und dieselbe Regel geleitet, die zugleich den Gegenstand des Ausdrucks konstant hält, indem sie ihn als Fluchtpunkt desselben, potentiell unendlichen Prozesses der Verfeinerung der Methoden seiner Identifikation erster Stufe bestimmt.

Es gibt zwei naheliegende Sorgen bezüglich dieses Vorschlags, eine exegetische und eine sachliche, die beide die zentrale Rolle des Begriffs der Kausalität darin betreffen. Wittgenstein scheint diesem Begriff skeptisch gegenüberzustehen: Er verwendet ihn bei der Lösung philosophischer Probleme selten bis gar nicht, weil er der Meinung ist, dass dieser Begriff selbst Anlass für allerlei philosophische Probleme gibt. Und er äußert sich kaum zum allgemeinen Begriff der Kausalität.

Aus sachlicher Perspektive liegt die Sorge nahe, dass es sich bei Kausalität selbst um eine natürliche Beziehung in Kripkes Sinne handeln könnte. In diesem Fall böte die vorgeschlagene Auffassung keine stabile Lösung des Konflikts zwischen Kripkes Beobachtungen bezüglich unserer Rede über natürliche Arten und Wittgensteins Auffassung von Sprache. Um diese beiden Sorgen zu beruhigen, bedürfte es einer Wittgenstein'schen Auffassung des Begriffs der Kausalität, einer Angabe der kanonischen Arten und Weisen, auf die wir Aussagen über Kausalität prüfen, die sich in Wittgensteins Auffassung der Bedeutung sprachlicher Ausdrücke als Art ihrer Verwendung einfügt. Ich bin zuversichtlich, dass eine solche sich entwickeln ließe, kann das hier jedoch nicht in Angriff nehmen.

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Collingwood, Winch and Wittgenstein on the Status of Logic

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Abstract

This paper compares R. G. Collingwood and Peter Winch, with Wittgenstein as an important background figure. Their shared philosophical concerns were (1) resistance to ontology, especially metaphysical realism, in favour of a view on philosophy as cultural self-understanding; and (2) critique of the idea of logic as a formal science, labelled "Aristotelian Logic". Instead, they advanced a conception of logic as the contextually sensitive analysis of actual reasoning. The connection between these two concerns was particularly explicit in Collingwood's work. We bring out the connection via their reactions to Moore's "Proof of an External World". The meaning of what Moore says is indeterminate, because he has not specified the doubt to which his "Proof" is an answer. We see the logical status of a statement when we understand how it constitutes an answer to a question that has arisen. As Collingwood would put it, the logical analysis of a concrete piece of reasoning is an 'historical' exercise.

1. Collingwood, Wittgenstein and Winch

This paper chiefly compares R. G. Collingwood and Peter Winch, but Wittgenstein comes in as an important background for Winch, and as a philosopher with views parallel to those of Collingwood. Currently no large-scale detailed analysis exists of the relation between Collingwood and Winch.

Collingwood (1889–1943) and Wittgenstein (1889–1951) were exact contemporaries. They were active within the small world of British academic philosophy, and both felt they were working against the mainstream. They did not influence each other directly (Wittgenstein's later work was not generally available at Collingwood's death). Unlike later Wittgenstein, Collingwood had the explicit ambition to develop a philosophical system. Wittgenstein did not write about the epistemology of history and the human sciences. Their similarities are, however, no less striking.

Two similarities stand out: (1) their resistance to ontology, in particular, Realist ontology, casting philosophy instead as a descriptive enterprise, a project of cultural self-understanding; (2) their views on the status of logic. Both rejected the idea of logic as a formal science, instead favouring the analysis of situationally contingent language use. Collingwood makes the connection between these two philosophical concerns particularly explicit.

Peter Winch (1926–1998) continued these lines of thought in many ways. His first book *The Idea of a Social Science* (1990 [1958]) was, like Collingwood's *The Idea of History* (1993 [1946]), an exploration of the specific form of understanding involved in our knowledge of human action. To put it very briefly, the idea was that we understand social life because we are part of it. We understand the thoughts of others by *thinking* those thoughts. Moreover, Collingwood and Winch believed they were simply explicating a form of understanding as it naturally occurs in human life. The task for the human sciences was not so much to adopt a new methodology, as it was to pursue and develop the understanding that was there already.

Early in *The Idea of a Social Science*, Winch also formulates his resistance to ontology, a point to which he returns in his later work (Winch 1995: 212). Philosophy certainly investigates "reality as such and in general". However, this is not ontology – not an inquiry of what kinds of thing exist or may exist. Unlike the empirical sciences, philosophy investigates "the *force of the concept of reality*" (Winch 1990 [1958]: 9). We must be open to the variations that the uses of that concept may involve, due to the various ways in which it may make a difference in human pursuits. This is a direct consequence of Winch's general approach to linguistic meaning. The meaning of 'reality', as of other concepts, is something we understand by looking at its uses in the relevant contexts.

2. Reactions to Moore's 'Proof'

G. E. Moore (1873–1958) became a shared point of reference for these three thinkers. Along with Russell and Whitehead, Moore was a founding father of what became analytic philosophy. These early-20th-Century philosophers pinned much of their professional self-understanding on their opposition to philosophies favoured by the previous generation – which they labelled 'idealism'. Moore had a long history of anti-'idealist' polemics (Baldwin 1984), culminating in his two papers, "A Defence of Common Sense" (1959 [1929]) and "Proof of an External World" (1959 [1939]). Moore's aim was to defend a form of direct knowledge (1959 [1929], 107). We can directly know many things to be certainly true. Moore knows he is a human being, he has a body, he lives on the Earth, *this* is a human hand. In a related argument (1959 [1939]), he showed up his two hands. They are external objects, hence he has produced a proof that external objects exist independently of the mind.

Moore's "Proof" famously stimulated Wittgenstein to start the notes subsequently published as *On Certainty*. He asked whether it was right to say that Moore knows he has two hands. Can you produce, just like that, a list of all the things you know (OC 1969: 6, 488)? Wittgenstein's argument was that genuine knowledge claims are responses to possible or imaginable doubts of some kind. Moore has not specified the doubts to which his statements are answers.

Winch (like Wittgenstein, OC 1969: 19) points to the sceptic's obvious answer to Moore. The sceptic would agree that Moore has produced two hands, but the sceptic would dispute that they count as parts of an external world. However, presumably drawing on interpretations by Norman Malcolm and Alice Ambrose, Winch presented a rather benevolent gloss on what Moore had been doing:

> Moore was not making an experiment; he was reminding his audience of something, reminding them of the way in which the expression 'external object' is in fact used. And his reminder indicated that the issue in philosophy is not to prove or disprove the existence of a world of external objects but rather to elucidate the concept of externality (Winch 1990 [1958]: 10).

On this view, Moore's paper was simply a reminder of how we ordinarily prove the existence of something or other: we may do it by showing up that thing. However, Moore (1952 [1942]) disowned that interpretation in his response: he *was* presenting a genuine philosophical proof. Regardless of this, there is a more troublesome objection to the Ambrose-Malcolm-Winch interpretation. Moore was looking at his hands in order just to produce in himself a *feeling* that he knows something (Wittgenstein, as related by Malcolm 1978: 87–88). But this is not how proofs work in ordinary language. No one had actually *doubted* that Moore had two hands. The example falls flat as a demonstration of the actual use of 'proof'.

Collingwood presents, in his *Autobiography*, a critique that connects this failure directly to the question of linguistic meaning.

> The Oxford 'realists' talked as if knowing were a simple 'intuiting' or a simple 'apprehending' of some 'reality'. At Cambridge, Moore expressed, as I thought, the same conception when he spoke of the 'transparency' of the act of knowing [...]. This doctrine, which was rendered plausible by choosing examples of knowledge statements like 'this is a red rose', 'my hand is resting on the table', where familiarity with the mental operations involved has bred not so much contempt as oblivion, was quite incompatible with what I had learned in my 'laboratory' of historical thought (Collingwood 1978 [1939]: 25–26).

In historical research, but also generally, knowledge claims come as responses to specific questions, explicit or implicit. However, Moore has not presented the questions to which his statements are answers. You might certainly "excogitate" (Collingwood 1978 [1939]: 38) any number of questions to which a given sentence is an answer – for instance, "*Whose* hand is resting on a table?" or, "*Where* is my hand resting?" or, "What did Moore say?" – but that would presuppose that the question *has arisen* or might plausibly arise.

Considered entirely on its own, a sentence does not represent knowledge. Its meaning has not (yet) been specified. Knowledge, then, is part of a "questioning activity", where truth pertains to "a complex consisting of questions and answers" (Collingwood 1978 [1939]: 26, 37).

3. Aristotelian vs Socratic Logic

Collingwood presents, in other words, a contextualist account of linguistic meaning– "a logic of question and answer" (Collingwood 1978 [1939]: 38). That leads him to question the plausibility of formal logic as practiced by his contemporaries. He frames his opposition in terms of a contrast between "Aristotelian" and "Socratic" logic. In this context, "Aristotelian logic" is not specifically the logic of Aristotle's *Organon*. It is the general idea that you can spot contradiction simply by looking at the abstract forms of sentences. You do not actually need to know the subject matter (Collingwood 1993 [1946]: 253–254).

Commitment to "Aristotelian logic" gives rise to the project of "reducing" propositions "to logical form", Collingwood says, "ending, for the present, in the typographical jargon of [Russell & Whitehead's] *Principia Mathematica*" (1978 [1939]: 35–36, fn 1). Russell's famous example was his disambiguation of "The present King of France is bald" in his groundbreaking paper "On Denoting" (1905). Another example from the same paper was his proposed refutation of St Anselm's proof of God's existence.

Against the idea of logic as the extracting of 'propositions' from underneath surface grammar, Collingwood advanced a view of logic as the analysis of reasoning, i.e., the analysis of what is meant in concrete instances of reasoning. This must be an 'historical' exercise, because it requires us to attend to the original questions and answers.

Winch, too, used the expression 'Aristotelian logic' to describe the approach he opposed. This is, however, not a term he got from Collingwood but from Wittgenstein (Winch 1993: 3). Winch was developing Wittgenstein's views (chiefly in PI I: §§81–108 and RFM 1956). According to Winch's summary, the "Aristotelian" conception of logic has "two aspects":

> (1) A conversion of what we say into 'canonical form' – which is supposed to express the real form of our thought, a form which is supposed to take its authority from its mirroring the structure of reality;
> (2) The idea that this structure exercises a special sort of constraint on our thinking. (This is the aspect picked up by Lewis Carroll's Achilles and exposed as hollow by the Tortoise (cf. Winch 1990 [1958]: 55–57; Winch 1991: 7–8; Winch 1993: 3).) (Winch 1993: 4).

The argumentative structure exists in the form of "rails" (cf. PI 1953: I §218) along which reasoning will proceed. If you feed true premises into the machinery, true conclusions unfailingly result in the other end. In a sense, the machinery is always already 'there', waiting to be put in motion as soon as a concrete instance of reasoning is entered. Unlike real machinery, the logical machine knows of no wear and tear and no bending of the parts.

You can formalise "It is raining and it is not raining" as "p & ~p". Its logical form (the typographical form) itself indicates that the formula is self-contradictory. So, (1) from the formalisation you see the contradiction right away. As you might say, the one proposition contradicts the other. (2) You *cannot* hold the two propositions at once: you *must* conclude that it is impossible. The rules of logic supposedly create a 'constraint'.

Winch's response to this is that no propositions as such contradict each other. Contradiction arises when people use sentences to say contradictory things. We find out *whether* two sentences contradict when we see how people react to them – in other words, what people mean by them. "It's raining and it's not raining" may involve logical contradiction, but it may also be a *good* description of the Swansea weather. Of course, if someone *says* "it's raining and not raining" and obviously means (something by) it, our typical first reaction is not to dismiss it but to give it some plausible interpretation. The *typographic image* of "p & ~p" is of course neither self-contradictory nor coherent in itself. For instance, it might be a design for a wallpaper pattern (Winch 2017 [1990]: 14; LFM 1989: 34, 46–7, 59–60, 70, 120, 171; RFM 1956: V 33; Rhees 1998: 80).

Winch (1991), too, contrasted "Aristotelian" logic with what he called Socratic logic; in other words, the kind of dialectic that Socrates both exercised and described in Plato's dialogues. The central feature of this dialectic was that it was interaction between *specific people*. The 'constraint' involved in an argument is in part dependent on the attitude of the person who puts it forward – whether she believes it, for what reason she presents it and what kinds of consequences she would accept. This dialectic has a moral aspect, which Socrates often stressed.

Hence, Winch writes, "criteria of logic are not a direct gift of God, but arise out of, and are only intelligible in the context of, ways of living or modes of social life" (Winch 1990 [1958]: 100).

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The Chess Analogy: Shifting Perspectives

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Abstract

I examine Thomae's analogy between arithmetic and chess, which has been discussed by Frege, Wittgenstein, and their recent interpreters. I argue that the analogy should be read differently than it usually is. Rather than showing us how rules impart meaning to linguistic symbols, the analogy is meant to provide a model for a certain shift in mathematical perspective which underlies Thomae's formalism. I re-assess its relationship to platonism in this light.

1. Platonism, formalism, and the chess analogy

Mathematical *formalism* is usually opposed to platonism in the philosophy of mathematics. While for a platonist, numbers are something abstract which our signs designate, for a formalist, numbers are those signs themselves.

Formalism was defended by numerous mathematicians in the nineteenth century, including Frege's colleague Thomae, who offered the following analogy to support his view:

> Now, for the formal conception, arithmetic is a game with signs which one may well call empty, thereby conveying that (in the calculating game) they do not have any content except that which is attributed to them with respect to their behaviour under certain combinatorial rules (game rules). A chess player makes similar use of his figures: he attributes certain properties to them which determine their behavior in the game, and the figures are only external signs for this behavior. (Thomae 1898: 3)

This analogy (and Frege's critique of it) played an important role in Wittgenstein's philosophy and continues to be discussed by Wittgenstein scholars (e.g. Kienzler 1997; Stenlund 2015).

Most commentators seem to read Thomae's analogy as follows. The symbols in arithmetical expressions, particularly the numerals, are like chess pieces. They have no meaning in themselves; outside the game, they are just "empty" pieces of syntax. But chess shows us that such empty signs can acquire a meaning when they are embedded in a practice of manipulating them according to rules. Thus formalism, backed by the chess analogy, appears to offer an anti-platonist philosophy of mathematics: since we can understand the meaning of a numeral like "2" without saying that it *designates the number 2*, we have no need to postulate a realm of independently existing numbers as meanings for mathematical terms.

This interpretation of the analogy is common to Thomae's critics–including Frege, who complained that "it cannot simply be said that the black king designates something as a consequence of these rules" (Frege 1893–1903/2013: vol. II §95)–as well as more sympathetic readers–including Wittgenstein, who thought the chess analogy showed that Frege had "failed to see the other, justified side of formalism, that the symbols of mathematics […] have no meaning in Frege's sense", and instead "the signs can be used the way they are in the game […] the essential thing is the rules that hold of these structures" (Waismann 1979: 105).

I think this standard reading obscures the analogy's most important lesson, however. Although Thomae does think that the rules of chess give a "meaning" to its pieces in some sense, they only have this meaning *in chess,* that is, within the perspective we adopt when playing the game. Outside that perspective, we conceive those same pieces differently. Thomae appeals to the chess analogy because it gives us a model for understanding how this is possible. Essentially his idea is: just as we can come to conceive a piece of wood *as* a bishop when we play chess, we can come to conceive something else as a number when we adopt the formal standpoint.

I would like to elaborate this idea in what follows, explaining what Thomae uses the analogy to show, and what this implies about how his formalism relates to mathematical platonism.

2. The context for the analogy

I have discussed the context and mathematical background which motivates Thomae's appeal to the chess analogy elsewhere. Although I don't have space for the details, here are the important points:

4. The "formal conception" of numbers is an algebraic per spective. This means it is a way of looking at a domain of objects that focuses on their relations under arithmetic operations, and ignores their other (e.g. geometric) features.
5. Thomae introduces this perspective in order to give a construction of the real numbers from the rationals, compa rable to Dedekind's construction using cuts. His construc tion defines arithmetic on infinite sequences of rationals via arithmetic on the rational numbers in them, and pro ves these definitions equip the sequences with the alge braic structure of the reals.
6. For Thomae, a "sign" is a representation of such a sequen ce of rationals, i.e., the result of viewing this sequence from the algebraic perspective.

Arithmetic with real numbers is thus a "game with signs" in the sense that it involves manipulating sequences of rational numbers within a perspective in which we ignore the features they have *qua* sequences (e.g. infinite length), and only consider their arithmetic relations. A shift in perspective therefore underlies Thomae's formalist construction of the real numbers: we come to see sequences of rational numbers *as* real numbers by recognizing an algebraic structure in them, and ignoring their other, non-algebraic properties.

3. Revisiting the analogy

Thomae's analogy with chess provides a model for that shift in perspective, and that is where its interest lies.

We might first look at the pieces on a chessboard from the perspective of ordinary physical objects. Within that perspective, we can describe them as made of wood or plastic or stone, as brown or gray, as having various shapes, or as being 3.4cm apart. But when we actually play chess, we occupy a perspective in which these physical properties are not relevant. We consider the pieces only as bishops or knights, as black or white, as occupying certain board positions.

What constitutes a "perspective"? It is at least this much: a point of view taken on a domain of objects in which certain features of those objects are available or relevant, while others are unavailable, irrelevant, or ignored. A perspective is constituted by what is available or unavailable in it. If I observe during a chess game that a white knight in your motley chess set is made of plastic instead of wood, I have exited the chess-playing perspective and adopted the perspective of everyday physics, since the material from which this piece is made is irrelevant in chess.

We might say that a perspective "conceptualizes" the various features of objects that are available inside it. Thus in chess, a piece of wood can conceptualized as a *knight*, as *black,* or as *protected by the bishop*. Importantly, two things can be conceptualized the same way in one perspective even though they might appear quite different from another perspective. This is because the features which distinguish them in one perspective are unavailable in the other. A brownish piece of wood and a cream-colored piece of plastic might both be conceptualized as *white* in chess; the same piece of wood in many slightly different physical locations can be conceptualized as being at *position B4*.

A special case occurs when such conceptualized features uniquely determine an object within a perspective. The brown piece of wood and the cream-colored piece of plastic might both count as not just white, but as *the white queen* (in two different chess games). In this case, we can say that the two objects "play the same role" in chess.

Most interpreters take Thomae's analogy primarily to suggest that such conceptualizations or roles are given by *rules*. But Thomae makes no real use of this idea. Indeed, the "rules" he gives are the usual descriptive axioms for the arithmetic operations, not normative statements, as in chess. Much more important for Thomae is the idea that things not conceived as numbers *outside* the formal standpoint can play the roles of numbers *inside* it, for that is what makes his construction of the reals possible. It also makes chess a useful analogy: just as we can come to view this piece of wood as the black queen in a chess game, we can come to view sequences of rational numbers as real numbers with purely arithmetic relations to each other. This suggests that on both sides of the analogy, we should focus less on the rules operating inside perspectives, and more on the rules mapping *between* them.

In Thomae's construction, these mappings are given explicitly. They consist of definitions for the arithmetic operations on sequences of rational numbers; they tell us what it means to add, subtract, multiply and divide two such sequences. Once these definitions are in place, one can prove that the sequences form the algebraic structure of the real numbers. Such a proof justifies us, as he says, in "calling" them real numbers: it allows us to shift into a perspective where we view them as real numbers, rather than as sequences of rationals.

In chess, the analogous mappings enable the analogous shift, from the perspective of everyday physics into the chess-playing perspective. They tell us how colors are conceptualized as black or white, which physical shapes correspond to which roles in the chess game, and so on. We don't usually articulate these mappings explicitly, though we can when we need to, such as when teaching someone how to play chess. They are nevertheless always operative, for we rely on them to translate perceptions of a shared physical environment into a shared game of chess, to adopt the chess-playing perspective on a domain of physical objects.

In sum, the chess analogy illustrates how we can conceptualize a given domain of objects in a new way. Chess serves as an easily graspable model of the kind of shift in perspective which underlies Thomae's construction of the real numbers. It shows that such shifts are possible, and useful.

4. Perspectives and platonism

Thomae claims that his formalism "lifts us above all metaphysical difficulties" (Thomae 1898: 3). Part of what he means by this is that formalism about the real numbers does not require us to recognize any new objects; it just requires us to look at previously given objects from a new perspective. Is this an anti-platonist view?

To see the issue here more clearly, we can compare Thomae's position with Dedekind's. When Dedekind gives his construction of the reals using cuts, he infamously speaks of "creating" irrational numbers "corresponding" to the cuts, rather than just identifying the real numbers with the cuts. Dedekind argued that cuts have features which the corresponding numbers lack, such as having infinitely many members, so cuts could not be identical to real numbers (Dedekind 1888/1932). That is, Dedekind felt the need to introduce new objects because he thought that one and the same object cannot both have and lack a given property. He distinguished the real numbers from the cuts so that they could have different properties than the cuts do.

Thomae faces the same problem: like Dedekind's cuts, his sequences of rationals have properties which the real numbers lack. But rather than introducing new *objects* to resolve the difficulty, he introduces a new *perspective*, the formal standpoint. Since different perspectives conceptualize the same objects in different ways, the tension is resolved: a sequence has infinitely many members when viewed from outside the formal standpoint, but within the formal standpoint, no such feature is available or relevant.

This solution too is suggested by chess. When we treat a piece of wood as a knight in the chess playing perspective, we ignore its material, shape, color and so on. But we might nevertheless insist that we play with *that very piece*, and that we have no need to "create" a new, abstract knight "corresponding" to the wooden piece whose properties we ignore. We just ignore those features when using the piece to play chess. This requires reconceptualizing the object; but it does not require us to recognize any new objects. There is no tension in saying that the knight both has and lacks a brown color, once we acknowledge the shift between perspectives from which these judgements are made.

A platonist might take issue with both solutions. She might agree with Dedekind that the real numbers are something different from the cuts, but would argue that we do not create this "something different". We only *recognize* it as a form or structure already present in the cuts. As Frege put it, "the mathematician cannot create things at will…[he] can only discover what is there and give it a name" (Frege 1884/1980: §96).

It is open to Thomae to agree with the platonist here, because creation plays no role for him: we recognize the "something different" by shifting perspectives, not creating new objects. On the other hand, the platonist might object that because shifting perspectives relies on stipulated definitions, they still do not provide a view of the real numbers as sufficiently *independent* from our cognitive acts. Thomae can resist this: the definitions only setup mappings, which presuppose that the image of the map is already there. One cannot see a piece of wood as a knight in chess unless there is already such a thing as the role of a knight, independent of the wood.

This is hardly the end of the story. As others have pointed out, different understandings of "independent existence" are possible, especially for modern platonists like Frege (e.g. Reck 2005). Some platonisms are more compatible with Thomae's formalism than others. In this context, it is worth remembering one of Plato's own metaphors: we recognize forms by "turning the soul around", just as we must turn our bodies around to see new things with our eyes (*Republic* 518c). It is exactly this kind of shift in perspective that underlies Thomae's chess analogy and his formalism.

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Imagination in Wittgenstein's Writings

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Abstract

The concept of imagination has become central in twenty-first century cognitive linguistics (Johnson 1993, 2014, 2018). Johnson extends the concept of imagination, yet it is still a challenge to identify concrete characteristics that would allow to understand the difference between imagining and other cognitive functions. Though Lakoff and Johnson (1999) relied on Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance in their attempt to understand how metaphors function within the process of meaning construction, they did not make the connection between the concept of imagination as it appears in Wittgenstein's writings and the way that people construct metaphor. This paper addresses this lacuna by assessing the development of Wittgenstein's writings on the concept of imagination, to clarify two additional important contributions that he made to the debate about imagination in the twenty-first century: the activity of imagination as an intermediate link and as an expression of free will.

1. How does imagination work?

The philosophical revolution in metaphor research, initiated by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (2003 [1980]), has led to an investigation of the embodied basis of all cognitive operations. Imagination plays a central role, especially in art and poetry and more generally, in any uniquely personal expression. Furthermore, Lakoff and Johnson characterized imagination as "necessary for expressing the unique and most personally significant aspects of our experience. In matters of personal understanding the ordinary agreed-upon meanings that words have will not do." (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 189).
Beyond establishing the role of imagination in embodying personal experiences, in his more recent studies, Johnson focused on the operation of moral imagination and exposed the various metaphors people utilize to express voluntary acts of moral deliberation (Johnson 1993, 2014: 2018). Throughout their research, Lakoff and Johnson emphasize that all human actions are in fact manifestations of bodily and neurological processes. As such, interdisciplinary research involving linguistics and neuroscience can, in principle, explain all our actions (Johnson and Tucker 2021: 265). Ultimately, this research would eliminate the personal dimension of imagination and the personal dimension offering instead an 'objective' observation:

> Objectivity is then achieved through intersubjectivity – the capacity of abstract insight into the mind of another that shows that reality is not fixed by our egocentric perspective. […] The process of mind is then both embodied and cultural, a process of maintaining an identity through knowing, as we continually organize the relations of mind to participate in the events of the world. (Johnson and Tucker 2021: 279)

At this point, two questions arise: First, can the activity of imagination be encapsulated in the general space of concept formation? Can the differences between the individually constructed products of imagination be reduced to a general array of human thought? Second, can the distinction between a voluntary action of imagination and an involuntary sensory response be eliminated? In the present discussion, I will present different possible interpretations of Wittgenstein's concept of imagination, which illustrate the function of imagination as a separate mode of understanding reality, and as thereby irreducible.

2. Imagination from the *Tractatus* to *Philosophical Investigations*

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein describes imagination as the key that links our thought to reality through language: "A proposition is a picture of reality. A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it" (TLP 1963: §4.01).

Imagination constitutes a bridge upon which the model is constructed – the way we picture the world as individuals. This is a general description, which reflects a family resemblance among all uses of the concept of imagination. Another key in the *Tractatus* to understanding Wittgenstein's development of the concept of imagination is the parallel he draws between its usage in language and performing a musical composition (TLP 1963: §4.014–4.0141). This correspondence allows us to comprehend his seemingly poetic claim at the beginning of the *Philosophical Investigations*: "Uttering a word is like striking a note on the keyboard of imagination" (PI 2009: §6).

Wittgenstein argued that practically every use of language is based on the mental capacity for imagination: the metaphor of "Vorstellungsklavier" links the act of pronunciation and the mental act. Yet another mention of the activity of imagination in a musical context appears in Wittgenstein's discussion of remembering a tune. The tune already exists in imagination and is extracted from it through the processes of remembering (TLP 2009: §184). In his later investigations into the philosophy of psychology, Wittgenstein also compared verbal language to a musical composition. He argued that music "speaks" and that: "verbal language contains a strong musical element" (RPP 1980a: §888).

The connection Wittgenstein draws between imagination and music, on the one hand, and imagination and picturing reality, on the other, allows us to describe a denominator to acts of imagination: an act of imagination reflects individual and personal creativity. The musical aspect of imagination is engaged both in using verbal language and musical language; it embodies the personal mark that is manifest in the individual usage of a certain public language game. The parallel between uttering a word and a musical performance shows how the act of imagination occurs simultaneously in the concrete sensory domain as well as in the domain of emotion or attitude.

Beyond describing the personal character of imagination, in the *Philosophical Investigations,* Wittgenstein formulated the capacity to understand a language as conditional on acts of

imagination: "to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life" (PI 2009: §19). At this point, Wittgenstein moves from specific examples of the operation of imagination (uttering a word, picturing the world) to a deeper understanding of an entire form of life. Such an understanding involves understanding rules of behavior, agreements, and judgments (PI 2009: §241–242). Given the central role that imagination plays in formulating Wittgenstein's philosophical goals, it is a wonder why so little attention has been directed at Wittgenstein's concept of imagination throughout the years (cf. ter Hark 1990: 221).

3. The difference between images and imagination

In his later writings, Wittgenstein compared various states of consciousness and suggested certain distinctions by which to understand the character of the elemental unit of imagination – the image:

> Images: Auditory images, visual images – how are they distinguished from sensations? Not by "vivacity". Images tell us nothing, either right or wrong, about the external world. (Images are not hallucinations, nor yet fancies.) *While I am looking at an object I cannot imagine it.* […] *Images are subject to the will.* Images are not pictures. I do not tell what object I am imagining by the resemblance between it and the image. (RPP 1980b: §63, my emphasis)

Wittgenstein did not distinguish between a visual and an auditory image, a fact that relates to the connections he draws in the *Tractatus* and in *Philosophical Investigations* between imagination and music, world, and language. The common denominator of an image and a sensation is their vivacity. Nevertheless, one cannot simultaneously think about them both. This seems to be the case because a sensation is involuntary, and an image arises from a person's will.

An image is not a source of knowledge about some object in particular, or about the external world in general. For this reason, though the act of imagination is an activity, Wittgenstein struggled to characterize it as a tangible activity: "In this way—but in no other—it is related to an activity such as drawing. And yet it isn't easy to call imaging an activity" (RPP 1980b: §80).

Wittgenstein's central contribution in his conceptual analysis of the concept of imagination, beyond clarifying the act of picturing and understanding forms of life, was his attempt to distinguish different usages of the concept "imagination": "One ought to ask, not what images are or what goes on when one imagines something, but how the word 'imagination' is used. But that does not mean that I want to talk only about words. For the question of what imagination essentially is, is as much about the word 'imagination' as my question" (PI 2009: §370).

According to Mary Warnock, Wittgenstein focuses in this passage on the activity and not on the product of the mental image (Warnock 1976: 158). Warnock emphasizes that for Wittgenstein it is not descriptions of the mental image that will teach us what imagination is but observing our usage of images. Such usage is grammatical and exposes species of thinking: "The concept of imaging is rather like one of doing than of receiving. Imagining might be called a creative act" (RPP 1980b: §111).

The act of imagination involves a 'doing' component, not merely receiving. According to Wittgenstein, the act of imagination is an activity that adds an interpretation, an additional perspective, or creates a change in the world, as we shall presently see. Before doing so, it is important to note Michel ter Hark's distinction between imagination in artistic as opposed to everyday contexts:

> The meaning of the German 'vorstellen' is 'to place something before one's mind'. […] In this sense 'to imagine something' is a certain activity and one which is directed at people or situations in reality. […] In English 'to imagine' can also refer to an activity which is directed at something fictional. This fiction may be quite ordinary, like somebody who imagines himself making the winning goal for his home team; it may also be artistic. Imagination in the artistic sense is usually referred to in German as 'Vorstellungskraft' or 'Einbildungskraft'. Wittgenstein does not use these terms; his analysis is more related to the first kind of imagining directed at reality. (ter Hark 1990: 222)

Ter Hark introduces two additional concepts on Wittgenstein's behalf: 'Vorstellung' and 'Einbildung' ('fancy'). The former is intended to denote, whereas the latter is meant for philosophical discussion regarding the inner contents of consciousness (ter Hark 1990: 222). Following ter Hark one can ask, what did Wittgenstein think that the concept of imagination would add to the operation of consciousness.

4. Imagination as an intermediate link

When bringing together the different usages of the concepts of imagination within Wittgenstein's writings it seems that they jointly constitute a rich concept that allows seeing a hidden aspect followed by a hermeneutical consideration. First, it is impossible simultaneously to see and to imagine. Second, an image does not add any knowledge about the world; that is, it engages the will. The third characteristic completes the picture: an image is voluntary; it cannot be forced upon consciousness. Hans Julius Schneider (2014) expands on this complexity of imagination and argues that, according to Wittgenstein, imagination does not operate on its own, but accompanies activities that seemingly conflict with it, such as calculating (PI 2009: §449). Furthermore, Schneider refers to Wittgenstein's discussion of forms of life, in which Wittgenstein argues that the complexity of imagination allows people to etch life events into their consciousness: "Imagination is not like a painted portrait or plastic model, but a complicated pattern made up of heterogeneous elements: words and pictures. One will then no longer place operating with written and phonetic symbols in opposition to operating with 'mental images' of events" (GB 1993: 131).

Thus, imagination can accompany all types of language use, including phonetic pronunciation, picturing, and event-memory. This complexity sheds light on Beth Savickey's argument in her study of Wittgenstein's usage of the concept of imagination. After reviewing the different places in which Wittgenstein mentions the concept of imagination, and the related research, Savickey concludes that we cannot comprehend a form of life through imagination (cf. Savickey 2017: 28–29). Therefore, Savickey reaches the methodological conclusion that Wittgenstein's direction ought to be understood as a general suggestion about versatile functions of language (PI 2009: §304). Savickey emphasized that a language and a form of life are one and the same, and that language exemplifies the complexity of the activity of imagination even in the simplest of forms of life.

The capacity of the activity of imagination to unify two different modes, on the one hand, and to distinguish between different functions of language and forms of life, on the other, clarifies the role of imagination as an intermediate link. Recall that locating and devising intermediate links is one of Wittgenstein's central methodological directives (cf. PI 2009: §122). The difficulty with this interpretation is that it fails to capture an important aspect of imagination according to Wittgenstein, which was mentioned but not elaborated upon (cf. Glock 1996: 170). Imagination allows for hermeneutic flexibility followed by changing aspects:

> The concept of an aspect is related to the concept of imagination. […] Doesn't it take imagination to hear something as a variation on a particular theme? And yet one does perceive something in so hearing it. "Imagine this changed like this, and you have this other thing." One can produce a proof in one's imagination. (PI 2009: §254–255)

5. Conclusion

The above discussion unified the different functions of imagination that were suggested by Wittgenstein. In so doing, two central characteristics stood out. The first is imagination's capacity to serve as an intermediate link between states of consciousness. The second function is the capacity conferred by imagination to grasp dynamics and change, which are part of the nature of language and therefore also part of the activity of consciousness.

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Seeing-as and the Necker Cube in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*

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Abstract

Though Wittgenstein devoted himself to aspect perception in the second part of *Philosophical Investigations*, and other post-*Investigations* writings, his attention to seeing-as runs through his whole philosophical development. In the *Tractatus*, a solution to perceiving complex picture (taking the Necker cube as instance) is brought up, by attributing this perception to seeing two or several different facts. The analysis of the Necker cube among scholars are primarily concerned with its reflection on perception, judgement, then suggest what Wittgenstein fails to recognize regarding seeing-as in the *Tractatus*. However, in this paper, I argue that the conception of projection, implicit in his analysis of the Necker cube, offers a nice bridge between the *Tractatus* and Wittgenstein's later writings about aspect perception. In doing this, I will first discuss the case of the Necker cube, and then introduce "projection" followed from the distinction between fact and state-of-things, finally elucidate that "projection" is actually still implicit in aspect perception in his later times.

Wittgenstein's notion of seeing-as, namely aspect perception, has been recognized as one of central concerns in his later works of the philosophy of psychology. The last two decades have witnessed increasing attention to the issue of seeing-as, represented by two excellent works – *Wittgenstein's Method: Neglected Aspects*, written by Gordon Baker in 2005, *and Seeing Wittgenstein Anew*, edited by William Day and Victor Krebs in 2010. Instead of treating it as a marginal or independent topic that did not emerged until *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment* (PPF), known as part II of *Philosophical Investigations*, scholars have started to see aspect perception in relation to other periods in Wittgenstein's philosophical development. This paper focuses on seeing-as in the *Tractatus*. I demonstrate that though Wittgenstein has not been technically attentive to the philosophy of psychology in the Tractatus, there is still some continuity that could shed new light on his intensive study on aspect perception in later works.

1. 'Seeing two different facts' in the Necker cube

Wittgenstein briefly studies on a puzzle picture in the *Tractatus*, namely the Necker cube in the remark 5.5423, where he does not yet use the phrase of 'seeing-as' or aspect perception. As a start to discussing the perception of puzzle picture, we should do justice to this case, despite its number sequence. It is after all an opening of Wittgenstein's long-lasting concern of aspect perception and seeing-as. In the *Tractatus*, he tries to offer a solution to how should we make sense of the perception of seeing ambiguous figure,

To perceive a complex is to perceive that its constituents stand to one another in such and such a way.

This may also explain how the figure



can be seen as a cube in two ways, and all similar appearances. For we really do see two different facts.

(If I look first at the a corners and only fleetingly at the b ones, then the a corners appear in front, and conversely.)

Thus, there is the same picture, but we can see it differently. As he said, seeing a cube in two ways is equivalent to seeing two different facts (*Tatsachen*). That is the answer he gives in the *Tractatus,* applied to 'all similar appearances' as the Necker cube. Let us take a further look at this case. Obviously, there are two views to perceive this two-dimensional picture as three-dimensional, one view we see the 'a' in the front of the picture and the b' in behind; and another view we see the 'b' in the front and the 'a' in behind. In result, the lines and corners of the drawn figure can be combined in two different ways, and accordingly, there are two different facts (i.e. perceptual representations) we see. The spatial relations between them are different, so the facts are correspondingly different as well.

Having said that, it is a quite unnatural and bizarre way to equate seeing an object in two ways with seeing two facts. What is about seeing two 'facts'? How can 'facts' be seen? Naturally, a few discussions arose among scholars who has worked on the Necker cube in relations to aspect perception. O'Sullivan takes Wittgenstein's solution as substituting the seeing of facts for the seeing of objects, given facts are individuated more finely than objects (cf. O'Sullivan 2015). J. Hintikka takes the facts Wittgenstein is talking about as configurations of perceptual objects, given facts are configurations of objects (cf. Hintikka, 1996). They both pay attention to the distinction and relation between facts and objects, despite having different arguments. Ter Hark then takes the distinction between fact and complex as essential (cf. ter Hark 2015).

Indeed, clarifying what role 'fact' is playing is crucial. I do agree facts differing from object holds some responsibility to Wittgenstein's solution to the cube. Back in the *Tractatus,* Wittgenstein hasn't realized aspect seeing is seeing/ perceiving internal relation between what is seen and another object we might see. He only takes two different relations to be two different facts, since the fact being represented should be analyzed into objects as components. And the two ways of seeing it ends up with two different analyses. However, the interpretation I try to offer in this paper on seeing two 'facts' differs from either of them, by distinguishing 'fact' from 'state-of-things' (*Sachverhalt*). This leads to the following section.

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2. The Obtaining of state-of-things and Rule of projection

I found it very interesting that why Wittgenstein says "see two different facts", rather than two different state-of-things. Now that what we perceive is that "its constituents stand to one another in such and such a way", why Wittgenstein does not suggest it is two different state-of-things that we see, considering "[a] state-of-things is a combination of objects (entities, things)." (TLP: 2.01) Here the relation between facts and state-of things come into play – "What is the case, a fact, is the obtaining of states-of-things." (*Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, ist das Bestehen von Sachverhalten*.) (TLP: 2) Besides, "[w]e picture facts." (TLP: 2.1), which means it is we represent the fact in the world via picturing. When we manage to see it as either advancing or receding, the state-of-things, where objects hang in one another (TLP: 2.03), is thus obtained.

Hence, it amounts to seeing the cube in one of the ways is the obtaining of state-of-things. We could rephrase our seeing of the cube as something that "*that* the a appears in front of b", or "*that* the b appears behind the a". Perceiving the Necker cube thus gives voice to the same paradoxical manner, that is, the picture stays exactly the same, and yet we see it completely differently. The way it is seen by us is becoming true because of we are picturing it. This is precisely why Wittgenstein chose 'facts' over 'states-of-things'. The cube appearing differently lies in the way it is being pictured. Put it differently, the way we *project* it constitutes an obtaining state-of-things, i.e., a fact. In seeing it in the different ways, we are 'projecting' its constituents in a different way. There comes the conception of 'projection', the rule of projection that is indispensable to the Necker cube and to the underlying continuity in aspect perception.

In making an analogy between symphony and its score, Wittgenstein detects a law of projection, "this rule is the law of projection which projects the symphony into the language of the musical score." (TLP: 4.0141), a rule employed as a translating rule by which we reconstruct the fact that is represented from the fact that is representing. As Marie McGinn nicely pointed out, only through rule of projection, does picture or proposition reach out to reality in an internal relation. (McGinn 2006) The importance of rule of projection is manifest in the relation between propositional facts and (other) facts 'in the world', which is the primary concern of the *Tractatus*. But something like the Necker cube seems to fall somewhere between these two kinds of 'facts'. We both see it as something in the world, but it also has a representational function, representing different cubes 'in the world'.

That is to say, either of the fact we see in the cube is a representation of a shape of cube in reality, represented/ pictured by the projection of its combination of constituents. It is the rule of projection that holds responsibility for Wittgenstein saying 'seeing two facts' in the Necker cube. However, this paper will not end here. In the following text we will see that projection as a more general conception still remains rigorous in Wittgenstein's philosophy through his change of thought, although he undermines the fundamental theories of the *Tractatus*, such as logical analysis, picture theory and so on.

3. The Conception of projection and Noticing an aspect

In this section, I try to show how the conception of projection offer a nice bridge between the *Tractatus* and Wittgenstein's later writings about aspect perception. Speaking of Wittgenstein dedicating to seeing-as in his later philosophy, the phenomenon of noticing an aspect, as instantiated in the case of duck-rabbit picture, has a paradoxical feature that "I see that it has not changed, and yet see it differently." (PPF 2009: §113) The same paradoxical manner that the Necker cube shows in the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein gives us an answer: "what I perceive in the lighting up of an aspect is not a property of the object, but an internal relation between it and other objects." (PPF 2009: §247) From the view of this paper, the general conception of projection could explicate that we perceive an internal relation in seeing-as.

Wittgenstein's change of view from 1929 onwards is epitomized by the fact that the form of agreement between language and reality in virtue of rule of projection is deserted. He reflects his earlier view on projection in his transitional period:

> For what I said really boils down to this: that every projection must have something in common with what is projected no matter what is the method of projection. But that only means that I am here extending the concept of 'having in common' and am making it equivalent to the general concept of projection. (PG 1974: I §113)

Despite the fact that the logical analysis and isomorphism between language and reality is broken down, the conception of projection still implies things having in common. We are able to project one thing into another, so that we see the latter in a new way.

A trait can be detected in the transitional period: "sometimes we *project* the character *into* the name that has been given. Thus it appears to us that the great masters have names which uniquely fit the character of their works." (PG 1974: I §129, my emphasis) Not only does the method of projection apply to naming a character, but also apply to seeing an *aspect*. It would explain what we are seeing is an aspect of a given object, instead of seeing plus interpreting. After all, at the very moment we project the preexisting knowledge into what is seen, we then actually see it in that way. It then reveals what we perceive in seeing-as is indeed an internal relation, in the sense that the aspect we see and something else we might have seen or remembered holds in a relation of projecting and being projected. Just as we would "have pointed to real rabbits, talked about their kind of life", when further asked about the picture-rabbit we see. (PPF 2009: §120)

Besides, the vital attribute that internal relation can only be *shown* still holds. As Beaney claims, "Although Wittgenstein does not himself make use of the distinction between saying and showing in his later work, […] the underlying idea remained." (Beaney 2008: 57) Noticing an aspect of a given object is shown in reacting correspondingly with it. In the same vein, a meaning-blind man would show his ignorance in his reaction:

> Geach: Would a meaning-blind man be able to tell that isn't a sad face? – Wittgenstein: I'm inclined to say he wouldn't smile at a smiling face in a drawing. (LPP 1946–7 1988: 105)

4. Conclusion

To conclude, the general concept of 'projection' (and the concept of 'showing'), which are both implicit in reading an impression into a given object, is still vivid after *Tractatus*. Armed with conception of projection, it could be better understood that seeing-as is not a mental state or process that is hidden from us. Therefore, by placing the Necker cube in the develop-

ment of aspect perception, we are seeing seeing-as in a new way.

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Toward a Wittgensteinian Cognitivism

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Abstract

With its picture theory of meaning, Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* provides an early articulation of truth-conditional semantics. Partly under the influence of Noam Chomsky, in turn partly under the influence of later Wittgenstein, Paul Pietroski argues that we ought to abandon truth-conditional semantics. On Pietroski's alternative, sentence meanings are not truth-conditions. Instead, sentence meanings are instructions for composing concepts in a (Fodorian) language of thought. At first blush, this cognitivist approach to semantics looks like a significant departure from the Tractarian line of thought. But Pietroski allows that (at least certain stretches of) this language of thought (Mentalese) comprising the concepts composed in executing the instructions that meanings are may have a truth-conditional semantics; and implicit in the *Tractatus*, I argue, are the outlines of a cognitivist account of propositionally-articulated thought agreeing in all essential respects with Pietroski's full account–provided that a Mentalese sentence composed by executing the meaning of a natural language sentence and that natural language sentence share a logical form. Drawing on Chomsky's competence/performance distinction, and recognizing that what is provided in the *Tractatus* is not a performance model but the outlines of a competence model, we arrive at a form of psychologism, but not one that gets us "entangled in unessential psychological investigations".

1.

On the Tractarian picture theory of meaning, the function of language is to picture states of affairs (objects having certain properties, or standing in certain relations); the meaning of a sentence is what it pictures; and the sentence is true just in case that state of affairs obtains, that is, just in case what is pictured is a fact–where the picturing relation obtains just in case there is a correspondence between elements of the picture and elements of the state of affairs pictured (TLP: 2.1, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, 2.131, 2.14, 2.15, 2.1511, etc.).

In essence, this is the picture of meaning inscribed in the dominant paradigm of formal semantics–to wit, truth-conditional semantics, according to which knowing the meaning of a (declarative, indicative) sentence, and thus understanding that sentence, is knowing what is the case if it is true. Within this general framework, as it has been developed, the meanings of linguistic expressions are extensions or intensions. Taking the first line, the meanings of terms, predicates, and sentences are objects, sets of objects, and truth values. Taking the second, the meanings of terms, predicates, and sentences are functions from possible worlds to the same. (Of course, these functions, too, can be taken in extension.) Often, this is combined with the view that human languages are Platonic objects of a sort, namely functions from linguistic expressions (written, spoken, or signed) to meanings, or sets of expression-meaning pairs.

The picture, as it is usually understood, is a static one of language as an abstract corpus on the one hand and the world (totality of facts) on the other.

2.

In his recent book *Conjoining Meanings: Semantics without Truth Values*, Paul Pietroski makes the case that "this abstraction from psychology has outlived its utility" (Pietroski 2018: 3). Working in the Chomskyan tradition of cognitivist linguistics, Pietroski takes individual natural languages to be biologically implementable procedures for generating linguistic expressions and linking them to meanings (2, 47, 50–2, etc.). Such meanings are a natural kind, and paradigmatically linguistic facts are to ground talk of them (3, 23–4, 347). Among these are structural and lexical homophony and polysemy.

We know that "a spy saw a man with a telescope" has two meanings, partially captured by the parsings [[a spy] [saw [a man with a telescope]]] and [[a spy] [saw [a man] with a telescope]] (42). Provided the grammar of a language, there is a limit to such structural homophony. Provided the lexicon, there is some number of meanings associated with any given linguistic expression ("bank", for example), though the number is essentially open-ended (5–6). Such lexical homophony, in turn, is contrasted with polysemy. On Pietroski's view, this is not one expression associated with more than one meaning but one expression with one meaning associated with a family of concepts bearing certain family resemblances. It is, in brief, "conceptual equivocality" (4–6). See, for example, "lines", as in "Euclidean lines", "telephone lines", "lines of thought". Similar remarks go for "book", "door", "country", etc. The examples can be multiplied indefinitely: polysemy is a ubiquitous feature of natural language (5). So is vagueness.

These last two features of natural language, Pietroski thinks, pose insuperable problems for a truth-conditional semantics. If the extensions of predicates are sets, they must have determinate members. It is clear, besides, that if natural language expressions have extensions, distinct expressions with distinct meanings can be necessarily co-extensive: for example, "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus". Likewise, then, extensionally equivalent sentences can have distinct meanings (10). This is enough to show that meanings are not extensions. But in fact, Pietroski argues, it is not clear that expressions have extensions, provided that this supposition leads to paradox with sentences like "this sentence is false" (70–3). All the more so, then, it is not clear that meanings determine extensions expressions have.

But rather than conclude with a general skepticism about the prospects of a formal semantics–as Chomsky, under the influence of later Wittgenstein, seems to do–Pietroski outlines an alternative approach consonant with the Chomskyan framework. Meanings of the kind indicated by the foregoing, Pietroski hypothesizes, are "composable instructions" ("*Begriffsplans*") for composing concepts of a (Fodorian) language of thought (1, 24–7); where "concepts have contents that can be described as ways of thinking about things" (4).

The meaning of "meaning" is thus an instruction. The idea of executing an instruction is a general one, appealed to in many domains of computational psychology, including further as-

pects of language: "pronunciations", for example, "might be described as instructions for how to articulate" (292). For of course, an utterance is an articulate act–"a particular gymnastics executed by certain anatomical structures", as Pietroski quotes Morris Halle remarking (292). I now requote Halle at length from Pietroski:

> An X-ray motion picture recording the behavior of the vocal tract in the course of producing a particular utterance bears a striking resemblance to a stylized dance performed by dancers of great skill. If utterances are regarded as "dances" performed by…movable portions of the vocal tract, then one must also suppose that underlying each utterance ("dance") there is a "score" in some "choreographic" notation that instructs each "dancer" what to do and when.

The resonances between Pietroski's gloss on this passage, in which he draws the parallel with logical forms, and several passages from the *Tractatus*, as will be seen, are striking:

> From this perspective, phonetic transcriptions of utterances are depictions–encoded in a particular alphabet–of biologically implemented choreographic instructions, which can be executed by anatomical structures that let speakers perform some impressive vocal gymnastics. Though one shouldn't be surprised if alphabets that were invented long ago, without this specific purpose in mind, are not quite what phonologists need. Similarly, I think the logical forms that semanticists often posit are best viewed as initial depictions–encoded in a notation designed for other purposes–of certain instructions for how to build concepts. (292)

Granted, Pietroski argues at length that a *Fregean* Begriffsschrift is not up to the task of articulating the structure of natural languages; and Wittgenstein was of course working in the Fregean paradigm. But then, Wittgenstein remarks that "all the propositions of ordinary language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order" (*Tractatus*, 5.5563). So if the Fregean Begriffsschrift should prove incapable of the task of explicating its logical structure, the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* ought to be amenable to this update. The idea remains that a natural language is indeed a Begriffsschrift in a wider sense. It is a notation for thought: instructions for composing concepts.

3.

At *Tractatus,* 4.0141 Wittgenstein relates the structure of the musical score to the structure of the symphony to the structure of the groove on the gramophone record–a variety of objects with a common structure:

> There is a general rule by means of which the musician can obtain the symphony from the score, and which makes it possible to derive the symphony from the groove on the gramophone record, and, using the first rule, to derive the score again. That is what constitutes the inner similarity between these things which seem to be constructed in such entirely different ways. And that rule is the law of projection which projects the symphony into the language of musical notation. It is the rule for translating this language into the language of gramophone records.

In focusing on the structured objects and their correspondence, we are led–as Russell encourages, in his introduction to the Tractatus–to the static picture earlier noted. But of course, between each structured object are articulated *acts* (events), carried out in application of a method of projection.

The musical score is a picture of "the musical idea" (as Wittgenstein puts it), instructions for (re-)producing the series of sounds composing the symphony; and the groove of the record is a (literal) record of the series of sounds (changes of waveform in the medium of air) as they were produced on an occasion. The score and record present at a time the structure of the symphony in space. When you play the symphony by reading the score–that is, by *reading off* the music, by a method of projection–you re-produce the movements of the first players to play the score. A record, too, can be read, and is read by a record-player. When you set the player to play the record the movement of the needle repeats the pattern the first needle made, as it was moved by the sounds that were played for recording.

Essentially the same remarks apply to any event which unfolds according to some system of instructions. They apply, for another example, to dance, including again the sort of gymnastics performed by the vocal musculature. And they apply also to thought, or thinking–that is, to propositionally-articulated cognition.

The sentence on the page or screen before you is a record of thought as act and a representation, for those who can read it, of "the reality with which it is concerned" (TLP: 4.011). In reading it, by a method of projection, you re-produce it (the italics to follow are mine):

> 3.001 A state of affairs is *thinkable'*: what this means is that *we can picture it to ourselves*.
>
> 3.11 We *use* the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written, etc.) as a projection of a possible situation.
> The method of projection is *to think of the sense of the proposition*.
>
> 3.12 I call the sign with which we express a thought a propositional sign.–And a proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.
>
> 3.5 A propositional sign, *applied and thought out,* is a thought.

It is clear that this is a psychological act. But it seems to me equally clear that the proposition, being "a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world" is not a Platonic entity *à la* Frege but a psychical one. Thus understood, it is a sentential concept in Pietroski's sense, or what we might call a psychologically real Fregean thought.

This interpretation has precedent in the interpretation of Anthony Kenny, a justly revered interpreter of Wittgenstein; see Kenny 1981, where he cites alongside several additional passages from the *Tractatus* a telling alteration made between the *Prototractatus* and *Tractatus* and some decisive remarks in correspondence with Russell. So why has this interpretation been so widely missed? Wittgenstein obviously sees what he is doing as philosophy, and at *Tractatus* 4.1121 he writes that "psychology is no more closely related to philosophy than any other natural science". He continues:

> Does not my study of sign-language correspond to the study of thought-processes, which philosophers used to

[1].

> consider so essential to the philosophy of logic? Only in most cases they got entangled in unessential psychological investigations, and with my method too there is an analogous risk.

Taking it for granted post-Frege that psychologism of any variety must involve conceptual confusion, and reading in light of Russell's introduction and Wittgenstein's subsequent de-psychologizing even psychology (as Stanley Cavell aptly puts it), it is easy to gloss this passage as rejecting the connection queried. But the implied answer is Yes. It is not Wittgenstein's aim to psychologize, but in the course of carrying out his aim he does provide the outlines of a psychology–albeit one which idealizes and abstracts away from *unessential* psychological investigations. Put in terms of Chomsky's (1965) competence/performance distinction, unavailable to Wittgenstein, what is provided is not a performance model but a competence model. It is not Wittgenstein's task to provide the processing details; it suffices that such details can be given.

4.

Pietroski by his own lights separates semantics from metaphysics and situates it within computational psychology, and Wittgenstein by his lights separates semantics (logic) from (at least some aspects of) psychology and situates it within philosophy, namely by wedding it to metaphysics. At first blush, these approaches seem opposed. But on further reflection, I think, they are seen to be complimentary.

Wittgenstein has a place for psychological processes in his invocation of "the method of projection", and again I think a case can be made for the view that his propositions are not Platonic (Fregean) but psychical entities. Pietroski, for his part, does not deny that we can think truly and express our thoughts in language. "A *thought*", he says, "can be described as a sentential concept that lets us think about (some portion of) the universe as being a certain way" (4).

Pietroski's meanings and the concepts composed by executing them are composite: "In this respect, the meaning of a complex expression reflects both its grammatical form and the structure of any concept built by executing that meaning"–structures over which can be defined a natural logic (359, 360). There is, that is to say, an isomorphism between the structure of the sentence and the structure of the sentential concept, the thought "expressed" by the sentence. This would, in fact, be nicely explained by their identity; and in some places Pietroski appears open to this hypothesis. To return to the Tractarian picture, then, all that is missing here is an admission that the structures of true sentential concepts are reflected in the structures of the states of affairs of which they are true. As for what is missing in the Tractarian picture, namely a specification of the relevant method of projection: Pietroski's work can be seen as providing a first pass at filling in the details.

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Wittgenstein and Butler: Encountering Different Forms of Life

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Abstract

The project of this paper consists in finding an analogy between the thought of Judith Butler and that of the later Wittgenstein in the consideration of what is different, as both authors seem to ask themselves fundamental questions to understand the possibility and the modality of the relationship with what is not contemplated in our system of thought. Indeed, thinking about forms of life and cultural modalities different from ours is not something easy, as it is impossible to abstract and alienate ourselves from the very conceptual scheme in which our questions and reflections are formulated. Both authors, however, while recognizing these difficulties, affirm a possibility of change, albeit progressive and limited, in our forms of thought. To demonstrate this last point, the concept of repetition presented by Butler in *The Psychic Life of Power* (1997) will be analyzed, as well as that of analogy in the later Wittgenstein, underlined by Andronico's research on the imaginative method.

The aim of this paper is to draw an analogy between Judith Butler and the late Wittgenstein, mainly focusing on their investigations around the possibility of understanding and actualizing "the different", i.e., what is not contemplated in our system of thought. This attempt is articulated through a double dynamic. On the one hand, both authors recognize the impossibility of detaching oneself from a certain conceptual system, within which we are formed as thinking subjects. Indeed, thinking about forms of life and cultural modalities different from ours is not something easy, as it is impossible to abstract and alienate ourselves from the very conceptual scheme and language games in which our reflections are formulated. On the other hand, while recognizing these difficulties, both authors affirm a possibility of change, albeit progressive and limited, in our forms of thought. For Butler, as she claims in *The Psychic Life of Power* (1997), this happens thanks to the subject's *repetition* of actions, that, even if they necessarily take place within a system of power, can produce constant and progressive modifications of it. For Wittgenstein, this opportunity of change is made possible by the contingency of our linguistic games, as they are not universally necessary. The awareness of this possibility allows us to think about different linguistic forms and forms of life and, thus, to approach what is different. Object of analysis will be the method used by the later Wittgenstein to carry out this operation, referring mainly to Marilena Andronico's studies on the descriptive and, mainly, on the imaginative method in Wittgenstein.

1. Butler: The Psychic Life of Power

The fundamental thesis of Butler's *The Psychic Life of Power* consists in the observation that power is not something that oppresses us from outside, that is, it is not something that opposes us as already constituted subjects and commands our bodies. Rather, power is something with which we have an intimate relationship because, in its subordination, it also produces us as subjects. That is why for Butler it is not possible to distinguish a theory of power from a theory of the psyche: power and psyche are two spheres that penetrate one another, and it is not possible to understand one independently of the other. Indeed, for Butler "'subjection' signifies the process of becoming subordinated by power as well as the process of becoming a subject" (Butler 1997: 2).

To understand this link, we need to see how Butler understands the process of forming the subject through the internalization of a norm. The movement of the subject, in its act of internalizing power, can be described as a turning, a rebellion against itself: the subject internalizes a norm, which commands and forces it, and for this reason it turns on itself. But, underlines Butler, this image distracts us from the authentic process of formation of the subject: it can at most be understood as an explanatory image, because it is not possible to think of a subject before this turn, precisely because the subject is formed by that same movement of internalization. This movement constitutes the "paradox of subjection" (Butler 1997: 4): it is not possible to think of a subject who puts into action the internalization of a power or a law, being the subject generated by that same movement of internalization. This means that it is not possible to think of a subject who internalizes a law that is external to it, since precisely at the moment of the formation of such a subject the division between an internal and an external does not exist. The paradox is therefore also a "paradox of referentiality" (Butler 1997: 4): we want to refer to something that does not really exist, that is, a subject who twists against itself by internalizing the law.

The subject, therefore, cannot be formed outside the discourse of power. On the one hand, there is a desire on the part of the subject to distance itself from the conditions of its production: the subject wants to rebel against the power which subjects it. But this desire for rebellion turns out to be a desire that has as its objective the defeat of the subject since the subject is subject because it is subordinate to power. The subject itself, therefore, to preserve its persistence, opposes its own desire to rebel against power and finds itself characterized by "a passionate attachment to those by whom she or he is subordinated" (Butler 1997: 7).

The situation presented by Butler does not seem to propose ways out: the subject is such as produced by power itself, therefore, to rebel against power and its structures would lead to the destruction of the subject itself. At this point, a question concerning the subject's freedom of action is necessary: "If subordination is the condition of possibility for agency, how might agency be thought in opposition to the forces of subordination?" (Butler 1997: 10). For Butler, the possibility of a 'free' action, an action that could even oppose the power, exists, even if we must always remain aware of the limits imposed by the structures of power which form us as subjects.

Indeed, for Butler, the power which create the subject is not automatically translated into an action, and the action of the subject can result in a significant reversal and opposition to the power, since "agency cannot logically be derived from its conditions" (Butler 1997: 12). In other words, this means that even if the subject in its actions preserves the conditions that make it emerge, this does not mean that its capacity to act is

bound to those conditions and that these remain unchanged by the action itself. The act of appropriation of power by the subject can alter that power to such an extent that it is in opposition to the power that made it possible, resisting it.

Power therefore (a) on the one hand is what makes the subject's emergence possible; (b) on the other hand is what is kept alive and reproduced by the subject's action. In this way, when the subject actively assumes the power, this loses its aprioristic character: this opens up the opposite perspective in which it is the subject who exercises power. In the active moment of repetition, therefore, the movement of opposition to power occurs: the act of repetition is "never merely mechanical" (Butler 1997: 16), but it is the place of possible alteration and therefore opposition to power itself.

The repetition of power shows how the conditions of subordination are not immobile, but temporalized, active, productive: power is not only something primary, but also what forms the sense of action of our present operations. In this way, Butler manages not to fall into a "politically sanctimonious forms of fatalism", nor into "naive forms of political optimism" (Butler 1997: 17). To describe this situation the author introduces the concept of the 'excrescence of the subject': the subject is neither completely defined by power, nor completely able to define power, but it represents that excrescence of logic which goes beyond the binarism of the *aut/aut* and lives in the ambivalence. The subject as a reformulation of power is the place of subordination in which power operates, but also the place of subversion in which power is repeated, opening the space for a new original activity, because repetition is not a mechanical process.

2. Wittgenstein, the imaginative method, and the role of analogy

The parallelism between Butler and Wittgenstein can be found in the attempt by both authors to investigate the possibility of understanding and actualizing the different. This attempt develops, on the one hand, with the awareness of the inevitability and impossibility of detaching ourselves from a certain conceptual system within which we are formed as thinking subjects. On the other hand, however, both thinkers seem to propose a small breach, a possibility of action of the subject within the system, able to expand and modify it, even if starting from within. For Butler, as shown, this happens thanks to the subject's repetition of actions, which, even if they necessarily take place within a system of power, are able to produce constant and progressive modifications of it. In the thought of the later Wittgenstein, we can find a similar movement: on the one hand, there is the awareness of the fundamental role played by linguistic games – within which we have formed ourselves – for our representation of the world; on the other hand, for Wittgenstein it is necessary to demonstrate the contingency of our linguistic games, as they are not universally necessary. The awareness of this possibility allows us to imagine different linguistic forms and forms of life, to approach what is different. In this chapter I will try to analyse the method used by Wittgenstein to carry out this operation, referring mainly to Marilena Andronico's *Descrivere e Immaginare nel Secondo Wittgenstein* (1984).

Before proceeding with the analysis, it is necessary to clarify the relationship between 'form of life' and language, as these terms will be largely employed in this section. The following passage from the *Philosophical Investigations,* in which the author compares the form of life to an activity, might be worth considering: "speaking of a language is part of an activity, or of a form of life (*das Sprechen der Sprache ein Teil ist einer Tätigkeit, oder einer Lebensform*)" (PI: §23). This means that, although Wittgenstein seems to suggest an equation between forms of life and language when he writes that "to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life" (PI: §19), the latter should rather be considered as a *part* of the former. Hacker underlines this aspect clearly, noticing that "different educations, interests and concerns, languages, different human relations and relations to nature and the world constitute distinct forms of life.". Nonetheless, language is certainly a very clear mirror of the structures of a given form of life. Therefore, the fact that here will be shown the possibility of imagining different language games relates to the possibility of thinking about different forms of life.

For the later Wittgenstein, philosophy consists in the study of the forms of ordinary language whose role is to make clear the functioning of our conceptual system. Philosophy therefore has not a foundational character, but exclusively descriptive: "It leaves everything as it is" (PI 2009: 124). As Andronico points out, it is necessary for Wittgenstein to maintain a firm distinction between empirical propositions and grammatical propositions. Indeed, for Wittgenstein "philosophical problems […] are, of course, not empirical problems" (PI 2009: 109), but the attention of philosophy is turned to grammatical problems: its aim is to describe not facts, but "internal relations" between our concepts, outlining the field of "what will be called possible and what not, i.e. what grammar permits" (PG 127: 175). Grammatical expressions are in this sense *a priori* (see Andronico 2007: 52), i.e., they are expressions not directly derived from facts, but linked to our linguistic system, from which we start to analyse and experience the world: they establish the limits, the possibilities, and the modalities of our understanding of the world.

Wittgenstein's descriptive method, by which certain rules of our language are made explicit, serves precisely to make us aware of these conceptual structures, since they are so deeply rooted in us that they remain "hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity" (PI 2009: 129). This questioning is necessary to understand the structures that govern our thinking and relating to the world, and consequently to make us aware that they, considered from this perspective, are not absolute and necessary (see Andronico 2007: 56). To demonstrate this contingency of the structures of thought, in Wittgenstein's work intervenes the imaginative method, which consists in imagining different conceptual connections and linguistic games. Imagining different situations, allows us to see the possibility of new forms of life that otherwise we would not have contemplated (see Andronico 1984: 8). The imaginative method therefore serves to make us understand the contingency of our conceptual structures, the fact that our way of relating to the world is not absolute and necessary, but simply dictated by a set of linguistic games that we have assimilated until they become part of us. For example, when Wittgenstein proposes a different approach to contradiction in the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, proposing new logical and linguistic possibilities in which contradiction can be accepted, his "aim is to alter the *attitude* to contradiction" (RFM 82: 106e), i.e., to show us the fact that the principle of non-contradiction is not an absolute and necessary truth, but simply represents the way we, with our thought structures, approach to the world.

If with the descriptive and imaginative method Wittgenstein shows us how our conceptual system is contingent, it is equally fundamental to remember that our form of life is not something purely arbitrary, but the necessary and constitu-

tive background for our becoming subjects: from this point of view, we can say that our thought categories are necessary, as they represent our only way of approaching the world, the only 'natural' way for us, because they are firmly rooted in us (see Andronico 1984: 20).

Here arises the philosophical problem, which reminds us of the movement described by Butler: on the one hand philosophy wants to describe those forms of thought with which we analyse the world; on the other hand, it is precisely these same structures that form us as subjects, that is, they are now part of our nature, and it seems impossible to place oneself outside of them to judge them. In other words, we find ourselves in front of the paradoxical moment in which our research has as its object a language, which, however, also has the function of an instrument of research itself. The solution to this *impasse* resides precisely in Wittgenstein's imaginative method, since thanks to it we can reach that moment of alienation from our structures of thought, which is necessary to give a detached analysis of it (see Andronico 1984: 26). Andronico sums up the work of the imaginative method in three stages: first, it makes us aware of the grammatical and not empirical nature of the conceptual structures with which we relate to the world; second, it underlines their contingency, showing how they are only some of the possible connections that we are able to produce; finally, it allows us to look at these propositions as if they were empirical, or as if they described a fact, which is the existence or non-existence of certain linguistic games (see Andronico 1984: 27).

In this way, we reach an anthropological-descriptive perspective, which allows us to recognize the contingency and the non-absoluteness of our forms of thought. But without forgetting how these structures are somehow absolute, as they represent that conceptual structure with which we have been accustomed to look at the world. From here, we can glimpse the particular way Wittgenstein adopts for the possibility of understanding and representing the different of the imaginative method. According to Andronico, this is to be found in an analysis of the term "different": we can understand what is different, but only because it has something to do with our conceptual system, that is, because it has a similarity or analogy with our concepts (see Andronico 1984: 31). In other words, we can understand what is different, but as long as it is not *too* different, i.e., it does not radically distance itself from our conceptual structures, but has, at least in some respects, a relationship of similarity or analogy with our concepts. The old and the new concept will be "*somewhat* different", and their difference will therefore not be an absolute difference, but a difference "with respect to one or another feature" (ROC 32: 21e).

Just like Butler, for Wittgenstein one cannot think of an 'outside' of the conceptual system that has formed us as subjects, because it is necessary in the sense not of absolute, but of impossible to transcend in our relationship with the world. But, just like Butler, this does not mean that 'from within' our own conceptual structures, we cannot take small progressive and gradual steps towards increasingly different concepts. This movement produced by an analogy between concepts can be traced back to the method of repetition proposed by Butler: we cannot move outside the confines of our conceptual system, which is somehow absolute for us, but we can gradually expand it starting from within.

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A Sceptical Paradox for Computation

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Abstract

In this paper I explore a point of connection between Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (PI 1958) and the contemporary philosophy of computation. As for the former, I follow the exegesis famously offered by Kripke in *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (1981), who interprets the text as a repudiation of a mentalistic conception of rule-following presented in the shape of a sceptical paradox for the metaphysics of language. As for the latter, I focus on a theory called "Ontology of Levels of Abstraction" (LoAs) which, quite unusually, endorses the very Wittgensteinian observation that no physical fact-of-the-matter about a machine can univocally determine which function it is implementing. But the advocate of the LoAs Ontology also claims that, given a machine, what really settles the question about its implementation is the content of the intention of the human who designed it. This opens the way to the formulation of a sceptical paradox analogous to the one Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein, this time concerning the metaphysics of computation. This paradox forces us to the unacceptable conclusion that nothing can determine which function a machine is implementing and, therefore, whether its output is correct or incorrect. Finally, a sceptical solution à la Wittgenstein is sketched.

1. Wittgenstein's Machine-as-Symbol

Kripke claims that in the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein takes great pains in dismissing a mentalistic view of intention, according to which what really determines a univocal correct/incorrect partition between all the applications of a sign is the content of one person's mental state of intention. The outcome of this metaphysical scepticism about intention opens the way to an extraordinarily devastating scenario for metasemantics, to the point of compelling the unacceptable conclusion that no language and no form of communication is strictly speaking possible (Kripke 1981: 60). It is worth noting that the claim is not only absurd, but also pragmatically self-defeating since it is stated by the means of language.

It is interesting to appreciate how attractive a sort of "technological escape" can seem at this point. An idea could be that of preventing the paradox conclusion by appealing to the way a concrete machine behaves. After all, we definitely think of machines as following a determined rule (call it a function, a program, an algorithm) so that, prima facie, the machine behaviour seems to be the perfect counterexample to Wittgenstein's statement that "every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule" (PI 1958: §201).

Wittgenstein himself discusses this point (PI 1958: §§193–195), and Kripke relevantly elaborates on this topic when he considers dispositionalism as a possible way out of the paradox (Kripke 1981: 22–37). However, both philosophers point out (in different ways, of course) that the strategy in examination is flawed by a crucial weakness, as it presupposes a prior idealization of the machine behaviour itself:

> If we know the machine, everything else, that is its movement, seems to be already completely determined. […] do we forget the possibility of their bending, breaking off, melting, and so on? […] We use a machine, or the drawing of a machine, to symbolize a particular action of the machine […]. But when we reflect that the machine could also have moved differently it may look as if the way it moves must be contained in the machine-as-symbol far more determinately than in the actual machine. (PI 1958: §193)

Whether a machine ever malfunctions and, if so, when, is not a property of the machine itself as a physical object but is well defined only in terms of its program, as stipulated by its designer. (Kripke 1981: 34)

Although in the quoted excepts both Wittgenstein and Kripke speak of a "machine" in a broad sense, it is quite interesting to restrict the scope of this philosophical point to the subset of computing machines only. As far as computational physical systems are concerned, the Wittgensteinian claim in examination becomes that there is no mind-independent, physical fact capable of determining which function a computing system is implementing. But what determines the correctness of a computer behaviour then? The Ontology of Levels of Abstraction is one of the few philosophical theories on the market to offer an account of the notion of implementation which does not exclusively appeal to certain physical facts about the machine.

2. The Ontology of Levels of Abstraction

The Method of Abstraction abandons the idea of a polarised and dichotomic metaphysics for hardware and software. The theory rather subsumes both elements under a unique ontology made of a hierarchy of distinct levels of abstraction (LoAs). Each LoA describes the computational system at a certain specific gradient of abstraction, but no LoA in isolation constitutes it, as the system is made of the whole abstraction hierarchy.

The method of abstraction proceeds from the least abstract level, i.e., the hardware layer, by building new levels upon it by progressive abstractions. Primiero (2016: 9) devises a five-fold ontological structure for computational systems, ordering the hierarchy from the most to the least abstract level:

- Intention
- Algorithm
- Programming Language
- Machine Code
- Electrical Charge

According to this view, the designer's intention (1) is satisfied by an algorithm (2), which is implemented in a programming language (3) that denotes a machine code (4) capable of controlling the electrical charges (5) of the physical machinery. The relation between each LoA and the one immediately higher in the abstraction hierarchy is called implementation (Primiero 2019: 213) and, by transitivity, every LoA is said to be able to implement all the levels above (Angius & Primiero 2013: para. 1). Implementation stops being a relation holding only between two, fixed levels (e.g., "the hardware implements the

software") and becomes a relation which ranges over each one of the five LoAs.

This significant broadening of the sense to attribute to the notion of implementation has important consequences. To begin with, every LoA can now receive its specific definition of correctness: functional, procedural, and executional (Primiero 2019: 213–214). These level-specific definitions of correctness can then be reassembled into a unique notion of correctness which ranges over all LoAs: a physical computing system can be said to be overall correct if it satisfies the required definitions of correctness at each LoA, i.e., if every LoA is a correct implementation of the one above in the hierarchy (Primiero 2019: 241).

What instead determines the correctness of the algorithm chosen by the programmer to be implemented into a string of high-level language code (i.e., what gives an "interpretation" to the algorithm itself) is the top level of abstraction, the LoA of intention. It is ultimately the content of such a mental state that fixes the algorithm correctness: "It is in view of the designer's intention that the algorithm is considered a correct mathematical representation of the intended task, and, in turn, the written program is deemed correct or not" (Primiero 2016: 8). It is hence clear that the existence of intention as a mental state is more than essential for the solidity of the metaphysical structure just described as a whole.

3. A Sceptical Paradox for Computation

If a computational physical system can be said to correctly compute a certain function only in relation to its designer's intention and if this mental state turns out to be but thin air, how in the world could we ever be able to determine which function is computed by the system? This question could be seen as a Wittgensteinian sceptical paradox for the metaphysics of computation. In a referentialist picture, in fact, proving that nothing in the world corresponds to the proposition "physical computing system S implements function F" should compel us to conclude that the entire portion of our language which involves the concept of implementation should be surgically removed, exactly as we got rid of many other empty notions in the past, such as phantoms, witches, werewolves, ether, phlogiston, etc. Note how such a highly revisionist resolution clashes with the increasing need we are facing, as a linguistic community, to have available a robust concept of implementation.

Strictly speaking, however, it is not necessary to conceive the paradox about computation in the light of its (however strong) connection with that one about meanings. More schematically, the two paradoxes could equally be seen as two stand-alone, independent problems running along parallel rails, both engendering from equivalent questions around the relation between an abstract and a concrete realm, one in the metaphysics of language and the other in the metaphysics of computation.

- What links a meaning to this word?
- What links a function to this physical computational system?

In both cases, the purported answers seem to call for a mentalistic appeal to intentional facts. The symmetry between the two issues holds also when a philosophical analysis like Wittgenstein's gives us good reasons to believe that *no fact of the matter* corresponds to intending something by a certain sign. This leads to the formulation of the two separate sceptical claims sharing the same antecedent:

a. Since intention does not exist as a mental state, nothing links a meaning to this word.
b. Since intention does not exist as a mental state, nothing links a function to this physical computational system.

4. Sketching a Sceptical Solution for the Paradox About Computation

Wittgenstein would notice that our "form of life" is every day getting more and more interweaved with implementation-related activities, to the point that a modern-day version of his famous "five red apples" scenario would realistically involve some computing. More in general, the philosopher firmly rejects the idea that a genuine philosophical enquiry can legitimately result in a reformation of our ordinary linguistic practices (PI 1958: §§124, 126). From the Wittgensteinian anti-revisionist and pragmatist stance, in order to clarify the concept of implementation, we ought to translate the philosophical interrogative around the truth conditions governing the *fact* of implementation into a question about the assertability conditions governing our *talking* of it. As a starting point, let us take into examination the question about implementation in a referentialist setup:

- Under which conditions is it true/false that a physical system implements a computation?

Which, translated into the anti-referentialist terms Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein's view of language (Kripke 1981: 73), becomes the following, two-fold interrogative:

- Under which conditions is it appropriately asserted/denied that a physical system implements a computation?
- What is the role, and the utility, in our lives of our practice of asserting/denying that a physical system implements a computation under these conditions?

An answer to the latter question would be all too obvious, in the light of the fact that we literally rely on the behaviour of computing systems for matters of life and death, which makes it fundamental to be able to express the idea that certain outputs are expected from machine M but not from machine N.

Coming to the former interrogative, instead, my impression is that the circumstances under which someone is licensed to make an assertion around a machine implementing a certain computation are very similar to those Kripke individuates for intention ascriptions (Kripke 1981: 91–98), at least for a relevant subset of cases. Take a very simple function, like that of addition, involving non enormous arguments. We, as a linguistic community, feel entitled to assert that the machine is implementing this function as long as the results it returns are the same that nearly each one of us would give as primitive inclinations. For the simplest calculations, implementation could simply be the concept we attribute to machines in the same manner as we do for intention with human beings. The former concept might have even been shaped on the basis of the latter one, i.e., the assertability conditions governing the former might have been individuated following the model given by those governing the latter.

One could perhaps raise the question why a new notion (that of implementation) and hence a new associated language game had to be introduced into our linguistic practice, when, to the bone, the former is just a sort of duplicate of the concept of intention. What is the utility of keeping both, separate concepts? Well, I think that implementation and intention do in fact show at least two substantial differences, which suffi-

ciently give reasons for the utility of their coexistence in our language.

I think that a significant difference between attributions of implementation and of intention concerns the very objects of such ascriptions. Intention is used to attribute a mental state to other conscious beings, where the claim that every other human being has a mind and an inner conscious life is, for Wittgenstein, a grammatical fact. As such, its negation, or even any rephrasing that can suggest its possible negation, is quite a nonsense to us. Wittgenstein observes:

> 'I believe that he is suffering.'–Do I also believe that he isn't an automaton? (Or is it like this: I believe that he is suffering, but am certain that he is not an automaton? Nonsense!) (PI 1958: II, 178)

A substantial divergence between intention and implementation ascriptions hence fundamentally concerns the fact that the language games the two notions are involved in are characterised by different primitive features (or grammatical facts); this is why, for instance, ascriptions of intention can be given in the first or third person while the only acceptable form of ascriptions of implementation is in the third person.

At this point, we could raise the question of who, within the linguistic community, is entitled to assert such third-person ascriptions about implementation. Nothing in the Wittgensteinian picture of language games prevents us from thinking that only certain members of the community ("the experts", such as programmers, developers, etc.) have the right, or the prerogative, to make certain assertions about implementation. More in general, we could consider the condition of being part of a particular subgroup within the linguistic community as just a further, relevant circumstance to be added to the assertability conditions mentioned in (a).

If these very simple observations are correct, the circumstances for implementation ascriptions simply have no immediate counterpart in the set of circumstances for intention ascriptions, thus revealing that the two language games do not perfectly overlap, and that they are not *the same game*.

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On Wittgenstein and Socrates' Use of Maieutic Devices

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Abstract

In this paper, I explore similarities between what I call "maieutic auxiliary devices" found in the dialogue *Theaetetus*, and various methodological devices Wittgenstein uses throughout *Philosophical Investigations*. I begin by giving a brief description of a maieutic auxiliary device, using an example drawn from the *Theaetetus*. I then examine Wittgenstein's responses to his Augustinian interlocutor in the opening sections of the *Investigations*, and argue that the way Wittgenstein employs fictional scenarios in response to the interlocutor (in particular, the builder-tribe scenario) has some similarities with the Socratic Midwife's employment of so-called auxiliary devices. Furthermore, I argue that where Wittgenstein's employment of such devices differs from the Socratic Midwife's, he is still fulfilling the criteria for a maieutic practice of philosophy. I hope that this will help highlight a neglected maieutic aspect of Wittgenstein's later philosophy and will spur further work in attempting to locate such devices in the *Investigations*.

First, I will clarify what is meant by 'maieutic auxiliary devices'. By 'maieutic', I refer to a practice of philosophy that takes its cue from Socrates' 'secret doctrine' of midwifery that he reveals in the *Theaetetus*. To be brief, the salient features of 'Socratic intellectual midwifery' centre around the idea that the midwife has skill in diagnosing 'intellectual labour' in their interlocutors, determining whether the offspring is viable and, if necessary, terminating the offspring. Central to this skill is their own intellectual 'barrenness'. The midwife does not 'inseminate' their interlocutors with knowledge: rather, they aid their interlocutor in discovering "many fine and admirable things in themselves". The aim is to draw implicit knowledge out, not to teach doctrines or supplant them with positive philosophical theses (148b4–150c3).

This brings with it some further requirements. Firstly, that the intellectual midwife encourages their interlocutor to submit their genuine and true beliefs for examination. Secondly, the midwife makes moves to understand their interlocutor and what they are proposing, on their terms. Lastly, the midwife seeks to ensure that the interlocutor also understands whatever is being raised in discussion, seeking their consent when trying to clarify their ideas and ensuring that such clarifications do not distort the interlocutor's original idea. Whether or not Socrates is successful in sticking to these standards himself is debatable: but, in his stated method these are his ambitions (148b4–150c3).

In speaking of 'auxiliary devices', I follow Catherine Rowett's lead when she identifies the presence of such devices in the *Theaetetus* (Rowett 2018: 171). Rowett observes that Socrates' method in the *Theaetetus* differs from the elenchus in the so-called 'early Socratic dialogues', with which the *Theaetetus* is so often compared. A routine application of the elenctic method has a purely destructive goal of moving his opponent into self-refutation, but in the *Theaetetus,* Socrates' process deviates significantly from this kind of elenctic formula. In the Theaetetus there is, as Rowett identifies, a two phase process at work: an initial 'constructive' step, when Socrates seeks to provide the idea with as much support as possible after exploring what would be necessary for such an idea to be plausible, and a secondary 'destructive' phase where Socrates explores the ontological cost of said supports, terminating the idea if the cost is found to be too great.

It is the first of these steps that marks Socrates' practice in the *Theaetetus* out as being different to other portrayals of Socrates' practice. In those 'early dialogues' Socrates typically seeks his interlocutor's assent to a further set of premises that are logically independent from his interlocutor's original claim, and then demonstrates how assenting to these premises undermines the interlocutor's original position. Here instead Socrates first assists the interlocutor in keeping the intellectual offspring 'alive' by introducing a series of supporting mechanisms, or what Rowett calls 'auxiliary devices', to help sustain the idea. Taking Theaetetus' first attempt at a definitive answer to the question 'what is knowledge' as an example, we can see just how Socrates goes about doing this:

1. Theaetetus suggests 'knowledge is a kind of perception' (KP) (151d7–e3)
2. Socrates seeks to clarify what Theaetetus understands this to be. Once mutual understanding is achieved, and with Theaetetus' consent, Socrates introduces two auxiliary devices that help establish that KP: Protagoras' 'man is the measure of all things' (MM) (152a3) and Heraclitus' 'everything is in flux' (EF) (152d5–e6) doctrines.
3. Socrates then goes on to do everything he can to defend KP, adapting the account with Theaetetus where needed to fend off objections.
4. Eventually, KP is shown to be non-viable even with the support of these auxiliary devices. The devices themselves are shown to either result in self-refutation (as is the case with MM) or are shown to have too high an ontological cost (as is the case with EF, which results in the impossibility of various everyday concepts such as intelligent language).

Note also that the auxiliary devices need not be arguments: Socrates introduces various analogies and models as auxiliary devices in response to Theaetetus' other offspring, in order to visualise what kind of world, or what kind of mental capacities one would have to obtain, to make Theaetetus's suggestion come out as being a true description of how knowledge works. For instance, he tries out the idea that the mind might have to be like a wax tablet (191a–196c) or an aviary (196c–200d).

These auxiliary devices are the apparatus by which the Socratic midwife both supports and tests their interlocutor's position. They are key pieces of kit for the Socratic Midwife, and for maieutic practice more generally: since the aim of maieutic practice is to preserve the authenticity of the interlocutor's thoughts, these devices are proposed and refined via careful discussion to reach mutual understanding about exactly what is being proposed. Throughout, Socrates seeks to ensure that Theaetetus is a) familiar with the devices Socrates is adducing and b) that Theaetetus believes that the devices are supportive and fitting for what he has in mind. The maieutic midwife deftly uses the interlocutor's consent in order to examine the

conceptual terrain, and to draw further knowledge out of their interlocutor, without (in theory) projecting theses of their own or distorting the interlocutor's account.

My suggestion is that we can usefully compare Socrates' use of such devices with Wittgenstein's practice. Firstly, then we should consider for whom Wittgenstein might be serving as intellectual midwife. Secondly, we should look for the ways in which the interlocutor could be seen to be willingly offering up an account that is demonstrably theirs (or at the very least, not given to them by the midwife). Lastly, we should expect to find that Wittgenstein responds to his interlocutors with devices designed not to supplant the interlocutor's account, but to make use of the interlocutor's own implicit knowledge and understanding; so as to point them towards alternative ways of thinking (while also demonstrating that the account they had been clinging to is not viable).

My example is the opening passages of the *Investigations*. Although the *Investigations* is not written in dialogue, many scholars have observed that dialogical exchanges are ubiquitous. The opening passage is one such example, where Wittgenstein is responding to views implicit in the text that he quotes from Augustine. I will not digress into the many interesting questions regarding Wittgenstein's portrayal of Augustine here. I shall rather treat it as an exchange with *an* interlocutor and without prejudging whose theory it is, I shall call this interlocutor 'the Augustinian'.

This opening discussion (PI: §1) centres around "a particular picture of the essence of human language" for which Wittgenstein uses a passage from Augustine's *Confessions* as his springboard. The idea that Wittgenstein takes from this is that words are names of objects and sentences are just combinations of such names (what I shall label 'the naming thesis' from here on in). Shortly thereafter, Wittgenstein invites us (and by extension, his interlocutor) to consider another fictional scenario, picturing what a world would look like were the naming thesis correct. He introduces a scenario in which the language used by a group of builders conforms to the naming thesis. He writes:

> The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs, and beams. B has to pass him the stones and to do so in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they make use of a language consisting of the words 'block', 'pillar', 'slab', 'beam'. A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. — Conceive of this as a complete primitive language. (PI: §2)

How would they be acculturated into this language? Wittgenstein concludes that it must be the language of an entire tribe, and that their training involves the teacher "pointing to objects, directing the child's attention to them, and at the same time uttering a word" (PI : §6), as imagined in the passage from Augustine.

Rather than undermine the naming thesis from the get-go, Wittgenstein first constructs a hypothetical world in which it is correct, to see what such a world would be like. Recall that Socrates introduces devices such as MM and EF in order to see what the world would have to be like for Theaetetus' 'knowledge is perception' account to be the case. Like the Socratic Midwife, Wittgenstein responds to his interlocutor's account by clarifying the implications of the proposal, by exploring potential worlds in which such an account is correct. Like Socrates, he does so without forcing any further theses on his interlocutor. Wittgenstein does not ask his interlocutor to assent to any further controversial premises in the development of the builder tribe scenario.

After building this fictional builder's scenario to accommodate the naming thesis, Wittgenstein then moves towards undermining the picture that is capturing his interlocutor. The aim seems to be to position his interlocutor to be able to contemplate other ways of using language, beyond pointing and naming objects. A blow by blow summary of this process would exceed the scope of this paper, but it is worth noting that Wittgenstein does not proceed to a direct refutation nor does he supplant the interlocutor's thesis with his own preferred thesis. Rather, he draws the interlocutor's attention to everyday occurrences – things well understood and familiar to the interlocutor from everyday life – to enable the interlocutor to recognise the variety of ways in which language can be used, including (but not limited to) naming.

As we've seen, this resembles the moves that Socrates makes in the *Theaetetus*. There, Theaetetus is brought to realise that, in order for KP to be valid, the world would have to be much more limited than it evidently is. Likewise, the Augustinian interlocutor would have to approve and endorse the claim that we live in a world like the builder tribe, if they were to insist on the naming thesis. Even with various amendments, it becomes clear that the world of the builder-tribe cannot accommodate a multitude of practices in which the interlocutor engages frequently. Referring to their own knowledge and experience, the interlocutor realises that the cost of the naming thesis is too high – one would have to do away with all sorts of practices if one was to insist on the naming thesis being the correct account.

Why should we get excited about the similarities between such devices, and how would it change our reading of the *Investigations*? It is hoped that by observing the similarities between Wittgenstein and the Socratic Midwife's use of these kinds of devices, we are in a better position to see the shared maieutic nature of their philosophical practices. I believe that, doing so will also help us further align Wittgenstein's practice in the *Investigations* with various methodological remarks he makes about his relationship with his reader/interlocutor (such as not wishing to "spare them the trouble of thinking" and the various notions of agreement he expressed throughout his work) and the often-neglected pedagogical aspects of his later philosophical work. Reading these devices as maieutic auxiliary devices affords us a way of seeing how these pedagogical concerns play out in the actual mechanics of his philosophical work.

Hopefully, I have demonstrated several interesting parallels between Socrates' practice as an 'intellectual midwife' and Wittgenstein's practice in the *Investigations*. In subsequent work, I shall explore other passages of the *Investigations* in search of further devices that illustrate the constructive/destructive maieutic approach. For now, and in the discussion session, it would be useful to consider whether there are also any significant differences between these apparently similar ways of responding to an interlocutor's muddled ideas.

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Ganzheit, Subjektivität, Praktiken: Iris Murdoch zwischen Wittgenstein und Platon

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Abstract

Welche Gründe gibt es, im Schatten des Wittgenstein'schen Denkens platonische Ideen zu rehabilitieren? Diese Frage steht im Zentrum meines Beitrages, der sich mit dem Denken der britisch-irischen Philosophin Iris Murdoch beschäftigt. Nur bei wenigen Philosophen ist es so offensichtlich, dass sie von Platon und Wittgenstein beeinflusst worden sind, wie bei Murdoch. Anhand des Problems der organischen Einheit zeichne ich einige wesentliche Aspekte ihres Denkens nach. Weiter argumentiere ich, dass die platonische Idee der Wiedererinnerung (*anamnesis*) das Scharnier darstellt, das Murdochs Rückwendung von Wittgenstein zu Platon ermöglicht. Und damit zeigt sich, dass Murdoch zwar eine „Platonikerin" ist, aber nicht hinter Wittgensteins Einsichten über die Verflechtung von Subjektivität und Praktiken zurückfällt.

1.

Bei nur wenigen Philosophen ist es so offensichtlich, dass sie von Platon und Wittgenstein beeinflusst worden sind, wie bei Iris Murdoch. In ihren philosophischen Texten, aber auch in ihren Romanen, setzt sich die britisch-irische Philosophin immer wieder mit Ideen ihrer beiden Vorgänger auseinander. Murdochs „Platonismus" wird oft unter Verweis auf ihre Gedanken zur Wirklichkeit des Guten und ihr Interesse an Vorstellungen ästhetischer Einheit erläutert; gern wird auch die Position vertreten, die Philosophin sei von der Wirklichkeit einer transzendenten Idee des Guten überzeugt gewesen (etwa Antonaccio 2000: 52; Trampota 2003: 133). Umgekehrt muss Murdochs Interesse am Gewöhnlichen offensichtlich auf den Einfluss Wittgensteins zurückgeführt werden (z.B. Hämäläinen 2014); schon in ihrem frühen Aufsatz „Vision and Choice" aus dem Jahr 1956 schreibt sie etwa, dass Moralphilosophinnen und Moralphilosophen es vermeiden sollten, hinter der Mannigfaltigkeit der Lebensformen eine höhere Einheit zu suchen – denn eine solche gebe es nicht (Murdoch 1999b: 97). Im Gegensatz zu Moralphilosophen wie R.M. Hare und Stuart Hampshire kommt es ihr darauf an, nicht in Distanz zu den Differenzen, den historisch entstandenen Sprechweisen und konkreten Praktiken zu treten, sondern sie genau in den Blick zu nehmen, ja sie wieder in ihr Recht zu setzen.

Wenn das Wort „Platonismus" also verstanden wird im Sinne eines Modells von Objektivität, demzufolge Moralphilosophen die Aufgabe haben, die Bedeutung von Begriffen so festzulegen, dass sie mit einer objektiven Welt übereinstimmen (unabhängig vom Gebrauch durch die Individuen), dann ist Murdoch gewiss keine Platonikerin. Wenn „Platonismus" jedoch in einem weiteren Wittgensteinischen Sinne verstanden wird als eine Form des Philosophierens, das mir dazu verhilft, im Prozess der Selbstklärung Einsicht in das Unverfügbare im Herzen meiner Erfahrung zu gewinnen, das genau jene Existenzbedingungen widerspiegelt, denen sich meine Lebensgeschichte nicht entziehen kann (vgl. Hampe 2014: 305f.), dann ist Murdoch zweifellos eine Platonikerin. Was genau das heißt, möchte ich im Folgenden ausführen.

2.

In ihren philosophischen Texten gibt Murdoch immer wieder einem Ungenügen an der säkularen und liberalen Kultur des 20. Jahrhunderts, an der modernen Moraltheorie, an Existentialismus, Kantianismus und Strukturalismus Ausdruck (vgl. die zahlreichen polemischen Spitzen in Murdoch 2001: 1–44). Im Kern handelt es sich um ein Ungenügen an einem Skeptizismus, der nicht nur längst die Existenz der letzten Dinge in Frage gestellt, sondern auch viele kulturell vermittelte und historisch tradierte Praktiken zur Erfahrung von Einheit, Struktur und Kontinuität demontiert hat. Ich möchte die These verteidigen, dass Murdochs Rückwendung zum platonischen Denken vor diesem Hintergrund verstanden werden muss: eine revidierte Fassung von „Platonismus" stellt ihr ein bestimmtes Modell von organischer Ganzheit bereit, das anderswo so nicht zu haben wäre.

Was heißt das? Für Murdochs Denken ist es charakteristisch, dass dem Paradigma der ästhetischen Erfahrung ein zentraler Stellenwert eingeräumt wird, insbesondere jener kontemplativ-distanzierten Wahrnehmung, die mit den Aktivitäten des „Aufmerksam-Seins" (*to attend to*) und des „Schauens" (*vision*) verbunden ist. Gleich zu Beginn ihres Hauptwerkes *Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals* (zuerst 1992) beschreibt sie, wie Kinder die „Idee der Aufmerksamkeit oder Kontemplation" lernen, indem sie von Erwachsenen angehalten werden, einen Gegenstand genau zu betrachten, ja „ihn im Geiste zu vergegenwärtigen" (*holding it before the mind*; Murdoch 2003: 3). In der Betrachtung eines Gemäldes oder im Lesen eines Gedichtes vermögen Rezipierende eine Einheit unmittelbar anzuschauen, wie Menschen im Alltagsleben ohnehin ein intuitives Verständnis von Einheit besitzen, z.B. von der Einheit eines Gegenstandes, der mir gegenüberliegt, oder der Einheit meines Körpers (Murdoch 2003: 1). Murdoch schreibt darüber hinaus ästhetischen Gegenständen die Fähigkeit zu, unsere genau besehen oft zersplitterte Erfahrung zu vereinen und uns auf diese Weise zu befähigen, „die fortgesetzte Erfahrung einer mentalen Synthese" zu machen (Murdoch 2003: 3). So gilt es für Murdoch als unbezweifelbar, dass wir uns sogar nach den tiefen kulturellen Umbrüchen des 20. Jahrhunderts „weiterhin an künstlerischen Gegenständen erfreuen, die unsere Empfindsamkeit vereinen" (Murdoch 2003: 160).

Was genau macht aber eine solche Einheits- oder Ganzheitserfahrung aus? Hilfreich ist hier ein Blick auf Murdochs Kritik an G.E. Moores Neufassung der organischen Ganzheit als Gegenstand der Werterkenntnis (Moore 1970: 63ff.; vgl. Shusterman 1996: 35–42). Murdoch geht nicht auf die komplizierten technischen Details von Moores Diskussion ein; stattdessen referiert sie zustimmend John Maynard Keynes' Kritik an diesem: Moores Vorstellung von organischer Ganzheit sei ungenügend, da sie die Einheit des Lebens oder, in Keynes' Formulie-

rung, „das Muster des Lebens als einer Ganzheit" (*the pattern of life as a whole*) vernachlässige (Murdoch 2003: 45). Anders gesagt wirft Murdoch Moore vor, dass seine Vorstellung der Ganzheit statisch bleibe und damit auch nicht fähig sei, die dynamische Einheit zwischen Teilen, die erst in einem Entwicklungsprozess eine Einheit bilden, zu denken. An dem Verweis auf das „Leben" lässt sich darüber hinaus bereits erahnen, dass Murdoch nicht wirklich an der gegenständlichen Natur des Kunstwerkes (und seiner Einheit) interessiert ist, sondern Kunstwerke unter Bezug auf eine in Praktiken eingebettete Subjektivität verstehen möchte. Wie aus vielen anderen Passagen hervorgeht, insistiert die Philosophin unter dem Einfluss des existential-sprachanalytischen Paradigmas modernen Philosophierens immer wieder auf der Zeitlichkeit und historische Kontingenz solcher Praktiken (siehe etwa Murdoch 2001: 25, 28, 37, passim). Wenn also von einem Murdochschen „Platonismus" die Rede ist, dann darf darüber nicht vergessen werden, dass platonischen Vorstellungen von Ganzheit, Identität und Transzendenz bei ihr nur in einem metaphorischen Sinne verstanden werden können, quasi als eine *façon* de parler, die ästhetischen Wert immer *innerhalb* – und nie außerhalb – der menschlichen Lebensform ansiedelt (Murdoch 2003: 91, 447; vgl. Hämäläinen 2014).

3.

Wenn aber Murdochs Nachdenken über organische Ganzheit, wie bereits angedeutet, vor dem Hintergrund eines zutiefst modernen Verständnisses von menschlicher Subjektivität stattfindet, muss sich die Frage nach einem gelingenden Weltbezug, wie sie die ästhetische Kontemplation zu stiften scheint, mit neuer Schärfe stellen.

Seit ihrem Sartre-Studium beschäftigt Murdoch die Frage, wie ich mich überhaupt auf mich selbst beziehen kann (siehe Murdoch 1999a). Eine Form ist die Praxis der Introspektion, die ja auch Wittgenstein zufolge durchaus zur Selbstkenntnis beitragen kann, etwa wenn ich mich frage, ob ich einen Menschen wirklich liebe (PU 1984: 587). Wenn ich mich in der Introspektion vertiefe, behauptet Murdoch, stellt sich mir leicht die Erfahrung einer angsterfüllten „Leere" (*void*) ein, womit sie offensichtlich den Umstand meint, dass ich mich als nicht durch Gründe bestimmt erfahre. Kein Grund kann mich zu einer bestimmten Handlung *zwingen*, weil ich mich immer von ihm distanzieren kann (Murdoch 2001: 35, 37). Wenn ich weiter in mich „hineinschaue", vermag ich Empfindungen, Eindrücke und Erinnerungen zu identifizieren, aber auch all jene Schwebezustände, die von Schriftstellern wie Marcel Proust oder Henry James so präzise beschrieben worden sind (insbesondere Murdoch 2003: 170ff.) – aber eben in der Zeit persistierendes Selbst. Was es gibt, ist Selbstbewusstsein, also ein Bewusstsein vom Strömen der Erlebnisse, ein Für-sich-Sein der Erlebnisse, wie Sartre es nennen würde. Auch Murdochs These von dem „Bewusstsein oder Selbstsein (*self-being*)" als der fundamentalen Seinsweise des moralisch ansprechbaren Individuums ist offensichtlich von dem französischen Philosophen inspiriert (Murdoch 2003: 171). Nur die „Aufmerksamkeit" (attention) scheint diesen Erlebnisstrom überhaupt punktuell vereinen zu können.

Alles spricht dafür, dass Murdoch in solchen Überlegungen Wittgensteins (und Heideggers) Kritik an der traditionellen, gegenstandsorientierten Rede von einem Selbst fortführt. Es gibt kein „abgeschlossenes oder prinzipiell abschließbares Selbst, als ganzheitliche Einheit, als vollständig in Erscheinung tretende Entität" (so Taylor Carman über Heidegger, zit. nach Kreuels 2015: 123). Murdoch spitzt diese Einsicht noch einmal zu, wenn sie im Zentrum der menschlichen Existenz ein Rätsel sieht: „Wenn wir ein Ganzes sind, dann nicht mit ihm als Zentrum? Und wer sind wir, wenn sich dies uns entzieht?" (Murdoch 2003: 258)

An dieser Stelle kommt schließlich eine Idee ins Spiel, die nicht weniger darstellen dürfte als das Scharnier, welches Murdochs Rückwendung von Wittgenstein zu Platon ermöglicht: die platonische Idee der Wiedererinnerung (ασναυμνησις anámnēsis). Wittgenstein hat bekanntlich mitunter direkt Bezug auf platonische Ideen genommen, etwa im berühmten §46 der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*. Interessanterweise sah er außerdem, zumindest wenn wir der Erinnerung Norman Malcolms Glauben schenken dürfen, eine Ähnlichkeit zwischen seiner Spätphilosophie und der sokratischen Behauptung, dass Wissen Wiedererinnerung sei (Malcolm 1984: 44; vgl. Rowe 2013: 111f.). Er mag den platonischen Dialog *Menon* auch selbst gelesen haben, in dem Sokrates auf denkwürdige Weise demonstriert, dass der philosophische Dialog gerade nicht den Zweck einer Weitergabe von Wissen hat, sondern vielmehr Hilfestellungen zur Selbstbesinnung und Selbstklärung zum Zwecke der Selbsterkenntnis bieten soll; denn die Seele wisse bereits alles und brauche sich nur wieder zu erinnern. Murdoch erwähnt den „Mythos" der „Wiedererinnerung" (*recollection*) aus dem *Phaedrus* gleich zu Beginn ihres Hauptwerkes *Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals* und kommt in vielen späteren Passagen auf dieses Thema zu sprechen (Murdoch 2003: 14f., 23, 180, 373, 378, 397, 400).

Was heißt das? Murdoch möchte gewiss nicht auf die traditionelle Position zurückfallen, der zufolge wir das Selbst, bzw. das Selbstbewusstsein nach dem Modell von einer Substanz mit deren Zuständen verstehen sollen (als eine unsterbliche, vom Körper gänzlich unabhängige Seele: ψυχηυ psyché). Stattdessen, denke ich, fungiert die platonische Seelenlehre wieder einmal nur metaphorisch, als ein „Bild", das es uns erlauben soll, die Erfahrung des Menschen vollständig in den Blick zu nehmen: „die ganze Erfahrung einer ganzen Person" (Murdoch 2003: 148). Murdoch geht es in solchen Passagen wohl gar nicht um eine *ontologische* These zur Personalität, sondern um eine *epistemische*: Meine Selbsterfahrung, meine Selbstkenntnis, ist nur so weit möglich, wie meine Erinnerung reicht. Oder, in zugespitzter Form: Nur durch die rückläufige Bewegung der Erinnerung kann ich je hoffen, mein Leben in seiner Abgeschlossenheit zu erfassen.

Dieser Gedanke lässt sich anhand der Aktivität des autobiographischen Schreibens genauer ausbuchstabieren, das in Murdochs Denken eine prominente Bedeutung besitzt; wie es auch kein Zufall ist, dass sie die „Wiedererinnerung" mit einer Diskussion über den Stellenwert des Schreibens in Platons Siebtem Brief verbindet (Murdoch 2003: 23). Es verhält sich dabei wie folgt: Indem ich beginne, vergangene Lebensepisoden aufzuschreiben, vermag ich mir ein Bild zu machen von einem Leben als ganzem; ich kann mir über die Reihenfolge von Ereignissen klar werden, einzelne Ereignisse zueinander in Beziehung setzen, auf diese Weise Sinnzusammenhänge herstellen, außerdem Kriterien entwickeln, anhand derer ich einzelne Episoden (sowie andere Menschen) bewerte und vielleicht sogar eine Gesamtbewertung meines Lebens versuche. Ähnliches leistet auch der innere Monolog, sei es im wirklichen Leben oder in der Literatur (siehe wiederum Murdoch 2003: 170ff.). Denn auch im inneren Monolog suche ich mir über einzelne Episoden meines Lebens klar zu werden, stelle Sinnzusammenhänge her und nehme Bewertungen vor.

Strenggenommen ist es mir natürlich nicht möglich, mein Leben als Ganzes zu betrachten oder gar ihm mittels einer vollständigen Menge von Sätzen eine abgeschlossene Form zu

geben. Denn solange ich noch lebe, ist der Zukunftshorizont offen und der Tod, der mein Leben abschließen würde, liegt noch in einer wohl mehr erhofften, als sicher festzustellenden Ferne (vgl. Kreuels 2015: 153). Dennoch beharrt Murdoch darauf, dass es eine solche Abgeschlossenheit gibt – bezeichnenderweise spricht sie einmal von Platon und Freud als den Vertretern einer Sichtweise, der zufolge die Seele als „organische Totalität" verstanden werden muss (Murdoch 1999b: 419). Die Abgeschlossenheit meiner Lebensgeschichte ist quasi der „ideale Limes", dem ich mich beständig annähere, den ich jedoch nie erreichen kann (Murdoch 2001: 28). Und gerade die Form des Romans, durch die ästhetische *Rahmung*, kann es mir ermöglichen, schon im Jetzt eine Erfahrung von Abgeschlossenheit zu antizipieren, etwa wenn ich vom Leben – und vom Tod – Anna Kareninas lese.

4.

Offensichtlich thematisiert Murdoch immer noch jene „holistische Temporalität", die Heidegger und Wittgenstein beständig umkreist haben (Rentsch 2003: 219); nur dass Murdoch dem Bezug auf die Form des ganzen Lebens mithilfe platonischer Metaphern eine normativ stärkere Bedeutung verleiht. Entscheidend ist dabei, dass die rückläufige Bewegung nicht auf das reflektierte Selbstverhältnis reduziert werden darf, denn wenn ich in meinen Erinnerungen versunken bin, objektiviere ich diese nicht in distanzierter Weise, sondern nehme von *innen* an ihnen teil. Und so habe ich gute Gründe, an die Wirklichkeit meiner vergangenen Praktiken zu glauben, denn sie sind längst in mein Selbstverhältnis eingegangen. Dieses ist überhaupt als „praktische[s] Sichzusichverhalten" zu verstehen (Tugendhat 2017: 32). Und im Rahmen eines solchen Selbstverhältnisses erlangt auch das platonische Ganzheitsideal eine unmittelbar praktische Bedeutung. Die narrative Einheit eines Lebens drückt sich etwa darin aus, dass „eine spätere Episode des Lebens die Erwartungen einer früheren erfüllt" (Kreuels 2015: 172). Durch die Erinnerung an solche Episoden, so dürfen wir hinzufügen, vermag ich gegenwärtige Erwartungen abzubauen und die Welt interesselos anzuschauen. Damit hätte ich mich aber bereits verändert. Und wenn es mir endlich gelingt, mich in den Praktiken wiederzuerkennen, die mein vergangenes Selbst konstituiert haben, bräuchte ich nicht einmal mehr zu sagen: „So handle ich eben." (PU 1984: 217). Ich würde einfach sagen: „So bin ich eben."

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Wittgenstein on Darwin(ism)

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Abstract

This paper aims to reconstruct Wittgenstein's opinion on Darwinism. Even though he wrote very few and scattered remarks on the topic, I will argue that there is an epistemological understanding of Darwinism in Wittgenstein that, though merely sketched, is surprisingly modern. I will proceed as follows. In the first section, I will address the Tractarian remark mentioning Darwin (4.1122) and show its function within the *Tractatus,* considering Bertrand Russell's critical opinion on "evolutionism" as its probable background. Second, I will analyse Wittgenstein's claim that Darwin discovered "a fruitful new aspect', not a true theory, and argue that this statement still mirrors Wittgenstein's commitment to Heinrich Hertz's philosophy of science. Third, I will address Wittgenstein's quick criticism of Darwinism as "lacking multiplicity' and show that, far from revealing a form of reactionary distaste for evolutionary theory, such a comment adumbrates (or better, it is compatible) with recent criticisms to what Stephen J. Gould and Richard Lewontin called "adaptationist program' in evolutionary biology.

1. *Tractarian* Darwin

There is only one mention of Darwin in Wittgenstein's main works. It is proposition 4.1122, claiming: "The Darwinian theory has no more to do with philosophy than has any other hypothesis of natural science' (TLP 2005: 4.1122). If we look at its context and follow the order of *Tractarian* numbers, we see this proposition to work as a final comment to a strain of thought focusing on the distinction between philosophy and science. After claiming that "the totality of true propositions is science' (TLP 2005: 4.11) and that "philosophy is not one of the natural sciences' (TLP 2005: 4.111), rather an "activity", whose result is not "philosophical propositions" but their clarification (TLP 2005: 4.112), Wittgenstein feels the need to remark that, as a consequence, philosophy has nothing to do with psychology (4.1121), nor Darwinism (4.1122).

At this point, one might ask why Wittgenstein, among all the examples of actual sciences he could have chosen, decided to mention specifically the Darwinian theory. An answer might be found if we look back to Russell. We know from Russell's private letters to Ottoline Morrell that Wittgenstein actually read and liked his paper *The Philosophy of Bergson* (see letter dated 03.15.1912). In this paper, Russell heavily criticized Bergson's philosophy and its appeal to evolutionary theory as a sort of foundation for a vitalist (and irrationalistic, according to Russell) philosophical doctrine. As such, it is not interpretatively hazardous to conclude that Darwinism, at least in its rudimentary essentials, was in the air during Wittgenstein's formation in Cambridge. Furthermore, a more evident connection in terms of content can be found in the first chapter of Russell's *Our Knowledge of the External World* (OKEW), where Russell discusses various attempts to ground a rigorously scientific philosophy, Bergsonian evolutionism among them. Russell's conclusions are harsh: we cannot use Darwin's theory of adaptation through natural selection to ground any philosophical doctrine about human destiny, as Bergson aims to do, as this would be an "hasty generalization" (Russell 1914: 18). More generally, Bergsonian evolutionism committed the original sin to believe that philosophical propositions can occur in science, whereas a rightful scientific philosophy should have "a province of its own and aim at results which the other sciences can neither prove nor disprove" (Russell 1917: 17).

Notably, Russell's discussion on evolutionism aims to define by contrast what a scientific philosophy is supposed to be. Analogously, in the *Tractatus* Darwinism is mentioned to remark an essential feature of Wittgenstein's philosophy. However, the disagreement with Wittgenstein is profound: even though they both agree that philosophy and science have entirely different domains and that any convergence between the two should be avoided as it leads to metaphysical (and anti-scientific, for Russell) philosophies, yet Russell thinks that there are genuine "philosophical propositions" (in quotation marks, that Wittgenstein not coincidentally uses in 4.112) we can formulate, whereas for Wittgenstein nothing of that sort may be obtained and philosophy is only an activity of clarification of propositions, not a theory or a discipline formulating propositions on its own. Wittgenstein's reference to Darwinism might be interpreted then as a direct reference to the Russellian discussion on the nature of philosophy in OKEW, that works as a target in those sections of the *Tractatus*.

2. A Fruitful New Aspect

In the *Tractatus,* Darwin's presence seems then to be mainly indirect, as Wittgenstein's focus remains the nature of philosophy. In the *Investigations* his name is not even present. However, it is in his later thought that Wittgenstein's views on Darwinism emerge clearly. In the Nachlass we find the following entry (republished in *Culture and Value*, dated 1931): "The real achievement of a Copernicus or a Darwin was not the discovery of a true theory but of a fertile new aspect" (MS 112: 233). This remark is clearly epistemological, as it works as a claim concerning the logical nature of evolutionary theory as such. To understand what Wittgenstein meant, we need to focus on Copernicus rather than Darwin, as the Copernican system is mentioned few times in more detail elsewhere.

In the *Big Typescript*, Wittgenstein compares the establishment of a rule to solve those philosophical problems that anguish us to "the discovery of an explanation in physics, for instance the Copernican system" (BT 2013: 307). As further expressed in Ambrose's notes, Copernicus did not discover new facts about the planets, as those facts alone could well be expressed in the Ptolemaic system. It is the case, for instance, of the introduction of complicated epicycles to explain the anomalous movements of planets. Rather, he introduced a "new notation", according to which all the planets are put on the same level and the word "earth" lost its importance, became just a name for a planet among many others (AWL 2001: 98). The Copernican discovery has thus the form of the introduction of a new conceptual framework, a new point of view, in this sense, a new aspect, which is consequently said to be fertile insofar as it enables us to get free from those habits of thought (those ob-

sessions, in Wittgenstein's terms) rooted in an old framework that gets us disoriented.
Analogously, we can extend these conclusions to Darwinism. Darwin did not discover (only) new facts, he rather introduced a new system of thought centred on the idea that species are the result of a non-teleological process of change, radically alternative to the old essentialist ways to conceive species as fixed and immutable entities. What Copernicus did with the word "Earth" was done by Darwin with the word "mankind", now thought as a natural kind among many. This move, though dramatically difficult to accept for our culture, got us free from the obsession to accommodate any natural fact to a vision of the world able to preserve man's uniqueness and centrality.

Suggestively, Wittgenstein's account of Copernicus and Darwin looks similar to Kuhn's notion of paradigm shift. Historically, however, his philosophy of science derived from Hertz's principle of mechanics, the same work that shaped Wittgenstein's picture theory in the *Tractatus* (Kjaergaard 2002). In a nutshell, Hertz conceived physics as a representation, or a model, a self-contained account of the principles governing the movement of physical objects. Such a model is not the only one available: as a representation, it depicts a possibility of arranging physical facts among many, a possibility that is to be privileged the more it is consistent with nature. If facts cannot be accommodated anymore, we need to change picture. One final quotation from Wittgenstein about Darwin clearly maintains this Hertzian outlook. While again discussing the nature of philosophical problems and solutions he says: "that is why one often thinks one has discovered the real state of affairs, if one has only found a new possibility, how it could have behaved. (Darwin's theory.)" (MS 116: 220). The appeal to possibility does not need to be read as an appeal to probability, as if Wittgenstein were saying that Darwinism is not a true theory but merely a model more probable than others. Rather, he is just making a direct reference to the nature of scientific theories conceived as representations, models in an Hertzian sense, that as pictures have a sense that does not depend on their truth, as much as the propositions in the *Tractatus* represent not actualities but only possible states of affairs.

In conclusion, Wittgenstein seems then to extend this epistemological account he used to shape his picture theory and his conception of physics to evolutionary theory too. Intriguingly, this epistemology is also used to exemplify his philosophical method. Darwinism is a discovery of a new possibility, in the precise sense that it introduced a new picture of the development of life.

3. A Lack of Multiplicity

Finally, it is worth discussing the last comment on Darwin that we can attribute to Wittgenstein. Both Rush Rhees and Maurice Drury have reported that in their conversations Wittgenstein tended to be critical with Darwin's theory, as "it does not account for the variety of species, it lacks the necessary multiplicity" (Rhees 1981: 174, Rhees 1984: 160–161). Differently from the epistemological remark about the nature of Darwinism investigated above, here Wittgenstein seems more to elaborate a criticism concerning its very explanatory power, in his opinion unable to fully explain the plurality and variety of biological life. However, there is a direct connection to the previous discussion. The word "multiplicity", Hertzian by spirit, brings us back to the *Tractarian* idea that propositions, as pictures, need to share the same number of distinguishable components as in the state of affairs they represent. This is what it means to have the same logical multiplicity (4.04 – 4.041). Supposedly, according to Wittgenstein, Darwinian theory, as indeed a picture in Hertzian sense, lacks multiplicity insofar as its principles cannot cover the plurality of natural facts and their internal constituents. The logic of the picture does not fit the complexity of the facts represented.

We cannot really say what Wittgenstein had in mind by saying that Darwinism does not possess enough multiplicity, as the reference is stark and underdeveloped. However, one final remark in the lectures' notes might suggest a possible solution. While critically discussing Frazer's reductionist approach to anthropology, Wittgenstein mentions Darwinian explanation as an example of the modern tendency to explain a phenomenon by a single cause, that is, we would say nowadays, the tendency to adhere to a form of epistemological reductionism. In particular, this tendency is shaped in Darwin as a reduction of "importance to utility", as every natural reaction, such as our hair standing on end when frightened, is explained by some purpose it serves for animals in our evolutionary history (AWL 2001: 34). In other words, Wittgenstein seems to think that Darwin introduced a specific kind of explanatory model, according to which every physical or behavioural trait of living beings is to be conceived as an adaptation, that is, as a trait naturally selected because it was useful, at some point in our evolutionary past, for survival.

Now, the reductionist tendency Wittgenstein envisages in Darwinism might explain in which sense it lacks multiplicity: every phenomenon is forcefully and by default reduced to a single explanatory principle of sort encompassing every possible case under examination. As reductionism tells us *a priori* the form of the explanations it demands, it tends also to be dogmatic, as every trait is automatically conceived as an adaptation and an adaptationist explanation is supposed to be always available. Some utility for survival is forced onto every physical or behavioural trait of leaving beings even when it is hard to find one or different explanatory models might be available. As adaptation through natural selection is the only principle composing the picture of evolutionary theory, such a picture lacks multiplicity insofar as it hardly fits the variety of species it is supposed to account for.

We can also say that Wittgenstein here allusively advocates for a more pluralistic approach to evolutionary theory. In precisely this lies the modernity of his opinions on Darwinism. In fact, Wittgenstein's views, though barely sketched and surely underdeveloped, yet are perfectly compatible with the criticisms Stephen J. Gould and Richard Lewontin moved against what they called the "adaptationist program" of the Modern Synthesis (that is, the research program born from the merging of Darwinian natural selection from variation and Mendelism to explain the genetic mechanisms of inheritance). To sum up very quickly, adaptationism is defined precisely as the attitude to "atomize organisms into 'traits' and these traits are explained as structures optimally designed by natural selection for their functions" (Gould and Lewontin 1979: 151). When a trait is recognized as non-optimally adapted, this was usually explained as a necessary compromise to the full optimality of the organism as a whole. At the heart of the program lies the presumption that the immediate utility of a structure is the evolutionary sufficient reason for that structure to exist: the tiny arms of a *Tyrannosaurus* may have been used to help the animal rise, but this is by no means sufficient to conclude that they were selected for this reason. Intriguingly, Gould and Lewontin accuse adaptationists of dogmatism, as they keep looking for adaptationist explanations even when they cannot find any. Against this tendency, then, Gould and Lewontin advocates for a more pluralistic understanding of evolution,

according to which natural selection is only one among many explanatory principles, and structural and developmental constraints of organisms acquire a major role in the explanation of biological traits too, now understood as inter-related sections of the organism conceived non-atomistically as 'integrated whole" (Gould and Lewontin 1979: 147).

Further details are history of evolutionary biology, some still discussed and debated. The kind of epistemological pluralism Gould and Lewontin advocate is also embryonically already present in Darwin's *Origins of the Species* (see Pievani 2013). Wittgenstein was probably unfair to Darwin, in this respect. However, the lack of multiplicity he envisages in Darwinism, with its reductionist approach to adaptation and its insistence on past utility, far from being motivated to back up Creationism or a more general anti-scientific attitude, was surprisingly on point. He already sensed that adaptationism cannot exhaust the plurality of living forms in a single unified account.

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Tractarian Names and the Cardinality of Logical Space

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Abstract

The role of names in Wittgenstein's Tractatus has been controversial. Realist interpreters hold that the association of simple names with simple objects plays a fundamental explanatory role in the Tractarian philosophy of language. Anti-metaphysical readers challenge this assumption. One prominent example of the latter tradition is Hidé Ishiguro, according to whom Tractarian names are mere dummy names akin to temporary constants in a natural deduction calculus. Anderson Nakano has recently put forward a new objection to Ishiguro's view: It is said to conflict with Wittgenstein's own commitments by getting the cardinality of logical space wrong. I will defend Ishiguro by showing that Nakano's argument relies on an assumption about the nature of objects anti-metaphysical readers reject anyway.

1. Introduction

What is the role of names in an account of the relationship between language and world? According to one prominent tradition they are the fundamental building blocks, because the association of names with objects forges the connection between language and reality – see Russell's doctrine of acquaintance. Another tradition has it that language makes contact with the world at the level of *sentences*, whereas names only play a secondary role in the order of explanation – see Frege's context principle. On which side of this divide does Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* fall? Traditional realist readers go with the first option, holding that Tractarian names are connected to simple objects through an act of ostension. More recent anti-metaphysical readers have opted for the latter alternative.

One pioneer of this newer tradition is Hidé Ishiguro, who argues that names in the *Tractatus* should be conceived of as *dummy names*, in analogy to the temporary constants introduced when using the existential instantiation rule in a natural deduction calculus (Ishiguro 1969). Anderson Nakano has recently posed a new and potentially damaging objection to this view. According to him, construing Tractarian names as dummy names results in an incorrect analysis of the cardinality of logical space (Nakano 2021). In this paper I defend Ishiguro's account by showing that Nakano's objection relies on an assumption about the nature of objects anti-metaphysical readers of the *Tractatus* can and do reject.

2. Nakano's Cardinality Argument

Evidence for Ishiguro's position is provided by the following passage:

> 5.526 We can describe the world completely by means of fully generalized propositions, i.e., without first correlating any name with a particular object.
>
> Then, in order to arrive at the customary mode of expression, we simply need to add, after an expression like, 'There is one and only one x such that [...]', the words, 'and that *x* is *a*'.

Wittgenstein's position appears to be that Tractarian names are strictly speaking *optional*. We *can* introduce them based on general claims if we want to, but this requires nothing like an act of ostension. Naming is rather described as the introduction of an arbitrary label for things we can already talk about. This fits the analogy Ishiguro draws between Tractarian names and dummy names in a natural deduction system, which are introduced by means of the *existential instantiation* rule:

$\frac{\exists x \phi(x)}{\phi(a)}$, where a is a new constant

Nakano shows, however, that the exegetical situation becomes more complicated once we consider other passages which, at first sight, seem unconnected to the nature of names. In 4.27–28 Wittgenstein describes the cardinality of logical space, i.e. how many possible state of affairs there are:

> 4.27 For *n* states of affairs, there are $K_n = \sum_{\nu=0}^{n} \binom{n}{\nu}$ possibilities of existence and non-existence.
>
> Of these states of affairs any combination can exist and the remainder not exist.
>
> 4.28 There correspond to these combinations the same number of possibilities of truth – and falsity – for *n* elementary propositions.

This means that if there are n elementary propositions, then there are 2^n possible states of affairs. Each elementary proposition can be either true or false and they are all independent of each other.

Let us look at an example in order to see why this might conflict with Ishiguro's interpretation. Suppose that the following collection of sentences is a complete description of the actual world:

$\exists x\, Fx \,\&\, \neg\exists x \exists y (Fx \,\&\, Fy \,\&\, x \neq y)$
$\exists x\, Gx \,\&\, \neg\exists x \exists y (Gx \,\&\, Gy \,\&\, x \neq y)$
$\forall x \neg (Fx \,\&\, Gx)$

How many possible states of affairs are there? None of the sentences listed in (1) is an elementary proposition, so we cannot apply the formula from 4.27 directly. Strictly speaking elementary propositions are combinations of names, but for the sake of exposition we can identify them with *atomic* sentences. Atomic sentences are generated from (1) by instantiating the quantified claims and introducing new names like 'a' and 'b', which leads to the following assignment of truth values:

(2a) *Fa* = True; *Fb* = False; *Gb* = True; *Ga* = False

At this point everything seems fine, since by permuting the truth values we get $2^4 = 16$ possibilities. Nakano puts these words into the mouth of a fictional interlocutor:

> Look, if we have four dummy elementary propositions *Fa, Fb, Ga* and *Gb*, generated from our complete fully generalized description (1), with truth-values given by (2a), we

> can surely imagine each one of them being true/false independently of the truth or falsity of the others. This gives the sixteen possibilities you want. (Nakano 2021: 237)

But Nakano thinks that this conclusion is premature. To see why, note that (2a) is not the only way to generate atomic sentences from (1). One could have switched the names 'a' and 'b' around and arrived at the following assignment:

> (2b) *Fa* = False; *Fb* = True; *Gb* = False; *Ga* = True.

This is not a problem as such, because the same argument in favour of 16 possibilities is available. But, according to Nakano, Ishiguro is forced to say the following:

> (2a) and (2b) do not actually describe distinct possible scenarios.

If this is correct, then Ishiguro does face a problem. Two apparently distinct possibilities are collapsed into one, and we end up with fewer than 16 possible states of affairs:

> [...] Ishiguro's view is essentially committed to saying that descriptions (2a) and (2b) do not absolutely differ from each other. In this view, (2a) and (2b) both say: 'An object, any old object, is an F and another object, any other object, is a G'. They both describe the same possibility. This is, however, incompatible with 4.27. (Nakano 2021: 237)

However, I think that the fictional interlocutor is right and Nakano wrong. In the next section I will explain why Ishiguro does not need to endorse this alleged consequence of her position.

3. Dummy Names and Realism

To begin with, let us ask from *which perspective* someone who claims that (2a) and (2b) represent the same possibility must be speaking. We already saw that, starting with (2a), (2b) appears to be a distinct possibility, and vice versa. It is therefore apt for Nakano to write that (2a) and (2b) "do not *absolutely* differ from each other". We must inhabit a perspective from which the 'a' of (2a) and the 'b' of (2b) can be seen as referring to the same object. But does Ishiguro have to grant that there is such a perspective? No. Rejecting this assumption is one key feature that distinguishes anti-metaphysical readings of the Tractatus from realist ones.

According to realist interpreters, Tractarian names enable language to make contact with the world. They are attached to language-independent objects through an act of ostension. Peter Hacker describes this ostensive act as one that "injects meaning or significance into signs" (Hacker 1986: 75). And according to David Pears, after attaching an object to a name the "intrinsic nature of the object will immediately take over complete control and determine the correct use of the name on later occasions" (Pears 1987: 10).

According to anti-metaphysical readers of the Tractatus like Ishiguro, however, the proposals of Hacker and Pears are misguided. They rely on the mistaken assumption that reality is *in itself* divided into objects, waiting to be named. The alternative is to hold that the notion of object only makes sense *from within* the perspective of an already given language:

> [...] there is no need in the *Tractatus* for dubbings at all. And no dubbings mean that we have no external view of the objects. As I put it, the account rests content in language. [...] there is no conception of objects, and of situations, hence of the world, independently of language. These notions are given only via our operating in language. (Goldfarb 2011: 10f)

In the most recent presentation of her view, Ishiguro stresses the same point. We "start with thoughts, i.e. propositions of facts", and through a top-down process of logical analysis eventually arrive at logically simple propositions. Only then can objects be identified as "whatever these propositions are about" (Ishiguro 2001: 30).

This way of looking at things defuses Nakano's objection. In order to claim that (2a) and (2b) are two ways of representing *the same* possibility rather than genuinely distinct, one needs to occupy a perspective from which one can judge that 'a' as it occurs in (2a) names the same object as 'b' in (2b), and vice versa. But no such perspective is available if our conception of objects is given *through* the use of names. Thus the argument of Nakano's fictional interlocutor is vindicated.

4. A Revenge Problem?

This response to Nakano is not the end of the matter, however, for the strategy I proposed makes Ishiguro vulnerable to a *different* objection. Remember that, according to 5.526, it is possible to give a complete description of the world using purely general statements. Now consider the following passage:

> 4.26 If all true elementary propositions are given, the result is a complete description of the world. The world is completely described by giving all elementary propositions, and adding which of them are true and which false.

Nakano argues that there is a conflict between 4.26 and 5.526. According to 4.26, a complete description of the world should look like (2a) or (2b): a list of elementary propositions and their truth values. 5.526, on the other hand, suggests that (1) suffices as a complete description. But, so Nakano, (1) does not imply either (2a) or (2b), while the reverse entailment holds. (1) therefore seems *less informative* than (2a) and (2b), which in turn undermines the claim that (1) is a *complete* description of reality.

To assess the force of this argument we need to reflect on the notion of *implication* at play in Nakano's claim that "(1) alone does not imply either (2a) or (2b)" (Nakano 2021: 234). Earlier we already saw that, based on (1), we can arrive at (2a) by using the existential instantiation rule. Analogously, we could also derive (2b) from (1). We cannot do both at the same time, of course, since each application of existential instantiation requires the use of new names.

There is thus *a* sense in which (1) *can* be said to imply (2a) and (2b). What Nakano presumably has in mind when he denies this implication, however, is that it is left open to us *which* of the two options we go for. Nothing forces us to prefer (2a) over (2b), or vice versa. But do we really need this stronger form of implication to make sense of 5.526? I don't think so. All that is required is an explanation of why the choice of names is *arbitrary* and does not add any content to the quantified claims of (1).

Such an explanation has recently been provided by Thomas Ricketts. He begins as follows:

> I take 5.526 to maintain that the collection of true fully generalized sentences fixes the truth-value of elementary sen-

> tences containing the names introduced on the basis of the generalizations. (Ricketts 2014: 276)

The guiding idea is that, starting with a generalised description of the world, we first repeatedly apply the existential instantiation rule until we have introduced sufficiently many names to form all the atomic sentences. According to 5.526, it follows that the truth values of these atomic sentences are fully determined by the generalised sentences.

Based on this we can cash out the sense in which a generalised descriptions of the world is just as informative as a list of atomic sentences. Suppose you are given such a list, which, in accordance with 4.26, counts as a complete description of the world:

(3) *Fm* = True; *Fn* = False; *Gn* = True; *Gm* = False.

Ricketts's procedure generates a different list of atomic sentences based on the generalised description (1), for instance the now familiar (2a). It is then possible to construct a systematic 1–1 mapping between (2a) and (3), such that true atomic sentences are associated with each other: *'Fm'* is mapped to *'Fa', 'Fn'* to *'Fb',* and so on. Ricketts takes the availability of such a 1–1 mapping to show that (2a) and (3) are mere notational variants of each other, and concludes that the "the body of true generalizations offers a description of the world that contains all the information contained in the exhaustive specification of true elementary sentences" (Ricketts 2014: 276). The precise choice of names does not make any substantial difference, and therefore 4.26 and 5.526 are in harmony. Furthermore, this explanation ''rests content in language'' and does not require a language-transcendent perspective on objects.

One might think, however, that Ricketts's strategy makes the cardinality problem reappear. For will we not get the result that (2a) and (2b) correspond to the same possibility after all, since it is possible to construct a 1–1 mapping between the respective atomic sentences? No. The crucial difference is that, while (2a) and (3) contain distinct names, (2a) and (2b) share the names 'a' and 'b'. Ricketts's method is only to be used to coordinate sets of sentences formulated in different vocabularies. (2a) and (2b) can simply be taken at face value as descriptions of two incompatible possibilities, and there is thus no reason to construct any 1–1 mappings. My defence of Ishiguro therefore does not fall prey to a revenge problem.

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The *Reductio* Argument in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*

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Abstract

The *Tractatus* appears to advance a *reductio ad absurdum* of the assumption that logical form can be represented. Yet the declared aim of the *Tractatus* is not to prove the truth or falsity of any such assumptions, but rather to reveal philosophical theses to be nonsensical. We must therefore rethink the nature and aims of Wittgenstein's *reductio*. As I propose to read it, the argument aims to expose indeterminacies in the use of language within which the assumption is couched, and to lead the reader to transform their use of language. Moreover, since the *reductio* itself draws on the same indeterminacies that it is meant to expose, it too is ultimately to be thrown away. I further argue that this interpretation speaks in favor of a resolute reading of the *Tractatus*.

1. Introduction

Arguments by *reductio ad absurdum* serve to show that a certain set of propositions implies a contradiction, and hence that upholding belief in all members of this set is logically impossible. In some cases, this may lead to a simple rejection of one of those beliefs; in other cases, a more radical revision is required. Our situation in philosophy, according to both early and later Wittgenstein, is like the one in which a thinker finds herself just before a *reductio* argument forces her to admit that her beliefs lead to a contradiction. The possibility of deriving such a contradiction from her beliefs indicates that the thinker lacks clarity on what she holds to be true, for else how could she purport to believe what is in fact impossible to believe? Rather, she must be misled about what her words mean; in her state of delusion, there is in fact nothing determinate that she can be taken to mean (cf. PI 2009: §125, §334, §§463–4, §500). According to the *Tractatus,* the philosopher's attraction to the nonsensical propositions of metaphysics is similarly sustained by the covert ambiguities and indeterminacies that underlie a defective use of language. It is the official goal of the *Tractatus* to lead the philosopher to transform her use of language, to recognize the nonsensicality of expressions that she has taken to be significant, and thereby to reach clarity (TLP: 4.112, 6.53–6.54).

In the following I propose to examine the line of argument through which the *Tractatus* introduces the central claim that logical form shows itself in our use of propositions, but cannot be represented by them (4.12–4.121). The argument is often regarded as a *reductio* of the assumption that logical form can be represented. But as I understand it, the contradiction exposed by the *reductio* is not to be taken to indicate that the assumption is false, but rather that it is incoherent, and that the indeterminate use of language that underlies it must be overcome.

2. Standard and Resolute Readings

On the standard reading of the Tractarian *reductio* its goal is to show that the assumption that logic can be represented is incompatible with other principles that underlie Wittgenstein's own account of logic and representation. But this gives rise to a peculiar predicament: the conclusion that logical form cannot be the topic of assertions seems to follow from premises that involve assertions about logical form. The remedy, according to the standard reading, is provided by the introduction of the distinction between what can be said and what can be shown (4.1212), since this seems to allow Wittgenstein to indirectly convey substantive insights concerning the logical form of language and reality, while avoiding the obstacle that logic cannot be directly represented (e.g. Geach 1976, Hacker 2001, and Nordmann 2005).

Even though according to the standard reading the grounds of Wittgenstein's theory are ineffable, it is still a *theory* that he is taken to provide. And yet in spelling out his conception of philosophy Wittgenstein expressly says that it is "not a theory but an activity" which essentially consists in elucidations (4.112). Philosophical elucidations, Wittgenstein explains, aim to clarify our use of language, and thereby allow us to overcome our philosophical confusions. Far from holding that his elucidations involve a commitment to substantive philosophical theses, in the penultimate paragraph of the book Wittgenstein urges us to throw away the ladder of elucidations on which we have climbed up, for once we have reached clarity, we should no longer have any use for them (6.54). Taking these remarks as the starting point has led proponents of the so-called "resolute" reading of the *Tractatus* to reject the way Wittgenstein's aims are standardly understood (Diamond 1991, Conant and Diamond 2004).

The alternative construal of the *reductio* that I propose here lends support to the resolute reading. The inconsistencies that the argument seeks to expose reflect the presence of pervasive confusions that underlie our use of language, rather than the falsity of this or that premise of the argument. Not only the expressions of the inconsistent philosophical theory, but the very questions which gave rise to them are thereby recognized to have lacked a determinate sense, and to reflect a misunderstanding of the logic of our language (27 and 3.323–4). The proper response to the discovery of such underlying confusion, Wittgenstein suggests, is the transformation of the language within which those problems are couched (4.112). As a result, the philosophical problems would not be solved, but would rather be made to disappear (6.52–6.521 and 7), and the philosophical theses by means of which we sought to respond to these problems would no longer seem to make sense. Contradictions will be overcome, not by trading a false belief for a true one, but by overcoming confusion and rejecting it completely.

The *reductio* argument, on the resolute reading I will propose here, does not aim to establish the ineffability of logical form, but to expose the indeterminacy of our talk of logical form and lead us to surpass it. In order to achieve this goal, no ineffable insights would need to be relied on. Clarity would transpire by removing confusion, not by metaphysical discovery (cf. 6.53).

3. A Reconstruction of the *Reductio*

The *reductio* argument appears, in condensed form, at 4.12:

> 4.12 Propositions can represent the whole reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it–the logical form.
> To be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to put ourselves with the proposition outside logic, that is outside the world.

Abstracting from many interpretative issues that cannot be dealt with in the present context, here is how I propose to reconstruct the argument. There appear to be three principles that spell out the account of representation that the argument takes for granted:

- *Common Form*: a representation and what it represents are correlated with one another by virtue of having a common form. (2.16, 2.17)

- *Outsideness*: a representation is distinct from what it represents. (2.172–4, 4.041)

- *Universality*: logical form is the least common denominator of all correlation. (2.18–2.182)

Against this background, a further assumption is introduced, which the *reductio* seeks to undermine:

- *Representability*: We can make a representation of logical form.

Together with *Outsideness*, Representability yields:

(1) The representation of logical form would be *outside* its putative object, i.e. outside logical form.

But in the words of 4.12, such a representation would be "outside logic":

(2) The representation of logical form would not have logical form.

Given Universality, however, according to which logical form is the least common denominator of all forms of representation, it follows that:

(3) The representation of logical form would not have anything in common with logical form.

But since this contradicts Common Form, it seems that we must reject Representability and conclude:

(4) We cannot make a representation of logical form.

In the words of 4.12, "Propositions […] cannot represent […] the logical form".

4. Is the Assumption False or Nonsensical?

Let us take a closer look at the arguments that lead up to 4.12. In 2.172 Wittgenstein seems to argue, on the basis of Common Form and Outsideness, that it is impossible for any picture to represent its own form of representation. But upon further reflection, as I will now show, what he brings us to see is that the thought that there can be such a representation is neither true nor false, but incoherent.

On Wittgenstein's view, pictures are individuated not only by reference to the elements and structure that make up the depicting fact, but also by reference to the form of representation that is employed in "projecting" such a fact onto the depicted fact. This can be seen from the way Wittgenstein distinguishes the mere sign from the significant symbol, and argues that the meaning of signs can only be identified when one considers their role within the context of the significant use of a propositional picture (3.3, 3.321). It is precisely by failing to pay heed to such shifts in the context of use and by ignoring the ambiguities that result from them that the attraction of philosophical nonsense is sustained (3.323–3.324, 5.4733).

For illustration, suppose that there could be a single *spatial* picture which depicted its own form of representation. To do that, it would have to serve two radically distinct roles. Qua spatial picture, it would have to employ a form of representation that correlates spatial aspects of the depicting fact with spatial aspects of the fact that it depicts. But qua representation of a form of representation, it would have to employ a form of representation that correlates a spatial fact with a fact of a different order of complexity, i.e. the fact which consists in the *correlation* between two spatial facts. Inasmuch as a spatial picture performs the first role, it employs a form of representation that is simply not cut out for performing the second. And even if a single pictorial fact–a single sign– might *seem* to perform two such radically distinct roles, we should understand such a fact as a merely ambiguous and indeterminate sign, which takes part in two distinct pictures, rather than counting it as a single picture that represents its own form of representation.

In 2.172, a philosophically tempting idea seems to suggest itself in the phrase "a picture which represents its own form of representation." Its attractiveness depends, however, on our failing to notice the ambiguity of the expressions that appear in this phrase (particularly, "a picture" and "its own form"). The standard reading would take the phrase to refer to a coherently specified possibility, which the first step of the *reductio* shows not to be realizable. But if it cannot be unabmiguously read as referring to any single picture, then what we are meant to realize is not the truth or falsity, but the nonsensicality of the claim that a picture cannot represent its own form of representation.

The same indeterminacy comes to the surface in step (3) of the *reductio* argument, where we explicitly entertain the possibility of a representation (of logical form) that has nothing in common with what it purports to represent. But the very idea that we can call anything a representation while depriving it of even the most minimal correlation with that which it represents disintegrates upon reflection. In other words, in proposing that we could represent logic illogically, we lose our grip on the very idea of representation. Indeed, the indeterminacy that becomes explicit at this point runs through the entire argument, all the way back to its starting point, Representability. For to say that (and similarly to ask whether) we can represent logical form involves a merely equivocal use of the terms "logical form" and "represent". In saying it, we purport to distinguish the form and content of a single, determinate representation of something which is distinct from it, but we then take the form to be the content that that picture represents.

Consequently, Representability cannot truly be taken to specify any determinate possibility that we should affirm or deny, and its negation in (4) is just as indeterminate as it. Both are nonsense, in the specific sense that we have failed to assign the signs they involve a determinate meaning (6.53), "even if

we believe that we have done so" (5.4733). But this casts doubt on the intelligibility of the other principles on which the proof depends–Common Form, Outsideness and Universality. In framing them, too, our words did not succeed in representing anything, either rightly or falsely.

5. Throwing Away the Ladder

Standard readers of the *reductio* construe its upshot as the denial of an intelligible but false assumption, namely that logical form can be represented. The *reductio* proves, for such readers, that attempts to represent logical form would consist in nonsense; but it is not nonsensical, according to them, to say of these failed expressions what it is they fail to represent.

On the construal I favor, the *reductio* might initially seem to its reader to rely on substantive premises from which one then derives a conclusion, but it is ultimately meant to lead the reader to realize that the premises which she took to be meaningful lack a determinate sense. They are nonsense, on this construal, not because they manage to determinately refer to logical form and fail to say something which cannot be said about *it*, but rather because there has been no determinate "it" that they said anything about (Cf. Diamond 1991: 198 and Conant and Diamond 2004: 65). But since nothing was determinately meant by such expressions, nothing substantive is being denied when these expressions are rejected as nonsensical; just as we do not feel deprived of anything when we are told that we cannot "put an event into a hole."

Indeed, the *reductio* itself draws on the language which it ultimately leads us to transform, and to this extent it too involves an indeterminate use of language. The apparent contradiction the *reductio* exposes thereby manifests the defects of our current use language; and once we transform that language and overcome those defects we can come to see the proof itself as defective. The proof thus does not establish the ineffability of the insights on which it itself depends–rather, it shows the expressions that it involves to lack a determinate sense. In realizing this and in throwing the proof away, along with the other philosophical expressions whose nonsensicality the proof made manifest, we would not be repudiating the clarity that the proof helped us achieved–rather, we would be reaffirming it. Our clarity will transpire by removing confusion, not by metaphysical discovery (6.53).

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Question One: Is the Goldbach Conjecture Formally Decidable? – Question Two: Is Question One Formally Decidable in Some Meta-Calculus?

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Abstract

An advocatus diaboli in the philosophy of mathematics could perhaps develop a radical pessimism as opposed to Hilbert's optimism. I should like to investigate the relationship between mathematical impossibilities (such as the squaring of the circle; there are about 30 of them in Wittgenstein) and Ignorabimus phenomena in Emil Du Bois-Reymond's letter to E. Dreher of 1889 and David Hilbert 1900 in the English version given by William B. Edward (1995). This comparison reveals that Du Bois-Reymond equates the two concepts in a letter of 3rd October, 1889, whereas Hilbert separates the two concepts – as can be seen from the fact that he calls a negative clarification ("It is definitely not possible to …") the solution of a problem. Can one give a clear definition for Hilbert's concept of Ignorabimus phenomena in mathematics? He himself, in fact, refused to give such a definition in 1900. Mathematical impossibilities occur both in geometry and algebra: regular heptagon (MS 162b: 18v) and trisection of the angle (WVC 18th Dec. 1929) in the former and general solution for fifth degree equations in the latter (PG: 374). Mathematical impossibilities are ruled out by Hilbert as a definiens for Ignorabimus phenomena, so what is left for them? I pose the question as to whether there are propositions in which the question of their formal decidability leads once again to an unsolvable problem. In that case, not even a "proof of unprovability", i.e. a proof of impossibility (RFM, Appendix III of Part I, Sections 14, 16 and 17), would be achievable! The belief in the existence of a proposition in which the question of its formal decidability leads to another undecidability gives rise to substantial pessimism. We could call this a Wittgensteinian impossibility! Do they actually exist?

1. Pessimism versus Optimism

In the foundational debate of mathematics in the first third of the 20th century, optimists and pessimists held opposing opinions. In this paper, I see these two options for philosophical positions opposed in a dialectic antagonism. In the history of philosophy, it is Leibniz who is the primary proponent of optimism; Schopenhauer can be regarded as a proponent of pessimism, yet this attitude of his does not extend to include mathematics. Sometimes, Leopold Kronecker is called the primary pessimist of this discipline. Ivor Grattan-Guinness mentions "Kronecker's pessimistic constructivism" (481).

Surprisingly enough, Gödel likewise emerges as an optimist in the discussion arena too. This fact is connected with his belief in God. Eckehart Köhler once said to me in 2014: "Gödel's Platonismus, das ist Optimismus pur!" Translated into English, this would be: "Gödel's Platonism is pure optimism!" This assessment is largely counter-intuitive, as Gödel's theorems of 1931 are seen as the death knell for Hilbert's programme.

One of the variations for exaggerating Gödel's optimism is to give expression to the following hypothesis: "For every true but not provable proposition in arithmetic, there is a (large) inaccessible cardinal which makes it provable if one assumes this cardinal to exist. John Stillwell simply asks in a headline: "Do Axioms of Infinity Settle Everything?" (2010: 181).

In my opinion, there is a passage in which Gödel comes close to such a hypothesis (1990: 264 = 1964: 268; also see Bedürftig + Murawski, Chap. 4.4.1., 2015: 306).

I should like, however, to investigate a radical, profound pessimism. I first came across it when investigating Wittgenstein's remarks on mathematical impossibilities. My motivation is to establish a negation of the very optimism to which Hilbert and, to some extent, Gödel gave expression.
In the *Dictionary of Philosophy* by Thomas Mautner, I found a statement about pessimism which is again a negation:

> Any sufficiently radical pessimism is prone to [a] pragmatic paradox: if everything is as hopeless as the radical pessimist thinks, what good can he hope to achieve by publishing his views? (1996: 317)

The answer is: my pessimism could perhaps be refuted! That is my hope, and if it happens then Wittgenstein's statement of 19th December 1929 will have come true: "Die Mathematik kann nicht unvollständig sein!" ("Mathematics cannot be incomplete!"; MS 108: 21) This remark of Wittgenstein's was written down four days before the first written announcement of Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem was recorded in Carnap's diary (see Köhler 2002: 92). Wittgenstein's struggle, which resulted in this formulation is evident from his saying one day previously, in WVC: "Die Mathematik hat keine offenen Stellen", an expression which is translated as "Mathematics has no gaps" in English. If we had to choose a Latin word for this key concept of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics, we could speak of "lacunae mathematicae"!

The concept of lacunae mathematicae includes the following five sub-concepts:
- non-existent ratios of integers (root of 2),
- not-existent algorithms (Hilbert's tenth problem and the *General Problem Solver* for Mathematics),
- non-existent proofs (axioms of parallels and Gödel's Proposition *This proposition cannot be proved*),
- non-existent formulas (polynomial equations degree five) and
- not-existent geometrical constructions (heptagon, trisection, duplication of the cube).

2. Emil Du Bois-Reymond's concept of the Ignorabimus differed greatly from Hilbert's application of it

It is interesting to see the philosophical impact on mathematical terminology in the case of the term "transcendent" numbers, which was derived from transcendent problems, as problems that lay beyond reach and off limits were called by

Emil Du Bois-Reymond (Reid 1970: 13 and 72) It is therefore not advisable to thoroughly investigate the emergence of *Ignorabimus* Phenomena ("Riddles of the Universe") in Du Bois-Reymond's philosophy here, as they are placed within the fields of physics, astronomy and physiology – but Hilbert transfers this concept to mathematics.

The point here is that Emil Du Bois-Reymond compares his pessimism regarding certain problems of physics to the phenomenon of impossible tasks in mathematics. As he writes in a letter:

The two essays "Grenzen des Naturerkennens" and "Die sieben Welträtsel" and all I have written in their spirit, starts from the basic attempt to understand the world as a mechanism. In those aspects, in which one fails in this attempt, the unsolvable residue of the riddle should be expressed with determination and clearly. I think I have done so satisfyingly and by this *I reached a point of rest in my thinking, similar to a mathematician, who has proved the insolvability of a certain task* (The original of the letter to Dreher is in German, 3rd October 1889 in Wollgast 1976: XXXIV, with italics added by me, MO).

The problem here is that the epistemological situation in the natural sciences differs from that in mathematics. In mathematics, a problem proven to be insurmountable ("unbezwingbar", Rudio 1971: 31) will retain that status forever. There is no such proof of impossibility in physics, as Michio Kaku admits (2008: 13). In illustration of this difference between formal mathematics and realistic physics, witness the fact that Thomas S. Kuhn says practically nothing about mathematics, but instead maintains distance to it.

Ursula Prokop informs us that Margret Wittgenstein had read Emil Du Bois-Reymond's "Sieben Weltträtsel" together with her brother Rudi in his early years (2005: 97).

3. Hilbert accepts a negative clarification of the "inverted problem" (i.e. the meta-problem of "is it possible to …?") as a solution to the problem.

When one wants to investigate the epistemological optimism developed in mathematics, the first step is to read David Hilbert's famous address of August 8th, 1900 thoroughly. What is astonishing is the fact that he admits there are unsolvable problems in mathematics. For example, one of Hilbert's teachers, Ferdinand Lindemann, proved the impossibility of constructing π using compasses and ruler only, because it is transcendent. This specific mathematical impossibility is mentioned by Hilbert (page 1098 in the pagination of Ewald) among a good handful of others.

I have already investigated the phenomenon of unsolvable problems to some degree (see Ohmacht 2020). When mathematicians have been trying to solve a problem for some time and have been unsuccessful, then the foreboding arises that it might be unsolvable. We should then turn the tables on the problem and form a conjecture that it can be proved to be unsolvable. If the problem concerned is a proposition that must be proved, then we're headed for a "proof of unprovability", as Wittgenstein uses the phrase in his RFM (Appendix III to Part I, sections 14, 16 and 17). This phrase is not contradictory, but is in fact absolutely to the point: we prove at the meta-level that there is no proof at the object level – just as we prove in the meta-calculus of real numbers that there is no construction for π in the object calculus of Euclidean Geometry.

The prevailing issue for a "proof of unprovability" is the problem of proving the axiom of parallels which haunted geometers and mathematicians for millennia. The acceptance of its impossibility led to Non-Euclidean Geometries (geometries on surfaces with a constant positive or negative curvature).

Mathematically unsolvable problems then give rise to an "inverted question" (Hilbert: 1102): "to show the impossibility of the solution under the given" premises (1101). "Such proofs of impossibility were effected by the ancients," he writes (1101 ff.).

Impossible-to-solve problems are epistemologically highly ambiguous, because we can can state: "We've now been trying to solve it for such a long time and eventually we found out that all these attempts were necessarily futile!" Thus, the prevailing climate is one of frustration.

On the other hand, we can state that "We've found a proof for the impossibility and hence clarified the problem. We've clarified it negatively, but now no one needs to pursue this dire question any longer!" A definite calm replaces the previously intriguing open question!

Is the glass half full or is it half empty?

4. Overview: Hilbert 1900 and Wittgenstein on Mathematical Impossibilities

What is most important when reading Hilbert's address of 1900 is the fact that he frankly admits that there are mathematically unsolvable problems! He mentions the squaring of the circle (1995: 1098), the three body-problem (1995: 1097), the root of 2 (1995: 1102), the axiom of parallels (1995: 1102), a general formula of equations of degree five and higher (1995: 1102) and the duplication of the cube (1995: 1098).

Another remarkable philosophical result is the fact that Wittgenstein deals with most of the mathematical impossibilities known before 1940: cubic equations with unmarked ruler and compasses (RFM part VII: 371, section 12), dividing 735912 by 19 without a remainder (MS 151: 17), the impossibility of formalising the Cretan Liar without a contradiction, trisection of the general angle (WVC: 18th Dec. 1929, 36 ff.) and the construction of the regular heptagon (MS 162b: 18v) with unmarked ruler and compasses, and the solution of all quadratic equations in the integers, the rational and the real numbers.

Wittgenstein furthermore makes a single remark on hypercomplex numbers = Hamiltonian Quaternions (i.e. the impossibility of imposing a field-like structure on R^3; WVC: 29th June 1930, 104). As I have already stated, he deals with a "proof of unprovability" (the Gödel Problem), works on the impossibility of establishing a proof of consistency for arithmetic (RFM Part VII: 371, section 12), makes three remarks on the Continuum Hypothesis (RFM: section 35, 135; RFM: section 42, 409; LFM: unit XVIII, 171), on function expressions without an indefinite integral (MS 112: 17V), and on the Axiom of Choice.

5. Historiographical material on climbing to the meta-level

The most important contribution to mathematics and logics in the second half of the 20th century was probably Paul Cohen's unprovability proof of the Continuum Hypothesis. In an interview about this landmark achievement, Cohen states that the main focus of his work was thereby not mathematical, but philosophical. How can we climb to the meta-level? The cur-

rent situation in mathematics is mainly dominated by the fact that we make a great effort to use our methodological imagination and creativity to find opportunities for climbing up to the meta-level for the Goldbach Conjecture, for example, in order to be prepared in any event for a possible outcome of its being formally undecidable. The weak Goldbach Conjecture is formally decidable, though only – as we've known since 1937 – through a result achieved by Vinogradov (see "Winogradow, Iwan M." in Guido Walz, vol. 5, 2002: 418).

Here, the work on the historiography of mathematics can be helpful in the following way: we could once more study the emergence of non-Euclidean Geometry (geometries) through studying books like that of Staeckel (1895) to find out how the all-important concept of curvature emerged from desperate attempts to prove the axiom of parallels. In fact, the concept of curvature did not form part of mathematicians' considerations from the very beginning at all, but this concept was completed later on, possibly as late as with the Beltrami models 1868.

6. Conclusion

Since Hilbert rules out provable mathematical impossibilities as *Ignorabimus* phenomena, in my opinion only the following situation is left as a definiens for a definition for *Ignorabimus* phenomena: when a problem is posed and then, after several attempts to settle the original problem, the "inverted problem" ("Is it possible to …?") is investigated and leads to an impossibility again. This could with total justification be called an *Ignorabimus* phenomenon. *We could call this horrendous situation a Wittgensteinian Incompleteness,* because Wittgenstein wrote: "Die Mathematik kann nicht unvollständig sein" on 19th December 1929. (MS 108: 21) Note that he is not writing about a concrete calculus here – such as, for example, arithmetic – but about mathematics, i.e. the finite sum of all calculi known up to now in the historical process of research.

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The Roots of Wittgenstein's Analyticity

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Abstract

Although original, Wittgenstein's notion of analyticity presents characteristics that can be traced back to Leibniz's and Kant's accounts of analytic claims, or so I argue. Specifically, they pertain to (a) Leibnizian identities consisting in the connection of the P-term with the S-term (its inclusion in the S-term); and (b) the Kantian containment (cf. Anderson 2015) that dismisses Leibniz's metaphysical ground and shifts analyticity and a priori truth toward semantics. Accordingly, Wittgenstein's account of analyticity (1967) seems a development rather than a rejection of (a) and (b). It turns Leibnizian identities into tautologies and (later) the Kantian a priori into a grammatical rule (cf. Baker-Hacker 2009) showing how an intelligible description of reality ought to be (cf. Glock 1996). Therefore, I conclude that Wittgenstein's account of analytic claims as tautologies and semantic rules furthers the notions of identity and apriority developed by Leibniz and Kant, respectively.

Wittgenstein's notion of analyticity seems prima facie to share little or nothing with the others. It instead presents original characteristics irreducible to anybody else's account. However, as discussed by Wittgenstein, (*a*) analyticity derives from Leibnizian identities and consists in the connection of the predicate with the subject (its *inclusion* in the subject). Leibniz, though, presupposes the existence of a perfect substance (monad) whose properties are all intrinsic. (*b*) Later, Kant dismisses this metaphysical ground and shifts analyticity and truth toward semantics, relying on the notion of containment (Anderson 2015). Nevertheless, he identifies a class of *non-tautologous analytic judgments* (Dreben and Floyd 1991), namely the synthetic a priori, largely rejected since Frege (1884).
Notwithstanding, Wittgenstein's account of analyticity seems a development rather than a rejection of (*a*) and (*b*), or so I argue. Indeed, it turns Leibnizian identities into tautologies (e.g., '~(*p*•~*p*)'), and (later) the Kantian a priori into a grammatical rule. The nature of reality does not determine grammatical rules, which, instead, are constitutive of that nature (Baker-Hacker 2009). The proposition "white is lighter than black" (RFM I: 105), for instance, expresses *internal relations* between concepts (of color) and accordingly licenses the transformation of empirical propositions. It thus shows how an intelligible description of reality ought to be (Glock 1996). Therefore, I conclude that Wittgenstein's account of analytic propositions as tautology and semantic rule furthers the notions of identity and apriority developed by Leibniz and Kant, respectively.

1. Leibniz's identity

The current notion of analyticity derives from Leibniz. In any true proposition, "the predicate or consequent is always in the subject or antecedent" (*Primary Truths:* 31). True propositions are analytic by default: "the notion of the denominated subject must contain the notion of the predicate" (Bennett: 3). In this definition consists "the nature of truth in general, or the [true-making] connection between the terms of a statement" (Ibid), meaning the S-term and the P-term. "In identities, the connection of the predicate with the subject (its *inclusion* in the subject) is explicit; in all other [true] propositions it is implicit, and has to be shown through the analysis of notions" (Ibid).

Leibniz therefore assumes (but doesn't prove) all truth is resolvable to identities. All true propositions are instances of identity. "First truths are the ones that assert something of itself or deny something of its opposite" (2). For example, "A is A," "A is not not-A," "if it is true that A is B, then it is false that A isn't B (i.e., false that A is not-B)". Also, "everything is as it is", "everything is similar or equal to itself", and "nothing is bigger or smaller than itself."

Others of this sort follow. Further, "all other truths are reducible to first ones through definition, that is, by resolving notions [into their simpler components]" (Ibid). Leibniz exemplifies this reduction. Consider the axiom *a whole is bigger than its parts or a part is smaller than the whole*. Leibniz neglects the infinite compositions of parts, for which the axiom fails. Hence, we need to introduce a restriction, '*whole*' stands for 'finite compositions' only. After that, we can follow Leibniz and prove the axiom by relying on the definition of 'smaller' or 'bigger' together with the axiom of identity. Here is the argument.

1. For *x* to be smaller than *y* is for *x* to be *equal to a part of y* (which is bigger)	Definition of 'smaller than'
2. Everything is equal to itself (axiom of identity)	Axiom of 'identity'

3. A part is equal to itself	2
4. A part is equal to a part of the whole	3
5. A part is smaller than the whole	1, 4

"For the *less* is that which is equal to a part of the other (the *greater*)" (1989: 31) is easy to grasp. People "take away from the bigger thing something equal to the smaller one, and find something left over" (Bennett 2017: 2).

For Leibniz, analyticity entails apriority in two ways. (*a*) Reducing all truths to first ones by resolving them into their simpler components "is giving an a *priori* proof, a proof that doesn't depend on experience" (1). However, the independence advocated by Leibniz remains vague. It could be independence from 'further' or 'all' experience. The proof could thus be 'relatively' or 'absolutely' *a priori*. Leibniz offers no clarification. (*b*) Despite this vagueness, it's clear that the "a *priori* demonstration rests on" (2) the analysis of the propositional terms. The same holds for derived and primary truths as well. "This is true for every affirmative truth – universal or particular, necessary or contingent – and it holds when the predicate is relational as well as when it isn't." (Ibid)

All truth, therefore, derives from the analysis of identities whose components or notions (S-term and P-term) are related by inclusion (or containment). Otherwise, "there would be a truth that couldn't be proved a *priori*, that is, a truth that

couldn't be resolved into identities, contrary to the nature of truth, which is always an explicit or implicit identity." (2)
The semantic notions of analyticity and truth lie on a metaphysical ground. Leibniz presupposes the existence of a perfect substance (monad); whose properties are all intrinsic. "There are no purely extrinsic denominations [relational properties] – that is, denominations having absolutely no foundation in the denominated thing". (3) Relational (extrinsic) properties are grounded in non-relational (intrinsic) properties. As Bennett suggests, this "implies that every relational truth reflects non-relational truths about the related things." (4) "The complete [perfect] notion of an individual substance," clarifies Leibniz, "contains all its predicates – past, present, and future". (3) "If a substance *will* have a certain predicate, it is true now that it will, and so that predicate is contained in the notion of the thing." (Ibid)

2. Kant's containment

Kant conceives epistemic necessity as follows, "*p* is knowable a priori if and only if it is knowable independently of all experience." His sketchy argument appears in the first Critique (1781 and 1787).

> In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought (if I only consider affirmative judgments, since the application to negative ones is easy), this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies entirely outside the concept A, though to be sure it stands in connection with it. In the first case, I call the judgment analytic, in the second synthetic. (A6–7)

Frege (1884) challenged this notion of containment (Anderson 2015) and reviewed the synthetic-analytic distinction. Moore and Russell accepted Kant's distinction but dismissed his consequences, namely the class of non-tautologous analytic judgments (Dreben and Floyd 1991), that is the synthetic a priori judgments. For Moore and Russell, "all purported analytic judgments are mere tautologies, and hence not judgments at all" (27). Later, Quine (1951) radically rejected the synthetic-analytic distinction, including a few of its entailments. Unlike Quine, Putnam (1979) believes that defensible notions of analyticity are available. Nevertheless, it is not the case that they entail apriority.

After Kant, many adopted the notion of a *priori.* Schopenhauer and Hertz, for instance, "explained the a priori elements of science by reference to structural features of the way we represent objects." (Glock 1996: 199) Their account influences Wittgenstein. His *form of representation*, 'standpoint' from which we picture the world, echoes the Hertzian forms of describing the world, which lead the scientific theories. Although imperfect, Glock's analysis is mostly correct.

> Kant distinguished between 'formal logic', which abstracts from the objects of knowledge, and 'transcendental logic', which investigates preconditions of thinking about objects. The former consists of analytic a priori truths. But there are also synthetic a priori truths in mathematics, metaphysics and the a priori elements of science. They hold true of experience (are synthetic) without being made true by experience (are a priori), because they express necessary preconditions of the possibility of experience. (Glock 1996: 199)

3. Wittgenstein's tautology

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein restricts the notion of *apriority* "to the analytic truths of formal logic, while rejecting the idea of synthetic a priori truths." (Ibid) "Necessary propositions," clarifies Glock, "reflect the conditions for the possibility of empirical representation." (Ibid) Wittgenstein replaces the cognitive normativity of Kant with the logical syntax, namely "the system of rules which determines whether a combination of signs is meaningful." (Ibid) Notwithstanding, he maintains the characteristics of that normativity. Like this latter, logical syntax precedes truth and falsity. No empirical propositions can overturn it. As Glock argues, "the special status of necessary propositions is not due to the abstract nature of their alleged referents, for there are no logical constants or logical "objects." They aren't statements about objects of any kind, but reflect 'rules of symbolism'." (Ibid) "That one empirical proposition is true and another false is no part of grammar." (PG: 88) Grammar itself is not subject to empirical refutation.

Wittgenstein states that, "The only correlate in language to an intrinsic necessity is an arbitrary rule" since "It is the only thing which one can milk out of this intrinsic necessity into a proposition." (PI: 372) "Grammar is not accountable to any reality. It is grammatical rules that determine meaning (constitute it) and so they themselves are not answerable to any meaning and to that extent are arbitrary." (PG: 133)

In this sense, all necessary propositions of logic can never be false. Understanding their sense equals to recognizing their truth. However, if this is the case, the truths of logic are all tautologies. They all say and repeat the same thing, e.g., '~(p?~p)'.

> For example, the fact that the propositions 'p' and '~p' in the combination '~(p.~p)' yield a tautology shows that they contradict one another. The fact that the propositions 'p⊃q', 'p', and 'q', combined with one another in the form '(p⊃q).(p):⊃:(q)', yield a tautology shows that q follows from p and p⊃q. The fact that '(x).fx:⊃fa' is a tautology shows that fa follows from (x).fx. Etc. etc. (TLP: 6.1201)

The necessity of logical propositions depends on their bipolarity. In certain combinations, they display how the truth-falsity of elementary propositions cancels out. Propositions have two poles (T and F), which ultimately ground the logical structure of all languages. As for the rule, consider the case of the law of contradiction. This latter states a rule that prohibits an expression like 'p.~p'. The validity of the rule emerges from violations that imply a contradiction. However, it could not tell one what to do: "a contradictory proposition is no more a move in the language-game than placing and withdrawing a piece from a square is a move in chess" (Glock 1996: 90).

According to Kripke (1980), *a priori* is an epistemological category, *necessity* a metaphysical one, and *analyticity* a logical one (34–39). Wittgenstein's position differs. For him, necessity characterizes propositions of logic (e.g., those of the form "~(p & ~p)") and mathematics (e.g., "7+5=12"), as well as analytic propositions, broadly conceived. This latter also includes classic definitional truths like (1) "All bachelors are unmarried." Wittgenstein seeks to preserve a connection between (1) and the meaning of the word "bachelor" (Kalhat 2008). Accepting (1) relies on verifying the meaning of "bachelor" and "unmarried", not the marital status of men (a conclusion rejected by Williamson 2007). Rejecting (1) betokens linguistic misunderstanding rather than factual ignorance. As a grammatical proposition, (1) "standardly expresses a *rule* for the correct use of at least one of those constituents and thereby deter-

mines their meaning instead of following from it" (Glock 2008: 25). Therefore, (1) has a normative status: it can be used to explain "bachelor," and to criticize or justify one's use of that term, including its nonsense like "There is a married bachelor at the party." This normative role of (1) explains its *necessity*. A statement such as (1) "cannot possibly be refuted by the facts, simply because no sentence contradicting it counts as a meaningful description of reality, one which is even in the running for stating a fact." (Glock, Ibid) As Wittgenstein states, necessary propositions look very much like grammatical rules. They neither describe states of affairs, perhaps about a Platonic super-physical abstract, nor amount to empirical generalizations.

Further, Wittgenstein maintains that the rules of grammar are autonomous in a similar way to the rules of chess. Grammatical rules are not determined by the nature of reality. Instead, they are constitutive of that nature (Baker-Hacker 2009). A similar thesis holds for mathematical propositions (Dummett 1959; Marion 1998: 179). As Putnam clarifies, "to Wittgenstein's view: when we make a mathematical assertion, say "2+2=4," the "necessity of this assertion is accounted for by the fact that we would not count anything as a counterexample to the statement. The statement is not a "description" of any fact, but a "rule of description" […] In a terminology employed by other philosophers, the statement is analytic." (1979: 423–4)

The proposition "white is lighter than black" (RFM I-105), for instance, expresses *internal relations* between concepts (of color) and accordingly "licenses transformation of empirical propositions" (Glock 1996: 139). "It lays down what counts as an intelligible description of reality" (Ibid). The proposition "a is more than b" holding for non-independent but partially or wholly identical terms rules over all propositions about distinct objects and their external relations (Mácha 2015: 12–3, 87).

4. Final remarks

The early Vienna Circle (Schlick, Carnap, Weismann) welcomed two fundamental ideas of the *Tractatus*.

(a) Necessary propositions are all analytic; hence they express no knowledge of reality. Necessity derives from the combination of bipolar propositions that leaves out all factual information. The early Wittgenstein holds rules of logical syntax to show the essence of the world, namely its logical form. "The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the formal – logical – properties of language and the world." (TLP 6.12) Later, he abandons this view.

(*b*) Metaphysical assertions are non-sensical pseudo-propositions. At best, they either assert what cannot be otherwise (e.g., "red is a colour") or denies what contravenes logic (e.g., "red is a sound"). Unlike Wittgenstein, logical empiricists, however, view semantic rules as arbitrary conventions governing the use of signs. Later, Wittgenstein will no longer condemn necessary truths as pseudo-propositions. Nevertheless, he will still consider analytic propositions (including the mathematical ones) as tautologies. However, they now mask grammatical rules, which ultimately deal with semantic conventions.

Later, Wittgenstein develops his form of conventionalism. Notwithstanding, he denies necessary propositions derive from meanings or conventions. They instead stand for rules (norms of representation) that *partially* determine the meaning of words. For example, to a tautology like '(p•(p⊃q))⊃q' corresponds a rule of inference (modus ponens). Both the tautology and its rule further the notions of identity and apriority developed by Leibniz and Kant, respectively.

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Vindicating Water

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Abstract

Philosophers generally agree that water is H2O. I argue that this is a mistake. I show that, instead, being H2O it is neither necessary nor sufficient for something to be water. Ice, snow, vapour, fog, mist, are not water; conversely, water – the stuff we are familiar with from everyday experience – consists of more than H_2O. The fact that chemists have borrowed the word 'water' for H_2O should not deceive us about what water really is. Linguistic and metaphysical considerations support this conclusion. This paper's argument thus turns against Platonism, defending a common-sense understanding of the paradigmatic stuff of water. The aim is to link the semantics of 'water' to our everyday experience, a precondition for explaining language acquisition and practice.

There is not much that is largely undisputed in philosophy; after all, as philosophers we are in the business of questioning everything we can. When there is a point of practically general agreement, we take it to be a truism. One of this small number of assumed truisms is that water is H2O. The number of papers evidently taking this for granted is so large that I won't even start citing them. To give just one example, Putnam (1973: 705) evidently thinks he states the obvious in saying that today, most adult speakers "know the necessary and sufficient condition 'water is H2O'". It is time, someone from within philosophy toppled this widely shared belief, so here I go: I think this assumption is wholly mistaken. In fact, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for what we call 'water' to be H2O.

But what is water then? I claim, that water is just what we think it is. It is that important stuff without which there is no life (hence space missions to Mars looking for water there). Luckily, there is plenty of it on earth, although much of it is not potable. It fills rivers and oceans, falls from the sky when it rains, we drink it, use it for cooking and making tea, for showering and to flush toilets. A chemical analysis of samples of any of the liquids I've just listed will show that they contain very much H2O, but they also contain several other chemical substances – check the small print on your bottle of mineral water for some. So, the stuff we deal with day in, day out, and that we call 'water' is not H2O, but only contains a lot of it. For it to be successfully referred to by the name 'water', it is not necessary that it be H2O only. Instead, what usually goes by the name of 'water' is a liquid *containing* much H2O.

But is this maybe just a matter of carelessness, loose talk, or vagueness? Do we *properly* call only H2O 'water' but not bother to strip a stuff of the name 'water' just because it contains a little of this and that as well? Not so. The vast majority of us have never seen pure H2O. This is because, chemists tell us, pure H2O is not found in nature and, in fact, hard to produce and maintain pure in a lab because it dissolves other substances so easily. For instance, Kevin Prior, Chair of the Water Science Forum of the Royal Society of Chemistry, explains:

> Water is a compound made up of hydrogen and oxygen, so pure water would be water that contains nothing but hydrogen and oxygen. However, pure water of this sort […] does not exist in nature. Water is the universal solvent. Even as it falls to earth as rain it picks up particles and minerals in the air. And as soon as it hits the ground it captures minerals from the soil and rock upon which it lands and then makes its way into streams and rivers. (2013: 36)

So, the stuff consisting of hydrogen and oxygen only, that Prior calls 'pure water' for the purposes of his explanation to the British Parliament, is nowhere to be found in nature. The stuff we do know by acquaintance and refer to as 'water' is a liquid with a lot of H2O in it, but it comes with many other substances, particularly minerals, dissolved in it. So, either the entire community of English speakers is mistaken in their use of the word 'water', or it is not necessary for a stuff to be (pure) H2O for it to be water.

But is there perhaps a metaphysical explanation that may save the day for the mainstream definition? Maybe, given the "right" sort of metaphysics, this is nothing to worry about. For instance, an old-school Platonist who considers worldly objects only imperfect exemplifications of essential forms should not be surprised to learn that actual portions of water don't match the ideal form of H2O. Aristotelians might similarly regard those various substances dissolved in H2O as accidental properties, in the same way that objectual natural kind instances come with their accidental properties, such as the neighbour's loving her cat. On that view, water would essentially be H2O and accidentally have some admixtures. Sadly, neither of them takes us closer to viable necessary and sufficient conditions for water involving H2O. The trouble is that if we admitted impurities or admixtures to water, there is no metaphysical line we could draw between that stuff and tea, coffee, herbal or fruit infusions, even clear soup, all of which share the feature of containing large shares of H2O jointly with other substances, and none of them is water. We will return to metaphysics below. For now, it should be noted that 'containing very much H2O' is not even sufficient for making a liquid water. But this, of course, was never the claim. The claim was that (pure) H2O is water. Even if not necessary, is this at least a sufficient condition?

Alas, no. We know that most liquids containing a lot of H2O, including (almost) pure H2O artificially produced in labs, freeze below 0°C, thereby turning to ice; they evaporate when heated above 100°C, thereby turning to vapour. What was once water – and may often become water again – can come in the form of snow, fog and mist as well. That none of these are water will be conceded, I expect, when the doubter gets thirsty and finds that snow, ice or vapour can't be drunk. Beyond this almost Moorean point, there is clearly no linguistic basis for the claim. If by being H2O, snow were water (we're ignoring the "admixtures" for the sake of simplicity), we would have to be able to refer to snow interchangeably as 'water', just as we can refer to ewes as 'sheep', 'livestock' or 'animals'. But this clearly is not the case. So, the logic behind the H2O theory is not reflected in our language practice. Moreover, we experi-

ence the different aggregate states of H2O as so stable, that we are rarely tempted to relate them to each other. Fog and mist don't tend to turn into water before our eyes; even vapour only leaves a few drops on the lid of a pot. There is a good reason we have vastly different words for each of these H2O-based stuffs and for those words not to resemble or even share a root with the word 'water', or to contain 'water' in a compound. This clear conceptual separation is also illustrated in Wittgenstein's *Remarks on Colour*: If water were conceptually a part of snow for us, his approving quote of Runge that white water is inconceivable (ROC 1977: §94) would simply be false. Finally, the claim that ice, snow, vapour, fog or mist are water would change the definition of the word 'water' (the OED, correctly, created a separate section for the chemical compound). So, there is no support in our language practice, no linguistic, and no conceptual support for the assumption that being H2O might be sufficient for anything to be water.

To sum up, being H2O is neither necessary nor sufficient for something to be water.

This means that people who claim that water is H2O get the semantics wrong. The chemical compound H2O simply isn't the same sort of stuff as what we call 'water' outside the chemistry lab (in the lab, it is also known as 'aqua'; but since this is the Latin name of water, it doesn't change the situation philosophically). Instead, as linguists Isac and Reiss (2013: 44) point out, "scientists borrow words from everyday language. […] [I]t is an arbitrary fact that chemists borrowed this term to refer to a pure molecular substance. […] It would not have been inconceivable for chemistry to have applied the name *air* to what it called instead *oxygen*."

But, it may be said, shouldn't we let the experts on stuffs, the chemists, tell us what water really is? I don't think so – first, because Isac and Reiss are surely right when they stress that chemistry did not discover the true meaning of 'water', but instead just borrowed a word for its own purposes (Isac and Reiss 2013: 44), important though those purposes may be. Secondly, because if we did, surely we should need other names for all those liquid-state chemical solutions we now call 'water'. If 'water' denoted H2O, it would not be right to call the liquid in my glass with all its Calcium, Potassium, Magnesium, Sodium, Chloride and Sulphate (1000 mg/l) 'water', too, nor should the liquid that comes out of my tap or the one that covers my window sill when it rains be called 'water', because they are not the same stuff as H2O. Instead, I suggest, we should treat the term 'water' just as we treat 'bread': a generic term applying to a group of stuffs that share important features. What these features are, I am happy to let experts define, provided they comprise all and only what we designate by the term 'water'.

An upshot of my argument may be that Putnam's (1973) twin-earth substance XYZ, which *ex hypothesis* shares all features except the chemical composition with H2O, turns out to be water, too. If something like XYZ is possible at @ (I can't tell whether it is), that's perfectly fine since it meets all the criteria we apply to 'water' in everyday life and hence everyday language. By contrast, H2O, as I have explained, doesn't.

Now, why is this important? There are at least two good reasons, one metaphysical, the other pertaining to philosophy of language and mind. Metaphysically, the question is what we consider stuff generally, and what we consider water – a paradigmatic sort of stuff – in particular to be. The definition of water as H2O could arguably lead to the *café* au lait problem (Cartwright 1970), with the substances dissolved among the H2O molecules playing the role of milk in the coffee. The *café au lait* problem is that milk in *café au lait* cannot physically be separated from the coffee, *so café au lait* would seem to be a different sort of stuff than "pure", i.e. black, coffee; the separation is only made conceptually – a move unpalatable to many. Conversely, defining water as what we usually call 'water' – the whole liquid consisting of the H2O and the other substances – might lead to the fruit cake problem (Steen 2016), where the dried fruit in the dough are necessary for the cake to be fruit cake, but compromise its homoiomerousness, an essential feature distinguishing stuffs from objects. The question is whether Calcium in tap water, or salt in seawater behaves as fruit does in fruit cake (my guess is they don't).

From a philosophy of language and mind point of view, the question is about language acquisition. If we learn important parts of language by joint exposure to speakers and what they speak of – which is surely the case – then, a word as fundamental in most children's lives as 'water' would surely be learnt by hearing people speak of water in a situation when we are presented with water. But this is exactly how we learnt to use 'water' for what's in the cup, in the bath tub, the puddle, and hopefully not in our shoes, rather than in a laboratory vial. If, instead, 'water' denoted H2O, we would very likely never come across any of it other than hidden in what contains it – which could be a plant as well as a cup of coffee as well as that clear, odourless liquid that comes out of the tap, but now turns out not to be what we call it and, indeed, think it is.

Getting clear on what 'water' really means is an important issue in philosophy, and I argue that we should stick to the meaning in ordinary use, not the specific scientific use for which there is, moreover, a short enough chemical formula.

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Übersetzung des Unsinns: Übersetzungskritik zum ersten Satz des *Tractatus*

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Abstract

The problem of translating philosophical works meets a certain vacuum in the translation of the first sentence of *Tractatus* ("Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist"). Measured on its own "theory" of meaning, TLP 1 is nonsensical ("unsinnig"): objectless in reference, tautological in grammatical structure. Despite its initial impression, it is not a theorem; instead, this sentence has a specific philosophical function of constructing and destructing ideals/illusions simultaneously, as it corresponds to the non-sensical experience of the existence of the world "as a limited whole" (6.45). In a way, it can be seen as absolutely nonsensical. But how can a nonsensical text be translated? Is translation not an operation of communication, after all? In this work, I attempt a critical examination on translations of TLP 1 in English, Chinese and Japanese. It shows that terminological accuracy and presumed transparency of meaning in the process of translation – often interwoven with an analytical interpretation, in the case of *Tractatus* – lead to the opposite effect of concealing the productive obscurity of the original. The examples in Chinese and Japanese show furthermore, that the asymmetrical constellation between "West and the Rest" is a great obstacle for the intercultural validation of the philosophical dynamic of intentionally nonsensical texts.

1. Einleitung

Im folgenden kurzen Text werde ich den Versuch unternehmen, die Ergebnisse der vergleichenden Übersetzungskritik zu TLP 1 aus meiner Dissertation *Paradoxien der Grenzsprache und das Problem der Übersetzung*, nämlich in Bezug auf die Sprachen Englisch, Chinesisch und Japanisch, zusammenfassend darzustellen. In meiner Dissertation habe ich weitere Übersetzungen in den Sprachen Französisch, Italienisch, Portugiesisch, Rumänisch sowie Koreanisch behandelt, was ich aber hier aus Platzgründen auslassen muss.
Der Anfangssatz des Tractatus findet sich bekanntermaßen nicht in dessen erster erhaltener Entstehungsstufe MS 101–103, sondern erst in der Kompositionsstufe MS 104 (sog. *Prototractatus*). Man kann vermuten, dass dieser Satz ein später, summierender Rückblick auf das Ganze des Gedachten ist, und somit im Bewusstsein der Unsinnigkeit der Sätze des Tractatus – nämlich gemessen an der darin festgelegten Konzeption des Sinns – hinzugefügt wurde; in dieser Hinsicht muss der offensichtlich unsinnig-tautologische Charakter von TLP 1 in den Vordergrund gestellt werden. Welt zu kommunizieren produziert keine Information (Luhmann/Fuchs 1989): Einerseits ist „Welt" als Allreferenz keine sinnvolle Referenz, denn eine solche nur in Bezug auf Tatsachen, die erst nach Weltzerfall (TLP 1.2) entstehen, möglich ist. Andererseits aber ist auch der Satz schon der Struktur nach eine Tautologie, die allerdings keine logische Struktur aufzeigt, sondern vor allem die Unmöglichkeit der eigenen Sinngenerierung inszeniert. Der Anfangssatz des TLP scheint eine metaphysische Theorieleistung zu erbringen, was aber mit der daraus entfalteten Theorie rekursiv als unmöglich erkannt werden muss. Dieser ist dies ein unsinniger Satz, der bei metaphysischer Höchstforderung mit einem Maximum an Sinn angereichert ist, aber sich ebenso streng und rasch aus dem Sinngeschehen zurückzieht, versucht man, ihr Gehalt sinnhaft zu erfassen. In TLP 1 drückt sich der innere Widerspruch des Aussprechens des Unaussprechlichen, d.h. des philosophischen Schreibens, der das ganze Werk durchzieht, in kristallisierter Form aus.

Nicht jeder Übersetzer des Tractatus hat sich aber dieser inneren Spannung des Tractatus gestellt. Ganz im Gegenteil kann man betrachten, dass TLP 1 als metaphysisches Theorem gelesen und durch Übersetzungen als solches reproduziert wird, was wiederum gewisse analytische Rezeptionsmodi begünstigt. Denn jedes Werk kann, auch wenn es eigentlich das Verlassen des Bereichs des innerweltlichen Sinns intendiert, wiederum als sinnstiftendes Geschehen interpretiert und somit „in die Welt" zurückgeholt werden. Dies ist bei sprachgeschichtlich und philosophiegeschichtlich entfernteren Sprachen, nämlich der ostasiatischen, im erhöhten Maße sichtbar, aber Übersetzer europäischer Sprachen tendieren ebenfalls dazu, diesen unsinnigen Satz in der Übersetzung wieder mit Sinn auszufüllen.

2. Übersetzungen ins Englisch

1. The world is everything what is the case. (Ogden)
2. The world is all that is the case. (Pears/McGuiness)
3. The world is everything that is the case. (Google Translate)

Wir merken, dass die semantischen Differenzen zwischen den Varianten hier minimal sind. Hier befinden wir anscheinend auf einem Feld, wo professionelle Übersetzer von kostenlosen Algorithmen nicht zu unterscheiden sind – wohl ein Grund dafür, dass es mit der englischen Übersetzung des TLP bis heute grundsätzlich bei beiden genannten geblieben ist.

Die Ähnlichkeit zwischen deutscher und englischer Sprache ermöglicht hier eine Zusammenkunft von Satzform und Satzsinn. Der Urtext und die Übersetzung sind einerseits durch eine gemeinsame ideengeschichtliche Entwicklung lexikalisch verwandt – beispielsweise „Welt" und „world" sind nicht nur etymologisch, sondern auch konzeptuell eng verbunden, weil beide Wörter Übersetzungen für den lateinischen Begriff „mundus" sowie den älteren „kosmos" darstellen. Das Ergebnis: In allen drei Varianten die gleiche Anzahl von Wörtern bei identischer Wortreihenfolge. Ebenso bleiben dabei alle Artikel und übrigen grammatischen Kategorien nahezu unverändert. Der idiomatische Ausdruck „der Fall sein" korrespondiert homomorph mit „to be the case". Die Gefahr ist hier deshalb groß, dass das Unproblematische der Übersetzung zwischen diesen zwei indoeuropäischen Sprachen die Sache der Philosophie verdeckt, sodass „die für uns wichtigsten Aspekte der Dinge durch ihre Einfachheit und Alltäglichkeit verborgen [sind]" (PU 2003: §128). Das Unerhörte, das Staunen machende dieses Satzes wird erst beim Überschreiten seiner eigenen Form sichtbar. Die Übersetzung ist, weil sie eine arbiträre Verbindung zwischen Formen herstellt, ein Anlass, wo das Transgressive des ersten Tractatus-Satzes thematisiert werden kann, welcher jedoch bei einer zu durchsichtigen Übersetzung versäumt wird. Die genannten Übersetzungen ins Englische bleiben wortgetreu und somit „transparent". So verweist sie einzig auf die Originalität des Originals, und simuliert seine Sinnhaftigkeit, die im Original fehlt. Die vordergründige Trans-

parenz verdeckt hier die tiefe Intransparenz des Originals. Ist hier nicht ein Ort, in dem eine markierende, verfremdende Übersetzung möglich und geboten ist, sodass dem „dunklen" des Originals nur eine dunkle Übersetzung entsprechen kann? (Heidegger 1979)

Aber das ist vermutlich auch der Regelfall der Übersetzung gewesen, den der Wittgenstein des Tractatus selbst im Sinne gehabt haben muss:

> 4.025 Die Übersetzung einer Sprache in eine andere geht nicht so vor sich, dass man jeden S a t z der einen in einen S a t z der anderen übersetzt, sondern nur die Satzbestandteile werden übersetzt.

Aber – trifft das auf die Übersetzung von Tractatus selbst? Wohl hat die erste bedeutende Ausgabe des Tractatus, die in bilingualer Fassung auf Deutsch und Englisch in Druck erschien, diesen Anschein der bijektiven Entsprechung verstärkt. Der Grund für diese editorische Entscheidung war nach Ogden „the obvious difficulties raised by the vocabulary and in view of the peculiar literary character of the whole, und daher für die Strategie einer sehr wörtlichen Übersetzung, die andernorts übermäßig wörtlich („over-literal") gewirkt hätte (TLP 1951: 5).

Die philosophische Sprache im Tractatus ist demnach terminologisch stringent und zugleich literarisch; diese Kombination der ansonsten konträren Merkmale ist eine zentrale Charakteristik philosophischer Textualität insgesamt. Die philosophische Sprache ist eine Sprache, in der literarische Offenheit trotz Begriffsstringenz gegeben ist. Diese diffizile Operation, die im Philosophieren gesucht und gar getroffen wird, ist dabei so sehr mit der Sprachlichkeit der Ursprache selbst verschränkt, dass die Operation der Übersetzung sie als Hindernis meldet. Die Forderung an den Übersetzer gestellt ist enorm im Falle der philosophischen Textualität, fast widersprüchlich. Einerseits muss die Idealität der Begriffe, die sich um das Konkrete der Sprache, in der sie gebraucht werden, nicht kümmert, bewahrt werden: Wenn der Terminus „Satz" das Grundprinzip der Abbildung des Sachverhalts auf seine Möglichkeit des Wahrheit hin bedeutet, kann es nicht mehr einen alltäglichen Satz bezeichnen. Andererseits aber ist das Fundament, auf dem gerade diese Idealisierung geschieht, gerade das Ganze der Sprache: Ohne die mannigfaltigen, tatsächlich gebrauchten Sätze gibt es auch keinen Begriff von „Satz" als propositio. Es scheint fast, dass die Gewalt der Begriffsbildung an diesem Verhältnis zwischen Alltagssprache und Idealität besteht – eine Erkenntnis, die ein innerer Beweggrund für Wittgenstein selbst war, nach Jahren wieder erneut mit der Philosophie zu beginnen, obwohl er sie längst „abgehandelt" hatte. Die „schweren Irrtümer" des eigenen Frühwerks sind genau in diesem Spannungsfeld zwischen Idealität und Alltagssprache anzusiedeln, wo die Begriffe ihr Zuhause haben: „Wir missverstehen die Rolle, die das Ideal in unserer Ausdrucksweise spielt" (PU 2003: §100).

3. Übersetzungen ins Chinesisch

Wir betrachten zuerst die erste Übersetzung des TLP ins Chinesische aus dem überraschend frühen Datum 1927. Der Übersetzer Chang Sungnien war Mitbegründer der „New Tide Society" und zugleich der Erste, der Russells Philosophie dort einführte. Der erste Satz in dieser Übersetzung, die übrigens eine Übersetzung aus dem Englischen darstellt, lautet:

世界是一切是情實者

1) Interlineare Hilfsübersetzung:
世界 是 一切 是 情實 者
Welt (Kopula) alles (Kopula) Tatbestand (Modalpartikel)
2) Wörtliche Rückübersetzung:
Die Welt ist alles ist Tatbestand.

3) Sinngemäße Rückübersetzung:
Die Welt ist alles, was Tatbestand ist.

Die reibungslose Rückübersetzung ins Deutsche 3) erweckt den Eindruck, dass es sich hier um eine gelungene, originaltreue Übersetzung handelt. Sogar die Satzstruktur und Wortreihenfolge wurden analog abgebildet. Diese scheinbar bijektive Übersetzungsrelation täuscht allerdings. Dafür gehen wir zurück auf die Interlinearversion: Als Erstes fällt auf, dass hier zweimal das Zeichen „shih 是" vorkommt, das ich in der Hilfsübersetzung als „Kopula" wiedergegeben habe.

Schon die Doppelung der Kopula lässt vermuten, dass hier eine grammatische Abbildung der Prädikation nicht vorliegen kann. Dabei handelt es sich nicht um eine „echte" Kopula, die zugleich Prädikat im Satz ist. Die chinesische Sprache, in diesem Fall die klassische Schriftsprache, ist eine stark isolierende Sprache, in der das Verb „sein" als solches nicht vorkommt. (Es ist sogar fraglich, ob man ohne Weiteres in nichtflektierenden Sprachen überhaupt von Verben als eigene Klasse sprechen kann) (Elberfeld 2004). Im Chinesischen kann die Gleichheitsrelation auch ohne das Zeichen „shih 是", beispielsweise durch das Zeichen „爲", oder einfach durch Wortstellung ausgedrückt werden (Elberfeld 2012). Zudem ist die etymologische Herkunft des Zeichens nicht grammatisch, sondern bedeutet nach dem kanonischen etymologischen Wörterbuch *Shuowen Jezi* „recht" bzw. „gerade". Die gewichtige etymologisch-ontologische Verbindung von „ist" mit „Sein" in indo-europäischen Sprachen, die durch den philosophischen Kontext aktiviert werden kann, im Chinesischen also ganz abwesend.

Was berechtigt hier dann die Verwendung des Zeichens zur Wiedergabe der Kopula? Dazu muss man den Kontext der Rezeption etwas deutlich machen. Denn der Grund für diese Entscheidung ist nicht mehr grammatischer oder lexikalischer Art, sondern entspringt der asymmetrischen Dynamik im Kulturkontakt, die man an dieser Stelle vereinfachend mit einer „Europäisierung" des Chinesischen bezeichnen könnte. In der Phase der Modernisierung und Verwestlichung in Ostasien, die in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts ansetzte und noch heute nicht als abgeschlossen gelten kann, gab es eine Hierarchisierung der Sprachen, welche die Übersetzungspraxis maßgeblich beeinflusst. Dabei werden europäischen Sprachen als ontologisch überlegen konstruiert, sodass nicht nur der Inhalt europäischer Diskurse, sondern die sprachlichen Formen selbst als Desiderat kultureller Weiterentwicklung erscheinen. (Lee 2013) Das Westlich-Fremdkulturelle soll hier nicht mehr mit dem Eigenen versöhnt und darin integriert werden; sondern das Fremde muss mit allen Mitteln das Eigene überformen. Die hieraus resultierende Übersetzungsstrategie ist eine extreme, verfremdende Originaltreue, deren Anschlussfähigkeit bis an die Grenze der Lesbarkeit gebracht wird (Lehnert 2015).

Was in der Übersetzung von Chang also geschieht, ist vielmehr die Erschaffung einer artifiziellen Sprache zur Übersetzung der als „westlich" markierten Gedanken. Diese neue Sprache ist ihrer Funktion gemäß durch ihre hohe Transparenz gekennzeichnet, was bewirkt, dass die philosophische Sprache ihre Selbstreferenz fast komplett einbüßt. Es ist aber nahezu

unmöglich für den Leser, die Tiefenstruktur der Erkenntnisdynamik in TLP 1 zu erkennen und philosophisch zu validieren. Durch die hohe Originaltreue, die selbst die Sprachstruktur der Zielsprache ignoriert, ist es der Übersetzung zwar teilweise gelungen, das spezifische monolinguale Argument bzgl. der Subjekt-Prädikat-Struktur zu transferieren; aber dies führt nicht zur Sprachkritik, wie sie im Tractatus intendiert war Eine ähnliche Tendenz zur Verfremdung und Transparenz zeigt sich, in noch gesteigerter Gestalt, in der modernen Übersetzung von Mou Zongsan (Mou 1988), deren Besprechung ebenfalls aus dem Englischen geschieht und hier aus Platzgründen nicht wiedergegeben werden kann.

4. Übersetzungen ins Japanisch

Mit den beiden Beispielen aus der japanischen Sprache erreichen wir ein Maximum der geographischen und sprachlichen Distanz zum Urtext. Schon Nietzsche vermutete, freilich gemäß seinem damaligen Wissenshorizont, dass „Philosophen des ural-altaischen Sprachbereichs (in dem der Subjekt-Begriff am schlechtesten entwickelt ist)" aufgrund der grammatischen Struktur „anders „in die Welt" blicken", anders nämlich als „Indogermanen oder Muselmänner". Wenn auch nicht monokausal aus der Strukturdifferenz der Sprachen zu erklären, kommt es im Endeffekt zu anderen „Grundworten" in der japanischen Philosophie (Elberfeld 1999), was eine Dissonanz der Begriffe verursacht. Die lange Geschichte der rezeptiven Haltung gegenüber der kulturellen Hegemonie Chinas das Instrument der Übersetzung in Japan (sowie in Korea und Vietnam) zudem nachhaltig geprägt, sodass wenn ein philosophischer/wissenschaftlicher Begriff übersetzt wird, in der Regel ein Neologismus mit chinesischen Zeichen geschaffen wird. Die viel gelesene moderne Übersetzung von Noya Shigeki folgt diesem klassischen Muster des Vorbehalts terminologischer Sprache für das Chinesische:

世界は成立していることがらの総体である。
[Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Sachverhalte, die bestehen.]

Bei dieser Übersetzung sind drei von vier terminologisch/philosophisch konnotierten Wörtern (mit der Ausnahme von „Sachverhalt"), nämlich „Welt" (世界) „Gesamtheit" (総体) und „bestehen" (成立) in chinesischer Schrift, was selbst sprachunkundige Betrachter erkennen können. Beim zweiten Blick erkennt man auch, dass diese Übersetzung sich nicht allein auf den ersten Satz des Tractatus bezieht, sondern einen Vorgriff auf den weiteren Text bedeutet. „Alles" wird durch „Gesamtheit" (1.1.) und „was der Fall ist" durch „bestehen von Sachverhalten" (2) ersetzt. Eine solche substituierende Vorgehensweise scheint aufgrund des systematischen Charakters des Tractatus gerechtfertigt – diese Ausdrücke werden ja nur wenige Sätze später den entsprechenden Terminologien synonym gebraucht, im Falle von TLP 2 sogar aktiv für äquivalent erklärt. Mit diesem Vorgriff auf die kommenden Textstellen kann der Hauptschwierigkeit der *Übersetzung der Unsinnigkeit* gewichen werden. Bei dem Ausdruck „was der Fall ist" ist das Zusammenspiel von der nichtssagenden Relativsatzkonstruktion mit der Einheit von alltäglicher und philosophischer Sprache wesentlich für die philosophische Erkenntnisdynamik. Dies ermöglicht die philosophisch relevanten Grenzübergänge, nämlich zwischen den Bereichen Sinn/Unsinn und Alltagssprache/Begriffssprache. Die grenzsprachlich aufgestellte Lektüremöglichkeit ist zugleich die Möglichkeit des Aspektwechsels zwischen den scheinbaren Gegensätzen. Denn der eigentümliche Erkenntniswert des TLP 1 liegt in seiner Normalität, in der Hypostase des Gewöhnlichen und Sinnvollen bis hin zur Paradoxie. Die terminologisierte Sprache, die folgt, greift diese Grenzerfahrung auf und verarbeitet sie zu einer systematischen Darstellung, welche ja die Unaussprechlichkeit des Unaussprechlichen von einer anderen Seite her beleuchtet, und ihre Sprache ist eine andere als im ersten Satz. Die Übersetzungsstrategie hält sich an der Vorstellung von innersprachlicher Bedeutungsgleichheit fest, die durch den systematischen Teil von Tractatus selbst inspiriert ist, überträgt diese auf die Übersetzungspraxis (sowie auch in der älteren Fujimoto/Hidetoshi-Übersetzung). Die einseitig-theoretische Aufnahme der philosophischen Dynamik bewirkt mitunter auch, dass der Gedanke gleichsam in doppelter Gestalt, nämlich einmal mit dem eindeutigen Fremdheitsmarker des „Übersetzerischen" („Translationese") (Venuti 2008, Yanabu 1991), und einmal in einer idealsprachlichen Transparenz erscheint. Die neuere Übersetzung von Okazawa versucht dagegen, einen ganz anderen Weg zu gehen.

世界は、そうであることのすべてである
[Die Welt ist alles, was so ist.]

Diese Übersetzung ist überraschend in der Alltagssprache verankert, frei von technischer Manier und absichtlich verfremdender Haltung. Glücklicherweise wird auch die doppelte Kopula zweimal mit „(で)ある" wiedergegeben, einem Ausdruck, der geschichtlich keine begriffliche oder philosophische Relevanz hat, aber an dieser Stelle auf die Probe gestellt wird. Der Ausdruck bewahrt das Tautologische des Urtextes, das Befremdliche des vollkommen Gewöhnlich-Sinnlosen: Die Welt ist alles, was so ist. Der japanische Satz klingt nach innerer Inkongruenz, obwohl die Syntax sowie die verwendeten Ausdrücke höchst natürlich sind. Es wird hier geschickt ein Punkt innerhalb der Alltagssprache angerührt, an dem die Sprache ins Sinnlose übergeht – und darin besteht eine Hauptwirkung der philosophischen Sprache des Tractatus.

5. Fazit

Bei der Betrachtung der Übersetzungen des Anfangssatzes von Tractatus konnte festgestellt werden, dass die hohe Transparenz und imaginierte Äquivalenz in direktem Widerspruch zur Funktionsweise bzw. philosophischen Erkenntnisdynamik des Werks stehen können. Bei einem fingierten Einsatz von Unsinn als Modus philosophischer Sprache muss vielmehr in der Übersetzung nochmals markiert werden, dass das Original den Begriff der semantischen Kommunikation bereits überschreitet. Dieses Phänomen tritt in den europäischen wie ostasiatischen Sprachen, in je eigentümlicher Form, klar zutage. Damit sollte auch die grundsätzlich analytische Auslegungstendenz des Tractatus in globaler Rezeption relativiert werden: Indem eine transparente Übersetzungsstrategie mit Betonung der Idealität der Begriffssprache eingesetzt wird, wird die Möglichkeit versäumt, in der eigenen gesprochenen Sprache ein philosophisches Potential zu entdecken und zu entfalten – die philosophische Begriffsbildung aus der Muttersprache heraus zu schöpfen.

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Connecting Words and Things. Wittgenstein And the *Cratylus*

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Abstract

In the *Big Typescript*, Wittgenstein writes that his philosophical stance on language can be illuminated by comparing it with what Socrates says in Plato's Cratylus (434a). This paper presents a critical reexamination of the *Cratylus* remark in its *Nachlass* context and offers a historically informed perspective on how Wittgenstein's engagement with the dialogue influenced his philosophical development. The main function of the reference to *Cratylus* in MS 111, TSS 211–213, and MS 114 is to illustrate a specific group of causal theories, according to which a word's meaning consists in evoking a mental image, association, memory, or idea of a respective thing. Drawing on G.E. Moore's lecture notes, the paper highlights thematic links between Wittgenstein's 1931 May Term lectures and MS 111 and reconstructs an argument against direct reference theories of meaning. It then retraces how Wittgenstein applies the same general refutation strategy to Socrates' mimetic theory of names. Even though Wittgenstein does not explicitly mention the *Cratylus* in subsequent writings, the central problem he identifies in the dialogue, the question of how words and things are connected, provides an important background for his later investigations.

Wittgenstein famously insisted that the philosophical problems he dealt with were essentially "the same questions which Plato discussed." (Rhees 2006: ix) On 14 June 1931, Wittgenstein wrote the following remark in his manuscript volume MS 111, which he later copied into TS 211, transferred to TS 212, and ultimately included in the *Big Typescript*:

We can shed light on the way we talk about words by considering what Socrates says in the *Cratylus*. Cratylus: 'By far and without question it is more excellent, to portray what someone wants to portray by using something similar to it than by using the next best thing.' Socrates: 'Well spoken, …' (BT 2005: 35)

The *Cratylus* remark appears like an open invitation to contrast Wittgenstein's and Plato's views on language, and Wittgenstein scholars, philosophers, and literary scholars have published various comparative studies in recent years. The existing literature rarely addresses what specific claim Wittgenstein attributes to Socrates, however, and it does not always sufficiently take the remark's Nachlass context into account, which seems crucial for correctly assessing the scope of the comparison.

This paper presents a critical reexamination of Wittgenstein's remark on the *Cratylus* in its *Nachlass* context, and attempts a broader perspective on how Wittgenstein's engagement with the dialogue influenced his philosophical development. Section 1 provides some philosophical background. I show how the introduction of the *Cratylus* remark in MS 111 is linked with Wittgenstein's departure from the Tractarian conception of language and relates to Wittgenstein's 1931 May Term lectures. Drawing on G.E. Moore's lecture notes, I sketch some features of Wittgenstein's grammatical approach and reconstruct an argument against direct reference theories of meaning. In section 2, I analyze the *Cratylus* remark as it features in MS 111, TSS 211–213 and MS 114. Following Rachel Barney's work on the *Cratylus*, I argue that Wittgenstein identifies a key passage of the dialogue, and discuss how Wittgenstein applies his basic refutation strategy to Socrates' mimetic theory of names and other causal accounts of meaning. In the final section, I give an outlook on the *Cratylus*' significance for Wittgenstein's philosophical development and briefly identify some implications for future research in the field of Wittgenstein studies.

1. An Argument Against Direct Reference Theories of Meaning

MS 111 picks up various threads from Wittgenstein's 1931 May Term lectures, such as the nature of elementary propositions, the relation between propositions and pictures, the verifiability principle, and the function of proper names. In the manuscript entry immediately preceding the *Cratylus* remark, Wittgenstein officially abandons the Tractarian conception of elementary propositions: A proposition's being elementary now merely means that it is not represented as a truth-function of other sentences within a given calculus. (MS 111: 13)

The analogy of language as a calculus is a central theme of Wittgenstein's work in the early 1930's. As G.E. Moore's lecture notes document, Wittgenstein emphasizes that symbols pertain to a system guiding their usage. (2016: 139) This idea can be illustrated by considering the symbolic representation of a melody through music notes: Musical notation requires a system of meters, scales, harmonies, etc., and music notes' values are relative to a given clef and time signature. Music notes do not signify in isolation; their meaning is established by their role within a notational system. Likewise, the meaning of a word is determined by the rules guiding its usage, i.e., its position in grammatical space.

Wittgenstein's calculus conception and grammatical approach have far-reaching implications, especially for his treatment of proper names. Wittgenstein grants that names can represent things in propositions, and he accepts that the meaning of a name can often be explained by ostensive definition. What Wittgenstein objects to is the idea that a name's meaning is simply identical to its bearer, as an extra-linguistic entity. In his final lecture of the May Term, on 1 June 1931, Wittgenstein presents the following counterargument to such direct reference theories of meaning:

> A word can only be a substitute, if so & so is the case: its being a substitute depends upon a fact.
> But the meaning of a word cannot depend on a fact.
> 'There is no such thing as red' has only sense if 'red' has meaning.
> But, if it is true, 'red' can't be a substitute.
> Meaning is fixed inside language. (Moore 2016: 151).

The *reductio* ad absurdum argument relies on the principle of bivalence. If the statement "there is no such thing as red" were

true, nothing would correspond to "red." But then, according the direct reference theory, both the word "red" and the sentence would become meaningless. The contrary statement "there is such a thing as red" becomes nonsense on this theory, since it would violate the bivalence principle. This presents a serious challenge to direct reference theories, since one would expect it to be possible to formulate a meaningful statement about the object of an ostensive definition. Any theory that attempts to reduce meaning to extra-linguistic facts, or to extra-linguistic entities or properties, seems susceptible to a version of this refutation. Wittgenstein's argument supports the idea that language is autonomous: meaning is determined by grammatical rules within language.

2. The Refutation of the Causal Account of Meaning

The next group of theories that Wittgenstein considers are causal accounts that explain meaning in terms of a word eliciting mental images, memories, associations, or other psychological effects. It becomes particularly apparent that the comparison with the *Cratylus* is meant to illustrate such antithetical views in the context of the typescripts (TS 212: 145; TS 213: 40), where the remark prominently features in the chapter '*The Meaning of a Sign is Given by its Effect (the Associations that it Triggers, etc.)*.' (BT 2005: 33). The comparison is somewhat more open-ended in the manuscript, though it is worth noting that Wittgenstein initially wrote and then crossed out that what Socrates says illuminates "den Gegensatz" (MS 111: 13), i.e. the opposite, of his own position. Wittgenstein continues immediately after the *Cratylus* quote in MS 111 by stating that the connection between a word and the thing it portrays is established by an explanation, or by teaching the language. Wittgenstein asks what kind of connection this is, and what other kinds of connections between words and things exist more generally.

The two dialectically opposed responses to these questions that are considered in Plato's dialogue are *conventionalism*, represented by Hermogenes, and *semantic naturalism*, represented by Cratylus. According to conventionalists, speakers can arbitrarily define names for things, and names within a language community are determined by social agreement. Semantic naturalists hold that names possess an intrinsic form of correctness. Socrates casts doubt on naive conventionalism by arguing that it would lead to an undesirable relativism, and lends the semantic naturalist position plausibility by characterizing names as a special kind of tool, as instruments "of teaching and of separating reality" (388c). As G.E.M. Anscombe explains the analogy, "words for the same thing in different languages (as 'horse', 'cheval') are like tools made of different metals but all shaped to catch hold of the same object. What these words catch hold of is the same essence." (2011: 220)

In the passage that Wittgenstein's remark alludes to, Socrates develops a stronger formulation of semantic naturalism and proposes the mimetic theory of names: words are depictions, i.e. images or imitations of things, and naturally correct names "disclose the natures of their referents through the expressive properties of the letters they include" (Barney 2001: 7) Socrates' mimetic theory implies that even the letters making up a correct name must share the same (or at least similar) essential properties as the thing itself has: "if the name is like the thing, the letters of which the primary names are to be formed must be by their very nature like the things" (434a).

As Rachel Barney writes, this "mimetic phase of the naturalistic account is of absolutely decisive importance for the dialogue as a whole" (2001: 17), and the dialogue is ring-composed around this passage. Wittgenstein's *Cratylus* remark thus directs the reader straight to the heart of Plato's argument. The two options Socrates presents Cratylus with at this stage (433d–e) are conventionalism versus the mimetic theory. Barney notes that apart from providing a summary of the discussion up to this point and encouraging Cratylus to recommit to a stronger version of naturalism, Socrates introduces a further interesting stipulation:

> Mimetically correct names, through their likeness to the objects named, promised to be a 'self-teaching' means for people to learn about those objects […] But a name which functions thanks to convention can only do so given a prior acquaintance with the thing it names, and a habitual association of name and thing […]. (Barney 2001: 124)

As the dialogue progresses, Socrates subjects the strong version of naturalism to decisive criticism (434e-5c) and shows that convention cannot be completely dispensed with in determining the correctness of names. (Barney 1997: 145) What we are thus left with is that a name's mimetic function requires a form of habitual association, which fits well with Wittgenstein's framing of the dialogue. In his first revision of the *Big Typescript* (MS 114: 56), and in a parallel handwritten annotation in the *Big Typescript* (TS 213: 39), Wittgenstein explains his disagreement with Cratylus by writing that he considers this kind of psychological suggestiveness or causal efficacy of symbols to be completely irrelevant for its meaning:

> One function of the word "red" is to recall the colour to our memory, and it might be found, for instance, that the word "red" is better suited for this than another one, (that, say, its meaning is less readily forgotten or confused). But, as mentioned above, we could have used a table (or something like it) instead of the mechanism of association; and then our calculus would simply have to proceed using the associated or painted image [sample]. We're not interested in the suitability of a sign in that sense. (In contrast to this: Cratylus: "By far […] next best thing".) (BT 2005: 35).

If language is autonomous in the sense described in section 1, then a symbol's meaning cannot depend on outer-linguistic facts. For this reason, as the *Big Typescript* emphasizes, explanations of meaning in terms of psychological factors miss the point, namely that linguistic meaning is normative in an important sense:

> Meaning is a stipulation, not an experience. And therefore it is not causality. What the sign suggests is found through experience. It is experience that teaches us which signs are least frequently misunderstood. In so far as the sign is suggestive, i.e. in so far as it has an effect, it doesn't interest us. It only interests us as a move in a game: as a component in a system that is self-meaning; that means all by itself. (BT 2005: 35)

This remark is reflective of Wittgenstein's general eschewal of causal explanations and preference for analogical reasoning in philosophy (Rothhaupt 1996: 177). Wittgenstein's remarks are not just directed at Plato, of course; they are partially a response to the causal theories of meaning proposed by contemporaries such as Russell and Ogden and Richards. Cause and effect, Wittgenstein maintains, is of a different category than sense and meaning, and causal explanations cannot provide insight into the inner workings of language. From Wittgenstein's perspective, the view that the meaning of a word is equal to its effect appears like a remnant of a primitive con-

ception of language, akin to the superstition that there are supernatural entities or essences present in the words we use.

3. Outlook: Footnotes to Plato?

What general conclusions can be drawn regarding Wittgenstein's reading of the *Cratlyus* and its role in the development of his later philosophy? As the previous section has shown, the main point of Wittgenstein's self-comparison with the *Cratylus* is rather specific, namely to contrast the grammatical approach with Socrates' mimetic theory of names and similar causal accounts of meaning. Nevertheless, I believe it would be artificial to reduce the *Cratylus* remark to this single aspect.

In MS 111, Wittgenstein's discussion of Plato is closely related to his reflections on the pictorial nature of linguistic representation and to his critical reevaluation of the ontological commitments underlying his earlier conceptions of objects and propositions, facts and complexes. The arrangement of the remarks indicates that Wittgenstein's reference to the *Cratylus* sheds a special light on the reasons why Wittgenstein decided to reject the Tractarian conception of elementary propositions. The context of MS 111 is sometimes treated like a loose collection of quotes from Plato and Augustine that Wittgenstein considered as potential alternatives to begin his book with. Wittgenstein's systematic exploration of the interrelations between Plato's dialogues in MS 111 is usually overlooked. A contrastive and more holistic reading of the remarks on Plato, and a further analysis of the way Wittgenstein composes these sections, could afford a fuller picture of Wittgenstein's understanding of the dialogues and transformation towards his later philosophy. In this regard, it is worthwhile to complement a careful study of the *Nachlass* with supplementing evidence from conversation notes (for example the notes of Bouwsma, Rhees, and Drury) and with further biographical research. It is interesting to note that Wittgenstein does not write about the *Cratylus* in writings after his first revision of the *Big Typescript* in MS 114, despite his close friendship and intellectual exchange with the Russian classicist, linguist and *Cratylus* scholar Nicholas Bachtin (1894–1950) in later years. To which extent did Bachtin and Wittgenstein discuss the *Cratylus*, and how did this influence Wittgenstein's and Bachtin's respective research?

There are some interesting parallels between the *Cratylus* and the *Brown Book* and *Philosophical Investigations*. Wittgenstein revisits Plato's lines of inquiry into the workings of language in later years and extends Plato's analogy of words as tools to include nonverbal instruments of language such as gestures, color samples, and patterns. Despite Wittgenstein's opposition to Plato's philosophical method, metaphysics, and conception of language, Wittgenstein does not simply discard Plato's insights, but rather critically reexamines his underlying assumptions and attempts to set them right.

Beyond their interest for Wittgenstein scholarship, the insights about language that Wittgenstein gained from reading Plato remain highly relevant for contemporary discussions in philosophy of language. Most of the predominant theories in current debates about proper names, such as causal accounts, descriptivist accounts, and metalinguistic theories, seem prone to the same basic defects that Wittgenstein identifies in his refutation of reductive explanations of language. The fundamental dialectic between conventionalism and semantic naturalism that Plato uncovered and that Wittgenstein revisited continues to provide a helpful lens for reexamining and reconceptualizing the basic connections between words and things.

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Correspondence, Identity or Nothing: The Role of the Truth in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*

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Abstract

The aim of the paper is to examine Wittgenstein's remarks about truth in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and see if the view which suggest that the TLP should not be read as expounding a correspondence theory of truth can be coherently held. The main focal points of the paper will be Hacker's and Beckermann's deflationary/semantic reading of the TLP, Sullivan's and Johnston's identity reading and Glock's reading which proposes that the official theory of truth of the TLP is the obtainment theory joined with a correspondence theory of depiction. As Glock proposes that the TLP could hold a non-conventional correspondence theory of truth, the views on truth from the TLP will be compared with such a correspondence theory as proposed by Rassmussen in his book *Defending the Correspondence Theory of Truth*.

1. Introduction

The view that Wittgenstein's TLP expounds a correspondence theory of truth has long been widely accepted. Glock (2006: 364–5) offers quite an extensive list of the proponents of this view. Different from this, Glock sees himself as offering a somewhat different perspective, while also stating that he is not lonely in negating that the TLP construes truth as correspondence. Glock (2006: 346) mentions Hacker (1996, 2000) and Beckermann (1995) as the main protagonists of such an idea. It is also worthwhile to include Sullivan (2005), Horwich (2016) and Sullivan & Johnston (2018) as diverging from the correspondence interpretation. While all these authors agree that the TLP does not construe truth as correspondence, they diverge in attributing another construal of truth to the TLP.

The paper will firstly tackle the issue whether the TLP can be construed as offering a deflationist theory of truth as proposed by Hacker and Beckermann and try to point out its main drawbacks. After this, the focus will be shifted to the claim made by Sullivan and Johnston, namely that the TLP should be read as exhibiting an identity theory of truth. In the end, Glock's proposal to compare the TLP's theory of truth with some unconventional correspondence theories will be taken up and the TLP's theory of truth will be compared with a correspondence theory proposed by Rassmusen (2014).

2. Tractatus and deflationism

Hacker comments on this issue only briefly, stating that the TLP contains only a correspondence conception of sense and not of truth. (cf. Hacker 2000: 386, n. 36) This does not imply that Wittgenstein sees truth as correspondence and Hacker construes his talk of truth in a deflationist manner: "To assert that a proposition 'p' agrees with reality is to assert that 'p' says that p and it is in fact the case that p." (Hacker 2000: 386, n. 36) Horwich and Glock also claim that the crucial role of correspondence in the TLP is connected to sentence meaning. As Glock puts it: "Although the *Tractatus* sets store by the idea of an isomorphism between language and reality, this is part of a correspondence theory *not* of truth, but of *sentence meaning* or *sense*. Correspondence is required for a sentence to depict reality at all, whether truly or falsely, not for it being true." (Glock 2006: 346) Horwich argues similarly, namely that Wittgenstein proposes a two-stage theory of sentential truth in the TLP, of which only the first stage contains a correspondence relation. However, this relation concerns Wittgenstein's theory of representation i.e., the relationship between possible facts and sentences, what clearly dismisses it as a candidate for a correspondence theory of truth. (cf. Horwich 2016: 98–9) Subsequently, Horwich states that what we find in the TLP is "*not really* a correspondence theory of truth but rather a limited correspondence theory of *representation* plus a primitivist *non*-theory of when the represented entities are facts." (Horwich 2016: 99)

Horwich holds that the TLP theory of truth is defective because it relies on the concepts of actuality and reference without explicating these concepts. This could be easily resolved if we integrate a deflationary component into the TLP by identifying facts with propositions that are true and giving up on the idea that possible facts have some intrinsic quality which actualises them. Interestingly enough, Horwich believes that this cannot be done because deflationism about truth is closely linked to deflationism about reference, which is in turn closely linked to construing meaning as use and the two latter concepts are, according to him, very different from Wittgenstein's earlier views on this issue. (cf. Horwich 2016: 103–4)

Even though Beckermann (1995) states that the TLP should be read as proposing a semantic theory of truth, Glock argues that his proposal is very similar to what Hacker wants to accomplish and that the contrast between them is more apparent than real, the main difference being the label they attach to the theory. Both of them see the TLP as proposing the following conception of truth: *A sentence is true iff things are the way the sentence says they are* (cf. Glock, 2006: 354). However, both of them tend to disregard certain passages of the TLP (all references are to the 1922 edition) which can be read as strongly advocating truth as correspondence:

> 2.21 The picture agrees with reality or not; it is right or wrong, true or false.
> 2.222 In the agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality, its truth or falsity consists.
> 2.223 In order to discover whether the picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.

The difference between these passages and those involving a talk about isomorphism is that here Wittgenstein speaks about what distinguishes true pictures from false ones and not about pictures in general. Although Wittgenstein speaks of the sense of a sentence in 2.222 and not of the sentence itself, the sentence itself as a picture is clearly referenced in

2.21, what makes Glock consider this as a clear example of correspondence, even though not a standard variant. (cf. Glock 2006: 354–5) Glock goes on to argue that he believes that the TLP could be seen as offering a partial justification for a deflationary or a semantic reading of truth, but that it would be wrong to read it in a redundantist fashion, what makes the TLP different from remarks on truth predating it and from Wittgenstein's later remarks on this issue. (cf. Glock 2006: 363–4)

3. *Tractatus* and the identity theory of truth

The thesis that the TLP advanced an identity theory of truth has been proposed by Sullivan (2005) and Sullivan & Johnston (2018). In Sullivan (2005: 49), it is claimed that the TLP claims that the world is nothing more than the totality of facts, what is seen as following the heritage of early Russell, early Moore and Frege as the main protagonists of the identity theory of truth (cf. Sullivan 2005: 56–8). Sullivan & Johnston (2018) expand on this and claim that Wittgenstein built his picture theory as a revised version of the multiple-relation theory, improving its main drawback. In other words, the picture theory offered us a way of explaining what it means for a judgement to have content without the need of a correspondence theory to do the job (cf. Sullivan & Johnston 2018: 190). This is done by equating content and truth, i.e., it is the same to ask for the content of the proposition and what is required for its truth (cf. Sullivan & Johnston 2018: 176). Subsequently, facts will not be something in terms of what the truth conditions were explained, facts are truth conditions that obtain (cf. Sullivan & Johnston 2018: 166).

Firstly, Sullivan & Johnston (2018: 171–2) argue that it is a misinterpretation of Wittgenstein to attribute to him a "two step" interpretation of truth, as they call it. However, the paragraphs they cite as a support for their claims could also be interpreted otherwise. Namely, 4.063 and 4.064 are, according to them an indirect critique of the two-step project. The claim that "[e]very proposition must *already* have a sense: it cannot be given a sense by affirmation" can be seen as a critique of Frege's assertion sign. The sense that the proposition has is the possible state of affairs it depicts if it is true and every proposition must have that as a condition of meaningfulness. This can be connected with Wittgenstein's remarks on the propositional sign being a fact, statements 3.13–3.1432, where it is clearly said that every proposition is a fact, i.e., articulate. However, this does not mean that there exists a complete identity between the proposition and the fact. The point of these remarks is that a "proposition is not a mixture of words" (3.141). Similar considerations should be applied on 2.13–2.15, where Wittgenstein states that "a picture is a fact". Since every proposition is a picture, the aim of this remark is that a picture must have a certain structure if it is to be a picture of a piece of reality – it cannot be a random mixture of elements.

On the other hand, it would be completely wrong to say that the TLP does not have any notion of identity which holds between sentences and possible states of affairs. But this identity is only structural (cf. Glock 2006: 353). In other words, it is more like logical equivalence (cf. Glock 2006: 359). Glock does, however, leave the space open for this relation to be the identity that is supposed in the identity theory of truth, but even then, this is not the whole story. Namely, this identity has to be followed by a correspondence theory of depiction to have a full view of the link between a sentence and a possible state of affairs (cf. Glock 2006: 363).

This brings us back to the claim that facts are truth conditions that obtain. This can be said to be a truism, but the main problem here is that the relation of obtainment is not explained. In other words, we need to know which conditions need to be fulfilled for something to be a fact, i.e., for the truth conditions to obtain. This is exactly the part where the introduction of isomorphism of the TLP is needed.

Finally, it is far from obvious if Wittgenstein would accept such a label for his treatment of truth, especially if we consider the way in which Wittgenstein speaks about the notion of identity. We find that identity is not a relation (5.5301) or a property (5.473), that the identity sign is not an essential constituent of logical notation (5.533) and at 5.5303 we find that to "say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing". Taking all this into consideration, it is more likely that Wittgenstein would take a deflationary approach as described by Hacker than to consider truth to be an identity relation if we discard any correspondence interpretation.

4. What kind of correspondence

Although Glock maintains that Wittgenstein's treatment of truth in the TLP cannot be construed as classical correspondence, he still maintains that Wittgenstein should not be read as a deflationist (in the TLP itself, as different from previous or latter remarks on the issues). Along with the paragraphs that strongly suggest a correspondence reading that were mentioned earlier (2.21–2.223), Glock points out that the TLP uses an ontological category, namely possible states of affairs, while these categories are traditionally avoided by deflationists. (cf. Glock 2006: 356) The main reason why the TLP cannot be read as a full correspondence theory is a complete lack of a truth-making relation. However, this does not imply that the TLP does not hold a correspondence theory of truth, it can also mean that the version presented in the TLP is not a classical one. Thus, it is interesting to compare the TLP's treatment of truth with a correspondence theory proposed by Rassmussen (2014). However, it is worth noting that Rassmussen commits the error mentioned at the beginning of the paper and considers the relation of isomorphism as a sort of correspondence. Leaving that aside, we start with his notion of correspondence. According to him: "Necessarily, a thing p is true if and only if p corresponds to something(s)" (Rasmussen 2014: 12). His theory has two distinct basic constituents, facts and propositions. While facts are arrangements of things, propositions are arrangements of properties. The link between propositions and facts is possible because "a proposition picks out things by containing properties that are necessarily unique to the things it picks out" (Rasmussen 2014: 107). More precisely, "…a proposition p corresponds to an arrangement A if and only if (i) for each exemplifiable part of p, there is a part (or improper part) of A that exemplifies it, (ii) the proposition that A exists entails p, and (iii) every part of A is part of a composition that overlaps exactly those things that exemplify part of p." (Rasmussen 2014: 130)

Although the terminology used is slightly different, the arrangements Rassmussen talks about could be seen as facts of the TLP, his propositions would be sentences as described in the TLP and the relation which Rassmussen sets up could be construed as the structural identity Wittgenstein talks about. It is certain that the link is definitely not straightforward and clear, but as Rassmussen's goal is to avoid all the difficulties that truth as correspondence faces and still retain the notion of correspondence, this could be seen as being close to what Wittgenstein was trying to do in the TLP, at least according to the interpretation offered by Glock.

5. Final words

This paper has a negative and a positive task. The negative task is to show that the interpretations according to which Wittgenstein offers a deflationary or an identity theory of truth are not quite on the mark, while the positive task is to follow up on Glock's idea of Wittgenstein offering a non-classical view of correspondence and offer a possible comparison of Wittgenstein's position with a correspondence view of truth proposed by Joshua Rassmussen. While the negative task is seen as something that is on point, the positive task is just a hint and is not conclusive in any way thus leaving a lot of space for future investigations.

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Limits or Limitations? – On a Bifurcation in Reading Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* §§185–201

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Abstract

In *Philosophical Investigations* §§185–201, Wittgenstein addresses an oscillation in our thinking about the nature of rules. He seems to introduce a problem – how do we follow rules? –, and a "paradox" in which it is rooted, in order to find a solution to them; only to then call the whole puzzle a "misunderstanding" after all. My contention is that this apparent friction can best be understood and resolved when we view it in light of Wittgenstein's engagement with limits and limitations, and how easy it is to confuse one with the other when thinking about human thought and language. He is concerned, then, not simply with matters of semantics, convention, or community, but rather with the question of a proper philosophical method for thinking about our life with language in general. When traced out, these few remarks elucidate a bifurcation in interpreting one of the central methodological themes in Wittgenstein.

1. Introduction

Philosophical Investigations §§185–201 address an oscillation in our thinking about the nature of rules. Wittgenstein first describes teaching a mathematical rule (expressed by the order "+2") to a pupil who develops a peculiar practice (adding 2 until reaching 1000, then adding 4). There is tension between the two points structuring the ensuing line of thought. First Wittgenstein writes:

> In such a case, we might perhaps say: this person finds it natural, once given our explanations, to understand our order as we would understand the order 'Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000, and so on'. (PI 2009: 185)

This gives rise to a series of questions and puzzles which have been called (part of) "the rule-following paradox" (e.g. Kripke 1982: 8). However, their result is perhaps surprising:

> This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule. […] That there is a misunderstanding here is shown by the mere fact that in this chain of reasoning we place one interpretation behind another, as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another lying behind it. For what we thereby show is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call 'following the rule' and 'going against it'. (PI 2009: 201)

Why does Wittgenstein seemingly introduce a problem and devote a series of sections to it, only to arrive at the result that seeing it as such is a misunderstanding? This question raises a central Wittgensteinian issue Stephen Mulhall describes: "it is fatally easy to interpret limits as limitations, to experience conditions as constraints" (Mulhall 2005: 94). Whether one takes Wittgenstein to be concerned with the former or the latter constitutes a bifurcation in reading these sections, and in understanding his overall ambition.

2. Meaning, Anticipation, Predetermination (§§185–192)

Wittgenstein initially contrasts the unusual pupil with the teacher. It appears as if in her (or any competent speaker's) "*meaning the order*" (or any utterance), her "mind […] flew ahead and took all the steps before [she] physically arrived" (PI 2009: 188). We may feel that in following a rule, "[t]he steps are *really* already taken, even before [we] take them in writing or in speech or in thought" (PI 2009: 188). Otherwise things seem left up to fancy – how, then, would a rule properly guide our going on?

Conversely it seems clear enough that in understanding a rule, we do not explicitly grasp each instance of it (see PI 2009: 186–7). Wittgenstein even appears to suggest a libertarian view, musing that "[i]t would almost be more correct to say […] that a new decision was needed at every point" (PI 2009: 186). This seems strange alongside his sensitivity for the pull behind the picture of an always-already completed sequence. Where would there be room for a decision here?

It turns out, however, that both ideas – *rule determinism* and *rule libertarianism* – are instances of one picture: that of a constitutively mysterious mechanism 'within us' or 'in our minds' that springs into action in rule-following. "[I]t seemed as if […a rule's steps] were in some *unique* way predetermined, anticipated – in the way that only meaning something could anticipate reality." (PI 2009: 188) The libertarian act of deciding each step is their entire predetermination – for if the mechanism within us is inherently elusive to understanding, its 'decisions' are hardly decisions *of ours*. They're much the same thing as predeterminations outside our ken and control.

We might see this picture as one of the *mind-internality* of rules, and Wittgenstein as favoring an 'externalist' picture. One such reading deems him a conventionalist (e.g. Dummett 1978: 170–1): the normativity of linguistic rules lies, not (mysteriously) 'within us', but (plainly) 'without us'–in their *use*, their conventional application in a community. However:

> Your "I already knew at the time …" amounts to something like: "If I had then been asked what number he should write after 1000, I would have replied '1002'." And that I don't doubt. This is an assumption of much the same sort as "If he had fallen into the water then, I would have jumped in after him." (PI 2009: 187)

Wittgenstein doesn't doubt we can act *spontaneously* in light of rules – that our acts can be *without premeditation* and *authored by* us: we know, and act upon that knowledge, of our own accord when encountering a case that falls under a rule we have mastered.

The first recourse to something approximating convention – the "way we always use [a sign]" –tellingly reacts to linguistic confusion: we should consult everyday practices when we don't know our way about, e.g. when someone "uses a sign unknown to us" (PI 2009: 190). This indicates a casuistic, not a general principle. Indeed, it seems we *can* "grasp the whole use of a word at a stroke" – or express our understanding that way (see PI 2009: 191, 197). Yet this capacity is puzzling: thinking about it, we can be "seduced" (PI 2009: 192) by "the crossing of different pictures" (PI 2009: 191).

3. Interlude: Minds and Machines (§§193–196)

These "different pictures" cannot be determinism and libertarianism, which are facets of *one* picture – that of the 'internality' of rules. Wittgenstein now considers the background idea bringing about the "crossing": *viewing mindedness like machinery.* This theme is evident in the internalist picture: a machine "seems already to contain its own mode of operation" such that "the movements it will make […] seem to be already completely determined" (PI 2009: 193). This notion of machinery is complicated by unexamined metaphysical implications (see PI 2009: 194–5). But the analogy is symptomatic of a pernicious prejudice about the mind: Wittgenstein's insistence that we often imagine our mental life as "an odd *process*" (PI 2009: 196) corresponds to his general concern with the tempting picture of the mind as a strange "mechanism" or "apparatus" (see e.g. PI 2009: 149, 170, 270, 317).

But a mechanical apparatus – a machine – is crucially different from human mindedness: most importantly, the mind is autonomous *precisely in that it can go astray*. We can misunderstand, misapply a rule, etc. We are *finite* thinkers and speakers and thus bound to err occasionally. But this openness to error also constitutes our freedom – our capacity to truly *act* on a given rule in an open-ended way. A machine lacks this openness: it does not operate in light of a rule. Its operation is merely a passive carrying-out of a predetermined process, except when it breaks – in which case it *stops* operating. Here, machinery is no apt analogue, but the opposite of mindedness.

'Internalism' is thus revealed as a vision of something machine-like and *inhuman* within us – something wholly other to explain what is most integral and familiar to our existence as speakers. It belongs to the master theme Cavell finds in Wittgenstein: the all-too-human wish to deny the human (see Cavell 1979: 109). We might think that something 'without us' holds the cure for this vision, but this new opposition between 'within' and 'without' is actually the fateful "crossing of different pictures".

4. Understanding from Within (§§197–201)

I now want to examine the following parts of §197:

> (D) 'It's as if we could grasp the whole use of a word at a stroke.' – Well, that is just what we say we do. […] But there is nothing astonishing, nothing strange, about what happens. It becomes strange when we are led to think that the future development must in some way already be present in the act of grasping the use and yet isn't present.
> (1) For we say that there isn't any doubt that we understand the word, and on the other hand that its meaning lies in its use. […]
> (2) Where is the connection effected between the sense of the words 'Let's play a game of chess' and all the rules of the game? – Well, in the list of rules of the game, in the teaching of it, in the everyday practice of playing. (PI 2009: 197)

(D) is Wittgenstein's *diagnosis*: we can get a sense of strangeness about something usually quite unremarkable – our grasping a word at a stroke. §185 and §195 suggest we can be puzzled similarly about sentences and mathematical rules. We are tempted to say "that the future development must […] be present […] and yet isn't present". This hovering between two opposites expresses a confusion. We want to have *all meaning* present, but fear the inhuman 'internalist' consequences. So we search for a way to say it isn't present, and we oscillate.

(1) is an *elucidation* of this oscillation – which is striking: interpreters who ascribe a 'use theory of meaning' to Wittgenstein, must find it awkward to see its motto, "meaning lies in […] use", used to elucidate an oscillatory confusion. "[T]here isn't any doubt that we understand the word", grasp its "whole use" within one act, yet we also want to say that its meaning just is its use and thus 'without us'–in our "customs (usages, institutions)" (PI 2009: 199).

This indicates that readings which claim that our understanding depends on guidance from an 'outward' shared linguistic practice are motivated by a false pair of opposites. According to them, our choice is between either a *machine-like internalist* or a *conventionalist externalist* conception of rules. They refer to passages like (2)'s insistence on "list[s]", "teaching[s]", and "everyday practice" (see also PI 2009: 198–9).

Note, however, how Wittgenstein employs this customary knowledge: he insists a community "unacquainted with games" could go through the motions of a chess game, "even with all the mental accompaniments".

> [I]f *we* were to see it, we'd say that they were playing chess. But now imagine a game of chess translated according to certain rules into a series of actions which we do not ordinarily associate with a *game* – say into yells and stamping of feet […]. Would we still be inclined to say that they were playing a game? (PI 2009: 200)

Conventions, in externalism, aren't simply 'external' to some naïve picture of mind-internality. They are external to our very acts of speech and thought, because these acts are seen as inherently deficient. But as §200 shows, the purpose of conventions and community is not to guide our understanding externally, but to reorient it *from within* – in a sense that is quite different from internalism (see Stroud 2018: 244) –whenever we feel we reach its limits: confronted with a practice that uncannily seems both familiar and strange, viz. divergent human rules and customs, we can reach within our own customs to see how far the analogies go, and where they give out. We might encounter something unknown to us, but even then "[s]hared human behavior is the system of reference" (PI 2009: 206). This new sense of 'within' concerns the overall living, rule-governed structure we inhabit as speakers; what Wittgenstein calls "form of life" (PI 2009: 19, 23, 241). His apparent conventionalism in (2) is thus rather a call for *understanding from within*.

This internality leaves no room for externality as an alien guiding force. We might abandon rules for new ones. But in doing so, we remain engaged in language: it is impossible to attain a "view from sideways on" (McDowell 1998: 214) upon that engagement. The point is to not mistake this *limit* to our understanding for a *limitation*. It's not that we are precluded from doing something – it's that this purported thing to be done is wholly impossible and thus nothing to be done at all. Reaching the limit of what we do here means reaching the very conditions for doing it. Wanting to go further, towards a

view 'from without', is thus comparable to Kant's dove thinking it would fly even better in airless space (see Kant 1998: 129).

I have argued that Wittgenstein treats two confused sets of opposites: rule determinism versus rule libertarianism, which are actually facets of one '(mind) internalist' picture, and that 'internalism' versus '(conventionalist) externalism'. They all take our ways of thinking and speaking – our life with rule-governed language – to stand in need of something above and beyond: a 'strange mechanism', our 'customs', or the 'community'. But this destroys any possibility of recognizing our moves within language as genuine acts of our own accord. That they are just that is Wittgenstein's conclusion: the "misunderstanding" behind the "paradox" is "shown" by our having "a way of grasping a rule which is *not* an interpretation" (PI 2009: 201). In understanding there is no need for super-understanding. And when a pupil *mis*understands a rule, they don't interpret it peculiarly – they simply don't understand.

Internalists and externalists see Wittgenstein's remarks that "[e]xplanations come to an end" (PI 2009: 1), and that we sometimes "have exhausted the justifications, […] have reached bedrock", and are "inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do'" (PI 2009: 217), as defeatist or quietist declarations of a limitation. I have argued that a careful look reveals them to rather delineate a limit, and therefore a condition, of rule-governed language. The bifurcation between these options, then, is whether one views such remarks as articulations of a deficiency–or of an insight.

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Russell's and Wittgenstein's 1913 Discussion on Truth-Tables and the Sheffer Stroke

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Abstract

The paper offers a reconstruction of a possible conversation between Russell and Wittgenstein about truth tables and the Sheffer Stroke on the basis of jottings in Russell's and Wittgenstein's handwriting on folio 1v of Russell's paper "Matter: The problem stated". Preserved letters in the Bertrand Russell Archive suggest April 1913 as the most likely date for such a conversation. In conclusion, it can be assumed that Wittgenstein developed and used truth-tables at that time, but considered them to be of secondary importance for logic compared to the *ab*-functions and *ab*-diagrams developed at the same time. The paper also includes a diplomatic transcription of folio 1v.

On April 15 1913, Henry Maurice Sheffer sent a draft of his paper A Set of Five Independent Postulates for Boolean Algebras, with Application to Logical Constants to Bertrand Russell. The paper was published later in the same year in the Oct. 1913 issue of the Transactions of the Mathematical Society (Sheffer 1913) and famously introduced what since the 2nd edition of *Principia Mathematica* (P.M.) became known under the name 'Sheffer stroke' (for the role of the Sheffer sroke in P.M. 2nd Edition see Linsky 2011: 124–128). Russell answered by the letter from 27 April1, in which he points out that also the dual of the definition chosen by Sheffer could be introduced as primitive idea (Levine, Linsky forthcoming).

Since Wittgenstein was a student of Russell at Cambridge at the time of these letters and there was an intense exchange between the two men, it is very likely that it was Russell who (probably immediately after receiving Sheffer's letter) introduced Wittgenstein to Sheffer's undoubtedly important logical idea of reducing the number of logical constants to one. Wittgenstein is mentioning the Sheffer stroke explicitly in remark B31 of his 1913 *Notes on Logic* (NL2).

Between the two letters (dated 15 April and 27 April 1913), there are indications of at least two meetings between Russell and Wittgenstein (on 23 and 24 April 1913). Furthermore there is a certain probability that jottings in Russell's and Wittgenstein's handwriting found in the Russell Archives on the (upside down) verso side of folio 1 of Russell's paper Matter: the Problem stated (RA 220.011450; Russell CP 6: 11a) indeed belong to a discussion of Sheffer's proposal. The preserved leaf refers directly to the Sheffer stroke without any doubt. If we exclude the assumption, that Russell or Wittgenstein themselves had developed Sheffer's idea earlier independently from Sheffer, 15 April 1913 is a terminus a quo for such a discussion. Because later meetings between them in May and June very quickly moved on to other topics (Russell's *Theory of Knowledge* and his 'Multiple Relations Theory of Judgment'), it is most likely that the discussion about the Sheffer stroke took place on 23 or 24 April 19133.

At the top of the sheet Wittgenstein introduces the notation "p|q" which obviously differs from the notation Sheffer uses in the published version of his paper: "a|b". What is visible next seems to be a scheme of truth-conditions for 2 arguments (p, q) in Wittgenstein's hand: "W" for 'true' (German 'wahr') and "F" for 'false' ('falsch'). The scheme is only sketched and incomplete but can naturally be completed to achieve all 16 groups of truth-conditions in TLP 5.101 (McGuinness 1988: 161). Further expressions on the sheet seem to relate to a conversation about the two possible ways of defining the Sheffer Stroke and its expressive power, e.g. we can find "p|q" for the negation "~p". The sheet shows all the signs of spontaneous notes on the occasion of a conversation between Wittgenstein and Russell. However there are visible two distinct themes on the sheet: truth-tables and the Sheffer stroke. A satisfactory explanation for the presence of the Sheffer stroke theme would be Russell's desire to discuss Sheffer's discovery of a possible reduction of logical indefinables with Wittgenstein before answering the letter to Sheffer on 27 April 1913. Since truth-tables are in no way part of Sheffer's paper and presumably also not in the draft sent to Russell we may ask, why they are present at all on the sheet and who of both introduced this second theme and obviously found connections between them. According to Potter it is more likely that it was Russell who invented the idea of representing truth-functions by a table (Potter 2009: 160).

I would like to put forward arguments in favor of the contrary that it is more likely that Wittgenstein introduced the method of truth-tables (the "WF scheme" in NL C31 and CC 1995: Nr. 29) at that very time to Russell.

The sheet is clearly dominated by Wittgenstein's handwriting. It is in this respect also noticeable that in the discussion for the abbreviation of 'true' and 'false' the letters 'W' and 'F' are used and not 'T' and 'F'. So it looks more like an original idea of Wittgenstein, since we may assume that their colloquial working language was English and not German at that time.

But why should Wittgenstein immediately change the theme to truth-tables when Russell brought forward the in some sense groundbreaking idea of the Sheffer stroke to him? If we look at the NL (especially the 'Birmingham Notes') we can observe Wittgenstein discussing the bipolarity of proposition from around 15 March (the date of his first meeting with Alfred North Whitehead) onwards. First he expresses the desire of finding a "method of designation in which 'not-not-p' corresponds to the same symbol as 'p'" (B22); then he introduces the notion of "two poles true and false" determining the "sense" of a proposition (B23). In the following step (B25) he introduces a suitable symbolism "$^{a}_{b}p$" demanding "transitivity" of the associated poles such that "$^{a-a}_{b-b}p$" is the same symbol as "$^{a}_{b}p$" . The poles are now labeled "a" and "b". With this notational setting the demands of B22 can immediately be fulfilled: ~~p = $^{a-b-a}_{b-a-b}p$ = "$^{a}_{b}p$" = p (see Connelly 2021: 151). Later the theory of bipolarity is expanded to so-called "ab-functions" which are the precursors of the 'truth-functions' of the

Tractatus. At the stage of NL B22–25 they are not yet developed. In the following remarks, the first reference to ab-function is made in B30. But the same remark also clearly expresses the idea of the Sheffer stroke as a means to construct "the totality of ab-functions as the totality of those that are generated by application of this function. Such a function is ~pv~q" (B30). Therefore, ab-functions seem to have been introduced by Wittgenstein only around the time of or even in connection with the acquaintance with Sheffer's ideas via Russell.

It is very natural to expand the bipolarity of atomic propositions to truth-functional combinations of them and to study the 'polarity' of the resulting proposition, which – being necessarily true/false – again have a bipolar structure. Experiments with combinatorial schemes of truth-values are a natural and useful instrument to understand the logical behavior of all the possible combinations of the truth-values of two atomic propositions (p, q).

In this sense, the method of 'truth-tables' may have been a mere byproduct when Wittgenstein systematically studied the nature of the bipolarity of molecular propositions. The use of truth-tables formed only a transitional stage on the way to the invention of the ab-functions and probably he was not interested in themselves, because he never explicitly uses truth-tables throughout the NL and in the later CN the so called 'WF-scheme' is contrasted sharply with the ab-functions. ab-functions stay at the center of Wittgenstein's understanding of language and logic, whereas the WF-scheme and also the derivation of further ab-functions with the help of the Sheffer stroke only function as "mechanical instruments" (B31) for the construction process.

Before this background work Wittgenstein in the very moment when Russell showed him Sheffer's idea may have interrupted him with the explanation of his own progress of generalizing the ab-structure of propositions: The sheet starts with choosing a symbolization of the Sheffer stroke (with the unusual sign "⍲" for the stroke). But it immediately continues with the demonstration of a scheme of all possible combinations of 'W' and ´F' labels, hasty and incomplete. It is not impossible that he tried to demonstrate Russell that the proposed function (Sheffer stroke) is by no way a new connective but is necessarily contained in the combinatorial scheme of the 'Ws' and 'Fs' either as the combination 'WFFF' or as 'FFFW'. The sheet in the following lines contains both: the definition of the stroke in the common P.M.-symbolism p⍲q = ~pv~q and the definition of its dual (~p.~q) by means of a truth table. A scenery like the proposed may explain Russell's dissatisfaction visible in a letter to Ottoline Morell. Russell wanted to show Wittgenstein his news – which for his, Russell's theory, are without doubt interesting – and Wittgenstein immediately turned the discussion towards his own logical developments. This is the kind of 'tyranny' (14 May 1913) he lamented to Ottoline: "I find I no longer ever talk to him about my work, but only about his." (24 April 1913)

The way Wittgenstein quickly and intuitively incorporated the new idea into his own line of thought must have appeared Russell overhasty and incomprehensible; hence his complaint in the same letter: "When there are no clear arguments, but only inconclusive considerations to be balanced, or unsatisfactory points of view to be set against each other, he is no good". Russell's final verdict of the meeting on 23 April 1913 was: "The result is that I become completely reserved, even about work." – and indeed he did not inform at that occasion that he was full of plans about writing a new book (*Theory of Knowledge*), he had decided to begin with a few days before (see Letter to Ottoline Morell from 18 April 1913). Wittgenstein only later was informed about this project (on 13 May 1913) and reacted exactly the way Russell was afraid of.

Two questions remain to be answered: Why the 'Birmingham Notes' (especially B23–31) do not mention truth-tables or WF-schemes? Why does Wittgenstein insist on the symbolism of ab-functions instead of truth-functions?

The relationship between atomic and molecular propositions is clearly representable with the help of WF-schemes. The outcome from these investigations underlined Wittgenstein's view, that logical connectives are not logical objects, because the combinatorial scheme of the W's and F's already expresses all the possible logical connectives like 'or', 'and', 'implies' etc. without the necessity of assuming the existence of corresponding logical objects to which the connectives refer. Hence, all the information we have about the world is already expressed in the atomic propositions (B36: "If we formed all possible atomic propositions, the world would be completely described if we declared the truth or falsehood of each."). C2, C10 and C11 conclude further: "Whatever corresponds in reality to compound propositions must not be more than what corresponds to their several atomic propositions." (C2); "Molecular propositions contain nothing beyond what is contained in their atoms; they add no material information above that contained in their atoms." (C10); and finally: "All that is essential about molecular functions is their T-F schema [i.e. the statement of the cases when they are true and the cases when they are false]." (C11).

Nevertheless, there remains a danger that instead of the connectives the 'W' and 'F' itself will be hypostasized to logical objects, as it is the case with Freges 'das Wahre' and 'das Falsche', which serve as the reference of the names of propositions. To avoid this Wittgenstein rigorously kept apart the use of 'W' and 'F' as labels in mere schemes from the ab-functions and insisted to express the bipolarity by the more neutral expressions 'a' and 'b'. This persistence was incomprehensible to Russell, who remarks in a letter to Wittgenstein from 25 October 1913: "What you call ab-functions are what the Principia calls 'truth-functions'. I don't see why you shouldn't stick to the name, 'truth-functions'." (CC 1995: Nr. 29). Wittgenstein's answer was: "Whether ab-functions and your truth-functions are the same cannot yet be decided." (CC 1995: Nr. 28) – He eventually stuck to this idea until the beginning of the transcription of the Prototractatus in mid-1915.

That Wittgenstein assumes a deeper reason for the necessity of his neutral ab-symbolism becomes also visible in his preference of truth-diagrams (as Potter 2009: 160 calls them – in fact it is important that they are ab-diagrams) over WF-schemes (i.e. truth table devices), although they are isomorphic (that Wittgenstein was aware of this can be seen from CC 1995, Nr. 28: "In fact all rules of the ab-symbolism follow directly from the essence of the WF scheme."). Examples of ab-diagrams can be found in CC 1995 (Nr. 32) and (in Russell's hand) in TS 201a2:



(www.wittgensteinsource.org/BFE/Ts-201a2,b27r_f)

If one interprets 'a' with 'true' (W) and 'b' with 'false' (F), the above diagram becomes isomorphic to the truth table for the Sheffer stroke dual p|q = ~pv~q

The main difference between both methods of representing truth functions (for molecular propositions) is that in the ab-diagram the bipolar structure of the atomic propositions as well as of the resulting molecular proposition is directly present and visible, while in the more abstract WF-scheme it remains hidden.

The *Notes dictated to Moore* (D 301) from April 1914 give a long justification for the neutrality of Wittgenstein's ab-formalism which reveal a second reason for Wittgenstein's affection. The interpretation of ab-diagrams is a more complicated process than simply to determine the meaning of the symbols 'a' and 'b'; Wittgenstein explains: "In settling that it is to be interpreted as a tautology & not as a contradiction, I am not assigning a meaning to a & b; i.e. saying that they symbolise different things but in the same way. What I am doing is to say that the way in which the a–pole is connected with the whole symbol symbolises in a different way from that in which it would symbolise if the symbol were interpreted as a contradiction." (D 301: 21)

It shows something about the scaffolding of the world, that an ab-diagram may be interpreted as a tautology or equally well as a contradiction, but not as representing any meaningful proposition. With the determination to interpret the diagram e.g. as tautology, a whole sequence of implicit further determinations is firmly connected: which of the poles (a, b) stands for 'true', which sign expresses the logical connection 'and', which 'or', whether there is a valid inference schema, etc., is the most important.

Notes

1) All quotations in this article from Russell's letters come from the Bertrand Russell Archives (https://bracers.mcmaster.ca).

2) References to the *Notes on Logic* follow the numbering system in the edition in Potter 2009. An important feature of the edition of the NL in Potter 2009 is his distinction between 'Birmingham Notes' (BN) and 'Cambridge Notes' (CN). The BN are a collection of remarks from Wittgenstein's Cambridge notebooks dictated by him in Birmingham on 7 October 1913; the CN contain additional remarks written down and dictated by Wittgenstein in the presence of Russell on 8–9 October 1913 in Cambridge. Facsimile pictures and transcriptions of the NL (Ts-201a1 and Ts-201a2) are available at the *Bergen Nachlass Edition* (BNE) under www.wittgensteinsource.org.

3) A facsimile of the sheet has already been published twice: Shosky 1997 (picture on p. 20); Landini 2007 (picture on p. 109); the sheet is also discussed in McGuinness 1988: 160–162 and Potter 2009: 160. Shosky thinks that the sheet was written 1912 a year before the letter from Sheffer to Russell about the Sheffer stroke. According to McGuinness the leaf was written immediately after Russell's talk in the Moral Science Club 25 Oct. 1912. McGuinness does not mention Sheffer or Sheffer's paper in his extensive discussion. Landini's suggestion is that it shows instead a discussion between Wittgenstein and Russell connected to the Sheffer draft from April 1913. In a similar matter Potter assumes that Russell and Wittgenstein discussed truth-tables "at their meetings (most likely some time after Russell had received Sheffer's paper)". Landini's claim that in the *Notes on Logic* and the Tractatus Wittgenstein used the 'dagger', i.e. the dual of the stroke, instead of the "stroke" is not entirely correct: in NL B31 Wittgenstein defines p|q as ~pv~q while in the Tractatus it is the dual version i.e the joint negation ~p.~q he uses and this is also what is generalized to the n-place N-Operator in the *Tractatus*. Things stand even more confusingly since Sheffer himself in his paper primarily refers to the definition ~p.~q, which today is associated with the 'Peirce Arrow' and only in a footnote mentions the dual definition by ~pv~q which today commonly is called the 'Sheffer stroke'.

4) While in the NoL itself there is to be found no comparable example, in a letter to Russell (CC 1995, Nr. 28) Wittgenstein gives an analogous example "~~~p = ~p" in the new ab-notation.

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

Folio 1v of RA 220.011450 (jottings in Wittgenstein's and Russell's hand)

Is the Official Theory of Truth of the *Tractatus* an Obtainment Theory?

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Abstract

According to Hans-Johann Glock, truth does not consist in the Tractatus in a correspondence relation understood as a form of structural isomorphism, but, rather, in an obtainment theory: "a sentence is true iff the state of affairs it depicts obtains" (Glock 2006: 347). Though sympathetic to Glock's critique of the standard interpretation of truth in terms of structural isomorphism, I present three problems his account in terms of obtainment is facing (the omission of the depicting vs representing distinction, evidential support that truth is taken to consist in depicting reality, and, finally, the inadequacy of the obtainment theory as an account of truth), and argue, on that basis, that Wittgenstein does not subscribe to an obtainment theory. Finally, I briefly sketch the outlines of a new correspondentist interpretation according to which truth in the Tractatus consists of an indirect relation of correspondence which Wittgenstein understands in terms of 'correctly depicting reality'.

1. Truth, correspondence and obtainment in the Tractatus

The question of Wittgenstein's solution to "The problem of Truth" (NB, 6(7)) has received a wide consensual answer. This consensual or standard interpretation (SI) on the issue has been summed up as follows by Pascal Engel:

> Wittgenstein […] holds a correspondence theory of truth, where propositions represent or picture reality, and where the elements of propositions – which are ultimately names- correspond to the elements of reality – ultimately objects. […] The correspondence relation between propositions and facts is characterized as a structural isomorphism between propositions and states of affairs. (Engel 2002: 20)

If SI is correct, Wittgenstein's position on the issue would be closed to Russell's in that they would both account for truth in terms of correspondence with a fact (Russell 1912). The novel element in Wittgenstein's account would be his understanding of the correspondence relation in terms of structural isomorphism.

SI has however been challenged lately. One of its most thoroughgoing critique has been formulated by Hans-Johann Glock (2006) whose position partly consists of the three following theses:

> (T1) Rejection of SI's account of the correspondence relation:
> The isomorphism between a sentence and what it represents is not a sufficient condition for a sentence to be true and cannot turn the relation of representing into a correspondence relation.
>
> (T2) Rejection of any alternative account of truth as correspondence:
> Since no other relation in the *Tractatus* qualifies as a genuine correspondence relation, there is no sound alternative interpretation of truth as correspondence.
>
> (T3) Truth as consisting in the obtainment of some fact:
> Truth of a sentence is accounted for only in terms of the obtainment of the represented state of affairs, and thus: "The official theory of truth in the *Tractatus* is an obtainment Theory - a sentence is true iff the state of affairs it depicts obtains (Glock 2006: 347).

I shall here critically examine this position by first presenting Glock's case in favour of it (2.). I shall then argue that though Glock is right to say that SI does not capture the tractarian account of truth, (T2) and (T3) are facing three problems which are important enough to make them false (3.). Now, if this is right, it leaves us in need of an alternative interpretation and I shall, in the end, briefly sketch the outlines of a new correspondentist interpretation according to which truth in the *Tractatus* consists of an indirect relation of correspondence which Wittgenstein understands in terms of 'correctly depicting reality' (4.).

2. The case against correspondence and in favour of obtainment

According to Glock, the isomorphism thanks to which a sentence may represent a state of affairs cannot turn representing into a relation of correspondence between a true sentence and reality. For, contrarily to correspondence, isomorphism holds between a sentence and its sense no matter what happens to be the case in reality. It helps explaining how a sentence represents its sense, but not its truth:

> A thesis of isomorphism does indeed play a crucial role in the *Tractatus*. But this structural identity holds between an elementary sentence and its sense, the possible state of affairs it depicts. It does not just hold between a true elementary sentence and an actual fact. For Wittgenstein, isomorphism explains sense rather than truth. Sharing a form of depiction with a situation is a prerequisite of representing; yet to represent is not the same as to represent truly. (Glock 2006: 353).

Hence, (T1) is true, i.e. one ought to reject SI's account of truth.

Glock then examines the possibility that some other relation in the *Tractatus* may qualify as a correspondence relation and provides the basis for an alternative correspondentist account. In order to qualify as a genuine correspondence relation, Glock argues that a relation must have the following two features:

> (F1) It ought to obtain between a truth-bearer (linguistic item) and a worldly item;
> (F2) It ought to be a "relation that a true but not a false sentence has to reality, and which explains its being true". (Glock 2006: 359)

Glock identifies three semantic relations in the *Tractatus* that could fulfill these requirements, namely:

> (R1) Agreement of sense:
> The relation of agreement the sense of a sentence may have to reality (TLP: 2.222)
>
> (R2) Correspondence as depiction:
> The relation a sentence has to its sense, i.e. the possible state of affairs it represents (the relation identified in SI as the correspondence relation)
>
> (R3) Correspondence as reference:
> The relation a sentence has to its names' referents (whether or not these constitutes an existing state of affairs) (TLP: 4.0621).

Now, according to Glock, none of these three relations fulfils both (F1) and (F2):

> None of the three notions of correspondence we have encountered in the *Tractatus* is a genuinely truth-making relation, a substantial relation that a true but not a false sentence has to reality, and which explains its being true. On the one hand, the *agreement* between what is said by a true sentence and what is the case makes for truth rather than falsehood. Yet it is not a genuine relation between a truth-bearer and a truth-maker, but the kind of logical equivalence or even identity stressed by deflationary theories. On the other hand, both *correspondence as depiction* and *correspondence as reference* are genuine relations between sentence *s* and reality. However, neither of them distinguishes being true from being false: whether or not "p" is true, it depicts the very same state of affairs and is about the very same objects. (Glock 2006: 359)

Hence, (T2) is true. There is no sound alternative interpretation of truth as correspondence.

Finally, since no correspondence account is correct, and since it is the obtainment of some fact which may explain the being true of a sentence, the Tractatus account of truth is an obtainment theory, i.e. it is a theory according to which truth is a semantic property (and not a relation) that a sentence has whenever the fact it represents obtains: "What makes the difference between a true sentence and a false one is not the existence of these ?previously mentioned? relations, but the obtaining of the depicted state of affairs" (Glock 2006: 359). Hence, (T3) is true.

This obtainment account of truth does not affect however the thesis according to which Wittgenstein's position is close to Russell's. According to Glock, strictly speaking, Russell's position is also an obtainment theory that has been labelled as a correspondence theory.

3. Problems with Glock's position

Glock's position faces however three problems, namely:

> (P1) the omission of the relation of depicting that qualifies as a genuine correspondence relation;
> (P2) the fact that Wittgenstein understands truth in terms of 'correctly depicting reality', but not in terms of obtainment; and finally,
> (P3) the fact that obtainment does not provide a satisfactory answer to the question of the nature of truth, but only explains what makes some sentence true.

I hereby present these problems and indicate their consequences for Glock's position.

3.1 Omitting depicting

Besides (R1)-(R3), there also is, in the *Tractatus*, depicting (*abbilden*) that Glock does not take into account, because he wrongly assimilates it to the relation of representing (*darstellen*) a sentence has to its sense, but which differs from it in the following respects:

> - Depicting is the relation a sentence or a picture is said to have to a fact, reality or the world (T LP: 2,171, 2.18, 2.19, 2.2, 2.201, 4.014, 4.016), whereas representing is a relation a sentence has only to its sense or a possibility (TLP: 2,11, 2.202, 2.203, 2.22, 2.221, 4.03, 4.031, 4.1).
> - Depicting may be done "correctly" or "incorrectly" (TLP: 2.17, 2,18), whereas representing holds independently of what is the case (TLP: 2.22) and may therefore not be incorrect.
> - A picture depicts reality by representing a "possibility of subsistence or non-subsistence of states of affairs" (TLP: 2.201) and it is therefore necessary in order to depict reality that a proposition first represents its sense.
>
> - Since a sentence is (in)correctly depicting reality whenever the sense it represents (dis)agrees with reality (TLP: 2.222), depicting is a relation that a sentence has indirectly to reality, whereas representing is a relation a sentence directly has to its sense.
> - Depicting is said to be internal (TLP: 4.014), whereas representing is essential (TLP: 4.03). (Plourde: 2017)

Now, being a relation that holds between a linguistic item and a fact as well as a relation which may explain the being true of a sentence (correctly depicting) in contradistinction to its being false (incorrectly depicting), it satisfies (F1) and (F2) and therefore fulfils Glock's requirements for any relation to qualify as a genuine correspondence relation.

3.2 Truth, correspondence, and depicting

A further problem with Glock's position is that Wittgenstein never accounts for truth in terms of obtainment, but does understand truth in terms of "agreement" or "correspondence" (*übereinstimmen*) and falsity in terms of "failing to agree" or "to correspond" (*nicht übereinstimmen*), which are also taken to be equivalent to "being a correct" and "being an incorrect" picture of reality: "A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false" (TLP: 2.21). Now, a correct picture of reality is one that depicts reality correctly and an incorrect picture is one that depicts reality incorrectly (TLP: 2.17, 2.18; Plourde: 2017). Hence, depicting not only fulfils Glock's requirements to qualify as a correspondence relation, but it is taken in the *Tractatus* as that in which correspondence consists of. Hence, (T2) is false. There is a sound alternative correspondence account to SI, one that accounts for the correspondence relation on the basis of depicting.

3.3 Obtainment, explanation, and analysis

In "The Nature of Truth", Ramsey puts forward a relevant distinction for the present discussion between the question as to what 'truth' means or what is the nature of truth and the question of the specification of a criterion on the basis of which one may discriminate true from false sentence and on the basis of which one may determine the sentence's truth-value. Ramsey further insists that it is a fundamental mistake committed by

Kant to believe that an answer to the latter issue may constitute an answer to the former:

> The first type of confusion arises from the ambiguity of the question which we are trying to answer, the question "what is truth?", which can be interpreted in at least three different ways. For in the first place there are some philosophers who do not see any problem in what is meant by 'truth', but take our interpretation of the term as being obviously right, and proceed under the title of "what is truth?" to discuss the different problem of giving a general criterion for distinguishing truth and falsehood. This was for instance Kant's interpretation (Ramsey 2001: 441–442)

A good criterion to discriminate true from false sentences should allow us to identify as true all and only those sentences that are true. It should therefore specify a set of necessary and conjointly sufficient conditions for any sentence to be true. In so doing, it ought not necessarily to provide any condition that explains why a given sentence is true. But it may also provide as a criterion such an explaining reason. Now, when Glock formulates his second requirement for a relation to qualify as a correspondence relation, he requires that it be a "relation that a true but not a false sentence has to reality, and which *explains its being true*" (Glock 2006: 359. My emphasis). In other words, what he is asking is not something that tells us what truth consists of, but something on the basis of which we may say that and why a given sentence is true. To that extent, he is committing a specific variety of Ramsey's confusion and his obtainment theory is not an answer to Wittgenstein's problem of the nature of truth, but an account as to what makes some sentence true: even though the obtainment of the fact a sentence s represents might explain the being true of that sentence, s's truth does not consist in the obtainment of the represented fact. Hence, T3 is false.

4. Concluding remarks

If the above critiques are right and given 2.21 and the fact that a 'correct picture' is one that 'depicts reality correctly', the tractarian account of truth would be a nonstandard correspondence theory according to which truth consists in the indirect relation of depicting correctly:

(TDC) A sentence 's' is true iff it depicts reality correctly

In order for a sentence to do this, it ought to represent its sense independently of what is the case (TLP: 2.22) and this sense must agree with reality (TLP: 2.222). Hence, correctly depicting reality is an indirect relation. Now, whenever the represented sense does agree with reality, the sentence *eo ipso* stands in a relation of correctly depicting to reality. Hence, it is internal.

This position agrees with Glock's point that SI does not capture Wittgenstein's position on the nature of truth. It also agrees with Glock that, in the *Tractatus*, agreement of the represented sense with reality and the obtainment of the depicted fact each are necessary conditions for a sentence to be true. It however denies that truth consists for Wittgenstein in nothing more than the obtainment of the represented fact. Nevertheless, the obtainment account remains complementary to (TDC) in that it arguably accounts for what explains the being true of a sentence for Wittgenstein (NB: 26(6)).

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Frege und die neukantianische Tradition. Gestalten des Platonismus um die Jahrhundertwende

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Abstract

Eine wichtige Quelle platonistischen Denkens für den frühen Wittgenstein bilden die Werke Gottlob Freges. Wer die Kritik des *Tractatus* am „Platonismus" verstehen will, muss deswegen prüfen, in welcher Gestalt er sich bei Frege zeigt. Es wird dafür argumentiert, dass Frege nur in einem qualifizierten Sinn als „Platonist" bezeichnet werden kann. Zu diesem Zweck wird die Verwurzelung von Freges Denken im Neukantianismus untersucht. Die neukantianische Tradition prägte die Unterscheidung von der Entstehung und der Begründung eines Urteils – eine Unterscheidung, die für Freges Werk von zentraler Bedeutung ist. Diese Unterscheidung erlaubt es, zwischen einem ontologischen Platonismus und einem normativen Platonismus zu differenzieren. Freges Überlegung zu der Natur von Gedanken und logischen Gesetzen machen ihn zu einem Vertreter des letzteren. Der normative Platonismus behauptet nicht die Existenz nicht-sinnlicher, abstrakter Entitäten, sondern die Unabhängigkeit dessen, was gilt, von dem, was ist. Als zentrale Schwierigkeit des normativen Platonismus wird die Beziehung von normativen Denkgesetzen und faktischem Denken hervorgehoben. Es werden verschiedene Antwortversuche auf die Frage untersucht, wie die im logischen Gesetz ausgedrückte Norm Eingang findet in das sich faktisch vollziehende Denken. Abschliessend wird der Vorschlag gemacht, das Frühwerk Wittgensteins im Horizont der erläuterten Problemstellung zu betrachten.

1. Einleitung

Wer die Kritik des frühen Wittgenstein an einer philosophischen Denkfigur verstehen will, die man als „Platonismus" bezeichnet, muss zuerst die Frage stellen, in welcher historischen Gestalt sich ihm eine solche darstellte. Als eine Quelle „platonistischen" Denkens für den *Tractatus* können die „grossartigen Werke Freges" (TLP 1984: 9) gelten. Es soll argumentiert werden, dass Frege nur in einem qualifizierten Sinne als Platonist zu bezeichnen ist, nämlich als ein normativer Platonist. Zu diesem Zweck werden verschiedene Gestalten des Platonismus unterschieden, wie sie sich insbesondere in der Platon-Rezeption des Neukantianismus wiederfinden – einer philosophischen Strömung, der Frege mit Recht zugeordnet werden kann.

2. Freges Platonismus als Anti-Psychologismus

Frege gilt allgemein als ein Vertreter des Platonismus. Damit ist gemeint, dass Frege die Existenz von nicht-anschaulichen, abstrakten Entitäten behauptete, die ihr Bestehen unabhängig vom Akt ihrer Erkenntnis haben. Die Entitäten, von denen dabei die Rede ist, sind vor allem mathematische Objekte, wie Zahlen, aber auch propositionale Gebilde, die Frege „Gedanken" nennt, und die er in einem „dritten Reich" ausserhalb „der Innenwelt der Vorstellung" wie auch ausserhalb der „Aussen-Welt, der Welt der sinnlich wahrnehmbaren Dinge" (Frege 1986: 75) verortet. Ein solcher Platonismus mathematischer Gegenstände hatte ein Nachleben über Frege hinaus, seine Ansichten über das Sein von Gedanken blieben dagegen singulär. Es ist zurecht daraufhin gewiesen wurden, dass Frege seine platonischen Entitäten vor allem auf negative Weise charakterisiert (Gabriel 1986: 99). Das Sein des Gedankens ist etwa zeitlos, dem Wahrheitsprädikat kommt kein Tempus zu. Ebenso wenig hat ein Gedanke eine Stelle im Raum. Mit diesen negativen Bestimmungen richtet sich Frege gegen ein kategoriales Missverstehen dessen, was mit „Gedanke" gemeint ist: Der Gedanke ist kein psycho-physischer Gegenstand, dessen Sein von „Denkgesetzen" im Sinne der Psychologie regiert würde.
Am besten versteht man die platonistischen Obertöne in Freges Theorie vom Gedanken als Ausdruck seines Anti-Psychologismus. Die Abwehr psychologistischer Einflüsse auf die Wissenschaft der Logik durchzieht Freges gesamtes Schaffen. Fundamental ist für ihn die Unterscheidung, die Psychologie habe es mit den „Gesetzen des Fürwahrhaltens", die Logik dagegen mit „den Gesetzen des Wahrseins" (Frege 1966: XV) zu tun.

3. Normen und Naturgesetze im Neukantianismus

Die Gesetze des Für-Wahr-Haltens beschreiben, wie der Mensch faktisch denkt, die Gesetze des Wahr-Seins, wie er denken soll. Mit dieser Unterscheidung steht Frege ganz in den Diskursen der akademischen Philosophie seiner Zeit. Der physiologische Materialismus um Carl Vogt und Jakob Moleschott war zu Zeiten Freges in der deutschen Universitätsphilosophie bereits auf dem Rückzug (Köhnke 1993: 306). Er hatte Raum gemacht für das neukantianische Programm, durch die Rückbesinnung auf Kant aufstrebende Naturwissenschaft und apriorisches Wissen zu versöhnen. Ein Grundzug des Neukantianismus bestand darin, die Frage nach der *Entstehung* eines Urteils von der Frage seiner *Geltung* zu unterscheiden. Kants Rede von apriorischen und aposteriorischen Sätzen sollte demnach nicht verstanden werden als eine Unterscheidung bezüglich des „Ursprungs" eines Urteils, sondern bezüglich seiner „Begründung" (Windelband 2021: II 101). Besondere gedankliche Nähe zu Frege lässt sich bei Vertretern der südwestdeutschen Schule feststellen, etwa bei deren Gründungsfigur Wilhelm Windelband:

> Für die Psychologie mag es von Interesse sein, festzustellen, ob eine Vorstellung auf dem einen oder dem anderen Wege zustande gekommen ist: für die Erkenntnistheorie handelt es sich nur darum, ob die Vorstellung gelten, d.h. ob sie als wahr anerkannt werden soll. (Windelband 2021: I 24)

Freges Thema ist zwar nicht Erkenntnistheorie, sondern Logik. Der Sinn der kantischen Unterscheidungen ist für ihn aber derselbe wie für Windelband:

> Wenn man einen Satz in meinem Sinne aposteriorisch oder analytisch nennt, so urteilt man nicht über die psychologischen, physiologischen und physikalischen Inhalte, die es

> möglich gemacht haben, den Inhalt des Satzes im Bewusstsein zu bilden […], sondern darüber, worauf im tiefsten Grunde die Berechtigung des Fürwahrhaltens beruht. (Frege 1988: §3)

Für Frege und die Neukantianer ist es entscheidend, dass die Frage nach der Entstehung und die Frage nach der Berechtigung beziehungsweise Geltung eines Urteils nicht aufeinander reduzierbar sind. Die Frage nach der Geltung erfordert eine Untersuchung *sui generis*.

4. Zwei Arten des Platonismus

Für die Frage nach dem „Platonismus" ist es nun von nicht geringer Bedeutung, dass die Wiederaneignung Kants in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts unter anderem inspiriert wurde durch die einflussreiche Platon-Deutung Hermann Lotzes. Nach Lotze will Platon mit seinen Ideen nicht das Sein ewiger, ungewordener und unvergänglicher Gegenstände behaupten, die, getrennt vom Werden und Vergehen der Sinnendinge im herakliteischen Fluss, an einem Überhimmel stehen. Stattdessen will Platon die Geltung von Urteilen und damit die Möglichkeit sinnvoller Rede vor Protagoras und seinen Anhängern bewahren, die das Wahrsein selbst in den Fluss des Werdens und Vergehens hineinziehen wollen.

> Ewig, weder entstehend noch vergehend mussten die Ideen genannt werden gegenüber dem Fluss des Heraklit, der auch ihren Sinn schien mit sich fortreissen zu sollen. Die Wirklichkeit des Seins kommt ihnen bald zu bald nicht zu, je nachdem vergängliche Dinge sich mit ihnen schmücken; die Wirklichkeit der Geltung aber, welche ihre eigene Weise der Wirklichkeit ist, bleibt unberührt von diesem Wechsel. (Lotze 1847: §318)

Nicht für ein zweites Reich des unsinnlichen Seienden neben dem Reich des wahrnehmbaren Seienden stehen die Ideen Platons nach Lotze, sondern für das Reich der Geltung neben dem Reich des Seienden. Obwohl „Platon nur die ewige Gültigkeit der Ideen, niemals aber ihr Sein behauptete", für die Frage aber, was die Ideen seien, nur „den Allgemeinbegriff der ousia" zur Verfügung hatte, „so war dem Missverständnis Tor und Tür geöffnet." (Lotze 1847: §318). Im Anschluss an Lotze kann man also zwei Arten von Platonismus unterscheiden: 1) einen *ontologischen* Platonismus, der die Existenz unsinnlicher Entitäten behauptet und andererseits 2) einen *normativen* Platonismus, der die Unabhängigkeit einer Ordnung der Geltung von der Ordnung des Faktischen annimmt, ohne der Ordnung des Faktischen weitere Bewohner hinzuzufügen.

5. Freges Position

Es stellt sich die Frage, auf welcher Seite des Zauns Freges Platonismus zu finden ist. Hier ist ein Vorschlag: In Bezug auf mathematische Gegenstände scheinen Freges Aussagen eher für einen ontologischen Platonismus zu sprechen. Wir wollen die Frage nach mathematischen Gegenständen hier beiseitelassen, und uns auf Freges Überlegungen zur Natur des Gedankens und der logischen Gesetze konzentrieren. Für das Sein eines Gedankens gilt, dass es in dessen Wahr- oder Falsch-Sein besteht. Mit Charles Kahn könnte man sagen, das Sein eines Gedankens ist ein Sein in einem veritativen Sinn (Kahn 1966: 252), nicht ein Sein im Sinn der Existenz. Anstatt Freges drittes Reich der Gedanken als die Hypostasierung der Existenz einer Ordnung abstrakter Entitäten zu verstehen, wäre es deshalb der Prüfung Wert, es entlang der neukantianischen Traditionslinie als ein Reich der Geltung zu deuten. Frege wäre, so der Vorschlag, in Bezug auf Gedanken und die sie regierenden Gesetzen, die Gesetze der Logik, ein normativer Platonist zu nennen.

Mit diesem Vorschlag sind verschiedene Schwierigkeiten verbunden. Die erste ist exegetischer Natur. Frege hält es für sein grosses Verdienst, die Behauptung von dem Inhalt eines Urteils getrennt zu haben (Frege 1983: 271). Es ist möglich, den Inhalt eines Urteils, das heisst einen Gedanken, zu fassen, ohne sich dabei auf seine Wahr- oder Falschheit festzulegen. Dieser Befund spricht dafür, dass Frege das Sein eines Gedankens als unabhängig von seinem Wahr- oder Falsch-Sein, und damit unabhängig von seinem Gelten, verstanden wissen wollte.
Dieser Befund lässt sich mit dem Hinweis, wenn nicht entkräften, so zumindest relativieren, dass Frege das blosse Fassen eines Gedankens als privativ gegenüber der Beurteilung seiner Wahr- oder Falschheit verstanden hat. „Warum genügt uns der Gedanke nicht? Weil und insofern es uns auf seinen Wahrheitswert ankommt." (Frege 2008: 33).

6. Das *Methexis*-Problem

Ein anderes Problem wiegt schwerer. Es betrifft eine Frage, die sich dem „Platonismus" in allen seinen Gestalten stellt, nämlich die Frage nach der Beziehung der getrennten Sphären zueinander. In Anlehnung an das antike Problem der *Teilhabe* der Sinnendinge an den Ideen kann diese Frage als *Methexis*-Problem bezeichnet werden. Im Falle des normativen Platonismus lautet sie auf die Beziehung der Norm zum faktischen Denken. Was verschafft den Gesetzen des Denkens, die vorschreiben, wie gedacht werden soll, ihre Geltung für das sich tatsächlich vollziehende Denken? Wie beeinflussen die Gesetze des Wahr-Seins die Gesetze des Für-Wahr-Haltens?

7. Geltung der Norm – Die teleologische Deutung

Im Umkreis Freges können verschiedene Antwortversuche auf diese Frage ausgemacht werden. Wirft man nochmals einen Blick auf Windelband und den Südwest-Deutschen Neukantianismus, so trifft man auf die Idee vom Denken als einem teleologisch organisierten Vermögen. Wahrheit ist demnach der Zweck des Vermögens zu denken (Windelband 2021: II 73). Die normative Kraft der logischen Gesetze beruht darauf, dass ihre Befolgung der Erlangung dieses Zwecks zuträglich ist. Die logischen Gesetze gelten, weil ihre Einhaltung *zweckmässig* ist.
Diese Lösung ist weder der Sache noch Freges Schriften angemessen. Wenn Wahrheit den Erfolgsfall des Denkens beschreibt, so kollabieren im Falle des Misserfolgs falsches Denken und Nicht-Denken ineinander. Falsch zu denken heisst jedoch immer noch zu denken, und nicht *nicht* zu denken. Diesem Kontrast kann die teleologische Deutung der Denkgesetze nicht Rechnung tragen.

Darüber hinaus können teleologisch verstandene Denkgesetze als nützliche oder zweckmässige Denkregeln gelten, sie sind jedoch selbst keine Wahrheiten. Frege war jedoch jederzeit der Auffassung, dass logische Gesetze selbst wahre Urteile darstellen (dazu Goldfarb 2010: 67).

8. Geltung der Norm – Die transzendentale Deutung

Dieser Befund stellt auch das grösste Hindernis für eine transzendentale Deutung der logischen Denkgesetze dar, wie sie etwa Gottfried Gabriel vorgetragen hat (Gabriel 1986: 91). Nach einer solcher Deutung ist den Gesetzen der Logik dadurch Eingang in das faktische Denken verschafft, dass sie die Bedingungen jeden Denkens darstellen. Sie sind die un-

umgänglichen Voraussetzungen dafür, dass ein gedanklicher Gehalt überhaupt Geltung besitzt, das heisst, wahrheitsfähig ist. Ein Denken, welches die logischen Gesetze nicht befolgte, wäre deswegen unmöglich.

Dieser Versuch, Frege noch enger in eine kantianische Traditionslinie einzubinden, scheitert jedoch an dessen eben genannter Wahrheitsdoktrin logischer Gesetze. Die Gesetze der Logik sind wahre Deskriptionen. Sie können nicht Geltungsbedingungen von Urteilen darstellen, weil sie selbst geltende Urteile sind. Was logische Gesetze von anderen Urteilen unterscheidet, ist lediglich der Grad ihrer Allgemeinheit. Sie haben den grösstmöglichen Gegenstandsbereich; sie gelten nicht von einem besonderen Ausschnitt der Wirklichkeit, sondern der Wirklichkeit insgesamt. Aber sie teilen mit allen anderen Urteilen denselben objekt-sprachigen Status. Meta-Sätze, die über die Geltungsbedingungen anderer Sätze reflektieren, kommen in Freges Logik nicht vor. Die Vermeidung einer solchen Überstiegsfigur ist vielleicht sogar ein zentrales Charakteristikum seiner Logik.

9. Freges Wieder-Vereinigung von Deskription und Präskription

Freges Bestimmung der logischen Gesetze des Wahrseins enthält zwei Momente, deren Vereinigung jede Interpretation vor Schwierigkeiten stellen muss. Einerseits besitzen sie einen präskriptiven Charakter. Sie beschreiben nicht, wie gedacht wird, sondern wie gedacht werden soll. Das unterscheidet sie von den psychologischen Gesetzen des Fürwahrhaltens. Zugleich behauptet Frege, dass logische Gesetze selbst wahre Sätze seien. Sie sind weder nützliche Denkregeln, noch Meta-Sätze über die Geltungsbedingungen anderer Sätze. Sie sind also ebenfalls deskriptiv.

An einer Stelle deutet Frege eine eigentümliche Versöhnung beider Momente an. Präskription und Deskription sollen einander nicht ausschliessen, sondern stehen sogar in einem Begründungsverhältnis zueinander:

> Jedes Gesetz, das besagt, was ist, kann aufgefasst werden als vorschreibend, es solle im Einklang mit ihm gedacht werden, und ist also in dem Sinne ein Denkgesetz. Das gilt von geometrischen und physikalischen nicht minder als von den logischen. Diese verdienen den Namen „Denkgesetze" nur dann mit mehr Recht, wenn damit gesagt sein soll, dass sie die allgemeinsten sind, die überall da vorschreiben, wie gedacht werden soll, wo überhaupt gedacht wird. (Frege 1988: XV).

Die Wahrheit der logischen Gesetze *erklärt* ihre normative Kraft. *Weil* sie richtige Beschreibungen der Wirklichkeit sind, sind sie Vorschriften für das Denken. Der deskriptive Charakter der logischen Gesetze schliesst ihren präskriptiven Charakter nicht aus, sondern bedingt ihn: Frege scheint andeuten zu wollen, dass es der uneingeschränkte Skopus ihrer Deskription ist („dass sie die allgemeinsten sind"), der die logischen Gesetze im besonderen Masse zu präskriptiven Gesetzen macht.

10. Die Ausgangslage für den Autor des *Tractatus*

Freges eigene Lösung des Methexis-Problems, wie es sich für den normativen Platonismus stellt, ist alles andere als einleuchtend. Sie lautet: Die Gesetze der Logik gelten für das menschliche Denken, weil sie allgemeinste Beschreibungen dessen sind, worauf sich Denken richtet: Das, was ist. Aber wie erfasst das Denken diese allgemeinsten Wahrheiten über das Sein? Muss es sie als eine gegebene Evidenz hinnehmen? Und was hindert daran, ein Denken anzunehmen, dass nicht den Gesetzen der Logik entspricht, und ein un-logisches Sein denkt? (Für die Aporien dieser Frage siehe (Conant 1992)).

Der vorliegende Text will den Vorschlag machen, den *Tractatus* als eine Reaktion auf eine neukantianische Problemstellung zu lesen, wie sie im Vorangegangenen an Frege entwickelt wurde. Die Problemstellung lautet, wie nach der erfolgten Trennung der Sphäre der Norm von der Sphäre des Faktums, des Reichs des Sollens vom Reich des Seins, eine Vermittlung beider zu denken ist. Eine solche *Tractatus* Lektüre muss an einer anderen Stelle erfolgen.

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How Can Mathematical Objects Be Real but Mind-Dependent?

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Abstract

Taking mathematics as a language based on empirical experience, I argue for an account of mathematics in which its objects are abstracta that describe and communicate the structure of reality based on some of our ancestral interactions with their environment. I argue that mathematics as a language is mostly invented. Nonetheless, in being a general description of reality it cannot be said that it is fictional; and as an intersubjective reality, mathematical objects can exist independent of any one person's mind.

I can sum up the thesis under discussion here to the idea that mathematics can be thought of as a very abstract theoretical physics, this is an idea that Quine welcomes (Linnebo 2017: 94). Quine (1986: 402) claims that epistemologically, mathematical objects and that of theoretical physics are the same.

I take mathematical objects as non-spatiotemporal. If we agree that space and time are a (transcendental or physical) basis of our reality, it's not so far from tautological to say that all spatiotemporal objects are necessarily a part of the physical reality. However, I argue that mathematical objects despite being non-spatiotemporal are also in a sense real.

Regarding reality in mathematics, one interesting view is that of Wittgenstein in the *Philosophical Investigations*, where he sees this problem as an illness that we should get rid of (PI 2009: 254; Bangu 2012: sec. 4). Before that in the *Tractatus,* Wittgenstein maintained that mathematical propositions are not real propositions (TLP 6.2), for one reason because we can see that their forms are superficial (see Bangu 2012: Introduction). The most important reason for this superficiality is because Wittgenstein thought that mathematics is not independent of human language and practices (Bangu 2012: sec. 4).

So whereas he first thought of the mathematical propositions as unreal, he later claimed that the question of the reality of mathematics is altogether nonsense. My thesis here is in alignment with these two claims from Wittgenstein. However, although I agree that the philosophical question of the reality of mathematics is analogous to a sickness, I think we are compelled to come up with a cure because we cannot just get rid of this sickness only by acknowledging it.

In this paper, I present two ways in which we can talk about the reality of mathematical objects. Firstly, mathematics is a description of reality and in this way, we can affirm that mathematics cannot be fictional. Not only mathematics is a description of reality but it's the transcendental condition of its possibility. Secondly, mathematics can be regarded as an abstract realm in which its reality is independent of our empirical limitations. Here the reality of mathematics is maintained by the activities of the mathematical society, and the existence of mathematical objects is justified in an intersubjective way.

Though the mathematical practice is dependent on human creativity, the enterprise of mathematics is more than just another formal game or fiction, and because the apprehension of reality is intractable without mathematical discourse, we cannot say that mathematics is fictional. This argument can be construed along the same lines as Quine's indispensability argument, that is, our most accurate description of the world is the scientific description which is inseparable from mathematics, and that this inseparability justifies the existence of mathematical entities (see Resnik 1995: 166; Putnam 1971). Now if we take mathematics as an indispensable apparatus to describe reality, we can never hope that it can describe reality purely. Here I adhere to Resnik (1997: 124–26), maintaining that we cannot hope for a discipline that is deprived of presuppositions.

Mathematics is a descriptive apparatus, and at its most fundamental level, it describes matters of the real world – not fantasies. The practices of our ancestors in sorting, arranging, fitting things and constructing geometric templates is the precursor to mathematics (see Resnik 1997: 226–28). As Linnebo (2017: 15) points out the focus on the empirical experience for commencing the epistemology of mathematics is not a new thing, e.g., Meno's slave boy needed some empirical trigger to activate his mathematical intuition. Kant also admits the importance of empirical experiences but eliminates the sort of Platonic basis. With Kant (1998: B1), the source of such knowledge comes built-in in our cognitive faculties.

Resnik (2018: 305) narrate an oral account from Benacerraf that we acquire mathematical knowledge by somewhat abstracting physical reality into properties. Let me put it this way. Mathematics describes reality, and maybe we can call it real in this thin sense: mathematical intuition works as a thin wrap that bundles the phenomenal experience into understandable equivalence classes that show the structure of reality. This wrap abstracts the outer world as to be comprehensible by our cognitive faculties. It packs and forces the components of our perception to fit into their place in a communicable mental structure that is shared between human beings. So mathematical objects are abstractions from the physical reality and their purpose is to describe this reality, in a specific sense.

The general working of the abstraction process can be characterized by what Lewis (1986: 84–85) calls "the Way of Abstraction" that is "abstract entities are abstractions from concrete entities. They result from somehow subtracting specificity, so that an incomplete description of the original concrete entity would be a complete description of the abstraction". Mathematical abstractions tend to generalize reality into an austere and unambiguous language that shows the structure of reality–that is, the general form in which reality can be described – and it's in this sense that I say mathematics shows the structure of reality.

As a way of communicating cognitive abstractions, mathematics is invented. And this is regardless of whether mathematics is an innate cognitive ability or not. So even if mathematics is a priori and transcendental this will not contradict the fact the communication of mathematics can only be superficial. Because after all, in order to communicate something abstract and non-spatiotemporal we can but invent tools and conven-

tions that strive to catch and reify the intangible. And this is the sense in which Wittgenstein thinks that we invent mathematics (LFM 1976: 22). Further, the very act of communicating the cognitive abstractions give rise to further abstractions. These abstractions are not a direct result of our interactions with the physical world. The set-theoretic hierarchy is one example, and it's untenable to say that the reality of this complex comes from the transcendental nature of mathematics nor can we find any use for it in our best sciences. Later, I will argue that such abstractions get their legitimacy in a separate reality.

Wittgenstein mocks platonists by saying that "chess only had to be *discovered,* it was always there!" (PG 1974: 374). Now whereas Wittgenstein maintained that mathematics is another invented formal game like chess I say that this is not so. Although it was not necessary to have chess in order to describe the world, it was necessary to have for example the notion of a geometric line to describe the geography of the environment. Or to talk cogently, we needed to distinguish between quantities; one can note the embedded quantifications in the grammar of many languages, like English that distinguishes between one and more than one, or Arabic that does so for one, two, and more than two. So even by accepting the superficiality of mathematical expressions, these expressions induce a descriptive power that formal games like chess don't have; and an expressive faculty that is not implied in works of fiction.

There's yet another aspect that distinguishes basic mathematical objects from fictional creativities. For once more, take the notion of a geometric line, although this object is not out there in the concrete world, it is naturally inclined by the workings of our minds. That is, it doesn't take much effort to convey the existence of this object to another person. This is so because other people possess the same mental capabilities and our descriptions, gestures and communication strategies will effortlessly trap a mental impression in the mind of the other that is known as a line.

The rules that mathematics is based on are derived from practical empirical experience, which itself is regulated by the regularities of the world. As culture and society develop, some of these regularities are "hardened" into rules. Solidification of rules, is again a Wittgensteinian notion. I am saying that when the rules of mathematics are derived, mathematics starts the life of its own and its truth and expansion becomes independent of the experience and of the physical world. So much so that mathematics becomes the paradigm on which reality itself is measured, not the other way around (cf. RFM 1978: VI, 22).

I assume that we agree that there are things in the world that we specify by names, that these things interact in ways that we can describe, and that there are laws that these objects are based on and rules that they follow. Regardless, we cannot ostensively denote these laws or rules–they are abstract. But this doesn't mean that they do not exist and that they are not real. Think for example of the second law of thermodynamics – we can only observe systems that exemplify its idea. And in doing so we can affirm the fit of the abstract model to what we take as its concrete exemplification. These examples are the doors that enable us to perceive the underlying abstract structure. So similarly, it's not correct to talk about the existence of mathematical objects in the terms of physical spatiotemporality. We should also note that objects of mathematics are ontologically more abstract and general than that of physics.

In platonism, we can view mathematics as an independent reality. In this regard not only does mathematics describe reality, but it's a reality in its own right. Mathematical platonism constitutes of three theses of existence, abstractness, and independence. That is: there are mathematical objects, they are abstract, and they are mind-independent (see Linnebo 2017: 11). The characterizing difference between platonism and its antithesis – nominalism – is that in the former we hold that mathematical objects exist. Now, the locution *existence* can denote a variety of different meanings. From a model-theoretic neutral stance about existence to a substantial denotation of existence analogous to the material mind-independent existence of ordinary things. Here to keep the matters tractable–concerning normal platonism – we take Frege's view. That is, the singular terms of true arithmetical statements refer to numbers, now, these statements can be true only if there exist such things as numbers (see Linnebo 2018: sec. 2.1).

Though I stand for the *existence* of these objects, here I deviate from the normal and take existence in a different sense. Mathematical abstracta exist as the necessary result of the interaction of the human mind with the world. In embodied mind theories we have a similar view in which mathematical *abilities* are the result of our interaction with the world. For example, the fact that at least some basic properties of numbers (multitudinous of things) are perceptual attributes (see Jones 2018: 148).

Mathematical objects are mind-dependent as much as the word "table" is mind-dependent in contrast to the intended mind-independent table. So by saying that the word "table" is mind-dependent we do not deny the existence of a pile of particles that we dub as "table"; it just happens to be the case that we have an ability and a practical inclination to discern so much of these particles as a table, but not a handful of electrons and other elementary particles within this pile (cf. Frege 1953: 34). This is to argue that the superficiality of mathematics is not arbitrary, and there is "something" that exists substantially, that *compels* us to invent conventions to target its existence. We are compelled because we live in a mind-independent environment that we share with other thinking beings like us and we need to convey the content of our phenomenological experience: we have to convey the innate impression of objects, patterns and thoughts to other parties. These impressions are the abstract objects. And the texture of these existences is not the same as the concrete particles that we denote by means of words. The mathematical objects are internal abstractions that generalize and regiment the phenomenological experience.

The independent realm of mathematical reality lies in a non-spatiotemporal domain. This reality is the enterprise that rose from the grounds of natural cognitive tendencies of the human mind in communicating abstract proto-mathematical ideas. But ideas in any one person's mind can be vague, ambiguous or prone to blunder. By getting rid of these unwanted properties, via regimentation of abstract mathematical thoughts, a grounded reality can come into being that exists between the interactions of people and is maintained by a collective effort. This reality can be found in the practice of mathematicians. And in this sense, one can say that mathematical objects exist, independent of any one mind. Wittgenstein talks about some behavioural agreement that is not simply an agreement of opinion but rather an agreement on the whole procedure that leads to an agreement about a matter at hand: a consensus "of action" (Bangu 2012: sec. 5). In the *Philosophical Investigations,* Wittgenstein says, that these agreements are not "agreement[s] […] in opinions, but rath-

er in form of life" (PI 2009: 241). In this sense, there is another layer to the reality of mathematics, which is the consensus of the society, as accepting mathematics as a legitimate tool to describe reality and as a reality in its own right. For example, if we are to run a simulation, in which we populate a physically similar world with people that are mentally similar to us, these people should end up having roughly the same mathematics as we do.

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„Das Wesen ist in der Grammatik ausgesprochen" – Wittgensteins Antiplatonismus und Cavells Zweifel

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Abstract

Zwei Denkbewegungen Wittgensteins im Zusammenhang mit dem Wesensbegriff stehen in einem interessanten Spannungsverhältnis. Auf der einen Seite Wittgensteins scharfe Kritik an jeder Form eines (platonischen) Essentialismus, die sich aus seinem Konzept der Familienähnlichkeit ergibt. Dem gegenüber steht seine methodische Maxime, das Wesen eines Gegenstandes wäre in der Grammatik festgelegt, bzw. „ausgesprochen" (PU 371), die den Wesensbegriff für die Philosophie eigentlich zurückgewinnt (Stanley Cavell). Der Beitrag versucht eine Synthese aus diesen beiden Aspekten zu finden.

1. Wittgensteins Kritik am traditionellen Wesensbegriff

Wittgensteins formuliert seine anti-essentialistische Kritik bereits in den frühen 30er-Jahren explizit. Er stellt grundsätzlich in Frage, dass allen An-/Verwendungen eines Begriffs ein gemeinsames Wesen zu Grunde liegen müsse, das sich beschreiben oder „erschauen" ließe – wie es etwa Edmund Husserls Überzeugung war.

Im so genannten „Diktat an Schlick" vom Jänner 1932 schreibt Wittgenstein:

> Ich kann meinen Standpunkt nicht besser charakterisieren, als indem ich sage, daß er der entgegengesetzte Standpunkt dessen ist, welchen Sokrates in den platonischen Dialogen vertritt. Denn würde ich gefragt, was Erkenntnis sei, so würde ich Erkenntnisse aufzählen und die Worte "und Ähnliches" hinzufügen. Es ist kein gemeinsamer Bestandteil in ihnen allen zu finden, weil es keinen gibt. […] Wendet man ein, daß die Worte "und Ähnliches" den Begriff nicht abgrenzen, so kann ich nur sagen, daß die Anwendung des Begriffswortes in den meisten Fällen tatsächlich nicht begrenzt ist. (DIC 302: 14)

Ganz analog argumentiert Wittgenstein im MS 114: 85r (PG 1974: Nr. 76):

> Sokrates weist den Schüler zurecht, der, nach dem Wesen der Erkenntnis, Erkenntnisse aufzählt. Und er läßt dies auch nicht als einen vorläufigen Schritt zur Beantwortung der Frage gelten. Während unsere Antwort gerade eine solche Aufzählung & die Angabe einiger Analogien ist. (Wir machen es uns in der Philosophie in gewissem Sinne immer leichter & leichter.)

Das ist Antiplatonismus pur. Was der platonische Sokrates nicht einmal als vorläufig Annährung an die Frage nach dem Wesen der Erkenntnis gelten lässt, nämlich eine Aufzählung verschiedener Anwendungsfälle des Begriffs, entspricht genau Wittgensteins Methode – es ist alles, was wir tatsächlich tun *können*. Ein gemeinsames Wesen, das allen Anwendungsfällen zu Grunde liegen soll, existiert schlicht nicht, – meint Wittgenstein – es ist eine durch nichts gerechtfertigte Annahme, die uns auf eine sinnlose Suche nach einer Illusion schickt.

Genau so – nämlich durch einzelne mehr oder weniger zufällige Beispiele – haben wir die Verwendung eines Wortes auch gelernt, bis wir schließlich in der Lage sind, das Wort korrekt zu verwenden – und das bedeutet in Übereinstimmung mit den Regeln, die in der Sprachgemeinschaft bestehen. Dabei sollten wir nicht nach exakten Verwendungsregeln suchen, weil es sie (zumeist) nicht gibt. Das schließt freilich nicht aus, dass wir solche exakten Grenzen ziehen können, etwa durch (wissenschaftliche) Definitionen, wenn dies sinnvoll ist. In unserem alltäglichen Sprachgebrauch spielen sie aber meist keine Rolle.

Wittgenstein warnt ausdrücklich vor der Idee, dass die Aufzählung von Anwendungsbeispielen nur ein *Mittel* zu einem Intuitiven Erfassen des zu Grund liegenden Wesens sei:

> Wir nehmen daher nicht an, dass die Beispiele im Lernenden etwas hervorrufen, ein Wesen vor seien Seele stellen, die Bedeutung des Begriffswortes […] Sollten die Beispiele eine Wirkung haben indem sie , sagen wir, ein bestimmtes Gesichtsbild im Lernenden erzeigen, so geht uns der kausale Zusammenhang zwischen den Beispielen und diesem Bild nichts an, für uns stehen sie nebeneinander." (PG 1974: Nr. 74) […]
>
> Der Irrtum ist, daß angenommen wird, wir wollten durch Beispiele das Wesen, des Wünschens etwa, illustrieren, und die Gegenbeispiele zeigten nun, daß diese Wesen noch nicht richtig erfasst sei. (PG 1974: Nr. 76)

Die Beispiele, die wir für die Verwendung eines Begriffs geben können, stehen aber auch nicht völlig willkürlich nebeneinander. Was sie verbindet ist ein komplexes Netz von Ähnlichkeiten und Verwandtschaften. Wittgenstein verwendet dafür bereits ab den frühen 30er Jahren den Begriff der „Familienähnlichkeit", wie er schließlich in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* (Nr. 65 ff) am Beispiel des Begriffs „Spiel" ausführlich erläutert. Da für die Anwendung eines Begriffs wie „Spiel" offenbar keine exakten Regeln definiert sind, ist es unsinnig, danach zu suchen. Das macht den Begriff aber deswegen nicht unbrauchbar, sondern entspricht einfach der Unschärfe, die er in unserem tatsächlichen Sprachgebrauch hat.

> Was ist noch ein Spiel, und was ist keines mehr? Kannst Du Grenzen angeben? Du kannst welche ziehen: denn es sind noch keine gezogen. (PU 2009: Nr. 68)
>
> Wir kennen die Grenzen nicht, weil keine gezogen sind. (PU 2009: Nr. 69)

Und daraus folgt auch, dass wir uns über die Verwendung eines Begriffs nicht immer vollständig einig sind. Wenn ein Hund auf der Straße mich ins Bein beißt und sein Besitzer mir versichert, dass der Hund ja *nur spielen* will, so werde ich viel-

leicht darauf bestehen , dass das für mich kein Spiel ist. Daran zeigt sich, dass das „Wesen des Spiels" nicht verbindlich festgeschrieben ist. Doch stören diese punktuellen Uneinigkeiten und Unschärfen in der Anwendung eines Begriffs unseren gewöhnlichen Sprachgebrauch normalerweise nicht.

Fazit: der traditionelle philosophische Wesensbegriff erweist sich in Wittgensteins Kritik als ebenso obsolet – wir können ein solches Wesens für die meisten unserer alltäglichen Begriffe gar nicht beschreiben – wie unnötig, weil wir die Verwendung unserer Begriffe auch ohne hypostasierte Wesenheiten mit Hilfe des Begriffs der Familienähnlichkeit ausreichend erklären können.
Dieses negative Ergebnis, Wittgensteins Zurückweisung einer platonischen Wesensmetaphysik ist aber nur ein Aspekt, sein Umgang mit dem Wesensbegriff wesentlich komplexer.

2. Wesen als Grammatik

Auf eine andere konstruktive Perspektive hat etwa Stanley Cavell verwiesen:

> I might summarize the vision I have been trying to convey of the tempering of speech – the simultaneous tolerance and intolerance of words – by remarking that when Wittgenstein says "Essence is expressed by grammar" (§371), he is not denying the importance, or significance, of the concept of essence, but retrieving it. The need for essence is satisfied by grammar. (Cavell 1979: 186)

Cavell meint also, dass Wittgenstein gerade mit seinem Konzept der Familienähnlichkeit den Wesensbegriff für die Philosophie zurückgewinnt, bzw. genau dieses Bedürfnis nach Wesenheiten mit dem Ver2weis auf die Grammatik befriedigt wird.. Ganz ähnlich argumentiert auch Wilhelm Lütterfelds in einem Artikel aus 2004:

> Mit alle dem ist Wittgenstein trotz seiner radikalen Kritik an der traditionellen Wesensmetaphysik, […], weit entfernt von einer positivistischen Destruktion der Philosophie des Wesens. Im Gegenteil, seine ‚begrifflichen' Untersuchungen stellen den Versuch dar, eine grammatisch angemessene Konzeption des Essentialismus zu liefern, so daß man zu Recht von einer ‚grammatischen Rehabilitierung' der Wesensmetaphysik bei Wittgenstein sprechen kann. (Lütterfelds 2004: 151)

Entspricht Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie also eher der Neukonzeption einer (platonischen) Wesensphilosophie als deren Destruktion? Bzw. wie lassen sich beide Denkbewegungen mit einander in Einklang bringen? Dieser Frage soll hier weiter nachgegangen werden. Als Ausgangspunkt eignen sich Wittgensteins programmatische Bemerkungen in PU 371 „Das Wesen ist in der Grammatik ausgesprochen" und PU 373 „Welcher Art von Gegenstand etwas ist, sagt die Grammatik (Theologie als Grammatik.)"

3. Exkurs

Den etwas kryptischen Klammerausdruck in PU 373 erläutert Wittgenstein ausführlicher sowohl in seinen Vorlesungen von 1933 („Luther said: 'Theology is Grammar of word of God'. / This might mean: An investigation of idea of God is a grammatical one." ; Sterne 2016: 320f) als auch später in seinem Tagebuch , wo es heißt:

> man sagt Gott sieht alles was ich tue; man sagt Gott spricht zu mir in meinem Herzen; man spricht von den Augen, der Hand, dem Mund Gottes, aber nicht von anderen Teilen des Körpers: Lerne daraus die Grammatik des Wortes ‚Gott'! [Ich habe irgendwo gelesen, Luther hätte geschrieben, die Theologie sei die ‚Grammatik des Wortes Gottes', der heiligen Schrift.] (MS 183: 203, vom 23. 2. 1937)

Plausibel ist Gabriel Citrons (Citron 2013) Vermutung, die Quelle Wittgensteins für diesen Hinweis auf Luther wäre einen Brief von Johann Georg Hamann – ein von Wittgenstein hoch geschätzter Autor - , in dem es heißt (Hamann bezieht sich hier auf das Buch *Gnomon oft he New Testament* von Albert Bengel):

> In der Vorrede führt der Autor einen sehr merkwürdigen Ausspruch unseres Luther an, der von dem philosophischen Geiste dieses Mannes Zeugnis gibt: Nil aliud esse Theologiam, nisi Grammaticam in Spiritus Sancti verbis occupatam. [Theologie ist nichts anderes, als Grammatik angewandt auf die Worte des Heiligen Geistes.] Diese Erklärung ist erhaben und nur dem hohen Begriff der wahren Gottesgelehrsamkeit adaequat. (Hamann Briefwechsel, vol. II [1760–1769], Insel-Verlag, S. 10 [Brief vom 19. Februar 1760])

Dass Wittgenstein in PU 373 gerade die Theologie als Beispiel einer grammatischen Untersuchung anführt, mag seinen Grund – wie Citron vermutet – darin haben, dass gerade hier die Grenzen zwischen einem orthodoxen (=regelkonformen) und einem häretischen oder blasphemischen Sprachgebrauch sehr streng gezogen sind bzw. besonders sensibel beobachtet werden. Luthers Begriff der ‚Grammatik' ist historisch im Sinne des klassischen Triviums (Grammatik, Dialektik, Rhetorik) zu sehen, was einen interessanten Blickwinkel auf Wittgensteins Begriff der Grammatik eröffnet.

Sucht man nach weiteren Erläuterungen zu den knappen aber grundlegenden Bemerkungen in PU 371 und 373 aus 1944, so stößt man auf wesentlich ältere Einträge, etwa im MS 108 aus 1929:

> Was zum Wesen der Welt gehört kann die Sprache nicht [sagen| ausdrücken. […]
> Das Wesen der Sprache aber ist ein Bild des Wesens der Welt & die Philosophie als Verwalterin der Grammatik kann tatsächlich das Wesen der Welt erfassen nur nicht in Sätzen der Sprache sondern in Regeln für diese Sprache die unsinnige Zeichenverbindungen ausschließen. (MS 108: 1, 2)

P. Hacker (1990: 236) sieht in diesem Zitat eine noch auf den TLP zurückgehende „misconception", von der sich Wittgenstein schon im *Big Typescript* befreit hätte. Es ist allerdings nicht klar, worin dieser Irrtum bestehen sollte. Fragen nach dem Wesen einer Sache, so Wittgenstein, werden beantwortet durch den Hinweis auf die (philosophischen) Grammatik des entsprechenden Begriffs, denn nur dort wird es für uns fassbar. Oder wie Cavell es formuliert, unsere Frage nach dem Wesen wird „befriedigt" durch eine Untersuchung bzw. übersichtliche Darstellung der Grammatik des entsprechenden Begriffs. Und "Eine vollständige Grammatik der Wörter, enthält 'alle Regeln', die von ihnen handeln." (MS 142: 88). Hier besteht kein Widerspruch zum obigen Zitat aus den *Philosophischen Bemerkungen*.

Dass die Philosophie die Grammatik nur „verwaltet" ist hier wesentlich. Es bedeutet, dass sie nicht versucht, unseren gewöhnlichen Sprachgebrauch zu verbessern, zu verfeinern oder zu reformieren. Sie lässt – wie wir wissen – alles wie es ist.

> Die Philosophie darf den tatsächlichen Gebrauch der Sprache in keiner Weise antasten, sie kann ihn am Ende also nur beschreiben.

> Denn sie kann ihn auch nicht begründen.
> Sie läßt alles, wie es ist. (PU 124, vgl. auch PU 133)

Maurice Drury berichtet, dass Wittgenstein geradezu empört war über einen philosophischen Missbrauch von Wörtern, der sie gleichsam in einen „academic isolation ward" führt, abgetrennt vom „stream of life" ihrer alltägliche Verwendung: „He told his class, that this is the very last thing philosophy should do […] it is shocking to use words with a meaning they never have in normal life and is the source of much confusion." (Hayes 2017: 8).

Wenn die Philosophie die „Verwalterin der Grammatik" ist, so ist sie nach PU 371 gleichzeitig auch „Verwalterin des Wesens", was einem platonischen Verständnis zumindest sehr nahe kommt. Und doch – könnte man einwenden – bleibt dabei der eigentliche Kern der Frage unklar: ist die Grammatik eines Begriffs nun durch das Wesen der Sache bestimmt, oder bestimmt umgekehrt die Grammatik das Wesen? Anders formuliert: warum sind die grammatischen Regeln so und nicht anders? Es scheint aber, als würde sich Wittgenstein genau dieser Frage konsequent entziehen.

> Es hat den Anschein, als könnte man aus der Bedeutung der Negation schließen, daß ~~p p heißt. Als würden aus der Natur der Negation die Regeln über das Negationszeichen folgen. So daß, in gewissem Sinne, die Negation zuerst vorhanden ist & dann die Regeln der Grammatik. […] Anderseits ist es klar, daß die Regeln, wenn sie aus dem Wesen der Negation hervorgehen, nicht wie aus einer Regel, einem Satz, folgen. Und täten sie es, so wäre eben dieser Satz die eigentliche Regel auf die es uns ankäme. Ich will also sagen: die Regeln folgen nicht aus dem Wesen der Negation, sondern sie drücken es aus. (MS 110: 107)

Das Wesen drückt sich in der Grammatik aus. Die Frage was zuerst war, ist hier nicht sinnvoll zu stellen.

Ein Konkretes Beispiel: Können Computer denken?
Die falsche Richtung wäre es zu fragen: ist das, was Computer tun, mit den Wesen des Denkens vereinbar? Ist das, was menschliche Subjekte tun nicht etwas ganz Anderes? Eigentlich aber fragen wir dabei nach der Grammatik des Begriffs „denken", d.h. nach seinen Verwendungsregeln. Und diese Regeln sind nicht explizit formuliert, also grundsätzlich offen, lassen Veränderungen und metaphorischen Gebrauch zu. Vieles was Computer bzw. Computerprogramme heute können, also etwa komplexe Rechenaufgaben lösen, Texte übersetzen, Schach spielen usf., würden wir ohne weiteres als Beispiele für Denken gelten lassen. Ob wir den Begriff „denken" auch für Computer verwenden wollen, ist letztlich also eine *Entscheidung* – nicht das Resultat einer *Wesenseinsicht*. Es ist aber nicht die Entscheidung eines Einzelnen, sondern einer Sprachgemeinschaft, welcher Sprachgebrauch sich schließlich durchsetzt. Dass Flugzeuge fliegen können, wird heute niemand in Frage stellen, und doch tun sie es in ganz anderer Weise als Vögel oder Insekten. Diese (von Herbert Hrachovec stammende) Analogie zur Frage, ob Computer denken, trifft die Sache sehr genau.

Ein anderes Beispiel wäre die Frage: Ist Pluto ein Planet? Für den Begriff „Planet" gibt es in der Astronomie heute verbindliche wissenschaftliche Kriterien, daher ist diese Frage nur durch einer empirischen Untersuchung zu klären, ob diese Kriterien im Fall Pluto vorliegen oder nicht. (Und natürlich kann sich diese Definition auch wieder ändern). Das ist genau der Punkt, wo Wittgenstein uns warnt, empirische (=sachliche) Fragen mit philosophischen (=begrifflichen) zu verwechseln: der Kernfehler der klassischen Metaphysik.

> Philosophische Untersuchungen: begriffliche Untersuchungen. Das Wesentliche der Metaphysik: daß ihr der Unterschied zwischen sachlichen & begrifflichen Untersuchungen nicht klar ist. Die metaphysische Frage immer dem Anscheine nach eine sachliche, wo || obschon das Problem ein begriffliches ist. (MS 134: 153)

4. Resümee

Wenn Wittgenstein – wie Cavell meint – den Wesensbegriff für die Philosophie zurückgewinnt, so doch mit einer wichtigen Akzentverschiebung. Das Wesen ist nicht mehr ein, unter der Oberfläche aller Anwendungsfälle verborgenes, geheimnisvolles Etwas, (vgl. PU 92), sondern es zeigt sich gerade in der Vielfalt der Anwendungsfälle, bzw. dem komplexen Netz an Ähnlichkeiten und Verwandtschaften zwischen ihnen. Die grammatischen Regeln für die Verwendung unserer Wörter, die unser Bedürfnis nach dem Wesen befriedigen, weisen aber stets beides auf, so Cavell, eine innere Konstanz oder Stabilität und eine Toleranz oder Offenheit für neuen Anwendungsfälle; anders könnte Sprache nicht funktionieren (Cavell 1979:185).

Der Wittgensteinsche Philosoph macht es sich so also insofern „leichter", als er sich damit begnügt, auf die verschiedenen Anwendungsfälle eines Begriffs zu verweisen. Er muss nicht versuchen, unseren alltäglichen Sprachgebrauch exakter zu machen, als er tatsächlich ist. Gibt es Unschärfen bei der Anwendung von Begriffen – etwa die Frage ob Computer nun denken können oder nicht – so hält er sich bescheiden zurück: „Wer Philosophie lehrt kann immer sagen: Ich weiß nicht, entscheide Du." (MS 119: 80)

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On the Limits of Academic Language

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Abstract

Reading and writing play a predominant role in modern philosophy. In the course of academic training, however, we are conditioned (encouraged or forced) to apply working techniques which tend to suppress individually shaped reading experiences. Reflecting on those, we come to understand that it is linguistic borderline experiences that awaken our philosophical mind. Yet, the borders of language become visible in the way and style of our writings and cannot be made an *object* of our speech. Hence, in order to keep alive our original philosophical motives, we must have the courage to cross the boundaries of academic representation. The first step in doing so is to no longer treat ideas of philosophy in a scientific manner as identifiable and transmittable objects or themes but rather as something that is laid down in our language and can only be demonstrated through linguistic (rhetorical, literary) work. This does not mean that doing philosophy is a formalistic enterprise without any value for our real lives. But it means that philosophy's ethical impact can only be brought to life if we drop the idea of philosophy as a science.

1. Reading Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*

Reading Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, propositions 6.5 and 5.6 (as well as their followers) always struck me as kind of an indicator of my own philosophical disposition. In times where I had been *searching* (in the sense in which Walker Percy's *Moviegoer* (1961) was involved in a search) I also deeply resonated to sentences like "*The limits of my language* mean [bedeuten] the limits of my world" (5.6) or "The subject does not belong to the world; rather it is a limit [eine Grenze] of the world" (5.632). Those sentences not only seemed to capture (or at least to indicate) experiences which I myself was not able to put into words, but also encouraged me to try harder when I was in danger of losing what might be called one's 'lingual morale'. Reading and bethinking those remarks gave me a feeling of obligation to work on my language (i.e., to weed out all the idling stuff) in order to make the world a better world. Presumptuous as this may sound, I still suppose (or at least I hope) that readers of the *Tractatus* are free to acknowledge that there is a way of understanding this work that is not only propositional but has to do with its power to *lift up*, to *encourage,* or—using a phrase of Kierkegaard—to *edify* ("opbygge") the reader.

In the way Wittgenstein draws it, the distinction between *saying* and *showing* is relevant for both our own philosophical *practice* and also when it comes to *reading* the *Tractatus* in the first place. By taking into consideration that it's already in this first book that the use or application of a sign determines not only its meaning but also its symbolic status (cf. 3.326–8), we come to acknowledge that it may depend on the reader whether a propositional sign, despite being a senseless tautology, *shows* us something. Thus, our own reading experiences can provide us with an idea of how a proposition either becomes philosophical and valuable (even though later we may be willing to do away with it) or whether it remains a dead and idling sequence of letters from the start.

Now my own experience showed me what at first glance looks like a paradox. On the one hand, it is *me* who *transforms* tokens like "*The limits of my language* mean the limits of my world" into a conceptual pattern by connecting it in multifarious ways with my daily actions. For example: Amidst a quarrel I pause and tell myself that I don't want to shape the world by filthy, half spoken phrases. Or I stop listening to the news for fear that its lousy language might gradually penetrate my thinking. And while talking to a child I remind myself that it is also me who moulds its perception […] Thus, I look at the world as circumscribed by (my) language and let my actions be formed and guided by this idea.

On the other hand, when I am really into a philosophical book, it is not *me* at all who *does* anything; rather it is the proposition, the text's style and figure that leads me, determines my outlook and makes me see things one way or another. Of course, reading *is* an activity, and the psychologists might tell us what's going on in our brain while our gaze slides from sign to sign. But still, it is not by analysing and dissembling that we do justice to a philosophical proposition. Rather, it is the other way round: a philosophical remark gains this status from not being scrutinised, operating as a paradigm by means of which we are able to analyse, to compare and to judge in the first place. So, what I want to say here is that any philosophical proposition can only play this role as long as we (as its readers) are ready to plunge into its form. One might even say that it is not *us* who touch the *sentences* but rather the sentences who have to touch us in order for them to do their philosophical work. Reading a philosophical text as a philosophical text consists in this openness for being touched, gripped, edified.

Well, I have the impression that we tend to unlearn this by becoming way too "professional" in dealing with philosophical texts. I think that our academic procedures of interpreting and objectifying, besides their hermeneutic benefits, do harm to what is of intrinsic value for our philosophical practices, namely, to let ourselves really be led and determined by a philosophical thought and not to deprive it of its very status by handling it *as* or converting it *into* a contentual proposition that stood in need of an analysis. In short, philosophy can only lift you up if you do not try to nail it down.

2. Writing about the *Tractatus*

Writing about the *Tractatus* has always been a challenge to me. And I wouldn't speak about my personal difficulties if I were not convinced that they were rooted in the matter itself. To shorten a big problem, I want to quote Frege who famously said it was "a mere illusion to suppose that a concept can be made an object without altering it." (Frege 1960: xxii) And Wittgenstein himself even called it the fundamental idea of his book "that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts." (4.0312) [Cf. Geach (1993) or Bromand (2003) for detailed discussions of connections between these two remarks.] — If, as I take it to be the case, the value of a philosophical text is present in its form and style, i.e., in the formal architecture which modifies and designs our outlook on the world, we cannot speak

or write *about* this book without changing and thus losing its real meaning. We can of course try to describe peculiar formal aspects of the text, focusing on various levels, as for example: the word, the sentence, the paragraph, their arrangement, the system of numbering, the drawings, the lingual pictures and metaphors, and so on and so forth. And there is a strong temptation to believe that by focusing on these aesthetic features we would get to the real core of Wittgenstein's philosophy. But that's an illusion. By explicating the formal apparatus which guided the naïve reader we actually lose what this naïve reader experienced. Philosophy is only for those who are within.

Frege used to think that it was a shortcoming of human language that one cannot speak about concepts without transforming them into objects. And he developed a formal technique that allowed him to preserve (or rather to indicate) their conceptual status while operating with concepts of another form. Wittgenstein showed that this formal apparatus might well be a good part of mathematics but that it is not what Frege, by calling his *Begriffsschrift* (1879) a "formula language of pure thinking", had in mind. It is not possible to capture or to unify thoughts. It is not possible to preserve a way of thinking by means of another way of thinking. It is not possible to make philosophy explicit.

But then how can we speak about the *Tractatus*? Well, one could of course say that we shouldn't discuss it anyway: "Read Wittgenstein's book, try to get everything out of it and leave it with that." — I take this to be a proper answer. At least as long as by writing about another man's philosophy one was trying to find some denotable, identifiable meaning of what can in fact only be shown and demonstrated. Yet, as philosophers we are not restricted to squeezing out texts in order to prove what is true and what is false, or to canvass how much of it had already been thought and written in earlier days. There is so much more to reading and writing philosophical texts than merely trying to identify their empirical, historical or hermeneutic significance (cf. IJsseling 1982). However, this is what we find ourselves doing most of the time. In the very first years of our academic training, we are told that philosophical thinking must proceed argumentative, at best deductive; and we are taught that everything subjective should be eliminated from the presentation as much as possible. In my opinion that's the real misery of modern academic thought. And that's the reason why we can hardly deal with a text like the *Tractatus*.

At this point one might be inclined to say: 'Well, by synchronizing the forms of expression, academia becomes less attractive to individualists, yet that's the prize for gaining facts, objectivity, comparability.' And I would agree with that; but I would also say that we have changed the subject matter: the objectivity gained is the objectivity of formal and hence empirical science. There is no way of finding the peculiar shapes of philosophy which are only visible at the edges, at the borderlines of representation, and which thus stand in need of an individual who runs up against and tries to transform those borders. What Wittgenstein writes about solipsism sounds proper for any representational form that is petrified and stable: the academic "shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it" (5.64). Indeed, the real problem with following the rules of academia is not that we are obliged to quote and expose our sources, write hypothetical research proposals and summarising abstracts; the problem rather is that all these procedures and practices are based on and repeat a picture of philosophy according to which it was something *out there,* waiting to be grasped, described, passed on to others. All practices of anticipating, planning, structuring nourish a concept of philosophy that stands in harsh contrast to the idea that the "philosophical self is […] the limit of the world—not a part of it." (5.641)—So instead of trying to formalise our studies we should rather try to bring ourselves, not necessarily into the *picture*, but at least into its *framing*.

One might be shocked by these ideas, taking them to point towards voluntaryism and the anarchy of randomly chosen worldviews. But that's simply not true. From my own humble experience as a literary writer, I know that the kind of lingual individuality that I am asking for has little to do with nourishing our ego in the social realm. On the contrary, to write in a way such that hitherto neglected, forgotten *forms* of language and thinking become visible, demands a sensibility and openness that leaves hardly any place for egotism and self-conceit. Hence, it is not true, as a self-appointed philosopher of philosophy would say, that loosening our standards results in "the capricious tyranny of petty feuding warlords" or that "unclarity of constraints in philosophy leads to authoritarianism." (Williamson 2007: 290). Williamson's paradigm for philosophical research is that of physics and chemistry. But that's not how philosophy works, provided that we want it to be more than an eclectic history of ideas.

3. Walker Percy's *Moviegoer*

Walker Percy's *Moviegoer,* 'Binx' Bolling, is a man to whom one morning "for the first time in years" occurs "the possibility of a search" (7). "What is the nature of the search?", he asks. "The search is what everybody would undertake if he were not sunk into the everydayness of his own life." (Percy 1988: 9) Of course, this 'answer' would not have satisfied Aristotle. The nature of the search is not defined by a species-determining difference. It is not even clear if and where this thing called 'search' could be found. Yet, as the story unfolds, a sincere reader of Percy's book will not only see what this search can be like; she will also be reminded that once she had been on a search herself. And something very similar used to happen when, after working on a purportedly philosophical paper, I opened the *Tractatus* and was struck by the fact that what I had been doing so far was in fact far away from doing philosophy. I had been too absorbed in academic standards and schemes as to advance to the edges of language where alone something that deserved to be called philosophy would have become visible.

I know that this sounds rather dramatic and that in the face of this embarrassing revelation some may turn up their noses, saying: 'Well, better leave academia then and look for life's meaning in the cinemas if you can't find it here.' To which I would have answered that it is exactly the cinemas where I very often found what I called with Kierkegaard the edifying power of philosophy. It is actually this mood of a new beginning in which excellent art can transform us and which I also demand from philosophy. This uplifting cannot be brought about by stringing together supposed philosophical contents but it is the fruit of aesthetic work on the borders of language. In order for academic philosophy to maintain this at the same time aesthetic and ethical aspiration, it's not enough to promote transdisciplinary research projects. Rather, the way this research is conducted must itself be transformed. Transformed into *what*? Well, I don't know. I have some vague ideas. I'm still on the search. Or so I hope …

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Rush Rhees on Set Theory, the Sophists, and Wittgenstein

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Abstract

Rush Rhees, one of Wittgenstein's three trustees, lectured on Plato and the Presocratics for two decades. In his lecture notes on the Sophists, Rhees briefly mentions Wittgenstein's views on set theory and claims that mathematicians have responded to them like Sophists. This essay discusses and contextualises Rhees's claim, including a brief discussion of how Rhees's understanding of Plato might have influenced him as an editor of Wittgenstein's *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*.

1. Introduction

Rush Rhees is perhaps best known as one of Wittgenstein's students and trustees. He co-edited many of the volumes we today know as works by Wittgenstein, including the first edition of the *Philosophical Investigations* and the original as well as the revised edition of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*. While acknowledging how much he had learned from Wittgenstein, he supposedly also "spoke of his enormous indebtedness to Plato" (Rhees 2004a: vii). He taught courses on Plato and the Presocratics for around 20 years at what is today the University of Swansea, and his lectures have been presented in two volumes with the title *In Dialogue with the Greeks* (Rhees 2004a and Rhees 2004b). The volumes were compiled by D.Z Phillips from notes by Rhees and from notes by one of his students. In this essay, I will focus on one of the chapters in the first volume, compiled entirely from notes written by Rhees in 1958–65, and given the title 'Is Man the Measure of All Things?' by Phillips (Rhees 2004a: 79–94).

The chapter is, of course, about the Sophists. But in the middle of the chapter we find, a bit unexpected, the following comment on Wittgenstein and set theory:

> Regarding the confusion about what mathematics is, the tendency to use false criteria, the search for a mechanical method, and so forth, Wittgenstein might have said that certain developments of Mengenlehre (number theory) were pseudo-mathematics. And the replies of the mathematicians would be, or have been, much on the same lines as the replies of the Sophists. (Rhees 2004a: 87)

What can Rhees mean by this? The rest of this essay will consider what else Rhees wrote about the Sophists and investigate why he thought of Wittgenstein and set theory in this context.

2. This is what we do

Rhees imagines that mathematicians would reply to Wittgenstein's critique by saying "Well, this is what we do? Isn't that the sanction you use?" The problem is just that "this is what we do" has not been clearly understood, and neglecting this sets the scene for sophistry, that is for subtle and clever reasoning that seems true and impressive but that is actually deceptive and false. This might seem surprising and provocative at first, but it could be the non-extensional perspective that Floyd and Mühlhölzer (2020) have identified that Rhees has in mind. The non-extensional perspective has been neglected when we try to describe what mathematicians do. Rhees writes that Socrates's way of examining what we are doing would have been relevant to, for example, proof theorists, since it seems to him that they fail to describe what they're doing, just stopping at "that's how we do it" (Rhees 2004a: 88).

Referring to the *Crito*, Rhees writes about how one can imagine a lawyer who is excellent at presenting a case without any special understanding of the subject (Rhees 2004a: 90). What is more, this sort of lawyer can even speak without understanding the laws. Although she might be learned in the law, she is unable to learn *from* the laws. She would not be prepared to argue for *any* case if she had learned from the laws. Rhees claims that there is a "parallel between this attitude towards the laws and the Sophist's attitude towards argument" (Rhees 2004a: 90). The Sophist's treatment of arguments makes it impossible for him to learn from them. It also makes the whole discussion false since it cannot proceed without the very kind of understanding of arguments that it rejects. What has this to do with set theory? Well, in its surroundings in, say, the *Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik*, the idea was that any domain of mathematics could be formalized and thereafter decided mechanically, without really even having to understand the content, let alone learning from it (Hilbert and Ackermann 1928: 72–77). In that sense, the overall attitude was similar, then, to the Sophist's attitude towards argument.

Rhees elaborates this point as follows:

> I think Plato suggests that the Sophist has not understood discourse. His main point is that the Sophist perverts discourse, or offers a false imitation of discourse. He does this by somehow making a separation between using language and understanding what is said, or being spoken about. […] Plato would say that he does not understand the connection or 'communion' between discourse and reality. You do not understand discourse if you make that separation. (Rhees 2004a: 88)

This bears similarities to what I said above about the idea of the *Grundzüge*. In light of this, one can interpret Wittgenstein's remark about the "'disastrous invasion' of mathematics by logic" as a critique of sophistry (RFM V: §24).

But how does one come to see this point? As Rhees asks (Rhees 2004a: 88), "How can discourse show you what the relation of discourse to reality is?" Rhees argues that the philosopher clearly cannot immediately understand the discourse of, for example, a physician. Of course, this holds for the discourse of a mathematician, too. But can the philosopher discourse about discourse? Rhees reckons that the philosopher certainly cannot teach you discourse. That would make him into something like a grammarian, and that is not what a philosopher does. He also claims that a philosopher cannot teach dialectic in the same way a physician can teach medicine. "If we were asked, 'How can any *discourse* show you what the relation of discourse to reality is? we might answer, 'It cannot. Only long experience can do this, experience accompanied by reflection.'" (Rhees 2004a: 89). I suppose this holds for mathematics

as well, and perhaps that is why the idea of formalisation in set theory would fail to show the relation of a certain mathematical field, say number theory, to reality in the broadest sense of our existence (so not only to, say, mathematical or physical reality). On the other hand, one can certainly argue that set theory is a form of reflection par *excellence* accompanying experience. But perhaps still not reflection of the right kind. Protagoras, Rhees holds, denied both the reality of discussion and the reality of discourse (Rhees 2004a: 90). The first means to deny any difference between a discussion in which people are trying to find something out and to examine themselves and a discussion where one simply tries to win the argument or play a game. The second means that he denied any correspondence between what is said and *what is,* which means that you cannot learn from what is said.

3. Sham and the genuine

A topic which Rhees is concerned with throughout his writings is the difference between something genuine and what he called sham. Sometimes he refers to this as the difference between science and pseudo-science. This distinction is something that Plato, according to Rhees, investigates in the *Gorgias*, the *Republic* and the *Sophist* (Rhees 2004a: 89 ff). In the *Republic*, Rhees holds, Plato argues that dialectic can help us distinguish false forms of mathematical science from genuine ones. In the *Sophist*, however, Plato, according to Rhees, says that the sciences can take care of themselves and that philosophy can learn as much from them as the other way around. In fact, for the one who denies the reality of discourse, one could point to a science as a domain of discourse where the distinction between understanding and ignorance is clear, the distinction between "knowing what you are talking about and talking in the air" (Rhees 2004a: 90). The sciences can be good examples of genuine discussion and investigation.

Rhees (2004a: 84) writes that Protagoras promised people that he could teach them how to achieve their life goals, the kind of life they wanted to live. Socrates took issue with this and held that most of us do not know what kind of life we want to live. Socrates idea of education was to expose that ignorance so that one could then ask oneself what one really did want and start criticising one's own ideas. From this perspective, Protagoras conception of education is sham. And the goal was not to arrive at a set of rules or a technique for living. Socrates negative result for defining for example friendship is therefore not incapacity, as Aristotle held, but rather something, that shows that no such definition is possible. Connected to this is the observation that there cannot be any general method for speaking with understanding, for distinguishing what is genuine from what is sham (Rhees 2004:a 86). There is a relation to set theory here, if set theory the general method one thinks one wants. What do you want from set theory? From category theory?

Plato shows, according to Rhees (2004a: 90), how a *discussion* can be false. A discussion can be false in the same sense as a statement can be false, or a conclusion from a fallacious argument can be false. Moreover, a false discussion can contain true statements, and genuine discussion can contain false statements. Plato thought that Parmenides' statements were wrong and that his arguments did not hold, but not that the whole discussion was false. In contrast, the Sophist's discussion is false. Just as a false statement is still real, a false discussion can still be a real discussion – yet false. It is remarkable and enlightening that Rhees, pointing to Wittgenstein, places set theory with the Sophists. Did Wittgenstein think that the whole, or at least entire parts, of set theory were somehow a false discussion, although it contained valid mathematical arguments? And how would one go about showing that?

4. Growth of understanding

Rhees shows that even before Socrates, philosophy as, on the on hand, enquiry into the nature of things and, other hand, philosophy as an enquiry into good and evil, or a worthless life or a life worth living, run into each other in intricate ways (Rhees 2004a: 79–80). Both aspects of philosophy are there also when one is thinking about mathematics. Rhees thinks that there is also a question whether science means something to someone. How it is connected to other things in his life, between one science and another one, for example. Understanding is not just that someone is "faultless in going through the motions", Rhees says in connection to Protagoras (Rhees 2004a: 88).

Socrates claimed, Rhees says, ignorance about the greatest things, like justice and injustice. It was not only that he knew that there were many common things he was ignorant about, which according to Rhees is a common misinterpretation (Rhees 2004a: 80 ff). Philosophy aims at clarity about the greatest things. The point of mathematical study was becoming aware that one's real concern is the eternal (Rhees 2004a: 85). If one's mathematical study does not result in this, it could even be considered pointless. And this recognition of the eternal is not something one can arrive at only through the study of material things.

A central idea that Rhees identifies in Plato is the growth of understanding (Rhees 2004a: 86). This growth of understanding does not lie increased proficiency in some skill. And this is to do with discourse that we understand not having a formal unity. Growth in understanding cannot, therefore, be achieved by some method or technique. "There is no method which you can teach men to follow if they want to arrive at truth or wisdom" (Rhees 2004a: 86). This, Rhees claims, is Plato's position in the *Sophist, Parmenides* and *Timeaus*. In the *Republic* there is, according to Rhees, something like stages in education, but Plato emphasises that the study of mathematical science may but does not necessarily give you understanding (of the greatest things, I suppose). It seems Rhees, and possibly Wittgenstein, thought parts of set theory were sham from this perspective.

5. Conclusion

So it is in this context that Rhees places Wittgenstein's remarks on set theory, qualified by a "might have". Indeed, Rhees and Wittgenstein had discussed Plato's *Parmenides* in July 1942, around the time that Wittgenstein's wrote some of his remarks on mathematics (Rhees 2004b: 167). This shows that Rhees had some reason to connect Wittgenstein's thinking about mathematics with Greek philosophy. Moreover, the PI contains references to *Theaetetus* and to Socrates.

I think that when editing the RFM, Rhees was concerned with truth or falsity in the sense of truth or falsity of a discussion. His aim was to make it possible for the reader to differentiate the genuine from the sham regarding a whole discussion, and not just in details. And, moreover, the truth and falsity of the discussion in connection to the greatest things. One can, I believe, see this in the correspondence between the editors when they were revising the first edition of the RFM (Solin 2022). From this perspective, the details of certain remarks perhaps do not matter as much as if one had edited from, say, the perspective of mathematical clarity or mathematical

development. Seen as a critique of sophistry also makes the so-called subliminal-resentment remarks in which Wittgenstein attacks mathematicians such as Gödel and Hardy more comprehensible (see Floyd and Mühlhölzer 2020: 22–23 and Solin 2021).

Was it fair to Wittgenstein to place his work on set theory in the middle of this discussion about the Sophists? Was it fair to the set theorists? Is Rhees reading Wittgenstein into Plato or Plato into Wittgenstein? Or is he reading himself into both? However that may be, the discussion is interesting in its own right. It sketches another form of Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics than the ones we are used to.

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Über Denken, Reden und Schreiben: Sokrates/Platon und Wittgenstein

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Abstract

Ausgehend von Platons Dialog *Phaidros*, in dem Sokrates zwischen Denken, Reden und Schreiben unterscheidet und über die Kunst der Rhetorik spricht, sollen Wittgensteins Gedanken und Bemerkungen zu dieser Thematik erörtert werden, die sich teilweise von Platon unterscheiden, aber auch Ähnlichkeiten aufweisen.

Der aus mehreren Abschnitten aufgebaute Dialog *Phaidros* gipfelt im „Zwiegespräch über die Redekunst". Im Rekurs auf eine Sage aus dem alten Ägypten, sagt Sokrates zu Phaidros, dass der Philosoph Kostbareres besitze als was er schreibe. Wichtiger sei die Selbstbesinnung, als sich auf Schriftzeichen zu verlassen, die nur ein Mittel zur Erinnerung, nicht aber zur Stärkung des Gedächtnisses seien. Nur die Rede, „die mit Erkenntnis geschrieben wird [...], die fähig ist, sich selbst zu verteidigen, die zu reden und zu schweigen weiß [...]" (275D), betrachtet Sokrates als „die lebende und beseelte Rede des Wissenden" – eine Bemerkung, die den Ansichten Kierkegaards als auch Wittgensteins über die Bedeutung des Schweigens im Gegensatz zu „Geschwätzigkeit" entspricht. Das Geschriebene, so Sokrates, ist dabei ein Nachbild des lebendigen und beseelten Wortes des Wissens (275D). Worte können demnach als Söhne des Sprechers bezeichnet werden, als „Sprößlinge" des von ihm Erdachten (277D).

Allerdings stand Sokrates einem ständigen Ändern von Geschriebenem kritisch gegenüber – eine Eigenschaft, die er an Dichtern, Redeverfassern und Gesetzesschreibern beobachtete (vgl. 227B). Wesentlich sei das Streben nach Weisheit, wovon der Redende erfüllt sein müsse. Nicht nur im öffentlichen, sondern auch im privaten Bereich sollte die Rede eine Funktion haben – nämlich die der „Führung der Seele" (271B).

Bevor Sokrates auf die Kunst des Redens eingeht, spricht er über den Eros und die Unsterblichkeit der Seele – dies als Reaktion auf die Rede des Lysias über den Eros, in der dieser dem Nichtverliebten gegenüber dem Verliebten eindeutig den Vorzug gibt. In seiner ersten Rede verurteilt Sokrates den Eros als sinnliches Begehren, dies allerdings mit verhülltem Haupt, da er sich vor dem Gotte Eros schämt. In seiner zweiten Rede preist er das Göttliche am Eros – als rauschhafte, doch göttliche Mania, die notwendig für schöpferisches Denken und Schaffen sei. Nur im Rausch werden große Werke geschaffen, da der Rausch durch göttliche Schickung entstanden und edler als die von den Menschen stammende Besonnenheit sei (244D).

Im Anschluss an seine Preisrede auf den Eros, gehen Sokrates und Phaidros daran, die Weise des Schön- und Unschön-Redens zu ergründen. Bevor sie darauf eingehen, wird Sokrates der Zikaden gewahr, die in der Mittagsglut unentwegt über seinem Haupte singen, was er als Aufforderung betrachtet, im Geiste nicht müde zu werden und womöglich einen Mittagsschlaf zu halten. Und er erzählt seinem Schüler die Legende von den Zikaden, nach der diese einst Menschen waren, doch als die Musen und der Gesang aufkam, im Singen und Tanzen Speise und Trank vergaßen und starben. Das daraus entstandene Geschlecht der Zikaden erhielt von den Musen die Gabe, ohne Nahrung auszukommen, um sich ganz dem Gesang zu widmen. Darüber hinaus obliege es ihnen, den Musen zu melden, wer unter den Menschen die verschiedenen Musen verehre. „Der Kalliope, der Ältesten, und Urania, der ihr Nächsten, melden sie die, die in Philosophie leben und ihre Musenkunst ehren" (259B) – „denn diese, [...], lassen die schönste Stimme tönen" (ibid.)

Nach dieser Erzählung beginnt Sokrates mit Phaidros über die Kunst des Redens zu sprechen und berichtet, dass die zu der Zeit üblichen Reden anlässlich Gerichtsverhandlungen oder Versammlungen von geschulten Rednern verfasst wurden, deren Kunst jedoch im „Überreden" bestand, d.h. den Menschen sogenannte Schein-Wahrheiten zu vermitteln, statt nach der Wahrheit zu suchen. Doch nur darauf käme es an (vgl. 260D) – eine Forderung, die sich auch bei Wittgenstein hinsichtlich seiner Auffassung von Lehre wiederfinden wird. Darüber später.

Anhand von Beispielen führt Sokrates die Schwierigkeiten an, die bei Worten und Begriffen entstehen, über die wir uns nicht im Klaren sind. Für die dialektische Methode führt er zwei Prinzipien an:

1.) Das vielfach Zerstreute auf eine Idee zu führen, um den Gegenstand bestimmend deutlich zu machen. Dann habe „die Rede Klarheit im Ausdruck und die Übereinstimmung mit sich selbst" (265B).

2.) Die Kunst, wieder nach Begriffen zu zerlegen.

Diese Teilungen und Zusammenfassungen befähigen, klar zu sprechen und zu denken, um „das Wirkliche als Eines und Vieles zu sehen", was Sokrates bisher als dialektische Methode bezeichnet hatte. (266A)

Für die Rhetorik bzw. die Kunst des Redens, nennt Sokrates vier Prinzipien: 1. Die Einleitung, 2. Die Darstellung einschließlich der Zeugnisse, 3. Beweise, 4. Die Wahrscheinlichkeiten. Wichtig seien Widerlegung und Nachwiderlegungen.

Wittgenstein, der sich zeitlebens mit den Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Sprache auseinandersetzte, war sich nicht nur der Grenzen des Aussagbaren hinsichtlich der, den Tatsachenbereich transzendierenden Fragen, bewusst, sondern auch der feinen Unterschiede zwischen Denken, Reden und Schreiben. Es ging ihm nicht nur um die Verfertigung der Gedanken beim Schreiben oder Reden, wie sich Kleist ausdrückte, sondern um die dazwischen liegenden „Nuancen".

Obgleich bei ihm Denken und Schreiben vielfach eine Einheit bilden – er denke mit der Feder, während sein Kopf oft nicht wisse, was seine Hand schreibe (VB, 52), er daher häufig als „Schreibarbeiter" gesehen wird, war ihm andererseits bewusst, dass nicht alles aufgeschrieben werden kann, was man denkt. Nur das, was „in der Schreibeform" in uns entsteht, lasse sich in Worte fassen, die aufgeschrieben werden können (vgl. DB: 27).

> Man glaubt oft – und ich selber verfalle oft in diesen Fehler – daß alles aufgeschrieben werden kann was man denkt. In Wirklichkeit kann man nur das aufschreiben – d.h. ohne etwas blödes & unpassendes zu tun – was in der Schreibeform in uns entsteht. Alles andere wirkt komisch & gleichsam wie Dreck. D.h. etwas was weggewischt gehörte. Vischer sagte „Eine Rede ist keine Schreibe" und eine Denke ist schon erst recht keine. (DB: 27)

Allerdings könnten mit den Gedanken, die sich nicht schreiben lassen, sogenannte vage, unfertige Gedanken bzw. Gedankensplitter oder auch Empfindungen gemeint sein, denen die adäquaten Worte, eine Satzstruktur, daher „Schreibeform" noch fehlen. Denn gerade auch im Prozess des Philosophierens spricht Wittgenstein immer wieder von den Gedanken, die ihn bewegen, aber noch nicht ausgedrückt, nicht in die entsprechende schriftliche Form gebracht worden seien:

> Es ist mir, als ob ich ausgezeichnete Gedanken in mir hätte, die aber nicht an die Oberfläche kommen können, höchstens einen Augenblick hervorschauen & sich wieder zurückziehen. Anderseits fühle ich auch, daß mir zum Ausdrücken dieser großen Gedanken eine Kraft nötig wäre, die ich weit entfernt bin zu besitzen. Ich habe tatsächlich nicht die Kraft, sie zu gebären. Sie herauszupressen. Oder sie zerbröckeln beim Austritt. (MS 118: 8v)

Eine Diskrepanz zwischen Gedanken und schriftlich Festgehaltenem bleibt wohl immer bestehen, da bereits die erste Niederschrift durch den Prozess des Schreibens Änderungen unterworfen ist. Trotzdem war der Schreibprozess für Wittgenstein wesentlich, gerade aufgrund der ständigen Änderungen und dabei erneuten Reflektierens seiner Gedanken, um diese zu der treffenden Formulierung zu führen und damit zu einer ihm gebührend erscheinenden, schriftlich festgehaltenen Form zu werden. – Insofern sich also beim Schreiben neue Gedanken entwickeln, was der Bemerkung „mit der Feder zu denken" entspräche. Daher dient das Schreiben nicht nur als sprachliche Überarbeitung durch ein Feilen am Ausdruck, sondern vor allem auch als Klärung seiner Gedanken – wie es bereits im *Tractatus* sein Ziel war, dem Ausdruck von Gedanken eine Grenze zu ziehen, um Klarheit in philosophische Sätze zu bringen – und darüber hinaus, auf das Undenkbare, sprachlich nicht Fassbare, hinzuweisen. Und wie sich bei Wittgenstein zeigt, ist es mit dem schließlich Geschriebenen seiner Gedanken bei weitem noch nicht getan: Auch wenn etwas geschrieben ist, ändert sich der Blick des Schreibers beim Lesen des Geschriebenen erneut, was zu neuerlichen Änderungen des Textes führt, in der Folge zu einem nie enden wollenden Prozess des Änderns durch sich stets entwickelnde, neue und dadurch veränderte Gedanken.

Die Schwierigkeit im Formen und Niederschreiben seiner Gedanken beschreibt Wittgenstein auf bildhafte Weise:

> Meine Gedanken kommen beinahe nie unverstümmelt in die Welt. Entweder es wird ein Teil bei der Geburt verrenkt oder abgebrochen. Oder der Gedanke ist überhaupt eine Frühgeburt und in der Wortsprache noch nicht lebensfähig. Dann kommt ein kleiner Satz-Fötus zur Welt, dem noch die wichtigsten Glieder fehlen. (DB: 98f.)

Gedanken oder Sätze als Lebewesen, als Föten zu sehen, erinnert an Sokrates, der, wie vorhin erwähnt, Worte als „Söhne des Sprechers" bezeichnete. Es dauert lange, bis ein Satz-Fötus seine Glieder erhält und selbst dann sind diese aus Wittgensteins Sicht nicht vollkommen, weshalb er sie unentwegten Änderungen unterwirft. Trotzdem ist er mit seiner Art der Gedankenbewegung beim Philosophieren manchmal zufrieden, ja, in sie verliebt, wie er zugibt. Doch dies betreffe nicht seinen *Stil*, wie er betont (vgl. DB: 100).

Wittgenstein unterscheidet also zwischen der Art der Gedankenbewegung beim Philosophieren und deren Verarbeitung beim Schreiben und seinem Stil. Der Stil müsse sich am Gesichtspunkt *sub specie aeternitatis* orientieren und dies gelte für jeden Stil – dem des Schreibenden oder anderweitig künstlerisch Tätigen (vgl. DB: 28). Nur in Erfüllung eines solchen Stils zeige sich die eigentliche *Tiefe* des Schöpfers, die sich von Seichtheit durch Phrasenhaftigkeit und Oberflächlichkeit unterscheide. Die Orientierung an einem Stil *sub specie aeternitatis* ist an den Zusammenhang zwischen Kunst und Ethik geknüpft, den Wittgenstein bereits 1916 in seinen Tagebüchern thematisierte. Seine Schriften zeugen von einem unermüdlichen Streben nicht nur nach sprachlicher Perfektion, sondern vor allem nach Wahrhaftigkeit im Niederschreiben seiner philosophischen Gedankengänge.

Nicht nur im Denken und Schreiben, auch in der Lehre hatte er ein hohes Ethos vor Augen: Es kam ihm darauf an, seinen Zuhörern oder Studenten nicht sogenannte fertige Weisheiten weiterzugeben, sondern vor ihnen an den Problemen zu „nagen", wie er es bei G.E. Moore beobachtet und geschätzt hatte (vgl. CLH 1994: 143). „Zu nagen" bedeutet die mündliche Verarbeitung der Gedanken durch das Sprechen, so wie durch den Prozess des Schreibens deren schriftliche Verarbeitung erfolgt.

In der Orientierung an ethischen und ästhetischen Kriterien, an einer alles zugrundeliegenden Wahrhaftigkeit, ging es Wittgenstein ähnlich Sokrates um „Kostbareres" als das bloße Verfassen eines Textes. Sein Ziel war keineswegs das eines Überredens, sondern die Anregung zu selbständigem Denken seiner Zuhörer und Leser – um „Licht in ein oder das andere Gehirn zu werfen", wie er es im Vorwort zu den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* klarstellte. In der Hinführung auf die vielfältigen Aspekte der phänomenalen Welt und der Achtung vor dem Kosmos als auch Ehrfurcht vor dem nicht sichtbaren, nicht erklärbaren Bereich, könnte man nicht zu Unrecht von einer Führung der Seelen im Sinne Sokrates' sprechen.

Wittgensteins Unruhe im Schreiben lag oft die Angst zugrunde, Gedanken nicht rechtzeitig festzuhalten, so dass sie vor dem Niederschreiben entschwinden könnten. Daher verwendet er häufig Metaphern des Fliegens oder des Windes (vgl. MS 107: 117; MS 105: 105).

Für Sokrates liegt der Schwerpunkt im *Denken*. Im Reden, sofern es darin um die Wahrheit geht, sei durch die dialektische Methode mehr zu erreichen als im Schreiben, da bei letzterem die Rechtfertigung des Geschriebenen nicht gegeben ist. Abgesehen davon, wird der Geist nicht angeregt, wie es bei Gesprächen der Fall ist, sondern eher eingedämmt.

Auch Wittgenstein ging es darum, die Menschen zu eigenen Gedanken anzuregen, statt durch eine Lehre Epigonen seiner Philosophie zu züchten, was deren Anstrengung zu eigenem Denken nur schwächen würde. Durch die schrittweise Weiterentwicklung durch Fragen und Antworten in seinen fiktiven Dialogen, ermöglicht er dem Leser, die zur Diskussion stehenden Probleme philosophischer Erörterung durch selbständiges Denken zu hinterfragen. Insofern gleichen die Dialoge aus Wittgensteins *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* einer sokratischen Methode und wie aus seinen Vorlesungen bekannt ist, praktizierte er diese Art der philosophischen Diskussion auch mit seinen Studenten: Indem er eine Frage aufwarf, ein Pro-

blem in den Raum stellte, um dann an diesem, vor – und mit – seinen Zuhörern zu diskutieren. Es kam ihm darauf an, seine Zweifel als Zweifel und Unsicherheiten wiederzugeben. Denn nur durch „innere Wahrheit" könne man Anderen zu größerer Wahrheit verhelfen (vgl. CLH 1994: 140–144).

Auf diese Wahrheit kam es auch Platon an: Anstatt Andere durch die Kunst des Überredens zu der Wahrheit nicht entsprechenden Meinungen zu führen, sah er die eigentliche Kunst des Redens darin, dass der Redner von Wahrheit erfüllt ist.

Abschließend sei noch auf die Bedeutung des Mythos hingewiesen, der bei Platon, insbesondere im *Phaidros*, zum Ausdruck kommt, doch der auch bei Wittgenstein eine Rolle spielt, wie ihm überhaupt Bilder, Metaphern und Gleichnisse wichtig waren und in gewisser Hinsicht wie bei Platon rationalem Denken – dem logos – vorgezogen werden.

Der Mythos der Zikaden, der die schöpferische Besessenheit, die *mania*, veranschaulicht, kann als Bild für die im Staunen wurzelnde Begeisterung gesehen werden, die auch bei Wittgenstein zum einen als ein Staunen über den Kosmos – über „die Existenz der Welt" – , zum anderen als ein bewegtes, ruheloses sich Verwundern über die Entdeckung stets neuer Aspekte an einem Objekt philosophischer Betrachtung zum Ausdruck kommt.

Trotz seiner kritischen Haltung gegenüber dem Mythos als einem Werk des Dichters, das immer Falsches – wenn auch Wahres – enthält, verwendet Platon immer wieder Mythen, Gleichnisse, Metaphern, Bilder. Denn wie schon Hesiod von den Musen sprach, die auch die Wahrheit sagen können, so ist Mythos auch hier Logos – im Sinne der Rede mit Wahrheitsgehalt. Zwar scheint er oft im Gegensatz zum Logos, dann wieder mit diesem verwoben zu sein, was auch zu unterschiedlichen Interpretationen in der Platon-Forschung führte. Im Phaidros, wo es um den Eros, die Schau der Ideen und die Rhetorik geht, dient der Mythos neben dem dialektischen Gespräch als Mittel zur Erziehung (vgl. Somavilla 2012: 29). Demgemäß beschließt Sokrates seine Gespräche mit *Phaidros* mit einem Gebet an Pan und die Nymphen an einem geradezu mystischen Ort. Dort, wo die Zikaden singen, deren von Sokrates erfundene Legende für den ganzen Dialog von größerer Bedeutung ist, als es auf den ersten Blick erscheint (ebd., 30f.).

Die Bedeutung der Dialektik steht als eine Art Spiegel zum unentwegten Zwiegespräch der Zikaden, auf die Sokrates hinweist und die er als „Prophetinnen der Musen" (262B) bezeichnet – als Mittlerinnen zwischen den Menschen und den Musen, wie es Eros zwischen den Menschen und den Göttern ist.

Die Rede um das Wesen der Rhetorik bezeichnet Sokrates im *Phaidros* einmal als Spiel – ein Spiel mit Sprache, wie der Mythos ein Spiel mit Bildern ist. Beide – Rede und Mythos – erfordern Phantasie und Überzeugungskraft – wie es auch in Wittgensteins *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* zutage tritt. In seinen Beispielen über die unterschiedliche Bedeutung von Wörtern in verschiedenen Sätzen stellt er einmal die Frage: „ist alles was ich hier treibe nicht Mythologie? Dichte ich nicht zu dem Offenbaren dazu? […]" (TS 211: 195). An anderer Stelle schrieb er: „Ich glaube meine Stellung zur Philosophie dadurch zusammengefaßt zu haben indem ich sagte: Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur dichten." (MS 146: 50).

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De Malorum Scienta: On the impossibility of *Kakologia* in Proclus and Pseudo-Dionysius

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Abstract

This paper illustrates a point of overlap between the Wittgenstineinian and Platonic traditions, particularly their shared penchant for dissolving rather than solving philosophical questions. In particular, I develop a Platonic argument against the possibility of κακολογία (a science of evil). I argue that inquiries into the per se causes of evil constitute what Wittgenstein, in *Philosophical Investigations*, calls "unobvious nonsense." First, I examine Aristotle's argument in *Metaphysics* Eta against a science of accidental being. Second, I turn to Proclus's and Pseudo-Dionysius's disjunctive arguments for classifying evils as beings per accidens. Given this classification, I draw the conclusion that a science of evil is, in principle, incoherent. Third, I put forward a few therapeutic implications of this argument. If a science of evil is impossible, then the troubled philosopher need not be worried by vexing questions such as "unde malum" (whence evil?), but can content himself with investigating what is actually intelligible.

Philosophy is a "struggle against the bewitchment of the understanding by means of language" (PI 2009: §109), a struggle against the pseudo-problems generated by imprecise concepts. This characterization of philosophy is operative in Platonic arguments regarding the intelligibility of evil. In the *Confessions*, Augustine dissolves the question "whence evil?" (*unde malum*), by attending to the terms involved, i.e. '*bonum*' and '*substantia*' (Augustine 2014: 330). Once he recognized that these were convertible, he realized that evil did not have a per se cause, but a variety of contingent ones.

Following Augustine, Proclus, and Pseudo-Dionysius, I argue that inquiries into the per se causes of evil are instances of "unobvious nonsense" (PI 2009: §464). Several scholars have noticed that, for Platonists, *per se* inquiries into evil are "mistaken" (Jones 2011: 86), "unintelligible" (Perl 2007: 63), and "philosophically misguided" (Opsomer and Steel 1999: 246). Apart from Opsomer and Steel, though, these discussions have overlooked the Aristotelian presuppositions motivating the Platonic rejection of κακολογία (a science of evil).

Accordingly, my analysis consists of three parts. First, I examine Aristotle's argument against a science of *per accidens* being. Second, I outline Proclus's and Dionysius's argument for classifying evils as beings *per accidens*. From these points, I conclude that κακολογία is impossible insofar as evil lacks a per se cause.

1. Against a Science of Accidents

In Metaphysics Eta, Aristotle says "it is clear that there can be no knowledge of the *per accidens*" (Aristotle 1957: 1027a19–20). Yet, knowledge that someone has, for instance, gotten a tan or gone to the agora seems unproblematic. Both of these changes are accidents. They may or may not be predicable of a substance. Neither does their generation entail a change in substance, as a man with a tan is still a man. But one can give an account of accidents. The tan man was outside in the sun. Given that one can give an account, it seems there is knowledge of accidents.

However, this argument equivocates on 'knowledge,' which, for Aristotle, signifies grasping "what is always or for the most part" (Aristotle 1957: 1027a20–21). Authentic knowledge *(epistēmē*) that Socrates is a rational animal is not like knowledge of his location in the agora. Scientific knowledge touches upon something *universal*. Moreover, it is of something necessary. While Socrates may be in the agora, he must be a rational animal. Third, scientific knowledge is *infallible*, as one cannot know what is false or falsifiable. Therefore, if *epistēmē* is universal, necessary, and infallible, then the causes it grasps must be stable.

What is a stable cause? For Aristotle, it is one that reliably answers the question "on account of what?" (Aristotle 1950: 194b16–21). One knows a thing when one can explain either: (1) "the pre-existing out of and in which [it] comes to be, (2) its unified look ((εἰδος), (3) its primary source of change or rest, or (4) its [...] for the sake of which" (Aristotle 1950: 194b25–35).

Since formal, efficient, and final causes generate their effects on the whole or for the most part, they are objects of *epistēmē*?. Aristotle illustrates the regularity of per se causes when he distinguishes what is properly caused by the housebuilder's art from what comes to be *per accidens*. He says:

> For the one building the house does not make the things that happen to come about in addition to the house coming into being (for these are infinite [ἄπειρα]. For nothing prevents the thing being made from being sweet to some, harmful to others, useful to still others, and different [ἑτέραν], so to speak, from all beings of which the housebuilding art is productive (Aristotle 1957: 1026b30).

Not everything that results from the housebuilder's art is caused by it. The art of housebuilding, determines the end of the house, its *form*, and the *movement* of the relevant matter into place. These effects follow from the art always or for the most part.

Yet, one might think that the material cause is regular and scientific. Does not the builder need specific materials, like stones and stucco rather than water or air? While the builder cannot work with any material, his art determines the house's function, shape, and generation more than its matter. He may use stones, but he must intend to build a house, something with a habitable form, and move material in a given way. In this example, Aristotle excludes everything ἄπειρον and ετερον from the builder's art. Such things merely "happen to come about" (Aristotle 1957: 1026b301). Even if the housebuilder's art results in pleasure or pain, such things are not, strictly speaking, caused by art. They are infinite and different from the art itself.

What principle accounts for indeterminacy and variability among causes and effects? As we saw, formal, efficient, and final causes bring about their effects on the whole or for the most part. The only other principle left in composite substances is matter. He says:

> Since not everything comes to be by necessity and exists always […] but rather for the most part, it is necessary that the *per accidens* exist, as when the white man is musical, which is neither always nor for the most part. Since it comes to be sometimes, it will be per accidens. If not, then everything will be by necessity. [Thus] matter will be the cause admitting things outside of or different [ετερον] from that which is for the most part (Aristotle 1957: 1027a8–15).

Unless one maintains that all effects follow uniformly from their causes–a claim contradicted by experience–one must assume the existence of some principle of the ετερον or the ἄπειρον.

This principle is matter. Devoid of form, matter is perfectly receptive to form. It receives various forms and unites them in a single substance. Green, for instance, can exist alongside 'circular' or 'triangular' on account of matter. As these combinations do not always go together, their actual presence in a substance is due to their co-inherence in that substance. Matter is thus a condition of accidental being, of what comes to be sometimes and not for the most part.

From such combinations, it is clear there cannot be a science of *per accidens* being. Matter is the principle of causal variation and alterity. Since material substances possess various, unrelated forms, their features are sometimes particular rather than universal, accidental rather than necessary, and falsifiable rather than infallible. But these characterizations are opposed to the causal stability required by επιστήμη.

2. Against κακολογία

With this framework in place, we can examine Proclus's and Dionysius's claim that evil is *per accidens* being. Both philosophers make similar disjunctive arguments justifying this designation. One could reconstruct the argument in the following way. First, both assume evil must exist either *per se* or *per accidens*. Second, they assume per se beings result from per se causes, and per accidens beings result from *per accidens* causes. Third, both assume the Aristotelian list of *per se* causes, though they add paradigmatic causality. Fourth, they claim evil does not result from any of the five *per se* causes. This premise is the hinge of the argument. Since evil does not have a *per se* cause, it is not a being *per se* but *per accidens*.

How do Proclus and Dionysius rule out the possibility of a *per se* cause of evil? Their methodology is peculiar. They do not simply rule out the list of per se causes. Rather, they posit a counter-list of ψευδοαιτίαι, fake or "negative causes" (Moraru 2019: 73). This phrase captures the fact that such 'causes' work through dissonance and absence of form.

Both begin their accounts with paradigmatic causality. They argue that there is no paradigm of evil in God or νοῦς. This claim follows from their shared assumption that the First Principle is the Good. Moreover, both assume the maxim 'every agent makes something like itself' applies to God (Dionysius 1990: 179). Hence, nothing that exists in or emanates from God can be evil. The Good does not produce evil, as heat does not refrigerate (Proclus 2007: 231).

But one might think that evil results from final, formal, or efficient causes. Proclus and Dionysius show that the *factivae causae malōrum* (efficient causes of evil) are actually caricatures of efficient causality (Proclus 2007: 240; Dionysius 1990: 176). As material substances are bundles of unrelated forms, these bundles are sometimes "adverse to one another." This aversion creates "space for the coming to be of that which is contrary to nature (Proclus 2007: 241). Because dogs and fires differ, their properties do not always interact beneficially. A dog may warm itself by the fire or it could burn itself. The latter effect does not follow necessarily from either the dog's or the fire's nature, but from the disharmony of unrelated forms.

Likewise, both argue that evil has an ersatz formal cause. *Per se* formal causation occurs when a whole determines its parts, as when a ratio determines a harmony. By contrast, evil's 'formal cause' is the determination of a property through some defect in the whole. A man is weak because his limbs are ill. The illness is an absence of health caused by a mixture of two unrelated forms, which, on their own, are good (cells and spinal tissue). This ersatz formal cause, the determination of some effect (i.e. weakness) on account of a defect in one's form is possible because matter allows forms to coexist.

Perhaps most significant of all, Proclus and Dionysius argue that evil has a faux final cause. Ignorance and desire for what is not, τα μη ὄντα, are 'causes' in this sense. Both thinkers hold the Platonic maxim that people choose evil on account of ignorance, mistaking an apparent good for a real one. "No one, intending evil, does what he does" (Dionysius 1990: 176; Proclus 2007: 243). As with formal causation, the precondition for the possibility of ignorant choice is matter. For one can only choose what is different from and hostile to form only if alterity and variation exists among material bundles.

Having analyzed and rejected these *per se* causes, it is important to stress three points. First, negative, ersatz causes are made possible by matter. For alterity and variation make possible: (1) disharmonious associations, (2) privations of form, and (3) malformed desires. Second, Proclus and Dionysius rejected *per se* causes of evil by offering a list of ersatz causes in their place. Evil's 'causes' are caricatures of real causes, acting through absence and disorder rather than presence and order. Third, this argument implies a criticism of Plotinus, who thought that matter itself was the principle of evil, or "the primary evil" (Plotinus 1969: 306). For Proclus and Dionysius, one must distinguish between a necessary precondition of evil and the evils themselves. Matter is the condition for the possibility of diversity and variation within causal chains. But matter does not necessitate evil, it only makes it *possible*.

If the above analysis is correct, it seems that the initial disjunctive argument obtains. Evil does not have a *per se* cause. Hence, it is a being *per accidens*. Since, there is no science of the *per* accidens, a science of evil is likewise impossible.

3. Conclusion

If the analysis of Proclus's and Dionysius's argument is correct and their argument sound, then one is entitled to dissolve certain questions about evil. This result is significant. For people often ask questions like, 'why do bad things happen to good people?,' 'why is there so much suffering and evil in the world?,' etc. These questions have the appearance of profundity, and, to be sure, they are experienced as such by those who suffer. Nonetheless, these questions are also misleading. They are bewitchments of the understanding, whose resolution constitutes a kind of therapy. For they tempt us to search for a

per se cause of evil rather than a contingent *set of causes*. Their apparent intelligibility leads us to search for an ultimate answer when none is available and to feel dissatisfied when we fail to explain evil or when we arrive at some contingent cause.

Nonetheless, the dissolution of the original question does not imply that talk of evil is simply meaningless or incoherent. It is as intelligible as our talk of accidents. 'The tsunami struck the town because of an earthquake' is no less intelligible than 'I happened upon a friend in the marketplace today.' The fact that these statements lack some ultimate principle or cause for their being true hardly makes them meaningless. However, it does chasten our language and keep it within the realm of what is intelligible. Indeed, recognizing this fact should exorcize us of our fascination with evil and its works, revealing it for the fraud and parasitic being that it is. Evil's radical unintelligibility, its darkness, should turn our minds towards what is and what is good, indeed, to what is beyond every light and everything intelligible.

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Translation as Open Quotation

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Abstract

In the present paper, I will propose the view that translation is as a form of open quotation by putting forward the following generalization. When a translator renders a linguistic expression from language A into language B she quotes the author of the source text. In particular, I will argue that the source and target expressions from two natural languages are linked in translation by means of the logical operator *translate* as. Under this view, despite of being put within quotation marks expressions retain their usual semantic values. The operator *translate* as establishes two sorts of relations between the source and target expressions. First, the target expression is a quotation of the source expression because it mentions it. Second, the target expressions is a quotation of the source expression because it acquires its meaning through the use of the source expression. These relations can be represented in situation semantic terms as a series of embedded situations. If Situation 1 denotes a state of affair that occurs in the world and Situation 2 denotes an utterance situation in which the source expression is produced then Situation 1 serves as a truth-maker of Situation 2. Finally, if there is a Situation 3 in which the source expression matches with a target expressions by means of translate as then this situation will be true in virtue of Situation 2 being true in virtue of Situation 1.

1. Introduction

In the present paper, I will propose the view that translation is as a form of quotation by putting forward the following generalization:

> when a translator renders a linguistic expression from language A into language B she quotes the author of the source text;

I will suggest approaching translation in terms of the logical operator *translate* as that establishes a link between a source expression x1 from L1 and the corresponding expression x2 from L2 (where L1 and L2 are any two natural languages). The crux of the argument will be that x2 through *translate as acquires* the status of a quotation of x1 and that it is through this quotation relation that it acquires its semantic value. It should be noted that my proposal shares very little with the relevance-theoretic view on relations between translation, direct speech and quotation (e.g. Gutt 2014).

My paper is organized as follows. First, I will explain why translation is a form of quotation. Second, I will explore how the semantic value of corresponding expressions is determined. Finally, I will briefly comment on why the semantic value is non-identical across languages.

2. Translation as a form of open-quotation

To get an idea what quotation is about consider the following example:

1. The earth moves.
2. Galilei said "The earth moves".

One may wonder whether the speakers of the two sentences perform the same speech act? Apparently not. Whereas the former speaker (Galileo) utters a statement, the second speaker (I) quotes that statement. Following Davidson (1979), in uttering her sentence the speaker of the second sentence does not do the same thing as the second speaker. To reveal what the second speaker does let us consider the logical form of the second sentence by representing it in the following way.

3. The earth moves.
4. Galileo said that.

The complementizer that serves here as a demonstrative singular term that refers to the utterance *The earth moves*. This becomes more apparent if we represented the relationship between the sentences in the following way:

5. Galileo said that.
6. The earth moves.

Crucially, the speaker cannot say just anything after that in his reference of what the first speaker said. For example, the following would not be acceptable:

7. Galileo said "The Earth stands still."

Now, let us ignore for a moment the ill-formedness of [7] and let us jump to how translation is quotation. If we replace the prefix *Galileo* said with an infix *translate* as that links two quoted expressions we come at a representation of translation as quotation. [8] is an illustration of how this works in practice. But, what does this exactly mean?

translate as is a logical operator that matches the entire first and second quotations. The first expression serves as a quotation of the second expression with respect to the operator *translate as*. By serving as its quotation the second or target expression mentions the first or source expression.

8. "The earth moves." translates as "Die Erde bewegte sich".
9. "The earth moves." translates as "Die Erde schläft".
10. "Cicero" has 6 letters.
11. "Cicéron" has 6 letters.
12. "Cicero" translates as "Cicéron".

Notice that under the current interpretation the sentence [9] would also be well-formed. This is because presently *translate as* serves only to link any two expressions. But, [9] is obviously wrong. Not just any expression can be used as a target expression here. The reason why is this so is that both English and German expressions in quotation marks are semantically active. In other words, despite being quoted these expressions are not empty of their semantic value. In fact, they retain the same semantic value as when they are not quoted. Recanati (2000) refers to such instances of quotation as *open quotation*. This is opposite to *closed quotation* which arises when quoted terms acquire a non-ordinary content such as in [10]. In closed quotations, it is the expression that becomes a reference. In

contrast, in open quotations the target expression refers both to the source expression and to a state of affairs.

Notice, that *translate as* cannot be a form of closed quotation because it does not serve to establish the link between two expressions with the same phonological make-up. [11] demonstrates this. Had it been the case that *translate as* is an operator of closed quotation the word *Cicéron* would have had as its referent the word *Cicero*. But, *Cicéron* is a word that has as its referent the name *Cicero* which has as its referent a person named Cicero. Since translation is a form of open quotation both the source and the target term have their usual semantic value. But, where is their semantic value coming from?

3. Situations

If the quoted sentences retain their semantic value and if x2 acquires its semantic value through the use of x1 then to answer the above question we need to consider x1 in its non-quotational usage and outside the translation context. We can begin by postulating a unique situation in which x1 is uttered as a token-expression. In such a situation, the semantic value of x1 is determined by a state of the affair that serves as its truth-maker. The notion of state of affairs will be used here to refer both to objects and events that occur in the world. Linguistic expressions will be regarded as linguistic representations of states of affairs which are subject to morpho-syntactic, semantic and phonological rules. Using the formalism of situation semantics we can regard states of affairs also as a form of situations. Representations are facts which are true if they are supported by some situations.

The following is a simplistic representation of the truth-making relation between a state of affairs and the sentence *It is raining*, where [RAINING IN VIENNA ON JUNE THE 5TH …] stands for a specific situation in which *it is raining* „It is raining." This says that the sentence It is raining. is true if there is a situation in which it is raining in a specific spatial and temporal location.

[RAINING IN VIENNA ON JUNE THE 5TH] ⊨ „It is raining."

Thus, the semantic value of the English source expression from above could accordingly be represented in the following ways.

[THE EARTH MOVES] ⊨ „The earth moves."

In this simplified representation, the exact spatial and temporal properties of a situation are not entirely specified. In fact, what the linguistic expression picks out from the world is not always completely encoded in a language. In the above example, the tense indicates that the actual world in which the raining event takes place is such that it is raining in a present situation. But, it is also a part of our linguistic knowledge that raining occurs in a specific location although this semantic element is not encoded in *It is raining*. In addition, we also presuppose that the temporal property of the raining situation is such that raining occurred on a specific day and so on. The difference between the properties of a situation and the linguistic expressions that encode them is also indicated in [12].

The semantic value of a linguistic expression, therefore, includes both articulated and unarticulated constituents (Recanati 2000). As pointed out in Creswell (1972) it is impossible to isolate in advance a list of contextual features which are relevant to the semantic value of an expression.

What happens in translation is that x2 unlike x1 does not acquire its semantic value under the circumstances just described. The semantic value of x2 arises as a result of applying the function *translate as* from x1 to x2. Whatever is the semantic value of x1 will be mapped to the semantic value of x2 {*translate as*}.

One important aspect of translation is missing from the current account. In translation studies, it is generally agreed that what is being translated are linguistic expressions and this is also intuitively easy to grasp. To include this in the present account I will regard quotation marks "..." as being indicative of mentioning an expression. Thus, when we say that *translate* as establishes a link between x1 and x2 it will be regarded that what is being linked are quoted expressions. What occurs between quotation marks is indicative of the semantic value of that expression. Thus, when we say that *translate as* establishes a link between x1 and x2 it will be regarded that what is being linked is also the content that occurs within quotation marks. *translate as* therefore links both what is mentioned and what is used. *translate as* activates both mentioning and using.

The existence of x2 from L2 supervenes on mentioning of x1 from L1. Prior to the translation situation, there was another uttering situation that determined x1 as a referent of a state of affairs. Notice that the uttering situation under discussion supervenes on a given state of affairs.

Following the formalism of situation theory, we can represent translation as a series of situations. Situation 1 is a state of affairs in the world. Situation 2 is uttering X1. Situation 3 is a translation of X1 as X2 where X2 acquires its truth value in virtue of Situation 1 serves. Situation 2 is supported by Situation 1 and Situation 3 is supported by Situation 2 being supported by Situation 1. This is represented as:

[[Situation 1 ⊨ Situation 2] ⊨ Situation 3]

4. Non-identity of semantic values

It is important to stress here that translation relation is indifferent to the extent of semantic resemblance between source and target relations. This comes as a result of linguistic factors of which I will mention two major ones.

First, consider how properties of states of affairs are linguistically encoded across languages. Suppose there is a state of affairs containing a group of persons playing with a ball. Then in English, those persons will be referred to through the personal pronoun *they* and in Serbo-Croatian through *oni* or *one*. Two choices in the latter case indicate that in this language unlike in English personal pronouns mark the gender properties of event participants. Languages can differ in many other ways relevant to how states of affairs are represented in particular languages. The point of stressing such morpho-syntactic differences is that although the target expression acquires its semantic value through the source expression since these expressions come from distinct languages there will be differences in corresponding representations.

Second, I have used in the current paper the term *token-expression* to stress the fact that the semantic value of linguistic expressions is rooted in their unique relationship with unique states of affairs. But, of course, the part of the linguistic knowledge of a competent speaker is to apply the same term recurrently to different states of affairs. In fact, what we conventionally refer to as the meaning of a linguistic expression is a mereological sum of all occurrences of individual token

-expressions. To distinguish between token-expression and the mereological sum of re-used token-expressions, I will regard the semantic value of the former and latter as Kaplan's *content* and *character,* respectively. Content and character are mutually interdependent. Character is the accumulation of individual contents but the existing character has an impact on future contents. The nature of this interdependence is akin to the relationship between exemplars and classes (Hampton, 2015). Languages, therefore, differ not only with respect to morpho-syntactic features but also in relation to the dynamics of language use. In brief, if we regard token-expressions x1 and x2 from two different languages as members of a family of type-expressions X1 and X2 then it is more likely than not that X1 and X2 have different usage histories and these histories will shape the use of token-expressions x1 and x2.

5. Conclusion

In the present paper, I suggested exploring translation as a form of open quotation in terms of the logical operator *translate* as that matches

i. the target expression to the source expression and
ii. the target expression to its semantic value through the relationship between the source expression and its reference.

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Neurophilosophical Perspectives on Wittgenstein's Puzzles of the Will

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Abstract

Wittgenstein's reflections on the nature of the will were motivated by the effort to combine two philosophical approaches: one in the empiricist tradition and the second based on Schopenhauer's philosophy. The philosophical paradoxes that he encountered are described in *Philosophical Investigations* and in several his other works. Although Wittgenstein's claims are not meant as empirical statements we believe that several of his questions can be enlightened by comparison to a neurophilosophical approach. We focus primarily to analysis of the relation of the will to wishing, experience and action. The text also provides a short commentary on the complexity of the problem of the voluntary control of body movements from the point of view of philosophical phenomenological analysis as well as from a neurophysiological point of view.

1. Introduction

The philosophical problems that surfaced when different authors tried to think about the nature of the will have resulted in the constitution of two elaborated concepts of will at the beginning of the 20th century: one in the empiricist tradition (Hobbes, Locke, James, Russell) and the second in the tradition of Schopenhauer. While the concept of the will in an empiricist tradition was closer to empirical science, the Schopenhauerian concept of the will captured certain important phenomenal intuitions at the expense of not being easily reconcilable with scientific observations. The philosophical paradoxes that emerged as the result of the effort to combine these two concepts were well expressed in the remarks formulated by Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical investigations* (PI 2009) and in a number of his Whewell's Court lectures that were only recently collected and published (WCL 2017). Although Wittgenstein's claims presented in these works are not meant as empirical statements, we believe that comparison to a neurophilosophical approach may enlighten several of his questions.

2. The will and the motions of the body

The will is usually considered to be related to the motions of the body because it is difficult to think of the will in the case of non-moving living beings, such as plants (as Aristotle already noted, see Bos 2010). It is the fact that the relation of movement to the will is accepted as important by many existing studies, therefore if we are to study the will from neurophilosophical perspective it is useful look at the brain structures related to movement – see overview provided by Walter (2005). The study of these brain structures and their activation patterns can be then matched with philosophical observations, such as those provided by Wittgenstein.

The account of the will by classic empiricist philosophers and psychologists is an obvious precursor to the contemporary neurophilosophical approach. James, a psychologist carefully read by Wittgenstein (Hyman 2011, Wenzel 2016), already at the end of 19th century stated: "Every pulse of feeling which we have is the correlate of some neural activity that is already on its way to instigate movement" (James 1890: 526). These feelings are comprised of external perceptions but also kinaesthetic impressions, i.e., impressions that originate in organs that participated in the movement (enervated muscles, tendons, ligaments, articular surfaces, and skin about the joints). Today, Fuster (1996) speaks about the perception-action cycle; however, he emphasizes external perceptions and does not pay much attention to kinaesthetic impressions. On the contrary, we have argued that kinaesthetic impressions (discussed also by Wittgenstein – PI II 2009: 56) have primary importance in forming phenomenological perception of the will (Vacura 2018). Walter (2005) relates the idea of the perception-action cycle to von Weizäcker's (1950) idea of a Gestalt circle – an elaboration of works by Gestalt psychologists of the 19th century.

Nevertheless, the idea of the perception-action cycle is today understood to be much complex than James imagined. Cycles operate at several levels. At the lowest, these are simple reflexes that match external stimuli that are not immediately conscious. We realize them backwards after they have passed, partially based on sensory inputs, partially based on our own reflections of our kinaesthetic perceptions. At a higher level, cycles are conscious but automated by constantly repeating the same actions in response to similar stimuli. Only at the highest level can we probably speak of the will in the full sense of the word. In this case, the response to sensory input is not automated, but is the result of certain internal process with a nature that is, however, itself problematic.

3. Willing and wishing

One of the problems related to the will is the relationship between wishing and willing. It may seem that these two are somehow connected, that both willing and wishing occur before an event or action, so maybe the willing is a type of wishing. Wishing is a mental act, an imagination (not necessarily visual) of a non-existing situation. Wittgenstein disagrees that such a mental act is a necessary precondition of an action: "Wishing to do it is certainly in no way a condition preceding the doing of it" (WCL 2017: 261), and already in his *Notebooks*: "Wishing is not acting. But willing is acting" (NB 1979: 88). So, Wittgenstein believes that willing and wishing are two different phenomena. Neurological evidence suggests this assumption is correct. Wishing as an imagination of a non-existing situation is closely related to contrafactual thinking. Contrafactual thinking can be thought of as imagining possible alternatives to events and actions that have already taken place, while wishing is imagining possible future alternative events that may occur. There is evidence that contrafactual thinking activates right occipital cortex (cuneus) and right basal ganglia (caudate nucleus). This activation is apparent during counterfactual sentence processing – initiated by both visual and auditory stimulus presentation (Kulakova et al. 2013). The location of this activation is completely different than the activated areas of the cortex related to motoric functions. There are three parts of the brain related to body movement and participating in motoric functions: the primary motor cortex, premotor cortex and anterior cingulate cortex (Walter 2005).

We may think about another difference between the will and the wish: the latter is a kind of thought and a thought must be conceptual. If one is wishing something, they know "what" they wish, e.g., "that it stops raining". Such a wish is always conceptual – it is never some non-conceptual feeling of discomfort. At the same time, wishing does not require immediate action. In various cases, one wishes for something that is not possible to achieve by any of their actions at the given time; maybe it will be achievable in the future or may be achievable by luck (e.g., one may wish to win lottery).

In contrast, if one is thinking about action and not acting at the same time, can they really say that they have a "will" to act? Would it not be more appropriate to describe such a situation as contemplating an action, or merely wishing one can act? One may contemplate an action in a situation where they are not sure whether that action will be successful. Only after deciding that taking the action is worthwhile may the will to act (and the action) occur. Wittgenstein's discussion of will in *Philosophical Investigations* (PI 2009: §615) can also be understood as an observation that wishing as a kind of thinking is a conceptual mental act while willing is non-conceptual.

4. Willing and experience

There is another concept of the will that Wittgenstein explores: the will as an experience. He presents this questionable claim for further analysis: "Willing – wanting – too is merely an experience" (Wittgenstein 2009: §611), and encloses it in quotation marks to emphasize its role as a starting point for further research, not as a conclusion. It is based on the hypothetical claim that both will and perception "come when they come" and there is no difference in "bringing them about". When someone has their eyes open, perceptions just arrive and there is no bringing them about. Similarly, it might be said that when one sits quietly without any movement, then at some point, the will to do something just comes and they (if there are no obstacles) perform some movement; there was no bringing about or anything similar.

In juxtaposition, Wittgenstein asserted that this is not the usual way to describe such phenomena. He observed that it is unnatural to say about movement of the arms that it takes place when it takes place and that there is no bringing it about. On the contrary, it is natural to distinguish between two domains: the domain of experience and domain of the will (PI 2009: §612). In the domain of experience, we may say that something simply happens to us and it makes no sense to speak of "doing experiences" or anything similar. In the domain of the will, the situation is just the opposite - it makes no sense to say that rising of one's arm just happened, while it makes perfect sense to say that one carried it out. He concludes with another sentence put in quotation marks to emphasize its first-person character – each of us would agree to such a claim: "I don't need to wait for my arm to rise – I can raise it."

However, today, we know that there are cases of people that have different types of first-person experiences. There is a well-known phenomenon called "alien-hand syndrome" (sometimes called "Dr. Strangelove syndrome" or "anarchic hand syndrome") – in the most typical cases, affected patients experience one of their hands is out of the domain of their own voluntary control, acting seemingly on its own or being "disobedient" while the second hand acts normal (Scepkowski 2003). Sometimes, the hand is even personified – patients give it a name as if it were an independent agent (Doody 1992).

The patterns of activation of brain areas under normal conditions during the movements of a healthy hand under voluntary control and accompanied with a sense of agency have to be studied by utilization of brain imaging techniques sensitive to temporal (EEG, MEG) and spatial (fMRI) differences. The activation is interpreted as being related to forward and inverse internal models, which represent one's own body and its possible interaction with the affordances of the external world (Blakemore 2002). This theory assumes that only certain component processes of internal models of motor control are available to consciousness. Under normal conditions, we are aware of goals and desired states underlying most movements we make, but not of all the fine adjustments in muscle contraction. Hence, only the results of a forward model are available to consciousness – a comparison of actual outcomes perceived by senses, the outcomes predicted by the model and desired outcomes. This enables modification of motoric output accommodating perceived differences between predicted and desired states. Conscious movement encompasses this kind of feedback loop and there is continuous modification so there is a complex pattern of brain areas activated during episodes of conscious voluntary movement.

Assal et al. (2007) compared functional neural correlates of healthy hand movements with damaged hand movements in patients with alien hand syndrome using fMRI. They observed that the contralateral primary motor cortex (M1) area was activated similarly during voluntary or alien movements. On the contrary, right premotor and left prefrontal areas were activated selectively during voluntary movements. While premotor cortex was partially active even while involuntary alien hand movements, the prefrontal areas were very active during voluntary movements and not active at all during involuntary alien hand movements.

It turns out that in order for a person to feel that they are controlling their hand, it is necessary to activate a specific pattern of brain regions: the motor, premotor and prefrontal cortices along with the anterior cingulate cortex. Only then will the phenomenological experience adhere to Wittgenstein's "I don't need to wait for my arm to rise – I can raise it".

5. Conclusion

The will is fundamentally interconnected not only with movement but also with consciousness. If we accept perception-action cycle theory, then a portion of voluntary actions are somehow also processed such that they interpret sensory inputs. Moreover, if we also accept the theory of forward and inverse internal models, then the will requires also complex processing in prefrontal areas. It turns out that voluntary processes are extremely complex and include many other subordinate processes of different kind. However, as Wittgenstein has observed at the phenomenological level, the will is different from mere experience and wishing. We believe that research which combines deep philosophical insights from philosophers such as Wittgenstein with the latest neurophysiological and cognitive investigatory techniques can contribute to overcoming the gap between our understanding of processes in the brain and phenomenological perceptions of our inner mental life we all experience.

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The (In)Existent Paradigm. On the Notion of Form in Wittgenstein's Aesthetics

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Abstract

At the beginning of his *Lectures on Aesthetics* (1966: 2), Wittgenstein counterposes two ways of understanding language: (1) looking at the form of words (the wrong way) and (2) looking at the use made of that form (the right way). With respect to this opposition: form vs use, in my paper I wonder if (and how) it also applies to art and aesthetics, and if we should conclude that, at least according to Wittgenstein, there is no place for the notion of form in aesthetics or rather recognise that in aesthetics 'form' takes on a new and different meaning. Particularly, I shall try to answer these questions (a) by taking into consideration the possible meanings of 'form' to be found in Wittgenstein's thought (from the logical form of the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* to the later notions of perspicuous representation and paradigm), and (b) by focusing on the relation between form, works of art and aesthetic experience. What will turn out is that Wittgenstein doesn't admit neither linguistic nor aesthetic (or artistic) formalism. Actually, the form considered as the paradigm which guides our aesthetic evaluation is not strictly a form, not a paradigm: we aesthetically evaluate art (and things) as if there is a paradigm, yet the paradigm doesn't properly exist beyond our practice. So, for Wittgenstein, form is nothing but a rule of use: a rule of language, of thinking and feeling (see *Culture and Value,* 1998: 59). It is, shall we say, a 'form through the use'.

1. Form vs. Use

I want to start with the following quotation from Wittgenstein: "If I had to say what is the main mistake made by philosophers of the present generation, including Moore, I would say that it is that when language is looked at, what is looked at is a form of words and not the use made of the form of words" (LA: 2).
This remark by Wittgenstein is interesting to me both because of what it is about, and because of where it occurs. Clearly, Wittgenstein is stressing once again what is the core of his (later) conception of language: if we have to say what the meaning of a word is, we should say that it is the use of that word in language, or better said, in a language-game. That is, what makes a word meaningful "is the game it appears in, not the form of words" (LA: 2). So, with respect to what it is, for Wittgenstein, the right way of understanding language, form contrasts with use.

Though it is neither surprising nor curious that Wittgenstein is pointing out once more what we can consider one of the major themes of his philosophy, i.e. meaning as use, one reason why it becomes peculiar is that the quoted remark is taken from the *Lectures on Aesthetics*, the notes of the famous lectures he held in Cambridge in the summer of 1938. While defining the subject of his lessons: aesthetics, Wittgenstein draws the attention of his students not to the form, but to the (context of) use of the aesthetic words: "We are concentrating, not on the words 'good' or 'beautiful', which are entirely uncharacteristic, generally just subject and predicate ('This is beautiful'), but on the occasions on which they are said–on the enormously complicated situation in which the aesthetic expression has a place, in which the expression itself has almost a negligible place" (LA: 2). So, very briefly, during his lessons Wittgenstein stresses that (a) adjectives such as 'good', 'beautiful', 'fine', 'lovely', and so on, are learned, and therefore used, as interjections or substitutes for a facial expression or a gesture (cf. LA: 2–3) and (b) that it is our actions or behaviours, not our words (and much less the "uncharacteristic" and "negligible" form our words have), which play a preeminent role when we aesthetically evaluate or appreciate things and art (cf. LA: 11). Put in another way: through many examples, Wittgenstein makes his students see that our aesthetic (and artistic) evaluation or appreciation consists more in some actions we do than in the words we say. For instance, we show our approval of a suit "by wearing it often, liking it when it is seen, etc." (LA: 5), of a poem by reading it time and time again or quoting it, of a painting by buying a print of it and exhibiting it in the wall of our room, etc; and no matter the words we say. If we look at real life when aesthetic judgements are made, we see that "aesthetic adjectives pla[y] hardly any role" (LA: 5), that 'right' (or 'wrong') and 'correct (or 'incorrect') are more frequently used, and that it is the way we act which is more decisive to express our appreciation: this is why Wittgenstein can say that appreciation is a "complicated activity" (LA: 11) and that "[t]o describe what it consists in we have to describe the whole environment" (LA: 7), some "ways of living" (LA: 11) or even an entire culture (cf. LA: 8).

Now, considering the initial quotation and the opposition which it suggests: form vs use, I would like to pose a question, maybe a daring one, but certainly justified by the context in which the quotation is found: is there any room for some notion of form in Wittgenstein's insights on aesthetics? Or does his insistence on use totally exclude it? And if there is a form, what type of form would it be? I will try to find some answers first by taking into consideration what are the possible meanings of 'form' we can find in Wittgenstein's thought, and then by focusing on form with relation to works of art and aesthetic experience.

2. On (possible) different uses of 'form' in Wittgenstein

(At least) three concepts in Wittgenstein may fit the label of 'form': (1) the logical form of the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus,* (2) the perspicuous representation (or clear view) commanded by the methodology of the *Philosophical Investigations* (cf. PI: §122) and (3) the paradigm (or rule). What it is primarily important to underline is that, in Wittgenstein, the notion of form is both an object and a tool of philosophising, especially as regards the perspicuous representation, which is both the heir of the form as logical notation and a tool for philosophical clarification.

Undoubtedly, form is the pivot around which the so-called 'picture theory' of the *Tractatus* turns: the logical form (or form of reality, cf. TLP: 2.18) is precisely a form of representation that the picture (propositions, images, etc.) and reality must share in order for the picture to represent reality (cf. TLP: 2.171) and it is a sort of a priori, the "possibility of structure" (TLP: 2.033, cf. 2.15, 2.151) which language cannot express but can only display in its internal properties (cf. TLP: 2.172, 4.121). Apparently, there

is no opposition between form and use in the *Tractatus*. There is only an opposition between the "apparent logical form" and the "real" form (TLP 4.0031). It should not be forgotten, however, that "[a] sign does not determine a logical form unless it is taken together with its logico-syntactical employment" (TLP 3.327). Finally, in the *Tractatus,* form is also synonymous with 'essence': Wittgenstein sought (and thought he had found) a notation for the general form or essence of the proposition (cf. TLP: 5.471, 6; "My *whole* task consists in explaining the nature of the proposition", NB: 39). And, as is known, this is exactly one of the "grave mistakes" (PI: Preface) for which he reproaches himself at the time of the *Philosophical Investigations:* dogmatism. As Wittgenstein puts it, there is dogmatism when "[o] ne thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it" (PI: §114), confusing a model, i.e. a method of description or representation, with the nature or the essence of what the model describes or represents.

The notion of form as a model is the one behind two cardinal concepts of the *Philosophical Investigations*: the perspicuous representation and the paradigm. There is indeed more or less an overlap between the two, but we can say that the perspicuous representation highlights the representational (visual and clarifying) aspect of the form, while the paradigm the procedural one; specifically, the perspicuous representation "earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things" (PI: §122) and the paradigm can be said as our "entanglement in rules" (PI: §125) (a rule being the description of a set of steps or passages we do to reach a certain result). In both cases, form is not an (absolute) ideal, but one of the many possible models we can produce by describing things. And of these models Wittgenstein emphasises the practical origin and function: forms have no other foundation than in use.

3. (Neither linguistic) no(r) aesthetic formalism

Putting now attention to Wittgenstein's ideas on art and aesthetics, the first question one would ask is: given his rejection of a linguistic formalism (I pointed out that Wittgenstein has revised his initial 'dogmatic' formalist position on language, switching from the form as essence to the form as one between many other possible used models), what is Wittgenstein's position with respect to aesthetic (or artistic) formalism? That is: is there, for Wittgenstein, an aesthetic form? And what kind is it?

It should be said that some of Wittgenstein's remarks seem at first glance to go exactly in the direction of a formalist conception of aesthetic experience and art. I am referring to his early notes about contemplating a stove *sub specie aeternitatis* as a world (cf. NB: 83) or about considering a melody as a kind of tautology which "is complete in itself" and "satisfies itself" (NB: 40). But also, I am thinking of the emphasis he places on our resistance to the idea that a given work of art might be interchangeable with any other means capable of producing the same reactions (emotions, sensations, etc.) and to any psychologistic account of aesthetic experience entirely focused on the effects of (works of) art. As Wittgenstein points out, we defend (what seems to us to be) the peculiarity or uniqueness of the aesthetic experience, and of the work of art: 'It isn't the same!', we would reply to anyone who told us to give up listening to a piece of music (or reading a poem) we love to listen to (or read) another one. Think, for instance, of "hearing *this* [minuet]: would another have done as well?" (LA: 29). Or would anything else (e.g. a syringe) which produces the same effects on us does just as well as the minuet? Of course, not. Wittgenstein stops the nonsense of such questions by replying that "[m]usic conveys to us *itself"* (BBB: 178, cf. 166), that is to say: only the music (that specific piece of music) counts.

All of these considerations could lead us to think that Wittgenstein is close to formalist positions in aesthetics, so to speak, 'art for art's sake' approaches. Yet, what he says in *Zettel* about whether a musical theme points to anything outside itself removes any doubts: for Wittgenstein, (a work of) art always relates to and "is connected with things in its surroundings – e.g. with our language and its intonation; and hence with the whole field of our language-games" (Z: §175). The richness of our experiences with art is the richness of our life, thought and language: when, listening to a phrase, a poem or a tune, or looking at a painting, we are tempted to "say 'What a lot that's got in it!' […] it is only, so to speak, an optical illusion if [we] think that what is there goes on as we hear [or see] it". Because, as Wittgenstein has never ceased to stress, "[o]nly in the stream of thought and life do words [and works of art] have meaning" (Z: §173).

4. An aesthetic paradigm is not a paradigm

From the above, we should understand in what sense appreciating art is for Wittgenstein "a manifestation of human life": (appreciation of) art is first (the description of) "the relation human beings have to it" (CV: 80).

I would now like to return to an aspect already highlighted: the normative character of aesthetic judgments. Wittgenstein stresses that words of aesthetics are those whose meaning is akin to 'right' and 'correct' and expresses, so to speak, a certain normativity. For instance, one may hear a melody (or a poem, or see a painting) and say, 'This is not how it ought to be played (recited or painted), it goes like this'. As Wittgenstein suggests, here we are inclined to ask what it is like to know the tempo (rhythm or colour shade) in which the melody (poem or painting) should be played (recited or painted) and the idea behind our question is that there is (or could be) "a paradigm somewhere in our mind" to which we should conform the tempo (rhythm or colour shade) (BBB: 166). We feel that there should be a conformity, and a sort of internal rule. Wittgenstein describes it well with a metaphor, the metaphor of 'clicking': when we appreciate (and are satisfied by) something, it is as though we feel that the thing 'clicks', i.e. has fallen into place (cf. LA: 19).

But can we really say that a paradigm guides our aesthetic evaluations? Is there a form? A "pattern" or a "kind of visual centre of gravity" (RPP I: §514) that allows us to see and evaluate things in a certain way? We should already know Wittgenstein's answer: certainly, a form isn't there. Just think of this: if someone asked us how we think the melody should be played, perhaps we would just whistle it in a particular way "and nothing will have been present to [our] mind but the tune *actually whistled* (not an image of *that*)" (BBB: 166). There is no form, no paradigm. Or rather, a form is there, but it is not properly a form. It is nothing but a rule of use, founded in practice: a 'form *through* the use', shall we say. In the words of Wittgenstein: "we feel then as though a model for [the] theme must […] exist in reality", and as though the theme 'incorrectly' played doesn't correspond to it, "[a]nd yet there *just* is no paradigm there other than the theme. And yet again there *is* a paradigm other than the theme: namely the rhythm of our language, of our thinking and feeling. And furthermore the theme is a *new* part of our language, it becomes incorporated in it; we learn a new *gesture*" (CV: 59).

Philosophy as a Language-Game? An Appoach to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Methodology

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Abstract

Wittgenstein introduces the notion of language-game as a methodological device, which aims to describe and clarify language use. This term allows us to regard language as internally related to action (PI 2009: 7). As Wittgenstein suggests, we can consider different human practices through the lens of this notion for clarificatory purposes (PI 2009: 5). This paper explores to what extent philosophy can represent a language-game. The first section presents the problem by showing that if philosophy has not articulated its own terminology, there would be no specific vocabulary related to a particular set of actions that constitutes the language-game of this practice. Section two expands on the notion of language-game and explains why science accords with this model in contrast to more mainstream philosophical approaches. The final section asks whether a Wittgensteinian approach to philosophy represents a language-game. By rejecting a binary answer to this question, this analysis will shed light on a crucial aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy, namely, that this approach can be understood as the practice that enables the understanding and facilitates the development of grammatically complex language-games (PI 2009: 125–126).

1.

In the remarks that constitute the discussion about philosophy in the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein says:

> When philosophers use a word – "knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition/sentence", "name" – and try to grasp the *essence* of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home? –
> What we do is to bring words back from the metaphysical to their everyday use. (PI 2009: 116)

This passage suggests that philosophy does not have its own vocabulary, a uniform terminology across history, schools of thought, or even among its different branches. Introduced to address and solve philosophical problems, this terminology seems to be at best inadequate. It does not solve such problems; quite the opposite: philosophical terminology seems to foster their emergence. In this sense, one of Wittgenstein's objectives is to "bring words back from the metaphysical to their everyday use", that is, to survey the use of words targeting the dissolution of philosophical problems.

Baker and Hacker clarify the purpose of the quote above by connecting it to a passage of the *Nachlass*, in which Wittgenstein "queries whether the philosopher cannot use these words in a special technical sense, contrary to their ordinary use? Doesn't a scientist do so? What is the difference? The scientist's new use of a received term is justified by his theory. If his theory is false, then the new use is abandoned. But that is not how it is in philosophy" (2005: 254). In other words, the articulation of a theory supports the scientific vocabulary and the technical use of terms. If the theory proves to be incapable of solving the problems it addresses, then such scientific vocabulary is modified or even abandoned. On the other hand, the lack of agreement in using a specific terminology to address philosophical problems across different periods of history makes it difficult to think words can have a separable and coherent philosophical meaning.

It seems then that if philosophy has not yet managed to articulate its own terminology, there is no distinctive language-game of this practice, i.e., there is no specific vocabulary connected to a particular set of actions that distinguishes philosophy from other disciplines. Let us explore this argument and ask to what extent philosophy represents a language-game.

2.

According to one of the characterizations of the notion of language-game, this term can be understood not as representing arbitrary behavior but as a structured, open-ended set of actions that shape either emergent or established practices (PI 2009: 7, 23). In such activities, language is not merely an accidental feature or an accompaniment of the group of actions that characterize the practice. Instead, language belongs to the form of the practice. For example, the builders' language in *Investigations* (2) constitutes a substantial component of their activity. In this situation, language and action are fundamentally intertwined. Moreover, language appears to be organized or systematized in this practice, i.e., language has a coherent and articulated use. Since the speakers interact naturally, we can say that they agree with how they communicate through words and non-linguistic behavior (PI 2009: 241). The merging between language and action shows a fundamental feature of this situation. As Wittgenstein says, "The word 'language-game' is used here to emphasize the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity" (PI 2009: 23). Thus, concepts and actions are two interrelated aspects of the language-game as a complex phenomenon. In these activities, language is inseparably connected to non-linguistic, meaningful behavior.

Solving problems through a scientific procedure accords with this characterization of language-game. Let us imagine a situation where we want to determine an object's force and know that $F = ma$. We weigh the object and measure its acceleration. The results we get are 25 kg and 30 m/s2, respectively. We substitute these values in the formula and perform the corresponding mathematical operation: $F = (25)(30)$. The force of the object equals 750 N. Determining an object's force is an example of a practice in which language and action are logically related. Giving orders, describing an object by its measurements, forming a hypothesis, acting in a play, etc., are examples of language-games (PI 2009: 23). In this sense, we can also add activities such as weighing an object and measuring its acceleration to this list.

It is important to say that "force" is used in a special or technical sense in the circumstance above. However, such use is justified by a particular theory, namely, Newton's laws of motion. The scientific community has a clear understanding of the secondary use of this concept. In other words, the technical use of "force" represents a coherent use within science. Every

term has a use in this circumstance, and words and actions are connected.

Let us now consider the philosophical statement, "only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it" (PI 2009: 246). Just as the example above, the uses of "to know" and "pain" in this expression deviate from their uses in ordinary language. For example, the term "pain" is conceived as naming a private object, an object to which only I have immediate access and know directly. Although we may be inclined to think in these terms, this conception of "pain" conflicts with its grammar, that is, with how concepts of sensation work. Moreover, and in contrast to the scientific employment of "force", the special use of "pain" in this expression is not justified by a theory in an ordinary sense. Thus, we cannot say this expression is true or meaningful (PI 2009: 246).

The conception of "pain" as a private object does not constitute an established usage and does not serve any particular purpose. In this sense, there is no philosophically separable meaning of the terminology employed in the expression above. Following Wittgenstein, this philosophical use of "pain" represents an idle use of language (PI 2009: 38). In other words, such uses of our concepts represent situations in which language does not operate or in which language is not intertwined with any activity. For this reason, such philosophical uses of words do not represent language-games, i.e., situations in which language and action are logically related.

3.

Consider the following quotes.

> Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word "philosophy" must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them.) (TLP 1961: 4.111)

> If [...] we call our investigations "philosophy", this title, on the one hand, seems appropriate, on the other hand it certainly has misled people. (One might say that the subject we are dealing with is one of the heirs of the subject which used to be called "philosophy".) (BB 1969: 28)

If Wittgenstein understands his approach to philosophy as different from science and more mainstream philosophical approaches, it seems reasonable to ask whether this approach to philosophy represents a language-game.

Science and Wittgensteinian philosophy share essential aspects. Both enterprises aim at the solution of problems through specific procedures. *Grosso modo,* Wittgenstein portrays his approach to philosophy as active involvement in understanding the grammar of our language (PI 2009: 109). In other words, philosophy provides us with clarity about our concepts' workings. In so doing, it is possible to address philosophical problems produced by "a misinterpretation of our forms of language" (PI 2009: 111). In order to clarify conceptual problems, philosophy employs certain methods. For example, the description of the use of a specific term, "substituting one form of expression for another" (PI 2009: 90), "finding and inventing *intermediate links* between the use of our words" (PI 2009: 122), and studying the "phenomena of language in primitive kinds of use" (PI 2009: 5). Insofar as Wittgenstein's philosophy aims to solve problems related to the use of our concepts, this practice represents a use of language intertwined with a particular activity, and thus, a practice that can legitimately be regarded as a language-game.

Furthermore, in the *Investigations,* Wittgenstein does not use philosophical terminology as such. Arguably, the technical terms we find in Wittgenstein either display a considerable part of its ordinary employment, such as "criteria", "use", and "rule", or are introduced as methodological devices for describing and clarifying language use, for example, "form of life", "grammar", and "language-game". Unlike mainstream approaches, Wittgenstein's philosophy is not characterized by introducing terms detached from non-linguistic, meaningful behavior. The terminology of this approach would depend on the problems it addresses.

Nevertheless, there is still room for asking whether the activity of clarifying a conceptual issue without introducing technical terminology represents a language-game. We can certainly think of situations in which a person finds clarity after someone else points to mistakes in her use of certain terms. For example, in learning a language, children are frequently corrected by their parents and teachers. However, clarifying a certain conceptual misunderstanding does not seem to represent an actual, established activity. If a particular form of expression does not mislead the person, clarifying such a form of expression would be redundant. In this sense, Wittgensteinian philosophy does not represent an independent practice with a distinguishable subject matter, i.e., a contextual and bounded use of language, such as chess, buying apples, building a wall, and determining an object's force. Instead, philosophy seems to be a second-order activity (Hacker 1996: 232), in the sense that it gets its purpose "from the philosophical problems" (PI 2009: 109). In sum, it is still not clear what activity clarifying a conceptual confusion represents. In other words, there seems to be no set of actions that backs up this use of language. Based on these considerations, it is difficult to argue that Wittgensteinian philosophy represents a language-game.

Thus, there is no binary answer to whether this approach to philosophy represents a language-game. Depending on what aspects are considered, Wittgensteinian philosophy shares features with each side of the spectrum. This ambivalence can be interpreted as communicating something important about this practice. The fact that it is not an easy task to think of a certain set of actions that connects with the enterprise of clarifying conceptual problems does not entail that philosophy is entirely independent of the understanding and development of our most valuable language-games, such as mathematics or psychology.

The complexity of grammar may hinder in a non-trivial sense the understanding and development of a certain language-game. If there is no clarity about the use of our terms, there will be no agreement in their employment. Moreover, conceptual confusions may also influence how such language-game is considered. For instance, the description of the use of equivalence propositions in mathematics, such as 12 in = 1 ft, warns us against believing that these expressions describe a metaphysical reality (RFM 1978: VII). Likewise, describing the use of concepts of sensation may prevent the inclination to regard "pain" as the name of a private object (PI 2009: 304). Philosophy understood as the attempt to clear away confusions concerning language use is the practice that comes prior to the understanding and development of the language-game in question.

> It is not the business of philosophy to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to render surveyable the state of mathematics that troubles us – the state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved. […] The name "philosophy" might also

> be given to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions. (PI 2009: 125–126)

Therefore, if the scientist aims at explaining the causes of a particular phenomenon and has clarity about her use of concepts, there will be no misunderstandings that hinder her research. At this point, the objectives of her practice become easier to achieve. In Baker and Hacker's words, "If 'in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion', philosophical investigation into psychological concepts will affect empirical psychology, for it may show that some questions are senseless, that some experiments rest on incoherent presuppositions, and that some experimental results do not prove what they are held to demonstrate" (2005: 266). Thus, philosophy may result in a state in which we have enough clarity to continue researching, a state in which "we are able to think about the matter without entanglement in confusions" (Kuusela 2008: 340). In this sense, philosophy leads to an "of course!"-feeling when the grammar of a certain language-game has been completely clarified, and no confusion stands in our way.

According to this reading, philosophy may not represent a language-game as such. However, this activity fosters the understanding and development of our practices by emphasizing crucial aspects of our forms of expression and "clearing up the ground of language on which [a certain misunderstanding] stood" (PI 2009: 118).

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Modesty in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*

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Abstract

Modesty with respect to a conception of meaning is the idea that it is impossible to explain what it is for something to be meaningful without invoking the notion of meaning or semantically related notions. Wittgenstein's remarks on meaning in the Tractatus suggest that it should be read modestly. A modest account of meaning has implications for an account of truth. Wittgenstein's remarks on truth in the Tractatus are further evidence in favour of a modest reading.

1. Modesty and Full-bloodedness

Should a theory of meaning be modest or full-blooded? This question was at the centre of a debate between Michael Dummett and John McDowell; Dummett argued that it should be full-blooded; McDowell argued that it should be modest. In what follows, I would like to recapitulate what modesty and full-bloodedness are and present some considerations in favour of a modest reading Wittgenstein's account of meaning in the *Tractatus.*

A theory of meaning attempts to specify what it is for something to mean something. Thus, such a theory will name the conditions under which, e.g., a given pattern of behaviour counts as speaking a language or a number of marks of ink on paper count as designating objects in the world. Some philosophers have attempted to arrive at such a theory by first giving a theory of meaning for a particular language. Such a theory will, for each expression in a language, give its meaning. This might be accomplished, for instance, by specifying the meaning of the primitive vocabulary of the language and by specifying rules for their combination. The hope is that once we have such a theory, its workings will provide insight into what it is for something to have meaning in general.

In specifying the meaning of a primitive expression of a language, a full-blooded theory is committed to the following restriction. In its explanation of the meaning of an expression, nothing is to occur *as a content*. Because a full-blooded theory of meaning must not "take as already given any notions a grasp of which is possible only for a language speaker." (Dummett 1991: 13). That is, a full-blooded theory of meaning may not presuppose the concept of meaning or any concept in which the concept of meaning figures–such as content, designation, representation, signification, picturing, thinking, saying, etc. These are the ideas that the theory of meaning is supposed to explain. If the theory employs them, it is bound to become circular. From the perspective of a full-blooded theory of meaning, this is the problem with modesty. Modest accounts cannot explain the meaning of an expression as they are circular. Full-bloodedness can thus be understood as the attempt to give a non-circular explanation of meaning, to explain meaning in simpler terms. A full-blooded account explains meaning from outside the idea of meaning (Cf. McDowell 1998: 92).
Modesty is the idea that such a theory is impossible. According to modesty, an account of meaning must be given *from inside the idea of meaning*. Such an account must employ concepts the grasp of which is only possible for someone who speaks a language. According to modest accounts, meaning is not reducible to simpler terms, and thus every account of meaning must be circular (Cf. McDowell 1998a: 111).

2. Meaning in the *Tractatus*

At first glance, the *Tractatus* might seem to give a full-blooded account of meaning. It might seem that Wittgenstein defends a theory that gives the conditions a fact must meet in order to be a proposition. And the theory gives these conditions, it might seem, without relying on a prior understanding of meaning.

According to the *Tractatus*, every proposition is the result of the application of truth-operations on elementary propositions (5.3). Thus, the meaning of a proposition can be analyzed in terms of the meaning of the elementary propositions that occur in it. Elementary propositions are concatenations of names (4.22). Likewise, atomic facts are concatenations of objects (2.03). That an elementary proposition represents an atomic fact is a matter of the names being combined in the way the objects are combined in the fact (2.15). This, it seems, can be described by a full-blooded theory: That the names are combined in such and such a way is a fact. That the objects are combined in such and such a way is a fact. Neither of these facts presupposes the idea of meaning. Thus, the main part of what it is for a proposition to have meaning seems to be describable from outside the idea of meaning.

What remains to be explained is what it is for a name to signify an object. For it is not the case that the propositional sign–i.e. the perceptible part of the proposition–signifies just in virtue of the way its parts are combined. What makes a fact a picture of another fact is the representing relation (2.1513). The representing relation consists of correlations of the picture's elements with objects (2.1514). Thus, what makes a propositional sign a proposition is that its names are correlated with objects.

If an account of the correlation of names with objects can be given from outside meaning, a full-blooded theory of meaning modelled after the *Tractatus* is possible. Given the meaning of the names and the way they are combined, the full-blooded theory could derive the meaning of the elementary propositions. And thereby, in a bottom-up fashion, it could explain the meaning of all possible propositions.

At this point, two questions can be asked: First, can the fact that a name signifies an object be described in a way that does not make use of the idea of meaning? And second, would Wittgenstein endorse the bottom-up method of explaining the meaning of a proposition?

Let me address the first question first. What is it for a name to be correlated with an object? Wittgenstein says about this the following. A sign is the perceptible part of a symbol (3.32). A sign is a symbol if it designates an object. And that is the case only if it is used (3.326–3.328). Accordingly, a simple sign

is a name if it is *employed* in a proposition (3.202). What, in turn, makes the propositional sign a *proposition* is its projective relation to the world (3.12). For a proposition to stand in a projecting relation to what it depicts is for the propositional sign to be used as a projection. And that is for the sense of the proposition to be *thought* (3.11). Wittgenstein does not explain the correlation of a name with an object in terms of a relation between two objects that is understandable from outside the idea of meaning. Instead, he uses concepts like *using a sign, employing a sign in a proposition, using a sign as projection*, and *thinking* to explain what it is for a name to have meaning. These concepts can hardly be counted as being *from outside meaning*. A full-blooded theory would now seek to explain the idea of thinking something in terms of more simple notions. But the *Tractatus* will not help here. The only information it gives about the analysis of "A thinks *p*" is that it is a *correlation* of facts by means of the *correlation* of their objects (5.542). The idea of correlation is explained using the idea of thinking, and the idea of thinking is explained using the idea of correlation.

But more importantly, Wittgenstein uses the idea of a *proposition* to explain the meaning of a *name*. This brings us to the second question. Would Wittgenstein endorse the bottom-up method of explaining the meaning of a picture? This method is based on the *principle of compositionality*. According to this principle, the meaning of a proposition depends on the meaning of its parts. Wittgenstein endorses this principle in several places in the *Tractatus* (most clearly in 3.318, where he says that the proposition is a function of the expressions it contains). Yet, Wittgenstein also endorses the *context principle,* according to which a name has meaning only in the context of a proposition. The two principles seem to lead to a circle. To explain the meaning of the proposition, one has to explain the meaning of its parts. But to explain the meaning of the parts, one has to explain the meaning of the proposition. This circularity poses a problem for a full-blooded theory of meaning. If understanding the meaning of a name presupposes a grasp of the role it plays in a sensible proposition, there is no hope for an explanation of the meaning of a proposition in terms of the meanings of its parts and an explanation of the parts in terms of something else that does not involve any conception of content or meaning. There have been attempts to reconcile a full-blooded approach to meaning with the two principles by giving weaker interpretations of the principles. I cannot discuss whether these attempts are successful (For a lucid discussion of this topic see Bronzo 2011). For the present purposes, it suffices to say that Wittgenstein does not try to rule out circularity. Quite the opposite, he explicitly embraces it. See, for instance:

> The name cannot be analyzed further by any definition. It is a primitive sign. (3.26)
>
> The meanings of primitive signs can be explained by means of elucidations. Elucidations are propositions that contain the primitive signs. So they can only be understood if the meanings of those signs are already known. (3.263)

If the *Tractatus* is read as modest, these circularities in explaining the meaning of an expression can be read as intentional. On a modest reading, Wittgenstein's aim is not to give a theory that explains the conditions a fact must meet in order to be a picture – the conditions a propositional sign must meet in order to be a proposition – such that these conditions are understandable from outside the idea of meaning. Instead, he seeks to shed light on the idea of meaning *from inside*.

But a modest reading of the *Tractatus* has implications not only for the way we interpret Wittgenstein's remarks on meaning. It implies a variety of topics in the *Tractatus*. I would like to comment on one other topic briefly. In the remainder of this essay, I shall explain the relationship between modesty and truth and point out some passages in the *Tractatus* that suggest that Wittgenstein took a modest stance on truth.

3. Truth and Modesty

It is evident that there must be a connection between a conception of meaning and a conception of truth. This is because for a proposition to be true is for things to be as the proposition says. But according to McDowell, this truism amounts to more: "That things are thus and so is what one says, but it is also what is the case if what one says is true. […] If one thinks or speaks truly, what one thinks or says is–is no other than–something that is the case." (McDowell 2007: 352) According to McDowell, truth conditions are contents and *vice versa*. Therefore, it is possible to specify the meaning of an expression by giving its truth-conditions.

A full-blooded theory of meaning cannot allow for the concept of truth to figure in the explanation of the meaning of an expression in this way. A full-blooded theory seeks to explain meaning from outside the idea of meaning. If a theory of truth figures in the explanation of meaning, the same restriction must be imposed on it. That is, the truth of an expression must be explained from outside the idea of meaning. That is not the case if truth-conditions are conceived of as contents.

Take, for instance, the correspondence theory of truth. According to this theory, the proposition "*p*" is true if it corresponds to the fact that p. Here, the truth-condition is "*p*"'s correspondence to the fact that *p*. Usually, correspondence theorists of truth do not take this to be the content of "*p*". Such a theory is therefore given from outside meaning.

In general, every theory according to which the "is true" in "*p* is true" has substantial content over and above what is already entailed in "*p*" has thereby ensured that the truth-condition of "*p*" differs from its content. A modest philosopher seeking to identify truth-conditions with contents will therefore insist that the "is true" is not a property like any other property, predicated of an independently existing object "*p*". Rather, "is true" brings out something that is already contained in the proposition.

We find in the *Tractatus*, quite explicitly, all of these ideas: The idea that understanding a proposition is understanding its truth-conditions. The proposition shows its sense.

> The proposition shows how things stand, if it is true. And it says, that they do so stand. (4.022)
> To understand a proposition means to know what is the case, if it is true. (4.024)

The idea that truth-conditions are contents.

> […] in order to be able to say "p" is true (or false) I must have determined under what conditions I call "p" true, and thereby I determine the sense of the proposition. (4.063)
> The proposition is the expression of its truth-conditions. (4.431)

And the idea that "is true" does not add content to "*p*".

> […] the verb of the proposition is not "is true" or "is false"–as Frege thought–but that which "is true" must already contain the verb. (4.063)

> Theories that make a proposition of logic appear substantial are always false. One could *e.g*. believe that the words "true" and "false" signify two properties among other properties, and then it would appear as a remarkable fact that every proposition possesses one of these properties. […] (6.111)

On a modest reading of the *Tractatus*, these remarks can be made coherent sense of.

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Gelingt Kripkes Trennung von Epistemologie und Metaphysik? Das Urmeter

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Abstract

In *Naming and Necessity* argumentiert Kripke für eine Trennung von Epistemologie und Metaphysik, wobei auch Apriorität und Notwendigkeit voneinander getrennt werden. Er greift Wittgensteins Beispiel vom Urmeter auf und argumentiert gegen Kant, dass man einerseits a priori wisse, dass es einen Meter lang ist, dass es aber andererseits nur *zufälligerweise* einen Meter lang sei. Dass Kripke Wittgensteins Beispiel missversteht, ist schon bekannt. Weniger klar ist jedoch, wie er die Begrifflichkeiten gegenüber Kant verschiebt und ob sein Neuansatz überzeugend ist. Dem will ich hier nachgehen.

1. Einleitung

In einer Reihe von Vorträgen, die er im Jahr 1970 im Alter von 29 Jahren in Princeton hielt und die 1972 in *Synthese* und 1980 als Buch mit dem Titel *Naming and Necessity* (NN) erschienen, argumentiert Kripke für eine starke Trennung von Epistemologie und Metaphysik. Traditionellerweise, so Kripke, gingen Notwendigkeit und Apriorität immer Hand in Hand, und ebenso Zufälligkeit und Aposteriorität. Sie implizierten einander. Notwenigkeit und Apriorität wären traditionellerweise sozusagen Wechselbegriffe. Ebenso Zufall und Aposteriorität, oder Kontingenz und Empirie. Gegen diese „traditionelle Auffassung," wie Kripke sie nennt (NN: 34), führt Kripke mehrere Beispiele an, die dieser Auffassung widersprechen.

So konnte man entdecken, dass Wärme molekulare Bewegung und dass Wasser H_2O sei. Nach Kripke gilt nun, dass diese Identitäten *notwendigerweise* gelten. Einmal entdeckt, erkenne man, dass die Wärmephänomene in unserer Welt, *physikalisch* verstanden, molekulare Bewegung sein *muss*. Ebenso sei Wasser *notwendigerweise* H_2O. Wir hätten also notwendige Zusammenhänge empirisch und nicht a priori entdeckt. Wir wissen von diesen Identitäten aufgrund empirischer Untersuchung und nicht durch apriorische Überlegung. Bei Schmerzen, Bewusstsein, und anderen mentalen Phänomenen sei dies anders, weil dort sozusagen Wärme und Wärmempfindung zusammenfallen. Das Körper-Geist Problem sei noch ganz offen. Mit Kripkes Beispielen empirischer Erkenntnisse notwendiger Wahrheiten will ich mich hier nicht beschäftigen, sondern mit seinen Beispielen apriorischer Erkenntnisse zufälliger Wahrheiten. Dabei möchte ich mich auf das Beispiel des Urmeters konzentrieren und Kripkes Ansichten, insbesondere seine Auffassung der Apriorität, in Frage stellen.

Kripke sagt, jemand, der das Urmeter mit Hilfe eines Stabes festgelegt hat, wisse „automatisch, ohne weitere Untersuchung" (*automatically, without further investigation*, NN 56), dass dieser Stab einen Meter lang sei. Kripke sieht dies als eine Erkenntnis „a priori" an, aber er untersucht nicht weiter, in welchem Sinne jemand es denn „automatisch" wisse. Beides aber scheint mir problematisch.

In diesem Zusammenhang werde ich Kants Verständnis vom „A Priori" heranziehen und Anmerkungen zu Wittgenstein und Platon machen. Kripke selbst bezieht sich auf Wittgenstein und Kant, und dabei geht einiges schief. Bezüglich Wittgenstein macht dies sachlich nichts, bezüglich Kant aber schon.

2. Kripke und Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein schreibt im Paragraph der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen:* „Man kann von einem Ding nicht aussagen, es sei 1 m lang, noch, es sei nicht 1 m lang, und das ist das Urmeter in Paris. – Damit haben wir aber diesem natürlich nicht irgend eine merkwürdige Eigenschaft zugeschrieben, sondern nur seine eigenartige Rolle im Spiel des Messens mit dem Metermaß gekennzeichnet." Kripke schreibt dazu: "this seems to be a very 'extraordinary property,' actually, for any stick to have. I think he must be wrong" (NN: 54). Aber Kripke übersieht, dass es Wittgenstein hier um ein begrenztes Spiel des Messens geht. In diesem Spiel wird das Urmeter verwendet, um andere Gegenstände zu messen, und nicht mehr. Die Frage, wie lang das Urmeter selbst sei, kommt in diesem Spiel nicht auf. (Darauf wurde schon oft gegen Kripke hingewiesen, siehe etwa Malcolm 1981 und Diamond 2001.) Das Spiel ist, so meine ich, trotz seiner Beschränktheit als „vollständig" anzusehen, ebenso wie Wittgenstein im Sprachspiel mit Würfeln, Säulen, Platten und Balken sagt: „Fasse dies als vollständige primitive Sprache auf" (PI: §2).

Außerdem übersieht Kripke noch folgendes aus dem Kontext. In Paragraph 46 führt Wittgenstein eine Passage aus Platons *Theätet* an, in der es um „*Urelemente*" geht, die man nur benennen aber nicht weiter erklären kann. In Paragraph 48 geht es dann um farbige Quadrate als „*Urelemente*," und in 50, gleich nach dem *Urmeter*, um ein „*Ur-Sepia*" als Farbmuster. Dazu schreibt Wittgenstein: „Dieses Muster ist ein Instrument der Sprache, mit der wir Farbaussagen machen. Es ist in diesem Spiel nichts Dargestelltes, sondern Mittel der Darstellung." Ebenso, so meine ich, müssen wir das Urmeter verstehen. Es ist ein *Mittel* des Messens anderer Gegenstände, und damit ist seine Rolle erschöpft. Auch dies hat Kripke wie mir scheint übersehen.

Wittgenstein verwendet ein Zitat von Platon, weil es ihm dienlich für die Entwicklung seiner eigenen Darstellung ist. Ebenso bezieht sich hier Kripke auf Wittgenstein, nicht um diesem gerecht zu werden, sondern um einen Einstieg in seine eigene Theorie zu haben. Die großen Geister haben oft keine Geduld, sich auf die Gedanken anderer Denker einzulassen. Das sei ihnen verziehen. Bei Kripkes Bezugnahme auf Kant aber scheint mir dies nicht unproblematisch zu sein, wie ich im Folgenden zeigen möchte.

3. Kripke und Kant

Eine große Diskrepanz zwischen Kripke und Kant scheint mir darin zu liegen, dass Kripke, wohl unter dem Einfluss der damals entwickelten anglo-amerikanischen analytischen

Sprachphilosophie, das „A Priori" auf Aussagen und Wahrheiten beschränkt, wohingegen Kant das „A Priori" in einer Hinsicht viel breiter und in anderer Hinsicht spezifischer verwendet. So sind für Kant Raum und Zeit apriorische Anschauungsformen und apriorische Anschauungen. Auch die Kategorien sind apriorisch. Raum und Zeit und die Kategorien sind *Elemente der Erfahrung*, aber sie sind keine Aussagen und keine Wahrheiten. Kripke spricht immer wieder davon, dass wir bestimmte Wahrheiten von Aussagen a priori „wissen" (*to know*). Aber Raum, Zeit, und die Kategorien sind nicht etwas, das wir „wissen" und das wahr oder falsch sein könnte. Bei Kripke finden wir also von vorn herein beim Gebrauch des Ausdrucks „a priori" eine Beschränkung, die wir so bei Kant nicht finden. Zugleich verwendet Kant das „A Priori" in Bezug auf Erfahrung *überhaupt* und in dieser Hinsicht spezifischer.

Allerdings liegt aufgrund der Kopernikanischen Wende bei Kant tatsächlich ein Schwergewicht auf der Epistemologie. Die Elemente der Erfahrung sind keine Elemente der Welt an sich. Andererseits aber geht es bei Kant zugleich um Welt, nämlich eine Welt, die möglicherweise erscheinen und erkannt werden kann. Darüber hinaus gibt es nur das Ding an sich. Die Metaphysik, zumindest die Welt der Gegenstände möglicher Erfahrung, ergibt sich bei Kant somit aus der Epistemologie. Aber zugleich versucht Kant, diese Epistemologie sehr allgemein und grundlegend zu denken. Die Kategorien sollen für alle erkennende Wesen und alle Gegenstände möglicher Erfahrung gelten, und mit diesem Ansatz will Kant auch „*metaphysische* Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft" entwickeln. In wie weit ihm dies gelingt, ist eine andere Frage. Aber es sollte klar sein, dass hier von vorn herein eine Akzentverschiebung bei Kripke gegenüber Kant vorliegt. Bei Kant ist die Epistemologie im Rahmen seiner Transzendentalphilosophie mit Folgen für die Metaphysik und daher grundlegender gedacht als bei Kripke. Bei Kant sind Epistemologie und Metaphysik zwei Seiten einer Medaille.

Bei Plato ist von objektiven Urelementen die Rede, aus denen die Welt besteht, bei Kant von „subjektiven" Urelementen, wie ich in diesem Zusammenhang sagen möchte, Urelemente mittels derer eine Welt erkannt werden kann. Aber diese subjektiven Urelemente sind universal. Sie gelten für alle erkennende Wesen und alle Gegenstände der Erfahrung. Die Bedingungen der *Erfahrung* von Gegenständen sind zugleich Bedingungen der *Gegenstände* der Erfahrung, so Kants berühmtes Argument. Hinzu kommt, dass bei Kant dem *Bewusstsein* und dem „Ich denke" eines erkennenden Wesens eine zentrale Rolle zukommt, nämlich als „ursprünglich synthetische Apperzeption," und davon ist bei Kripke soweit ich sehen kann nichts mehr zu spüren. *Dafür,* so scheint mir, geht es bei Kripke oft um die *Seele*, und hierin scheint mir ein religiöser Zug zu liegen, mit dem Kripke über die Epistemologie hinaus seine Fühler in eine von der Epistemologie unabhängige Metaphysik ausstrecken will. Aber es geht um die Seele anderer Menschen, nicht die des Erkennenden und sein „ich denke."

Betrachten wir nach diesen allgemeinen Überlegungen genauer, was Kripke zum A Priori beim Meterstab sagt:

> What then, is the *epistemological* status of the statement 'Stick S is one meter long at t_0', for someone who has fixed the metric system by reference to stick S? It would seem that he knows it *a priori.* For he used stick S to fix the reference of the term 'one meter', then as a result of this kind of 'definition' (which is not an abbreviative or synonymous definition), he knows automatically, without further investigation, that S is one meter long. On the other hand, even if S is used as the standard of a meter, the *metaphysical* status of 'S is one meter long' will be that of a contingent statement, provided that 'one meter' is regarded as a rigid designator; under appropriate stresses and strains, heatings of coolings, S would have had a length other than one meter even at t_0. (NN: 56)

Kripke sagt, jemand wisse etwas „automatisch, ohne weitere Untersuchung" (*automatically, without further investigation*), und darin besteht für ihn die Apriorität dieses Wissens. Aber dabei geht etwas schief, wie mir scheint. Ich möchte zwei Punkte hervorheben. Erstens, Kripke sagte zuvor: "*I guess the traditional characterization from Kant goes something like: a priori truths are those which can be known independently of any experience*" (NN: 34). Aber „unabhängig von jeglicher Erfahrung" (independently of *any* experience), ist nicht dasselbe wie „ohne weitere Untersuchung" (without *further* investigation). Beim Urmeter Beispiel gilt nur das „ohne weitere," beim A Priori jedoch das „unabhängig von jeglicher," wie Kripke selbst sagt. Das macht aber einen Unterschied, sollte es zumindest.

Wer das Meter mit dem Urmeter festgelegt hat, der weiß zwar aufgrund von Reflexion und ohne weitere empirische Untersuchung, dass das Urmeter einen Meter lang ist. Aber er muss dabei doch einen Bezug zum Urmeter haben und darin liegt ein empirisches Element. Er muss das Urmeter vor sich sehen und weiß es nicht unabhängig von *jeglicher* Erfahrung. Jedoch könnte Kripke einwenden, das ganze sei ein Gedankenexperiment. Jeder Mensch könnte sich solch eine Einführung eines Längenstandards vorstellen. Man müsste sie nicht wirklich durchführen. Die bloße Vorstellung der Möglichkeit genügt. Dann, so könnte man Kripke verteidigen, wüsste man es doch „automatisch" und „unabhängig von *jeglicher* Erfahrung," und damit sei dem A Priori doch genüge getan. (Wenzel 2003 und 2004.) Man könnte alternativ auch einfach sagen, dass „a priori" bei Kripke eben nicht dasselbe bedeutet wie bei Kant. Soweit, so gut.

Aber es kommt noch ein zweiter Kritikpunkt hinzu. Wieso weiß man es „automatisch"? Muss man nicht einen Augenblick nachdenken, bis einem klar wird, dass das Urmeter einen Meter lang ist? Hier muss man nun aufpassen. Denn einerseits will Kripke, dass das Urmeter nicht einen Meter lang sein *muss*. Es soll ja eine *zufällige* Wahrheit sein. Denn der Stab hätte zuvor erwärmt werden können, wie Kripke sagt. Das stimmt. Er hat seine Länge so gesehen nur zufälligerweise. Seine Länge ist nur eine akzidentielle und keine wesentliche Eigenschaft. Sie gehört sozusagen nicht zu seiner Seele. Geben wir dies Kripke erst einmal zu. Aber zugleich weiß man „automatisch," dass der Stab einen Meter lang ist. Man überlegt nach der Festlegung einen Augenblick und weiß dann, dass er einen Meter lang sein *muss*. Denn sonst hätte jegliche Einführung eines Längenmaßes ja keinen Sinn. Man muss Kopien machen können, die Länge des Stabes und auch die Länge der Kopien müssen einigermaßen stabil bleiben, über die Zeit hinweg und bei räumlichem Transport. Längenvergleiche müssen transitiv, symmetrisch, und reflexiv sein. Sonst hätte solch eine Längeneinführung ja gar keinen Sinn. *Daher* weiß man es „automatisch, ohne weitere Untersuchung."

Hier verlässt sich Kripke also stillschweigend auf gewisse Grundannahmen. Kant hat dafür seine „Elemente" der Erfahrung anzubieten. Diese diktieren der Welt, dass eine Einführung eines Längenmaßes möglich sein muss. Eine Welt, in der dies nicht möglich wäre, wäre für uns keine Welt möglicher Erfahrung, sondern Chaos und „weniger als ein Traum." Ohne gewisse Annahmen und derartige Überlegung wüsste man es

nicht „automatisch." Man würde ansonsten vielleicht zur Sicherheit doch noch einmal nachmessen.
Ausserdem bedarf auch Kripkes Überlegung, dass die Länge nur eine akzidentielle Eigenschaft des Stabes ist, einer Erklärung und Begründung. Der Stab hat eine Substanz, und auch dazu könnte man sich auf Kant berufen. „Apriori" hat bei Kant eben nicht nur eine negative Bedeutung: „unabhängig von Erfahrung," sondern auch eine *positive*: „konstitutiv für Erfahrung." Die Rede von den „Bedingungen der Möglichkeit von Erfahrung" hat auch ihre positiven Seiten. Aus kantischer Perspektive kann man sagen, dass Kripke sich stillschweigend auf diese Bedingungen stützt, wenn er sagt, man wisse es „automatisch," (eine Einführung eines Standards für Längen ist möglich) und der Stab habe seine Länge „zufälligerweise" (ein Stab hat eine Substanz und seine Länge ist akzidentiell).

Wenn Kripke sich beim „automatisch" und „a priori" auf kantische Elemente stützen wollte (eine Längeneinführung ist möglich), so möchte das für ihn auf den ersten Blick noch angehen, weil es ihm beim „A Priori" um Epistemologie geht. Aber dann geht dies doch nicht, weil die kantische Epistemologie in Metaphysik umschlägt. Und wenn Kripke sich bei der Behauptung der Kontingenz auf kantische Elemente stützen wollte (Substanz und Akzidenz), so untergräbt ihm dies ebenso seine Trennung von Metaphysik und Epistemologie, weil Kant diese Elemente nicht in der Welt an sich sieht, sondern sie zutiefst subjektiv sind, wenn auch universal subjektiv. Kripke will bestimmt ohne derartige kantische transzendentalphilosophische Überlegungen auskommen. Dann aber muss er sowohl dieses „automatisch" als auch die Kontingenz anders begründen. Eine solche Begründung scheint mir aber zu fehlen. Beim Paar „a posteriori & notwendig," stützt Kripke sich auf Vorstellungen von ostentativen Bedeutungen, Seele, Essenz, Akzidenz, und einer Physik, die der Welt an sich gerecht wird und notwendige Wahrheiten an sich aufdeckt. Wasser *ist notwendigerweise* H_2O. Ich bin *notwendigerweise* das Kind meiner Eltern. Das scheint mir aber bei Kripke nur intuitiv angedeutet, und beim Paar „a priori & zufällig" fehlt die Begründung gänzlich.

Kripke hinterfragt nicht, warum jemand von der Länge des Urmeters „automatisch" wisse und warum die Länge eines Stabes „zufällig" sei. So ganz bedingungslos gilt dies aber nicht, und wenn man diese Bedingungen reflektiert, wird meiner Meinung nach klar, dass man den Zufall nicht so einfach ohne Epistemologie (was wir als zufällig ansehen) haben kann, und auch nicht das „A Priori" so einfach ohne Metaphysik (wie die Welt sein muss, etwa damit wir sie erkennen können). Bei Kant ist in der Tat vieles unscharf, vertrackt und verfilzt, aber dies lässt sich nicht so einfach vermeiden, wie mir scheint.

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Eine antiplatonistische Lesart der Bildtheorie des *Tractatus*

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Abstract

Es soll gezeigt werden, dass man die Bildtheorie des *Tractatus* nur dann angemessen verstehen kann, wenn man sie vor dem Hintergrund von Wittgensteins Kritik an Russells Versuch liest, Freges Projekt des Logizismus dadurch zu retten, dass man bestimmte Annahmen über die Beschaffenheit der Dinge in der Welt macht, die wiederum die Gesetze der Logik begründen sollen. Da Wittgenstein eine solche Fundierung der Logik in ontologischen Vorgaben bereits in seiner Frühphilosophie ablehnt, wie dies aus seinen *Aufzeichnungen über Logik* hervorgeht, kann die Bildtheorie des *Tractatus* nicht in einem platonistischen Sinne als eine Abbildtheorie ontologischer Entitäten im menschlichen Denken und Sprechen gelesen werden. Statt dessen muss sie als eine Theorie verstanden werden, der zufolge sprachliche Bilder von einem innerweltlichen Standpunkt aus gemacht werden und sich je nach Zwecksetzung des bildermachenden Subjekts voneinander unterscheiden, wobei diese Perspektivendifferenz auch für die einzelnen Disziplinen der Philosophie selbst gilt. Die verschiedenen Aspekte dieser antiplatonistischen Lesart der Bildtheorie des *Tractatus* sollen im Folgenden dargestellt werden.

Die platonische Ideenlehre bildet den Hintergrund, vor dem Wittgenstein sowohl seines Früh-, als auch seine Spätphilosophie entwickelt hat. Das platonische Erbe seiner Frühphilosophie geht allein daraus schon hervor, dass er im Tractatus eine Bildtheorie des Satzes entwickelt, der zufolge „[d]as logische Bild der Tatsachen […] der Gedanke" ist (TLP 3), der sich im Satz „sinnlich wahrnehmbar" ausdrückt (TLP 3.1). Zur Sicherstellung dieser Bildbeziehung zwischen sprachlich verfasstem Denken einerseits und innerweltlichen Tatsachenzusammenhängen andererseits wird gefordert, dass die Sätze der Alltagssprache einer vollständigen Analyse unterzogen werden (vgl. TLP 4.002, 3.25), an deren Ende nur noch so genannte Elementarsätze stehen dürfen (vgl. TLP 4.21). Diese Elementarsätze dürfen sich ausschließlich aus „Namen" zusammensetzen (TLP 4.22), welche „Gegenstände[]" bedeuten (TLP 3.203), die „einfach" (TLP 2.02) sind. Mit dieser Forderung einfacher Gegenstände als der Bedeutung ebenso einfacher Sprachzeichen (vgl. TLP 3.201) wird sicherlich auf die platonische Frage nach der natürlichen Richtigkeit der Namen im *Kratylos* angespielt (Vgl. Platon, *Kratylos*, 383a). Vor allem aber können mit den einfachen Gegenständen nur die platonischen Ideen selbst gemeint sein, beziehungsweise die platonischen „Urelemente", wie Wittgenstein sie in seinen *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* dann auch explizit zitiert (vgl. PU §§46, 48).

Obwohl dem so ist, verhält es sich gleichzeitig so, dass die platonische Ideenlehre nur die Kontrastfolie darstellt, vor der Wittgenstein seinen eigenen philosophischen Ansatz entwickelt hat. Besonders deutlich geht seine Kritik am Platonismus bereits aus seinen *Aufzeichnungen über Logik* sowie aus den *Aufzeichnungen, die G. E. Moore in Norwegen nach Diktat niedergeschrieben hat* hervor, in denen er sich kritisch mit den platonistischen Logikkonzeptionen von Gottlob Frege und Bertrand Russell auseinander gesetzt hat. Da er diese Notizen in den Jahren 1913 und 1914 und damit noch vor dem Zeitpunkt der Veröffentlichung des *Tractatus* im Jahre 1918 geschrieben bzw. diktiert hat, müssen ihre Ergebnisse zur Kenntnis genommen werden, wenn man den Status der Bildtheorie des Satzes aus dem *Tractatus* richtig einordnen möchte.

In diesen Notizen beschäftigt sich Wittgenstein mit Russells Versuch, dasjenige Paradox zu vermeiden, in das Frege sich in seinem Bemühen der logischen Begründung der Mathematik verstrickt hatte. In seinem Versuch, den Begriff der Zahl allein mit den Mitteln der Logik zu definieren, sah sich Frege dazu genötigt, ein Axiom aufzustellen, von dem Russell zeigen konnte, dass man ihm zufolge die Menge aller Mengen bilden können müsste, die sich selbst nicht enthält, was jedoch, wie Russell betont, unmöglich ist, da ein solcher Begriff in sich widersprüchlich ist. Um dieses Paradox zu vermeiden, hatte Russell dann eine eigene Mengenlehre aufgestellt, der zufolge sich Mengen dadurch auszeichnen sollen, dass sie sich nicht selbst enthalten können, so dass der Begriff einer Mengen aller Mengen, der Freges Logizismus zum Scheitern brachte, also gar nicht erst gebildet werden kann. Auf diese Weise hatte Russell versucht, Freges Logizismus dadurch zu retten, dass er bestimmte Annahmen über die Dinge in der Welt, das heißt, über Mengen, gemacht hat, die wiederum die Gesetze der Logik begründen und in ihrer Konsistenz rechtfertigen sollen. Zu Freges Logizismus und Russells Kritik an Frege vgl. Mayer (1996: 67–135).

Eine solche Absicherung des menschlichen Denkens durch ontologische Voraussetzungen hält Wittgenstein jedoch bereits in dieser frühesten Phase seines philosophischen Schaffens für abwegig. Denn wie er in einem Brief an Russell unmissverständlich schreibt, müsse dasjenige, was Russells ontologisch ausgerichtete Typentheorie sagen möchte, durch einen wohlgeformten Symbolismus und damit auf der Ebene der Logik selbst gezeigt werden. Wörtlich schreibt Wittgenstein an Russell, „dass die gesamte Typentheorie durch eine Theorie des Symbolismus ersetzt werden muss, die zeigt, dass die *scheinbar verschiedenen Arten von Dingen* durch verschiedene Arten von Symbolen, die unmöglich durch einander ersetzt werden können, symbolisiert werden." (Zitiert nach Monk (1992: 88)) Und „[d]eshalb ist", wie er es dann in den Aufzeichnungen über Logik selbst formuliert, „eine *Typen*THEORIE unmöglich. Sie versucht etwas über Typen zu sagen, während man doch nur über die Symbole sprechen kann." (TB: 211) Zu Wittgensteins Kritik an Russells Typentheorie vgl. Vossenkuhl (2003: 93–99 und 2001: 35–45).

Nimmt man diese Einsicht, dass ein logisches Notationssystem bereits aus sich selbst heraus, und damit gerade nicht mit Rekurs auf ein ihm ontologisch vorgegebenes Sein, zeigen muss, in welchen Fällen es zu wahren und in welchen anderen Fällen es zu falschen Sätzen führt, bei der Lektüre des *Tractatus* ernst, dann hat das natürlich weitreichende Konsequenzen für die dort entwickelte Bildtheorie des Satzes. Sie kann dann nicht länger als eine Abbildtheorie in einem platonistischen Sinne aufgefasst werden. Im Gegenteil ergibt sich vor dem Hintergrund von Wittgensteins Kritik an Russell, dass die Logik, wie es im *Tractatus* dann auch ausdrücklich heißt, in der Aufstellung der für sie gültigen Gesetze „für sich selber sorgen" muss

(TLP 5.473). Man kann deshalb sagen, dass der These von der ‚Autonomie der Grammatik' (vgl. Z: §320, PG: 97, 184) des späten Wittgenstein in dessen Frühwerk die These von der ‚Autonomie der Logik' entspricht (vgl. Vossenkuhl 2003: 94).

Dass die „Welt […] die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen" ist (TLP 1.1), hat vor diesem Hintergrund zur Folge, dass die Welt keineswegs als die ontologisch vorgegebene Vorlage angesehen werden kann, die in den sinnvollen Sätzen der Naturwissenschaften nur noch abgebildet zu werden bräuchte, wie man dies in einer platonistischen Lesart des Textes vermuten könnte. Im Gegenteil müssen die herkömmlichen Dualismen von idealem Sein einerseits und bloßer Erscheinungswelt andererseits oder auch diejenigen von Körper und Geist, von Sinnlichkeit und Verstand, oder auch von Satz und Sachverhalt vor dem Hintergrund von Wittgensteins radikaler Ontologiekritik aufgegeben werden, weshalb man seine Frühphilosophie passender als eine „Einwelttheorie" (Pears 1989: 56) bezeichnen kann, oder genauer als einen Monismus der Tatsachen, in dem beide Seiten der Wahrheitsrelation als durch Tatsachen bestimmt gedacht werden (vgl. Majetschak 2000: 39–45).

Die Frage nach der Übereinstimmung von Sprache und Wirklichkeit verwandelt sich deshalb für Wittgenstein in die Frage, wie „Tatsachen durch Tatsachen symbolisiert" werden können (TB: 192), was für den Satz zur Folge hat, dass er sowohl in seinem Bedeutungsgehalt als auch in seiner Verweisungsfunktion auf die außersprachliche Wirklichkeit von seiner sinnlichen Seite her bestimmt werden muss. Denn auch das Satzzeichen ist nach Wittgenstein eine „Tatsache" (TLP 3.14), und das heißt ein bestehender Sachverhalt (vgl. TLP 2), in dem „Gegenstände[] (Sachen, Dinge[])" mit einander in Verbindung stehen (TLP 2.01). Für die in einem Satz abzubildende Tatsache ergibt sich wiederum, dass auch sie als eine Tat-Sache zu begreifen ist, also nicht als etwas, das bereits ontologisch vorgegeben wäre und das in einem sinnvollen Satz nur noch korrekt repräsentiert zu werden bräuchte, sondern als etwas, das in den Bildern der Wirklichkeit allererst entsteht und damit als etwas, das, ebenso wie die Bilder selbst, vom Menschen *gemacht* wird (vgl. TLP 2.1).

Des Weiteren hat Wittgensteins Tatsachenmonismus zur Folge, dass sämtliche Anforderungen, die seine Bildtheorie des Satzes an Satz und Sachverhalt stellt, damit zwischen beiden Bildbeziehungen hergestellt werden können – Wittgenstein nennt hier insbesondere ihre Komplexität (vgl. TLP 2.1514), ihre Strukturiertheit (vgl. TLP 3.15), das Vorhandensein einer passenden Abbildungsform (vgl. TLP 2.17) sowie die Identität der logischen Form (vgl. TLP, 2.18, TB 104, TLP 2.161) in Satz und Satzverhalt – keineswegs als Eigenschaften aufgefasst werden dürfen, die dem Satz und dem abzubildenden Sachverhalt schon an ihnen selbst zukämen, so dass Wittgenstein in den genannten Sätzen Aussagen über das Wesen der Welt und über das Wesen sprachlicher Bilder machen würde. Im Gegenteil kann es sich bei diesen Bestimmungen vor dem Hintergrund seiner radikalen Ontologiekritik nur noch um „logische Notwendigkeit[en]" handeln (TB 14.6.15), die insgesamt im Dienste der „Forderung der Bestimmtheit des Sinnes" der einzelnen Sätze unserer Sprache stehen (TB 18.6.15, vgl. TLP 3.23; Simon 1981).

Letzteres gilt insbesondere für die Forderung, dass der vollständig analysierte Satz nur noch aus einfachen Sprachzeichen bestehen dürfe (vgl. TLP 3.202), und dass sich Tatsachen aus ebenso einfachen Gegenständen zusammensetzen müssen (vgl. TLP 2.02). Auch hierbei kann es sich keineswegs um Aussagen handeln, in denen behauptet wird, dass es solche einfachen Sprachzeichen und einfache Dinge tatsächlich gibt, wie man dies in der metaphysischen Tradition seit Platon und bis hin zu Russell und Frege behauptet hat. Vielmehr kann es sich dabei nur noch um logische Forderungen handeln, die wir an Satz und Sachverhalt stellen müssen, damit wir davon ausgehen können, dass wir uns in unseren Sätzen in einer sinnvollen Art und Weise auf Gegenstände in der Wirklichkeit beziehen können.

Außerdem hat Wittgensteins Tatsachenmonismus Konsequenzen für den in der Bildtheorie gebrauchten Bildbegriff selbst. Denn ein sprachliches Bild kann vor dem Hintergrund von Wittgensteins Kritik an den Platonismen von Russell und Frege nicht mehr als eine möglichst originalgetreue Reproduktion eines ontologischen Vorbildes aufgefasst werden, die idealerweise vollkommen mit ihrem Vorbild zusammenfällt, wie man dies in platonischer Tradition angenommen hatte. Statt dessen muss ein sprachliches Bild als eine sinnliche Gestalt aufgefasst werden, die in dem internen Verweisungszusammenhang ihrer Elemente vom Menschen ‚gemacht' worden ist (vgl. TLP 2.1), um sich modellhaft (vgl. TLP 2.12, 4.01) oder projektiv (vgl. TLP 3.13) auf die Wirklichkeit zu beziehen.

Der Umstand, dass nach Wittgenstein zu jedem Bild der Wirklichkeit eine „Projektionsmethode" (TLP 3.11) gehört, die allererst festlegt, wie die Bildelemente mit den Wirklichkeitselementen verknüpft werden sollen (Vgl. TLP 3.11 – 3.13), ist dabei von entscheidender Bedeutung. Denn damit wird gesagt, dass es letztlich immer nur unsere innerweltlich-subjektiven Zweckmäßigkeitsüberlegungen sind, die sowohl den Gegenstandsbezug unserer Bilder als auch die Zusammenfügung von Dingen zu Tatsachen herstellen. Außerdem wird damit zum Ausdruck gebracht, dass jedes Bild in der Anordnung seiner Elemente auf den individuellen Standpunkt zurückverweist, von dem aus es aus einer je eigenen Perspektive und mit einer je eigenen Absicht gemacht worden ist. Nur aus diesem Grunde sind in meiner ikonologischen Deutung des Tractatus alle Sätze der menschlichen Sprache nach Wittgenstein vergleichbar mit „verschiedenen Netzen", die als „verschiedene Systeme der Weltbeschreibung" über die Wirklichkeit geworfen werden, um sie je nach gewählter Maschendichte resp. entsprechend unserer jeweiligen Erkenntnisinteressen einzuteilen (TLP 6.341).

Nun hat die Bildtheorie aber nicht nur Konsequenzen für die Begriffe von Sprache und Wirklichkeit, sondern auch für den Begriff der Philosophie selbst. Denn wenn der menschliche Wirklichkeitsbezug grundsätzlich nur in perspektivisch gebundenen Sprachbildern erfolgt, dann muss diese Perspektivität auch für die philosophischen, die einzelwissenschaftlichen, die alltäglichen und alle weiteren gedanklichen und sprachlichen Wirklichkeitsbezugnahmen gelten. Es stellt sich deshalb die Frage, worin genau diese Perspektivendifferenz der philosophischen gegenüber diesen anderen Wirklichkeitsbezugnahmen besteht. Meine Kernthese in diesem Zusammenhang lautet, dass sich diese Differenz aus der je eigenen Zwecksetzung der philosophischen und der nichtphilosophischen Weltbetrachtung ergibt, wobei die Aufgabe der Philosophie in einer antiplatonistischen Deutung der Bildtheorie des *Tractatus* nur darin noch bestehen kann, die von den Einzelwissenschaften und im Alltagsdenken verdrängte Perspektivität ihrer Wirklichkeitsbezugnahmen in Erinnerung zu rufen und sie dadurch vor einem blinden Dogmatismus zu verwahren.

Aus diesem Grunde ist die „Logik" nach Wittgenstein diejenige philosophische „Tätigkeit" (vgl. TLP 4.112), die die von den Naturwissenschafen entworfenen Bilder auf ihre ursprüngliche Bildhaftigkeit zurückführt. Die Logik analysiert also die von

den Naturwissenschaften je verwendete Projektionsmethode und deckt damit den jeweiligen Zweck der naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisbemühungen auf. Damit bewahrt sie die Naturwissenschaften (und natürlich nicht nur sie) vor uneinholbaren Absolutheitsansprüchen und wird auch dadurch ihrer philosophischen Aufgabe der innersprachlichen Grenzziehung des Sagbarengerecht (vgl. TLP, Vorwort). Im Unterschied zur Logik, die sich mit den von den naturwissenschaftlichen Bildern hergestellten innerweltlichen Tatsachenzusammenhängen beschäftigt, hat es die Ethik nach Wittgenstein mit dem „Sinn" der Welt als Ganzes zu tun, der als ein absoluter und nicht nur standpunktrelativer notwendigerweise außerhalb der Welt liegen muss (TLP 6.41), da es innerhalb der Welt auch moralische Sinnzusammenhänge und Werte nur relativ zu dem jeweils frei gewählten System der Weltbeschreibung geben kann.

Die Tatsache, dass es innerhalb der Welt keine absolut gültigen Werte geben kann, hat wiederum zur Folge, dass die Frage nach dem moralisch richtigen, also freien und glücklichen Leben letztlich eine Frage der richtigen Betrachtungsweise des Lebens ist, wobei sich die freie Lebenseinstellung letztlich aus der Einsicht in die bloße Faktizität und Wertneutralität der Dinge innerhalb der Welt ergibt. Die Einsicht, dass das gute Leben aus der richtigen Einstellung zur Welt resultiert, die Frage nach dem richtigen Leben also letztlich eine Frage der richtigen Betrachtungsweise desselben ist, verweist schließlich auf den inneren Zusammenhang der Ethik mit der Ästhetik respektive der von ihr thematisierten Kunst. Ethik und Ästhetik sind deshalb nach Wittgenstein „Eins" (TLP 6.421).

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Private Language, Qualia, and Gradient!

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Abstract

The classical Plato's theory of forms can provide us an important tool to strengthen the inverted spectrum argument in defence of qualia. One can find two kinds of inverted spectrum cases in Wittgenstein (1968) out of which, he considers one to be coherent and rejects the other one outrightly. The coherent one doesn't pose a problem for his treatment of inner sensations, whereas the second one, he rejects on the basis on behavioural indistinguishability. Block (2007) responds to this indistinguishability condition and argues that there can be a case of shifted spectrum, that can defend qualia irrespective of the fact whether the subjects are behaviourally indistinguishable or not. In this paper, we argue that Block's argument is a case of application of concept of gradient and introducing the gradient does make the case for qualia stronger against the Wittgensteinian treatment.

1. Gradient

In Plato's theory of forms, forms are considered to be the perfect abstract entities and the particulars that we see in the world are imperfect copies of it. A flower which is visible in the physical realm is beautiful because the form of beauty which is in the realm of forms partakes in it. Plato in *Phaedo* talks about form of equality, beauty and great and small (74a–75d). There is one instance in *Republic* (book X, 596b) where it seems that Plato may have started with entities like beauty, justice etc but extended the theory to include more concrete categories, e.g., a bed, to have a form. There is one element in the theory of forms which is not discussed as explicitly as it should be, that is, gradient. If there is an exemplar and there are copies of that exemplar then it is possible that some of the copies will have a higher fidelity (more perfect copies of the form, closer to the form) than some of the others. One can then decide a gradient, either ascending to the form or the descending from the form. When we consider any principle on gradient, we see that it moves the discussion from simple yes-no (0/1) possibilities and considers all that can be in between 0 and 1. Gradient as a concept is not explicitly mentioned but can be read/found in the philosophical literature implicitly. Another important and interesting observation about recognising the gradient is that one can do away with the strict limit, that is to say, 0 can be replaced by *tending to zero*, and 1 by *tending to one*.

2. Private language argument and its implications on qualia

Wittgenstein (PI: §243) presents a question of a possibility of a private language. Here, he is not talking about a personal or private code written using the words/symbols of a shared language, but a language where the referents of the words in that particular language are comprehensible only to the individual who invents that language (say, a lone linguist). In subsequent sections (§§243–315), Wittgenstein provides reasons and examples to show why such a language would be incoherent. Wittgenstein raises the point that the ways in which one can attempt to argue for a case of private language turns out either to be incoherent (§258) or ultimately comes in the realm of public language (§270). Wittgenstein does seem to recognise sensations but "these are not our sensations, the everyday facts of human existence, but the supposed exemplars of *philosophical accounts* of the everyday facts." (Candlish & Wrisley 2019) The significance of the private language argument can be seen in the context of opposing the view that there are certain metaphysical concepts that must be understood in one way rather than other. (PI: 230) Sensations or phenomenal content of experience is one such example that is widely discussed in philosophy of mind and which is argued by its defenders that it, by definition, has to be understood or approached by a subjective standpoint.

Wittgenstein, by arguing for the impossibility of a private language argues for a different way of understanding the sensations where sensations themselves, if any, do not play a role as he shows with beetle in the box argument. (PI: §293) Then it does not matter what kind of beetle one has or if one has a beetle, since no one can see the beetle in the box of others, one can never reach an understanding of another persons' beetle. It may be the case that all the beetles are different or similar or they themselves are constantly changing. Wittgenstein argues that even if there are different inner sensations referring to certain signs, what is important in order to understand or comprehend 'beetle' (private sensation) is to understand how the word is used in a community of language users who share a form of life (context). So, what becomes important to understand sensation is to understand the use and grammar of the concept/word pain in a shared context. He shows by this argument that the first-person account of how a beetle looks to the subject does not play any role in how one understands beetle, 'it cancels out, whatever is'. This builds a case for the impossibility of private language and shows how a shared context of an inter-subjective public language is essential for communication in a community of language users such that they can understand what is being communicated.

Experiential content of sensations or phenomenal content of experience are often known as Qualia. It is often argued that the best way to describe qualia is through examples and analogies as they are by definition indescribable in a shared public language. (Dennett 1988) Problem of qualia as irreducible subjective content has been raised in Nagel (1974, 1986), Block (1978), Shoemaker (1982) and Jackson (1982). Block (2007) describes qualia as *ways* in which objects and their properties are associated with the experiential state, because a mere relation statement of the properties of objects and experiential state do not fully capture the content. So, phrases in public language, like 'feels hot', 'looks blue' do not capture the qualia in their entirety rather qualia should be defined, in a public language as ways in which an object can feel hot to a subject. This way of defining qualia keeps out ineffable aspect of qualia from the public language.

3. Gradient in defence of qualia

Inverted spectrum argument is often proposed as a possible critique of a reductionist physicalist paradigm. There are two kinds of inverted spectrum arguments that can be found in Wittgenstein. First kind can be found in the following passage,

> Consider this case: someone says "it's queer/I can't understand it/, I see everything red blue today and vice versa." We answer "it must look queer!'" He says it does and, e.g., goes on to say how cold the glowing coal looks and how warm the clear (blue) sky. I think we should under these or similar circumstances be inclined to say that he saw red what we saw blue. And again, we should say that we know that he means by the words 'blue' and 'red' what we do as he has always used them as we do. (LPE 1968: 284)

The other kind that can be found in the following passages,

> We said that there were cases in which we should say that the person sees green what I see red. Now the question suggests itself: if this can be so at all, why should it [not] be always the case? It seems, if once we have admitted that it can happen under peculiar circumstances, that it may always happen. But then it is clear that the very idea of seeing red loses its use if we can never know if the other does not see something utterly different. So, what are we to do: Are we to say that this can only happen in a limited number of cases? (LPE 1968: 316)

Block (2007) calls these the innocuous and the dangerous kinds of inverted spectrum. The former one according to Block was coherent for Wittgenstein whereas the latter one is rejected/refuted by Wittgenstein. Block calls the second argument dangerous because according to him, it can serve as an argument in favour of qualia.

The difference between the innocuous and the dangerous kind as pointed out by Block is that in the case of innocuous kind, the subject with inverted spectrum is behaviourally different whereas in the case of the latter the subject is behaviourally indistinguishable. Block argues that in the case of the dangerous scenario, even if the behaviour of the subject is distinguishable, it can still serve as an argument in favour of qualia.

Following Wittgenstein (PI: 273), Block argues that in innocuous kind of spectrum inversion, it is not required to suppose that there are certain experiences that cannot be expressed in terms of the properties of things, however in the case of the dangerous spectrum inversion, it must be granted that there are certain experiences that cannot be expressed in terms of the properties of things, "we have to agree that no color name expresses what it is like for either one of the inverted people to see red." (Block 2007)

For Wittgenstein, there is no pertinent difference in the usage of the term if the two individuals have inverted spectrum but behaviourally indistinguishable as, mentioned earlier and one can see in his beetle in the box argument (PI: §293), "The thing in the box has no place in the language game at all; not even as a something; for the box might even be empty. No one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever is."

Block considers a case of shifted spectrum. He derives from a number of experimental findings that there are variations in how different groups based on age, race and gender can have different colour sensitivity. (See Block 1999 for details) However, due to social and cultural training, people (tend to) categorise and homogenise the uses of the colour terms in such a manner that in the everyday usage, we can find, "many normal cases of same use of public color terminology, different phenomenology […] If red things look slightly different to you than to me, there is no saying that either of us perceives more veridically than the other, since we are both normal perceivers, and so there is no way of capturing the difference in external terms." (Block 2007) This argument does away with the behavioural indistinguishability condition because the argument holds despite (or in spite) of behaviours being distinguishable.

Block's argument of shifted spectrum rests on there being a gradient in the colour spectrum which is realised by the different colour sensitivity but harmonised by the cultural and social training. So, it does not matter whether subjects with shifted spectra are behaviourally indistinguishable or not, the phenomenal content or the ways in which they experience the same representational content (colours) is different. As introduced in the first section, when we recognise the gradient scheme, there need not be one 'correct/normal' way of perceiving a colour.

Thus, to conclude, let us consider a short example, a plumber installs a changeover switch in person X's washroom in such a manner where the plumber can switch the flow of hot and cold water running from two taps. And there is an evil neuroscientist who has installed a similar changeover switch in the person's brain where he can switch the neural connections to invert his sensations of cold and hot. If the plumber and the neuroscientist decide to play tricks with X at the same time such that, he touches hot water running from cold water taps yet due to inverted neural connection, calls it cold. The behaviour in this case would be indistinguishable from a third person perspective, yet if the person decides to touch the water from the other tap, he would still feel the difference in temperature. Whether it is gradient ascent or a gradient descent of temperature change, does not matter in the scope of this argument. So, the problem of spectrum change be it shifted or inverted becomes a problem for Wittgensteinian treatment of inverted spectrum.

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Wittgenstein über die Struktur der Rechtfertigung

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Abstract

Wittgensteins Bemerkungen in seinem Buch *Über Gewissheit* zeichnen eine gewisse Konzeption einer Struktur des Systems der Überzeugungen. Deshalb schreiben manche der diese Bemerkungen kommentierenden Philosophen dem Autor eine bestimmte Position in der heute viel diskutierten Frage der Struktur der Rechtfertigung zu. Avrum Stroll schreibt über Wittgensteins Fundamentalismus, Paul Moser über dessen relativistischen Kontextualismus und Carol Caraway über einen neuartigen Standpunkt Wittgensteins, der sich weder auf Fundamentalismus noch Kohärentismus oder Kontextualismus zurückführen lässt. Das Referat enthält eine Kritik der genannten Interpretationen, auf deren Grundlage die These formuliert wird, dass unter den heutigen Positionen in der Frage der Struktur der Rechtfertigung den Ansichten des „dritten" Wittgenstein ein im weiten Sinne verstandener inferentieller Kontextualismus am nächsten ist.

Thema meines Referats sind die Beziehungen zwischen Wittgensteins Konzeption der Struktur des Systems der Überzeugungen, die er im Buch *Über Gewißheit* (ÜG 2001) skizzierte und modernen Standpunkten in der Frage der Struktur der Rechtfertigung.

Als Wittgenstein in den Jahren 1949–1951 seine Bemerkungen über Wissen und Gewissen notierte, beabsichtigte er wohl nicht, eine Konzeption der Struktur der Rechtfertigung zu schaffen. Dennoch ergibt sich gewissermaßen nebenbei aus diesen Bemerkungen ein originelles Bild der Struktur des Systems von Überzeugungen, der Grundzug einer solchen Konzeption. In diesem Zusammenhang sehen Philosophen, die sich mit der Frage der Struktur der Rechtfertigung beschäftigen, in Wittgenstein einen Fundamentalisten, einen Kontextualisten, einen Kohärentisten oder sie behaupten, er habe eine eigne Konzeption entwickelt, die sich nicht auf eine der üblichen Standpunkten in der Frage der Struktur der Rechtfertigung zurückführen lasse.

In diesem Referat präsentiere und kritisiere ich kurz einige dieser Interpretationen von Wittgensteins Philosophie. Dabei bringe ich meine eigene Ansicht bezüglich der Frage vor, welche der heutigen Standpunkte bezüglich der Struktur der Rechtfertigung Wittgenstein am nächsten steht.

1. Wissen und Gewissheit

Die Bemerkungen im Buch *Über Gewißheit* sind den Kennern von Wittgensteins Philosophie gut bekannt. Ich werde also den Inhalt hier nicht zusammenfassen, sondern lediglich die wichtigsten Ideen aufzeigen, die den Grundriss von Wittgensteins Konzeption der Struktur des Systems der Überzeugungen bilden. Wittgenstein zufolge hat dieses System eine Schichtstruktur und besteht aus mindestens zwei Schichten: die eine bilden Gewissheiten und die andere das Wissen. Zum Wissen gehören begründete Überzeugungen, Gewissheiten bedürfen keiner Begründung, sie können aber Begründungen für das Wissen liefern.

Wenn Wittgenstein von Gewissheiten spricht, dann hat er die sogenannte objektive Gewissheit im Sinne. Während subjektive Gewissheit eine Frage der individuellen Erfahrung ist, zeichnet sich objektive Gewissheit durch eine allgemeine, intersubjektive Dimension aus, die von der Gesamtheit der jeweiligen Gemeinschaft geteilt wird.

Wittgenstein bezeichnet Sätze, die objektiv gewisse Überzeugungen ausdrücken, als „feststehend" und vergleicht sie mit Angeln (vgl. ÜG 2001: 341). Genauso wie Angeln die Bewegung der Tür ermöglichen, auch wenn sie selbst teilweise unbeweglich bleiben, so ermöglichen es feststehende Sätze, die nicht anfällig für Zweifel sind, Zweifel zu zerstreuen, Fragen zu stellen, Antworten anzubieten. Sicheren Sätzen lassen sich drei Eigenschaften zuschreiben, die sie von Sätzen unterscheiden, die Wissen darstellen: (a) sie lassen sich nicht begründen, (b) man kann nicht an ihnen zweifeln, (c) man kann sich in ihnen nicht irren.

Die Grenze zwischen der Schicht der sicheren Überzeugungen und dem Wissen ist fließend. Mit der Zeit können gewisse Überzeugungen ihren besonderen Status verlieren und andere deren Platz einnehmen.

Die Schicht der Gewissheiten bilden Überzeugungen, die miteinander durch zahlreiche Zusammenhänge verbunden sind. Diesen Zusammenhängen verdanken sie ihren Status. Gewissheiten begründen Überzeugungen, die das Wissen darstellen, aber das Wissen stützt ebenfalls in gewisser Weise die sicheren Überzeugungen.

2. Standpunkte in der Frage der Struktur der Rechtfertigung

Unsere Überzeugungen bilden ein System. Sie sind miteinander durch verschiedene Zusammenhänge verbunden, unter denen die Relationen der Rechtfertigung besonders wichtig sind. Diese Beziehungen haben einen unterschiedlichen Charakter, weshalb man sich die Struktur der Rechtfertigung unterschiedlich vorstellen kann. Die wichtigsten Standpunkte in dieser Sache sind: Fundamentalismus, Kontextualismus und Kohärentismus.

Vom fundamentalistischen Standpunkt aus kann man in unserem Überzeugungssystem basale Überzeugungen unterscheiden, dank denen andere Überzeugungen mittelbar begründbar sind. Diese Basalität der Überzeugungen wird unterschiedlich aufgefasst. Es kann sich um Überzeugungen handeln, die unmittelbar begründet sind, oder um solche, die aufgrund eines besonderen epistemischen Status keinerlei Begründung bedürfen.

Manche Philosophen sind der Ansicht, dass die Frage, ob manche Überzeugungen als basale anerkannt werden können (aber auch, ob die jeweilige Überzeugung als Rechtfertigungsgrund für eine andere gilt), hängt vom Kontext ihre Auftretens ab. Dieser Standpunkt wird als inferentieller Kontextualismus bezeichnet. Die Anhänger des Kontextualismus stellen eine

Reihe von Annahmen in Frage, die in den meisten fundamentalistischen Konzeptionen enthalten sind.

Der dritte wichtige Standpunkt in der Frage der Struktur der Begründung ist der holistische Kohärentismus. Hier gilt eine jeweilige Überzeugung als gerechtfertigt, wenn sie ein Element eines kohärenten Systems von Überzeugungen darstellt oder wenn sie in Relation der Kohärenz mit einem solchen System steht.

Was für eine Struktur hat das System der Überzeugungen nach Wittgenstein? Welcher Standpunkt in der Frage der Struktur der Begründung kann man ihm zuschreiben?

In *Über Gewißheit* sind Bemerkungen zu finden, die dem Fundamentalismus, dem Kontextualismus und dem Kohärentismus entsprechen. Zweifelsohne hat nach Wittgenstein unser Überzeugungssystem eine Schichtstruktur. Diese Schichtstruktur des Systems der Überzeugungen stimmt mit den Standpunkten des Fundamentalismus und des Kontextualismus überein. Infolgedessen wird die Konzeption des „spätesten" Wittgenstein zuweilen mit dem Fundamentalismus gleichgesetzt, in anderen Fällen mit dem Kontextualismus, manchmal aber auch als neuartige eigene Konzeption wahrgenommen.

Über Wittgensteins Fundamentalismus schrieb unter anderen Avrum Stroll, über den Kontextualismus unter anderen Paul Moser und über einen neuartigen Standpunkt Wittgensteins in der Frage der Struktur der Begründung Carol Caraway. Ich habe erhebliche Einwände gegen die Ansichten aller drei genannten Wittgenstein-Interpreten.

3. Strolls Interpretation

Avrum Stroll interpretiert Wittgensteins Konzeption in seinem Buch *Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty* (Stroll 1994) als eine besondere Abart des Fundamentalismus. Er zeichnet das einfachste Modell des Fundamentalismus, das die Natur dieses Standpunktes darstellen soll, und zeigt anschließend diejenigen Merkmale der Wittgensteinschen Konzeption auf, die sei von den herkömmlichen fundamentalistischen Konzeptionen unterschieden. Strolls Modell geht davon aus, dass im gesamten System des Wissens (der Überzeugungen) zwei Schichten zu unterscheiden sind: Fundament und Überbau. Zwischen dem Fundament und dem Überbau besteht ein asymmetrisches Abhängigkeitsverhältnis: Der Überbau hängt von dem Fundament ab, und der Fundament hängt von überhaupt nichts ab. Genauer gesagt: Wenn der Fundament aus sicheren Überzeugungen besteht, dann hängen sie nicht von anderen Überzeugungen ab. Trotz seines spezifischen Charakters stimmt Wittgensteins Konzeption nach Stroll mit einem solchen Modell überein.

Das System der Überzeugungen nach Wittgenstein hat aber keine genau solche Struktur wie Stroll und andere Fundamentalisten sie beschreiben. Nach Strolls Fundamentalismus hängt die Gewissheit bestimmter Sätze, die das Fundament bilden, nicht von den Überzeugungen des Überbaus ab. In dieser Hinsicht unterscheidet sich Wittgensteins System von den traditionellen fundamentalistischen Systemen. Er schreibt: „Es bildet sich nach und nach ein System von Geglaubtem heraus, und darin steht manches unverrückbar fest, manches ist mehr oder weniger beweglich. Was feststeht, tut dies nicht, weil es an sich offenbar oder einleuchtend ist, sondern es wird von dem, was darum herumliegt, festgehalten" (ÜG 2001: 144).

In dieser Bemerkung ist nicht klar, was dasjenige ist, was diese „feststehenden" Überzeugungen umgibt. Wittgenstein meint wohl andere sichere Überzeugungen, die unverrückbar im System feststehen, vielleicht auch Überzeugungen, die Wissen darstellen. In *Über Gewißheit* lassen sich sowohl Bemerkungen finden, die von den gegenseitigen Beziehungen zwischen den fundamentalen Überzeugungen sprechen, als auch andere Bemerkungen, in denen klar die Rede von einer Abhängigkeit sicherer Überzeugungen vom Wissen ist.

Nach Wittgenstein im Überzeugungssystem bestehen zwischen Fundament und Überbau beidseitige Zusammenhänge: „Wenn wir anfangen, etwas zu *glauben*, so nicht einen einzelnen Satz, sondern ein ganzes System von Sätzen. (Das Licht geht nach und nach über das ganze auf.) Nicht einzelne Axiome leuchten mir ein, sondern ein System, worin sich Folgen und Prämissen *gegenseitig* stützen" (ÜG 2001: 141–142). „Ich bin auf dem Boden meiner Überzeugungen angelangt. Und von dieser Grundmauer könnte man beinahe sagen, sie werde vom ganzen Haus getragen" (ÜG 2001: 248).

Folgen und Prämissen „stützen sich gegenseitig" in einem System, sagt Wittgenstein. Überzeugungen, die die Rolle des Fundamentes spielen, werden zu Gewissheiten im Kontext anderer, auch dank dem Überbau, dem Wissen. Wittgensteins Bemerkungen über die beidseitigen Beziehungen zwischen verschiedene Arten von Überzeugungen stimmen nicht mit Strolls Modell und der These der traditionellen Fundamentalisten von der Unabhängigkeit der basalen Überzeugungen von andersartigen Überzeugungen überein.

4. Mosers Interpretation

Einer der Epistemologen, die Wittgenstein für einen Kontextualisten halten, ist Paul Moser. Nach Moser, dem Autor des Buches *Empirical Justification* (Moser 1985), drückt sich die Hauptidee des Kontextualismus bei Wittgenstein in den Worten aus: „Am Grunde des begründeten Glaubens liegt der unbegründete Glaube" (ÜG 2001: 253).

Moser schreibt nicht viel über Wittgensteins Kontextualismus. Er formuliert Behauptungen, die er als Hauptthesen des Kontextualismus betrachtet, um anschließend die Konzeption von David Annis (1978) – als diesen Standpunkt illustrierend – genauer darzustellen.

Nach der allgemeinen Behauptung des Kontextualismus in Mosers Formulierung „verlangt die Rechtfertigung immer, dass jemand ganz einfach bestimmte Überzeugungen akzeptiert, die selbst ungerechtfertigt sind, aber die dennoch auf eine Weise Begründungen für andere sichere Überzeugungen liefern können" (Moser 1985: 41). Etwas weiter stellt Moser fest: „Die zentrale These des Kontextualismus ist, dass irgendein gesellschaftlicher Konsens eine hinreichende und notwendige Bedingung oder ein fundamentales Kennzeichen jeglicher epistemischen Rechtfertigung ist" (Moser 1985: 43). Diese Formulierungen sind nicht kohärent. Aus der ersten geht hervor, dass Basisüberzeugungen unbegründet sind, und aus der zweiten, dass sie (als solche, für die ein gesellschaftlicher Konsens besteht) begründet sind. Moser erkennt diesen Widerspruch nicht, dafür erblickt er eine Inkohärenz in Wittgensteins Bemerkungen. Nach einigen Bemerkungen in *Über Gewißheit* stehen am Ursprung des Systems der Überzeugungen unbegründete Fundamentalüberzeugungen (ÜG 2001: 253, 415), nach anderen aber (insbesondere ÜG 2001: 204) stellen unbegründete Handlungsweisen die Grenze der Rechtfertigung dar. Eine Möglichkeit der Vereinbarung dieser Bemerkungen soll nach Moser die Annahme sein, dass Fundamentalüberzeugungen unbegründete Handlungsweisen betreffen, was keine zutreffende Interpretation der genannten Bemerkungen ist.

Wittgenstein gibt zahlreiche Beispiele für Fundamentalüberzeugungen, die keinerlei Handlung betreffen.

Mosers Beschreibungen des Kontextualismus sind scheinbar auf der Grundlage der nicht besonders geglückten Analyse von Annis entstanden. Dadurch scheint die spezifisch interpretierte Konzeption Wittgensteins in den Rahmen eines spezifisch aufgefassten Kontextualismus zu passen. In Mosers Verständnis enthält der Kontextualismus einen deutlichen relativistischen Aspekt, wie er für die Konzeption von Annis bezeichnend ist. Heute vertritt der Kontextualismus in der Regel die Konzeption von Michael Williams, wie sie in den Bücher *Unnatural doubts* (1996) und *Problems of Knowledge* (2001) dargelegt ist. Der Autor widerspricht darin dem Relativismus.

5. Caraways Interpretation

Eine weitere Meinung zu Wittgensteins Standpunkt in der Frage der Struktur der Rechtfertigung präsentiert Carol Caraway (2003). Sie vertritt die Auffassung, dass Wittgensteins Konzeption aus *Über Gewißheit* keinem der Hauptstandpunkte bezüglich der Struktur der Rechtfertigung entspricht und auch keine Kombination aus ihnen darstellt, sondern den Grundstein für einen neuen epistemologischen Standpunkt legt und somit einen Wendepunkt in der Epistemologie darstellt.

Für die Fundamentalisten – behauptet Caraway – Fundamentalüberzeugungen bedürfen keine Unterstützung seitens anderer Überzeugungen – weder seitens anderer Basisüberzeugungen noch seitens des Überbaus. Sie begründen die Überzeugungen des Überbaus, aber nicht umgekehrt. Laut Wittgenstein verhält es sich anders: Fundamentalüberzeugungen werden in gewisser Weise von den Überzeugungen des Überbau gestützt (vgl. ÜG 2001: 141–142, 248). Die Kohärentisten behaupten, dass unsere Überzeugungen ein gigantisches kohärentes Netz bilden, Wittgenstein dagegen sagt lediglich, dass unsere Fundamentalüberzeugungen kohärent sind.

Nach Kontextualisten einige Überzeugung in bestimmten Kontexten basal sind und in anderen nicht. Dies hat nach Ansicht von Caraway relativistische Implikationen, wie sie in der Konzeption von Annis sichtbar sind. Für Annis sind die epistemischen Kriterien der Begründung und der basale Charakter der Überzeugung von gesellschaftlichen Praktiken abhängig. Nach Ansicht von Caraway ist Wittgenstein jedoch kein Kontextualist und unempfänglich für Relativismus. Er ist kein Kontextualist, denn (anders als Annis) bedient er sich sowohl des Begriffs des genauen als des sehr allgemeinen Kontexts. Die Kriterien der Anerkennung von Überzeugungen als fundamental funktionieren im Rahmen eines allgemeinen Kontexts, den er als „Weltbild" bezeichnet. In diesem allgemeinen Rahmen ist die Gewissheit von Basisüberzeugungen absolut.

In Zusammenhang mit den aufgezeigten Unterschieden behauptet Caraway, dass Wittgensteins Konzeption weder mit dem Fundamentalismus noch dem Kontextualismus noch dem Kontextualismus übereinstimmt. Zu bemerken ist, dass Caraway Fundamentalismus und Kontextualismus zu eng fasst, was es ihr ermöglicht die These zu verkünden, dass sich Wittgensteins Konzeption auf keinen dieser Standpunkte zurückführen lässt. Der Fundamentalismus ist für Caraway ein Standpunkt, der davon ausgeht, dass Basisüberzeugungen keinerlei Stütze seitens anderer Überzeugungen benötigen (wobei die Fundamentalisten diese Annahme nicht immer voraussetzen). Der Kontextualismus wiederum ist für sie ein relativistischer Standpunkt, der den Basischarakter von Überzeugungen von ihrer gesellschaftlichen Akzeptanz und Praxis abhängig macht (wobei nicht jeder Kontextualist zugleich Relativist ist). Caraway dürfte wohl ihre Auffassung von Fundamentalismus und Kontextualismus unter dem Einfluss der Konzeptionen von Stroll, Alston und Annis entwickelt haben – auf Publikationen dieser Philosophen beruft sie sich jedenfalls in ihrem Referat, nicht aber auf Werke, in denen eine komplexere Form des Fundamentalismus (etwa bei Robert Audi, 2001) oder des Kontextualismus (etwa bei Michael Williams) zum Ausdruck kommt.

Die Divergenzen in den Ansichten bezüglich der Frage, welchen Standpunkt Wittgenstein in seinen Bemerkungen in *Über Gewißheit* einnimmt, hängen also damit zusammen, dass die oben genannten Kommentatoren bestimmte Bemerkungen Wittgensteins ignorieren oder die Begriffe Fundamentalismus und Kontextualismus zu eng fassen.

6. Wittgensteins Kontextualismus

In seiner späten Phase versuchte sich Wittgenstein nicht am Aufbau einer Theorie. Es ist nicht bekannt, ob er die Zuschreibung irgendeines philosophischen Standpunkts für seine Gedanken akzeptiert hätte, denn ein Standpunkt drückt sich in Thesen aus, die einer gewissen Art von Theorien oder Konzeptionen gemein sind. Dennoch scheint mir, dass Wittgensteins Bemerkungen in *Über Gewißheit* eine Konzeption bilden, die man als kontextualistisch bezeichnen kann. Diesen Begriff verstehe ich im weiten Sinne als Standpunkt, der davon ausgeht, dass die Basalität von Überzeugungen vom Kontext ihres Auftretens abhängt und dass Basisüberzeugungen aufgrund ihrer Gewissheit keiner Rechtfertigung bedürfen. Ein solchermaßen weit gefasster Kontextualismus muss keineswegs relativistisch sein und kann fundamentalistische und kohärentistische Elemente integrieren. Ein solcher Standpunkt steht auch meinen eigenen Ansichten zur Struktur der Rechtfertigung nahe.

Wittgensteins Bemerkungen verweisen auf unterschiedliche Aspekte oder auch Dimensionen der Struktur des Systems der Überzeugungen: fundamentalistische, kontextualistische und kohärentistische. Das stellt eine Stärke seiner Konzeption dar, macht sie auch heute noch aktuelle und in hohem Maße zutreffend.

In vielen Zeitaltern haben die Philosophen über die Frage der Struktur des Systems der Überzeugungen gestritten. Lange Zeit dominierte der Standpunkt eines starken, reinen Fundamentalismus. Mit der Zeit kamen die Anhänger eines reinen Kohärentismus zu Worte. In letzter Zeit werden auch kontextualistische Konzeptionen entwickelt. Nach und nach begann man zu erkennen, dass jeder der Hauptstandpunkte in der Frage der Struktur der Rechtfertigung in Teilen durchaus Argumente hat. Deshalb ist es nur folgerichtig, dass heute gemischte Standpunkte in den Fokus rücken, wie etwa ein gemäßigter Fundamentalismus, der den Beziehungen der Kohärenz eine bestimmte Rolle zugesteht und die kontextabhängige Sensibilität von Überzeugungen berücksichtigt, oder ein lokalen Holismus akzeptierender Kontextualismus. Wittgenstein wusste um dies „Dreidimensionalität" des Systems von Überzeugungen schon vor siebzig Jahren. So kommt es, dass die Philosophen von heute in einem gewissen Maße Ideen annehmen, die Wittgenstein schon vor Jahrzehnten zum Ausdruck gebracht hat.

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Wittgensteins Texte und Manuskripte werden in diesem Band nach dem Werkschlüssel aus Pichler, Biggs und Szeltner: *Bibliographie der deutsch- und englischsprachigen Wittgenstein-Ausgaben*, 2019, zitiert.

Wittgenstein's texts and manuscripts are quoted in this volume by using the following citation keys from the Wittgenstein-Bibliography by Pichler, Biggs and Szeltner, 2019.

Deutsch	English	
BBB	BBB	*Das Blaue und das Braune Buch* (1958, 1960, 1969, 1970, 1998) [TSS 309–310]
BGM	RFM	*Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik* (1956, 1967, 1974, 1978) [TSS 221–224, MSS 117, 121–122, 124–127, 164]
BT	BT	*Big Typescript* (2005) [TS 213]
BÜF	ROC	*Bemerkungen über die Farben* (1977, 2007) [MSS 172–173, 176]
LSPP	LW	*Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie* (Zwei Bände 1982 und 1992, 1993, 1998) [MSS 137–138, 169–171, 173–174, 176]
PB	PR	*Philosophische Bemerkungen* (1964, 1975, 1998) [TSS 209, 214a, 215a, 215b, MS 109]
PG	PG	*Philosophische Grammatik* (1969, 1974, 2005) [TSS 211, 213, 214a–214c, MSS 112, 114–116, 140]
PU	PI	*Philosophische Untersuchungen* (1953, 1958, 1967, 1968, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2009) [TSS 227, 234]. [Kritische Ausgabe 2001: TSS 227, 234, MSS 142, 144, TSS 225, 220, 221, 239, 242]
PT	PT	*Prototractatus* (1971, 1989, 1996) [MS 104]
TB	NB	*Tagebücher* (1960, 1961, 1979, 1998) [MSS 101–103]
TLP	TLP	*Tractatus logico-philosophicus* (1921, 1922, 1933, 1955, 1961, 1963, 1972, 1989, 2003, 2004, 2009) [TSS 202–203]. [Kritische Ausgabe 1989: TSS 202–203, MSS 101–104, 301, TSS 201a–b]
ÜG	OC	*Über Gewißheit* (1969, 1971, 1974, 2006) [MSS 172, 174–177]
VB	CV	*Vermischte Bemerkungen* (1977, 1978, 1980, 1984, 1994, 1998, 2006) [MSS 101, 105–113, 116–138]
Z	Z	*Zettel* (1967, 1981, 1984, 1998) [TS 233]

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