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Volker A. Munz
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Language and World

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On Intensional Interpretations of Scientific Theories

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The picture theory from Wittgenstein's *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* provides a correspondence principle for the semantics of a formal language that in contrast to Tarski's extensional interpretation scheme, can be represented by maps from the domain to the language. It makes possible intensional interpretations of the predicates of the language of discourse for a domain consisting of physical objects or systems. The aim of this paper is to outline the basis for such an interpretation and explain how it can be extended to a language of discourse for the properties of the physical systems.

1. Introduction

A first order formal language has of the following elements:

- Vocabulary
 - Names, Variables, Predicates
 - Logical constants
- Rules of syntax
- Sentences and formulae
- Logical axioms
- Rules of deduction
- Ontology
 - Axioms
 - Terminological definitions
- Interpretation (semantics)

The vocabulary consists of words with different syntactic roles and semantic values that are used to formulate sentences and formulae according to the syntactic rules. The logical axioms limit the scope of the logical constants, while the ontology axioms both provides the language with a semantic structure by being implicit definitions of the primary terms of the vocabulary and a model of the domain picturing its structural properties. Secondary terms that serve to facilitate the discourse are introduced by terminological definitions.

Excluding the interpretation we are left with a formal system, *i.e.* a formal language is a formal system supplied with an interpretation. The interpretation is relating the primary terms of the vocabulary to external 'objects and actions'.

The standard way of providing a formal language with an interpretation is extensional and due to Tarski (1983, ch. VIII). If the domain of discourse consists of a set of (physical) systems, then a name denotes an individual system, a one-place predicate denotes a set of systems to which the predicate apply, a two-place predicate the set of pairs of ordered systems to which the predicate apply *etc.* The semantics is thus defined by a map that maps the names to the individual systems and the predicates to the set consisting of sets of individuals, sets of ordered pairs of individuals *etc.*

Russel's antinomy highlighted a problem threatening extensional interpretations. To avoid this problem at the outset Wittgenstein (1961) in *Tractatus* introduces the picture theory as a basis for the interpretation by correspondence with respect to the metaphysical assumption of logical atomism. A picture of a system can be seen as the image of a map from the domain to the language. I will use

this to outline a scheme for intensional interpretations of scientific theories in the framework of first order languages.

The restriction to first order makes it necessary to decompose the language in two coupled first order languages, an object language in which to describe the empirical facts about the systems of the domain and a property language in which to describe the properties of systems (Aaberge 2007). The reason for this separation is the need to quantify over physical systems and properties alike, but not in the same propositions. The distinction between the two languages captures scientific practice. In the object language a system is directly referred to, while in the property language the reference is indirect; it is given by means of identifying properties that are possessed by the system. The distinction is exemplified by the sentences "the water in bottle 3 is 5°C" and "5°C is a temperature" in the object and property language respectively. Here 5°C is a predicate of the first kind in the object language and a name in the property language.

2. The object language

Observations, operational definitions and observables

The object language applies to a domain consisting of physical systems. Physical systems possess properties and the attribution of a property to an individual system constitutes an atomic fact about the system. It is expressed by an atomic proposition, *i.e.* true atomic propositions are statements about observed atomic facts. The observations of atomic facts all involve the use of a standard of measure. The result of an observation follows from a comparison between a representation of the standard and the system. It determines a value from the standard, a predicate of the first kind.

Observations/measurements are based on operational definitions, *i.e.* definitions that specify the applied standard of measure, the laws/rules on which the measurements are based and the instruction of the actions to be performed to make a measurement. The operational definitions are formulated in a separate language. They provide intensional interpretations of the predicates expressing results of observations. The measurement of the colour of a system is an example. The measuring device is then a colour chart where each of the colours is named and the rule of application is to compare the colour of the system with the colours on the colour chart and pick out the one identical to the colour of the system. The name of the colour picked denotes the result of the measurement.

Each operational definition is symbolised by an observable that simulates the act of observation; the observable is an injective map between the domain and the set of predicates (of the first kind) that maps a system to the predicate representing a property possessed by the system (Piron 1975). The set of possible values of an observable represent mutually exclusive properties of the systems of the domain; no two properties corresponding to different values of the same observable can be possessed by any system. A system cannot at the same time weight 1 kg and 2 kg. Weight is therefore an observable. Other

examples of observables are position in space, number of systems in a given container and colour of systems.

Names, predicates of the first kind and truth

Let $L(D; N \cup V, P_1 \cup P_2)$ stand for the object language for a domain D . N denotes the set of names, V the set of variables, P_1 the set of predicates of the first kind and P_2 the set of predicates of the second kind¹. The distinction between predicates of the first and second kind is semantic and made possible by the intensional interpretation. The names of the systems are given by a map v ,

$$v: D \rightarrow N; d \mapsto v(d)$$

that to a system d in the domain D associates the name n by $v(d)=n$. v is an isomorphism; by convention, there is a unique name for every system and there is exactly the same number of names and systems.

Each observable δ determines an atomic fact about a system $d \in D$ by

$$\delta: D \rightarrow P_1; d \mapsto \delta(d)$$

For each δ there exists a unique (injective) map π defined by the condition of commutativity of the diagram

$$(1) \begin{array}{ccc} & \pi & \\ N & \rightarrow & P_1 \\ \uparrow v \nearrow \delta & & \text{i.e. } \pi(v(d)) = \delta(d), \forall d \in D \\ D & & \end{array}$$

The diagram relates the simulation of measurements determining atomic facts assigning a property to a system and the formulation of an atomic sentence expressing such a fact by the juxtaposition pn of the name n referring to the system d and the predicate p referring to the property, i.e. if $\pi(v(d)) = \delta(d)$, for $v(d)=n$ and $\pi(n)=p$. The commutativity condition $\pi(v(d)) = \delta(d)$ is thus the truth condition of the object language. It equates a proposition about the system d with a statement of the result of a measurement on d with respect to the observable δ .

The Tarski interpretation can be derived from the above interpretation. By taking the inverse images of the predicates of the first kind with respect to the observables we get the extensions of the predicates. The opposite is however, not the case. The reason is that intensional definitions contain much more information than extensional enumerations. In particular, operational definitions give meaning to predicates of the first kind at the outset while those of the second kind are introduced by terminological definitions.

Predicates of the second kind

One distinguishes between two kinds of observables referring to two kinds of properties, properties that do not change in time and thus serves to identify the system, and properties that change. The corresponding observables are identification and state observables respectively.

The systems can be classified with respect to the identification observables. One starts with one of the observables and uses its values to distinguish between the

systems to construct classes. Thus, one gets a class for each value of the observable, the class of systems that possess the particular property, e.g. the class of all red systems, the class of all green systems etc. The procedure can be continued recursively until the set of identification observables is exhausted. The result is a hierarchy of classes with respect to the set inclusion relation. The basic entities of the classification are the leaf classes.

The classes are referred to by predicates of the second kind which thus are ordered naturally in a taxonomy that constitutes a linguistic representation of the classification. The satisfaction conditions defining the classes are intensional definitions of the predicates of the second kind. They are of the form

$$\begin{aligned} pn_1 &= p_1n_1 \wedge p_2n_1 \wedge \dots \wedge p_mn_1 \\ pn_2 &= p_1n_2 \wedge p_2n_2 \wedge \dots \wedge p_mn_2 \\ &\cdot \\ &\cdot \\ pn_k &= p_1n_k \wedge p_2n_k \wedge \dots \wedge p_mn_k \end{aligned}$$

where p is the predicate of the second kind referring to the class defined by the satisfaction condition, $p_1, p_2, p_3, \dots, p_m$ are the values of the different observables and n_1, n_2, \dots, n_k , stand for the names of the systems for which the atomic propositions are true. The set of intensional definitions constitute terminological definitions belonging to the ontology of the language.

In the framework of the property language the subject-predicate form of the atomic propositions whose function is to attribute a property to a system can be considered fundamental. Seemingly atomic propositions like “ pn ” where p is a predicate of the second kind are only abbreviations of sentences being conjunctions of atomic sentences. For example the sentence “S-2003 is a Car” hides the description of what falls under the concept referred to by the predicate of the second kind “Car”.

3. Property Languages

Properties

Predicates of the first kind refer to *properties* of systems. A property is something in terms of which a system manifests itself and is observed, and by means of which it is characterised and identified. To an observer a system appears as a collection of properties. The properties of a system are thus in a natural way mentally separated from the system. The separation is made possible by the fact that the ‘same’ property is possessed by more than one system. It is expressed by the commutativity of the following diagrams

$$(2) \begin{array}{ccc} & P_1 & \\ \nearrow \delta & \uparrow \rho & \\ D & \rightarrow & E \\ & \varepsilon & \end{array} \text{ i.e. } \delta(d) = \rho(\varepsilon(d)), \forall d \in D$$

where E is the abstract representation of the set of properties of the systems in D ; the ε are injective maps that simulates the ‘mental’ separation of properties from the systems. In the case of coloured systems for example, the condition of commutativity means that if a system appears as red then it possesses the property redness. It is assumed that each predicate of the first kind refers to a unique potential property.

¹ In this paper the domain D is considered to consist of a set of systems with properties but without relations between them. There are then no two- and higher-ary predicate in the object language.

The property space E is a construction characterised by the diagram. The E chosen is a natural extension of the set of properties that can be associated to the systems of the domain as reflected in the set of predicates available in the standards of the operational definitions..

The maps $\rho: E \rightarrow P_1$; $e \mapsto \rho(e)$ can be considered as naming maps for the properties, e.g. a point in abstract space is named by a set of coordinates. To describe the properties we need a formal language, the property language $L(E, P_1 \cup W, Q)$, where P_1 denotes the set of names, W the set of variables and Q the set of predicates. The property language is associated with the diagrams

$$(3) \begin{array}{ccc} & \phi & \\ & P_1 \rightarrow Q & \\ \uparrow \rho & \nearrow \chi & \\ E & & \end{array}$$

The symbolic entities of E also belong to the property language. The maps ρ thus symbolises the kinds of measurements inside the language.

Ontologies

The ontology of the property language is a set of definitions relating the terms of the vocabulary. It consists of an axiom system giving implicit definitions of what is chosen to be the primary terms and a set of terminological definitions introducing secondary terms which serves to simplify the discourse. The axioms are formalised accounts of the operational definitions which constitute a basis for the interpretation of the primary terms. The axioms define a semantic structure that pictures structural properties of the domain as seen through the operational definitions (Blanché 1999).

The Theory of Special Relativity offers an example for how operational definitions impose an axiomatic structure on the property language. It is derived from an operational definition of time and distance measurements based on a definition of simultaneity of distant events with respect to a given observer, the physical law claiming the velocity of light to be constant and independent of the velocity of the emitting source and the Principle of Relativity which postulates that the laws of physics are the same in all inertial frames of reference. Presently, the standard unit of time defines the second to be 9 192 631 770 periods of the radiation emitted from the transition between two hyperfine levels in the ground state of Caesium 133. Moreover, 1 meter is equal to the distance covered by a light ray in empty space in 1/299 792 458 seconds. Length measurements are thus based on time measurements.

The axioms of the property language express the content of the operational definitions which constitute the basis for empirical investigations. Their truth can therefore not be ascertained through empirical investigations. They are "hinge" propositions expressing statements about structural properties of the property language that reflects structural properties of the domain as seen through the "lenses" of the operational definitions (Wittgenstein 1975). The object language can only be indirectly tested by means of the models of systems of the domain formulated in the language.

4. Theories

A theory for a given domain is the juxtaposition of an object language and a property language. Because of their association the triples of observables δ , π and ρ constitute the bridges between the object language and the property language with the observables δ as the central parts. The diagrams

$$(4) \begin{array}{ccc} & \pi & \phi \\ N & \rightarrow & P_1 \rightarrow Q \\ \uparrow v & \nearrow \delta & \uparrow \rho \nearrow \chi \\ D & \rightarrow & E \\ & \varepsilon & \end{array}$$

i.e. the composition of the diagrams (1), (2) and (3), expresses the structure of a scientific theory.

The commutativity of the diagrams (1) and (2) defines a unique π and ρ for each δ and ε . They all express the attribution of a property to a system and therefore represents the act of measurements. They will all be referred to as observables. Though their function differs the observables in a triple are therefore also given the same name. Colour is an example. Thus, while δ , by $\delta(d) = \text{red}$ associates the colour red to a system d , $\pi(n) = \text{red}$ stands for the atomic proposition "n is red", $\varepsilon(d) = \text{redness}$ claims that the system possesses the property redness and $\rho(\text{redness}) = \text{red}$ gives the name to the property. The observation that a system is red expressed by the sentence "n is red" is therefore to be interpreted as expressing that the system whose name is n possesses the *property* redness. This interpretation is justified by the commutativity of the diagram (4). The diagram thus shows how the semantic of the property language is based on the operational definitions.

5. Concluding Remarks

When Wittgenstein returned to philosophy in 1929 he started with the intention to revise *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*. He had become aware of its shortcomings as regards some of his initial objectives. In particular, he had discovered that the symbolism of *Tractatus*, the truth-false notation, did not exclude the construction of nonsensical sentences like "x is red and x is green" (Marion 1998). This forced him to abandon one of the pillars of *Tractatus*, the thesis that atomic sentences are independent (*Tractatus* 5.134).

I have made two proposals that make it possible to avoid some of Wittgenstein's own objections to the *Tractatus*. I have considered the language of discourse for a scientific domain to be the juxtaposition of two separate but interdependent languages; moreover, the definition of the observable by mutual exclusiveness imposes a restriction on the syntax that goes outside the purely truth functional logic. It implies that sentences like " $p_1 n \wedge p_2 n$ ", where p_1 and p_2 are different predicates of the first kind belonging to the same observable, are necessarily false since at least one of the atomic sentences in the conjunction must be false.

The realisation that there are constructions in language, outside the scope of truth-functional logic forced Wittgenstein to extend his investigations. He started to look at the different functions of natural language and introduced the notion of language game to account for its semantic foundation. Language is correctly applied if the discourse satisfies the rules of the game (Wittgenstein 1968).

In a language of the kind I am proposing, there are different kinds of rules that fall under the category of language game, the syntactic rules, deduction rules and the rules that the axioms of the property language imposes on the application of the primary terms. In addition, there are meta rules imposed by the operational definitions determining the interpretation of the primary terms as well as meta rules determining the semantics of the property language. It is clear that these different rules are at least partly interdependent. This interdependency should be analysable along the lines of *Investigations* and *On Certainty*.

I hope to have shown that a coherent intensional interpretation can be made of the framework of a scientific theory. To make a comprehensive extensional interpretation seems however, to be more difficult if at all possible because the underlying conceptual model of the domain and the direction of the interpretation map does not allow for the construction of commutative diagrams.

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Wittgenstein, Dworkin and Rules

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1. Introduction

In legal theory, there exists a continuing controversy about the nature and status of legal rules. According to some theorists, law is essentially a matter of rules (see e.g. Hart 1994); whereas others claim that rules form only a part of law, or that rules are only a source of law but do not by themselves determine the outcomes of judges' decisions (see e.g. Tushnet 1983). From the point of view of Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following, some conceptions about rules found in this debate look very strange. One example is Ronald Dworkin's famous separation of rules from legal principles. My aim in this paper is to point out, with the help of Wittgenstein, the oddness of Dworkin's definition of legal rules.

2. Dworkin's distinction between rules and principles

In his article "The Model of Rules I" (Dworkin 1977, pp. 14-45), Dworkin introduced a distinction that has become a commonplace in legal theory. He argues that a positivistic conception, according to which law is *just* a system of rules (which can be demarcated from other rule-systems by some formal criterion), is wrong. Dworkin claims that

when lawyers reason or dispute about legal rights and obligations, [. . .] they make use of standards that do not function as rules, but operate differently as principles, policies, and other sorts of standards. [Positivism's] central notion of a single fundamental test for law forces us to miss the important roles of these standards that are not rules. (Dworkin 1977, p. 22)

How do rules differ from principles (and other standards that are not rules)? According to Dworkin,

The difference between legal principles and legal rules is a logical distinction. Both sets of standards point to particular decisions about legal obligation in particular circumstances, but they differ in the character of the direction they give. Rules are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion. If the facts a rule stipulates are given, then either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes nothing to the decision. (Dworkin 1977, 24).

Thus, rules are something that, if they are valid, "dictate the result, come what may" (ibid., 35). Dworkin illustrates their nature by comparing them to the rules of a game. For example, in baseball it is a rule that if a batter has had three strikes, he is out. The referee of the game cannot consistently hold that this is an accurate rule of the game, and *at the same time* decide that some batter can have four strikes. Of course, there might occur some exceptional circumstances which allow a batter to have an extra strike; but according to Dworkin (and this is the feature that interests us in his account of rules), an accurate statement of the rule would take all exceptions to the rule into account. Any formulation of a rule that does not state all the exceptions would be "incomplete". In the same way, if it is a legal rule that a will is invalid unless signed by three witnesses,

then it cannot be that a will has been signed by only two witnesses and is valid. The rule might have exceptions,

but if it does then it is inaccurate and incomplete to state the rule so simply, without enumerating the exceptions. In theory, at least, the exceptions could all be listed, and the more of them that are, the more complete is the statement of the rule. (Dworkin 1977, 25)

Principles, on the other hand, do not dictate a particular result (even if they clearly are applicable to a given case). Sometimes a principle like 'No man may profit from his own wrong' can be the ground for decision (as in the famous case *Riggs vs. Palmer*, in which a grandson did not inherit his grandfather because he had murdered the latter), whereas in other cases a man may be allowed to profit from his own wrong (as e.g. in a case where one can enjoy the benefits of a new job even though one got it by breaching a contract with one's former employer). In short, a legal principle "states a reason that argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a particular decision" (Dworkin 1977, 26)

3. A Wittgensteinian critique

Dworkin's distinction between rules and principles, although enormously influential, has been criticised as well. The aim of the critics has mainly been to show that there is no reason why positivism couldn't include principles in their account of law. (See e.g. Hart 1994, 238-276) Yet legal theorists seem not to have paid attention to the astonishing idea, implicit in Dworkin's account, that there could be such a thing as a *complete expression of a rule*, which leaves absolutely no doubt about its correct application. What can Dworkin mean by such a thing?

A rule that would fulfil the theoretical requirement of completeness should have to be formulated in a language which is totally unambiguous: all the words used in the rule-formulation should have determinate, clear-cut meanings. Thus, there could not be any uncertainty about what e.g. 'signature' or 'witness' means. This means that the formulation of the rule should have to take into account all possible exceptional circumstances – situations in which, for example, a will is invalid even though signed by three witnesses (because one witness is e.g. drugged). As we saw, Dworkin indeed thinks that such a complete statement of a rule is possible.

Now as is well-known, Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations* reminds us that many of our concepts have no clear boundaries. A famous example is that of a game: if we look at all the various things that are called games, we find that there is nothing they all have in common, but see "a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing" (PI 67). "The concept 'game' is a concept with blurred edges." (PI 71) However, this is not to say that we cannot *give* determinate meanings to our concepts – Wittgenstein admits that this is possible for particular purposes (see PI 69). But Dworkin seems to require from legal rules more than this; he seems not to want precision for some particular purpose only, but absolute precision. Wittgenstein tries to show *this* to be a confused requirement.

Let us look at Dworkin's example of an unambiguous legal rule, the one that states that a will is invalid unless signed by three witnesses. Here, it seems, we can lay down in advance what all the terms mean so that a judge can

demarkate valid wills from invalid ones, “come what may”. But as H.L.A. Hart points out, even the most innocent-looking term of this rule, ‘signature’, can cause problems. What if the person who signs a will writes down only his initials? Or if he signs his name on the top of the first page and not on the bottom of the last page? Or if someone else guides his hand? Or if he uses a pseudonym? (Hart 1994, p.12) Dworkin would of course answer that a *complete* expression of the rule would take into account these cases; and if the present formulation does not do so, it has to be fixed accordingly. But would a complete expression of the rule also tell us what to do in cases where e.g. our laws of nature or our way of life changed radically (these changes are, after all, *theoretically* possible)? What counts as a signature if every time one touched a paper with a pen the paper would catch fire? Or if pens and papers disappeared from our culture altogether?

The point here is not to invent more and more bizarre circumstances after each new formulation of the rule, nor to point out some fundamental *defect* in human cognitive capacities (namely, the defect of not being able to know what the future will be like). The point is simply to remind us of the fact that

It is only in normal cases that the use of the word is clearly prescribed; we know, we are in no doubt, what to say in this or that case. The more abnormal the case, the more doubtful it becomes what we are to say. And if things were quite different from what they actually are [...] – this would make our normal language-games lose their point. (PI 142)

Thus, we could say that a rule such as ‘A will is invalid unless signed by three witnesses’ is complete if it fulfils its purpose in ordinary circumstances – in the everyday legal practice, with the users of the rule having received a similar legal training, with people in general behaving as they usually do, etc. (cf. PI 87) If things were quite different from what they are, we would not know how to apply this rule. This should not be understood as an empirical explanation of how rule-following is possible, but as a *grammatical* truth: it belongs to our *concept* of a rule that knowledge of its correct application presupposes ordinary circumstances. To want from rules *more* than this (which Dworkin seems to do) would, for Wittgenstein, to be a sign of having a confused conception of what rules are.

Perhaps Dworkin means, when he speaks of legal rules “dictating the result, come what may”, that the way they are *intended* determines the correct application. Thus, it would be the *meaning* of the rule which makes it determinate (in opposition to an indeterminate legal principle). This explanation seems to come to us naturally - to use Wittgenstein’s example, if someone applies a simple arithmetical rule “+2” correctly up until 1000, but after that writes down 1004, 1008, etc., we most probably would react by saying to this person. “No, I didn’t mean that” or “Don’t you see what I mean?” (see PI 185) It is tempting here to assume that if this person just saw into the mind of the rule-giver, he would know how to continue the series correctly. But then one must also assume that at the instant of giving the rule “+2”, all the future applications are somehow present in that instant. As Wittgenstein puts it,

your idea was that that act of meaning the order had in its own way already traversed all those steps: that when you meant it your mind as it were flew ahead and took all the steps before you physically arrived at this or that one. (PI 188)

Just such an idea seems to lie behind Dworkin’s conception of legal rules. However, Wittgenstein continues by saying

that “you have no model of this superlative fact, but you are seduced into using a super-expression. (It might be called a philosophical superlative.)” (PI 192) And I think that when Dworkin defines legal rules as something which can in principle anticipate all the exceptions to them (if the rules are completely expressed), he in fact has no clear model of what he wants. He is seduced into using a super-expression because he wants to make a rigid distinction between two different types of legal standards; and, perhaps, because he is misled by the *feeling* we often have when we follow simple (legal) rules. Wittgenstein admits that it often *strikes us* as if “the rule, once stamped with a particular meaning, trac[ed] the lines along which it is to be followed through the whole of space” (PI 219). This image (as Martin Stone has pointed out) can, of course, be used as stating an everyday feature of our rules: surely rule-following sometimes is like tracing a line that the rule has drawn through the whole of space. It is only if one takes this to be an *explanation* of how rule-following is possible, or as giving us the *essence* of rules (as distinct from other standards) that it falls apart. (See Stone 2004, 276) For if it is taken as an explanation, then not even a basic arithmetical order can fulfil its requirements: the order “add two” does not in an absolute sense determine just one way of applying it.

4. Conclusion

The upshot of the preceding discussion is that in so far as Dworkin implies that legal rules are *inherently*, i.e. on the basis of their inner nature, different from legal principles, then the distinction between rules and principles is not sustainable. The idea of rules as absolutely determinate standards which dictate a result in all circumstances is just a “philosophical superlative” of which we have no actual model. However, if one wants to make a distinction between different types of legal standards by pointing out that they have different *uses* in the legal practice, this can justify the distinction. And, to be fair to Dworkin, he also uses this criteria in his separation of rules from principles; as we saw at the beginning of the paper, he talks e.g. of lawyers’ making “use of standards that do not *function* as rules, but *operate* differently as principles...” (Dworkin 1977, 22, e.a.) The functional difference between rules and principles that Dworkin describes seems to boil down to this: if a judge refuses to apply a standard to a given case, and the rest of the legal community thinks that this is *wrong*, that the judge *should* have applied this standard, that it is *always* applied in cases like this, then the standard in question can be called a rule. If a judge can ignore a standard without this reaction, then it is a principle. My purpose here has not been to deny that such a distinction is possible; the purpose has only been to show, with the help of Wittgenstein, that if one turns this practical distinction into a *metaphysical* one, the result is just confusion. And I think that Dworkin’s way of characterising legal rules invites this confusion.

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Against Expressionism: Wittgenstein, Searle, and Semantic Content

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Introduction

In this paper, I present Wittgenstein's criticisms of a group of popular theories, which I call "expressionism." Expressionist theories of meaning claim that means of representation (e.g. sounds) represent semantic content by virtue of their relation to mental states. Wittgenstein, however, presents strong criticisms of such a theory. As an example of an expressionist theory of language, I will focus on the work of John Searle. Searle explicitly argues for a sophisticated version of expressionism that does not rely on phenomenal mental rules. Nevertheless, Searle's theory succumbs to Wittgenstein's criticism.

1. Searle and Expressionism

According to Searle, a speaker typically has two intentions in performing a linguistic act: 1) a meaning intention and 2) a communicative intention (Searle 165-166, 1983). Searle holds that meaning intentions are prior to communicative intentions in the sense that a person must represent the world in some fashion if she is to communicate that representation. Indeed, a person may intend to perform a meaningful linguistic act without intending to communicate with an interlocutor. A person cannot, by contrast, intend to communicate with an interlocutor without intending to perform a meaningful linguistic act. For example, a person can intend that her vocal performance be an utterance of the statement "Property is theft" even in a case where she does not address herself to an interlocutor. She cannot, on the other hand, intend to communicate with an interlocutor without intending that her vocal performance mean something – that it be, for example, an illocutionary act like the utterance of "Property is theft." As Searle sees it, a linguistic act is performed communicatively if and only if a speaker intends that an interlocutor recognize the performance of the action as a particular illocutionary act (Searle 168, 1983).

Searle's notion of a meaning intention is at the heart of his semantic theory. A speaker's meaning intention is her intention that a means of representation (R) represent some content (C). For Searle, this intention makes the difference between the production of meaningless physical facts and the performance of a meaningful linguistic act. Sounds and marks become representations when a person utters or scribbles them with the intention that they have conditions of satisfaction (Searle 164, 1983). The conditions of satisfaction for some linguistic act are the states of affairs that must obtain or come about in order for it to be satisfied. For instance, if a person makes the statement "The war in Iraq is a moral and political disaster," the conditions of satisfaction for this statement are that the war in Iraq is a moral and political disaster. A linguistic act is meaningful in that it is performed with the intention that it specify a possible state of the world that will satisfy it.

According to Searle, linguistic acts derive their meaning from intentional mental states. Intentional mental states, on the other hand, are directly and inherently related to their conditions of satisfaction. Nothing further is required to establish this link (Searle vii, 1983). The syn-

tactic or formal properties of the state are irrelevant to whether it specifies particular conditions of satisfaction (Searle 12, 1983). For example, a belief that there is life on Mars is different from a belief that neo-liberal economic policies impoverish much of the world because they are true under different circumstances. For Searle, linguistic acts derive their capacity to represent the world from the direct and inherent relation of intentional mental states to the world.

2. The Paradox: Meaning and Rules

Throughout his later work, Wittgenstein gives examples of mental rules with the intention of showing that means of representation cannot be linked to represented contents by such rules. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, he considers several kinds of mental rule which might be thought to effect such a connection. He writes, for instance,

When someone defines the names of colours for me by pointing to samples and saying "This colour is called 'blue', this 'green'...." this case can be compared in many respects to putting a table in my hands, with the words written under the colour-samples... One is now inclined to extend the comparison: to have understood the definition means to have in one's mind an idea of the thing defined, and that is a sample or picture. So if I am shewn various different leaves and told "This is called a 'leaf'", I get an idea of the shape of a leaf, a picture of it in my mind. (*PI*, §173)

Wittgenstein levels two basic objections at such attempts to link means of representation to represented contents: 1) a mental rule can offer no more guidance in acting than does a physical rule and 2) with respect to a mental rule there is no distinction between being guided by or obeying the rule and merely *seeming* to be guided by or obey the rule.

To establish the first point, Wittgenstein shows that a mental rule is no better than a physical rule in that it can be used differently. He writes,

Well suppose that a picture does come before your mind when you hear the word "cube", say the drawing of a cube. In what sense can this picture fit or fail to fit a use of the word "cube"? – Perhaps you say: "It's quite simple; - if that picture occurs to me and I point to a triangular prism for instance, and say it is a cube, then this use of the word doesn't actually fit the picture." – But doesn't it fit? I have purposefully so chosen the example that it is quite easy to imagine a *method of projection* according to which the picture does fit after all. (*PI*, §139)

The possession of a mental rule cannot be the bridge linking a means of representation (R) to some content (C) since even a mental rule must be understood or meant in some way. A diagram illustrating parallel parking, for instance, may be understood accidentally or deliberately as a diagram illustrating how to pull out from a parking spot along the street. Simply bringing such a diagram to mind, then, when given an order to park along the street (say at a licensing exam) cannot amount to understanding the order. (*PI*, §140)

To establish the second point, Wittgenstein stresses what is today called the “normative” character of rules (Kripke 37, 1982). A rule prescribes how things ought to be done under certain circumstances and serves the purposes of guidance, instruction, and justification for this reason. Mental rules, however, lack this quality. Wittgenstein explains

Let us imagine a table (something like a dictionary) that exists only in our imagination. A dictionary can be used to justify the translation of a word X by a word Y. But are we also to call it a justification if such a table is to be looked up only in the imagination? – “Well, yes; then it is a subjective justification.” – But justification consists in appealing to something independent. – “But surely I can appeal from one memory to another. For example, I don’t know if I have remembered the time of departure of a train right and to check it I call to mind how a page of the time-table looked. Isn’t it the same here?” – No; for this process has got to produce a memory which is actually *correct*. If the mental image of the time-table could not itself be *tested* for correctness, how could it confirm the correctness of the first memory? (*PI*, §265)

Since a mental rule is private, there is no standard by which to judge whether it is followed other than that it *seems* to be so to the person who possesses it. The distinction between what the rule *actually* prescribes and what it *seems* to prescribe thereby collapses.

3. A Rejoinder

It may seem that these arguments do not apply to the kind of expressionism offered by Searle. Whereas Wittgenstein is concerned in these passages with a theory that links means of representation to their represented contents using mental rules, Searle’s theory links means of representation to their represented contents via Intentional mental states. These states are not specters in the phenomenal theater of the mind like the tables Wittgenstein considers. Searle argues that these states are related directly and inherently to their conditions of satisfaction. As he explains,

A belief is intrinsically a representation in this sense: it simply consists in an Intentional content and a psychological mode... It does not require some outside Intentionality in order to become a representation, because if it is a belief it already intrinsically is a representation. Nor does it require some nonintentional entity, some formal or syntactical object, associated with the belief which the agent uses to produce the belief (Searle 22, 1983).

Linguistic acts, conversely, are indirectly linked to their conditions of satisfaction in virtue of this direct relation.

It is doubtful that Wittgenstein would view this position as an improvement on a theory according to which mental rules are this link. In the *Blue Book* he writes,

Now we might say that whenever we give someone an order by showing him an arrow, and don’t do it ‘mechanically’ (without thinking), we *mean* the arrow in one way or another. And this process of meaning, of whatever kind it may be, can be represented by another arrow (pointing in the same direction or the opposite of the first). In this picture of ‘meaning and saying’ it is essential that we should imagine the processes of saying and meaning to take place in two different spheres. Is it then correct to say that no arrow could be the meaning, as every arrow could be meant the opposite way? (*BB*, 33-34)

According to Searle, meaningless physical facts become meaningful representations by being related to Intentional

mental states. As he writes, “Entities which are not intrinsically Intentional can be made Intentional by, so to speak, intentionally decreeing them to be so” (Searle 175, 1983). An arrow, for instance, is an instruction because someone so intends it. However, according to Wittgenstein, this “decree” that some means of representation represent something relies on a means of representation. Thus, one can think of it as a mental arrow or a mental sentence like “Means of representation (R) represents content (C)” accompanying the other, external means of representation. But, of course, such mental representations fall prey to Wittgenstein’s criticisms of mental rules.

Searle might argue in response that Intentional mental states are *inherently related* to their contents. There is no such thing as “using an Intentional state differently,” since the relationship between the state and the content it represents is inherent in the state itself (Searle 22, 1983). In opposition to this Wittgenstein writes,

What one wishes to say is: “Every sign is capable of interpretation; but the *meaning* mustn’t be capable of interpretation. It is the last interpretation.” Now I assume that you take the meaning to be a process accompanying the saying, and that it is translatable into, and so far equivalent to a further sign. You have therefore further to tell me what you take to be the distinguishing mark between a *sign* and the *meaning*. If you do so, e.g., by saying that the meaning is the arrow which you *imagine* as opposed to any which you may draw or produce in any other way, you thereby say that you will call no further arrow an interpretation of the one which you have imagined. (*BB*, 34)

Intentional mental states are themselves embodied in means of representation and to claim of these that they are inherently related to their content is to *decide* that they cannot be used differently, not to *discover* this fact.

In fact, Searle argues for the importance of a background of dispositions, abilities, etc. on the basis of considerations similar to these. He writes,

Suppose you wrote down on a huge roll of paper all of the things you believed. Suppose you included all of those beliefs which are, in effect, axioms that enable you to generate further beliefs, and you wrote down any ‘principles of inference’ you might need to enable you to derive further beliefs from your prior beliefs... About this list I want to say, if all we have is a verbal expression of the content of your beliefs, then so far we have no Intentionality at all. And this is not because what you have written down are ‘lifeless’ marks, without significance, but because even if we construe them as Fregean semantic entities, i.e., as propositional contents, the propositions are not self-applying (Searle 153, 1983).

To have an Intentional mental state is to be able to “apply” it – i.e. to be able to discern the conditions that satisfy it. This requires a background of dispositions, abilities, etc. But, for Searle this background is a mental structure (Searle 153-154, 1983). One might have such dispositions, abilities, etc. even if one were a brain in a vat. But, to link means of representation to their represented contents in this manner denies that there is an independent standard according to which they could be said to represent one state of affairs rather than another (Kripke 22-37, 1982). One’s Intentional mental states thus represent whatever they *seem* to represent. But, people are often inclined to their count beliefs true when they are manifestly false. A belief’s truth-conditions are independent, that is, of anyone’s inclination to count it true.

Conclusion

In this paper I have presented Wittgenstein's criticisms of Searle's expressionist semantics. Expressionist theories of meaning hold that means of representation (e.g. sounds) are linked to their represented contents by virtue of their relation to mental states. This way of thinking about language presupposes that means of representation are fundamentally meaningless; that they are dead and must be animated by the mind. This picture of meaning, however, is beset by paradox and disquiet. Wittgenstein does not seek to link dead means of representation to semantic content. Rather, he shows that in people's everyday experience language is already alive. In general, people experience *representations*, not meaningless *means of representation*.

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Modal Empiricism and Two-Dimensional Semantics

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I. The concept of strong necessity

A strongly necessitates B, when it is not possible that A and not B, though it is conceivable that A and not B. In another formulation: A entails B, but it is not *a priori* that A entails B (A does not imply B). Strong metaphysical necessities determine the space of possible worlds. If the space of possible worlds is sparser then the worlds which are (ideally primarily positively) conceivable, then whether a world is possible or not, is determined by some metaphysical fact, over and above the world's being (ideally primarily positively) conceivable.¹ Thus: accepting that there are strong necessities commits one to modal empiricism; denying it, to modal rationalism.

The concept of strong necessity may be illuminated further by considering the relation between complete description of a world *w* and a particular true statement *S*. If, given the complete qualitative description of world *w*, *S* is true in world *w* considered as actual (viz. *S* is true, interpreted according to its primary intension), but *S* is not entailed *a priori* by the complete qualitative description of *w*, then the facts described by the complete qualitative description of world *w* strongly determine the facts *S* describes.

Whether strong metaphysical necessities exist, also have implications for the consciousness-brain relation, in the following way. Chalmers argues that the possibility of zombies is sufficient to refute materialism. Now, zombies seems conceivable (or, at least, I will not challenge this assumption here), but are they also possible? According to modal rationalism the conceivability of zombies implies their possibility, according to modal empiricism, it does not. Hence, one way of rejecting the zombie argument is to

¹ I use David Chalmers' conceptual apparatus here.

Negative conceivability of a statement *S*: *S* is not ruled out by our concepts. For example, is negatively conceivable that bats have bat-experiences, radically different from human experiences, for the concepts describing the ultrasound mechanisms of bat perception do not rule this out.

Positive conceivability of a statement *S*: a positive conception can be formed in which *S* is the case, (we have the relevant notions for conceiving it). For example, zombies are positively conceivable: we have the notions to conceive a being who is an exact physical duplicate of a normal human being, but has no phenomenal consciousness.

Ideal conceivability is conceivability by an ideal reasoner (an ideally rational being).

Metaphysical possibility. What God might have created, had He so chosen (metaphorically put). For example, God could have created a mile-high unicycle, but he couldn't have created a male vixen.

Primary intension. A function rendering extensions to possible worlds considered as actual. When "considering a world *w* as actual", we determine the extension of our terms at world *w* as follows. We take the reference-fixer of the terms in world *w*, and determine what they would pick out in world *w*, were *w* the actual world.

Secondary intension. A function rendering extensions to possible worlds considered as counterfactual. When "considering a world *w* as counterfactual", we take the reference-fixer of the terms in the actual world, determine what they pick out in the actual world, and render these references to world *w*.

A statement *S* is *primarily conceivable* (1-Con), if it is conceivable when interpreted according to its primary intension. A statement *S* is *ideally positively primarily conceivable*, if *S* is positively conceivable by an ideal reasoner, interpreted according to its primary intension. A statement it is *primarily possible* (1-Pos) if it is possible (there is a possible world in which it is true), when it is interpreted according to its primary intension. A statement *S* is *secondarily possible* (2-Pos), if it is possible, interpreted according to its secondary intension.

There is one single space of metaphysically possible worlds.

"→": entails *a priori*.

(See e.g. Chalmers 1996, chap. 2.)

hold that zombies are not possible, even though they are conceivable; viz. certain physical (brain) events strongly necessitate conscious events. This view is a version of a *posteriori* materialism, which holds that physical facts determine facts about consciousness, but they do not determine them *a priori*.

II. Chalmers' arguments against strong necessities

One argument of David Chalmers against strong metaphysical necessities is the following. There are no candidates of strong necessities, except – the alleged – strong necessity of the brain-consciousness relation; and this suggests that strong necessity is an *ad hoc* invention to save materialism. I shall argue, however, that it follows from *Chalmers' views* on the semantics and ontology of microphysical terms, that there are some *other* strong necessities: microphysical identifications, such as „Hydrogen is the such and such quantumstate” are strongly necessary. (If I am right, it also follows that a *posteriori* materialism cannot be rejected on the general assumption that there are no strong metaphysical necessities whatsoever. However, my argument clearly does not establish the truth of a *posteriori* materialism, I do not have this aim here.)

Chalmers modal rationalist claim that there are no strong necessities whatsoever, is elaborated in terms of the following principles (Chalmers 2002, 174-188):

(CP+) Ideal positive 1-Con $P \rightarrow 1\text{-Pos } P$

(CP-) Ideal negative 1-Con $P \rightarrow 1\text{-Pos } P$

(CP+) and (CP-) do not have the same strength of evidential support; (CP+) is almost certainly true, according to Chalmers, while (CP-) is not. This is not relevant to my argument, however, for I shall deal primarily with (CP+).

III. My thesis: microphysical identifications are strongly necessary

My thesis is that there are counterexamples to (CP+); they are ideally positively primarily conceivable, but not primarily possible. I suggest that microphysical identification are such cases: they should count as strongly necessary, if we adopt Chalmers' semantics and metaphysics of microphysical terms.

My example is the claim that "Hydrogen is QM". The terms "hydrogen" and "QM" should be understood as follows. The reference-fixer of "hydrogen" is "hydrogen-likeness", viz. having a certain emission spectrum, SpE; QM is a certain quantum-mechanical state, which is described by the Schrödinger-equation, the eigen-values of which are the energy levels corresponding to the spectrum SpE. In our world, what is hydrogen-like is QM.

Now consider the following argument.

(1) "Hydrogen is not QM" is ideally primarily positively conceivable.

(2) If "Hydrogen is not QM" is ideally primarily positively conceivable, then "Hydrogen is not QM" is primarily possible.

(3) If "Hydrogen is not QM" is primarily possible, then "Hydrogen is not QM" is secondarily possible.

"Hydrogen is not QM" is secondarily possible.

But the conclusion must be false. For if "Hydrogen is QM" is true in our world, then it is secondarily necessarily true that "Hydrogen is QM" (by the definition of the secondary intension of "Hydrogen is QM"), hence it cannot be the case that it is secondarily possible that "Hydrogen is QM". Hence, we have to reject one of the premises.

The support for the premises

As regards (1)

(1) is true, because it is *not a priori* that "Hydrogen is QM".

For all we can know *a priori* (in principle), do not rule out that "Hydrogen is not QM". After all, "Hydrogen is QM" is an empirical truth. And we can also conceive of a scenario in which "Hydrogen is not QM" (namely a scenario, in which "Hydrogen is QM*", QM* being a microphysical state other than QM). Hence it is both negatively and positively conceivable that "Hydrogen is not QM".

Note that there is another conception of conceivability which sometimes gets mixed up with the one we used here, namely: „it accords with our present knowledge“. If "Hydrogen is not QM" were only conceivable in this sense, this would not ground that "Hydrogen is QM" is strongly necessary. However, "Hydrogen is not QM" is conceivable in the relevant sense. To see this, consider the following example. The Goldbach-conjecture (any even integer is the product of two primes) and also its negation is conceivable, in the sense that they both accord with our present knowledge. But they both cannot accord with all what we can know *a priori* in principle. For if the Goldbach-conjecture is true, it is *a priori* true. Hence it is ruled out *a priori* that it is false; and we cannot form a scenario in which it is false, either. (We can know that the Goldbach-conjecture is true (or false) *a priori* in principle, for we can have an *a priori* proof for it – even if haven't got it as yet). Thus, if the Goldbach-conjecture is true, then it is both negatively and positively inconceivable that it is false, in our sense of conceivability. But the case of "Hydrogen is QM" is different. "Hydrogen is QM" is true, but *not a priori* true. So, unlike in the case of the Goldbach-conjecture, even if we know that "Hydrogen is QM" is true, we can conceive, in the relevant sense, that it is false.

As regards (2)

(2) is an application of the general (CP+) principle to a particular case. So if we accept (CP+), viz. modal rationalism, we have to accept (2) as well.

As regards (3)

(3) follows from Chalmers' semantics of microphysical terms. Accordingly

(i) "Hydrogen" has the same reference-fixer in all possible worlds.

(ii) The reference-fixer picks out the same entity, namely QM, at all possible worlds.

Hence,

The primary intension of „hydrogen“ is a constant function.

Since the secondary intension of "hydrogen" is the same as its the primary intension (it also renders QM to each possible world), therefore (3) holds: if it is primarily possible that "Hydrogen is not QM", then it is also secondarily possible.

Now, if we cannot reject (1) and (3), then the only option remaining is to reject (2). Rejecting (2) amounts to rejecting (CP+), viz. modal rationalism, for it is tantamount to the claim that while it is conceivable that "Hydrogen is not QM", it is not possible. This means, that "H is QM is strongly necessary: hence we have a case of strong necessity different from the brain-consciousness relation.

Objections

We may investigate further whether the support for (3) is really acceptable.

(i) expresses the so-called "semantic account of considering a possible world as actual". Against such an interpretation Robert Stalnaker has formulated objections (Stalnaker 2001).

As against (ii), there are several argumentative strategies. One line is to claim, that (a) the semantics of „H“ is similar to the semantics of „water“, in the sense that its primary reference may change across worlds (As „water“ may refer to XYZ, „H“ may refer to QM* at some non-actual worlds considered as actual). I shall come back to this later.

Another line against (ii) is to claim (b) that „H“ does not refer to some categorical property, but to some dispositional, structural property, and this allows that „H“ does not denote QM, but something else in some (non-actual) worlds considered as actual. According to the now dominant view, the properties microphysical theories attribute to microphysical entities are categorical properties, playing both a reference-fixing role and being essential properties of these entities (e.g. the reference-fixer of „electron“ is the „electron-role“, and the properties constituting the electron-role are the same properties which are the categorical properties of electrons, according to microphysical theories). But there are views to the contrary: Schlick's, Russell's, or Maxwell's structuralist materialism, or Chalmers' F-monism assert that properties appearing in the reference-fixing descriptions of microphysical terms are dispositional/structural properties, which are not identical with the essential properties of the referents of the microphysical terms.

There are well-known arguments against such a structuralist account. Just to mention one: in other cases, where the reference-fixing properties are not the essential properties of the referent, there are some plausible candidate of knowable nature for the role of the essential properties. (E.g. the essential property of what „water“ refers to, is its microphysical property of being H₂O, its reference-fixing property is being watery.). However, on the structuralist account of the meaning of microphysical terms, there are no such candidates, the nature of the posited essential properties are in principle unknowable; and this seems counterintuitive.

Now, coming back to (a), the „H“ and „water“ comparison. One may hold that (3) is false; the inference does not hold, for 1-Pos(hydrogen is not QM) is true, but 2-Pos(hydrogen is not QM) is false. There is an apparently similar case, water's not being H₂O: it *is* 1-Pos(Water is

not H₂O), but it *is not* 2-Pos(Water is not H₂O). The reason is that the reference-fixer of “water”, watery stuff, may pick out different substances at some possible worlds (e.g. XYZ); hence 1-Pos(Water is not H₂O). But the secondary intension of “water” renders H₂O to all possible worlds (if our world is the actual world), hence it is not 2-Pos(Water is not H₂O).

However, the case of “Hydrogen is not QM” is different. For the primary intension of “hydrogen” *is* a constant function, it renders QM to each possible world considered as actual. And the secondary intension of “hydrogen” is also (the same) constant function, by definition. Hence if it is 1-Pos(H is not QM), then it is 2-Pos(H is not QM); there is no analogy with the case of water’s not being H₂O.

We may still hold, the above answer notwithstanding, that the semantics of “H” *is* analogous with the semantics of “water”. For the metaphysical intuition behind the semantic idea that “H” refers to QM in all possible worlds considered as actual, is that hydrogen is a fundamental entity of the world: and hence, in worlds where it exists, it must have the same nature as in our world. However, the objection goes, hydrogen is *not* at the most basic ontological level, and the metaphysical-cum-semantic intuition concerned applies only to terms denoting the most fundamental entities. (We assume, for the sake of argument, that such a hierarchical ontological model of physical entities is correct.)

To this we can reply the following. First of all, Chalmers’ account of the water is H₂O case clearly supports my interpretation of his semantics for “H”, since he holds that “H₂O” refers to the same entity in all possible worlds considered as actual; hence the same should apply to “H” (H and H₂O being on the same ontological level). Second, even if we accept this objection, a similar argument may be run not with hydrogen, but with some other entity, which is assumed to be at the most fundamental ontological level, for example with quarks. A parallel identity claim may be for example “c-quark is C-QRK” (where “C-QRK” denotes the essential properties of c-quarks.) Then this identification would count as strongly necessary.

Conclusion

If we accept Chalmers’ semantics and metaphysics concerning microphysical terms, it follows that microphysical identifications are strongly necessary. Hence, within Chalmers’ metaphysical and semantic framework there must be some strongly necessary relations, besides the – alleged – strong necessity of the brain-consciousness relation. This result supports modal empiricism. It also counts in favour of a *posteriori* materialism, for it blocks the objection that a *posteriori* materialism is committed to there being strong necessities, but there are no such modalities at all.

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Compositionality from a “Use-Theoretic” Perspective

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1. Introduction

What does it mean to say that language is a *potential*-infinite object, as opposed to an *actual*-infinite one? What is at stake here? It is not only that our conceptualization of language is different from one choice of infinite to the other. In fact, it is our very understanding *in* language that changes. Let me elaborate. For the sake of the argument, if one accepts the metaphor that thought takes place in language, the ascription to language of either kind of infinite has consequences for the notion of thought. For thinking as a *process* is closer to a notion of a *potential*-infinite language, whereas thinking as a way of *perception* relates better to the idea of an *actual*-infinite language. But this is only a metaphor, to be sure, and a misleading one. Its only purpose here is to direct our attention to how we conceptualize language, because this might have consequences on how we put thought back into the picture.

I am interested in the understanding that takes place when one understands language. So I must distinguish the subject of my inquiry from a study of language as an object, as it occurs in, e.g., typology. It might be convenient to use an expression such as “language-understanding” to refer unambiguously to the understanding that is characteristic of what goes on when we read a book, conduct a conversation, give a speech, write a letter, etc. This understanding is clearly dependent on how one defines its object, namely language. But we must be clear that the definition of language is subsidiary to that which we understand.

This task is formidable. However, for the purposes of this paper, I only need to show what it does *not* consist in. To bring home the point, let me resort to an analogy with the case of perception. In this area it is clear, I believe, that it is one thing to investigate into our experience of colors and shapes, and quite another to provide an algorithm for mapping 2D arrays of intensity vectors into 3D matrices. For one thing, a 3D matrix is as much in need of interpretation as the original 2D array. An explanation of the mapping just doesn't count as an explanation of the perceptual experience. In the case of language, too, there seems to be a difference between our language-understanding and the non-introspectable mechanisms which are supposed to constitute the language faculty.

With these clarifications in mind, I want to examine the claim that natural languages are infinite objects. I want to inquire into the notion of the infinite that could be attributed to language, in such a way that we move closer to an inquiry into language-understanding. I will show in the next section that there is no compelling reason for the claim that languages are actual-infinite objects. After a systematic argument to this effect, I will argue in section 3 that the argument for the infinity of language can be “re-analyzed” so as to still throw light on the problem of “language productivity”, but without the negative effects mentioned. To this effect, I will (a) discuss the parallel between language's (purported) recursive syntax and the successor function on natural numbers; (b) discuss our understanding of natural numbers and their infinity in the light of Wittgenstein's late philosophy of mathematics; and (c) draw consequences for language-understanding from the discussion in (b).

2. Languages and Recursive Syntax

The claim to be discussed here is that language is an *actual*-infinite object –i.e., an infinite set of sentences. This claim is both surprising and unsurprising. It is *unsurprising* when it comes to *formal* languages. The recursion of the syntax with which most formal languages are defined is on a par with the recursion of the successor function on natural numbers, so the same type of infinity is associated to both cases –traditionally, the actual infinite. However, the claim that language is an infinite object, in the sense of infinity that evokes actuality, is surprising in the case of *natural* languages. What would support such ontological claim? Language is infinite, so the received view goes, because it is generated by a recursive syntax. This would explain how, with finitely many resources, language can be infinite. That a natural language such as English is infinite is a “fact” that follows, for instance, from rule (1):

(1) If S is a sentence of English, then *I believe that S* is a sentence of English

It must be clear that we are dealing with two different kinds of entities here: rules and languages. But if there is a difference between them, and it is languages that we are interested in, the idea that we analyze languages by means of rules raises the problem of the adequacy of rules: how do we know that *these* rules are the rules of *this* language? The only way to answer this question is to have an independent specification of the language –and one that shows that it is infinite— that the rules have to conform to. But since it is such specification that we are after, an analysis of language in terms of rules only pushes the problem one step back. A move here could be to abandon languages altogether in favor of rules. But this is not a viable move if what we are investigating is language-understanding. For we should ask ourselves what comes first in language-understanding: sentences or “tacitly known” rules? Thus, we are not compelled to accept this argument for the infinity of language. For even if certain recursive rules can generate an unbounded supply of sentences, nothing guarantees that these sentences are sentences of English and so that English is infinite.

The adequacy of rules is not the only problem for this argument that language is infinite. Another problem is the far reaching constrains that we need to apply to the notion of a sentence if the argument is to make sense. First, only if we have a theory-independent notion of a sentence can we say that (1) is a fact of language. Second, the notion of a sentence should also be independent from what people actually utter/write. Otherwise the idea of infinitely many sentences is meaningless. But what could be a notion of a sentence that is both theory- and use-independent? Only the notion of a sentence either as a material or as a platonic object will do. However, there are not infinitely many material objects, so sentences must be platonic objects. But if sentences are platonic objects, how do we understand them? How do we *know* there are infinitely many of them? What would an argument to this effect look like? At the very least, the argument could not be an empirical one.

Despite of this, philosophers do have attributed language the property of infinity in the actual sense. This has also provided motivation to come up with a compositional theory of meaning. In particular, one of the main issues in (formal) semantics is to "explain" how the meanings of sentences depend on the meanings of words and the way they are put together. Compositionality is also supposed to solve the following, related problem. Along with the observation that people develop mastery of a language, consisting in their ability to understand its sentences, the presumed infinity of language gives rise to the "observation" that people can understand and use infinitely many sentences, in particular, sentences they have never heard before.

However, the problem of productivity –i.e., how to explain that people can understand and use sentences they have never heard before– is independent from the claim of the infinity of language. This becomes clear from the fact that productivity as such cannot be an argument for the infinity of language. Actually, "productivity" is a misleading term. It is classified as a claim about language, whereas it is a claim about language *users* (Groenendijk and Stokhof 2005). It says that language users are able to understand and use sentences they haven't heard before. But does this mean that no-one uttered or wrote these sentences? Does it mean that there are infinitely many sentences? Since productivity is a claim about language *users*, it is not clear how it can be transformed into a claim attributing a property to *language*.

In the next section I will argue that the puzzlement about recursive syntax that gave rise to the idea of the infinity of language can be studied in a quite illuminating way. It will be illuminating because it will throw light into the notion of productivity.

3. The Infinity of Natural Numbers

The methodological strategy suggested is not to use mathematics as an uncritical source of understanding, but as a place where the kind of understanding that we want to conceptualize can be fruitfully discussed. The aim is to conceptualize *language* in such a way that it becomes perspicuous how we understand it. In particular, we need an account of the fact that we are able to understand sentences we have never heard before. To this effect, we will ask how *natural numbers* should be conceptualized so that it becomes perspicuous how we understand them. To be sure, the cases of numbers and language are not *prima facie* on a par. But the analogy might be interesting since it might suggest an improved methodology for the study of language-understanding.

We start our conceptualization of *natural numbers* in terms of the ability to write down *numerals*. The technique is easier to explain with strokes as numerals. Once a stroke for 1 is agreed upon, say |, we define it as the numeral for the number one. The numeral for the successor of a number represented by a given numeral can be obtained by putting another stroke to the right of this numeral. In this way we can construct all the numerals, each of them corresponding to a natural number.

Two things are important to note. First, this conceptualization does not commit us to actual-infinite entities such as the set of all natural numbers. A technical reason can be found in the existence of strictly finitistic approaches to mathematics (for example van Bendegem 1987). Another reason is manifest in the intelligibility of the distinction between the *actual* and the *potential* infinite, which dates back

to Aristotle (cf. Aristotle, *Physics*, book 3, chapter 6; cf. Moore 1991 for discussion.).

The conceptualization of the natural numbers as explained above can be analyzed in the following way (cf. Wittgenstein 1976, p. 31). One may ask how many numerals one has learned to write down. The answer could not be other than \aleph_0 . For clearly, any technique for writing down numerals that only yields a limited number of numerals is different from our own technique, which is unbounded. Our experience of the technique is that it doesn't get exhausted – numbers are infinite precisely because of this! This shows that we do not survey the totality of numbers *a priori*; numbers are unlimited in this sense that they are not epistemically accessible *a priori*. If the natural numbers were conceptualized as an actual-infinite set in some platonic realm, our chances for explaining how we know them grow thinner. For how do we grasp them? How do we find which properties they have? But, even more importantly, the actual-infinite is not the way in which we experience them. The fact that we can not actually finish the process is what gives us the experience of there being infinitely many of them. We do not survey the totality of the natural numbers in our minds. We have a technique for constructing more and more, but each time this technique has to be applied.

Now, any explanation of our understanding of natural numbers requires, besides showing how to write down numerals, also showing that one can operate with them, that we can find relations between pairs or tuples of them –e.g., being lesser or equal than–, etc. But it is clear that the bigger the numbers –i.e., the more strokes their numerals have–, the lesser the possibility of doing operations with them (and this is so even for machines, but that is beside the point). This also shows that positing a rule of understanding which is parallel to the successor function is not a fruitful strategy. For one thing, the rule would predict that we understand very big natural numbers in the same way as smaller ones. In fact, the rule would predict that we understand all numbers in the same way. But this just runs against our earlier observation that such similarity breaks down at some point.

The way to bring these observations concerning numbers back to an observation of language is clear (cf. Baker and Hacker 1984; Groenendijk and Stokhof 2005). As masters of language we have a technique for constructing and using sentences. But this technique does not give us a way to survey the totality of sentences in an *a priori* manner. In each case, when a sentence is presented to a hearer/reader, he can apply his ability without already having understood the sentence beforehand. The speaker can even say *I don't understand that S*, where S is what he just heard/read. And this will have a clear meaning in English. But this does not mean that there is a rule of understanding attached to this way of responding, let alone one that applies to the construction of all sentences. The reason is similar to the case of the natural numbers. To understand a sentence requires, among other things, the ability to operate with it, for example, drawing inferential relations. As it was the case with numbers, the bigger the sentence, the lesser the possibility of operating with it. Accordingly, our language-understanding is not uniform across sentences. Compositionality delivers a wrong "explanation" of our language-understanding, for it asserts that we have an *a priori* understanding of all language. As in the case of numbers, this is a wrong prediction.

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Eine Überprüfung von Norman Malcolms Bemerkungen über die Verwundbarkeit unserer objektiven Gewissheiten

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Während der letzten achtzehn Monaten seines Lebens schrieb Wittgenstein eine Reihe Aufzeichnungen, die später unter dem Titel *Über Gewissheit* veröffentlicht wurden. In diesem Werk untersucht Wittgenstein was ihn an einer objektiven Gewissheit zweifeln lassen könnte. Um Licht auf diese Frage zu werfen, beschreibt Wittgenstein eine Reihe von Ereignissen, die uns ganz aus dem Gleis werfen könnten. Es handelt sich um Ereignisse, die uns das Sicherste unanehmbar machen würde, d.h.: die bewirkten, dass wir unsere fundamentalsten Urteile umstießen (ÜG §517). Einige Beispiele dieser Evidenz sind: dass das Vieh auf der Wiese auf dem Kopf stünde, lachte und verständliche Worte redete; dass Bäume sich nach und nach in Menschen und Menschen in Bäume verwandelten, usw. (ÜG §513). Malcolm (1986, 216-218) behauptete, dass Wittgenstein drei verschiedene Möglichkeiten als Folge dieser Art Ereignisse betrachtete. Die erste Möglichkeit ist, dass das Ereignis verursacht, dass unser Bezugssystem zum Erliegen gebracht wird. Um diese Behauptung zu begründen, beschränkt Malcolm sich, vier Abschnitte von *Über Gewissheit* zu zitieren, wo Wittgenstein ausdrücklich darauf hinweist, dass er keines Urteils sicher sein könnte, wenn ein Zweifel sich über eine Gewissheit erhöhe (vgl. ÜG §§490, 613-614). Dann könnte er sich darauf nicht verlassen, was unter „wahr“ und „falsch“ zu verstehen ist (ÜG §515). Die zweite Möglichkeit ist, dass Gewissheit durch Zweifel ersetzt wird. Auch diese Möglichkeit begründet Malcolm nicht. Tatsächlich zitiert er nicht einmal einen Abschnitt von *Über Gewissheit*. Deswegen könnte man sogar sagen, dass Malcolms Behauptung, dass Gewissheit durch Zweifel ersetzt werden kann, dogmatisch erscheint. Die dritte und letzte Möglichkeit ist, dass man sich an den alten Gewissheiten festhält. Wenn jemand an seinem eigenen Namen zweifeln würde, „so gäbe es gewiß auch etwas, was die Gründe solcher Zweifel selbst zweifelhaft erscheinen ließe“. Deshalb könnte er sich dafür entscheiden, seinen alten Glauben beizubehalten (ÜG §516). Wenn jemand sagt, dass er keine Erfahrung als Beweis gegen seine Gewissheiten anerkennen wird, handelt es sich um eine Entscheidung (vgl. ÜG §§368, 362). Kurzum: wenn man fragt „Wie, wenn du auch in diesen fundamentalsten Dingen deine Meinung ändern müßtest?“, sollte die Antwort sein „Du mußt sie nicht ändern. Gerade darin liegt es, daß sie ‚fundamental‘ sind“ (ÜG §512).

Trotzdem denkt Richard Scheer (1990, 154-164) nicht, dass Wittgenstein die drei obgenannten Möglichkeiten als Folge unerhörter Ereignisse betrachtete. Seiner Meinung nach war Wahnsinn – d.h., die Entziehung der Grundlage alles Urteilens – die einzige Möglichkeit, die Wittgenstein ernst nahm. Bezüglich der Ersetzung der Gewissheit durch Zweifel, behauptet Scheer, dass man wahnsinnig geworden ist, wenn man daran zweifelt, was immer als gewiss behandelt wurde. Im Hinblick auf die Entscheidung, jede Erfahrung als Beweis gegen die eigenen Gewissheiten abzulehnen, erwähnt Scheer, dass diese Entscheidung nicht getroffen werden kann. Denn das wäre kein echter Verzicht, sondern ein Teil des Sprachspiels. Jetzt werde ich zeigen, wie Malcolms Bemerkungen gegen Scheers Kritiken begründet werden können.

Erstens liegt es auf der Hand, dass Wittgenstein den Wahnsinn als eine mögliche Folge aus unerhörten Ereignissen betrachtete. Tatsächlich nimmt Scheer auch diese Möglichkeit an. Trotzdem möchte ich etwas über diesen eigenartigen Wahnsinn hinzufügen. Wenn Wittgenstein „Wenn das falsch ist, dann bin ich verrückt“ bezüglich der Möglichkeit, sich in seinem eigenen Namen zu irren, sagt (ÜG §572), ist es offensichtlich, dass er sich auf den Wahnsinn nicht im klinischen, sondern im grammatischen Sinne bezieht. Der Wahnsinn, der einen Verstoß gegen unsere Sprachspiele darstellt, ist von großer philosophischer Bedeutung, weil er die Auswirkung, die die Überschreitung einer Gewissheit auf unser Bezugssystem zur Folge hat, zeigt. Denn dieses System besteht aus Folgen und Prämissen, die sich gegenseitig stützen (ÜG §142). Mit anderen Worten: Was in diesem System feststeht „tut dies nicht, weil es an sich offenbar oder einleuchtend ist, sondern es wird von dem, was darum herumliegt, festgehalten“ (ÜG §144).

Zweitens ist es wahr, dass Gewissheit durch Zweifel ersetzt werden kann. Meines Erachtens kann diese Ersetzung aber nur in bestimmten Fällen stattfinden. Um diesen Kommentar zu erklären, möchte ich den folgenden Abschnitt von *Über Gewissheit* zitieren:

Wenn das Wasser aus der Flamme gefriert, werde ich freilich im höchsten Maße erstaunt sein, aber einen mir noch unbekanntem Einfluß annehmen und etwa Physikern die Sache zur Beurteilung überlassen. – Was aber könnte mich daran zweifeln machen, daß dieser Mensch N. N. ist, den ich seit Jahren kenne? Hier schiene ein Zweifel alles nach sich zu ziehen und in ein Chaos zu stürzen. (ÜG §613)

Hier werden zwei Arten von Fällen unterschieden. Einerseits nimmt Wittgenstein die Möglichkeit an, eine Gewissheit in Zweifel zu ziehen. Wenn das Wasser aus der Flamme gefroren wird, könnten die Physiker eine unbekannte Ursache entdecken, die eine solche Neuigkeit erklärt. Tatsächlich könnte es sein, dass diese Neuigkeit früher oder später in unserem Bezugssystem integriert wurde. Obwohl diese Veränderung einige Anpassungen in unserem System verursachen würde, könnte sie auf ähnliche Weise assimiliert werden, wie es in der Vergangenheit assimiliert wurde, dass die Erde nicht flach, sondern rund ist. Andererseits nimmt Wittgenstein aber die Möglichkeit zu zweifeln nicht an, einen Bekannten, den man seit langem kennt, zu erkennen. Wenn man daran zweifelt, würde das Bezugssystem zum Erliegen kommen. Was Wittgenstein eigentlich meint, ist, dass er auf keinen Fall an der Identität dieses Bekannten zweifeln könnte. Trotzdem glaube ich, dass Wittgenstein spezifizieren sollte, dass er sich auf normale Umstände bezog. Denn ein besonderer Umstand – wie schlechte Sichtverhältnisse – könnte zu einem Zweifel daran führen, dass diese Person N. N. ist. Deswegen wäre es besser, in diesem Fall entweder diese Bemerkung zu machen, oder ein anderes Beispiel – wie den Satz „Ich bin ein Mensch“ – zu wählen. Welche Gründe oder Argumente könnte mir denn bieten, wer mich davon überzeugen möchte, dass ich ein Käfer geworden bin? Die Möglichkeit, dass ich zu einem Käfer mutierte, gehört

in den Bereich der Fiktion – z.B.: in Romanen wie Kafkas *Die Verwandlung*– angenommen werden. Eine solche Möglichkeit kann aber in unserem Bezugssystem nicht integriert werden. Nehme ich an, dass ich von einem Argument überzeugt wurde, das sagte, dass ich ein Käfer bin, wäre das kein Beweis der Gültigkeit des Argumentes. Stattdessen wäre es ein Beweis, dass ich von einer Reihe von Gründen verführt wurde, die trotz seines Anscheins keineswegs als echte Gründe betrachtet werden könnten: denn sie hätten keinen Platz in unseren Sprachspielen. Die Wissenschaftler könnten mir Gründe bieten, zu zweifeln, ob das Wasser aus der Flamme brodeln wird. Obwohl diese Gründe wegen meiner geringen Kenntnisse der Physik nicht einmal klar für mich wären, könnte ich mich auf die Autorität der Wissenschaftler verlassen. Aber die Wissenschaftler könnten mir keinen Grund bieten, zu zweifeln, dass ich ein Mensch bin. Es ist nicht von Bedeutung, wie wichtig die technologische Entwicklung sei: Zu zweifeln, ob ich ein Mensch bin, hat keinen Sinn. Dann hat Malcolm Recht: Gewissheit kann durch Zweifel ersetzt werden. Aber dies ist nicht wahr für alle Fälle. Wenn man betrachtet, ob man ein Käfer werden kann, ist es offensichtlich, dass es Fälle gibt, in denen es keinen Sinn macht, an der Gewissheit zu zweifeln.

Untersuchen wir nun die dritte Möglichkeit. Wirklich können wir uns entscheiden, die Evidenz gegen unsere Gewissheiten abzulehnen. Mit anderen Worten, wir können angesichts eines unerhörten Ereignisses an unseren Gewissheiten festhalten (vgl. ÜG §173). Gemäß Scheer muss aber die Entscheidung, die Evidenz gegen unsere Gewissheiten abzulehnen, als ein Teil des entsprechenden Sprachspiels betrachtet werden. Daraus folgt er, dass es fehl am Platz ist, zu sagen, dass es sich um eine „Entscheidung“ handelt. Analysieren wir dieses Argument. Man kann nur eine Entscheidung treffen, wenn man zwischen zwei oder mehr Möglichkeiten wählen kann. Wenn es aber keine Alternative gibt, kann man nicht behaupten, dass man sich entscheidet, etwas zu wählen. Richten wir unsere Aufmerksamkeit jetzt auf das nächste Beispiel. Es ist offensichtlich, dass ich ein Mensch bin. Kann ich aber entscheiden, ein Mensch zu sein? Die Antwort lautet ganz klar nein. In einem Märchen könnte es sein, dass mich ein Zauber entscheiden ließe, welcher Tier ich werden möchte. Doch wenn man die Science Fiction ignoriert, und normale Umstände betrachtet, ist es offensichtlich, dass man nicht wählen kann, ob man ein Mensch sein möchte oder nicht. Wenn wir uns auf normale Umstände beschränken, ist Scheers Einstellung richtig. Aber Wittgenstein spielt auf abnormale Umstände an, d.h., auf Situationen, in denen man „mit Zweifeln in dem Fundamente“ irregemacht werden könnte (vgl. ÜG §498). In dieser Art von Situationen kann man entscheiden: entweder an unseren Gewissheiten festzuhalten, oder zu erkennen, dass wir in einer solchen Lage desorientiert sind. Dieses Dilemma kann man im folgenden Abschnitt klar erkennen:

Auch ein Satz wie der, daß ich jetzt in England lebe, hat diese zwei Seiten: Ein *Irrtum* ist er nicht – aber andererseits: was weiß ich von England? Kann ich nicht ganz in meinem Urteilen fehlgehen?

Wäre es nicht möglich, daß Menschen zu mir ins Zimmer kämen, die Alle das Gegenteil aussagten, ja, mir ›Beweise‹ dafür gäben, so daß ich plötzlich wie ein Wahnsinniger unter lauter Normalen, oder ein Normaler unter Verrückten, allein dastünde? Könnten mir da nicht Zweifel an dem kommen, was mir jetzt das Unzweifelhafteste ist? (ÜG §420)

Hier schreibt Wittgenstein „Beweise“ zwischen Anführungszeichen, weil es sich nicht um übliche Beweise han-

delt, sondern um solche, die einer Gewissheit widersprechen. In diesem Fall widersprechen sie Wittgensteins Gewissheit, dass er in England lebt. Die Leute, die diese Beweise geben, verhalten sich wie Wahnsinnige – d.h., wie Leute, die gegen die Grammatik verstoßen. Wenn Wittgenstein sich aber von diesen Beweisen überzeugen ließe, würde er sich wie einen Wahnsinniger verhalten. Man kann in *Über Gewissheit* viele Beispiele finden, wo man sich an den eigenen Gewissheiten festzuhalten entscheidet (vgl. ÜG §§497-498, 512, 616, 636). Aber im folgenden Abschnitt von Wittgensteins *Zettel* kann man die Entscheidung finden, sich in die Desorientierung zu fügen:

Man kann sich leicht Ereignisse vorstellen und in allen Einzelheiten ausmalen, die, wenn wir sie eintreten sähen, uns an allem Urteilen irre werden ließen.

Sähe ich einmal vor meinem Fenster statt der altgewohnten eine ganz neue Umgebung, benähmen sich die Dinge, Menschen und Tiere, wie sie sich nie benommen haben, so würde ich etwa die Worte äußern »Ich bin wahnsinnig geworden«; aber das wäre nur ein Ausdruck dafür, daß ich es aufgebe, mich auszukennen. Und das gleiche könnte mir auch in der Mathematik zustoßen. Es könnte mir z.B. *scheinen*, als machte ich immer wieder Rechenfehler, so daß keine Lösung mir verlässlich erschiene. (Z §393)

Wie man sehen kann, bedeutet der Satz „Ich bin wahnsinnig geworden“ hier, dass man freiwillig und ausdrücklich verzichtet, sich in der Umgebung zu orientieren. Man kann also nur diese Entscheidung treffen, weil auch die Möglichkeit bestand, zu entscheiden, auf dem Selbstorientierungsversuch zu beharren; z.B.: könnte man an den eigenen Gewissheiten festhalten, wenn das unerhörte Ereignis als Folge eines Witzes, des Drogenkonsums, usw. genommen wird. Aber dieser Abschnitt liefert uns noch etwas. Wittgenstein würde etwa die Worte „Ich bin wahnsinnig geworden“ aufgrund abnormaler Ereignisse, die er vor seinem Fenster sieht, äußern. Trotzdem fügt er hinzu, dass ihm das gleiche auch in der Mathematik zustoßen könnte. Beispielweise wenn er den Eindruck hat, immer wieder Rechenfehler zu machen. Dann würde ihm keine Lösung – weder richtig noch unrichtig – überzeugend erscheinen. In diesem Fall handelt es sich also nicht um eine der Tatsachen, die Wittgenstein vor seinem Fenster sah, sondern um einen Sicherheits- oder Gewissheitsverlust in mathematischen Kategorien. Es ist von Bedeutung, diesen Fall des Gewissheitsverlustes zu betrachten, weil er zeigt, dass wir nicht immer an unseren Gewissheiten festhalten können. Wenn es sich um eine der abnormalen Tatsachen, die Wittgenstein vor seinem Fenster sah, handelt, ist die Gewissheit im Prinzip noch gegeben. Beweis dafür ist, dass es möglich wäre, die abnormale Tatsache nicht mehr zu beachten. Letzten Endes hätte diese Einstellung keine Wirkung auf das eigene Bezugssystem. Wie wir aber gesagt haben, kann der Fall, in dem keine arithmetische Lösung verlässlich erscheint, als Beispiel des Gewissheitsverlustes beschrieben werden. Man kann nur an der eigenen Gewissheit festhalten, wenn die fragliche Gewissheit bereits in Frage gestellt wurde. Denn eben diese Gewissheit ging noch nicht verloren. Man kann an einer bestimmten Gewissheit festhalten, um sie nicht zu verlieren. Es steht aber außer Zweifel, dass man an einer bereits verlorenen Gewissheit nicht festhalten kann. Natürlich wäre es möglich, sich in diesem Fall auszukennen, z.B. könnte man den Gewissheitsverlust einer vielleicht vorübergehenden Geistesstörung zuschreiben. Das würde uns die verlorene Gewissheit aber nicht zurückbringen. Tatsächlich kann man überhaupt nichts tun, um eine bereits verlorene Gewissheit zurückzubringen. Was den Fall des Gewissheitsverlustes betrifft, wäre es nutzlos jemanden zu versuchen davon zu überzeugen, dass viele arithmetische

Lösungen richtig sind. Denn man könnte keine Gründe finden, die sicherer sind, als die Behauptung dieser Gewissheit. Wenn dieser Mensch also seine verlorene Gewissheit zurückbekommt, läge es nicht daran, dass er absichtlich etwas getan hätte, um sie zurückzubekommen. Man könnte nur sagen, dass die Wiedergewinnung der Gewissheit ebenso unerklärlich wie ihr Verlust wäre.

Es ist sehr wichtig klarzustellen, dass es nicht das gleiche ist, sich in einer abnormalen Umgebung zu orientieren und an einer Gewissheit festzuhalten. Wenn man sich davon überzeugt, dass eine bestimmte abnormale Lage z.B. nur ein Witz oder eine Montage ist, dann kennt man sich in dieser Umgebung aus. Dass man diese Erklärung benutzen kann, um unsere Ablehnung der Evidenz gegen unsere Gewissheiten zu rechtfertigen, bedeutet aber nicht, dass man unbedingt eine Rechtfertigung dafür braucht. Wenn man sich entscheidet, diese Evidenz abzulehnen, genügt es, die entsprechende Entscheidung zu treffen. Man braucht keine Rechtfertigung dafür. An einer Gewissheit festzuhalten besteht schlicht und einfach darin, sich zu entscheiden, die Evidenz gegen eine Gewissheit abzulehnen. Aber es handelt sich um eine Gewissheit, die in Frage gestellt wird, aber noch erhalten bleibt. Wenden wir jetzt diese Definition auf den Fall des Gewissheitsverlustes an. In diesem Fall gibt es keine Evidenz abzulehnen. Außerdem ist das Problem des Gewissheitsverlustes nicht, an einer Gewissheit festzuhalten, die wir noch beibehalten. Stattdessen ist das Problem des Gewissheitsverlustes, eine Gewissheit zurückzubekommen, die *bereits* – wenn auch vielleicht nur vorübergehend – verloren gegangen ist.

Diese Erfahrung des Gewissheitsverlustes könnte uns helfen, auf etwas Wichtiges zu achten, nämlich dass unsere Gewissheiten, die wir oft als etwas ganz Festes und Unveränderliches betrachten, verloren gehen können. Und wir könnten dann ganz und gar nichts tun, um sie zurückzubekommen. Wir sollten den Menschen also als ein primitives Wesen betrachten, nicht nur weil man ihm Instinkt aber kein Raisonement zutraut (vgl. ÜG §475), sondern auch, weil er nicht einmal vermeiden kann, irgendwelche Gewissheit irgendwann zu verlieren.

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Wittgenstein and Skepticism About Expression

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Introduction

One answer to the question why the later Wittgenstein was so interested in the notion of expression is by now a familiar part of the philosophical landscape. The answer goes: "Through the notion of expression Wittgenstein wanted to break with a picture of language-use that focuses exclusively on assertion. That break provides an avenue to the solution of otherwise intractable philosophical problems such as the status of moral discourse and first person statements about mental states." That this is indeed an important theme of PI won't be contested in this paper; I think there is an important insight in this answer. I will, however, develop another answer to the same question, an answer that picks up a strand in PI that has not received due attention.

The answer that I would like to suggest in this essay is that the notion of expression helps to block a certain philosophically unfruitful way of thinking about the epistemology of other minds. Taking a well-known passage from PI as my starting point, I will show how Wittgenstein's use of the notion of expression can be brought to bear on the idea that knowledge of other minds is inferential.

I. Wittgenstein on Expression

Here's paragraph 244 of *PI*:

How do words refer to sensations?—There doesn't seem to be any problem here; don't we talk about sensations every day and give them names? But how is the connection between the name and the thing named set up? This question is the same as: how does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations?—of the word "pain" for example? Here's one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain behaviour. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p. 75.)

In the paragraph immediately preceding this passage, one of Wittgenstein's interlocutors asked us to consider a language with terms used only to refer to "what can only be known to the person speaking, to his immediate private sensations." (Wittgenstein, 2001, p. 75.) The reason why the interlocutor asks us to consider this language is that he is captivated by the thought that *our* language somehow works in that way. He's drawn to thinking that the words he uses to talk about his own inner states are such that they have (perhaps in addition to a publicly available meaning) a private meaning only accessible to him through his awareness of his own inner sensations.

In paragraph 244, Wittgenstein in effect refuses to play along with the way of talking about mental privacy that the interlocutor is trying to introduce. The interlocutor, presumably, would have his own way of giving an answer to the question how words refer to sensations. His response would involve taking introspection to be the means by which a person attaches a meaning to a sensation term. But instead of letting the interlocutor formulate such an-

swer, Wittgenstein suggests that learning the term 'pain' involves coming to use it to express pain in a new way.

Wittgenstein's proposed quasi-empirical hypothesis about how children are taught the words for sensations is that the process is based on the fact that we express our inner states. The force of the notion of expression is that expression makes the inner knowable to other people. If we take the idea of expression seriously (and unless something more is said on behalf of the interlocutor's conception, there is no reason why we shouldn't) we can say that other people can perfectly well *know* when others, including children and animals, are in pain, or hungry, tired, happy, etc. They are states and emotions with characteristic expressions that make manifest what is going on with the person. By reminding us of the notion of expression Wittgenstein is drawing our attention to the fact the interlocutor's conception of privacy is at odds with our ordinary supposition that we *can* know, and *do* know a lot of the time, the minds of others. Other people can know when the child is in pain, because the pain is expressed, and so there is nothing particularly problematic about teaching the child to use the word 'pain'.

II. The Inferential Model and Skepticism About Expression

The moral of the preceding section, it seems, is that expression affords knowledge of other minds, and so blocks a conception of mental privacy according to which we cannot know the thoughts and feelings of others. Such was the interlocutor's proposal: sensations are known only to the person having them. Since the interlocutor is denying that we know a range of facts we normally take ourselves to know, we can straightforwardly characterize his position as a form of skepticism. But what philosopher, nowadays, holds such a view about our knowledge of other minds? In this section I will argue that the notion of expression, when properly thought through, does more than prevent the interlocutor's pure form of skepticism about knowledge of other minds. It also calls into question one particular and quite common view about *what kind* of knowledge we can have of other minds. This conception is one in which our knowledge of other minds is essentially inferential.

In arguing for the idea that the inferential model amounts to a form of skepticism about expression, I'm using the term *skepticism* as a term of criticism in a fairly non-standard way, although not in a sense without precedence.¹ I will in effect be claiming that even a philosopher who takes herself to be preoccupied precisely with giving an account of the kind of knowledge expression affords, can rightly be called a skeptic about expression. She is subject to that criticism on my view, if she is driven by certain philosophical considerations to give an account of

¹ My way of using the notion of skepticism is heavily indebted to Stanley Cavell's work. In the *Claim of Reason*, Cavell comments on his own use of the term skepticism in the following way: "Now what I mean by calling an argument an expression of skepticism is this: it can seem to make good sense only on the basis of ideas of behaviour and of sentence that are invented and sustained by skepticism itself." (Cavell, 1979, p. 47)

expression that fails to reconstruct anything recognizable as the concept as we know and use it.

The central idea behind the inferential model is that even in the paradigmatic cases of knowing another mind, that knowledge is based on an inference from some publicly available fact to a mental state. Here's Paul Churchland's formulation of this thought:

It is of course by observing a creature's behavior, including its verbal behavior, that we judge it to be a conscious, thinking creature—to be 'another mind'. From bodily damage and moaning, we infer pain. From smiles and laughter, we infer joy. From the dodging of a snowball, we infer perception. (Churchland, 1988, p. 67.)

The idea here is that inference is a must when it comes to other minds, there is no other way of accessing mental facts than inferring them from outer behaviour. Peter Singer, interestingly, provides a similar formulation of this idea in his plea for animal rights in *Animal Liberation*:

[Pain] is a state of consciousness, a 'mental event' and as such it can never be observed. Behaviour, like writhing, screaming, or drawing one's hand away from the lighted cigarette is not pain itself; nor are the recordings a neurologist might make of activity within the brain observations of the pain itself. Pain is something we feel, and we can only infer that others are feeling it from various external indications. (Singer, 1990, p. 10.)

Now, neither Churchland nor Singer seems to be denying that there are expressions; indeed they talk about smiles and wincing. Why not think that the inferential model precisely gives an account of *how* expression affords knowledge? In order to see how different the notion of expression that is deployed in the inferential model is from the ordinary notion of expression, let's examine a straightforward attempt to define expression on the inferential model.

Alan Tormey, in *The Concept of Expression*, comes up with the following definition of expression:

If A's behaviour B is an expression of X, then there is a warrantable inference from B to an intentional state of A, such that it would be true to say that A has (or is in state) S; and where S and X are identical. (Tormey, 1971, p. 43.)

This conditional, I will argue, states neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for expression, and so it sheds no light on the concept what so ever.

The insufficiency of the condition is made apparent by the fact that other things than expression licence inferences to intentional states. If you see me going in to the library with jogging shoes sticking out of my back-pack, that might warrant the conclusion that I intend to go to the gym later. But the fact that I'm carrying around my gym-shoes doesn't *express* my intention to go for a run on the treadmill. It can be a reliable indication of my intentions, and thus make my intentions knowable (for those who are familiar with my habits and ways) but that doesn't mean that it makes any sense to call it an expression. So inference warrant is not a sufficient condition for expression. The more interesting point, however, is that inference warrant is not a necessary condition for expression.

The main problem with the idea that expression makes something knowable through warranting an inference is that it doesn't capture the way in which expression, paradigmatically, makes what it expresses *directly* manifest. Charles Taylor has captured this point nicely,

When I know something or something is plain to me, through an inference, there is something else which I know or which is plain to me in a more direct way, and which I recognize as grounding my inference [...] It is characteristic of expression that it is not like this. I see the joy on your face, hear the sadness in the music. There is no set of properties that I notice from which I infer to your emotions or to the mood of the music. (Taylor, 1979, p. 74)

There are two arguments in this passage. One has to do with the phenomenology of recognizing expressions. The idea is that in paradigmatic cases, say, the expression of joy in a smiling face, the joy the joy seems immediately present to us. It doesn't seem—as it does in the case of the intention gathered from the jogging-shoes—as a fact merely indicated, however reliably, by that which is immediately present. As Taylor points out, the words that come natural to us is that we *see* the joy in the face. If someone would say, about an apparently joyful face, that she inferred the joy from the way the face looks, that would probably strike us as an indicating a certain impaired ability to understand emotions. (If you read case studies of people diagnosed with autism, descriptions with this flavour are a commonplace.)

The second argument is logical. It hinges on the thought that for the idea of inference warrant to work, the expression must be thought of as a fact separable from the mental fact it provides a warrant for. This is, as Taylor rightly argues, not how it is with expressions. We are usually simply not able to describe the expression without specifying what the expression is an expression *of*. There is no independently available fact, "the expression itself," from which the inferential step to the mental state is taken. When I recognize the joy in your smile I don't do so by, say, noticing that your mouth is configured in such a way that the corners are pointing upwards and the upper row of your teeth are showing.

Taylor calls this phenomenon, discerning X in Y where there is not some other feature of Y which licences an inference to X, *physiognomic reading*. This captures a distinctive feature of the way in which expression allows something to be known.

In addition to the idea that expression offers a physiognomic reading, Taylor adds the important observation that expression is the most direct way of encountering the phenomenon expressed. This provides a further illumination of expression, since there are other phenomena, apart from expression, which allow a physiognomic reading. For instance, I can see the impending fall of a building, without being able to non-circularly specify what feature of the way the building looks makes me think it will fall. But the actual fall of the building can be observed on its own. Not so with expression. We can see the building fall, but it makes no sense to say that we can see the joy "in itself," apart from the smile, the song, or the utterance. There could be and more adequate expressions, of course, but no such thing as observing what is expressed apart from its expression. (Cf. Taylor, 1979, p. 74)

At this point a proponent of the inferential model will think that I am begging an important philosophical question. Can't we observe, or at least encounter, that which is expressed in a more direct way, namely in the first person? One of the main reasons why the inferential model has seemed so attractive is because of the undeniable difference between our own relation to our pain and other inner states, and the relations other can bear to them. However, on my view (which I can't argue for here) first/other person asymmetry doesn't directly lead to the inferential model, it

only does so given a certain philosophical gloss. I conclude with the suggestion that one lesson from the previous considerations should be that we consider it to be a constraint on an adequate conception of first/other person asymmetry that it acknowledges expression and so avoids the implication that our knowledge of other minds is inferential.²

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² Another important source of philosophical motivation for the inferential model is of course the argument from deception. Such an argument is parallel to the argument from illusion in the philosophy of perception. I think this argument also fails to warrant the inferential model. In a longer version of this paper, I will consider the apparent philosophical underpinnings of the inferential model.

A Digitalized Tractarian World

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1.

There is a widely accepted opinion that Wittgenstein abandoned the logical atomism in TLP because of the color exclusion problem. But some interpreters insist that such kind of judgment isn't enough to evaluate his whole program of the Tractarian world. The real reason, why they couldn't accept his abandonment, lies in the interest of the philosophy of information which is recently developed. In anyway it isn't fully appreciated that Wittgenstein's Tractarian world can be interpreted on behalf of the philosophy of information, even the basic concept of the digitalized world is given by him in TLP.

My aim is to give some constructive suggestions about the digital conception of a Tractarian world through the analysis of the logical space in which the logical scheme of truth functional propositions can be digital calculated, when the truth values F and T are to replace as 0 and 1. In that context it is necessary to explicate the binary arithmetization of 16 logical connectives in TLP. Further more I will try to show that a syntactical sameness exists between a digitalized Tractarian world and the digitalized conception of I Ching's symbolic system. The proof can be arrived if the same numerical symbol of yin and yang in I Ching are interpreted as 0 and 1, and the digitalized proposition system can be transformed into the graphic figures, because the whole system of I Ching consists of 64 graphic figures. The Tractarian world and I Ching's system base on the binary arithmetic, as Leibniz already had grounded its arithmetical sameness before 300 years ago.

2.

Recently regarding to the development of philosophy of information rises an interesting question in the milieu of studies on Wittgenstein's Tractatus world, whether the world of the logical atomism could be digitalized. Logic gates, for example, OR gate, AND gate, etc. are the logical construction of the Karnaugh map in the electronic computer technology. The model of the Karnaugh map in which 16 electronic circuits are presented is borrowed from 16 logical connectives of the propositional logic. The most interpreters on the Karnaugh map believe that Boole has invented 16 connectives and are unnoticed the fact that Wittgenstein also has introduced it in TLP.

However, the misleading idea that Wittgenstein might have abandoned the project of the logical atomism goes back to the logical impossibility which only depends on the relationship between tautology and contradiction. Namely, the famous colure exclusion problem formulates that nothing could be appeared as two colures in a same place and time. No one can say, something is red and green at the same time in a given place. But properly to say, the colure exclusion problem doesn't belong to the logical problem in its own way. The logical truth doesn't have to do with the problem of time. It also isn't related to the matter of an un-expressible world, as Wittgenstein says in the last sentence in TLP.

In different times you can say, it is red in t_1 , and it is green in t_2 . The real issue of the colure exclusion problem

in TLP goes back to the strong beliefs on the world of the logical atomism in terms of an atomist like Boltzmann. But that kind of atomistic world doesn't fit for the logical program in TLP which expresses the totality of the existing atomic facts which turns out to be all that is the case. But, as it is well known, the problem of the totality of facts is the reduction which demands two responses about the state of affairs, logically either yes or no, and ontologically either being or not being. The logical problem is connected in an ontological label with everything and nothing. In case of Leibniz two principles, the law of identity and the law of contradiction are each other complementary for the totality of monadic world. For Wittgenstein the principle of contradiction and the principle of tautology are reduced in a full sense to the logical space for the atomistic world. The contradiction encompasses the whole of logical space, where the tautology encompasses none of logical space. For Boole's algebra 0 means Nothing and 1 means Universe, where the language of yin and yang in I Ching's system also can be interpreted as Boolean algebra 0 and 1. If 0 and 1 are represented as \bullet and \circ , and \bullet and \circ are complementary, we can visualize it as follows. When \bullet enters into \circ , then it will be changed into \circ , \circ and \circ . It will get on the same result, when \circ enters into \bullet , as what Wittgenstein means about the encompassment of the logical space through contradiction and tautology.

Let's say, that the truth possibility of p is presented by two labels, for example tautology or contradiction in a logical space (4.31). But, p and $\sim p$ don't have the same truth value in terms of the logical space. That is the logical impossibility on facts of p and $\sim p$. However we know that p can be assigned to the truth values T or F. That is, they only have opposite senses, as Frege emphasizes that meaning of the object is same, but senses are different. We only have the True or the False in reality. I think Frege's project of an ideal language bases on the ontological states which is explained only by the notion of the logical impossibility, where we need to know the truth condition of propositions on affairs of states. So J. L. Zalabardo proposes a proposition p is a logical consequence of a set of propositions Γ which appeals to the logical impossibility that a set of truth combination for the elements of Γ is true and p is false.

Wittgenstein also agrees that all the truth grounds are truth grounds of a certain proposition, and the truth of that proposition follows from the truth of the others. (5.11). The basic idea of the logical atomism is that all propositions can be analyzed as truth functions of elementary propositions, when all elementary propositions are logically independent from one another and their components refer to simple subjects. The logical impossibility of p and $\sim p$ doesn't have the same truth value, but there is the same reality in the logical space, even no one can know what the sign p means. We can only suggest that p is only a nominal giving name which can not be defined. Sheffer is already aware of that kind of problem. His idea is that all the quantifier free formulas of sentential calculus in *Principia* can be expressed per one logical connective which is called the Sheffer Stroke " \uparrow ".

However, that we have one proposition of p means we only have two possibilities to express the truth function about p.

P	P
T	1
F	0

Fig. 1

If we read the letters from the bottom to the top, we get the number 0 and 1 at the first label. For two propositions of p and q, we only have 4 combinatory possibilities T and F. In truth table it can be diagramed as follows.

P	Q	P	Q
T	T	1	1
T	F	1	0
F	T	0	1
F	F	0	0

Fig. 2

Here we get the order of the binary numbers (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1). In 5.11 the account of the logical consequence is clearly expressed that the truth possibility of p and q can be presented by (T, T), (T, F), (F, T) and (F, F) at the second label. And the truth possibility of p, q and r can be presented by (T, T, T), (F, T, T), (T, F, T), (T, T, F), (F, F, T), (F, T, F), (T, F, F) and (F, F, F) at the third label.

P	Q	R	P	Q	R
T	T	T	1	1	1
T	T	F	1	1	0
T	F	T	1	0	1
T	F	F	1	0	0
F	T	T	0	1	1
F	T	F	0	1	0
F	F	T	0	0	1
F	F	F	0	0	0

Fig. 3

Here we get the binary order as follows (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0), (1, 1, 1).

Now we are arrived on the progression of binary number from the one-place at first label to the three places at the third label. The first label is $1 \times 2 = 2$, the second label $2 \times 2 = 4$, the third label $2 \times 2 \times 2 = 8$.

Wittgenstein says in 5.1 that every number of elementary propositions can be listed by the 16 truth functional connectives which are called *syncategoremata* in the mediaeval age. 16 truth functional connectives come from the operation of 4 basic elements which are operated by 0

and 1. The order of T F letters goes as follows. (TTTT), (FTTT), (TFTT), (TTFT), (TTTF), (FFTT), (FTFT), (FTTF), (TFFT), (TFTF), (TTFF), (FFFT), (FFTF), (FTFF), (TFFF), (FFFF). The order of the binary number of 16 truth functional connectives goes on as follows.

[See Figure 4 at the end of the paper]

If the world consists of each other independent atomic facts and could be conceived of as digitalized bits in logical space, that kind of the logical connective is already involved in Leibniz's understanding of the monadic world in terms of the law of identity and the law of contradiction, where Wittgenstein uses tautology and contradiction in the logical space for the same context.

Against R. A. Young who interprets that the atomic facts would be bits, I propose that these atomic facts can be operated by bits which are deposited as the truth values 0 and 1 in the logical space. Wittgenstein's proposal that a-pole depicts truth value and b-pole depicts false value in a b notation goes to the same direction for the operation of the truth values in logical space. In the logical space logical truths are each other dependent. No one proposition could be defined without knowing the truth ground of another proposition, because all propositions are each other dependent.

Wittgenstein says in 5.123, if a god creates a world in which certain propositions are true, then by that very act he also creates a world in which all the propositions that follow from them come true. And similarly he didn't create a world in which the proposition p was true without creating all its objects.

3.

D. Miller, D. E. Knuth and others show that the set of 16 connectives of two variables Boolean algebra and the set of 16 subsets of a four element set (a 4-set) have the same graphic structure, i.e. a Boolean lattice, without acknowledging Wittgenstein's achievement in TLP. So it is interesting to prove the structural sameness between binary expression of 16 connectives or Boolean algebra and Wittgenstein's 16 truth functional connectives through graphic diagrams. One important point for the visualization of graphic diagrams is the contrast between dark and bright, as we often observe it in the constellation of earth, moon and sun. We only introduce here two symbols \bullet \circ as graphic diagram. At first the series of 16 truth functional connectives come from 4 combinatory possibilities of p and q and at second 4 elements come from bi polarity of \circ \bullet . Fig. 2 is as follows.

	\bullet	\circ
\bullet	$\bullet\bullet$	$\bullet\circ$
\circ	$\circ\bullet$	$\circ\circ$

Fig. 5

These symbols \circ \bullet are independent, but complementary. They encompass each other in the logical space. The combinatory order of 4 elements $\bullet\bullet$, $\bullet\circ$, $\circ\bullet$, $\circ\circ$ are corresponding to the binary numerical order 00, 01, 10, 11. If we have two propositions p and q, we can get totally 16 combinatory possibilities of truth values on p and q. The binary order starts from $\bullet\bullet\bullet\bullet$ to $\circ\circ\circ\circ$. It means they start from 0000 to 1111.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
0000	0001	0010	0011	0100	0101	0110	0111
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1000	1001	1010	1011	1100	1101	1110	1111

Fig. 6

[See Figure 7 at the end of the paper]

16 truth functional connectives are only results of 4 elements, i.e. the combination of truth values in p and q.

4.

I Ching which consists of symbolic order of yin and yang (陰陽) is the oldest book in ancient China. Leibniz had invented as first European its mathematical meaning of 64 codes with the Chinese missionary J. Bouvet. The language of I Ching only is yin and yang. Two principles (duo rerum principium) of I Ching are yin symbol - - and yang symbol —. This order has one place in which the binary numbers 0 and 1 are corresponding to - - and —. From the two principles come 4 elements which are produced by truth variables of p and q. The symbolic order of 4 elements is ●, ◐, ◑, ○ (四象). We read from the bottom to the top, the binary number of these symbols are (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) which are called 'Four great images' or 'quatuor imagines' and mean 1, 2, 3, 4 according the order of natural number. This order has 2 places. For example OR gate can be presented in truth table as follows.

	OR
○	—
◐	—
◑	—
●	- -

Fig. 8

[See Figure 9 at the end of the paper]

[See Figure 10 at the end of the paper.]

The truth functional propositions with 3 places go to the following order, ☰, ☱, ☲, ☳, ☴, ☵, ☶, ☷. This is hexamer of 8 Gue (八卦). The natural order of the symbolism is corresponding to 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. The whole construction of I Ching system consists of double order of 8 Gue. So $8 \times 8 = 64$.

[See Figure 11 at the end of the paper]

What Wittgenstein operates with "T" and "F" for the truth table of elementary propositions, is that all possible truth grounds of elementary propositions fully can be transformed through the binary arithmetization of functional connectives. When the truth functional connectives purely depends on a digitalization of the Propositional logic, the logical space of possible atomic facts also can be digitalized, even possible atomic facts need not exist. The main idea of the digital culture through the modern computer can be successful achieved in TLP, where Wittgenstein needs the logical space of possible atomic facts. I think the last sentence of TLP also doesn't relate to the meaning of un-expressible world, because a logical space includes an element of the space of possible affairs. (3.4-3.42). That kind of idea can be easily linked to graphic diagram i. e. Venn diagram and visualized.

5. Conclusion

Wittgenstein' program of the logical atomism isn't ended. A new beginning of his project can be grounded on the philosophy of information which operates only binary number 0 and 1, where Wittgenstein uses its truth variable as T and F. The binary progression of 0 and 1 opens new horizon that all kind of truth functional connectives can be digitalized. In fact Wittgenstein has developed 16 truth functional connectives for the construction of the world of the logical atomism. In I Ching it is explained that 0 and 1 produce 4 elements (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), and (1, 1), and 4 elements produce 8 hexagrams (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0) and (1, 1, 1). The whole 64 hexagrams consist of the double 8 trigrams which begin from (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) and ends (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1).

Regarding to these facts about the parallel structure can be drawn that he basic structure of the modern digital is programmed through the binary numbers 0 and 1, and dyadic values yin(● or - -) and yang(○ or —) in Wittgenstein's Tractarian world and the I Ching's symbolic world.

	Contradiction															Tautology
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1
	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1

Fig. 4

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○
●	●	○	○	●	●	○	○	●	●	○	○	●	●	○	○
●	○	●	○	●	○	●	○	●	○	●	○	●	○	●	○

Fig. 7

	Tautology If p then p, and if q then q.	Not both p and q.	If q then p.	If p then q.	p or q.	Not q.	Not p.	P or q, but not both.
○	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
◐	- -	- -	- -	- -	—	—	—	—
◑	- -	- -	—	—	- -	- -	—	—
●	- -	—	- -	—	- -	—	- -	—

Fig. 9

If p then p, and if q then p.	p.	q.	Neit her p nor q.	p and not q.	q and not p.	q and p.	Contradic- tion p and not p, and q and not q.
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
- -	- -	- -	- -	—	—	—	—
- -	- -	—	—	- -	- -	—	—
- -	—	- -	—	- -	—	- -	—

Fig. 10

	☰	☰	☰	☰	☰	☰	☰	☰
☰	☰ ☰							
☰	☰ ☰							
☰	☰ ☰							
☰	☰ ☰							
☰	☰ ☰							
☰	☰ ☰							
☰	☰ ☰							
☰	☰ ☰							

Fig. 11

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – the Introduction of the Archetypal Sign of Logic

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Which is the idea Wittgenstein strove to make intelligible to the collective consciousness? Why it is important?

The result of our investigation so far shows that nothing essential was achieved. By marking the points at which we make wrong moves, we can come to the solution. It is required intellectual independence and readiness to drop previous notions, for Wittgenstein's work considers something which we do not expect.

Ground to Step on

1. The *Tractatus* cannot be interpreted: one either understands it or not. This is so, because "the *meaning* mustn't be capable of interpretation"; it "is the last interpretation". (Wittgenstein 1972) If we want to understand the meaning the *Tractatus* conveys, we have to respect the rules which the text establishes for its reading. For instance, if the *Tractatus* deals with the equilibrium of all propositions which displays the logical structure of language, reality, the world, it forces on one the form of interaction with its text: there is a picture to be seen – the archetypal sign of logic representing the structure of the logical space.

2. Wittgenstein's work deals with a single object "seen from different angles." (Wittgenstein 1980) The object concerns the nature of logic – it cannot be spoken of for all language breaks out from it, but only shown. The problem of what can be expressed by language and what cannot be expressed by it, but only shown, is the cardinal problem of philosophy. (Wittgenstein in Monk 2005)

3. Wittgenstein establishes that as there is something to be known by experience – empirical knowledge based on hypotheses, there is also something to be known which is *prior* to experience and does *not* rest on any hypothesis: it is about understanding "the basis, or essence, of everything empirical". (Wittgenstein 1968) It is arrived at in logic. Thus, our problem is *purely* logical.

4. Premises of the *Tractatus*' model of logic: 1) logic is *prior* to the world; 2) whatever can be said about logic, the said one cannot escape the logic of language; 3) language is organic to our nature (4. 002). Therefore, language is the only available to us epistemology: if we want to know something about the world, reality and ourselves, we have to know the nature of logic.

The Bipolar Structure of Logic or the Archetypal Sign of Logic

The Structure of the Logical Space is the Structure of the World and Reality.

1. Wittgenstein introduces this structure constituted of two places connected in a loop through the pattern: the totality of facts ("Tatsachen") which fills the logical space consists of two opposites, the positive fact – "everything that is the case", "das Bestehen von Sachverhalten", and the negative fact – everything "that is not the case", "das Nichtbestehen von Sachverhalten". (2. 06)

2. The *Tractatus* starts with an obvious bipolarity. "The world is everything that is the case." (1) What is the case, the fact ("Tatsache"), is "das Bestehen von Sachverhalten". (2) It follows that the world is the *positive* fact in the logical space; it is contained in the pattern. Also, the "world divides into facts" (1. 2) and any of these "can either be the case or not be the case" (1. 21). Thus, the world contains the pattern. On the other hand, the world is the "facts in the logical space". (1. 13) But the facts, "das Bestehen und Nichtbestehen von Sachverhalten", this is the reality. (2. 06) "The total reality is the world". (2. 063) Therefore, the world is everything that fills the logical space: it is both the positive and the negative fact, 'what is the case' and 'what is not the case' – it is the total reality and not the total reality.

3. If Wittgenstein uses "Tatsache" in order to establish that the positive and the negative fact determine two places in the logical space, through the use of "Sachlage" and "Sachverhalt" signifying two levels of logical being of things, objects, expressed through the opposites 'independence – dependence' (2. 0122), he introduces the *form* of their connexion and thus the structure itself.

"Objects form the substance of the world." (2. 021) Substance is the "fixed form of the world" determined by the objects. (2. 026) This is the form of the object which makes possible for it to occur in "Sachverhalten". (2. 0141) "Sachverhalt" is a connexion ("Verbindung") of objects, things (2. 01): the way how an object is connected with other objects in a "Sachverhalt" is its form. In "Sachverhalt" "objects hang one in another, like the links of a chain" (2. 03), where the "meaning is *that there isn't anything third* that connects the links but that the links *themselves* make connexion with one another" (Wittgenstein 1973). The "way in which objects hang together" in the "Sachverhalt" is its structure. (2. 032)

The pattern or form is recognizable: two links of a chain connected in a loop. It gives the structure of the fact (2. 034), i.e. of the world, by the means of two places connected in a loop. The pattern shows that the structure of the fact, of the world lies out of it – the world takes one place in the logical space but the whole structure of this space is its structure. The *loop* by the means of which the two places in the logical space are connected determines that the world is not merely a part of it but the whole of it. The pattern shows the relationship between the world and reality.

The Structure of the Logical Space is the Structure of the Logic of Language.

1. That which "mirrors itself in language" – the logical form common to the proposition and reality (4. 12), "language cannot represent" (4. 121).

1. 1. The "common logico-pictorial form", "general rule", "common logical pattern" or "logical structure", "adequate notation", are one and the same. At this structure language and reality meet each other. To describe the structure, i.e. the general propositional form (5. 471), is to give the essence of a proposition, and to "give the essence

of a proposition means to give the essence of all description, and thus the essence of the world” (2006, 5. 4711).

1. 2. The description of the general propositional form is the description of the one and only general archetypal sign of logic (5. 472: “des einen und einzigen allgemeinen Urzeichens der Logic”): a “possible sign must also be able to signify” (5. 473).

Wittgenstein pictures the bipolar structure of the logical space constituted of two interconnected places: the negating proposition determines in the logical space “a logical place *different* from that of the negated proposition. The negating proposition determines a logical place with the help of the logical place of the negated proposition. For it describes it as lying outside the latter’s logical place.” (2006, 4. 0641) A proposition takes one place in the logical space but the whole structure of this space is the proposition’s structure (3. 42): it ensures places to both propositions “p” and “~p”.

Despite being constituted of two places the bipolar structure of logic is a single space. It can be usefully imagined as a circle or sphere containing two smaller circles or spheres, let say black and white, both embracing in a loop the centre-point of the larger one, a point at which all things, expressions “are all in a certain sense one” (4. 014). Wittgenstein’s model of logic stands for the fundamental Oneness of all things.

2. In logic the sense of a proposition is not what it says but its determined relationship with the two places in the logical space. In logic we deal with the nature of the proposition which “corresponds to a logical form, to a logical prototype”. (3. 315)

2. 1. We misunderstand the logic of our language because of the way we understand the truth-conditions of the proposition. A proposition cannot “assert of itself that it is true”. (4. 442) “No proposition can make a statement about itself, because a propositional sign cannot be contained in itself”. (2006, 3. 332) Respectively, “the sign for a function already contains the prototype of its argument, and it cannot contain itself”. (2006, 3. 333) The “generality-sign occurs as an argument” (2006, 5. 523): “it refers to a logical prototype” (5. 522); it “contains a prototype” (3. 24) – the archetypal sign of logic representing its structure (“der Bau der Logic”). It could be said that it is the *sole* logical constant – it is “that which *all* propositions, according to their nature, have in common with one another”. (5. 47)

2. 2. From “the fact that a proposition is obvious to us it does not *follow* that it is true”. (5. 1363) It must be determined under what conditions “p” is called true; otherwise it has no sense. (4. 063)

2. 2. 1. The proposition represents the facts, “das Bestehen und Nichtbestehen der Sachverhalte” (4. 1), but it cannot represent “the *logic* of the facts” (4. 0312). The proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions (5): they determine its truth-conditions.

The bipolar principle implies that if the proposition is there, i.e. the composite, there has to be also the opposite case: the simplest proposition. The elementary proposition asserts “das Bestehen” of a “Sachverhalt” (4. 21), i.e. a determined connexion of objects. In “Sachverhalt” objects are connected “like the links of a chain”, therefore names are also connected by the means of a loop: the elementary proposition consists “of names in immediate connexion” (4. 221); it is “eine Verkettung, von Namen” (4. 22). If it is false, the “Sachverhalt” or a determined connexion does not hold (“nicht besteht”). (4. 25) The totality of the elemen-

tary propositions, true and false, describes the world. (4. 26) Here ‘true’ and ‘false’ signify positive and negative facts: there being and there being not a determined connexion of objects.

2. 2. 2. As a difference to the “old conception of logic”, the *Tractatus* demonstrates that there are no such things as “logical objects” which are called “true” and “false”. (4. 441) The *possibilities* of the “Bestehen und Nichtbestehen der Sachverhalte” are the truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions. (4. 3) The expression of the agreement and the disagreement with these truth-possibilities “expresses the truth-conditions of the proposition”. (4. 431) Wittgenstein marks the agreement with “T” (true); the absence of this mark means disagreement (4. 43); this permits the use of “F” (false). Both the agreement and the disagreement can be presented simultaneously (see 4. 442): a proposition agrees with some truth-possibilities of *n* elementary propositions and disagrees with some others. In the terms of this notation the proposition is *both* true and non-true: it is true for some “Sachlagen” and non-true for some others.

2. 2. 3. The “rule of combination” allows all the truth-possibilities of *n* elementary propositions and respectively their truth-functions to be ordered (see 5. 101). This shows that all possible groups of truth-conditions are locked between two extreme cases: tautology – the proposition agrees with all the truth-possibilities, i.e. it is true for every “Sachlage”; contradiction – the proposition disagrees with all the truth-possibilities, i.e. it is false for every “Sachlage”. (4. 46) Propositions “which are true for every Sachlage” cannot be connexions of signs at all, for if they were, only determined connexions of objects could correspond to them (4. 466) – the way they are connected in “Sachverhalt”. Tautology and contradiction are the boundary cases of the connexion of signs, i.e. the dissolution of the connexion. (4. 466)

The dissolution shows the structure of the logical space. Tautology and contradiction are not meaningless for they belong to the symbolism. (4. 4611) “Contradiction is the external limit of the propositions, tautology their substanceless centre.” (5. 143) This nullification or equilibrium is the bipolar structure of logic itself.

2. 2. 4. What the ordinary language conceals, the propositions of logic display clearly. For them to “describe the scaffolding of the world ... this is their connexion with the world”. (6. 124) That they are tautologies, this “shows the formal – logical – properties of language, of the world”. (6. 12) In a logical proposition “propositions are brought into equilibrium with one another” – the “zero-method”. (6. 121) That the constituent parts of logic are so connected that “give tautology characterizes the logic of its constituent parts” (6. 12), i.e. the way how the two places in the logical space are connected and everything which follows from that.

Some Implications

1. The *Tractatus* is the *maximum* of the analytical philosophy – there is no step further. Its achievement justifies there being the analytical philosophy.

2. Logic and one’s own being are not two different things. The investigator is an essential aspect of reality. An epistemology based on such a model of logic sets limits to an objective truth-investigation: its maximum is the logical pattern given to our experience.

3. The *Tractatus* demonstrates the space left open to “the totality of the natural science” (4. 11). Science

works up to the logical maximum of the sayable language or the boundary of the empirical reality. In the terms of the *Tractatus*' model of logic scientific knowledge is of great importance but it learns its place – science cannot say in nature the essential thing about the world and human being for it cannot say anything about the logic of language which makes it possible. The ignorance of the bipolar structure of logic and its implications meets the consequence that "the modern system makes it appear as though everything were explained" (6. 372).

Conclusion

When a logician introduces an ineffable language of equal power as the sayable, he does not mean that nothing can be done here. On the contrary, because it can be arrived at in logic, it is accessible to everyone.

The *Tractatus* is a proposal for a collective thought-experiment. Let start with the simplest logical condition given to our experience which cannot be refuted: the principle of the opposites.

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Language-Use as a Grammatical Construction of the World

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"The inexpressible (what I find enigmatic & cannot express) perhaps provides the background, against which whatever I was able to express acquires meaning." (Wittgenstein 1998a: 23)

The grammaticality of the world

Mental images are expressed through words. It is with words (but not only) that we can express something, i.e. it is with words that we can experience a meaning in association with a mental image. However, the connection between words and mental images or what is expressed and represented by words is complex enough to give a simple answer to the question "What is the content of the experiences of imagining and that of meaning?" (Wittgenstein 1996: 175).

Wittgenstein adds in § 292 of *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology-I* that words and behaviour related to the manifestation of pain sensation work as signs of mental processes. It is important to ask, as Wittgenstein says in § 370 of *Philosophical Investigations*, how the word "imagination" is used, since the essence of the imagination is its grammar. However, we can use the word "imagination" without any mental image in our head; thus, we can imagine things and express it by means of written words or drawings without seeing anything through our mental eye. We impute mental images to others considering their expression and behaviour. There are no criteria to first person utterances. A mental image is not a private entity, but is the way how we imagine something.

On the employment of the first person in psychological concepts, that is to say the expressive use of language, Wittgenstein has two perspectives: first, considering that utterances in the first person express a given emotion, as if the proposition "I am expecting a bang at any moment" was an expression of expectation (1993a: § 53); second, considering that utterances in the first person are part of a kind of behaviour, as if the proposition "I am expecting..." was a reference to my actions or thoughts of hope for something (1993a: § 65).

In the first perspective, related to expression, we can notice that the expectation that "someone will come" can be expressed in a variety of ways (working nervously about the room, glancing repeatedly out of the window, checking the appointment calendar, looking at my watch and saying "It's time!"). Expectation is expressed through behaviour in these ways.

In the second perspective, relating to behaviour, we can observe that saying "I am expecting..." is part of the expectation behaviour. The same can be said for all other first person utterances involving psychological concepts.

In the first case, the expressive capacities of language are recognized; capacities that permit an adequate and necessary exteriorization of the corresponding subjective experience, as if the words transported the inner-self from the emitter to the receiver (Wittgenstein 1993a: § 650; 1996: §§ 343, 585). This expressive capacity is heterogeneous, either by the verbal medium or by the behavioural medium (Wittgenstein 1996: § 444). The relationship be-

tween expectation and the event that it fulfils is entirely contingent, because to expect an explosion is to be in a mental state that will be fulfilled and satisfied, or not, when the explosion occurs. Then, the use of "I am expecting..." involves a relationship between a mental state (necessarily interior) and a common external event. Although Wittgenstein considered that an expectation and its satisfaction can be verified through language (1996: §§ 444, 445; 1993b: §§ 92, 95), the problem of knowing how it relates to the event which satisfies it is complex and escapes the linguistic scope that I have tried to attribute to the treatment of this problem.

In the second case, this mode is annexed to the clarification provided by context, because the circumstances of the observation determine its correct understanding. For Wittgenstein, we are disposed to attribute, in certain circumstances, a spontaneous expression to desires, either in a natural way or by training or education (1996: § 441). If, in accordance with § 65 of *Zettel*, saying "I expect..." is part of the process of expecting, then the same happens with all the other uses of elocutions in the first person that involve psychological concepts.

Nevertheless, the expression "I expect..." serves both cases (that is, "I expect..." whether as the expression of an expectation or as part of the process of waiting), and it reveals the proximity of its double use. Even though linguistic elocutions and behaviour can express experiences, Wittgenstein does not admit that both means of expression are simple expressions, because of the complex association between i) a linguistic statement concerning an experience, ii) reactive behaviour to the said experience and iii) the experience itself (1996: § 308). To have iii) does not only mean to utter i) or to manifest ii), because i) might not be expressively representative of iii) and ii) could be simulated. To have a pain is not only a question of saying "I've got a pain" or of behaving as such were the case.

The use of public signs linked to mental images about the world

According to Wittgenstein, the application of psychological concepts in the first person typically constitutes part of a specific form of behaviour (cf Fogelin 1976: 175). If a speaker says "I have a toothache", he is expressing his pain by using a typical expression for these cases, but not by reporting on an internal event (Wittgenstein 1996: § 244). The statement "I have a toothache" is the expression of the pain experience.

Wittgenstein took into account that first person utterances, on the one hand, expresses a given emotion (an expectation) and, on the other hand, takes part in some sort of behaviour (the words "I am expecting..." as reference to the act of expecting). Pointing out to the case of first person utterances expressing expectations, I consider the unavoidable semantic relation between language and reality, that is, the signification of language.

The reality topic arises because Wittgenstein's investigation brings to light the nature of thought, understanding, language and, precisely, reality. In Wittgenstein's words: "a proposition was laid against reality like a ruler"

(1993b: § 85). This reveals the main theme-problem of linguistic expression as grammar status, for example, the relation between language and reality in the following case: saying “Here is a red patch” and there is or not a red patch in reality. When we take an image for reality, what we imagine and what happened may be different things.

A fuller account of the relevance of our grammatical system is given by the fact that a proposition (like “This afternoon N went into the Senate House”) is not just a series of sounds, because it evokes images and has meaning (1993b: § 104). The image evoked is only a single representation or perspective of the sense. If, instead of a particular clear image of N called to my mind by such a proposition, I had painted it and shown it to someone else as a means of communication (instead of the proposition), he might say that it expressed a thought and needed to be understood. For Wittgenstein, “what he would think of as an act of understanding would probably be a translation into word languages” (1993b: § 104).

According to Wittgenstein’s example, if I say “I arrive in Vienna on the 24th of December”, this proposition cannot be just a series of sound or words, because various things happen inside me in addition to the perception of these words and mainly because the proposition has a definite sense and I perceive it. From this grammatical view, Wittgenstein draws the conclusion that the aim of this kind of linguistic expression is to perceive a definite sense, that is, to move around in the grammatical background of words and to understand their transformations, moves and consequences in a given game (1993b: § 104). This is the main point of Wittgenstein’s argumentative strategy. “I said that it is the *system* of language that makes the sentence a thought and makes it a thought *for us*.” (1993b: § 104).

The system of language is also a chain of mere symbols, applications and consequences and it is what makes us able to express the understanding from an image in a proposition. Through replacements of mental images by public signs or common words we constantly get different interpretations and understandings of what is meant and said. However, the images and the signs, *per se*, are meaningless, since “only in the stream of thought and life do words have meaning” (1998c: § 504; 1993a § 173). Otherwise, we become conscious of the nakedness of the words: “in ordinary circumstances these words and this picture have an application with which we are familiar. – But if we suppose a case in which this application falls away we become as it were conscious for the first time of the nakedness of the words and the picture” (1996: § 349).

The perspective of Wittgenstein on the theme-problem of exteriorization is also marked by a psychological (and not just anthropological, linguistic or sociological) aspect, because it reverts to the mental exercise of intending the linguistic expression of sensations and of choosing the words that can best satisfy the coding, that is, by using public signs that correspond to effective mental images.

How can mental images be referred to or represented through the use of public signs? The importance of this question originates in presupposing the understanding of the underlying exteriorization. In other words, the question calls for the explanation of the meaning of a word or expression, based on a given existence, which forms an identical image of something in people. Consequently, it is necessary to try to understand how a certain mental image has the meaning or content that it presents, for example if somebody utters the word “cube”, the speaker knows what it is meant because something comes to mind when they understand that word (Wittgenstein 1996: § 139).

According to Wittgenstein, the meaning of a word is not its image, but it is determined by its use, as if an image of the cube came to mind and suggested a certain use to us. In the interpretation of mental images, the problem lies in the use and not in the creation of the said images. In § 366 of *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein affirms that it makes sense to speak of a method of projection, according to which the image of a sign constitutes the representation of the sign itself. In the following paragraph, it alludes that the mental image is the image that is described when somebody describes what is imagined. In this case, the problem of the privacy of mental images is dissolved with the use of public signs that substitute, describe or represent them.

Concluding remarks: the grammatical construction of the world

The position of Wittgenstein on exteriorization is, thereby, circumscribed by a compass eminently designated as linguistic psychology, philosophy of the psychology or conceptual investigation. The psychological conception of exteriorization began to form, starting from the moment in which the philosophy of Wittgenstein turned towards linguistic concerns (1996: § 111), that is to say, for the use and understanding of concepts and psychological themes.

Wittgenstein conceived the idea of language-games as a reaction to the psychological theory of meaning. Instead of the mental effects of words, he sought the contexts of meaning provided by the referred games. When proposing these games, he understood that the meaning was not determined by its effects.

Wittgenstein conceived the meaning of a sign as the sum of the rules that determine its possible moves (applications), by analogy to chess. In § 23 of *Philosophical Investigations*, he provided a list of language-games, to reaffirm the language as instrument (or tool), that can be used in multiple activities and introduced in varied contexts.

According to S. Hilmy (1987: 110 ff.), Wittgenstein knew the psychological theory of meaning (e.g. that of Bertrand Russell), but he did not accept it. On the contrary, he based his definition of meaning as use (cf. Wittgenstein 1996: § 43; 1998d: § 12), that is, the meaning of the concepts does not lie in the conscience, but in the practice of language-games and forms of life (cf. Hark 1990: 27-30). This practical perspective about the meaning sustains the thesis of the language-use as a grammatical and social construction of the world.

If, on one hand, we do have indescribable aspects of mental images and, on the other, we do have the same uses of public signs that mean different things, how is it possible that one given expression on an expectation is understood by my interlocutor, when I transmit it to justify my anxiety behaviour, for example? This subject is omnipresent in the discussions of Wittgenstein, although not in a very clear and conclusive way, because it necessarily involves the confrontation between the interior and the exterior domains as well as the fields of what we usually mean by “private” and “public” aspects and contents of experience, language, experience and, consequently, the linguistic exteriorization of the experience itself, usually understood as such and wanting to say something specific.

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Critique of Language and Sense of the World: Wittgenstein's Two Philosophies

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The distinction between two kinds of philosophical activity is clear in the preface of the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein writes that he has finally solved the problems, because he has shown that the formulation of philosophical problems «rests on the misunderstanding of the logic of our language». Nonetheless he admits that it only demonstrates «how little has been done when these problems have been solved» (Wittgenstein 1966: Pref.). At the end of the book, in fact, he concludes:

My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless [...]. He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly (Wittgenstein 1966: 6.54).

Following Cora Diamond's suggestion, these remarks can be considered as a sort of "frame" of the book. What lies inside the frame is the philosophy oriented to language: it shows the logical essence of language bringing to light the source of philosophical misunderstandings. So Wittgenstein concludes:

The right method of philosophy would be this: To say nothing except what can be said, *i.e.* the propositions of natural science [...], and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions (Wittgenstein 1966: 6.53).

Wittgenstein establishes also a sort of equivalence between the meaningful language and the scientific representation of the world. Therefore it seems that language cannot express what concerns ethics, values and, in general, the sense of the world, because it «must lie outside the world» (Wittgenstein 1966: 6.43). Ethical problems cannot be solved through propositions picturing facts, because «the facts all belong only to the task and not to its performance» (Wittgenstein 1966: 6.4321).

Nonetheless Wittgenstein's anti-intellectualism does not mean that he professes some kind of emotivism, as it can be shown considering his philosophy of the subject. In the *Tractatus* he points out: «There is [...] really a sense in which in philosophy we can talk of a non-psychological I. The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the "world is my world"» (Wittgenstein 1966: 5.641).

This non-psychological connection between the I and the world emerges from the very enquiry on the limits of language. Wittgenstein claims that, in order to understand the logic of language, we don't need the experience «that such and such is the case, but that something *is*». Yet this is «no experience» (Wittgenstein 1966: 5.552), but it is «the mystical feeling» of the world as «a limited whole» (Wittgenstein 1966: 6.45).

The possibility of a philosophical sense of the I derives from the fact that such an "experience" is made by the subject through the will. In the notebooks Wittgenstein specifies that

the world is *given* me, *i.e.* my will enters into the world completely from outside as into something that is already there (Wittgenstein 1961: 8.7.16).

In this period he doesn't yet know what the will is (cf. Wittgenstein 1961: 8.7.16). In the *Tractatus* however he clearly thinks of the philosophical will not as a phenomenon but «as the subject of the ethical» (Wittgenstein 1966: 6.423).

There is also a deep relation between will and world, since, according to Wittgenstein, «the will seems always to have to relate to a representation». He means that

«the will is an attitude of the subject to the world. The subject is the willing subject» (Wittgenstein 1961: 4.11.16).

Wittgenstein is trying to tell that the world is given to each subject in his own life, so that the I must take an attitude towards the world as a whole. The I gives also to the world an ethical sense, which is not expressible through factual propositions, because it cannot be considered independently of personal experience. Wittgenstein thinks that «it is not sufficient for the ethical judgment that a world is given», because «good and evil only enter through the *subject*» (Wittgenstein 1961: 2.8.16).

Nonetheless the reference to the philosophical subject of the will should not be understood in a solipsistic sense. For what Wittgenstein is trying to do is showing the possibility of a universal dimension of ethics, which is accessible by every subject through the will, even if each one does it in a personal way.

This tension is neatly expressed in the *Lecture on Ethics*. In order to try to make clear what he means «by absolute or ethical value», Wittgenstein refers to the «idea of one particular experience», which is, «in a sense, my experience *par excellence*» (Wittgenstein 2007: 11). He specifies that «this is really a personal matter and others would find other examples more striking», but in referring to it, he aims at recalling in the reader «the same or similar experiences», in order to have a common ground for investigation (Wittgenstein 2007: 12).

The experience Wittgenstein is referring to is such that, he says, «when I have it I wonder at the existence of the world» (Wittgenstein 2007: 12). In the same sense, maybe remembering the years he spent as volunteer in the First World War, he mentions the experience of «feeling absolutely safe», safe «whatever happens» (Wittgenstein 2007: 12).

In both cases, Wittgenstein remarks, one is «misusing language» (Wittgenstein 2007: 12), because the proposition one uses when one says that one wonders at the world is senseless, since one cannot imagine the world as not existent; analogously one cannot conceive a situation in which he is absolute safe whatever happens.

Therefore ethical questions do not concern episodes or facts, but their sense, namely an attitude towards them. In order to try to make this clear, one should investigate the structure of the original relationship between subject and world.

Wittgenstein's conclusions in the *Lecture on Ethics* are not mere personal remarks unrelated to his enquiry on

language. They are rather the consequences of it: having shown that every fact happens «in logical space» (Wittgenstein 1966: 1.13), Wittgenstein concludes that «a necessity for one thing to happen because another has happened does not exist. There is only *logical* necessity» (Wittgenstein 1966: 6.37). Accordingly he states that,

even if everything we wished were to happen, this would only be, so to speak, a favour of fate, for there is no *logical* connexion between will and world, which would guarantee this (Wittgenstein 1966: 6.374).

During the hard days of the war, Wittgenstein writes: «I feel dependent on the world, and therefore I must fear it, even if momentarily nothing bad happens» (Wittgenstein 1991: 9.11.14; my translation). In such situations «we have the feeling of being dependent on an alien will»; we tend to call this «alien will» as «fate» or as «the world – which is independent of our will», or simply as «God». The disagreement between the subject and the world seems to be a contrast between two «godheads: the world and my independent I» (Wittgenstein 1961: 8.7.16).

In order to avoid the desperation resulting from this contrast, according to Wittgenstein «the human being must not depend on circumstances» (Wittgenstein 1991: 6.10.14; my translation). This means that happiness consist in living «in agreement with the world», namely «in agreement with that alien will on which I appear dependent». In this sense, Wittgenstein states: «I am doing the will of God!», and concludes that «to believe in God means to see that life has a meaning» (Wittgenstein 1961: 8.7.16)

The kind of philosophical activity involved in the search for the sense of life seems to be a sort of conversion of the will, in so far as the subject should change his attitude to the world. This means that,

«if good or bad willing changes the world, it can only change the limits of the world, not the facts; not the things that can be expressed in language. In brief, the world must thereby become quite another, it must so to speak wax or wane as a whole [...]» (Wittgenstein 1966: 6.43).

In 1931, some time after he came back to philosophy, Wittgenstein reasserts that the deepest philosophical activity consist in a conversion of the self:

«Work on philosophy [...] is really more work on oneself. On one's own conception. On how one sees things. (And what one expects of them)» (Wittgenstein 1977: MS 112 46: 14.10.1931).

Wittgenstein maintains this conception of philosophical activity even when he changes his conception of language. In the *Tractatus* he considered the link between language and social reality simply as «silent adjustments», which are «enormously complicated» (Wittgenstein 1966: 4.002). Later he realized that, if the personal change achieved through philosophical investigation is not merely a psychological matter, but has a universal character, then it should result in the real life and language of the subject in the community.

Considered under this closer perspective, language is not thought of as a well-defined phenomenon ruled by logical laws. It is a complex set of activities, strictly connected with one another through rules and conventions, which have their ultimate justification in the forms of life.

In order to articulate this new point of view, Wittgenstein uses the expression «language games», and he tells us that it means «the whole, consisting of language and

the actions into which it is woven» (Wittgenstein 1953: §7). He also specifies that «to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life» (Wittgenstein 1953: §19).

The connection between language and forms of life aims at making clear that the understanding of the meaning of words does not consist only and always in the knowledge of the objects or facts they denote. The task of philosophy consists in giving a «perspicuous representation» of the various functions of the words in the context of the manifold human activities. As a consequence, philosophy oriented to language, according to Wittgenstein, «may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is» (Wittgenstein 1953: §124).

What changes is also the perspective adopted by Wittgenstein in the investigation of language. What does not change is his conception of a deep philosophical activity oriented to the subject. The understanding of language seems to be a condition for operating a personal change, which must be evident also in the use of language.

In this deep sense, philosophy cannot leave everything as it is, because, as Wittgenstein writes in 1937,

«the solution of the problem you see in life is a way of living which makes what is problematic disappear» (Wittgenstein 1977: MS 118 17r c: 27.8.1937).

The mere analysis of language cannot solve problems of life, because they are «insoluble on the surface, and can only be solved in depth» (Wittgenstein 1977: MS 137 73b: 25.7.1948). It is not however the depth in which Wittgenstein searched the logical essence of language, but that of the personal investigation.

Nonetheless, this attitude is consistent with the new conception of language, because, as Wittgenstein states in 1946, «to go down into the depths you don't need to travel far; you can do it in your own back garden» (Wittgenstein 1977: MS 131 182: 2.9.1946).

This means that the changes operated by the individual subject cannot be understood in a solipsistic way, but involve changes in the whole form of life, because, as Wittgenstein remarks in 1948, «tradition is not something that anyone can pick up, it's not a thread, that someone can pick up, if and when he pleases; any more than you can choose your own ancestors. Someone who has no tradition and would like to have it, is like an unhappy lover» (Wittgenstein 1977: MS 137 112b: 29.11.1948).

Therefore philosophical problems concern not only the single subject, but also the forms of its life, so that changes in personal language interact with changes of a whole culture. Wittgenstein points out that

«the sickness of a time is cured by an alteration in the mode of life of human beings, and it was possible for the sickness of philosophical problems to get cured only through a changed mode of thought and of life, not through a medicine invented by an individual» (Wittgenstein 1956: II, 23).

In this strict connection between language, life and culture one should reconsider also the question of nonsense. For the sense of a proposition does not depend only on the picture of facts, but on the whole of one's culture and language. Wittgenstein's critique against the primacy of scientific culture is now accompanied by the revaluation of the impact of ethical and religious dimensions on language and forms of life. His search for a resolution of the problem

of life in a religious attitude to the world is deep and enduring for his whole life. And it is not a question of being convinced by doctrines, because «all wisdom is cold», and «you can no more use it for setting your life to rights, than you can forge iron when it is cold» (Wittgenstein 1977: *MS* 132 167: 11.10.1946).

The perspective of faith, that he has been striving for since at least the First World War period, teaches «that sound doctrines are all useless. That you have to change your *life*. (Or the *direction* of your life)». In other words, a deep philosophical activity means a change not in facts, but in one's attitude to them, because «here you have to be seized and turned around by something», and «once turned round, you must *stay* turned round» (Wittgenstein 1977: *MS* 132 167: 11.10.1946).

Deep philosophical activity, which Wittgenstein tries to express in the form of Christian perspective, could be understood as a personal investigation with the purpose of drawing the structure of a new way of thinking, of a new *Denkbewegung*. It means «grasping the difficulty *in its depth*», namely that one should «start thinking [...] in a new way». And once established the new way of thinking, «the old problems disappear», because

«they are embedded in the way we express ourselves; and if we clothe ourselves in a new form of expression, the old problems are discarded along with the old garment» (Wittgenstein 1977: *MS* 131 48: 15.8.1946).

In this deep sense «words are deeds» (Wittgenstein 1977: *MS* 179 20: ca. 1945), and philosophical activity cannot consider them in isolation from the forms of life where they have their meaning. In 1937, for example, Wittgenstein remarks that

«in religion it must be the case that corresponding to every level of devoutness there is a form of expression that has no sense at a lower level» (Wittgenstein 1977: *MS* 120 8: 20.11.1937).

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From the Prototractatus to the Tractatus

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Wittgenstein's Ms104 Notebook contains a final, unpublished section with 80 propositions, which almost perfectly match the text of the definitive *Tractatus*. In the manuscript, the distinction in relation to the previous part is pointed out by the inclusion of a little cross near the decimals, commencing with the second proposition on page 103, and by a note that informs: "+n are the numbers of the *Korrektur*". What did in fact take place on page 103 of the notebook?

In his *Historical Introduction* to the edition of the first part of Ms104, published as "Prototractatus", on this point von Wright speculates: «Wittgenstein did to the manuscript the same thing we have done to it here, *viz.* he copied it out, or had it copied out, with the remarks arranged in their proper number-order. Probably either this copy was a typescript or a typescript copy of it was made. Then he worked with this text (the '*Korrektur*') changing the formulation, grouping remarks which carried separate numbers under one single number, rearranging the order in places. Having done this (or when doing this) he also made some additions. These additional entries he noted down in handwriting in the same notebook as the '*Prototractatus*'» [Wittgenstein 1996, p. 8].

On the one hand, von Wright underestimates the complexity of the operation; on the other he doesn't focus correctly on the core of the problem. No-one would be able to reorganize the *Abhandlung* – von Wright argues – if they started with the chaos of the Notebook; therefore, first of all it was vital to reorder its propositions: exactly as he had to do even only to succeed in reading it. He doesn't consider, however, that until this point Wittgenstein has been successful in overcoming all that structured disorder; better, he has constructed it without mistaking any number, here and there carefully tuning the decimals and changing some dependencies. All the propositions had found their exact place in the virtual structure of the comments, forming a coherent whole: to the point that, at the moment in which one wants to draw an orderly copy, the hierarchical cascade is recomposed and the resulting 800 decimals miraculously connected. It is obvious that Wittgenstein must have always possessed the necessary representative tools to do what he has done; he is certainly able to preserve a perspicuous representation of his construction. So, why should Wittgenstein write down a previous copy of the book, just at the exact point when he decides that the structure is no longer adequate and must be modified?

More correctly, McGuinness believes that Wittgenstein already worked with an ordered copy, in parallel to the Notebook, and would not have needed a new, *preliminary* one. On the contrary, according to McGuinness "[in July 1918] Wittgenstein prepared a *Korrektur* – a version revised and renumbered which closely resemble our *Tractatus*. These corrections were not written into Ms104, but presumably onto a typescript, then, when new material was needed, it was written into Ms104." [Wittgenstein 1996, p. xi] In other words, while for von Wright the typed copy was necessary *before* restructuring, according to McGuinness it was required principally *later*, to record the *Korrektur* itself.

The point here is that still nobody has taken the job of looking and analysing how the "additions", found on pages 103 to page 118 were assembled. "There are additions to every part of the previous *Abhandlung* (i.e. to the ultimate '*Prototractatus*')," McGuinness says, calling them also "additional remarks" [p. xii].

"The second part [of the Notebook] – von Wright writes – has the character of additions to, and further elucidations of, the thoughts contained in the *Prototractatus*".¹ These statements would be perfect if referring to any preceding section of the Notebook: every proposition of Ms104, up to page 103, is indeed an addition to the structure, a further elucidation that doesn't alter the pre-existing propositions and also usually leaves their decimals intact. Referring to the last part of the Notebook, instead, such descriptions are quite misleading. In fact, most of the so-called final "additions" absorb, modify and integrate preceding propositions. Besides, their numeration doesn't generally put them after already established sequences, but rather at their beginning, or in elevated places of the hierarchy, and implies a rearrangement of surrounding material. Propositions and numbers don't imply any preliminary, consistent copy. If such copy should have existed, it would have been destroyed and rebuilt every time the new arranged propositions are inserted: on the contrary, it is the "additions" which suggest and determine the new correct version.

Then, we can exclude that, when he reached page 103, Wittgenstein has suspended the work, has created a supplementary copy, has broadly restructured it (possibly writing down an integral copy, typed or not), and then has returned to the job of adding material, annotating it from page 103 onwards. If we had to speculate about such an operation, then we would need to imagine new restructurings and complex re-writings taking place for each "addition", or to suppose that Wittgenstein had left holes and gaps, suspended material and provisional versions. We would also have to imagine some intermediary phases, incompatible with the procedure of the Notebook. Perhaps McGuinness suspected just this when he noted: "It requires some ingenuity and perhaps a little too much imagination to work out what these additions *replaced*" [McGuinness 2002, p. 281].

In truth, the final "additions" don't replace anything unknown other than, if at all, real propositions of the old "*Prototractatus*", propositions now taken up and re-written. McGuinness considers the *Korrektur* as "a version revised and renumbered so as to resemble closely our *Tractatus*",

¹ *Ivi*, p. 2. The tendency to consider them new additions leads to paradoxical affirmations. "With the exception of two propositions the new material does not draw on previous manuscripts that we know", McGuinness affirms [p. xii]. Yet, most of the "new material" is derived from the "*Prototractatus*" itself, i.e. from the preceding part of the manuscript; sometimes, from propositions that *in their turn* were derived from other manuscripts. This is the case with the two supposed exceptions that McGuinness specifies in his notes: in reality, 3.322 originates from PT 3.2012, which in turn was derived from the Notes on Logic; 5.503 originates from PT5.3003, and in turn originated from Ms103, 13.7.16. An analogous double passage also occurs in 5.2341, 5.25, 5.252, 5.254, 6.1201 etc. The only proper addition that is taken directly from other manuscripts we know of, is the last (unnumbered) remark of the book, which corresponds to the diary of November 21st 1916: "The concept of the operation is equivalent to the concept 'and so on'" (see TLP 5.2523).

and then doubts that it can be ever reconstructed. But, a restructured version, propaedeutic to the last part of the Notebook is not reconstructable, *simply because there has never been*. The "additions" integrate and modify the compositional phase that precedes page 103, whose propositions contextually, on the parallel copy, are put together and moved up until they become, step-by-step, the *Tractatus* that we know. If we really want to rebuild the version of "*Korrektur*", we have it in its entirety by the end of the "additions": for it is none other than the typescript of the *Abhandlung* itself (Ts202).

It can be hypothesized that the *Korrektur* starts as a normal intervention of maintenance on the decimals. In fact, the first four additions, which constitute all the new material of Group 2, are "additions" in the strictest sense and it would have easily been possible to integrate them into the preceding *Abhandlung*. It may be believed that they have been inserted into the twin structure (managed on loose sheets, in my opinion), requiring, at the first point, only the following simple interventions:

- a) PT 2.013 is eliminated, and the old 2.014, along with comment 2.0141, takes its place (becoming 2.013, with comment 2.0131). So, now the new 2.014 and 2.0141 can be inserted;
- b) new entry 2.033 takes the place of PT 2.033, which thus assumes the number 2.034;
- c) the new record now numbered 2.151 is actually born as 2.1511, a new main comment to PT 2.151; the old PT 2.1511 is renumbered 2.15101 (this remark remains the first note to 2.151, but at secondary level).

Now, as always, Wittgenstein has to transpose to the Notebook these modifications to the previous decimals. He starts with number 2.1511 on page 14, changing it into 2.15101: on the Notebook, this correction remains clearly readable. Here all should be fine, but, as Wittgenstein starts to appraise the general form of the whole page, he realizes that he ends up creating a structure with an aesthetical-formal meaning. Within the context of searching for formal equilibrium, he shifts the whole sequence and the new proposition assumes the number 2.151; and, as such, it is inserted on page 103. Likewise, the 2.014 graft, with the elimination of PT 2.013, suggests changes to branch 2.012, and finally to branch 2.06, with new attention to the relationships of decimal subordinals. The assemblage he arrives at is difficult to carry into the shattered panorama of the manuscript, so Wittgenstein postpones updating the book, and finally renounces it entirely. The first adjustment, i.e. the correction of number 2.1511 into 2.15101, remains the only one done to the Notebook and becomes one of the rare incongruities in the Prototractatus' numeration (as the Editors note on p. 52, note 1). It marks the factual beginning of the *Korrektur*, ultimately constituting a point of no return in the procedure of composition.

Without revising the book, Wittgenstein revises the whole structure of his *Abhandlung* on the parallel copy, recording on Ms104 only the more remarkable textual changes. On page 103, Wittgenstein reproduces propositions 3.1, 3.11 (that summarises PT 3.111, 3.12 and 3.13) and 3.12. Groups 3.1 and 3.2 include, in wide part, already-annotated steps, forcing the correction of the whole previous text. PT 3.14 has been modified and turned into the new 3.2, as recorded on p. 103; accordingly, section 3.2 suffered a drastic "cleaning up", with two new additions inserted on page 104. Proposition 3.3 is really an exact reissue of PT 3.202; while 3.31 includes three previous remarks; 3.323 (p. 105) condenses four of them, also picking up from section 4 (pulling in PT 4.00151).

Restructuring Group 4 involves only one further addition to the Notebook: proposition 4.24, which comes from rehashing PT 4.2211 and PT 4.2212. Then, there are five annotations belonging to Group 5.1, almost entirely original. Undoubtedly this phase required new numeration, on the parallel copy, to the other propositions of branches 5.0 and 5.1; Reassigning the decimals is equivalent to a complete redrawing of the form and structural dependences of these sections.

At this point, an entirely different operation appears. Wittgenstein returns to proposition 3.31 of page 104, that defines the relationship between "proposition" and "expression": he adds a last paragraph ("An expression characterizes a form and a content", condensed from ex 3.253), and then decides to comment on it in greater detail. So, he builds four new observations (3.311-4), to deepen the particular use of the terms, "expression" [*Ausdruck*] and "propositional variable" [*Satzvariable*]; yet confirming, in 3.313: "In the limiting case the variable becomes constant, the expression a proposition". These new comments aren't highlighted by a cross because they don't belong to the offline elaboration (the *Korrektur*), but are evidently elaborated directly during adjustments to the Notebook. The section concludes with a long line of separation that traverses the width of the page.

Now, Wittgenstein returns to aligning the text, continuing with Section 5.2. The whole section first appears in one form (on pp. 108-9) then, on page 110, in a different one. The sequence initially proposed (5.2, 5.21, 5.22, 5.232, 5.233, 5.24, 5.241) is partially marked as wrong and replaced by another series.

Since the discarded propositions, unlike those preserved, aren't highlighted by the small cross, it may be deduced that the mark sign (and the correspondent note saying of the *Korrektur*) had not yet been introduced at the moment of the deletion; therefore, up to this point there were no graphic distinctions between the propositions published today as "Prototractatus" and those that follow. At this point, perhaps, Wittgenstein wasn't wared about being able to update the whole Notebook; but, by now the collateral restructurings are so huge that any possible attempt to do so would be rendered entirely fanciful. It can be inferred that the crosses which signal the *Korrektur* have been introduced after the elimination of remark 5.241 (not yet marked), but before reassigning 5.233. In fact when, as a result of the formulation of a different 5.233 on page 111, the 5.233 of the preceding series was eliminated, it was already marked by a cross. Therefore, also the note on the *Korrektur* would be added only now, when the compilation already included page 110. The mark continues to be used up to page 114.

In summary, the text drawn from the phase of *Korrektur* is transcribed in strict numerical order, touching upon the sections 2.0, 2.1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 4, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5.

By now it is clear, I believe, that the *Korrektur* could not entail any full-scale writing-out, neither before nor after the restructurings: in no moment, in fact, does a rewriting appear reasonable. Not at the beginning, when nothing has yet changed; nor after each further restructuring, because what is finished no longer creates any problems, and what has still to be checked doesn't yet create any problem either. The adjustments happen one by one on the parallel structure that, although changing some sheets and rebuilding some parts, always remains coherent and complete.

It is evident, besides, that the work in the *Korrektur* involved a notable lapse of time, with changes of strategy and a progressive realisation of the depth of the transformation. A lot of corrections are the direct consequence of absorbing propositions coming from diverse sub-branches, some of which, accordingly, disappear entirely. The last proposition with a cross, 5.501, occupying the whole of page 114, absorbs eight propositions previously belonging to sections 5.003, 5.004 and 5.005.

On page 115, Wittgenstein recovers some parts which, until that point, have been unused: with 4.1273, he picks up and integrates the last four propositions of branch 5.0053 (originally annotated on page 21). Likewise, he reforms as 5.2522 a proposition intrinsically "orphaned", the PT 5.005351 of page 102 noted by the Editors for its incongruous and duplicated numeration. By the end, material not recovered in the new organization remains rejected: this corresponds to about thirty propositions referred as "Non-correspondences 'Prototractatus'-Tractatus" on Table 3 of the edited volume [Wittgenstein 1996, p. 253].

It is probable that it is at this point that Wittgenstein strives to revise Proposition 6, modifying its symbolism: in place of α , he uses the character ξ . This forces him to correct the just-transcribed proposition 5.501 (the change is visible on page 114) and to re-phrase 5.5. In a similar way, he modifies propositions 5.502, which introduces and defines the term "N (ξ)", and 5.503.

The final 10 propositions belong to Group 6.2 on mathematics; and in contrast to those that precede them, they are entirely original. Insertion 6.21 determines the revision of the whole branch; while other sections of Group 6 receive only minor adjustments. Only at this point does the revision come to an end; there was no reason to prepare an ad hoc copy before completing the schema: for by now, the copy is none other than the typescript of August 1918.

Surely this is the imminence of dictation; the last numbered proposition, 6.241, carries directions for the typist: "[6 free lines]" instead of a formula. It is also possible that in the intervening time the operation of typing had already begun, and that this page was compiled during some break in dictation. Perhaps this is the reason why the last reflection of the manuscript ("The concept of operation is equivalent to the concept 'and so on' ") doesn't find its correct position and remains without number².

On pages 119-121, we find the Preface to the *Abhandlung*, identical to the typed version (the elimination of its conclusive sentence happens on the typescript itself). It is likely that the typing of the preface took place *after* the typing of the propositions: in fact in Ts202, the pages of the *Vorwort* don't follow the numeration of the text, which starts on page 1, but are numbered "I" and "II". In version Ts204 (of which Ts202, in relation to the other parts, is a carbon copy), the preface is typed separately, on unnumbered sheets.

As we have seen, the last part of the notebook is divided into distinct sections following the new organization that Wittgenstein was creating. It is a characteristic of the top-down procedure, which is often combined with backward, or "purpose-driven", techniques. This has given the illusion that the final structure had already been built and that it was now only a question of modifying it. On the contrary, this structure was only virtual, beginning with the high-level schemas, and was developed bit by bit during the process of revision. There was therefore a "live" process of control and change, maintaining as far as possible the functionality of the whole and the consistency of the various parts, both the consolidated ones as well as those yet to be examined. The coherence with all the preceding phases of the manuscript is therefore very strong.

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² Only later will it be inserted, by hand, into the typescript.

Constructions and the Other

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Let me start with repeating some central points of the post-analytical (I mean “inferentialist” here, for the most part) view on language. In fact, most of these points were anticipated by Ludwig Wittgenstein in some form. Wittgenstein’s terminology also makes it possible to treat things in a less formal way and suits (I think) my topic better.

First of all, language philosophy is talking about is ordinary, natural language. Hence, it is *intersubjective*, that is: a matter of many people’s ((linguistic) community members’) communication with each other. According to this, language is never “private”. Which means, no segment of language (such that can be communicated) can be one person’s exclusive property, genuinely inaccessible (incomprehensible) to anyone else (see e.g. Wittgenstein 1958).

Secondly, the intersubjective language space is constituted by commonly shared *rules* of language. Rules govern the use of language in various “games” of which the body of language consists. Following/non-following the rule decides whether someone plays the game or not, and whether she plays it well (correctly) or not. Rules codify which steps, moves, transitions (in the broadest sense: inferences) a speaker can do are correct, and which are not – that is, which imply any incompatibility (“incompatibility” is meant here not strictly logically, as a contradiction; but just as incompatibility/inadequacy in terms of the respective game). Rules are usually present in the linguistic practice (inherent) *implicitly*. But they mostly *can* be made explicit, at least approximately (though it is not at always easy or equally easy) (see e.g. Brandom 1994).

Thirdly, the meaning of the spoken does not depend on the speaker’s “intention”. Nor does the fact whether she plays (correctly, i.e. successfully) the respective game. It is always the linguistic community who “decides” about it, that is, *other* people than the speaker. Inferentialism calls this a “stance attitude” – the *stance* of the others is what is decisive. What one says means what the others take it to mean; I am who *I am taken to be* by the others (Lance and White 2007).

Now let me introduce certain dissenting voice, from quite distant domain of 20th century philosophy: Emmanuel Lévinas says that to reduce the Other to the one who we take her to be, is a core of human freedom, foundation for the ontological attitude. But the metaphysical and ultimately the *ethical* stance means to doubt and limit my (our) own interpretative freedom with respect to the Other. That is: to accept that the Other is always something more than we take her to be. This fact becomes obvious in the Other’s *face* (Lévinas 1980).

Hence: what is more important: the community’s interpretative stance, or the signs of the Other’s transcendence, visible in her face? These two types of approach represent two different sides of one phenomenon, and ultimately supplement each other. The transition zone between them can be made perspicuous using the example of “private language”.

Originally, “private language” is Wittgenstein’s (1958) thought experiment: let us call “private language” a set of signs labeling someone’s inner experiences. The problem with such a language is following: no one, except its

speaker, has an access to this inner domain, so the only and ultimate authority as to whether the signs of this language are used correctly is the speaker herself. So there is no difference between her correct use (following the rules) and her only thinking she uses the language correctly (only seemingly following the rules). Hence, to speak here of meaning, rules etc. cannot make any sense. Wittgenstein concludes: there is nothing like private language, or rather: we would not call anything of this sort “language” in our sense (since in language, we can make mistakes and be corrected by others).

However, if we do not insist on private language’s being directed “inside”, into the speaker’s mental domain in the way sketched in Wittgenstein’s example, “private language” will be a good classification for each language game, where the speaker cannot know whether she plays it correctly and where rules cannot be identified, or at least identified easily. (Let us not remember that it is a devise of inferentialism that each game’s constitutive inferential rules can be, after all, made explicit).

There are several linguistic phenomena, that would be probable called “language games” (or least, that wouldn’t be claimed to not exist), where the abovementioned criteria of privacy seem to be fulfilled. One of them is literature: It is not at all easy to state any necessary and sufficient criteria for a text to be a piece of literature. Most of those criteria that are the less problematic are also the less informative: a novel is a text filling some number of papers, or the like. The most of more ambitious and informative delimitations of literature suffer from the subversive nature of literature – whenever a general rule of what literature is (or should do) is stated, some author will try to break it. However, the “private” nature of literary language games has a deeper cause. Quite in accord with private language’s difficulties with rules, neither the author, nor anyone else can tell (and be sure as to) what are the respective rules in operation, and whether the author follows them.

This uncertainty about rules and correctness, marking the privacy, is characteristic also e.g. for “schizophrenese” (Wolcott 1970). In the speech of schizophrenic patients, there is no certainty about the meaning of the “words” or the rules – the speaker can quite well only *think* that she is saying something and that she knows what she is saying. Nobody can decide here, what is the meaning (if any) of the said.

Nevertheless, it is interesting that private languages of this kind need not to be necessarily a property of *one* speaker. The condition that neither the others can discover the meaning and rules, nor the speaker is (or is liable to) any transcendent authority, is fulfilled in the case of “secret” languages of twins (cryptophasia). However, neither the scientists can set an agreement as to whether it is a real language (though secret, indecipherable or private), or just a phonological disorder (see Bakker 1987 vs. Dodd and McEvoy 1994).

The cryptophasia example shows the peculiar nature of all the *folies en deux*. They all represent a kind of self-contained world – the others are mostly unable to understand (to play competently) the game, since for them, it is

not sure whether it is a game and what are its rules. The players of such crazy binary game, however, are able to understand and correct each other. But the nature of the game normativity differs from usual language games. The correcture is not warranted by non-personal community lending the corrective authority to the person, but is directly personal – embodied in particular (only one) person, the speaker's counterpart. In this sense, such a game is much more "authentic" (in Heidegger's (1977) sense) than are more usual games.

Within this list of "private language", a particular position is occupied by the linguistic situation of people who understand themselves to be constantly misunderstood by the others (to be notoriously unable to express themselves the way they want the others to understand the utterance). Unlike the other examples of "private languages" which are apparent (in the case of literature, twin talk, or "schizophrenese", the other speakers know very well that they deal with something strange, not to say pathological), this one is *hidden*. The speaker's discontentment stems from the fact that the others indeed understand her (and are quite satisfied with it), but otherwise than she wants. In such cases, there is no precaution or suspicion on the linguistic community's part.

The speaker's situation becomes private here – for after some time, she cannot be sure whether what (she thinks) she says makes any sense, and what sense. And the private speech intention remains hidden by virtue of public interpretative simulacra constructed.

What is noteworthy here is the fact that this situation is often multiple (mutual): Two people can live together each rather with her/his "construction" of the counterpart, than really with one another. If there is some "who the other really is, as opposed to who do I just think she is", this remains private.

This example makes the disagreement between post-analytical philosophy and Lévinas' view more striking. Inferentialism is certainly right: in the speakers community's linguistic practice, a person is who she is taken to be by the other people – she adopts various roles, and even when she turns out to be individual or unique, "individuality" and "uniqueness" are public interpretative schemes (roles), too. To be individual, unique means to fulfill generally given public criteria. This doesn't mean that inferentialism proposes averaging and leveling of the individual by tyrannical community. This is much rather a semantic phenomenon: in order that the concepts of "individuality" or "uniqueness" have some content (either reasonable or not), there must be some criteria and criteria are always intersubjective, hence public in a sense.

Yet this position is reductive. Lévinas is right, too: there is something remaining behind the public interpretative scheme – at least the notoriously misunderstood speaker's despair and frustration is *real*. There must be something where it stems from. Despite a possible "ontology" of this "something", it is relevant from the pragmatist standpoint, since it "causes" (?) something that is operating in the intersubjective space of discourse (usually it is not observed – that's why the intention/interpretation discrepancy remains mostly hidden – but definitely it is observable).

Of course, a question is possible whether this remnant is of linguistic nature, or of extra-linguistic. Language, presented in the manner of analytical philosophy is in its core interpretative, thematizing, pragmatic. The remnant frustration doesn't enter into the space of discourse as a *move* in language game. Its presence is mostly negative. The frustrated misunderstood speaker is not remarkable by

her virtuous ability in whatever linguistic activity. Much rather she quarrels fruitlessly and turns out to be less skillful and able than other speakers. If there is something "private", the privacy exhausts the speakers discursive "energy" – much of it is consumed before it can enter the space of discourse and become manifest there. From the "public" perspective, the speaker burdened by the private onus seems to be just a little "slow" and dull person whose utterances are rather pointless (but quite comprehensible, at least because she usually doesn't seem to tell much).

Certainly, analytical philosophy of language not only can do away with postulating such private remnants, they even present a problem for it – documented clearly enough in Wittgenstein's considerations about the alleged "private language". Yet, what is this remnant's space-of-discourse importance (if any)?

For the sake of an answer, let's introduce another – quite particular – type of "private language". I mean here all the cases when privacy – or perhaps exclusivity – is a matter of task or claim. An example is private discourse between a psycho-therapist and a patient (Sussman 1995); or more generally, all "confidential" contexts of this kind: intimating secrets with the closest friend, confessional secret kept by the priest, etc. The privacy doesn't consist here in the impossibility to divulge the secret – it *can* well be divulged. But the game, by its very nature, stops existing in this moment. In divulging secrets entrusted to me by my closest friend, under the condition of strict discretion, I don't play the game of close friends' secrecy anymore and begin to play e.g. the game of betraying a pretended friendship (in the worst case).

Most of these games of "willing privacy" are not necessary for the pragmatic well-functioning of language. If they contribute anything, it is not a matter of quantity (an augmentation of (the number of) games constituting the space of discourse), but rather *quality*. Their cancellation probably wouldn't diminish notably the number of practical purposes that can be realized by means of language – if anything, it can cause rather some frustration or despair.

What about the case of mutual misunderstanding one another (constructing the fake Other)? Such misunderstanding can persist even whole life long. The point is not to attempt any de-construction of the constructed fake-Other. Any understanding I reach is always my understanding, i.e. still in a sense "public" with respect to the Other's "private" domain. Of course, understandings are not at all equal (and it is very desirable to try to reach as sympathetic one as possible), but the purpose of Lévinas' appeal is to bring myself to doubt my own understanding whatever is it – in order to make myself realize that my counterpart is so to speak "end in itself", someone who transcends whatever I can invent to catch her. Which is a way – of course unwarranted – of alleviating her feelings of frustration and despair.

Hence, Lévinas is quite right in claiming that his analyses are ultimately a matter of *ethics*: the point of his analysis is not to propose an epistemology of the Other (a method of finding who she really is), but an ethics of diminishing myself for the sake of the Other. From the interpretative point of view, it is an ego-central redefining my world: in uncritical (mis)construal of the Other, I conceived her as something naturally present in the world ontology. Now I come to know that only I am present in the world this simple way. In order to meet the Other, I must realize that she doesn't occur in the world that straightforwardly. However, the mechanism of this meeting is a linguistic mystery. The Other lurks beyond what the others (including me) can say about her.

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Our 'Form of Life' Revealed in the Action of Language

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The form of life is a concept that although it is usually taken as a fundament to understand the different language games, it is also *experiential*. It is a means of action in our language. This concept cannot be understood without our language, which at the same time reveals our whole world within. There is a strong relationship between our world, our language and languages; and our form of life.

The only form of life that we all share is that of mankind, but on the other side, our different languages reveal that there are diversities within this general form of life. This is how the notion of form of life and our understanding of language can be seen as action, because these change constantly, as do societies and cultures. It is already difficult to understand each other even if we share mankind, it is difficult to agree on something when there are idiomatic misunderstandings, it is difficult to learn other languages and to use them correctly, following the corresponding grammatical rules besides its everyday uses. Then, how can we really expect to 'create' an entire human symbolic language that can be sent to the outer space for extraterrestrials to find it and understand us as mankind? This can be thought to be possible, but, although we humans share one form of life, there are also many other particular forms of life within this general one, in which our different and collective worlds are shown. These are revealed through the way we use our languages.

In order to connect the notion of form of life to action, let us first think of Wittgenstein's idea of language after the *Tractatus*. He points out that our everyday language is not an exclusive or excluded entity. It is dynamic, it is in itself movement. As a creation of humans and while being used for communication, language and its practice changes, and *has* to change along the 'rules of the game', the lives and the histories of human beings. Then, as a result and *evidence* of cultures and movable societies, language is essentially in a continuous movement.

This is why there is a strong correspondence of language to the social activities and our processes of communication and understanding. For a more precise clarification of the connection between the activity of language and form of life, we can refer to the *Investigations* §23:

But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command? –There are *countless* kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences". And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. [...] Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.

The connection Wittgenstein makes between language in its spoken form, the activity of it, form of life, and language games is important. The way in which both 'game' and 'speaking' are italicized gives us a hint at the active nature of language games and language. When we speak a language, we are giving life to it. Language becomes an activity as we speak. This activity of speaking a language shows a form of life through our linguistic behaviour. How-

ever on a different level, our particular culture is also evidenced.

Nevertheless, the notion of form of life is broader than that of language games. Although language and form of life are strongly related, I agree with Glock that "Wittgenstein never identified the notion of language game with that of a form of life." (Glock 1996) It is hence more precise to say that: "Language games are 'part of', embedded in, a form of life (*PI* §§23-5)." Language games are elements of a form of life and constitute the totality of our form of life. Since language games have to do with the fact that speaking or writing a language is part of an activity, we can say as a consequence that this activity is part of a form of life. Moreover, we could say that the active characteristic of language games is to be conceived in any possible combination which forms the reality or the totality of a form of life.

Form of life is then a notion which inevitably interweaves references to culture, world view and language. This correlation can show how it is that language can be understood as a constant motion, in the same way as cultures. The way a form of life can be related to cultural relativity is understood from a perspective of representation. This means that we can only criticize the way a language game is *played* from the outside as a mode of *perception* which can only be cultural, and is not based on a universal rationality. This does not mean though, that the language game analogy should be reduced to cultural relativism.

Among humans, we have the possibility to understand anything we say to each other because we all share at least one form of life: that of being *humans*. But among this form of life, there is also the fact that some groups of human beings have forms of life that are totally different from those of other groups of people. What happens here? Wittgenstein asks how we can really understand each other, when we for example go to another country, where the traditions are completely different from ours. "Suppose you came as an explorer into an unknown country with a language quite strange to you. In what circumstances would you say that the people there gave orders, understood them, obeyed them, rebelled against them, and so on?" (*PI*, 206) Supposing we know the language, we could still not understand the people, because we do not know what is the *sense* behind the words they utter, this is, what kind of form of life, what language games and what rules are guiding the sentences and the structure of their language as they talk amongst themselves and to us.

However, language as well as language games does not only have a spoken/written way of being embedded in a form of life. As we can see within the different cultures and how *behaviour* is indubitably attached to it, the relation between these three notions can also be found in a non linguistic form. *Behaviour*, as another sort of language game as well as a type of activity, is evidence itself of specific forms of life. Furthermore, because of the inseparable attachment between these notions, and the way form of life is related to an essentially movable perception of societies, it is clear for Wittgenstein that if we manage to understand a form of life, this is because there was previously the possibility to understand the rules inherent in the language games, the behaviour and the practices that are

part of them and which are *used* on a daily basis. This is, since language games are embedded in a form of life, it is then possible to say that if we understand the form of life, we had already known how to play the game and that we know the rules of it.

Besides all the types of sentences and expressions we can think of, Wittgenstein also thinks of the *possibility of languages* that only consists of for example orders and reports, or another language that consist only of questions and answers. This comes with the reflection that: "[...] And to imagine a language means (*heißt*) to imagine a form of life." (*PI*, 19) This way language is not a totally mental calculus of *only* intellectual processes. As a form of life it is a natural activity: Wittgenstein likes to compare it with natural activities we do, like drinking or walking (*PI*, 25) and, as such, it is also a part of a process which alludes to constant movement and changes, not to a static notion.

At this point let us, as an example, imagine that I as a Mexican learn Hindi language before I am going to India. I have never heard that language or seen it written before. I have no connection to the country or to the culture or to any of their language rules. All that is related to this country and the forms of life of the people is completely unfamiliar to me (I might have seen pictures or a movie sometime in my life, but the knowledge it gives to me is minimum). After some time learning Hindi, I go to New Delhi and live there for nine months. After only perhaps the second month I start to *use* the language on a daily basis, because all I knew previously was grammatical rules and theory which has not really been practiced. Can I by this moment start to *play* the variety of language games with the people? Not necessarily. Knowing the language does not really give me enough grounding to know the rules of the game or to be able to play the same language games as them. Moreover, this is not yet giving me the possibility of sharing their form of life in any manner. Even if I lived there for years, learnt the language perfectly and started to play their language games with them, it would take a long time until I would start sharing their form of life. Even more, it only depends on my intention to get to share their form of life *at all*. One could ask concerning this example: to what extent did I master the technique of the use of language? To what extent do we presuppose a specific form of life in our inter cultural experiences, and to what extent do we show that in our language?

Can we say that the same way there are uncountable possibilities of language games; there are also different possibilities of existence of forms of life? We have to make clear this differentiation. On the one hand there is the more general form of life: that one related to being human, that one which does not let us understand the lion if he would be able to speak. On the other hand, as we can see with the example of the cross cultural experience, we could say that every new language we learn gives us a *possibility* of understanding a new form of life, with the uncountable language games and the cultural aspect embedded in it. And even more, the knowledge of each language opens also possibilities of understanding particular forms of life within that one language. But this possibility

does not assure that we can approach a form of life every time. There is form of life evidenced also in the activities of particular language games: the use of words within one same language, accents, slang, dialects, regionalisms, invented languages in a particular community and the mixture of two or more languages joined by political frontiers only to mention some cases.

Furthermore, in this example and in the variety of possible language games embedded in the cultural perspective, we can see forms of life in activity. The fact that words are used, reused and misused as they change regions, countries, and also how this happens with languages through time, gives us one more time the sense of language and form of life as action. Sharing a language does not mean that we can *really* communicate with each other, but at the end of the day we share a cultural background and behaviour and in most of the cases, in Wittgenstein's terms, the same *training*. This sharing of training is also related to how we are expected to follow the rules of the game. So as we share the language, culture, background, opinions, training, etc, we could as a consequence, share a form of life. And in this *sharing* we *act* as groups, societies, cultures, as speaking and communicative beings.

As a conclusion, Wittgenstein points out that beyond the notion of sharing a form of life vis-à-vis sharing culture, language and background, we as individuals shall be aware of what has been given to us in a non expected way, or in other words: "What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – *forms of life*." (*PI*, p. 226) It has to be accepted because it might be the only thing we have not chosen in our lives. Let's think now about someone who moves from place to place constantly, that he or she knows many languages and lives in an intercultural experience most of his or her life (for example the daughter or son of a diplomat). This constant activity is evidently embedded in her or his form of life and reflected in the language. But the form of life in which we were born and raised has specific characteristics and always remains with us, no matter where we go, or who we relate to.

To corroborate, language and the use of our particular languages permeates all of our life. It is shown as evidence, in everything we *do*, every movement of our body, every expression of our hands, every look in our eyes; that is how the form of life is manifested in –and through language; it is unavoidable. And it is also historically evident: genes, manners, vocabulary used in the family, tradition, religion, ideologies, all of our life is *formed* and *conformed* by language.

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Language as Environment: an Ecological Approach to Wittgenstein's Form of Life

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The paper works out a new way of seeing at the concept *Lebensform* in Wittgenstein's later writings. The literature dedicated to the term offers a range of possible interpretations; in particular we could divide, as Cavell (1996) did, between ethnological and sociological readings, or between empiricist and transcendentalist readings (Hutto 2004). In an article dedicated to the argument Hunter listed four possible interpretations of *Lebensform*: language-game account, socio-historical account, natural-history view, behaviour package view (Hunter 1968). In the recent years many authors had gave a pragmatic turn to the interpretations in particular those starting from the occurrences contained in the Nachlass, overall from OC 358-9 and from Wittgenstein's quotation of Goethe's Faust: "In the beginning was the deed". This pragmatic interpretation considers the *Form of Life* as the 'deed' that as to be accepted (PI p. 192).

In this paper I try to explore this interpretation starting from an article by Susan Hurley (Hurley 1998). I advance some hints for an account in which we can give up the dualistic accounts of the notion without falling in the mistakes of the pragmatic account. In particular I'd follow the hints contained in Gier (1981) and begin a comparison, even if at great distance and based only on some points, between the form of life and the philosophy of practical holism (Dreyfus 1980; Stern 1991) or better, the ecological approach to anthropology and psychology contained in the works by Bateson (1970), Ingold (2000), Gibson (1979). My aim is to show how we could talk about ecology of language in which the term Form of Life plays the part of the *Ur-Bild* or mythological image.

The Regress in Action: Hurley's critic to the Form of life

Hurley argues against the so-called 'theory of Form of life' maintaining that it could work only when considered as a *pars destruens* but not as a *pars costruens*. Like other philosophers recently (Stroud 1996) Hurley takes the term as a synonym for '[given] action', meaning it as something that stops the regress in interpretations. Taken from this point of view the appeal to the 'form of life' is a good way to avoid the problems connected with Platonism and Cartesianism but could not avoid another possible regress in actions. Following Hurley if we can interpret any rule in infinite ways, why couldn't we consider an action in infinite ways? Paraphrasing PI § 201 we could say: "any action could be made out in accord with another action". I think that Hurley's critic is not functioning when we consider the context and the period in which Wittgenstein actually used the concept *Lebensform*, but they function if we consider the works of Middle Period and in particular the Brown Book.

The works of this period are characterized by the application of the language game-method (PI § 48). The point is that this method is only sufficient to win battles against the dualism language-world; but it doesn't win the war. In particular the compared analysis of *Brown Book* and the subsequent 1936's manuscript of *Eine Philoso-*

phische Betrachtung (MS 115) gives us an idea of how the same Wittgenstein would have realized a sort of *saturation of the method* and tried to turn his thought into an anthropological analysis using the term *Praxis* as a substitute for the English 'language game': "Dies ist leicht zu sehen, wenn Du ansiehst, welche Rolle das Wort im Gebrauche der Sprache spielt, ich meine, in der ganzen Praxis der Sprache" (EPB p. 157) – in the *Brown Book* Wittgenstein used 'whole language-game' (BrB p. 108). In this way we realize that the works of the middle period are only a preparation to the practical holism considered by Stern (1991) because Wittgenstein just had prepared some conceptual tools of this strand of thought, namely: (i) consideration of life as a range of possible activities related to a context of possible choice in which the organism take part as a whole; (ii) definition of *Umgebung* as the practical environment constituted by the relations and inter-actions of the organisms embedded in it (EPB p. 120). Although all these considerations, in the thought of this period was still missing the image or more likely the *Ur-Bild* that collect all the parts of the mosaic in an organic account. There is a passage in EPB that confirm this analysis: speaking about the understanding of the arithmetical addition Wittgenstein uses the term "Akt der Entscheidung" (EPB p. 216) but suddenly expresses his dissatisfaction for that term because he's probably conscious of the same problem addressed by Hurley. In this period Wittgenstein had to do with the dualistic vocabulary and needed a deep reconsideration of any use of language.

I mean that the subsequent use of the term *Lebensform* in the MS 142 gives us this image and that we could properly speak of a practical holism or, better, of an ecology of language only from this moment. The basic thought of the theory of action expressed by the concept *Lebensform* is that any action could be an action only if it is considered in the stream of other actions and on the ground of a wide formal system of possible actions (LSPP 250), a system that coincides with our 'Form of Life'. The analysis of the beginning of the PI is a genealogical analysis on the origin of the term in Wittgenstein's work and a theoretical analysis on the connection between action, language and reality.

The conversion to 'Form of life'

Wittgenstein, whom used the term very rarely, applies it twice in the first 'chapter' of his work. This is not a casuality but a choice that shows how he confides on this notion to get his reader in the right attitude towards philosophical analysis. As Wittgenstein writes in LSPP 256: "Schon das Erkennen des philosophischen Problems al eines logischen ist ein Fortschritt. Es kommt die rechte *Einstellung* mit ihm, und die Methode". *Einstellung* belongs to a wide conceptual field of other words used by Wittgenstein: *Anschauung*, *Annahme*, *Stellungnahme*, *Überzeugung*. The *Einstellung* is an attitude towards something that is not definable; it is not towards an object and isn't modalized as true or false. It could be used with an image (*Bild*) but not to an Idea (*Idee*) (PU § 1). I consider image as a 'perceptuous presentation' [*übersichtliche Darstellung*] (PU §

122) of the misconceptions about language (Baker-Hacker 2005: p.1), that is to say, something similar to the notion of paradigm (Mulhall 2001) or akin to a mythology [*Mythologie*] (UG 95). The beginning of the PI could be seen as a rhetorical argument that tries to convince the reader to embrace the right point of view towards the relation language-world:

“Von der Richtigkeit einer Anschauung manchmal durch ihre *Einfachheit*, oder *Symmetrie* überzeugt wird” (UG § 92)

The strategy is double-faced and deals with the primitiveness, or simplicity [*Einfachheit*] of the language §2, and the symmetry [*Symmetrie*] between the reader's relation with that language and Augustine's position towards *his* language learning. The point of Wittgenstein is to realize a conversion [*Umstellung*] (Baker 2004) to the *Lebensform* as the environment dwelled by the speakers who inter-act each-other. As he wrote in the first manuscript of the PI:

“Die Unruhe in der Philosophie...kommt daher, dass wir die Philosophie falsch ansehen, falsch sehen...Die Umstellung der Auffassung macht die grösste Schwierigkeit” (TS 220 § 116).

The argumentation is developed around two points: the learning of language and the account of language as *action*, instead of as a means of giving information [*Mitteilung*]. As Williams had just noted (Williams 1999) the concept of learning plays an enormous significance in the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein: it has a causally grounding role if considered from a semantic point of view. The *Abrichtung* is just the way to learn the meaning of the words, and different kind of instructions give us different senses of the words we use (PI §6). But the ecological thinking allows us to see a more profound dimension. We could consider the process of learning as an enskilment in which the practitioners learn not definitions, as supposed by the russellian theory, but also are directly engaged in an interaction with the environment (Ingold 2000). Environment that is the range of possible situations in which they *live* – the term *Leben* in Wittgenstein is used as a synonym of activity to which we could give a meaning, and it follows from T 5.621. Choosing to translate the German *Abrichtung* with Enskilment we arrive to see two dimensions of

learning as strictly interwoven: an ontogenetic dimension of the growing of an organism in an environment, and the ontological commitment of the linguistic practices in building the world. To learn a language means to grow as person and to dwell an environment.

This first point could run the risk to follow some metaphysical temptations, and to give up to the allure of linguistic idealism (Anscombe 1981, Bloor 1996) or to the expressivist interpretations of the semantic in the later writings (Lawn 2004). This risk could be avoided interpreting at the letter the PI § 16 in which Wittgenstein condenses the semantic reflections collected in some remarks of PG and goes further substituting the dualism language-world with the image of the ‘form of life’ in which language and world are embedded into each other. In PG Wittgenstein destroyed the myth of representation [*Vertretung*] noting that there isn't an ontological difference between the symbol and the object represented: the same object could at the same time be the object represented or the means of representation (PG § 51). Wittgenstein used the distinction between *Sprache* and *Wortsprache* to figure out a distinction between the *process* of using symbols considered as ‘bits of linguistic behaviour’ [*Sprach-handlungen*] and the *event* in which signs [*Zeichen*] – could be words or gestures– are considered only as mere artefacts that stands for something outside them. In section IV of PG Wittgenstein brings the reader to the conclusion that *Sprache* is a process in which meaning is build step by step by the interaction between the dwellers of a common environment that is not pre-formed in the mind or in the books of grammar.

The general conclusion I would reach is that the term *Lebensform* works in the direction of destroying the dualism language-world but, contrary to the opinion in Hurley, the practice is something always embedded with the form, with rules and norms – even the so-called rules of thumb or practical norms – because we could only speak of life when our actions can be judged by the other components of our community. The regress in action is something possible *as an experiment* but not in the interaction with other beings. The life of the community is the ground against which an action could be judged as an action.

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Sprache als *Kontinuum*, Sprache als ‚*Diskretum*‘ in der aristotelischen *Physik*

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1. Einführung: die Natur der Erkenntnis

Nach dem Urteil des italienischen Philosophen Massimo Cacciari stellt die aristotelische *Physik* „il più grande trattato filosofico di Aristotele“ (Cacciari 2004: 42) dar. Das Ziel, das Aristoteles mit diesem großen Werk verfolgt, ist, eine Theorie der philosophischen Erkenntnis (ἐπιστήμη) zu begründen, die dem gnoseologisch relevanten Problem der Bewegung (κίνησις) des Realen (φύσις) Rechnung trägt. Auf den Punkt gebracht findet man diese, für die damalige Diskussion über die Erkenntnisleistung der Philosophie angesichts einer in Bewegung begriffenen Wirklichkeit fundamentale Fragestellung im platonischen Dialog *Kratylos* (vgl. Buchheim 1994: 22-28), und zwar in der folgenden Feststellung Sokrates':

Ja, es ist nicht einmal möglich zu sagen, dass es eine Erkenntnis gäbe, wenn alle Dinge sich verwandeln und nichts bleibt. Denn nur, wenn dieses selbst, die Erkenntnis, von dem Erkenntnis-Sein nicht weicht, so bliebe sie dann immer Erkenntnis und es gäbe eine Erkenntnis. Wenn aber auch diese Idee der Erkenntnis sich verwandelt, so verwandelt sie sich in eine andere Idee von Erkenntnis und das Ergebnis ist, dass es keine Erkenntnis gibt. Wenn sie sich aber ständig verwandelt, so gibt es ständig keine Erkenntnis, und aus diesem Grund auch weder ein Erkennendes noch ein Erkanntes. (Platon, *Kratylos* 440a-b, geänderte Übersetzung [E.B.]).

Im tradierten Text der *Physik* kommt vor allem in der systematischen Verschränkung der Begriffe ἐπιστήμη, κίνησις und φύσις der erkenntnistheoretische Gehalt dieser Schrift zum Vorschein, der wie folgt zusammengefasst werden kann: ‚Bewegung‘ scheint ein Unbestimmbares (vgl. *Phys.* 201b27-28) und daher auch ein wissenschaftlich Unerkennbares zu sein (vgl. *Erste Analytik* 32b28ff.). Da φύσις Prinzip von Bewegung und Veränderung ist (vgl. *Phys.* 200b12-15), drängt sich die Frage auf, wie überhaupt von der φύσις eine wissenschaftlich gesicherte Erkenntnis gewonnen werden kann, welche Erkenntnis also im Bereich der *Wissenschaft von der Natur* überhaupt möglich ist (vgl. *Phys.* 184a14-15). In der aristotelischen *Physik* geht es weniger um die Erkenntnis der Natur als vielmehr um die Natur der Erkenntnis, in welcher Weise nämlich vom Realen wissenschaftliche Bestimmungen gegeben werden können (vgl. *ibid.*).

Ziel des vorliegenden Beitrags ist es, die Struktur dieser Erkenntnislehre in ihren Grundmomenten durch die Analyse des Proömiums der *Physik* zu rekonstruieren und dabei die Rolle der Sprache herauszuarbeiten.

2. Die zweistufige Struktur des Erkennens

2.1 Textanalyse

Das Proömium der *Physik* lässt sich in drei Argumentationsschritte einteilen. In einem ersten Moment wird die Notwendigkeit der Prinzipienfrage auch im Bereich der *Wissenschaft von der Natur* beteuert, da jede Form von wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis erst dann als gesichert gilt, wenn die Prinzipien, die Ursachen und die Grundbestand-

teile ermittelt werden (vgl. 184a10-16). In der zweiten Passage führt Aristoteles die berühmte Unterscheidung ein zwischen dem, was *uns* und dem, was *an sich* bekannter und klarer ist (vgl. 184a16-23), und erklärt, dass der Weg zur Lösung der Prinzipienfrage im Bereich der Wissenschaft von der Natur führen soll „[v]on dem der Natur nach Undeutlicheren uns aber Klareren hin zu dem, was der Natur nach klarer und bekannter ist“ (184a19-21). Gegen die traditionelle Auslegung dieser Unterscheidung im Sinne einer konträr verlaufenden Differenzierung zwischen der Erkenntnis- und Seinsordnung, hat bereits Wolfgang Wieland in seiner bahnbrechenden, mittlerweile klassischen Studie über die aristotelische *Physik* (vgl. Wieland³1992) darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass hier Aristoteles in Hinblick auf die Prinzipienfrage die Struktur des Erkennens selbst beschreibt; diese sieht vor, dass Erkenntnis – und zwar auch Prinzipienkenntnis – immer aus einer bereits vorhandenen Form von Vorwissen erwachsen muss (vgl. *Ivi*, 69-72). Im Falle der Erkenntnis einer Sache aus ihren Prinzipien fallen Vorwissen (Prinzipien) und Erkenntnis (Sache) zusammen, im Falle der Prinzipienfrage fehlt jedoch diese Möglichkeit, da man sonst weitere Prinzipien bis ins Unendliche voraussetzen müsste. Für die Erkenntnis der Prinzipien bleibt nur der Weg aus jener Form von Vorwissen heraus, über die man schon verfügt, wenn man in der Lage ist, Fragen zu stellen (vgl. *Ivi*, 72). In der aristotelischen Erkenntnisstruktur, wie sie in dieser Textpassage zum Vorschein kommt, kristallisieren sich somit zwei Momente heraus, von denen nur das zweite als ἐπιστήμη charakterisiert werden kann, das jedoch ohne das erste keinen Bestand hätte, da dieses die Grundlage ist, aus (ἐκ) der jenes entsteht.

Anschließend geht Aristoteles dazu über, das erste Erkenntnismoment näher zu umreißen und die Modalität des Übergangs vom ersten zum zweiten Moment zu bestimmen. Im Text heißt es:

Uns ist aber zu allererst klar und durchsichtig das mehr Vermengte. Später erst werden aus diesem bekannt die Grundbausteine und die Grund-Sätze, wenn man es auseinandernimmt (διαίροισι). Deswegen muss der Weg von den Ganzheiten zu den Einzelheiten führen (*Phys.* 184a21-24).

Das bereits Bekannte hat ursprünglich die Form des Vermengten (τὰ συγκεχυμένα) bzw. des Zusammengegangenen (vgl. Wieland³1992: 86). Daraus (ἐκ τούτων) erwächst dann die Erkenntnis der Grundelemente und der Prinzipien, wenn man das undifferenziert Ganze diairetisch, d.h. mittels Begriffsanalyse, trennt und daraus einen Relationszusammenhang unter seinen Einzelteilen entstehen lässt.

In einem dritten, für die hier angestrebte Rekonstruktion fundamentalen Argumentationsschritt begründet Aristoteles das von ihm gerade entworfene zweistufige Schema des Erkenntnisprozesses, indem er auf zwei Strukturen der Erfahrungsverdichtung hinweist, in denen das undifferenziert Ganze die Basis für die daraus entstehende Erkenntnis darstellt. Die erste Struktur ist die Sinneswahrnehmung (αἴσθησις), die zweite die Sprache im Sinne der Wörter (τὰ ὀνόματα).

Warum gerade die Sinneswahrnehmung hier thematisiert wird, hängt mit dem erkenntnistheoretischen Problem der Bewegung zusammen. Als Ausgangspunkt der Erkenntnislehre im Bereich der *Physik* gilt für Aristoteles das epistemische Prinzip, nach dem „die Naturgegenstände entweder gänzlich oder nur teilweise bewegt sind“ (*Phys.* 185a13, geänderte Übersetzung [E.B.]). Das soll als Grundaxiom gelten, dessen Evidenz und Gültigkeit uns ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς (185a13-14, geänderte Übersetzung [E.B.]), „aus der Erfahrung“ kommt. Wenn alles, was natürlich ist, *qua* natürlich, der Veränderung unterworfen ist, dann muss gefragt werden, ob und wie diese stetig veränderliche Wirklichkeit überhaupt erfassbar ist, ohne dass sie deswegen aufhört Bewegung zu sein; denn, wenn man ihre Bewegtheit ausklammerte, würde man die natürlichen Dinge nicht, insofern sie natürlich sind, erkennen, sondern insofern sie aus einer anderen Perspektive betrachtet werden, wie beispielsweise aus der des Mathematikers, nicht jedoch aus der des Physikers. In einer für unsere Analyse interessanten Passage aus dem siebten Buch der *Physik* wird der Zusammenhang zwischen natürlicher Bewegung, Wahrnehmung und Erkenntnis erklärt (vgl. 247b16-248a9). Die Bewegung verursacht „in dem Teil der Seele, der das Vermögen zu sinnlicher Wahrnehmung hat“ (248a7-8) eine Eigenschaftsveränderung bzw. ein Anderswerden im Körper. Dieses natürliche „Durcheinander und Bewegungsfluss (ἡ ταραχή καὶ κίνησις)“ (1-2) wird in den Lebewesen, die dazu eine natürliche Veranlagung haben, zu einer festen Grundlage, indem die Seele „unter die Füße Boden bekommt (καθίσταται) und zu ruhiger Festigkeit findet (ἡρεμίζεται)“ (2). Wie sich aus der chaotischen Unordnung, welche die Bewegung in der Wahrnehmung induziert, Festigkeit herauskristallisieren kann, erklärt Aristoteles u.a. im letzten Kapitel der *Zweiten Analytik*, in dem er eine gnoseologische Klimax entwirft: das Beharren der Veränderung in der Wahrnehmung in Form von Retention ergibt das Gedächtnis (μνήμη), die Anhäufung der Erinnerungen lässt die Erfahrung (ἐμπειρία) entstehen, aus dem so in der Seele zusammengekommenen und zur Ruhe neigenden Ganzen entsteht die wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis (ἐπιστήμη). In derselben Passage aus der *Zweiten Analytik* bietet der Philosoph auch ein anschauliches Beispiel dieses Vorgangs an: „ähnlich wie wenn in der Schlacht alles flieht, aber Einer stehen bleibt, und nun ein Anderer sich ihm anschließt, bis die anfängliche Ordnung wiederhergestellt wird“ (*An. post.* 100a12-13).

Ähnlich wie mit der Wahrnehmung verhält es sich – wie man im Interpretationsteil (vgl. *infra* 2.3) genauer sehen wird – nach Aristoteles mit der Sprache im Sinne der Wörter. „Sie sagen unbestimmt ein Ganzes aus“ (*Phys.* 184b11). Auch die Sprache bildet also eine Grundlage für jenes Moment der Erkenntnis, das in der Bestimmung der Wörter besteht, indem diese in ihre einzelnen Bestandteile auseinandergenommen werden (διαρρεῖ) (vgl. 184b12).

Der Text fasst das Gesagte in einem Beispiel zusammen, in dem die zwei, hier zeitlich bestimmten Erkenntnismomente nochmals thematisiert werden:

So machen es ja auch die Kinder: *Anfangs* reden sie jeden Mann mit ‚Vater‘ an und mit ‚Mutter‘ jede Frau, *später* unterscheiden sie hier ein jedes genauer (184a12-14, kursiv von mir [E.B.]).

Der Hinweis auf die Kinder taucht auch in dem bereits erwähnten Buch VII auf: Im ersten Erkenntnismoment, das dem „anfangs“ im obigen Zitat entspricht, verfügen Kinder aufgrund der noch zu heftigen Bewegung, nur über ein beschränktes Unterscheidungsvermögen:

Das ist auch der Grund, weshalb kleine Kinder weder (die Wirklichkeit) voll einsehen können noch nach Maßgabe ihrer Wahrnehmung ähnlich wie die Älteren beurteilen können: da ist noch viel Durcheinander und Bewegungsfluss (247b18-248a2).

Kinder können zwar zwischen Mann und Frau unterscheiden, bleiben jedoch auf dieser grundlegenden kategorialen Bestimmung stehen und sind nicht in der Lage, relationale Verbindungen zu erkennen.

2.2 Interpretation

Die Textanalyse hat die Behandlung der Wahrnehmung und der Sprache als Grundlagen der ἐπιστήμη aufgrund ihres besonderen Verhältnisses zur Bewegung als Schlüsselpassage für das gnoseologisch relevante Problem der Erkenntnis einer stetig im Wandel begriffenen Wirklichkeit entdeckt. Es drängt sich die Frage auf, welche Tragweite diese Entdeckung in Hinblick auf die Sprache habe, worauf im Folgenden nun einzugehen ist.

Sowohl die Wahrnehmung als auch die Sprache scheinen etwas von der Bewegung der Wirklichkeit, die sie erfassen, zu haben, ohne sie jedoch dadurch festzuhalten. Wie die Bewegung kennt auch die Sinneswahrnehmung keinen wirklichen Anfang und kein wirkliches Ende, und zwar sowohl absolut als auch bezüglich der einzelnen Wahrnehmungsmomente. Es gibt nämlich keine absolut erste und auch keine absolut letzte Wahrnehmung, so wie es kein Anfangsmoment und keinen Endpunkt in den einzelnen Wahrnehmungsmomenten gibt, da Wahrnehmung nur dadurch aufrecht erhalten wird, dass immer neues Wahrgenommenes das davor Wahrgenommene ablöst, und zwar ununterbrochen. Das Wahrgenommene kann somit ein zusammengeglichenes Ganzes darstellen, weil es keine Abgrenzungen kennt. Die Wahrnehmung verlangsamt den stetigen, unaufhaltsamen Wandel der φύσις, kann allerdings keine ἐπιστήμη sein, da das Wahrgenommene in der Seele als Kontinuum vorhanden ist und die Wahrnehmung selbst nicht aufhören kann, durch neue, von der Bewegung der Wirklichkeit verursachte hinzukommende Wahrnehmungen im Fluss zu sein.

Bei genauerer Betrachtung erweisen sich auch die Wörter (τὰ ὀνόματα) als ein Kontinuum; denn sie stellen zwar eine erste Konkretion der Bewegung des Wirklichen dar, in dieser jedoch bildet die Bedeutung des Wirklichen noch ein undifferenziertes Ganzes, da sie alle unterschiedlichen Wortbedeutungen undefiniert enthält. Außerdem schließt ein Wort an das vorhergehende und nachkommende Wort unmittelbar an. Sprechen (λέγειν) geschieht durch die Aufrechterhaltung des linearen Redeflusses. Dadurch sind die ὀνόματα ein erstes sinnstiftendes Moment, ein ursprünglicher Sedimentations- bzw. Kristallisationspunkt, in dem eine Gerinnung der unendlichen Bewegungen der φύσις stattfindet – dies reicht allerdings nicht zur wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis aus. Wie bei den Kindern ist aufgrund des noch vorhandenen Bewegungsflusses in Hinblick auf die Bewegung des Wirklichen im linearen Kontinuum eine erste kategoriale Differenzierung zwar möglich, jedoch weder Abgrenzung noch Relationsbildung, nämlich Erkenntnis. Auf der anderen Seite aber wäre ἐπιστήμη ohne die erste, wohl noch instabile, jedoch bereits tragende Grundlage des linearen Kontinuums gar nicht möglich.

Wenn die Sprache ein erstes, wenn auch noch bewegtes und unbestimmtes Ganzes darstellt, dann lässt sich die wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis als jene Tätigkeit charakterisieren, in der mittels des διαρρεῖν die Einzelmomente und -bestandsstücke bestimmt werden:

Sie [die Wörter] sagen unbestimmt ein Ganzes aus, z.B. ‚Kreis‘, die Bestimmung des Kreises nimmt ihn dann in seine einzelnen Bestandsstücke auseinander (184b101-12).

Es ist die diairetische Tätigkeit des λόγος, der Begriffsbildung. Diese charakterisiert erstens die ‚Re-flexion‘, d.h. die – im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes – ‚Rück-beugung‘ auf das in den ὀνόματα bereits Enthaltene, im alltäglichen λέγειν bereits Gesagte. Das Alltagsprechen ist die notwendige Grundlage, aus der der λόγος erwächst. Zweitens: die begriffliche Erkenntnis besteht in der Entdeckung einer Struktur von Relationen mittels der Einführung von Grenzen im Zusammengedogenen. Nicht im Aufweisen isolierter Elemente besteht die Bedeutung, sondern im Aufzeigen und Zutagebefördern jenes Netzes von Relationen, in dem allein die Bedeutung als Struktur sinnvoll ist. So kann Aristoteles behaupten, dass selbst die Prinzipien, die obersten Begriffe – im Zitat der Begriff der ἀρχή –, nicht als Dinge, sondern als Relationen zu verstehen sind:

Es gibt nämlich gar keinen Anfang mehr, wenn nur eins und in diesem Sinne eines da ist. Denn ‚Anfang‘ ist immer ‚von etwas‘, einem oder mehreren. (*Phys.* 185a3-5).

Genau das zeigt der Kindervergleich am Ende des Proömiums. Nicht in der kategorialen Anwendung der Bestimmungen ‚Vater‘ auf jeden Mann und ‚Mutter‘ auf jede Frau besteht Erkenntnis, sondern in der Fähigkeit, aus der kategorialen Kontinuumsbestimmung das genaue Relationsverhältnis, d.h. diskrete Einheitszusammenhänge zu ermitteln. Drittens: wie das obige Zitat zeigt, beziehen sich solche Einheitszusammenhänge, welche die Begriffe sind, nicht auf Dinge, sondern auf Relationen. Das bedeutet, dass sie kontextspezifisch und nicht allgemeingültig sind. Im fünften Buch der Metaphysik listet Aristoteles für den Begriff der ἀρχή sieben Hauptdefinitionen auf. In anderen Passagen des *Corpus Aristotelicum* werden die Begriffe ‚Prinzip‘, ‚Ursache‘ (αἰτίον) und ‚Grundbestandteil‘ (στοῖ χεῖρον) als Synonyme verstanden, d.h. als ein Begriffsgeflecht (vgl. auch Craemer-Ruegenberg 1980: 27). Die jeweils richtige Begriffsbestimmung, ob es sich nämlich um Prinzip, Ursache oder Bestandteil handelt, hängt in entscheidender Weise von der Frage ab, die man stellt, d.h. von der Perspektive, die man einnimmt. Dieser letzte Aspekt zeigt, dass Begriffe zwar sprachlich diskrete Einheitszusammenhänge darstellen, dass sie jedoch nicht ohne das Kontinuum der Sprache bestehen können. Damit sind sie Begriffe einer bewegten Wirklichkeit und können sie erfassen, ohne sie zu fixieren. Das gilt selbstverständlich auch für den allerersten Begriff.

Conclusio: Die Analyse und die Interpretation haben gezeigt, dass Sprache im *Physik*proömium zweifach verstanden wird, einmal als Kontinuum, einmal als ‚Diskretum‘. Nur in der Dialektik und wechselseitigen Abhängigkeit dieser zwei Momente ist Sprache in der Lage, eine stetig in Bewegung begriffene Wirklichkeit zu erfassen und somit wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis zu begründen. Darin liegt auch die Erkenntnisleistung der Philosophie.

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Neo-Expressivism and the Picture Theory

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I. Neo-Expressivism about First-Person Authority

I'm calling a "neo-expressivist" account of first-person authority any account that (1) appeals to the *expressive* character of avowals (mental state self-ascriptions like "I'm afraid,") in accounting for their epistemic properties, while (2) insisting on the *assertoric* character of avowals in accounting for their logical properties. (1) is what makes an account of first-person authority an expressivist one; (2) is what makes it a *new* kind of expressivist account.

Traditionally, expressivist treatments of given ranges of sentences have applied to the *semantics* of those sentences, the characteristic thesis being that the sentences in question are, while superficially assertoric, really *non-assertoric*; they don't really say anything true or false. This, of course, invites the so-called Frege/Geach line of objections (briefly, the chosen sentences will have to be more than merely expressive if they *entail* anything, which almost every indicative sentence seems to do), and that line has all the appearances of being quite devastating. And anyway, the suggestion that, in particular, claims about one's own pain, fear, thirst, etc. (as opposed, for example, to claims about what's beautiful), aren't really assertoric, that they don't really deal in 'truth-evaluable contents', can seem plainly absurd. The inclusion of (2) in an expressivist account of first-person authority is geared toward eliminating these difficulties.

David Finkelstein characterizes first-person authority thus: "If you want to know what I think, feel, imagine, or intend, I am a good person--indeed, usually the best person--to ask." (Finkelstein 2003, p.100) In the early stages of his *Expression and the Inner*, Finkelstein sets out why *detectivism* (I'm the one to ask because I've got the best view, so to speak, of the relevant facts) and *constitutivism* (I'm the one to ask because my answer (belief) constitutes its own truth) about first-person authority simply won't do. I think his arguments are sound. Finkelstein claims, rightly, that attention to the expressive character of avowals is the road to understanding first-person authority: "If you want to know my psychological condition, I'm usually the best person to ask, for just the same reason that my face is the best one to look at." (Finkelstein 2003, p.101)

So far, so good, in my opinion. But, as Finkelstein recognizes, an obvious question arises: Why do we think of mental state self-ascriptions as *authoritative* in a way we do not think of smiles, e.g., as authoritative? Finkelstein's answer seems to be simply that smiles aren't authoritative because they aren't assertoric; avowals, on the other hand, are assertoric, and so can be called "authoritative." (Finkelstein 2003, pp. 101-2) Of course, this makes it look like "authoritative" is just another word for "assertoric" when it comes to expressions of mental states (where, roughly, what's expressed is just what's asserted); but "authoritative" suggests, ostensibly, epistemic praiseworthiness, while "assertoric", ostensibly, doesn't. For old expressivism it was held that epistemic praise and blame were strictly *non-applicable* to avowals, the illusion of knowledge and certainty being products of the (grammatical) exclusion of ignorance and doubt. We know Finkelstein's view isn't the traditional expressivist view, but is the only difference that he tacks on the assertoric "dimension"

of mental state self-ascriptions, and just like that he helps himself to the traditional vocabulary of epistemic praise and blame? But where there isn't any identification, where there isn't any observation, as Finkelstein admits there isn't in the case of avowals, how can there be any justification, how can there be knowledge?

When Finkelstein finally confronts this question in *EI* the response he gives is, basically, that we can say what we want; we can say that the epistemic praises apply or that they don't; he doesn't see that "we need be disagreeing about anything of philosophical import" (Finkelstein 2003, p.152). Now, this is going to strike many readers, no doubt, as entirely too evasive. And while I believe, actually, there's something right in this kind of response, I don't believe it can come out unless we understand how the *expressions* of sensation (conventional, via avowals, or otherwise) relate to the *ontology* of psychological discourse generally (first and third person). We need to understand the peculiar way that the assertoric dimension of avowals are, as it were, shaped by their expressive dimension. If, on the other hand, we uncritically read off a realm of inner objects from the 'surface grammar' of psychological discourse, it will be very difficult to see why we shouldn't embrace the traditional conception of sensations as *hidden* from everyone but their owners. But this is certainly not what an expressivist about first-person authority should want. I explain this in the following.

II. Expression, Assertion, and 'Grammar'

For those who want to understand the relationship between words and their meanings on analogy with the relationship between money and its uses (opposing, that is, analogies with some 'abstract' relationship between money and the 'kinds of things' one buys with it), it will seem not to be enough simply to grant an expressive 'dimension' right along side an assertoric 'dimension' when it comes to avowals.

Consider this: if I'm annoyed and say gruffly, "The keys are in the basket," I not only assert something, but I express my annoyance along with what I assert. Now, if I'm annoyed and I say, "I'm annoyed," again, I assert and express, as Finkelstein has it. First-person authority, apparently, resides in that what's expressed is what's asserted to be so; as Finkelstein says, first-person authority emerges as an "unsurprising concomitant" of the expressive character of mental state self-ascriptions. But what demands attention is the fact that avowals of annoyance, for example, unlike reports on locations of keys, are expressive in a way that pertains to their logic, in a way that the expressive aspects of gruffly put reports about the keys do *not* pertain to the logic of such reports. (What I mean by their "logic" is what's to be made of the 'truth-conditions' and 'truth-makers' for this domain of discourse.)

Finkelstein admits that avowals are assertions "of a special sort" (Finkelstein 2001, p.233), but, as far as I can tell, what he sees special about them is simply their asserting precisely what they express. What about their 'subject matter', though? One could ask: Aren't they special because they, like all psychological ascriptions, refer to spe-

cial kinds of objects? So then what kind of objects are referred to by avowals qua assertions? Can we get the epistemology of avowals right while leaving untouched the question which objects are the psychological objects? I don't believe so. In fact, 'referring to psychological objects' special or not, if it's uncritically assimilated to what's going on with 'referring to the keys', for instance, will, I think, mark the demise of neo-expressivism about first-person authority.

III. Neo-Expressivism and The Picture Theory

Suppose we adopt a 'picture theory' of the way language works, and with it that uncritical conception of 'objects standing in relation' I mentioned at the beginning. It is, of course, with this kind of thinking about language and the world that Wittgenstein implored us to "make a radical break": "the idea that language always functions in one way...to convey thoughts--which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please." (Wittgenstein 1951, §304) But let's take it on and see what becomes of a neo-expressivist account of first-person authority and self-knowledge.

Assuming, as I believe we must, that the sentence "He's in pain", for example, doesn't mean the same as "He's crying" (or "He's disposed to cry"), our picture theory is going to have us understanding "pain" as referring to *something besides* human behavior (or dispositions to it), however complex and however contextualized that behavior may be. The same goes for the rest of our psychological vocabulary. Even if we always teach our children how to make third-person psychological ascriptions by directing their attention to people behaving in manners characteristic of the presence of certain psychological conditions, their ascriptions will be made true or false by the presence or absence of those conditions, regardless of what's betrayed or belied in behavior. The point is, if we're working with a picture theory of psychological discourse, then the possibility of radical, pervasive separations between mentality and its expression in behavior becomes entirely unproblematic. It could be that everyone felt excruciating pain all the time, for example, but never gave the slightest indications of it, and vice versa.

But in that case, I believe, an important question needs to be asked: why should someone's crying, e.g., be any indication at all of something like a mental state 'behind' it? Or, why should we ever suppose that humans think of Vienna and that rocks don't? Why should we ever take thus-and-such behaviors as indicative of so thinking, and thus-and-such behaviors as indicative of the opposite? If these are real problems, then it's hard to see how the neo-expressivist is supposed to accomplish anything in stressing likenesses between avowals and pre-linguistic behavior. If, as Finkelstein says, "I'm usually the best person to ask [about my psychological condition], for just the same reason that my face is the best one to look at," then his account of first-person authority can only be as motivated as the supposition that one's face does, in fact, reliably indicate one's psychological condition. But if the

picture theory of psychological discourse is right, we start off understanding psychological discourse immediately saddled with a seemingly insurmountable problem of other minds.

Now, as far as I can tell, the only reason a picture theorist about psychological discourse will ever be able to give for thinking certain behaviors are indicative of certain psychological conditions will have to be some kind of argument from analogy. But, obviously, such arguments proceed only by taking *self-knowledge* as the secure thing, first and foremost; only from there does one inductively arrive at the significance of human behavior which the neo-expressivist needs. So, if the neo-expressivist is working with the picture theory, then it seems to matter very much whether she admits self-knowledge or doesn't: it seems she'll have to.

But here's the decisive moment, I think. If especially secure self-knowledge already has to be in place before the neo-expressivist can proceed with her account of first-person authority, then her account of first-person authority will be rendered superfluous. The question neo-expressivists want to answer is: Why are sincere claims about one's own mental states so strongly presumed true? Now, if we're given that people *know better* about their own mental states than other people do, then it follows more or less immediately that avowals (sincere claims about one's own mental states) should be so strongly presumed true. There's no reason to work backwards from the likeness of others' avowals to others' behavior, from the likeness of others' behavior to our own, and from our own behavior to correlated, 'underlying' psychological objects we're granting we know so well. I suppose a neo-expressivist like Finkelstein might have it that *other people's* self-knowledge is something that can be 'deflated' somehow, our saying what we please, and there being nothing of "philosophical import" hanging on what we say; while *his own* self-knowledge is something that can't be compromised. But for reasons I won't go into now, I very much doubt the plausibility of such a position.

The conclusion I draw is this: unless neo-expressivists take repeated expressions of sensation (the natural ones being gradually replaced with *conventional* ones) as the "beginning" (cf. Wittgenstein 1951, §290) of a new 'language-game' (the beginning of the *whole* of psychological discourse, in fact, without which that language-game would 'lose its point'), their account of first-person authority will be either hopeless, or else superfluous.

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Interpretation of Psychological Concepts in Wittgenstein

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Starting from 1929, the year of his return to Cambridge after a period of silence and reflection spent teaching in elementary schools in Austrian villages, Wittgenstein brought irrevocably to light the philosophical debate about the analysis of the relationship of the inner man and external representation (Bouveresse 1971; Lazerowitz and Ambrose 1985c). As Gargani says (1982), the works that indicate this direction of analysis are in particular *The Blue and Brown Books*, *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* and *Philosophical Investigation*. A widespread interpretation of Wittgenstein's observations on mental phenomena demands that he is opposed to the idea that they are phenomena that imply private representation, in the first person, accessible only to he/she who experiences them and are as a consequence unavailable for public investigation or in the third person (Malcolm 1986; Budd 1989; Stern 1995; Engel 1996). As he says in *Philosophical Investigation* (1953: 63), it is the instruments of grammar and linguistic games which provide a means to interpret psychological concepts. The external character of linguistic rules and their applied, intrinsic nature constitute the basis for a transposition of the inner being itself onto the level of anthropological practices.

The dichotomy between the Interior and the Exterior, or more precisely between the inner being and its expression, thus loses any relevance (Kenny 1973; Budd 1989). This leads to the negation of research that aims to reach stable meanings in a perfect isomorphism between internal states and the exterior world (Block 1981; Charles and Child 2001), chase away the ghost in the machine (Ryle 1949) reducing the description of internal states to the description of the use of the words that depict them. In fact, as he says in *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* (1980: I § 830), for some words, philosophers fashion an ideal use that, however, in the end isn't useful at all.

In this way language has a direct relationship with the aims for which it is used. The meaning of a word isn't to be looked for in what happens in our mind while we say it, but instead it is to be found in the use and the context in which it is employed. The unity of the language and the myth of philosophy as a normative science that tries to impose a higher order onto ordinary language show themselves to be illusory. Since every sentence of our language is ordered as it is and this order is in itself perfect and must also be present in a vaguer sentence. It is mistaken to say that in the philosophical sciences one must consider ideal language to be opposed to ordinary language. This has, in fact, created the idea that it is possible to improve ordinary language, but ordinary language is already correct (1958: 40). The inner world and its concepts thus spread across the surface of language and its rules, where the very essence is represented by Grammar (Cavell 1969; Baker and Hacker 1985; Hacker 1990).

The simplification of language and meaning to their usage imply a consideration and an investigation of the rules of their use, and our attitude towards them. For instance, internal states such as hoping, feeling pain, and understanding would not be possible without making use of a language. These are natural activities, like eating, walking, drinking (1980: I §25) and when faced with these we don't have to pose the problem of a theoretical legitimi-

zation and of a logical foundation, as stated instead in *Tractatus* (Popper 1957: 163-164; Anscomb 1959; Black 1964; Fogelin 1976; Hintikka and Hintikka 1986).

Wittgenstein, therefore, affirms the grammatical and conventional nature of the sentences that we opt to use in our daily lives (Kripke 1982). He refuses to accept the idea that the meaning of a word can be explained by psychological causes and the effects of the use of the word. This is in disagreement with the analysis of language as a psychological mechanism. His conception of the meaning of a word derives from the use that is made of it on a daily basis. The philosophical analysis of language is restricted to the description of its grammatical nature.

In *The Blue and Brown Books* (1958: 13) he says that it is the duty of the philosopher to understand the function of grammar. Grammar for Wittgenstein must describe the use of the words in the language and not look for, on the other hand, an explanation for their use in their meaning. And in trying to investigate the relationship that runs between internal states and external representations, he develops an analysis of the terms of our language by focusing on the concepts of a psychological nature, which are used every day in ordinary language. Like every linguistic expression, even concepts of a psychological nature must be subject to this infinite variety in language use, imposed by the several possibilities of usage that every expression possesses. The duty of philosophy is that of describing the use of words with psychological meaning by concentrating on their scope in relation to the exact moment and to the specific context in which it occurs.

The idea that in order to understand a general term one must find the element which is always present when it is used has paralyzed philosophical research. In fact, it has not only yielded no result, but it has induced philosophers to ignore, as irrelevant, concrete cases. Wittgenstein is interested in the language concerning psychological concepts because philosophical problems about the nature of the mind derive from the confusion over the use of our psychological vocabulary. The issue of interiority is transposed onto the dimension of linguistic practices and is not handled by taking into account facts of a psychological nature. While stating that it is not the duty of psychology to explain the meaning of the concepts that refer to internal states, he attempts a real neutralization of the psychological disciplines (Trinchero: 1986) The Austrian philosopher replaces the notion of psychological facts and phenomena with the notion of psychological concepts, thereby placing the focus on an analysis of a conceptual nature. The psychological concepts therefore would take life only in the context of linguistic expression.

To further study a psychological concept in detail, it is illuminating to analyze the expression "to be afraid". This does not consist in the experience of an occult process and then externalizing it by describing it through words, but in that intransitive and immanent linguistic act, in which, according to the Austrian philosopher, being afraid is acting afraid.

Analyzing the expression to be afraid is treated in great depth by Wittgenstein in both the second part of

Philosophical Investigation and Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. During the analysis a lot of attention is granted to the notion of context and to the transposition of this same expression in different linguistic games. In *Philosophical Investigation* (1953: II § 9) he writes:

I am afraid. I am sorry to have to confess it.
I am still a bit afraid, but no longer as much as before.
At bottom I am still afraid, though I won't confess it to myself.
I torment myself with all sorts of fears.
Now, just when I should be fearless, I am afraid!
To each of these sentences a special tone of voice is appropriate, and a different context.
It would be possible to imagine people who as it were thought much more definitely than we, and used different words where we use only one.
We ask "What does 'I am frightened' really mean, what am I referring to when I say it?" And of course we find no answer, or one that is inadequate.
The question is: "In what sort of context does it occur?"

Wittgenstein links the comprehension of a psychological concept such as being afraid to an exact interpretation of context. Language is not conceived as a static image of logical rules far from real contexts of interaction, but rather as a living entity which transforms itself through its constant usage. Thus, the meaning of a psychological concept, like every linguistic expression, is contained in the use that is made of it (1953: II § 9):

Describing my state of mind (of fear, say) is something I do in a particular context. (Just as a sit takes a particular context to make a certain action into an experiment.)
Is it, then, so surprising that I use the same expression in different games?

The importance of the context is therefore tightly linked to the possibility of using the same expression in different linguistic games. Fear can be of several types and can take on different meanings and shades according to the context in which it is placed. If such an assertion can have a deep impact on the linguistic expressions employed in everyday language, it is even more if valid also for psychological concepts, which often represent states of difficult communication and interpretation even for the person who experiments with them. For Wittgenstein, all this has no *raison d'être* because the analysis of externalisation of individual internal states is possible only by taking the analysis onto a linguistic plane. No more misunderstandings and obscurity, interpretation and understanding are possible.

In conclusion, citing the famous example of fear, I have presented a significant analysis, albeit not exhaustive, which requires further investigation concerning what Wittgenstein says in general about linguistic expressions and in particular psychological concepts. Highlighting the importance of context and the effective use of language and eliminating the need for inaccessible and mysterious internal processes, Wittgenstein states, as was demonstrated in this article, mental states do not come before language nor accompany a sequence of words, but are lived and experienced in the context of linguistic expression.

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Wittgenstein on Realism, Ethics and Aesthetics

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First, a word about terminology. It is often supposed that Wittgenstein is not involved in, and may even have undermined, distinctions in philosophical theory like the one between realism and antirealism in most of its manifestations. This view is untenable. First, it is implausible in itself to think that there is no substance to the distinction, and therefore it is *prima facie* implausible to ascribe this view to Wittgenstein. It is a sensible and important question whether a given domain of discourse is to be interpreted in such a way that what we say when we are involved in it is, at the very least, true or false. Moreover, it is a sensible and important question whether what we say, given that it is true or false, is true or false independently of our saying it, independently of our language, and independently of our way of life. In other words, it is an open question, in a given domain of discourse, whether there is a fact of the matter at all, and if there is, whether and how that fact is to be thought of as independent of our perspective. Physical theory is an example of a domain that clearly does, while ascribing colours to objects is an example of a domain that on reflection does not, support strong claims to objectivity. If so, there is room for a distinction, and with it, for a wide range of realist and antirealist interpretations of language.

Second, it flies in the face not only of good philosophical sense, but is inconsistent with his texts to deny that Wittgenstein trusts and employs something like this distinction. Much of the time, he is involved in identifying mistakes and confusions that arise from ignoring it. In mathematics and logic, in his discussions of colour and of religion, and especially in ethics and aesthetics, Wittgenstein is taking sides. Among other things, he clearly diagnoses a number of realist mistakes and confusions, and he goes on to suggest a cure by sketching alternative, antirealist interpretations of the linguistic practice in question. I hope that my interpretation of the passages on ethics and aesthetics serves as a case study to make the cogency of these claims clear.

Rush Rhees reports that Wittgenstein discussed the subject matter of ethics with him on several occasions. In conversations in 1942, Rhees brought up the problem facing a man who has come to the conclusion that he must either leave his wife or abandon his work of cancer research. Wittgenstein says that such a man may face a tragic dilemma. A striking fact about the passage is that Wittgenstein construes the situation and the possible responses to it as dependent on the different attitudes the husband or a friend may take:

If he has, say, the Christian ethics, then he may say it is absolutely clear: he has got to stick to her come what may. And then his problem is different. It is: how to make the best of this situation, what he should do in order to be a decent husband in these greatly altered circumstances, and so forth. The question 'Should I leave her or not?' is not a problem here. (Rhees 1965, 23)

In other words, not only the solution to the problem, but the answer to the question whether there is so much as a problem will depend on the commitments the husband already has.

At this point, a familiar realist impulse sets in. Surely what the man should do is not up to him, nor entirely dependent on attitudes? We want to say that one of the choices he faces must be the *right* one, and that one of the attitudes he may take must be *right*, must be the one he should take. Wittgenstein says, pointedly, "that this question does not make sense".

Suppose the man takes a different view and concludes that he should carry on with his research, leaving his wife to her own devices. He might say:

'Surely one of the two answers must be the right one. It must be possible to decide which of them is right and which is wrong.'

Wittgenstein counters:

But we do not know what this decision would be like – how it would be determined, what sort of criteria would be used, and so on. Compare saying that it must be possible to decide which of two standards of accuracy is the right one. We do not even know what a person who asks this question is after. (Rhees 1965, 23)

Now we are faced with two different questions. On the one hand, there is the question whether one of the answers is *right*. On the other hand, there is the question of how to *decide* which one, if any, is right, and *how* one could go about making such a decision. Evidently, there may *be* a right answer, even if we cannot *determine* it.

This is an important distinction, but what Wittgenstein is getting at is fairly clear precisely for the reason that he does not pause to distinguish between the two questions. The reason why we cannot find the right answer may be found in our epistemic perspective, which would explain why we have no method for determining truth in an ethical conflict. But the reason may also be that there is no truth to be determined. That the latter interpretation is more appropriate is suggested by the fact that Wittgenstein rejects the question of the right standard of accuracy as unintelligible. Here, it is clear that the question has no answer independently of our perspective, that is to say, independently of expectations and customs and uses we go on to make of that standard. Thus, Wittgenstein seems to deny that ethical outlooks can be divided into the true and the false, where this involves a reference to objective standards.

That moral objectivity, so understood, is his main target is further confirmed by conversations with Rhees in 1945. Here, Wittgenstein criticises what he calls "ethical theory", which involves "the idea of finding the true nature of goodness or of duty" (Rhees 1965, 23). Plato is named as a proponent of ethical theory so understood, while objectivity is said to be what ethical theory aims to achieve. Objectivity saves us from relativity. Relativity in turn "must be avoided at all costs, since it would destroy the *imperative* in morality" (Rhees 1965, 23).

This is an illusion, with respect to both ethical objectivity and the fears that inspire the search for it. Does it follow that there is no room for representation, truth and knowledge in ethics at all? Anticipating antirealist strate-

gies found in Stevenson, Blackburn and Gibbard, Wittgenstein admits truth and related notions into ethical discourse, and he does this by explicitly appealing to a modest conception of truth:

Remember that 'p is true' means simply 'p.' If I say: 'Although I believe that so and so is good, I may be wrong': this says no more than that what I assert may be denied. Or suppose someone says, 'One of the ethical systems must be the right one – or nearer to the right one.' Well, suppose I say Christian ethics is the right one. Then I am making a judgment of value. It amounts to *adopting* Christian ethics. It is not like saying that one of these physical theories must be the right one. The way in which some reality corresponds – or conflicts – with a physical theory has no counterpart here. (Rhees 1965, 24)

This is a significant passage, and it raises very sharply the question of how to construe the difference between ethics and physical theory with respect to their relations to a reality that exists independently of our perspective. That Wittgenstein does not merely mean to distinguish between different ways in which objective standards might be involved is clear from his inclusive formulation. What has no counterpart in ethics is the way in which *some* reality corresponds to a physical theory – not merely *the way in which* reality corresponds to a physical theory.

Rejecting realism, Wittgenstein seems to endorse a broadly expressivist interpretation of moral language instead. But note that there is room for a different interpretation. We may roundly reject all claims to objectivity in ethics, but allow that there are moral truths and facts. Given the link between 'truth' and 'fact' and 'reality', we may even say that a true ethical statement represents the ethical facts, and in this sense, represents part of reality. The point would be that ethical concepts apply from within a perspective that has no grounding in objective ethical fact. It would therefore still be true that "the way in which some reality corresponds – or conflicts with – a physical theory has no counterpart here". Moreover, it is fully compatible with the claim that to call an ethical framework like the Christian one 'true' is to adopt it. Indeed, now a substantial contrast would emerge between saying that a moral judgement may be true or false given a certain perspective, in particular an ethical outlook and a custom or practice of using words, which is not objectionable, and saying that such a moral perspective itself may be true or false. Unlike the former, the latter is not a useful expression, unless it serves to affirm that perspective.

What exactly Wittgenstein would have said had he addressed the issue is an open question, and the textual evidence is slim. The important point is his pronounced resistance to the realist temptation. This is no less evident in his 1938 lectures on aesthetics, to which I now turn. The situation is quite similar:

"Beautiful' is an adjective, so you are inclined to say: "This has a certain quality, that of being beautiful'" (Wittgenstein 1966, 1).

There is of course a sense in which it is perfectly true that beautiful things have the quality of being beautiful, just as there is a sense in which it is true that good things have the quality of being good. This is just a variation on 'It is true that these things are beautiful' or 'These things are good'. The important point is that this does not introduce an item or a quality *in the sense in which the realist construes it*. To think of beautiful objects in terms of a feature called 'beauty' that an object either has or lacks, and that exists somehow alongside all its other qualities, is a mis-

take. If so, the situation in aesthetics is strikingly similar to that in ethics. Indeed, according to Rhees, who took some of the notes from which the lectures were reconstructed, we find Wittgenstein speaking in that very sentence of both 'beautiful' and 'good' (Wittgenstein 1966, 1).

Whatever Wittgenstein said, the nature of the problem certainly suggests a connection. Moore famously thought that ethics takes the form of an enquiry into which actions or states of affairs have a certain quality, that of being good. Moore construed these claims in a realist fashion, and Wittgenstein thought this was a mistake. But what is the use of 'beautiful' and 'good', if it is not to represent a quality?

Wittgenstein asks how a word like 'good' and 'beautiful' is taught. This yields a primitive language, and even though "this language is not what you talk when you are twenty, you get a rough approximation to what kind of language game is going to be played" (Wittgenstein 1966, 1f.). As it turns out, these words have a different use than the realist imagines:

A child generally applies a word like 'good' first to food. One thing that is immensely important in teaching is exaggerated gestures and facial expressions. The word is taught as a substitute for a facial expression or a gesture. The gestures, tones of voice, etc., in this case are expressions of approval. (Wittgenstein 1966, 2)

Still, we will ask if this is the correct analysis of the language game we play 'when we are twenty'. Could it not be that this quite basic language game becomes much more sophisticated than expressivist analysis implies?

In one sense, the answer to that question must be 'yes'. There is a point at which we could no longer replace the words with exaggerated gestures or facial expressions. Indeed, there is a point at which the language game becomes complex enough to make it artificial if not inappropriate to say that we are dealing with 'expressions of approval'. Wittgenstein keeps emphasising differences:

"What similarity has my admiring this person with my eating vanilla ice cream and liking it?" To compare them seems almost disgusting. (But you can connect them by intermediate cases.) (Wittgenstein 1966, 12)

Now none of this discourages a realist who also waives all aspirations to a uniform analysis. But the fact is that what he says about words like 'good' and 'beautiful' tends to be philosophically confused. If so, we have reason to expect that the basic language game exposes that confusion. If Wittgenstein is right in stressing the pragmatic, the expressive, the affective side of ethics and aesthetics, as he clearly seems to do, then we must conclude that moral or aesthetic realism fails to provide the adequate interpretation of our attitudes even when we consider language that we speak 'when we are twenty':

Would it matter if instead of saying "This is lovely", I just said "Ah!" and smiled, or just rubbed my stomach? As far as these primitive languages go, problems about what these words are about, what their real subject is, don't come up at all. (Wittgenstein 1966, 3)

Realism is the illness, not the cure:

You could regard the rules laid down for the measurement of a coat as an expression of what certain people want. (...) The rules of harmony, you can say, expressed the way people wanted chords to follow—their wishes crystallized in these rules (the word 'wishes' is much too vague.) (Wittgenstein 1966, 5f.)

This is an interesting observation that helps us to avoid two different kinds of mistake. First, there is no suggestion that whenever we say that a coat should be cut in a certain way, this is merely an expression of a personal preference. There is a standard that is independent of a given preference, and one may dislike that standard. Second, there is no suggestion that there is a standard of correctness for the way in which coats should be cut that goes beyond the rules that were laid down. The rules themselves are said to answer, not to some realm of facts about the way coats should *really* be cut, but to our attitudes and expectations. Of course, there is not normally a clear division, so that first there were the wishes, all articulate and clear, and the rules were made to fit them. The process is much more involved than that. Wishes change as rules develop. Even talk of 'wishes' can become misleading: "And although we have talked of 'wishes' here, the fact is just that these rules were laid down" (Wittgenstein 1966, 6, n.2).

This is not, I take it, all that realists would want to say about this kind of situation. Few people are realists about the standards for the measurements of coats, but the situation is essentially the same in ethics and aesthetics. The false assumption is that language serves a single purpose:

If I had to say what is the main mistake made by philosophers of the present generation, including Moore, I would say that it is that when language is looked at, what is looked at is a form of words and not the use made of the form of words. (Wittgenstein 1966, 2)

Here we have the prime example of the moral realist who considers moral language through the spectacles of some misleading theory. Rightly realising that 'good' cannot be identified with, for example, 'pleasurable' or 'useful', he concludes that it must stand for some intrinsic, irreducible and very special feature. And this is a mistake. Ultimately, it is the expression of the myth that every word stands for an *object* or, failing that, for a *quality* of such an object. This is the Augustinian picture, and it is deeply flawed. There is no such thing as a science of aesthetics, as the realist construes that term. Science is the very paradigm of our attempt to transcend our individual and shared perspectives, so as to enable us to form a view of things and their relations as they are independently of us. What would that view amount to in the realm of ethics and aesthetics? Ought it not to include, as Wittgenstein quips, what sort of coffee tastes well?

You might think Aesthetics is a science telling us what's beautiful – almost too ridiculous for words. (Wittgenstein 1966, 11)

Less obviously perhaps, the same is true in ethics.

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Wittgenstein and Sellars on Thinking

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When we speak about thoughts and thinking we have to be careful to distinguish three significantly different concepts associated with the terms 'think' and 'thought'. *First*, there are so-called *occurrent thoughts*; dateable mental events constituting the mental activity of thinking. *Second*, 'think' is used in order to express or ascribe the propositional attitude of *belief*. *Finally*, we use 'thought' in a *Fregean sense* in which it is roughly equivalent to the technical term 'proposition'. In what follows I will be exclusively occupied with the nature of occurrent thoughts. Accordingly, when I use the words 'thought' and 'thinking' they should only be understood as referring to occurrent thoughts and the mental activity of thinking.

On one common interpretation the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* presupposed an account of the nature of occurrent thinking and its relation to language that Wittgenstein criticized sharply in his later work. According to this account, thinking is a kind of speaking, which consists of 'mental signs' that correspond to the signs of our public language; and the meaningful use of language, whether written or spoken, consists of two parallel processes, operating with signs and mental acts of thinking the senses of these signs. Both of these ideas, the idea of a *language of thought* and what could be called a *dual-process conception*¹ of meaningful speech, Wittgenstein later criticized pointedly.

The *dual-process* conception of meaningful speech is quite natural. There seems to be a significant difference between the utterances of a competent speaker and the squawkings of a parrot, although both might produce exactly the same words. The difference, one might be inclined to say, is due to the fact that only utterances of the former kind are accompanied by acts of thinking, whereas the latter are a mere production of noise. It is these accompanying acts of thinking that make all the difference, without them the signs are 'dead' (cf. Wittgenstein 1958, 4). This impression is reinforced when we consider the fact that sometimes we speak with thought and sometimes we think without speech. It seems that in the latter case the process that accompanies meaningful speech simply goes on without its overt expression (cf. Wittgenstein 1953, §§330, 332). The motivating idea behind the dual process conception is the belief that signs and utterances are mere physical objects and events and therefore possess no more meaning or intentional content than stones, chairs and claps of thunder. Hence they have to be accompanied by some sort of mental process, for example sentences in a language of thought or mental images.

The problem with this beguiling picture of the role of thought in meaningful speech is that whatever process we imagine thought to be, it won't be able to achieve its supposed role of endowing otherwise dead signs with 'life' or meaning. In the *Blue Book* Wittgenstein asks his reader to imagine that we replace the inner process that is supposed to give our utterances meaning by an outer activity (cf. Wittgenstein 1958, 3ff, 33ff). If we think that, for example, the use of colour words has to be accompanied by mental

images in order to be more than a mere production of noise, we should imagine that someone carries a colour chart with her, in which colour-samples are correlated with their names and which she consults whenever she speaks about colours (cf. Wittgenstein 1958, 3). If we are inclined to believe that the mere production of linguistic signs alone cannot determine their meaning, then we probably won't think that producing sounds plus handling a colour chart will do the trick. Colour charts are just another means of representing colours and can be variously applied. The defender of the dual-process conception will have to assume that their use has to be accompanied by some further kind of mental process, let us say speaking to oneself in *foro interno*. But such an activity, as well, can go on with or without thought (e.g. when one absent-mindedly recites a poem in the imagination) which might induce us to postulate a further mental process and so on *ad infinitum*.

Whatever parallel process or activity we imagine it does not seem to be any better to determine the meaning of our utterances than these utterances themselves. Wittgenstein, therefore, concludes that meaning an utterance or thinking its sense is not a distinct process or activity that runs parallel to the production of the utterance and is detachable from it (cf. Wittgenstein 1953, §339). What distinguishes meaningful from mere parroting speech is that only the former has a *use* (cf. Wittgenstein 1953, §43) in a language game. And what determines whether an utterance has a use or is a move in a language game is not something that accompanies the utterance but the manner and the circumstances of its occurrence. This is also the reason why it is perfectly coherent to imagine a people who only think out loud (cf. Wittgenstein 1953, §331).

Closely related to the dual-process conception of thought and talk is the idea that the process of thinking occurs in some kind of inner or mental symbolism, in a *language of thought*, constituted by mental signs. In a letter to Bertrand Russell the young Wittgenstein himself appears to have endorsed this idea. There he replies to a query by Russell concerning his conception of thinking that 'I don't know *what* the constituents of a thought are but I know *that* it must have such constituents which correspond to the words of Language' (Wittgenstein 1979, 130).

The problem with this conception of thinking is that it postulates an inner symbolism or language that has to be radically unlike any public language or symbolism we know. Whenever someone uses a public language, be it written or spoken, we can always ask what he meant by a certain sign or signs, say some name N that occurred in his speech. And the speaker will usually be able to further specify what he meant or to whom he referred. This is radically different in the case of thoughts. Contrary to public utterances which can be identified both as acoustical or visual occurrences and as intentionally contentful speech acts, acts of thinking cannot be separated from their intentional content. We cannot specify a thought independently of what it is a thought about; a thought is individuated by its intentional content; it is, as Wittgenstein says, the 'last interpretation' (Wittgenstein 1958, 34).

Despite his poignant criticism of the dual-process conception of thought and talk and the idea that thinking

¹ These terms are taken from Hacker 1990, 318-326.

occurs in an inner symbolism, even the later Wittgenstein repeatedly compared thinking to using language (cf. Wittgenstein 1953, §§319, 320, 331). It would be interesting to see whether there is a way of using language as a model to explain the nature of occurrent thinking, i.e. a way of conceiving of a language of thought, which is compatible with Wittgenstein's criticisms. The account of occurrent thoughts Wilfrid Sellars first developed in his classic essay *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (EPM) seems to achieve exactly this.

Sellars aims in EPM to develop a theory of thinking which retains the, as he calls it, 'classical' (Sellars 1963, 177) idea of thoughts as essentially episodic inner occurrences while departing from the classical tradition in several respects. *Firstly*, he rejects the Cartesian idea that all thoughts are, as it were, 'self-disclosing', i.e. cannot occur without the subject knowing them to occur. Thoughts, according to Sellars, are inner occurrences to which the subject has privileged access but which can occur without her being aware of it. *Secondly*, he sharply distinguishes thoughts from other inner occurrences such as feelings, sensations and mental images. *Thirdly*, he rejects the idea that self-knowledge is a kind of observation. Unlike observational knowledge, knowledge of our own thoughts does not involve sensations, such as visual or acoustical impressions. *Finally*, and most importantly he rejects the classical idea that 'both overt verbal behaviour and verbal imagery owe their meaningfulness to the fact that they stand to... *thoughts* in the unique relation of "expressing" them.' (Sellars 1963, 177) Instead he suggests an analysis of our semantic idioms that aims to show that semantical discourse about public linguistic behaviour does not have to be analyzed in terms of the intentionality of mental acts but "that the categories of intentionality are, at bottom, semantical categories pertaining to overt verbal performances." (Sellars 1963, 180)

At the time he wrote EPM Sellars didn't have a fully worked out positive account of the semantic idioms (cf. Rosenberg 2007, 173). It was only later that he arrived at his mature view, which is probably best articulated in *Meaning as Functional Classification* (Sellars 2007, 81-100), published 18 years after EPM. According to this view the meaning of an utterance is determined by its functional role within a norm-governed linguistic practice. The rules governing this practice determine essentially three kinds of linguistic performances, corresponding to the categories of perception, inference and action. The *first* kind of performances or 'moves in the language game' are 'language entry transitions', that is linguistic responses to non-linguistic stimuli; the *second* are 'intra-linguistic moves, i.e. transitions from one utterance to another, and the third are 'language departure transitions', utterances which are followed by non-linguistic performances such as raising one's hand (cf. Sellars 2007, 87-88). All sentences that have an equivalent norm-governed role within the network of language entry transitions, intra-linguistic moves and language departure transitions within their respective languages have the same intentional content. It is this equivalence of normative-functional role that allows us to say that the German sentence 'Schnee ist weiss' means the same as its English translation 'Snow is white'.

Thoughts are, according to Sellars inner goings-on which have the same normative-functional role within a network of thoughts or, as he sometimes puts it, within the 'game or reasoning' (cf. Sellars 1963, 324) as the utterances which express them have within our language games. This equivalence of normative-functional role al-

lows us to say that utterances and thoughts have the same *content*, similarly as equivalent statements in different languages share one and the same meaning. When we ascribe thoughts to a person we are ascribing inner episodes to her, which are characterized in purely normative-functional terms and which *causally explain* her behaviour. This explanation of human behaviour in terms of thoughts is, according to Sellars, similar to the explanation of the observable 'behaviour' of physical objects in terms of the postulates of scientific theories. However, unlike the postulates of scientific theories which can be literally *in*, i.e. be a proper part of, the object whose behaviour is to be explained, thoughts are only 'inner' in a metaphorical sense, indicating that they are not directly observable, and are ascribed to the person as a whole and not to any part of her (cf. Sellars 1968, 169-70).

Does Sellars's elaboration of the analogy between thought and talk avoid the objections Wittgenstein levelled against the dual-process conception of meaningful speech and the idea that thought is a kind of speech in an inner symbolism? It is quite clear that Sellars doesn't endorse the dual process conception of meaningful speech. His explicit aim in EPM is – as we saw – to 'reconcile the classical idea of thoughts as inner episodes... which are properly referred to in terms of the vocabulary of intentionality, with the idea that the categories of intentionality are, at bottom, semantical categories pertaining to overt verbal performances' (Sellars 1963, 180). This commits him to an explanation of the meaning of public utterances that doesn't refer to inner episodes. He provides this explanation with his theory of meaning as normative-functional role in language games. Public utterances according to Sellars do not stand in need of an inner accompaniment in order to be meaningful. Indeed we ascribe thoughts to a person not in order to explain *what* she said but to explain *why* she said it.

Let us now turn to the question of whether Sellars is committed to the problematic idea that thinking occurs in a language of thought *which is constituted by the use of mental signs*. It doesn't seem so; for although Sellars claims that thoughts are analogous to public linguistic utterances, he does not subscribe to the idea that thoughts are realized by the operation of mental signs. The problem with construing thoughts as occurrences in an inner symbolism is, as Wittgenstein pointed out, that with respect to all forms of symbolic representation, be it spoken, written, gestured or painted, we can always distinguish the symbol from its content. We can always ask what a certain symbol, for example a word, or a set of symbols, for example a sentence, means. This cannot be done in the case of thoughts. Contrary to symbolic representations thoughts cannot be variously interpreted, they are, as Wittgenstein says, the 'last interpretation' (Wittgenstein 1958, 34). Accordingly Sellars characterizes thoughts in purely normative-functional terms, i.e. as occurrences which play a certain normative-functional role in the game of reasoning. Unlike linguistic expressions, which we characterize in semantical statements *both* with respect to their sign designs *and* the normative-functional role, which constitutes their meaning, thoughts, according to Sellars, are characterized *only* with respect to their normative-functional role. Since this role determines the meaning of linguistic expressions, an episode which is characterized only in terms of its normative-functional role, i.e. its meaning-determining properties, cannot be said to be variously interpretable.

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Language and the World

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By the end of the 19th century, after the theory of evolution became the guiding paradigm of a scientific explanation of life, Descartes' fundamental distinction between body and mind was transformed into a distinction between nature and culture. This transformation is supposed to explain the variety of ways of life without humanity evolving into different species. The conception of the natural world remained the physical world as Descartes saw, but instead of the thinking mind being independent of the body came a culture independent of nature. According to this new dichotomy, the variety of languages came to be seen as distinct 'cultural lenses' through which its users understand the world and act accordingly. And most important, while Descartes' postulated that reason, with its purpose to create true knowledge was the essence of the thinking mind, reason became the product of *some* cultures and not of others. In this paper I want to show that while this transformation has led to cultural relativism, Davidson's criticism of Quine's version of it is reminiscent of Spinoza's naturalistic challenge of Descartes' dualism.

For scientists in the 17th century, 'the world' generally meant as Descartes understood it, namely all things and events which can be described as having positions in space changing in time. According to Descartes this world was causally explicable and was the only domain of science, which included animals and the human body. In a letter to the Marquess of Newcastle [1646] he wrote that more than anything else the use of language distinguishes humanity from the beasts. However, this distinction is not due to animals lacking the body organs used in speech, but due to their lacking thoughts, which belong to the realm of the mind. Although animals do many things better than we do, without thinking, like a clock which tells the time better than our judgement does, no animal is known which can use vocal signs beyond expressing passions. Contrary to them, there is no human being who cannot convey reasons for action. Even deaf-mutes invent special signs to express their thoughts. This, according to him, is a strong argument for proving that the reason why animals do not speak as we do is that they have no thoughts. It is due to this distinction that Descartes assigned understanding governed by reason to mankind alone.

In the 17th century Spinoza opposed the Cartesian consideration of the mind as being independent of the body. According to him, everything which exists, including the human mind, must be part of nature. He saw Descartes' distinction between the world and thoughts as a distinction between two ways of understanding the same natural world: either in terms of proximate causal relations or in terms of abstract laws which underlie them. Spinoza's central idea about language is that it is a natural 'instrument of the mind' comparable to the muscles which are natural instruments of the body. A language enables us to create logic and mathematics which improve on this natural instrument just as the creation of a hammer improves on the power of our muscles [TCU VI]. A language allows also the cultivation of the power of persuasion. And this can serve for both spreading the acquisition of knowledge and strengthening the tendency of people in power to impose their ideas on others.

Spinoza did not write about a variety of cultures. But he explains that the more one interacts with the environment in many ways the more mind one has and that a human passion is a combination of a change in the body with an idea of its cause [E. II, XIII and its corollary]. Together these explain that different ways of life lead to different effects on people's ideas and thus to different responses to these effects [TCU VI]. And most important, he explains that even if an idea or a response to it are natural, these can be suppressed or distorted by power-structures. He explains that when people in power design the rules for preserving the integrity of the community, they can never be free from their desire to preserve their own power [PT V]. The result is that they strongly influence the reasons for action in the minds of the population. The balance of these reasons, he says, is equivalent to the balance of physical forces acting in the body. We do not call these reasons causes because we do not know the 'instrumentality of the body' which corresponds to it [TCU X].

Although it would have been reasonable to adopt a naturalistic view of humanity after Darwin, this did not happen. The evolution of species concentrates on genetic change, and as pointed out already, a variety of languages are seen as providing distinct 'cultural lenses' through which its users understand the world and act accordingly. This view is well illustrated by two champions of the theory of evolution, Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett [UR and KM respectively]. According to both, the *evolution* of language can only apply to the brain's capacity to process ideas, because only this capacity can be inscribed in the DNA. The ideas themselves, which they call *memes*, are derived from cultural experience. However, for my purpose in this paper the interesting version of the nature/culture dichotomy is that of pragmatism because it provides the clearest challenge to cultural relativism.

Charles Peirce, one of the earliest pragmatists, explains that what we believe to be true depends on the methods used for settling disputed opinions. He distinguishes between three such methods. The first, is the psychological *method of tenacity* by which a person keeps to his opinions whatever the evidence against them. The problem with this psychological attitude is that opinions of others are bound to shake a person's confidence. So the real problem is how to fix beliefs in a community. This problem is solved by *the method of authority*. It is the attempt of any class of men, whose power depends on certain beliefs being held true, to prevent others from doubting them. Although this method of authority led to horrible atrocities in the eyes of any rational person, he says, there is no better method for preserving the survival of a community. This he says, is well documented in history. However, by analogy to individuals, people realized that it is a historical accident which caused them to believe as they do. This led to *the third method*, namely the rational methods of science [Philosophical Writings of Peirce pp.12-15]. But, he adds, although this method is superior to others, it can never become as general as the other two, because those in power "will never be convinced that dangerous reasoning ought not be suppressed in some way." Moreover, the suppression is not totally external because people are tormented when finding themselves believing a

proposition they have been brought up to regard with aversion [Ibid pp.18-19]. Peirce concludes that if a society chooses the rational method it does so by accident [Ibid pp.20-21], which means that the choice is not natural but the product of a particular culture.

In a series of lectures delivered from November 1906 to January 1907, with the title *What Pragmatism Means*, William James adds to Peirce, that pragmatism is primarily a method of settling disputes about unproven assumptions. Since such assumptions have been found to be strongly connected to the power of words, pragmatists turn to 'radical empiricism.' By this method they have discovered that although scientists believe to have discovered eternal truths, the evidence [of different cultures] shows that they describe the world from some useful point of view. [*Pragmatism* p.32]. In his book *The Principles of Psychology* James shows that his contemporary psychologists take the conception of nature prescribed by the nature/culture dichotomy to be the useful point of view. And in the chapter *The Perception of Reality* he agrees with Spinoza that faced with two contradictory ideas we cannot continue to hold both, but disagrees with him that it is not up to us to choose which reason we disregard [Ibid, p.448]. In this he sees the *psychological* basis for his assertion that "each of us literally *chooses*, by his ways of attending to things, what sort of a universe he shall appear to himself to inhabit" [Ibid p.424].

Later in the 20th century, the pragmatist Quine, argues in the introduction to his *Methods of Logic* that the most fundamental pragmatic principle is that the more central a belief is in our conceptual system of thoughts, the less likely we are to choose it for revision. The principles of logic are so central to *our* Western system of thoughts that in practice they enjoy immunity from revision. Therefore they seem to us as being inherent to the mind.

It is to the effect of this conclusion on Quine's theory of interpretation of a natural language [n.l.] that Donald Davidson addresses his criticism. His objection is not to the fact that theoretical logic was developed in some cultures and not in others, but to the conclusion that its basic principles are not natural.

Davidson's argument against this conclusion starts from Quine's own argument that a theory of interpretation for a n.l. must take into account start the evidence available to interpreters consists of while sentences [IT1 p.7]. As support for this claim he takes his cue from Frege. Frege, he says, rightly assumed that the meaning of words is derived from known true sentences in which they appear. For example, the meaning of fatherhood is derived from all sentences of the form "x is the father of y" when the replacement of x and y by two names yields a true sentence. The empty operator then is said to be satisfied (IT1 p.18). Davidson generalises Frege's idea to the creation of all *concepts*. Concepts are literally abstracted from true sentences. For example, the concept of reference is abstracted from all sentences satisfying the operator "y refers to x." It follows that knowledge of true sentences precedes having concepts.

Now Davidson considers the possibility to derive the concept of truth by abstracting it from Tarski's theory of truth where its theorems – called 'T-sentences' – are of the form

T) S is true if and only if p

where p states the condition of truth for S. The objection to his theory is that it simply shifts the question of establishing truth from S to p. But Davidson explains that Tarski

developed his theory for formal languages, where p is a sentence in a n.l., knowledge of which is taken for granted [Ibid p.167]. Obviously this cannot apply for a theory which purports to describe what must be known in order to acquire a n.l. However, Davidson thinks that Tarski's theory can be modified so as to apply to a n.l., provided p is not taken to express the truth condition for the whole sentence at once (Ibid pp.49-50). For example, in his notorious sentence

"Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white

the second 'snow is white' [p] is divided into two conditions: either

a) we assume that the meaning of "x is white" is known and we assert that 'snow' satisfies it, or

b) we assume that we know what 'snow' means and we assert that 'white' applies to "snow is y."

In other words, while Tarski takes knowledge of a n.l. to be non-problematic, Davidson suggests that the notion of truth should be taken to be non-problematic. This means that *true* is a primitive concept.

To say that the concept is primitive means both, that we cannot define truth in terms of other concepts, and that we cannot have the required theory without presupposing that every person has an idea what it means prior to knowing any particular true sentence. He compares this to Kant's argument that we must attribute to the mind a percept of space known prior to the perception of any spatial relation, because without it we cannot perceive any spatial relations, such as one object being adjacent to another. Although we cannot anymore accept Kant's conviction that the Euclidian concept of space correctly articulates this primitive percept, we must still accept his insight that an undefined *percept* turns into a *concept* of space through geometry. Similarly, the formal system of satisfied operators articulates the primitive concept of truth [Ibid p.218].

According to Davidson, he can show that all sentences in a n.l. can be understood by appeal to their truth conditions if, in addition to attributing to each mind a primitive concept of truth he also attributes to it an intuitive knowledge of the difference between the structure of grammar and the constraints of logic. The relevant constraint in this case is that a new truth can be inferred from previously known truths only within the same domain of interpretation. For example, for ascertaining the truth of "John thinks that p" the sentence is resolved into two assertions

1) p

2) "John thinks that", where "that" refers to p.

When interpreters hear the grammatically combined sentence they know that they have passed from one domain of interpretation (of p) to another (namely to the content of another's mind) (Ibid pp.165/6).

His point is that understanding a language and judging whether its sentences are true are not as distinct mental processes as assumed by linguists and logicians. Their mistake is that they fail to recognize what every interpreter naturally knows.

It is worth noting that Spinoza pointed out that logical thinking imposes constraints on understanding the world. If a person is killed by a falling stone, he says, a logical science can only explain separately the power of the falling stone and the reason for the man's walking in the direction he did [appendix to E.I]. But Davidson's inter-

est is not in the organization of science. His purpose is to resolve a paradox implied by what Quine called the indeterminacy of translation. According to Davidson, if this indeterminacy were as Quine's theory suggests, then any communication would have been impossible. But communication is possible, even under the conditions of *Radical Interpretation* (RI), namely the conditions which anthropologists face when confronted with a completely foreign language of people in a completely unknown culture. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that there must be some natural constraints on conceptual variability. Such constraints, he says, *must* be presupposed if one wants to explain how with them, different beliefs, no matter how strange or novel, can be understood, while by dropping them one drifts into the absurd and non-comprehensible (Ibid p.184).

The usefulness of RI, he adds, is that under its conditions an artificial differentiation can be made between speakers and interpreters (Ibid p.178). This is possible because there is a crucial difference between attributing to speakers intentions and beliefs in order to understand their actions, and attributing to them intentions and beliefs for understanding what they say. For understanding what speakers say, one always attributes to them the same intention and the same belief: they intend the sentence to be understood as *if* they were uttered under the specific circumstances under which they believe the sentence to be true (Ibid pp.161 and 166). 'Davidson emphasises the 'as if' because the function of a natural language in social life is not merely to give a true interpretation of the world. A n.l. allows people to avail themselves of the possibility to make dishonest assertions, as well as invent stories and much more (Ibid pp.164-165). Nevertheless, he says, only if a large enough number of sentences are taken to be true by both speakers and interpreters, these possibilities become available (Ibid pp. 157 and 179). In other words, only if the truth of utterances is taken to be the basic relation between a language and the world, it can also be used for other purposes. Moreover, these commonly assumed true sentences enables us not only to understand but also to correct beliefs found to be false.

His example is the belief of the ancients that the earth was flat. According to his theory, the meaning of 'the earth' could not be the same for them and for us because the set of sentences from which the meaning of 'the earth' is extracted today includes sentences like "the earth is a planet of the sun", and "planets are semi-spherical objects rotating around the sun" which were not among the sentences from which the meaning of the earth was extracted by the ancients (p.168). Nevertheless we do understand what they meant by their word for our 'earth,' and we also understand that ontologically nothing changed. The same applies to their conception of flatness which is abstracted

from the set of all satisfied operators "x is flat," because this set includes their word for 'the earth' but not for us. Yet, with sufficient overlapping of sentences held true in both languages, we can identify which of their held true sentences had led to their error.

Finally, although Davidson insisted that his theory is necessary only if Quine's version of pragmatism is accepted, *my* point in this paper is that it true for Quine it is also true for all versions of the nature/culture dichotomy. In particular, we must reject the idea that reason, with its main function to distinguish between true and false, is not natural to the human mind but is the product of *some* cultures and not of others. If the conception of truth is inherent to the mind, as Davidson suggests, then pragmatism comes very close to Spinoza's explanation, which in terms of this paper says that the evolution of language had given rise to the evolution of two contradictory drives in human nature. One is the drive to improve on a 'cultural lense,' namely to increase the understanding of the world, and the other is the drive to shape this lense to fit the interests of particular power structures. Both drives are well documented in human history.

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Approximating Identity Criteria

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1. Introduction: Identity criteria and their logical adequacy

In a loose and philosophically popular view, derived from Quine, *identity criteria* are required for ontological respectability: Only entities with clearly determined identity criteria are ontologically acceptable. Think, for example, of the case of *propositions*: They would not be ontologically acceptable, because they do not have any identity criteria. The credit for introducing the notion of an *identity criterion* is usually attributed to Frege. He suggests that an identity criterion has the function of providing a general way of answering the following question:

Fregean Question: How can we know whether *a* is identical to *b*? (Frege 1884, §62)

However, both Frege's examples (recall, for instance, the Fregean identity criterion for directions: If *a* and *b* are lines, then the direction of line *a* is identical to the direction of line *b* iff *a* is parallel to *b*) and later philosophical formulations assume that such a question is to be restricted to specific kinds of objects. In the philosophical literature, the *Fregean Question* has been reformulated in the following ways:

Epistemic Question (EQ): If *a* and *b* are *Ks*, how can we know that *a* is the same as *b*?

Ontological Question (OQ): If *a* and *b* are *Ks*, what is it for the object *a* to be identical to *b*?

Semantic Question (SQ): If *a* and *b* are *Ks*, when do '*a*' and '*b*' refer to the same object?

The difference between an answer to (EQ) and an answer to (OQ) is not purely formal. When answering (EQ), we think of conditions associated with a more or less general procedure for deciding the identity questions concerning objects of some kind *K*. In answering (OQ), we think of conditions which are meant to provide an ontological analysis of the identity between objects of kind *K*. Finally, an answer to (SQ) concerns sameness and difference of reference of simple or complex names. In the present paper we do not deal with (EQ), but we restrict our analysis to (OQ) and (SQ). Specifically, we think that an answer to (OQ) can shed some light on an answer to (SQ), too.

Each formulation of identity criteria contains an identity condition represented by a possibly complex formula $F(x, y)$ or a binary predicate R . In our paper, we want to focus on such a relation R . Among the possible formulations, we consider the following:

(IC) $\forall x \forall y \in D (f(x) = f(y) \leftrightarrow R(x, y))$

It is assumed that there is a domain of individuals D and a function f such that $f(D)$ constitutes a sort of individuals K . R represents the condition under which x and y are said to be identical. In the left side of the biconditional in (IC), there is an identity relation, which is an equivalence relation. Consequently, the relation R on the right side of the biconditional must be an equivalence relation, too. Unfortunately, as has been observed in the philosophical debate about identity criteria, some relations considered as candidates for R often fail to be transitive. The following are

examples of transitivity failure of R (see (Williamson 1986)):

- Let $x, y,$ and z range over colour samples and f be the function that maps colour samples to perceived colours. A plausible candidate for R might be the relation of perceptual indistinguishability. It is easy to verify, though, that such an R is not necessarily transitive: It might happen that x is indistinguishable in colour from y and y from z , but x and z can be perceived as different in colour.

- If $f(x)$ and $f(y)$ are physical magnitudes, to determine whether $f(x) = f(y)$, one could think to measure x and y with a measurement instrument. Instruments, though, are not infinitely precise. Suppose that x and y differ by very little and that our instrument does not detect such a difference. If we use the result of the measurement by the instrument as what provides the identity condition, it can happen that x turns out to be identical to y under the measurement, even if they actually differ. Roughly speaking, it is easy to see how in such a situation, transitivity of the identity condition can fail.

The examples above show how some relations that are intuitively plausible candidates to be identity conditions do not meet the logical constraint that (IC) demands. However, instead of refusing this kind of plausible but inadequate identity criteria, it has been suggested to approximate the relation R whenever it is not transitive. That means that, given a non-transitive R , we can obtain equivalence relations that approximate R by some operations. Some approaches have been suggested: Two of them are due to (Williamson 1986, 1990), while a third approach is due to (De Clercq and Horsten 2005). The aim of this paper is to present an improvement of De Clercq and Horsten's approach.

2. Closer approximations to identity conditions

(Williamson 1986, 1990) suggests giving up the requirement for the identity condition to be both necessary and sufficient. Given a non-transitive R , let R_1, R_2, \dots, R_n be equivalence relations that approximate R . Among them, we want to find the relation R_i that best approximates R . Williamson's proposal is to apply one of the following approaches:

Approach from above: Consider the smallest (unique) equivalence relation R^* such that $R \subseteq R^*$.

Approach from below: Consider the largest (not unique) equivalence relation R^* such that $R^* \subseteq R$.

Adopting the approach from above, you get a relation R^* that is a sufficient identity condition. On the contrary, if you adopt the approach from below, you obtain a relation R^* that is a necessary identity condition. Consider the following example. Let D be a domain of objects:

$D = (a, b, c, d, e)$.

Assume there is a candidate relation R , reflexive and symmetric, for the identity condition for the individual of D .

When R holds between two objects x and y , we denote this as \bar{xy} . Let R on D be the following:

$$R = (\bar{ac}, \bar{ad}, \bar{bc}, \bar{bd}, \bar{cd}, \bar{de}).$$

R is not an equivalence relation. In fact, it fails to be transitive. For instance, R holds between a and d and between d and e , but it does not hold between a and e .

Now, apply, firstly, Williamson's approach from above. We obtain the smallest equivalence relation R^+ such that it is a superset of R , i.e.:

$$R^+ = (\bar{ab}, \bar{ac}, \bar{ad}, \bar{ae}, \bar{bc}, \bar{bd}, \bar{be}, \bar{cd}, \bar{ce}, \bar{de}).$$

Consider, instead, the approach from below. We get a relation R^- that is not unique. For instance, one of the largest equivalence relations that are subsets of R is the following:

$$R^- = (\bar{bc}, \bar{bd}, \bar{cd}).$$

Now, we have at least two approximations, one from above and the other from below. Which is the best one? Following De Clercq and Horsten's suggestion, you first measure the degree of unfaithfulness of R^+ and R^- with respect to R . Such a degree is the number of revisions you must make to get R^+ or R^- from R . A revision is any adding or removing of an ordered pair to or from R . In the example considered above, R^+ is obtained by adding four ordered pairs to R and R^- by removing three ordered pairs. The degree of unfaithfulness of R^+ is 4 and the degree of R^- is 3. Thus, R^- is closer to R than R^+ . That means that with R^- , you stay closer to your intuitive identity condition R , because R^- modifies R less than R^+ .

De Clercq and Horsten claim that, given a kind of objects K , there are not always good reasons to decide whether you must take a necessary or a sufficient identity condition R . They consider a third option: to give up both the necessity and the sufficiency of the identity condition. They search for an overlapping relation R^\pm that is neither a super- nor a sub-relation of R . Such an overlapping relation has the advantage of being closer to R than either R^+ or R^- . With respect to the example given above, an overlapping relation that approximates the given R can be the following:

$$R^\pm = (\bar{ab}, \bar{ac}, \bar{ad}, \bar{bc}, \bar{bd}, \bar{cd}).$$

R^\pm adds one ordered pair and removes another one. So the degree of unfaithfulness of R^\pm is 2; that is, less than both R^+ and R^- . It is, then, the best approximation to R . An overlapping relation can be closer to R than the relations obtained with the approaches from below and from above.

3. Refinement of the overlapping approach

Consider now the following variants of Williamson's example concerning perceived colours:

Example a: You see just two monochromatic spots, A and B, and you do not detect any difference with respect to their colour. Following Williamson, you claim that they have the same colour, because they are perceptually indistinguishable (the identity condition R is perceptual indistinguishability). Now, suppose you add two further monochromatic spots, C and D, such that they are perceptually distinguishable. However, A is indistinguishable from C and B from D. In such a scenario, you can accept to revise your previous judgement and say that A and B are distinct.

Example b: You see two colour samples A and B from a distant point of view such that you are not able to distinguish A-colour from B-colour. You say that A and B have the same colour (the identity condition is, again, perceptual indistinguishability in colour). Now, you get closer to them and detect a difference between them. So, you revise your previous judgement and say that A and B are distinct.

Example a shows that our judgements about colours depend on how we compare colour samples. It seems that R can vary across contexts: Two objects that are indistinguishable in one context, and therefore judged as identical, can turn out to be distinct in another context. Example b presents a different issue from example a. In b, a context is fixed and R varies among different levels of observation. Suppose that from a distant and coarse point of view, you make an identity statement about some objects x and y in a context o via the relation R : for instance, $x = y$. From a more precise, fine-grained point of view, you can make a different identity statement about the same objects x and y in the same context o via R : for instance, $x \neq y$. That means you can look at the elements of a context under different standards of precision, which we call *granular levels*. The finer the level is, the more differences between the individuals can be detected.

Our proposal is to integrate the notions of contexts and granular levels with De Clercq and Horsten's formal treatment of approximating relations. Informally, our suggestion is as follows: Given a fixed context, each granular level provides a relation R for that context; however, if we fix a granular level of observation, R can hold between two objects in a context and not hold between the same objects in a different context. In the following section, we sketch a formalisation of the above suggestion.

4. Granular models

Let L be a formal language through which we can represent English expressions. L consists of the following:

- individual constant symbols: \bar{a}, \bar{b}, \dots (there is a constant symbol for each element of the domain);
- individual variables: x_0, x_1, x_2, \dots (countably many);
- two-arity predicate symbols P_1, P_2, \dots ; and
- usual logical connectives with identity, quantifiers.

The set of terms consists of individual constants and individual variable symbols. The formulas can be defined in the usual way.

Consider now an interpretation of L . Let D be a fixed, non-empty domain of objects. A context o is defined as a subset of the domain D . So, the set of all contexts O in D is the powerset of D :

$$O = \wp(D).$$

Consider now a binary relation R (a two-arity predicate). Assume that R is reflexive and symmetric, but not necessarily transitive. R pairs the elements in each context $o \in O$ that are indistinguishable in some respect. For instance, in the case of colour samples, R gives rise to a set of ordered pairs, each of them consisting of elements that are indistinguishable with regard to their (perceived) colour. We want R to vary across contexts as well as across granular levels. Consider, firstly, granular levels. R behaves in a specific way in each context $o \in O$ in each granular level. Take, for the sake of simplicity, the following context with

three elements: $o = (a, b, c)$. One of the following scenarios can occur:

1. R gives rise to three ordered pairs.
2. R gives rise to two ordered pairs.
3. R gives rise to one ordered pair.
4. R does not give rise to any ordered pair.

We can understand the different behaviour of R in the scenarios 1–4 if we think of each scenario as a description of the context o given in a specific level of observation. For example, in 1, we are in a coarse-grained level; in 4, in a very fine-grained level; and in 2 and 3, in some intermediate granular level. The same can be done for all contexts $o \in O$. Now, call *context structure* a structure M consisting of the domain D , all the contexts in D , and a binary relation R (a two-arity predicate); formally, $M = \langle D, O, R \rangle$.

We have seen that, in a fixed domain and set of contexts, R can vary across granular levels. More precisely, we have more than one context structure: There is at least one context structure for each granular level. Consider again the scenarios 1–4. We have some very coarse context structures with an R that behaves as in 1, some refined context structures with an R that behaves as in 4, and other context structures with an R that behaves as in 2 or 3.

Now, consider the behaviour of R across contexts. Fix a context structure, say M_i . Consider two contexts: $o = (a, b, c)$, $o' = (a, b, c, d)$. Suppose that M_i has a relation R such that $R_o = (\bar{a}b, \bar{b}c)$ and $R_{o'} = (\bar{a}b)$. You can observe that R holds between b and c in o , but it does not hold between them in o' . So, fixed a context structure, a relation R can vary across contexts.

If, according to some context structure, the relation R fails to be transitive with respect to some context $o \in O$, then the formal framework given by De Clercq and Horsten is applied. For instance, consider again M_i . Its relation R is not transitive in context o . Thus, an equivalence overlapping relation R^z can be defined for R relatively to o . In contexts where R is not transitive, R^z denotes a relation that differs from R in that it adds and/or removes some ordered pairs to or from R .

5. Conclusion

In this paper we have tried to show how the overlapping approach proposed by De Clercq and Horsten can be improved. Before determining the closest approximation to R , we suggest fixing a context and a granular level of observation, since R can vary along those two variables. If, according to a context structure M_i belonging to some granular level, R fails to be transitive in a context, you can build the closest approximation to R for that context in M_i .

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Model-Theoretic Languages as Formal Ontologies

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The success of ontological engineering using logical methods in the construction of pragmatically oriented domain ontologies revived interest to the old problem of the relations of logic and ontology. On the one hand, ontology extends its scopes and takes back its intellectual respectability. On the other hand, logical pluralism makes logic to take care of its own basis and bounds. One of the attempts to give an exact definition of the concept of logic is a definition of abstract logic in generalized (abstract) model theory. The concept of abstract logic is a generalization of the concept of truth as relation between structures and sentences. An abstract logic consists of (1) a collection of structures closed under isomorphism, (2) a collection of formal expressions, and (3) a relation of satisfaction between the two. This definition does not include any conditions concerning rules of inference. Hence it seems more appropriate to use the term 'model-theoretic *language*' instead of the term 'abstract *logic*'. Even though the generalized model theorists use the term 'abstract logic' they do it frequently only by pragmatic reasons of simplicity and brevity. My purpose is to interpret abstract logics as formal ontologies, i.e. as genuine logics at least in phenomenological sense.

The interpretation of logic as formal ontology, an a priori science of objects in general, goes back to Edmund Husserl. Although the truths of logic apply to all regions of reality, Husserl believed it to be possible to give its transcendental justification only if we postulate a special region of abstract categorical objects. If we want to save logic from the specific relativism of Kant's interpretation of logical structures in terms of universal human abilities, we should, Husserl believed, consider them as structures of some objective area of abstract higher-level objects. What is the nature of these objects? The answer to this question is crucial for all the phenomenological project of justification of logic.

In my view, the model-theoretic analogues of categorical objects of Husserl's formal region are classes (types) of isomorphism considered as abstract individuals of higher order. Any two isomorphic structures represent the same abstract system. A system is considered to be abstract, if we do not know anything of its objects except the relations existing between them in the system. Formal ontologies viewed as abstract logics are formal theories of relations quite similar to indivisible species (*automon eide*) of Aristotle's ontology. They do not distinguish between specific individuals in the domain, but are not 'empty' in Kant's sense, since they deal with individuals of higher order, i.e. classes of isomorphic structures.

At the same time classes of structures closed under isomorphism may be viewed as generalized quantifiers. Generalized quantifiers express Husserl's mental properties and relations which, unlike physical, do not influence on other properties and relations, but exist by virtue of other properties and relations. For example, Mostowski's generalized quantifiers interpreted by classes of subsets of the universe attribute cardinality properties to the extensions of first-level unary predicates. More precisely, a Mostowski's generalized quantifier is a function Q associating with every structure A a family $Q(A)$ of subsets of the universe of A closed under permutations of the universe of A .

Thus Mostowski's quantifiers perfectly satisfy the permutation invariance criterion by Alfred Tarski.

In his famous lecture "What are Logical Notions?" delivered in London in 1966 and published posthumously in 1986 Tarski proposed to call a notion logical if and only if "it is invariant under all possible one-one transformations of the world onto itself" (Tarski 1986, 149). Tarski's informal definition of logical notions was an extension to the domain of logic of Klein's Erlanger Program for the classification of various geometries according to invariants under suitable groups of transformations. Tarski characterized logic as a science of all notions invariant under one-one transformations (permutations) of the universe. He gave several examples of logical notions. Among individuals there are no such examples, among classes the logical notions are the universal class and the empty class. It is remarkable that the only properties of classes of individuals which we can call 'logical' are "properties concerning the number of elements in these classes" (ibid, 151). What does cardinality have to do with logic? Tarski proposed the following general philosophical interpretation of his invariance criterion, "our logic is logic of cardinality" (ibid.). In fact Mostowski's quantifiers nicely satisfy this criterion. But Mostowski's definition is not sufficiently general even to cover Aristotle's quantifiers. There is, however, no conceptual necessity to consider quantifiers as second-order *properties*. The obvious challenge here is to generalize this understanding on second-order *relations*. This generalization of quantifiers was proposed by Per Lindström (1966). His quantifiers interpreted as second-order relations between first-order relations on the universe are polyadic. Binary examples of Lindström's quantifiers are syllogistic quantifiers, e.g. «all ... are...» = $\{ \langle X, Y \rangle : X, Y \subseteq U \text{ and } X \subseteq Y \}$, Resher's quantifiers $Q^R = \{ \langle X, Y \rangle : X, Y \subseteq U \text{ and } \text{card}(X) < \text{card}(Y) \}$, Hartig's quantifiers $Q^H = \{ \langle X, Y \rangle : X, Y \subseteq U \text{ and } \text{card}(X) = \text{card}(Y) \}$.

Polyadic quantifiers go back to scholastic 'multiple quantifiers'. However in standard logical notation they are not to be regarded as having an independent value, but interpreted as iterated unary quantifiers. On the other hand, any iterated quantifier prefix may be viewed as a polyadic quantifier. Polyadic interpretation is especially important in the case of heterogeneous quantifier prefixes. The point is that heterogeneous quantifier prefixes, expressing properties of classes of pairs of individuals, i.e. binary relations, distinguish equicardinal relations. Let us consider a simple model with the universe $U = \{a, b, c\}$ (Микеладзе 1979, 296). Let set two binary relations on U , $F_1 = \{(a, a), (a, b), (a, c)\}$ and $F_2 = \{(a, a), (b, b), (c, c)\}$. These relations have an identical number of elements. However $\exists x \forall y F_1(x, y)$ is not equivalent to $\exists x \forall y F_2(x, y)$, and $\forall x \exists y F_1(x, y)$ is not equivalent to $\forall x \exists y F_2(x, y)$. In other words, binary quantifiers $\exists x \forall y$ and $\forall x \exists y$ distinguish equicardinal relations F_1 and F_2 . Thus Tarski's thesis of 'our logic' as 'logic of cardinality' may be fair for the theory of monadic quantification (logic of properties of classes of individuals), but not for the theory of binary quantification (logic of properties of classes of pairs of individuals). Polyadic quantifiers take into account not only cardinalities, but more refined formal features of the universe. Not only cardinalities, but also patterns of ordering of the uni-

verse have to be taken into account by logical conceptualization. Logic with polyadic quantifiers is not ontology of cardinality but formal ontology of structures, types of ordering of the universe.

In general, the permutation invariance criterion assimilates logic to set theory. It is not unexpected in the context of the model-theoretical reconstruction of Husserl's idea of formal ontology as "an a priori discipline that investigates all truths belonging to the essence of objectivity in general in formal universality" (Husserl 2008, 54). Husserl emphasizes the 'inseparable unity' of logic and mathematics. "People are", in his view, "in the habit (a habit thousands of years old) of keeping the two bodies of knowledge in drawers far apart from one another. For thousands of years, mathematics has been considered a unique, special science, self-contained and independent like natural science and psychology, but logic, on the other hand, an art of thinking related to all special sciences in equal measure, or even as a science of forms of thinking not related any differently to mathematics than to other special sciences and not having any more to do with it than they" (ibid). Thus the unity of logic and mathematics had not been realized because of a normative interpretation of logic as a technical adjunct of psychology and metaphysics. For Husserl, pure logic as *Mathesis Universalis* embraces logic and mathematics: "the whole of pure logic is to be understood as a formal ontology. The lowest level, apophantic logic, investigates what can be stated in possible form a priori on the first level about objects in general. The higher ontologies are concerned with purely formally determined higher-level object formations like set, cardinal number, quantity, ordinal number, ordered magnitude, etc." (ibid, 76). On the other hand, according to Tarski's definition, as Gila Sher remarks, "any mathematical property can be seen as logical when construed as higher-order. Thus, as a science of individuals, mathematics is different from logic, but as a science of higher-order structures, mathematics is logic" (Sher 1991, 63). As it was shown by Vann McGee an operation is logical according to Tarski's permutation invariance criterion if and only if it is definable in the infinitary language $L_{\infty, \infty}$ (McGee 1996). $L_{\infty, \infty}$ is the language which allows conjunctions and disjunctions of any cardinality together with universal and existential quantification over sequences of variables of any cardinality.

This assimilation of logic to mathematics contradicts W. V. O. Quine's thesis of ontological neutrality of logic. For Quine, logic cannot assume any special entities as existing ones. Thus if logic is supposed to be independent of ontology, not only set theory but also second-order logic as "set theory in sheep's clothing" go beyond the bounds of logic. In my view, the reason of this collision of two classical tests for logicity is the possibility of various interpretations of the formality of logic. Logic distinguishes formal, metaphysically unchanging features of reality. But what does it mean precisely? If we interpret formality of a theory as its invariance under permutations of the universe it means that the theory does not distinguish individual objects and characterizes only those properties of model which do not depend on its nonstructural transformations. This formality of a theory does not imply its ontological neutrality. Expressive power of a formal (in the permutation invariance sense) logic may be sufficient for the distinction of abstract mathematical objects.

Thus metaphysical considerations become a factor in choosing logical framework for formalizing theories. It seems worth trying to examine how more sophisticated models of reality can affect the choice of logical constants. For example, the permutation invariance criterion may be viewed as "only one extreme in a spectrum of invariance, involving various kinds of automorphisms on the individual domain" (van Benthem 1989, 320). The invariance criterion generalized this way is wide enough to include logics of abstract objects, for example, 'logic of colour'. As Ludwig Wittgenstein assumes in his *Tractatus*, "the simultaneous presence of two colours at the same place in the visual field is impossible, in fact logically impossible, since it is ruled out by the logical structure of colour" (Wittgenstein 2004, 6.3751). For Wittgenstein, as Jaakko Hintikka pointed out, "the conceptual incompatibility of color terms can be turned into a logical truth simply by conceptualizing the concept of color as a function mapping points in a visual space into color space" (Hintikka 2009, 52). Thus "nonlogical analytical truths sometimes turn out to be logical ones when their structure is analyzed properly" (ibid.). If we accept as a test for logicity the invariance not only for isomorphism but also for automorphism, namely, for all permutations of individuals which respect an additional structure of chromaticity, 'logic of colour' becomes possible. In the context of Klein's Erlanger Program this logic may be considered as a member of a family of logics which are in their turn 'geometries' whose notions are invariant for permutations respecting some additional structures. Thus abstract logics become logics of abstract objects quite similar to domain ontologies of ontological engineering.

However these liberal principles of the demarcation of the bounds of logic may seem too exotic. But as John Barwise remarks, the ideology of abstract logics does not contradict even the person-in-the-street notion of logic. "On the common sense view on logic", he believes, "all the concepts we use to cope with and organize our world have their own logic" (Barwise 1985, 4). The principles of the demarcation of the bounds of logic may have proof-theoretical or model-theoretical character. The first approach is the traditional one that characterizes logic as a theory of valid inferences. The second is the one that understands logic as a theory of specific classes of structures. Abstract logics or logics with generalized quantifiers assume liberalization of metalogical requirements to logical systems and lead to their interpretation as formal ontologies, i.e. theories of formal structures of the universe. Even though the abstract logics are model-theoretic languages they belong to the tradition of *Mathesis Universalis* presupposing the understanding of logic as *calculus ratiocinator*, but not as *lingua characteristica*.

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Language and Responsibility

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One of the important things we learn from Wittgenstein's highly influential treatment of rule-following is that all forms of language use is normative, and that the stability of this normativity depends on a contribution from the individual language user. In the rule-following investigations, Wittgenstein focus on a range of normatively structured activities such as reading, developing a series of numbers or following the rule +2; activities that are characterised by general uniformity in the behaviour of the rule-followers. Despite the existence of such agreement, Wittgenstein wants us to resist the idea that the normativity of such activities is established by something externally to the activity itself that determines our behaviour. In §219 Wittgenstein famously discusses this way of picturing basic normativity in. He begins by drawing up the desired picture: "All the steps are really already taken" means: I no longer have any choice. The rule, once stamped with a particular meaning, traces the lines along which it is to be followed through the whole of space'. The appeal of the picture lies in the fact that it portrays interpersonal uniformity as guaranteed because of an elimination of the contribution of the individual. Wittgenstein goes on to question the use of this picture. '– But if something of this sort really was the case, how could it help?' I may feel as if the rule is already laid out in advance, but even if this actually is the case, this 'in advance' is not what I have access to; what I know is the rule and particular applications of it. Platonic rules do not do any work in my application of the rule; even if the picture of 'rules as rail' does. And Wittgenstein famously goes on to make us see that, instead of serving as a guarantee of the normativity of the rule and its correct application, the picture serves a different purpose: 'No; my description only made sense if it was to be understood symbolically. – I should have said: *This is how it strikes me*. When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly'. What I want to emphasise here is the massive use of 'I' in Wittgenstein re-description of the 'symbolic' picture. Wittgenstein addresses the simple and automatic sense in which we follow certain basic rules, but he also emphasises that what we cannot eliminate contribution of the individual; it is always an 'I' that acts in this way. We cannot account for rule-following and thus for linguistic practice without the notion of an individual using language.

Wittgenstein's considerations on rule-following form a part of the general background of my interest, because they show how there is no domain of language where we proceed without some form of contribution on our part. Stephen Mulhall (2000) has addressed this implication of Wittgenstein's investigation by looking at our understanding of particular concepts, and he presents two possible notions of the grammar that guides this understanding; the determinant and reflective model of grammar. The first, the determinant model, holds that all we need in order to know whether a word has been correctly applied is to have a sufficient grasp of the grammar of that word. If we encounter forms of use that do not conform to ordinary grammar, we have the choice either to dismiss this use as faulty or misunderstood, or to let this case establish a new use, that is, establish a new concept with a new grammar. The determinant approach thus suggest that the norms involved in the grammar of concepts are primary to and independent of actual instances of that use much in the same way

as the rules of chess are independent of actual games of chess – a parallel that we might take to be implied by Wittgenstein's notion of a 'language-game'.

Mulhall is however not satisfied that this view accurately describes what Wittgenstein is trying to show us, and he introduces another notion of linguistic understanding, the reflective approach. This approach is meant to reflect Wittgenstein's insistence that it is often possible for us to understand quite unfamiliar or divergent uses of words, an insistence that is for example reflected in Wittgenstein's effort to find a way of understanding the Augustinian claim, introduced at the very beginning of the *Philosophical Investigations*, that all words in language functions as names. According to Mulhall, Wittgenstein's story of the builders is meant to establish a context in which this claim could be taken to describe a (admittedly very primitive) language. That is, Wittgenstein constructs a context in which it is possible for us to address the question of whether we can make sense of Augustine's use of the concept of language as a group of names as a concept of *language*. That is, Wittgenstein does not accept the dichotomy presented by the determinant approach, according to which he either has to dismiss the Augustinian claim as a wrong use of the concept of language or let it introduce a new, rather different concept. In contrast, Wittgenstein is trying to make us reflect on the differences and similarities between Augustine's view and our ordinary grammar of the concept of language.

In this way, Wittgenstein shows us how, in Mulhall's words, 'the degree of resemblance needed to ground the projection of a concept of a language into this (or any) context is importantly open to individual judgement' (Mulhall 2002: 313). Our grasp of the grammar of a concept and the criteria (in Mulhall's Cavellian sense) that is connected to it, of course guide our assessment of such projections, but, and this is Mulhall's point, the question of whether the norms and criteria involved in this grammar is met is open to judgement and therefore 'ultimately rest with the individuals invited to project those criteria into this imagined context' (ibid. 314). Even if our understanding of the grammar of a concept limits the range of uses of that we will accept as meaningful uses of that concept, any such use is also context specific in a way that makes it dependent on the understanding and imagination of the individual language-user. Mulhall sums up his point by saying that 'any concept must be flexibly inflexible in these ways: its normativity is of a kind that enables or rather constitutes individual freedom of judgement, because its grammatical schematism is such that our projections of words are at once deeply controlled and ineliminably creative' (ibid. 315).

What I want to note is a consequence of this view of language, namely that the individual's essential contribution to all forms of language use means that such use always involves an element of personal responsibility. In Mulhall's discussion, he primary focus on our understanding of other people's use of concepts, but we can turn the perspective round and see that his point also applies to our own uses of language. In my actual uses of language, I act from the 'flexibly inflexible' nature of concepts and this means that I on the hand should be able to account for

how a specific context invites or allows for the use of a concept, while I on the other recognise that my use is at the same time an exercise of freedom. In talking, when I use language, I can never refer to something that will definitely settle or justify the right or appropriate use; this use ultimately also relies on my individual powers of judgement and my ability to justify such judgement.¹ This means that any utterance we make, inevitable involve some form of responsibility; that is, responsibility – and possible guilt – is built into all dealings with language. Moreover, the responsibility involved in language use springs from the activity that establishes linguistic normativity, and the element of responsibility therefore cannot be eliminated.

Even if all uses of language is subject to individual responsibility, we nevertheless does not seem to consider the question of individual responsibility equally pertinent in all cases. Typically, we do not stress the responsibility involved in uses that we are tempted to describe along the lines the lines of ideally rigid rails, while we for example are more likely both to feel and hold other responsible for their description of other people. I describe the reason why we distinguish between the responsibilities of different language uses, but I will also argue that we should not let these reason led us to an idea of essentially different 'forms' of linguistic responsibility.

As the initial description of linguistic responsibility is completely general, it cannot account for the differences in the responsibility we connect to different instances of language use. My suggestion is that we instead turn to Wittgenstein's investigations of linguistic normativity, and look at the difference between the rules investigated in the section on rule-following and the uses of language where questions of responsibility becomes pertinent. One difference is the amount of agreement that we can expect within these different practices of language. We can spell out this difference if we compare basic rule-following with one of Wittgenstein's investigations of the use of moral concepts, that is, look at the contrast between the almost uniform agreement involved in activities such as reading or doing mathematics and the notorious possibility of disagreement in morally relevant discourse. One important difference is that a part of the point of learning basic mathematics is to be able to participate in a commonly shared practice that enable us to reach equivalent results. This means that when we learn to do mathematics, we also learn not to place any value on the possibility of disagreement (cf. PI §240 and Diamond 1991a: 28). If I want to be able to add two, I can only do so by accepting that I must respond in a way that minimises my individual contribution to a 'doing the same again', acting 'as the rule strikes me' or simply 'obeying the rule blindly'. If I do not respond in this way, my application of the rule is ruled out as meaningless; I simply will not be doing mathematics.

However, it now seems as if the question of responsibility arises in two different ways, at two different levels, we might say. First, in so far as I want to do mathematics, it is my responsibility to act in a way that is meaningful within the frame of that language-game, that is, I have a responsibility that is embedded in the language-game and tied to its purpose. Secondly, I could be doing something else, and I therefore must take responsibility for choosing to engage in this language-game rather than another. If I am the accountant of a firm where a large sum is suddenly missing from the books, I might insist that I am simply adding the numbers (that shows the deficit), and I may do so

perfectly, thus living up to any responsibility connected to the language-game of mathematics, but I might be to blame for the fact that I insist on doing mathematics and not for example responding to the question of where the sum has gone missing; or at least I am to blame in so far as this is my responsibility as an accountant. We may in this way identify two forms of responsibilities, where the first is internal to the language-game that I am engaging in and the other springs from my very choice of language-game. In the example, the difference between my mathematical and my professional or moral responsibility as an accountant.

In contrast to the case of mathematics, we do in moral discourse not consider agreement a goal in itself; a difference in purpose that reflects on our evaluations of uses of ethical concepts. When parents teach a child to use an evaluative word like 'good', they may consider it a sign of understanding if the child starts to use the word about objects that differs substantially from the ones that was used in the teaching – even if the parents do themselves not consider these objects good. That is, to use Mulhall's concepts, we do in ethics accept wide limits for creative use, not just of moral concepts, but of concepts in general, while it is a part of our understanding of mathematics that we accept how mathematical activity is thoroughly controlled. We could paraphrase a remark from *Philosophical Investigations* and say that the kind of agreement is the kind of language-game (cf. PI part II xi: 191). As we have already seen, the difference in levels of agreement that we find in mathematical and morally motivated language is not categorical, but is a matter of degree. It does not arise because our use of mathematical concepts is completely controlled, while our use of ethical concepts unfolds without restrictions; instead it results from the different forms of variation we allow in different practices, and this in an important way depends on *why* we engage in them, their *point*.

To look at the idea of the point of language use, we can draw on the number of places, where Wittgenstein discusses this difference between language-games by involving the idea of the *purpose* ('Zweck') of a word or a language-game (see for example PI 345, and LWPP I 890). Wittgenstein often opposes the idea that we may meaningfully talk of *the* purpose of language; what he wants, is instead to show us that we have a multitude of purposes in using language, and that such purposes are part of what determines meaningful use. Moreover, Wittgenstein links such purposes with the idea of a central or essential use of a word, for example in a 1949 version of recurring remark. 'Non & ne --- They have the same purpose, the same use – with *one* qualification. So are there essential and non-essential differences among the uses? The distinction does not appear until we begin to talk about the *purpose* of a word' (LWPP II 2, cf. LWPP I 384-5). To talk of the purpose of words may help us to distinguish between what is essential to our understanding of that word, and what is not. In general, to understand a statement a person makes, we need to have some grasp of what she wants to do in presenting this statement. Understanding her purpose is an integrated part of understanding the use she makes of her words. We find the point in Wittgenstein's remarks, when he talks interchangeable about the purpose and the use of words. (LWPP I 291, 138, 326).

However, if our understanding of the use of a word is connected to the purpose of using that word, then understanding draws on a very wide range of considerations about what it is meaningful to do, what is important etc. If someone spoke in a manner that revealed that he had very different purposes with his use of words, we would not just

¹ Avner Baz poses a similar concern against the conception of language found in McDowell's writings, see Baz 2003.

think that he had had a peculiar *façon de parler*, we would have much more general concerns. Thus Wittgenstein continues, ‘--- We might think it strange. “He doesn’t play our game at all” – one would like to say. *Or even that this is a different type of man*’ (ibid., my italics). When we try to understand what other people are saying, we draw on our general understanding of what they could want to do with their words, what the function or purpose could be. That is, words or language-games have different purposes because they fill out different roles in our lives. There are two implications of this. The first is that even the simplest uses of language connect to an elaborate understanding of what a human being is (see also Crary 2007). Secondly, the norms or criteria that guide our language-games are shaped to accommodate the purpose we have in engaging in them.

The second implication means that the purpose of engaging in a particular language-game is part of what accounts for the differences in the responsibility, we attribute different uses of language. If we thought that an important part of the purpose of mathematics was to voice our convictions, then it would be impossible to do mathematics. Instead, we consider agreement a part of this purpose and this means that part of what we accept when we learn to do mathematics is that it only places a very restricted and well defined set of responsibilities both on ourselves and others. The reasons why we engage in morally relevant language use is very different, and I will venture the claim that one such purpose is exactly to voice our convictions, of value for example. Moreover, if this is right, then we in ethics value the possibility of speaking our mind higher than we value the possibility of reaching agreement on particular matters. That is, in order to be able to voice our own moral considerations, we allow that the statements of a wide variety of such considerations are understandable moral uses of language, and in doing so, we also allow for the possibility of widespread moral disagreement. In morally relevant language use we share a purpose that can be said to involve a shared acceptance of the possibility of widespread disagreement. That is, the possibility of disagreement – and the existence of such disagreement – in ethics does not reflect the failure of our present moral status, but is an integrated part of the grammar of morally

relevant uses of language. Moreover, ‘because of the possibility for disagreement, each of us, when engaging in ethical language use, undertake the responsibility that we should be able (at least in principle) to supply or describe the context that invites our particular use of words. This is so because the context is neither laid out in advance nor necessarily commonly shared, and this means that the responsibility connected to morally significant uses of words becomes much more far reaching than the responsibility we undertake when engaging in mathematics.

The important question now becomes whether we can uphold the distinction between settled purposes of particular language-games and the purposes of individual language users, for example whether we can distinguish between the mathematical and the professional responsibility facing our accountant. The very idea of a purpose seems however, to make it impossible to uphold such a distinction. Our individual purpose in engaging in particular instances of language use determines what is done in that use in a way that makes it impossible to uphold the idea of a general and independent purpose of separate language-games. This means that we assume responsibility not only of our particular uses of language, but of entire language-games, and maybe even of language as such.

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Sidestepping the Holes of Holism

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1. Introduction

Holism is a position shared by many contemporary philosophers beginning with French conventionalists, Ajdukiewicz and some logical empiricists, ending with Quine, Davidson and even some postmodern philosophers. It has been characterized usually in an implicit manner, using metaphors rather than precise definitions. Nevertheless, it has found a strong rooting in many branches of philosophy, such as epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and social philosophy. Despite its vagueness, it is nowadays usually not the subject of strong controversy among professional philosophers that some holistic picture characterizes essential properties of the scientific enterprise, language, or the mind, respectively. Below we will attempt to show that holism might not be as attractive an idea as it appears at first glance. We will concentrate on two versions of holism: holism about confirmation and linguistic holism (holism about meaning). Our approach will borrow the argumentational strategy from the holists themselves, as they used to argue in favor of holism by showing weak points in localism and atomism. We will accordingly defend localistic and atomistic claims by pointing out difficulties in the holistic program.

2. What is holism?

Holism with respect to entities of a given type (sentences, scientific theories, mental states etc.) is a claim that some relevant properties of those entities are best understood as somehow derivative from properties of some structure containing the entities. For example: holism about sentences' meaning is a theory which claims that meaning of a particular sentence is derivative in character from properties of the language system to which the sentence belongs; holism about confirmation assumes that impact which experience has on sentences depends on the theoretical context in which a given sentence is situated; holism about knowledge is a thesis that true belief states of a rational agent are justified (and, as such, count as knowledge states) only in virtue of the relation of that belief state to other belief states of the agent. The notion of a *derivative character of some property* is often left unexplained but it is usually presupposed that it should be closely connected with two theses – one about the contingent character of the derivative property (which may be called the "Contingency Thesis") and one about its gradual nature (which may be called the "Degrees of Dependence Thesis"):

Contingency Thesis. All relevant properties an entity possesses within a given system are systemic properties. Internal properties can only be attributed to entities via a derivation from systemic properties. The relevant properties of an entity might have been different, had the entity been an element of a different system.

Degrees of Holistic Involvement Thesis. The holistic character of a property comes in degrees, i.e. holism may (although does not have to) take only some relations and entities as the basis for determining the relevant feature of the entity.

Thus, according to the Contingency Thesis, it may be claimed that a sentence's meaning may be different, had the sentence been an element of a different linguistic system. It may be also claimed that the rejection of a sentence in light of some experimental data may be transmitted to some of the background assumptions of the whole theory, had the assumptions been pragmatically or meta-theoretically less important. Finally, with respect to holism about knowledge, the Contingency Claim results in admitting the possibility that a true belief state might be unjustified, had the beliefs of the person been different. The Degrees of Holistic Involvement Thesis is rather methodological in character – it states that radical holism is just one possible option (it also shows that the so-called "localism" is simply holism to a lesser degree) and points to a possible source of the lack of clarity in holistic doctrines – namely the refusal of making the degree of dependence explicit. This last feature is especially important if we keep in mind that some holistic theories seem to be trivial in character – if, for example, by "being an element of the linguistic system" we understand, among other things, the fact that a linguistic system contains sentences stating meaning conventions (in the appropriate metalanguage or in a form of meaning postulates), then holism about meaning trivially follows. According to the Degrees of Holistic Involvement Thesis we may be proponents of many versions of holism about meaning, holism about confirmation and holism about knowledge – for example we may claim that the meaning of a given sentence is determined by its inferential (in a standard semantical sense) impact and we may claim also that in addition to this impact some pragmatic inferences are relevant; one can also defend different versions of holism about confirmation – e.g. one which imposes taking some particular scientific theories as theoretical context in which a confirmation result is evaluated and the other which assigns this role to the other theories; eventually varieties of beliefs may be taken as decisive for describing true belief as justified.

One of the possible conclusions which can be drawn from the above characteristic is that every type of holism which strives to be a philosophically salient theory must, in some form, find an equilibrium between the Contingency Thesis and the Degrees of Holistic Involvement Thesis. While the Contingency Thesis and the Degrees of Holistic Involvement Thesis are not strictly opposing, one must be careful, when endorsing a strong case of the former, not to fall into a trivial formulation of the latter. A good example would be Leibniz' ontology if understood in a holistic way. According to Leibniz, every individual is specified by a unique set of properties; moreover, all those properties are essential and global – they are sufficient to single out all other individuals in the world. In this scenario, changing a single element of the universe requires a change of the whole system – but as a side effect, we cannot speak about modifying any properties of this specific entity, since after even the slightest modification, the entity loses its sole criterion of individuation. This is a real problem for many versions of holism – how do we speak about having an entity play a different role in a given system without having the entity possess criteria of individuation outside the system?

3. Arguments against holism

We would like to begin our critique with a version of holism whose consequence is the egalitarian treatment of mathematical and logical statements and of empirical statements. This version of confirmational holism is widely defended in many works of Quine. It is worth noticing that said egalitarian treatment is in fact a variant of our Contingency Thesis, namely, one states that the sentences of logic and mathematics can be modified if they are a fragment of a different theoretical context from the one which we are given. Furthermore, the Degree of Holistic Involvement in this specific case is extremely vague. Due to this vagueness, the egalitarian treatment of said sentences is one of the few consequences which one can draw from this version of holism without fear of misinterpretation.

Treating empirical and logical sentences on par is something that drives Quine's famous criticism of modal logic and is one of the main assumptions behind his *sling-shot* arguments targeted at quantified modal logic. It is therefore something which is a consequence of his holism beyond any reasonable doubt. Quine does consider logical sentences to be more fundamental than empirical sentences, however, in no way does he endow upon them any special status, since this would run contrary to his holistic claims.

However, this treatment proves to be the undoing of a holistic theory that is so described. Let us assume that we take Quine's position for granted and we try to examine a case where an empirical statement that is contrary to the entire theory forces us to revise parts of the theory. On the surface, nothing seems to be wrong with such a description. However, the real problem is – how do we determine that said empirical sentence runs counter to the entire theory? We have to have an inference of the type: $T \ \& \ O \Rightarrow \text{False}$. Let's even assume a simple case: that our theory consists of exactly the sentences constituting T and said inference. How do we conclude that the empirical sentence requires a revision of our theory? The solution seems to be obvious: we apply *modus ponens* and arrive at the false conclusion. However, what is the status of the *modus ponens* rule of inference?

One can try to save Quine's holism by stating that the *modus ponens* rule is itself a sentence of the theory. However, such a solution quickly runs into the famous logical paradox formulated by Lewis Carroll and known as the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise: we have $T \ \& \ O \Rightarrow \text{False}$, $T \ \& \ O$ and $(T \ \& \ O \Rightarrow \text{False}) \ \& \ (T \ \& \ O) \Rightarrow \text{False}$ in the system, but we are no closer to inferring False from this than when we started.

Maybe the *modus ponens* rule is a metalanguage rule instead? Here, however, we run into another paradox, with unfounded levels of metalinguistic inference. If the rule is metalinguistic and states "If we have $T \ \& \ O$ and we have $T \ \& \ O \Rightarrow \text{False}$, then we conclude False ", how do we actually apply this rule to the said example? For the metalinguistic definitions to be meaningful, we have to assume the principles of their meaningfulness are themselves expressed in the theory, which requires a metametalanguage – tortoises on top of tortoises on top of tortoises and so on.

Let us consider a popular version of moderate holism about meaning, namely inferentialism. We will omit a version of this view according to which for an expression to be meaningful it suffices to play a role in some inferences (so-called *strong inferentialism* in the sense of Brandom), since according to this view even brackets and dots are extremely meaningful expressions. Let us concentrate on a

version of this view according to which the meaning of a sentence (in a given language L) can be defined as the set of inferences in which this sentence partakes. Formally, the meaning of a sentence p is an ordered pair $\langle f, g \rangle$, where f is a forest of proof trees that have p as a conclusion and g is a forest of proof trees which have p as a premise in one of its axiomatic leaves (of the form $p \vdash p$). This system is not holistic *per se*, what is needed to make it holistic is constraints imposed upon the proof tree structure. For example, if a certain proof containing a proposition q as a leaf belongs to the second element of the meaning of p , then the same proof has to belong to the first element of the meaning of q . This comes from the fact that while we call the trees that constitute the meaning-forest pair "proof trees", they are not in reality proof trees because we do not have a deductive system provided (one can only infer a deductive system from the meanings). Thus, we could have a bizarre situation in which the "results" part of the meaning for p contains q , but the "sources" part of the meaning of q does not contain p . The constraint imposes a quasi-deductive system on the meaning structure.

However, here we face a problem. We already imposed a structure on the system, making the trees inside the meanings some sorts of quasi-proofs. However, do we really want quasi-proofs? We probably want the system to have a certain sort of *proof structure* altogether. Now, we're faced with a decision: do we *impose* this proof structure on our model?

If we do, we are faced with a dilemma: why do we need a holistic structure anyways? If the means by which we construct a holistic system is an axiom-and-rule based one, then why not dispose with the entire holistic structure and just define meanings in the traditional, compositional way? It is certainly more feasible both in terms of explicatory strength and computational complexity.

The holist might try to defend his method by saying that it allows for constructing systems where rules have exceptions: situations that aren't really governed by rules, but where rules are inferred from the system itself. However, such an approach tends to fall under a *God's eye point of view* problem: how do we construct a viable theory with a possibly infinite structure that is not governed by rules? Do we really construct such structures? It seems to us that holism is really a poor magician's hat – one first puts the rabbit in the hat, then claims that no rabbit was ever there, then pulls the rabbit out of the hat and everyone seems genuinely surprised. Similarly, one first constructs a system based on rules, then forgets the rules, then seemingly recreates the rules from the system – making it seem a deep conclusion something that is essentially *petitio principii*. This time, as opposed to the failed attempt by Quine outlined above, we have tried to avoid the impossibility of considering a sentence as such outside the whole language system (and save the Contingency Thesis) by excluding rules of inference from the class of those elements of the system that are relevant for determining the meaning of the sentence (decreasing the grade of holistic involvement). However, as a result we have discovered those rules of inference as exactly those core elements that constitute the holistic structure.

4. Conclusions

It is hard to argue about holism since the view itself is usually not explicitly defined in the literature in which the term is used. We hope that by a systematic explication of some principles governing holism, we were able to show that at least in some cases, when explored thoroughly, holism

comes out as either fallacious (as in Quine's case) or as hiding an underlying structure which can be then used as the main theoretical content instead of the holistic one. Our two theses about holism do not preclude a holistic theory from being meaningful, however, it seems that successfully applying a holistic methodology by balancing the two theses is something that is not often achieved in contemporary philosophy.

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Tractatus 6.3751

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In the *Tractatus*, ascriptions of colour were *prima facie* threats to the independence of elementary propositions. If it is logically impossible for two colours to be at the same place in the visual field (6.3751), then the ascription of different colours to the same place must take the form of a contradiction. But if "a is red" and "a is green" were both elementary, they could not contradict each other due to the independence thesis. There are at least three possible escapes from this predicament: to deny that there is a "logical" (and not for instance a "merely psychological") exclusion involved here; to abandon the independence thesis; or to deny that colour ascriptions are elementary. Wittgenstein clearly chose this last option, but left no more than a hint about the line of analysis to be pursued in this case.

The hint is given in the second paragraph of 6.3751. In physics, he says, a contradiction like "a is both red and green" presents itself as the impossibility for a particle of having two different velocities. Taken in physical (and not phenomenal) terms, the statement "a is both red and green" would appear as an everyday-language translation of a statement like "the velocity of p is both m and n ", where p is a particle, and both m and n are numbers. So the logical exclusion of colours appears in physics as a particular case of the logical exclusion of diverging numerical ascriptions. And this is plainly reasonable, since the mutual exclusions of numbers and colours display exactly the same logical structure. In Aristotelian terms, we could say that we are dealing with cases of contrariety, not of contradiction. Diverging ascriptions of number — like incompatible ascriptions of colour — can always be both false, but never simultaneously true. It is possible that the number of men in this room is neither 5 nor 7, as it is possible that the colour of a shirt is neither red nor green. But it can't be both. Conjunction should necessarily give rise to logical contradiction.

Something like this should be true of chromatic phenomena. Phenomenal ascriptions of colour certainly exclude each other, says Wittgenstein, and exclude logically: "the assertion that a point in the visual field [*ein Punkt des Gesichtsfelds*] has two different colours at the same time is a contradiction [*ist eine Kontradiktion*]" (6.3751 again). The statement is unequivocal enough, and the suggestion is clear. As physical colour appears as a special case of number ascription (regarding velocity of particles), phenomenal colour must also involve numerical ascriptions somehow. Statements describing perceptions, like "a is red", are not elementary, but highly complex — at least as complex as a statement like "there are three circles in my visual field". They involve nested quantifiers, and the logical behaviour of these quantifiers should explain the logical relations between ascriptions of colour.

I agree that this is more a horizon than a trail, but the fact is that we have to go along with it. It would be useless to look for something more specific in the book. So let us explore this horizon a little bit more remembering how Wittgenstein imagined he could deal with numbers when he wrote the *Tractatus*. Number is defined as the "exponent of an operation" (6.021). The import of this definition is very simple. It implies that any ascription of number should be seen as a member of a formal series of proposi-

tions — a series generated by a formal procedure of producing a new proposition out of a given one. This kind of procedure is what Wittgenstein calls an "operation". As a matter of fact, there are operations applicable to more than one proposition — disjunction, for instance. But only operations applicable to just one proposition can generate what Wittgenstein calls "formal series", since the basic requirement of a formal series is uniform progression from term to term — from one proposition to its "successor" in the series.

It would be a gross mistake to imagine that every operation in the *Tractatus* must be a *truth-operation*. Simultaneous negation *is* a truth-operation in the sense that the truth-value of the proposition obtained as a result is *completely* determined by the truth-value of the propositions we began with. But consider this formal series of propositions:

There is no dog in this room.

There is just one dog in this room.

There are exactly two dogs in this room.

and so on

Clearly there is a formal process of transformation involved in the construction of the series. We know how to add any member to the series after the last given one. We just use the next member of the series of natural numbers. But this is so to speak the "macroscopic" aspect of the succession law. The use of logical lens would reveal a much more complicated process, involving the use of nested quantifiers, each one of which could by its turn be reduced to applications of simultaneous denial to formally selected groups of propositions. But no "microscopic" detail would deprive the process of its formal determinateness. Quite the opposite. The logical microscope of analysis would simply give us more evidence of the completely formal nature of the whole process.

Let us insist on a fundamental point. That series is formal because it has a "basis" (i.e., a proposition we "begin with"), and it is generated by a constant formal procedure of obtaining a new proposition out of a given one. The *same* transformation (in terms of nested quantifiers) that makes me advance from the first proposition to the second one will make me advance from the 57th to the 58th. It is always a question of introducing new existential quantifiers at the same places. Let us call the first proposition " p ", and let us make a capital "O" indicate the logical operation involved in this case. Now the whole series could be represented this way:

$p, O^0p, O^1p,$ and so on.

Or, using the tractarian notation,

$O^0p, O^1p, O^2p,$ and so on.

That is the way Wittgenstein explain the role that the word "two" plays in a sentence like "there are exactly two people in this room". It marks the place of this proposition within a formal series of propositions. Within each proposition of the series we do not find numbers, but only nested quanti-

fiers. Numbers are not part of the basic tools of language. After analysis, they simply disappear, leaving no traces behind.

Every context involving numbers should be analysed along similar lines. Measuring contexts should be no exception. "This table is 3 meters long" should be a proposition of the form O^3p for some operation O and some proposition p . The same could be said of a proposition ascribing a certain velocity to a particle, or a certain colour to a place in my visual field. If our analysis is right, a proposition such as "This is red" should be seen as the n^{th} member of a formal series whose first member is a certain proposition p . Now two related questions naturally arise: (i) Which kind of proposition could play the role of a "basis" in order to generate the whole set of chromatic ascriptions arranged in a formal series of propositions? (ii) How to build this formal series without using anything but logical tools (like nested quantifiers)? What would these quantifiers range over? The *Tractatus* is absolutely silent about these questions. As interpreters, we are condemned to overinterpret the text, trying to imagine different kinds of solutions that would be compatible with the tractarian point of view.

If we examine the texts he wrote in the early 30's, we come up with an interesting suggestion. Systems of representation of the so-called "space of colors" are presented and evaluated as to their ability to depict the logical relations governing that space. Colours may be displayed for instance in a circle, and also in an octahedron. Wittgenstein says that the octahedric representation is "more perspicuous" for it is capable to depict directly, in a purely geometrical way, certain fine grammatical distinctions that the circular representation does not grasp. For instance, the unmixed character of the phenomenally pure colors — green, red, yellow, blue, white and black. In a circle, they are on the same level as any other, while in the octahedron they occupy a distinguished position on the six vertices of the solid. There is a clear suggestion that we could associate a system of coordinates to the octahedron in order to determine each color by means of three numbers. One of these coordinates would range from apex to the

bottom vertex of the octahedron, having white and black at the extremities, and a neutral grey right in the middle of the whole solid. The second coordinate would go from the blue vertex to the yellow one. Accompanying this coordinate, we would see the pure blue progressively losing its hue, turning into gray, and then progressively acquiring a more and more yellow tone. The third coordinate would make a similar trajectory from red to green. If we associate numbers to these coordinates, any color of the visual spectrum can be associated to a triple of numbers ranging, let us say, from -1 to 1.

Using this system of representation amounts to analysing any ascription of color as the conjunction of three different statements, each one expressing a different kind of chromatic property. The first property is expressed in English by means of two different verbs: to darken and to whiten. In the octahedric representation, we would say that something is "darkening" by means of a number ascription closer and closer to -1; and we would say that it is "whitening" by means of ascriptions approaching 1. Similarly, we would have numerical expressions corresponding to expressions like "to become redder", "more yellow", "bluer" and "greener". Saying that something is grey would amount to say that it does not have any degree of white-black, nor any degree of red-green, nor any degree of yellow-blue. And now we are as close as possible to a metric of colors — a system of representation in which ascriptions of colors could be analysed as ascriptions of numbers, ascriptions of numbers could be analysed as quantified propositions, and quantified propositions could be analysed as truth-functions of elementary ones.

I won't push the analysis further, since we are stepping in a purely hypothetical territory. There are many possible ways of representing the space of colors by means of geometrical figures, and it would be possible to associate a coordinate system to each one of these figures. I just want to stress that Wittgenstein had good reasons to believe that it was perfectly feasible to give numerical expression to the logical multiplicity we find in our visual space as far as colors are concerned.

Social Externalism and Conceptual Falsehood

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Adult language users have the ability to report the content of their beliefs. Given one's cooperation and honesty, we are in a position to suspect that if a language user endorses a belief that p and is asked to assent to p , then he will. Unlike toddlers, adults are also able to say that they *believe* that p (Stich 2008, 564). These and possibly other features distinguish beliefs as *access conscious*. According to Ned Block (Block 2002) access conscious states can be described as the kind of states that are 'broadcast for free use in reasoning and for direct "rational" control of action' and speech, where 'rational' is contrasted with 'spontaneous' or 'automated' (Block, 2002, 208). In other words, when the content of a belief is available to me in an access conscious way, then I am aware of it in my reasoning across the network of consciously accessible beliefs, as well as in my actions and utterances. Thus, for instance, from a belief 'I have arthritis' and 'Jill has never been seriously ill' I might infer 'Jill has never had arthritis'. I might also comfort Jill by telling her not to worry if she suddenly starts to think that she might have developed arthritis at some point. Alternatively, she could ask me if she had ever had arthritis, to which I would reply that she hadn't.

Nevertheless, within the network of all beliefs I entertain, there may occur some false ones. For example, I might come to believe that the initial symptom of arthritis is an inflammation of the trachea and tell Jill, when she gets a sore throat, that she should visit a doctor; perhaps I would even offer to go with her. Although false, my belief appears alongside other beliefs and in a likewise manner it affects my reasoning, speaking and acting. At least until I somehow manage to verify it. Consequently, it seems natural to say that my ability to reason does not guarantee the verity of what I believe. What it guarantees is that if someone corrects me I will be inclined to accept the correction.

In what follows I will demonstrate that social externalism about mental content conceived by Tyler Burge in his highly influential paper "Individualism and the Mental" (Burge 1979) strongly denies that the ways we reason should have *any* impact on how the content of our beliefs is individuated.

A fundamental distinction Burge relies on is that between a conceptual mistake and an empirical mistake; i.e., between beliefs that are *conceptually false* because they *cannot* be true and beliefs that are *empirically false* as they *might turn out* to be true. His thought experiment describes situations in which a person makes a conceptual mistake by reporting a belief that is conceptually false.

The structure of the experiment can be summarised as follows.

(i) It is assumed of a term that it has a standard meaning, at least in the sense that the extension of the term is sharply determined. (ii) Actual users of the term are divided into two categories: experts, or the guardians of the meaning, and ordinary users. Of experts it is assumed that they know the full extension of the term, whereas ordinary users know only partial extension of the term and are involuntarily prone to transcend the extension. (iii) There is

an ordinary user who has some true beliefs with the term. Thus, it may seem that his beliefs exploit the standard meaning of the term. (iv) Now, the key fact is that the user utters a belief which is a *conceptual falsehood*. Immediately two interrelated questions arise: (A) What should be said of his true beliefs announced in (iii), i.e., what are they about? (B) What should be said about his conceptual falsehood, i.e., what is it about? There are two main possibilities. (v) One should say of the user that (A) his true beliefs, insofar as they include a term used abnormally, are beliefs whose content is non-standard. He and experts have (B) *different* concepts. (vi) It should be said that, despite this conceptual falsehood, (A) all his beliefs, including the false one, preserve the standard meaning. He and experts have (B) *the same* concept.

Now, to the question 'What is a conceptual mistake?' Burge's answer is rather vague. He hesitates between situations in which the *dictionary definition* of a term is violated and situations in which the *established usage* of the term is violated, especially if the definition does not specify the extension (Burge 1979, 78). Importantly, he suggests that we should recognize a case of the misapplication of a term by investigating the readiness of the user to adopt an attempted *correction* by the expert. If the user is easily persuaded by the expert and withdraws from making the conceptual mistake, his understanding of the term is dim but *standard*, if the user remains stubborn his understanding is clearly *deviant*. So, the fundamental problem is this: If a person makes a conceptual mistake consisting in the transcending of the standard extension of a term, is it sufficient to evaluate his understanding of the term as *deviant*? If a person makes the conceptual mistake but is *disposed* to readily accept correction, is it sufficient to say that his understanding of the term is standard? Answers bring two radical interpretations of Burge's example: the *meaning postulate* interpretation and *deference* interpretation.

1) There are two possible worlds: W_1 , which is the actual one, and W_2 - a counterfactual world.

2) The only difference between the two worlds is that by the word 'arthritis' the W_1 experts mean 'a chronic disease of the joints', whereas by the same word in W_2 , the W_2 experts mean, rather vaguely, 'a chronic disease of joints, muscles, bones, etc.'.

3) There are two persons: E_1 and E_2 who are mentally identical: they have beliefs which they express in the same sentences. Person E_1 in W_1 believes, among others, what he expresses in: 'I have arthritis in my knees'. He also utters the sentence: 'I have arthritis in my thigh'. Person E_2 in W_2 says exactly the same. Especially, E_2 also utters the sentence: 'I have arthritis in my thigh'. Later on, E_1 and E_2 meet experts. E_1 is informed that he makes a *conceptual mistake* and, *easily* surrendering to correction, stops thinking of arthritis in his thigh. E_2 is informed that his use of the term is conceptually correct (Burge 1979, 77-79).

Meaning postulate interpretation:

4a) Before correction, E_1 's belief concerning the disease in his thigh was *not* a belief about arthritis, as well as his true belief: 'I have arthritis in my knees'. E_2 's equivalent beliefs also did not concern arthritis. Correction *essentially changed* E_1 's understanding of arthritis.

After correction, E_1 's true beliefs *are* about arthritis. Nothing changed for E_2 : his beliefs are *not* about arthritis.

Deference interpretation:

4b) Before correction, E_1 's belief concerning the disease in his thigh was a belief about arthritis, as well as his true belief about his knees, just because he was *disposed* to adopt a correction. Correction *slightly modified* E_1 's understanding of arthritis.

After correction, there is no essential difference: all E_1 's beliefs are about arthritis. Nothing changed for E_2 : all his beliefs are not about arthritis.

Burge tends to stress that social factors, such as (α) meaning postulates established by experts and (β) the disposition to defer to experts on usage of terms, are what is essential to the determination of content. One should note that this version of externalism is wider in scope from mere natural kinds externalism as it has the power to demonstrate that both the content of natural kind concepts and the content of conventional concepts is determined broadly. However, it seems that Burge makes a mistake when claiming that (α) and (β) are both constitutive of his externalism, for (α) and (β) are mutually *superfluous*. It seems that if deference is crucial, violating meaning postulates becomes inessential and vice versa. Another point worth noting is that deciding whether conventional terms such as 'arthritis' are to be construed as rigid or non-rigid designators should be given careful consideration. As Burge silently accepts their rigidity, I shall set this problem aside. I will take a closer look only at the two interpretations outlined above and try to identify the right one.

Meaning postulates: A term designating a concept in the actual world rigidly designates the concept when the term picks out the very same concept in every counterfactual world. When E_1 comes to the W_1 -doctor and says 'I have arthritis in my thigh', the doctor does not treat his utterance as a *medical hypothesis* which can be confirmed or denied by some investigation. He will never say: 'Let's see' but: 'It is *impossible* that you have arthritis in your thigh because arthritis is defined as an inflammation of the joints'. This means that the doctor classifies 'I have arthritis in my thigh' as a *conceptual falsehood*. If it were classified as an empirical falsehood, such decision would be a result of investigation. When E_2 says the same, it is natural for the W_2 -doctor to react: 'Let's see' because in W_2 the utterance is an empirical hypothesis. If E_2 makes a mistake it is an empirical mistake. In W_1 'I have arthritis in my thigh' cannot be an empirical mistake, whereas in W_2 the utterance cannot be a linguistic mistake. In linguistically different worlds the utterance belongs to two different categories. In W_1 it is forbidden, in W_2 it functions in normal use. The standard extension of the term 'arthritis' decides of its correct use. Burge assumes that there is only one standard use of the term, the actual world use whose extension is determined by the meaning postulate: 'Arthritis is an inflammation of the joints'. He diagnoses that E_1 violates the postulate, whereas E_2 does not. E_2 uses the word 'arthritis' correctly but with *non-standard meaning*. From the point of view of the standard meaning, which is the only point of reference for interpretations, E_1 and E_2 both violate the standard meaning and their utterances are not about

arthritis but about a different disease. Nevertheless, E_1 is just an incompetent speaker of a standard language, whereas E_2 is a competent speaker of a non-standard language. So, it seems that the only way for E_2 to gain the concept of arthritis is to acquire the concept from W_1 in which case he would violate the non-standard meaning of W_2 .

Deference: The basic assumptions are that E_1 and E_2 live in different social environments and E_1 's environment is essentially distinguished: this is the standard environment establishing *the one and only* meaning of 'arthritis', and, that E_1 and E_2 are perfectly *deferential*, i.e., they are absolutely vulnerable to correction. How many and what sort of false beliefs they have does not matter. As perfectly deferential, they always have concepts established in their environments and the concepts of E_1 and E_2 are of necessity different just because only E_1 belongs to the actual world.

The important question now is what interpretation describes the actual Burge's view and if the interpretations mentioned are equally persuasive. Contrary to natural kind externalists who, rejecting the descriptive theory of mental content, boldly claim that what matters is the objective causal link between an object and a concept, Burge introduces a distinction between empirical and conceptual falsehood. This makes one expect that he is going to make some important use of it, namely, one anticipates the decision that making a conceptual mistake is a criterion of conceptual difference. Somewhat surprisingly, Burge is as drastic as natural kind externalists and proposes an equally radical version of social externalism, i.e., the *deference* version (Burge 1979, 84-87). If the acceptance of meaning postulates is an important measure of intellectual closeness between a subject and experts, an implication of Burge's view is that no matter how much *rationaly distant* from experts a person is, how many false beliefs he has, his beliefs preserve the standard meaning of the terms used, on condition that the person is dispositional enough. Thus Burge chooses option (vi) as the answer. The consequences are fairly counterintuitive. First, it is not easy to agree unreservedly that intellectual dependence, not to say slavery, guarantees linguistic identity; that someone who is ready to deprecate his own beliefs has the same concept as experts, even though these concepts in fact diverge. Second, in certain circumstances inferences involving 'arthritis' might yield completely different results for ordinary language users and for experts. Given such circumstances they would also generate different behaviours. To use the same example I once used, if I really believed that the initial symptom of arthritis were an inflammation of the trachea, then having found out that Jill has a sore throat, I would advise her to visit a doctor. If Burge were right and the content of my belief about arthritis were the same as that of experts, then I wouldn't be giving that advice. Well, would anyone dare stop me?

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Perception, Language and Cognitive Success

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It is deceptive to claim that by perception people acquire information about the world since a source of information is one thing and an agent who is to consume information is another: produced information needs not to be consumed. By consuming information I mean achieving a cognitive goal and I want to decide which type of perception entails genuine consuming. I ask first if linguistic interpretation of perceptual information is the sufficient condition of a cognitive goal. This issue is obliterated by the controversy over whether visual perception represents the world and, therefore, brings information about it (Crane 2006). Even if we think that visual representation is passive, i.e., the agent is unable to modify the mental picture delivered by his eyes, and that passive representation gives him the optimal information about the world, from the fact that some information has appeared it does not follow that any information has been absorbed (Sosa 2007, 46).

The opposition between non-epistemic and epistemic perception only minimally explains what is necessary for cognitive success. A typical distinction is that between conceptually loaded perception: seeing *that* p or seeing X as..., and conceptually empty perception: seeing X (O'Brien 2004). It leads immediately to interpretational difficulties. Propositional seeing *that*... is classified as factive. Whether non-propositional seeing X is factive, i.e., adequately represents the world, becomes dubious even if we assume that the world is ontologically stable, e.g., it consists of mentally independent facts.

Suppose that opening his eyes person A acquires a picture of falling rain and the rain is actually falling. If A is a child unable to make the statement: "The rain is falling" we would diagnose that A sees X (X = falling rain) but A does not understand what he sees: A neither sees *that* p (p = the rain is falling), nor A sees X as X, i.e., falling rain as falling rain. His eyes have delivered a picture, but this non-interpreted picture remains cognitively useless. In a similar situation, of a competent speaker we would say either that he sees *that* the rain is falling or he sees falling rain as falling rain. The child's visual picture merely represents the world, the speaker's picture seems to be cognitively consumed. The question I ask is: Is such a consumption satisfactory?

Considering the property of factivity helps to realize why in cases of simple perception the agent cognitively fails. Of propositional perception *that*... it is easy to say that it is factive, i.e., if A sees *that* it is raining, it is true that it is raining. But to say the same of perception X is problematic. If A's perception of falling rain is non-propositional we should not predicate the truth about it. The conditional 'If A sees falling rain, then it is true that the rain is falling' is epistemically strange at least for proponents of the view that truth can be ascribed only to propositions. There are therefore two things: to see a fact and to see a fact propositionally. I think that the term 'factivity' should be limited to linguistically interpreted perception: perception X is then beyond factivity.

Similar doubts concern fallibility. When we say that if A perceives, then A makes sometimes mistakes, i.e., A's perception does not agree with facts, the question arises: What type of perception is fallible and how? Fallibility and perception *that*... exclude each other. Certainly, we can safely speak of perception unrelated to facts when we dis-

cuss cases of perception as... There are then two things under suspicion: a visual picture and its linguistic description. Surprisingly, if we understand fallibility as the possibility of *making a mistake* the fallibility of perception X becomes dubious. We can perhaps say of a hallucinating child who passively acquires a picture of falling rain that he *is* mistaken but surely not that he *makes* a mistake. Of a person entirely passive we should not, therefore, say that his perception is fallible. Making mistakes requires some cognitive activity, e.g., linguistic interpretation. Thus, only perception as ... allows for two types of fallibility: (1) making factual mistake by accepting as the representation of fact p a picture not related to p and (2) making linguistic mistake by interpreting the picture related to fact p as representing not-p.

These proposals are themselves disputable as there are no clear ideas about passive components of perception. But I think that the possibility of making another kind of mistake is worth considering: I call it "the mistake of ontological interpretation" as it follows from the view that successful perception should adequately depict the world. I suggest below that we had better follow the hedonistic view that successful perception should help us to prosper. I am interested in situations where someone interprets visual representations truly but uselessly. I am going to stress that ontologically oriented epistemology often promotes making ontological mistakes by concentrating on cases of factive perception which do not entail cognitive success.

Typically, one distinguishes between perception *that*... and perception as... in order to proclaim inferiority of the latter. A case of illusion recalled in this context is that of a stick submerged in water. It is said of this situation, I think wrongly, that person A sees a straight stick as bent. In my opinion, all depends on whether he simply sees a bent stick, or he sees that stick as bent. In the first case he is only mistaken, in the second he also makes a mistake. In the first case we have passive perception, in the second we have active perception. An important question is which mistake can be overcome. I do not think that a passive mistake can be corrected. In the case of interpreted perception as ... the mistake can be overcome only if A refers to an explanation involving his linguistic competence, i.e., being a result of inference or instruction. We are then justified to say of A that although A cannot correct his visual picture of the stick, he can correct his belief about its shape. I think it is essential that without an additional linguistic explanation A would be unable to correct his belief and the possession of this explanation does not change A's simple seeing: A still has the picture of a bent stick, although A believes now that the stick is straight. A is continuously deceived by the picture, though he ceases to make a doxastic mistake.

We are in trouble, however, if we want to decide what to say of person A who believes *that* the stick is straight. Agreeing that he has a visual picture of a bent stick, we should say that he has a deformed picture of a straight stick. But what does his perceptual belief relate to? Can we say that it relates to A's seeing *that* the stick is straight, or should we say that it relates to A's seeing a bent stick as straight, or should we separate seeing from believing and say that A simply sees a bent stick but, thanks to an explanation, he believes that it is straight. It seems that only if the additional explanation is involved we can say of A that he sees *that* the

stick is straight. Since it is important here that no additional explanation can correct A's way of seeing the question arises whether A's true belief *that* this stick is straight remains a genuinely perceptual belief.

When we define perceptual beliefs as those concerning the perceptible features of the world we rely on the ontological assumption that the world has a content that can be causally transformed into a phenomenal content. The phenomenal content waits as it were for an adequate linguistic interpretation, interpretation that is in principle passive. For example, if person A sees falling rain, then he acquires the propositional perception *that* the rain is falling only if he depicts the fact of the falling rain by the proposition: 'The rain is falling'. To destroy the myth of passive description philosophers sometimes refer to the 'duck-rabbit' picture (O'Brien 2004). The question asked is to what a degree A's perception depends in this case on A's linguistic competence. Traditional foundationalists are linked with the view that the content of perceptual experience can always be non-conceptual, i.e., pre-linguistic. In reaction, it is argued that the phenomenon of 'seeing as' sufficiently proves the conceptual nature of perceptual experience. The 'duck-rabbit' picture is tricky, though, as it is hard to decide (1) whether it allows for simple perception and (2) what follows from the fact that it does not allow.

Can we reasonably ask: What does a pre-linguistic child see: a duck, a rabbit, changing aspects of a duck and a rabbit, or a duck-rabbit? If his perception is passive, must it be stable or can be dynamic? If stable, should his perception be monistic or dualistic. And so on. Further, is it possible to be mistaken in this case? Is it possible to make a mistake in this case? Can one obtain a perceptual success in this case? Are the above questions crucial, or just pathetic? The anti-foundationalist theory suggests that simple perception is an empty hypothesis and the lesson to be learnt from the 'duck-rabbit' picture is that every perception is conceptually loaded. It explains that only a person who has the concept of a rabbit can see the 'duck-rabbit' picture as a rabbit and, further, that the dynamic change of aspects is possible only if the person has both concepts: he must think of a duck to see the duck-rabbit it as a duck.

Unfortunately, this alternative theory provokes analogous difficulties: Do I see the changing aspects only because I am unable to construct the concept of a duck-rabbit? If I had the dualistic concept, would my perception stabilize? Is there anything ontologically determined on a lower level of this picture, i.e., Don't I see *the same* configuration of black marks? If seeing and interpreting are inseparable, can perception be cognitively unsuccessful? The thesis that we see only *through* concepts loses some of its attraction when we face them. To conclude, I do not think that the 'duck-rabbit' picture is ontologically illuminating. Nevertheless, I believe that epistemically it surely is if it helps to understand that ontological theses concerning perceptual representation are cognitively misleading. Philosophers dominated by the ontological perspective persistently ask about the possibility of representative seeing and then it seems to them, by analogy, that the basic epistemic question concerns the possibility of representative perceptual beliefs. To counter this perspective I would like once again to focus on two theses: (1) linguistically interpreted perception can still be cognitively useless and (2) the cognitive usefulness of perception as... is substantially higher than perception *that*... . Thus, I am going to switch from the ontological controversy over whether genuine perception is conceptual to the purely epistemic explanation in what way conceptual perception becomes cognitively successful.

It is reasonable to think that an epistemic counterpart of the problem of simple perception is the problem of non-inferentially justified beliefs because foundationalists usually hope that perceptual beliefs are both non-inferential and sensitive, safe or at least apt (Sosa 2007, 98-105). They either maintain that phenomenal beliefs such as: 'It looks to me as if the rain is falling' are non-inferential and infallible or that objective beliefs such as: 'I see *that* the rain is falling' are non-inferential and *prima facie* justified. Critics reject the first position because it fails to explain how phenomenal beliefs can justify objective beliefs. The second position looks promising only for those who think that un-defeated perceptual beliefs are self-sufficient (Audi 2002, 83-87). Anyway, respect for perceptual beliefs, preferably factive, is quite common.

If asked of the type of perception that should be particularly favoured, the foundationalists answer that perception *that*... is incomparable. Actually, in reaction to Gettier counterexamples, they are engaged in specifying conditions under which perception *that*... becomes knowledge, i.e., is effectively un-gettierized (Alston 2005, 21-28). As long as they automatically prefer perception *that*... to perception *as*... their thinking remains ontologically oriented: they value perception *that* p for its *factivity* and imply that perceptual belief that p is perfect when determined by the fact p.

What disturbs me about the phrase 'A sees *that* p' is its easy reduction to banal 'A sees X as X'. For example, 'A sees *that* the rain is falling' seems no more informative than 'A sees falling rain as falling rain'. What is heuristic in seeing falling rain as falling rain? If nothing, then it is worth stressing that perception *that*... is in most cases *non-heuristic*. Heuristic perception must resemble the duck-rabbit perception insofar as it must reflect the agent's switch to *different* aspects or his seeing *new* aspects. Only seeing object X as object Y, i.e., seeing X as something else, or seeing X as a sign of something else can be heuristic.

To end with the case of person A seeing falling rain, it is intuitively obvious, I hope, that rain rarely is a neutral fact beyond positive or negative evaluation: as something pleasant, desirable or unpleasant, dangerous. If rain were neutral, heuristic seeing of rain would be inessential. Suppose that A lives by a river and the rain has been continuously falling for a week but every time when A looks out of the window he sees *that* the rain is falling and *nothing else*: he is unable to see the falling rain as a sign of coming floods. Or suppose that A has a garden, there has been no rain for weeks and when it starts raining at last all that he sees is *that* the rain is falling: he is unable to see the rain as a sign of the ending drought. Is then A's perception *that*... a cognitive success? Can we say that A cognitively consumed some perceptual information? In such contexts, perception *that*... seems to be heuristic only if it is an abbreviation of prior perception *as*..., i.e., when A says: 'I see *that* floods are coming', or 'I see *that* the drought is ending'.

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Therapy, Practice and Normativity

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...we are good reasoners, as opposed to merely consumers of good reasons, not because we are bound to abstract rules and laws, but because we are agents who bind ourselves to, and hold ourselves to finding, particular things worthy of our attention. ... The source of good reasoning is the active self-legislating subject binding herself to how things are in the world.¹

Michael Luntley

1. Practice As therapy: The Negative Aspect of the Whole Idea of Normativity

The standard account of the concept 'practice' in the Wittgensteinian story emphasises that not what we say, but what we do with words is crucial and central to an account of the metaphysics of the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of the use of words. This account can be regarded as an anti-theoretical approach, according to which the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of word use cannot be theorised and put into words. Theorising has to stop somewhere, otherwise we are confronted with an infinite regress situation which never comes to an end because each theoretical candidate for the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of word use has to be interpreted and interpretation never comes to an end. In other words, instead of what we say, it is what we do with words that provides normativity. This account of the concept of practice results from a negative thesis: the normativity of word use cannot be put into words. In the absence of the theoretical account of normativity, the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of the word use cannot be put into words.

This Wittgensteinian anti-theoretic approach, which is often read as a therapeutic account, amounts to a denial of the idea that there are theoretical endeavours in the realm of philosophy. This is a negative thesis about practice which emphasises that there is nothing over and above practice and what we do with words which provides the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of word use. Normativity is grounded in what we do with words.²

According to the therapeutic account, Wittgenstein tries to show that philosophy does not deal with making theories. Rather, philosophy is an activity which never comes to an end. Being engaged in philosophy does not lead to arriving at theories. There is nothing over and above activity and being engaged in practice. We have to do something instead of saying something to be involved in philosophical activity. In such a way, we can make our problems clearer. Wittgenstein says:

Our... investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language (§90).

Philosophy deals with an ongoing clearing-up of different parts of language. There is no such thing as a theoretical approach to resolving philosophical problems. Rather, to the extent that we are engaged in practice, we can cure ourselves of thinking that philosophical problems exist. According to the therapeutic account, there is no such thing as a general and pre-existing signpost and criterion according to which we can find the right way to use a word. Rather, the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of word use is formed through our practice. There is no such thing as a theorised normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of the word use which is posited over and above practice. Being engaged in practice, on its own, guides us to how to go on.

1-1 Rule-Following Argument

Let us now look at the rule-following argument in *Philosophical Investigations* to make the therapeutic account clearer.³

According to the therapeutic account of Wittgenstein, the rule-following argument deals with the inability of a pupil to theorise and put into words the notion of following a rule like 'add 2'. Each explanation and interpretation needs to be interpreted. The interpretation never comes to an end. So, there is no such thing as a theorised normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of following a rule. There is no final theoretical account of how we arrive at the normativity which we are looking for. Consider the following quotes by Wittgenstein:

Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say +2) beyond 1000—and he writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012. We say to him: "Look what you've done!"—He doesn't understand. We say: "You were meant to add two: look how you began the series!"—He answers: "Yes, isn't it right? I thought that was how I was *meant* to do it."—Or suppose he pointed to the series and said: "But I went on in the same way."—It would now be no use to say: "But can't you see...?"—and repeat the old examples and explanations (§185).

According to Wittgenstein, there is no such thing as a theoretical understanding according to which we follow the rule. However, it does not follow from this that the whole idea of normativity will evaporate when we talk about obeying a rule. Rather, the right way of following a rule comes out to the extent that we are engaged in practice. The right way

¹ Luntley, M. (2005) 'The Role of Judgment', *Philosophical Explorations*, Special Issue, Competence: Educational Philosophy of Minded Agency, eds. Branson & Luntley, 8(3), p. 292.

² For more elaboration with regard to the therapeutic account, see the following references: Lovibond, S. (2002) *Ethical Formation* (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press), chapters 1,2 and 3. See also McDowell, J. (1994) *Mind And World* (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press), Lecture 5. See also Thornton, T. *John McDowell* (Chesham:Acumen), pp. 17-20 & chap. 1.

³ What I am doing is utilising the rule-following argument to make the distinction between the therapeutic account and its rival, the theoretical account, clearer.

For more elaboration on the rule-following argument, see McDowell, J. (1998) 'Virtue and Reason', pp. 50-73 & 'Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following', pp. 198-218 in his *Mind, Value, and Reality* (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press). See also Dabbagh, S. & Mosmer, R. (2007) "Frege, Wittgenstein and Private Language Argument" in *the Proceedings of International Analytic Philosophy Conference*, Iranian Institute of Philosophy.

of following a rule cannot be theorised and put into words. It cannot be articulated in a proposition, otherwise we will be confronted with a regress situation which never comes to an end.

In fact, the slogan of this therapeutic account of the rule-following argument is that instead of adhering to rules and their interpretations to give an account of what normative constraint consists of, focusing on practice and what we do with words over time provides normativity.⁴ In the denial of the Platonic source of normativity, according to which the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of word use consists of the theoretical patterns which are formulated entirely independently of what we, as language-users, do with words; we have a crucial role to provide normativity by being engaged in practice. What we do with words has the main role in the metaphysics of the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of word use.

2. Therapy Is Not Adequate

At this stage, I wish to criticize the therapeutic account of practice and the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of word use.

So far, we have dealt with the negative aspect of the whole idea of normativity and normative constraint. Now, what I am planning to show is that if we concentrate only on the point that being engaged in practice is enough to provide normativity, it seems that we are offered a mysterious and unclear account, according to which there is no account available of how we arrive at the rightness and wrongness of word use in a concrete situation.⁵

According to the therapeutic account, the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of word use cannot be put into words. If this is the case and there is nothing which can be put into words, how can we make the distinction between the rightness and wrongness intelligible? If there is nothing which can be put into words, how can we tell a convincing account, according to which someone who has got the wrong normative judgment in a concrete situation, changes his judgment? Is there any story to be told in this respect? It seems that the way in which a therapist arrives at the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of word use is vague and unclear.

In order to give an account of how the distinction between rightness and wrongness makes sense, something has to be added to the negative conception of practice. There is an account with regard to the positive conception

⁴ The role of time in arriving at the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of the use of words is this. Seeing the rightness of the usage of a word requires the word to be applied on different occasions. In other words, the language-user needs time to be engaged in using the word in several circumstances. Only in this way the language-user can arrive at the right usage of the word.

⁵ We must remember that we are talking about the whole idea of practice and its association with the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of the use of words in a first order sense. In other words, whether or not the way in which we are engaged with things in the world at the very basic level, is practising and doing but not theorising is not my concern at this stage. This is an issue with regard to the concept of practice from the second order point of view.

The mystery and vagueness of the concept of practice which I am discussing lies in *the way* in which we arrive at the rightness of 'telling the truth', in the realm of morality, in a concrete case in which it is combined with another morally relevant feature such as reparation. So, it is a first order perspective in the sense that it deals with what we do in each concrete ethical situation to arrive at the rightness and wrongness of moral vocabulary. In this philosophical endeavour, the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of words, and the way in which we arrive at rightness or wrongness are under investigation.

of practice which has to be given. The notion of practice has to be unpacked in such a way that the distinction between rightness and wrongness makes sense. It is not adequate to say that the concept of practice cannot be theorised. Something else has to be added and doing this provides the positive account of the concept of practice.

As long as we adhere to the unanalysed account of the notion of practice and being engaged in practice, we are not offered a positive account of the idea of normativity, according to which we can distinguish between rightness and wrongness.

In fact, by analysing the issue we are talking about the practical legitimation of the concept of practice. What follows below is just a sketch of the idea of practical legitimation of the concept 'practice'. I give an outline account of the positive aspect of the concept 'practice'.

3. First Order Account of the Concept 'Practice': Its Constituents

In order to give an account of the positive aspect of the normative story, it might be a good idea to distinguish between two different aspects of the concept of practice. Let us regard these two different aspects of the concept of practice as the first order account and the second order account.⁶

The discussion with regard to the concept 'practice' from the first-order point of view deals with the components of the concept of practice. It concerns the elements of practice which have to be acquired before one can be regarded as a person who practises well. In other words, talking about the constituents of the concept 'practice' at this level makes clear what one must do in order to be regarded as an individual who practises well. Moreover, the whole idea of the rightness and wrongness of word use, at this level, concerns the circumstances in which a practice can be regarded as correct or incorrect, though it cannot be theorised. However, the role of the concept 'practice' in arriving at the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of word use is not at stake.⁷ By contrast, having endorsed what we do with words which cannot be theorised and provides the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of the word use, the discussion with regard to the notion of practice, at this level, tries to shed light on the constituents of the concept of practice which have to be considered so that one can be regarded as a person who practises well.

We must remember that talking about the components of the concept of practice from the first-order point of view does not lead to the theoretical account of normativity and the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of word use which was criticised earlier. Rather, once the point has been endorsed, the whole idea of normativity and normative constraint cannot be theorised and put into words; this part of the positive aspect of the whole idea of normativity tries to give an account of how the concept of practice and its constituents provides normativity and a normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of word use which we are looking for. In other words, according to the negative aspect of the normative story, not what we say but what we do with words provides normativity.

⁶ Note that what I am saying with regard to the distinction between the first-order and the second-order account of the concept 'practice' is only a possible suggestion to elaborate the positive aspect of the concept 'practice'.

⁷ This is the issue with regard to the concept of practice from the second-order point of view.

We have to do something with words in order to provide normativity. But, according to the positive aspect of the normative story which deals with the concept of practice from the first-order point of view, saying only that what we do with words provides normativity would not be enough and we will end up with an unclear account of what the distinction between right and wrong is. So, we have to unpack the notion of practice and give more detail with regard to the components of the concept 'practice'.

4. Second-order account of the Concept 'Practice': Doing Goes All the Way Down

Now, let us consider the concept of practice from the second order point of view in order to give more detail to a possible account of the positive aspect of the whole idea of normativity.

Talking about the concept of practice from the second order point of view deals with the issue of whether or not being engaged in practice is prior to theorising at the very basic level of our confrontation with things in the world. Which comes first at the very basic level? Being engaged in practising or being engaged in theorising? Shall we say that our overt activity is the end of the line? Or, going deep down, our overt activities are based upon mental activities?

At this stage, I am outlining the idea that overt activities are ultimately grounded in mental activities. Being engaged in practice and doing is prior to theorising at the very basic level of our confrontation with things in the world. In other words, our beliefs, desires, etc. which outline our cognitive relationship with the world are based upon what we do instead of what we say. Doing goes all the way down, theories come afterwards. Moreover, we have to bear in mind that there is a normative element in saying that our beliefs, desires, etc. are formed by practice all the way down, which has to be taken into account. In other words, it is not the case that only theories are associated with *ought* and the idea of normative constraint. Rather, if we subscribe to the point that what we do with things in the world shapes our cognitive profile even at the very basic level, an account of how we arrive at the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of the use of words is presented. We show that we ought to respond to things in the world in such a way rather than the other way. In other words, there is a normative constraint which is being formed here to the extent that we are engaged with things in the world. If it is practice 'all the way down', then practice has to be intrinsically normative: it does not need theory to provide the normative 'ought'. What I want to sketch is one possible way of making sense of this idea. The idea is that in performing practice, we are *committing* ourselves to responding to the environment in a specific way. Attending and committing to the environment starts with mental activity, not a mental stasis that is then shaped by reasons. It is not the case that the way in which we are engaged with things in the environment is derived from some fixed and static rules. Rather, it is flexible and based upon our ongoing commitment to things in the world. Mental activity is the point of departure. Bodily practice is based upon mental activity.

Furthermore, if attending to things leaves no place for theorising at the very basic level, the role of the agent who engages with things is crucial and has to be taken into account. What I mean by the task of the agent is his capacity to engage actively with things in the environment. The agent has a capacity to shape his cognitive profile following his active engagement with things in the envi-

ronment. In fact, his capacity to couple with things at the very basic level and the way in which the agent conceptually engages with things in the environment gives an account of how we couple with things in the world at the very basic level. This kind of engaging and coupling with things in the environment is relational and provides a normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of the use of words. Luntley says:

By 'coupling' I mean a conceptually articulated engagement with a thing or property of the environment. Couplings are relational (2004, p.2).

So, the subject as an agent has a capacity to couple actively with things in the environment. The way in which his thought is formulated can be regarded as a kind of mental activity. This is an agent with a capacity to be engaged with things in the environment through mental activity which is primitive in the formation of a normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of word use. Theories come afterwards.

Having sketched the concept 'practice' from the second order point of view, we can say that the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of word use deals with what we do. Doing and practising goes all the way down in the analysis and forms our cognitive relationship with the world at the very basic level.

Moreover, the account of the concept 'practice' from the second-order point of view, unlike from the first-order point of view, is far from the common sensical account of the concept 'practice'. In other words, the common sensical account of the concept 'practice' deals with what we do in real life. For instance, a goalkeeper during a football match practises goal keeping. He can be a better goalkeeper provided that he keeps practising throughout the tournament. This is the account of the concept 'practice' which we have seen in the discussion from the first-order point of view.

On the other hand, the account of concept 'practice' from the second-order point of view does not deal with the common sensical account of the concept 'practice'. Rather, it tries to show that we cannot get away from being engaged in practice and doing even at the very basic level of our confrontation with the world. According to this account of the concept 'practice', doing goes all the way down. The way in which we are conceptually engaged with things in the world is based upon what we do rather than what we say at the very basic level.

To recap, in order to sketch the idea of the practical legitimation of the concept 'practice', giving an outline account of the positive aspect of the whole idea of 'normativity', it is a good idea to distinguish the first-order and the second-order accounts of the concept 'practice'. According to the first-order account of the concept 'practice', taking into account 'what we do with words', which provides the negative aspect of the normative story, sounds mysterious and vague. So, in order to eliminate the mystery from the concept 'practice' and give a justified account of the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of word use, the constituents of the concept 'practice' have to be articulated. The more the components of the concept of practice are unfolded, the more we see what the distinction between the rightness and wrongness of the word use is.

Furthermore, according to the second-order account of the concept 'practice', the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of the word use is entirely associated with activity. Overt activities depend on mental activities. Doing and being engaged in practice goes all the

way down in the analysis to the extent that there is no space left for theorising in the first place. Being engaged with a thing or a property in the environment at the very basic level provides the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of word use.

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Sprache und Wirklichkeit in Nāgārjunas Mūlamadhyamakārikā

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1

Der Begriff ist eine Regel, nach der ein Gegenstand unter bestimmten Vorstellungen gedacht werden kann. Jeder Begriff bezieht sich auf einen Gegenstand, und zwischen dem Begriff und dem Gegenstand, der ihm zugehört, besteht ein Verhältnis der Eindeutigkeit. Diese Beziehung des Begriffs auf seinen Gegenstand bzw. auf seinen Sachverhalt macht die Realität des Begriffs aus. Diese Realität des Begriffs gründet in der Anschauung, und das heißt, der Begriff beruht auf Anschauung. Jedoch beruht der Begriff nicht nur auf seinem immer schon vorhandenen Gegenstand, sondern er kann ihn auch erst konstituieren; dies ist der Fall bei mathematischen Begriffen. Ein Dreieck der Mathematik ist nicht vorgegeben, bis die Regel, die es konstituiert, gegeben ist. Jedoch beruht auch hier die Realität des Begriffs auf der Anschauung. Ohne dass der mathematische Begriff in der Anschauung konstituiert wird, kann aus der Regel, die ihn konstituiert, nichts geschlossen werden. So lässt sich aus dem Begriff des Dreiecks nicht folgern, dass seine Winkelsumme 180° beträgt, wenn mir dieser Begriff nicht in der Anschauung gegeben ist.¹

Der Begriff kann ein solcher sein, für den kein korrespondierender Gegenstand physisch vorhanden ist, der aber davon ausgeht, dass ein solcher Gegenstand vorgegeben ist und vorgefunden werden kann. Das sind zum Beispiel die platonischen Begriffe. Und der Begriff kann auch ein solcher sein, für den es weder einen entsprechenden Gegenstand, der vorhanden ist, noch einen, der vorgefunden werden kann, gibt, weil der Gegenstand ein solcher ist, dem niemals eine Anschauung korrespondiert. Das sind nach Kant die Vernunftbegriffe Gott, Freiheit, Unsterblichkeit. Nāgārjuna untersucht weder die erstere noch die letztere Art von Begriffen. Und er geht auch nicht auf die mathematischen Begriffe ein. Deshalb verzichte ich darauf, sie im Folgenden zu erörtern. Stattdessen untersucht Nāgārjuna Begriffe, die unsere Wirklichkeit ausmachen.

Unsere Begriffe von der Wirklichkeit sind sprachlich verfasst. Ich erkenne z.B. dieses vierbeinige Gestell mit einer horizontalen Platte als Tisch, indem ich es unter dem Begriff Tisch subsumiere. Diesen Begriff gibt es in vielen Sprachen, und natürlich kann ein Tisch auch bloß dreibeinig sein. Wenn ich diesen realen Gegenstand sehe, so ermöglicht mir der Begriff Tisch jeweils, diesen so wahrgenommenen Gegenstand, der darunter subsumiert werden kann, Tisch zu nennen. So gesehen konstruieren Begriffe die Realität, die wir benennen können. Nun ist die Realität, die wir uns durch unsere Sprache erschließen, jeweils unsere Realität. Gerade deshalb entsteht die Frage, wie sich diese Realität zur Sprache verhält. Ist die so konstruierte Wirklichkeit real in dem Sinn, dass sie einen Sachgehalt hat, oder ist sie bloß ein sprachliches Gefüge? Gibt es eine objektive Wirklichkeit, die unabhängig von der Sprache und wahrer ist als diese Wirklichkeit, die wir uns mittels unserer Sprache erschließen? Im Verhältnis zwischen Sprache und Wirklichkeit sieht der buddhistische

Denker Nāgārjuna (circa 4. Jh. n. Chr.)² Probleme. Wo liegen sie?

2

Um das Problem, das Nāgārjuna im oben angedeuteten Verhältnis von Sprache und Wirklichkeit sieht, zu erläutern, greife ich zwei Beispiele aus seiner Schrift *Mūlamadhyamakārikā* (MMK) auf.

Im ersten Kapitel der MMK behauptet Nāgārjuna: Weder ist Seiendes noch ist Nichtseiendes (MMK 1). Jede Aussage vollzieht sich entweder als Affirmation oder als Negation, und als eine solche bezieht sie sich immer auf das Seiende. Weil die Sprache das Seiende umgreift, kann in ihr über das Nichtseiende weder gedacht noch etwas ausgesagt werden. Deshalb gibt es nach Nāgārjuna das Nichtseiende nicht. Was folgt aus diesem Gedankengang? Wenn es weder das Seiende noch das Nichtseiende gibt, bleibt jede Aussage in der Schwebe. Die formale Umsetzung dieses Gedankengangs bedeutet, dass bei Nāgārjuna eine These zurückgewiesen wird, indem der Gegensatz von der These aufgestellt und zurückgewiesen wird durch Aufstellung eines neuen Gegensatzes, der wiederum durch den Gegensatz zurückzuweisen ist ad infinitum. Diese negative Dialektik findet keinen Ruhepunkt: Sie zeigt, dass nichts gezeigt werden kann, und dies anhand eines Denkens, das in den Dienst gestellt wird, sich selbst aufzuheben.

Insofern sich der Begriff des Seienden gegen den des Nichtseienden abgrenzt, bedingen die zwei Begriffe einander, und so gesehen, sind sie voneinander abhängig. Wenn man nun den Begriff des Nichtseienden fallen lässt, da das Nichtseiende in der Sprache weder denkbar noch aussagbar ist, dann fällt damit auch der Begriff des Seienden. Die Wahrheit ist, dass weder das Seiende noch das Nichtseiende ist; die Sprache aber tut so, als gäbe es das Seiende und das Nichtseiende wirklich.

Die Sprache täuscht, und Nāgārjuna untersucht sie, um ihr Täuschungspotential zu entlarven. Jedoch täuscht die Sprache nicht nur eine Wirklichkeit vor, die unwahr ist. Vielmehr schafft die Sprache dadurch, dass sie täuscht, ihre eigene Wirklichkeit. Wie MMK 6 zeigt, ist das Verhältnis von Eigenschaft und Träger der Eigenschaft nicht ohne Widersprüche beschreibbar, wenn es in sprachlichen Konzepten dargestellt wird. Existiert z.B. der von der Leidenschaft Ergriffene vor der Leidenschaft, dann wäre er ohne Leidenschaft. Dass der von der Leidenschaft Ergriffene ohne Leidenschaft sei, ist jedoch unsinnig. Die Widersprüche entstehen, weil sich Begriff und Sache nur in Beziehung zueinander konstituieren. Der Träger der Leidenschaft, z. B., ist dem Begriff nach von der Sache Leidenschaft abhängig. Die Widersprüche entstehen aber auch, weil, wie bereits angedeutet, Begriffe sich in Beziehung zueinander konstituieren, insofern sie gegenseitig bedingt sind.

¹ Vgl. Blumenberg 2007, 49.

² Vgl. Vidyabhusana 1921, 251f.

Wenn alles, was ist, Illusion ist, dann gibt es kein Seiendes. Durch Begriffsanalyse zeigt Nāgārjuna, wie die Realität des Begriffs hinfällig wird, wenn sich der Gegenstand des Begriffs als unreal entlarvt. Aber er zeigt auch andererseits, wie alles, was ist, sich als unreal herausstellen muss, wenn die Realität der Begriffe hinfällig wird aufgrund ihrer gegenseitigen Abhängigkeit. Zwar tut die Sprache so, als gäbe es die Welt der Phänomene. Jedoch zerstört Nāgārjuna jede denkbare Kategorie, wobei er diese Welt als leer entlarvt. Die Wahrheit ist, dass sich alles in gegenseitiger Abhängigkeit befindet, weshalb alles substanz- und eigenschaftslos und somit leer ist.

3

Alle Phänomene sind leer. Was kann man daraus folgern? Führt die negative Dialektik des Nāgārjuna in die Ohnmacht der privaten Existenz? Wir tun als Inder³ alles Mögliche, und versuchen sogar das Unmögliche, um unserer Familie zu helfen, während wir nicht imstande sind, dem Bettler, der ans Fenster klopft, einen Blick zu gönnen. Wir greifen nach dem Himmel und fahren zum Mond⁴, verlieren jedoch keinen Gedanken darüber, dass die Mehrheit unserer Mitmenschen nicht mal eine adäquate Mahlzeit am Tag zu sich nehmen kann. Welche Alternative gibt es zu dieser Ohnmacht? Man meint, ein Leben in der Öffentlichkeit. Jedoch ist zu bedenken, ob wir gefeit sind gegen die Verführung durch die Öffentlichkeit, insofern die Sprache der Öffentlichkeit sowohl führen als auch verführen kann.⁵ Nāgārjuna zeigt, wie die Sprache einen dazu verführt, an eine Wirklichkeit zu glauben, die jedoch nicht ist.

Es gibt einen Begriff von Wahrheit, der Richtigkeit bedeutet, und dem eine Falschheit korreliert. In der Welt der abhängigen Verhältnisse, d.h. in der Welt der Phänomene bedienen wir uns dieses Begriffs. Wir behaupten, etwas ist wahr bzw. unwahr und meinen damit, etwas ist richtig bzw. falsch.

Nun gibt es einen Begriff von Wahrheit, dem keine Falschheit korreliert. Eine solche Wahrheit ist die Leerheit (śūnyatā). Wenn alles leer ist, dann erübrigt sich die Frage, ob etwas richtig oder falsch sein kann. Nun berücksichtigt Nāgārjuna nur den kontradiktorischen und nicht den konträren Gegensatz. Aus diesem Grund hat er einen statischen Seinsbegriff; es lässt sich bei ihm kein Begriff des Werdens finden. Die Begriffe des Seienden und des Nichtseienden, von Saṃsāra und Nirvāṇa⁶ bilden kontradiktorische Gegensätze. Dagegen ist die Leerheit ein Begriff, zu welchem es weder einen kontradiktorischen noch einen konträren Begriff gibt, der etwas Reales (im Sinne von *realitas* = Sachgehalt) bezeichnet. Da es nichts gibt, was nicht nicht-leer ist, entzieht sich die Leerheit der Realität. Deshalb lässt sich von dieser Leerheit nichts Bestimmtes behaupten. Zum einen bezeichnet sie jene Grauzone zwischen dem Seienden und dem Nichtseienden, weshalb sie weder ist noch nicht ist. Zum anderen kann ich von ihr nicht mal sagen, ob sie ist oder nicht ist, ohne in die Verlegenheit zu geraten, in die die Sprache mich versetzt. Behaupte ich von ihr, dass sie ist, dann mache ich sie zu einem Seienden, das sie jedoch nicht ist. Behaupte ich von ihr andererseits, dass sie nicht ist, dann glaube ich, sie durch meine Behauptung zu einem Nichtseienden zu

³ Die Verfasserin stammt aus Indien.

⁴ Im Jahr 2008 schickt Indien seinen ersten Mond-Raumkörper auf eine zweijährige Mission, um den Mond zu umkreisen und Landkarten von der Mondoberfläche neu zu zeichnen.

⁵ Vgl. Heidegger 2004, 319.

⁶ Saṃsāra bezeichnet 1) die objektive Welt, 2) die Welt der Unerlöstheit, 3) den Kreislauf der Wiedergeburt. Nirvāṇa wird negativ bestimmt als das Verlöschen des Kreislaufs der Wiedergeburt.

machen, das sie wiederum nicht ist, während ich sie durch die Behauptung, dass sie nicht ist, zu einem Seienden mache dadurch, dass das absprechende ‚nicht‘ nur durch das ‚ist‘ zu denken und auszusagen ist. Die Sprache verwickelt uns in ein Paradox, und man kommt aus der sprachlichen Verstrickung nicht heraus, solange man versucht, über die Leerheit zu bestimmen, ob sie ist oder nicht ist. Der einzige Weg, zur Einsicht in die Leerheit zu gelangen, ist der Weg Nāgārjunas, auf dem er das Denken so weit führt, bis es sich selber aufhebt. Da die Leerheit weder das Seiende noch das Nichtseiende ist, ist es mir erlaubt, nur vorsichtig auszusagen: Es gibt die Leerheit. Derjenige, der diese Wahrheit einsieht, wird auf das Reden verzichten. Er wird kaum etwas oder nichts zu sagen haben. Die Einsicht in diese Wahrheit führt notwendig zum Schweigen.

4

Ich erinnere an Kants Ding an sich, von dem Kant sagt, dass es nicht erkannt werden kann, jedoch angenommen werden muss, wenn die Vernunft sich nicht mittels einer unendlichen Dialektik zerstören will. Die Leerheit, von der Nāgārjuna spricht, durchbricht den Kreis von Argument und Gegenargument, von Ansicht und Gegenansicht. Anders als das Kantische Ding an sich ist jedoch die Leerheit ein Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, und Nāgārjuna gelangt zu dieser Wahrheit nur über die Sprache. Die Einsicht in die Leerheit betrifft jedoch die Welt der Phänomene. Mittels der Sprache können wir nur erkennen, dass die Welt der Phänomene leer ist. Wir können mit den Mitteln unseres Denkens nicht zu der Wirklichkeit hinter den Phänomenen gelangen, denn diese Wirklichkeit ist nicht in der Sprache darstellbar. Diese Wirklichkeit, wenn es sie gibt, übersteigt die Sprache, so können wir sie durch die Sprache nicht ergreifen. Jedoch wie, so frage ich, können wir sie denn ergreifen? Welche Alternative haben wir, sie zu erfassen und mitzuteilen, wenn die Sprache wegfallen soll?

In seiner MMK suggeriert Nāgārjuna, seine Denkübung als eine praktische Übung, als Meditation zu vollziehen. Bedenkt man, dass das Denken ein Tun ist und sich jedes Tun als Illusion erweist, dann muss sich auch das Denken als eine Illusion herausstellen. Und doch ist es ein beunruhigender Gedanke, dass die Denkübung, zu welcher Nāgārjuna anleitet, nichts als Illusion, nicht real sein soll, dass sich alle Ergebnisse des Denkens auch als Illusion entlarven. Folglich ist die Wirklichkeit hinter den Phänomenen, wenn es sie gibt, nicht durch das Denken zu erreichen, wenn sie selbst nicht Illusion sein soll. Sie kann nicht auf dem Weg der Sprache erlangt werden, da das Denken sich der Sprache bedient. Diese Wirklichkeit liegt jenseits der Sprache und des Denkens. Aber dann gilt es überhaupt zu fragen, ob man je sagen kann, dass es sie gibt, ob sie erkennbar und mitteilbar ist? Oder ob, da sie durch die Sprache nicht erfasst werden kann, man nicht besser daran wäre, mit Gorgias zu behaupten, „1) daß nichts ist; 2) daß, wenn es ist, es dem Menschen nicht erfaßbar ist; 3) daß, wenn es erfaßbar ist, man es wenigstens nicht aussprechen und den Mitmenschen mitteilen könnte“⁷? Ein gewisser sophistischer Zug lässt sich im Denken Nāgārjunas nicht leugnen, wenngleich Nāgārjuna nicht wie die Sophisten sich des Täuschungspotentials der Rede bedient, um Täuschung zu erzeugen, sondern dem Reden entsagt, weil sich die Sprache als Täuschung entlarvt hat. Man muss sich jedoch weigern, selbst die Aussage „es ist nichts“ auszusprechen, denn selbst diese bringt einen in die sprachliche Verlegenheit, die daraus

⁷ Gorgias 2003, 63.

resultiert, dass das „nichts“ nur durch das ‚ist‘ gedacht und ausgesagt werden kann.

So muss die Frage, ob es eine Wirklichkeit hinter den Phänomenen gibt, unbeantwortet bleiben, will man nicht in das Paradox hineingezogen werden, in das die Sprache uns verwickelt. Diese Wirklichkeit ist kein Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Da sie sich der Sprache und dem Denken entzieht, lässt sich über sie nichts aussagen, nicht einmal, ob sie ist. Dennoch aber bildet sie einen leitenden Gedanken im Denken Nāgārjunas. Denn nur die praktische Annahme jener Wirklichkeit jenseits der Welt der Phänomene, die man jedoch niemals theoretisch erkennen und mitteilen kann, kann einem den Leitfaden geben, aus dem Kreislauf der Wiedergeburt herauszutreten und Nirvāṇa anzustreben.

5

Aber selbst das Nirvāṇa ist leer (MMK 8.6). Solange man sich in der unendlichen Kette des konditionalen Nexus befindet, sind sowohl Saṃsāra als auch Nirvāṇa leer. Die Leerheit der Phänomene beschreibt jene Grauzone, von der nicht einmal gesagt werden kann, ob sie ist oder nicht ist. Da die Leerheit unsere Welt der Phänomene betrifft, und der Fortgang der negativen Dialektik das Denken dazu zwingt, selbst von der Leerheit loszukommen, so muss sie nach Nāgārjunas negativer Dialektik sich selbst aufheben, um auf eine höhere Wirklichkeit zu verweisen, die jenseits der Welt der Phänomene liegt. Nāgārjunas Methode suggeriert eine solche Wirklichkeit jenseits der Sprache und des Denkens. Nicht unethisch ist er, sondern er fordert auf indirekte Weise zu einer Existenz auf, die jener Wirklichkeit entsprechen kann.

So spricht er davon, Tugenden wie Selbstzügelung und Wohlwollen zu kultivieren (MMK 17.1), und Leidenschaft, Hass und Verblendung zu vermeiden (MMK 23.1), und somit das Leben in ein moralisch-gutes Leben zu verwandeln.⁸ Was bedeutet das in der Gegenwart? Im Kontext der religiös-politischen Gefährdung, mit der man heute vor allem in Indien konfrontiert ist, erhält jene Aufforderung einen existentiellen Sinn. Sie weist auf eine Existenz hin,

die es sich weder leisten kann, sich in die Ohnmacht des Privaten zurückzuziehen, noch der Verführung durch die Öffentlichkeit anheimzufallen. Diese Wirklichkeit zu erfahren und mitzuteilen, verlangt nach einem anderen Denken, nach einer anderen Sprache, nicht jedoch in dem Sinne, dass man sich eine völlig neue Sprache aneignet und anfängt, in einer fremden Zunge zu reden. Die Sprache kann diese höhere Wirklichkeit nicht wiedergeben; sie muss dafür zugerichtet werden. Denn man kann nicht anders, als sich in die Sprache zu begeben. Aber man kann sich immerhin der Sprache bewusst bedienen; so kann man sich für das Schweigen öffnen und lernen, es einzubeziehen.⁹ Nirvāṇa ist nach Nāgārjuna weder eine metaphysische Idee noch eine metaphysische Wirklichkeit jenseits unserer durch die Sprache geformten und daher verführenden Wirklichkeit. Sondern Nirvāṇa ist existentiell gesehen das bewusste Leben in dieser Wirklichkeit selbst, die den Saṃsāra ausmacht. Denn Saṃsāra ist Nirvāṇa und Nirvāṇa Saṃsāra (MMK 25). Zwar sind beide kontradiktorische Begriffe, jedoch insofern sie sich gegenseitig bestimmen, sind Saṃsāra und Nirvāṇa unter der Maßgabe der Leerheit identisch.¹⁰

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⁸ Vgl. dazu Kalupahana 1986, 89f.

⁹ Wie schwierig es ist, für das Schweigen empfänglich zu sein, zeigt sich an der Verlegenheit, in die man gerät, wenn inmitten einer geselligen Runde plötzlich das Schweigen entsteht.

¹⁰ Vgl. MMK 25.19: „Es gibt nichts, was den Saṃsāra vom Nirvāṇa und das Nirvāṇa vom Saṃsāra unterscheidet“ wie auch MMK 25.20: „Die Grenze des Nirvāṇa ist zugleich die Grenze des Saṃsāra. Zwischen diesen beiden wird auch nicht der feinste Unterschied gefunden“. Weber-Brosamer / Back 1997, 100.

Referential Descriptions in Attitude Reports

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Say you are attending Jones' trial for murdering Smith. He's on the stand and everybody in the courtroom are astonished – instead of sound, firm defence, Jones is producing loud terrifying noises accompanied by massive sweating, hear pulling, eye twitching, and manic crying. Just as any other person in the courtroom you can barely watch such insanity, and you whisper to a person next to you:

(1) Smith's murderer is insane.

Your hearer believes you, understands what you have just said, and who you are talking about. He agrees with you and would probably express his belief about the insanity of the testifier just as you did; most people in the courtroom would. The only thing is, the person on the stand – Jones – is not Smith's murderer. Nevertheless, it appears that although you were both partly mistaken, you managed to refer to Jones using description 'Smith's murderer,' and you said something true about him (granted that Jones really is insane). Now, this is a standard example of Donnellan's referentially used definite description (further "referential description" in short), and his position is well known (Donnellan 1966). If in uttering (1) the speaker intended to refer to the person *he had in mind*, and that person is Jones, then he managed to refer to Jones using 'Smith's murderer' and to say something true about him, even though Jones is not Smith's murderer. Otherwise, if the speaker had no one in particular in mind in uttering (1), but wanted to say something about *whoever* murdered Smith (motivated perhaps by the terrifying image of Smith's mutilated body and associating insanity with such a deed) he used 'Smith's murderer' attributively (like Russell, or Strawson perhaps).

There is a lot of reasonable suspicion surrounding Donnellan's proposed referential/attribution ambiguity in general and referential descriptions as he characterised them in particular. But despite resolute defence of Russellian unitary quantificational analysis of descriptions, ever since Donnellan's paper some phenomena are brought in focus which apparently resist such analysis and support Donnellan's referential/attribution distinction, most notably incomplete definite descriptions (see e.g. Wettstein 1981, but also opening remarks in Kripke 1979). In this paper I propose to examine another phenomenon which could be used to support Donnellan's position, namely occurrences of definite descriptions in some attitude reports. Lycan (2008) offered such an argumentation. He considers the following report (Lycan 2008: 26):

(2) I wish that her husband weren't her husband.

The natural reading of (2), Lycan suggests, is to interpret occurrences of definite description 'her husband' as referential and attributive respectively. So, if I utter (2), what I wish is that the particular man I have in mind and to whom I refer using 'her husband' lacks the particular property of being the husband of the particular woman I have in mind. We can vary the example. We can put another definite description in places of 'her husband' and substitute a number of other psychological verbs for 'wish,' whereas opening first person pronoun is of no essence for Lycan's point. So the same reading would hold for 'She fears that

Smith's murderer is not Smith's murderer,' 'Jones believes that the man drinking a martini is not the man drinking a martini' etc. The proposed reading is certainly more appealing than the alternative one attributing to a person some strange wish/fear/belief that a fundamental logical or metaphysical relation lacks, or something similar. Indeed, it would be hard to construe a convincing example in which one would utter (2) with both uses of 'her husband' as attributive. And it would be equally hard to paraphrase (2) using formal notation in Russellian manner and to make something out of it; scope considerations do not help as well. Since it makes little sense to impose an alternative reading on (2) it seems that this and similar examples support Donnellan's introduction and characterisation of referential descriptions.

Further, compare (2) with another attitude report partly similar to it:

(3) I wish that her husband weren't alive so I could marry her at once.

If Donnellan is right and it makes sense to draw the distinction, 'her husband' in (3) could, of course, be used referentially as well as attributively. To decide how it is used, though, we need to consider a particular context in which (3) is uttered, the intentions of the speaker who uttered it etc. By itself (3) evokes no special intuitions or hints concerning use of 'her husband,' certainly not the ones pointing towards its referential use. Donnellan expressed this by saying that definite descriptions are neither syntactically nor semantically, but pragmatically ambiguous (1966: 186). According to him, descriptions are ambiguous in use; we have to look at a particular context to decide how exactly they are used. But now it appears that this claim might have been a bit hasty because we have intuitions about the first occurrence of 'her husband' in (2) regardless of a particular context of use of (2).

So, as an evidence for his distinction Donnellan took the fact that contexts (like the opening Jones' trial example) do exist. If Lycan is right about examples such as (2), however, it seems that we have another, even stronger case for Donnellan's distinction. Not only do particular contexts of use suggest that there must be another, non-Russellian, use of descriptions, as Donnellan argued, but also that there are linguistic contexts which by themselves, independently of a particular context of use, suggest that definite descriptions occurring in them have to be used referentially. And, as I said, lot of effort is required even to construe a sound example in which the first occurrence of the description in (2) would be used differently than suggested by the natural reading above. This is a stronger case because it seems much harder to discard it on the ground of pragmatic considerations such as those offered by Kripke (1979). Does Lycan, then, make a case for the ambiguity of definite descriptions? Although a series of objections to such a treatment of (2) is possible, in the rest of the paper I will consider some suggested by Kripke (1979, 1980).

One could test the strength and reliability of our initial intuitions concerning (2) and similar examples (captured in the natural reading of (2)) which were the main

reason for accepting such examples as supporting Donnellan's distinction. But how to examine what such examples actually amounts to? For example, we could follow Kripke and the following line of argumentation (Kripke 1979: 237–239, 1980: 25n, 85–6): Donnellan offered a number of examples of the use of definite descriptions which he took to support the referential/attributional distinction. Now, say we accept his distinction due to the intuitive appeal of such examples. But analogous examples might be construed using proper names instead of descriptions. However, no one would be prepared to apply the same distinction to proper names and to conclude that names are ambiguous in that sense. Hence, our reasons for accepting referential/attributional distinction for definite descriptions drawn from Donnellan's examples were invalid and by themselves are not sufficient to support the distinction in any substantial way.

We can try to argue similarly against examples such as (2). Just as one would utter (2) as suggested above, one could utter a similar sentence embedding a proper name instead, e.g.

(4) I wish that Jones weren't Jones.

In uttering it, the speaker is perhaps taking Jones as the paradigm of annoying neighbour and the living nightmare, and uses the second occurrence of 'Jones' accordingly (meaning by (4) something as: I wish that Jones weren't the annoying person he is). Now, (4) doesn't sound to odd and people could actually say similar things. (Indeed, that sentence goes in the class with Frege's 'Trieste is no Vienna' or Shakespeare's 'O Romeo, Romeo, wherefore art thou Romeo?') But can examples such as (4) help us in any way to assess the example that Lycan proposed in support of Donnellan's distinction? If there was an analogy between (2) and (4) strong enough, we could argue against Lycan just as Kripke did against Donnellan. And yet, although there are similarities between (2) and (4), there are also differences that seem to undermine the argumentation by analogy.

Firstly, although (2) and (4) have the same structure, namely 'I wish that ___ weren't ___,' non-standard uses of embedded singular terms are found on different places, depending on whether the structure embeds a definite description or a proper name. So in (2) referential use is found in the first occurrence of the description; in (4) an odd use of the name is found in the second occurrence.

Secondly, (4) is more on a par with (3) than with (2) because assessing of the use of the first occurrence of proper name depends on a context of use. As Kripke argued, Donnellan's distinction can be applied to proper names as well as to definite descriptions (1979: 237–9, 1980n: 25). Accordingly, the first occurrence of 'Jones' in (4) can be used referentially as well as attributively. Most likely, it would be used attributively to refer to the person that was originally thus baptised and subsequently so called in the community. But it could equally be used referentially. For example, if I were lurking through a window and observe the man across the street mowing the lawn for whom I (mistakenly) believe that he is my annoying neighbour Jones, I could utter (4) wishing that the man I am observing lacks particular attributes I'm strongly associating with him. However, to decide how it is used, just as with (3), we need to consider a particular context in which (4) is uttered, the intentions of a speaker who uttered it etc. So the point is that, as far as it makes sense to apply Donnellan-like distinction to proper names, to decide in what sense the first occurrence of name in (4) is used depends on the context of use. Nothing similar holds for the first occurrence of definite description in (2).

Thus, if one seeks the complete analogy in order to accomplish Kripke's point, argumentation starting from (2) and (4) fails. However, analogous to Kripke's argumentation, we could draw something against Lycan's example anyway. Although it is hard to find a context in which (4) would be used in a sense different from the above suggested, no one would be willing to infer some substantial ambiguity of proper names because of that. Anyone prepared to defend and exploit (2) and similar examples, as Lycan suggested, would have to cope with this fact.

Also, just as one can transform (2) into (4), so can one transform (2) into a modal context. So consider

(5) It is possible that her husband weren't her husband.

The natural reading of (5) is this: It is possible that her *actual* husband weren't her husband in some other world (see the intuitive test Kripke proposes in 1980: 48). Alternatively (although it amounts to the same thing) it could be read as: It is possible that her husband weren't her *actual* husband. In any case, one occurrence of 'her husband' has to be taken rigidly. What can we make of this example? Does it undermine or support Lycan's considerations in any way? Examples such as (5) suggest that one occurrence of embedded description has to be taken rigidly. Accordingly, we should introduce some appropriate ambiguity among descriptions, and such ambiguity would certainly be more appealing than the one suggested by (4). I'm not sure, though, how to assess the whole matter (see e.g. Kripke 1979: 231–2). Perhaps we could say at least this: If somebody would be prepared to accept argument based on modal considerations of this section, one would have to take into account Lycan's as well; but if we could find reasons against argument of this section, it would, by analogy, undermine the one based on Lycan's example (2).

In conclusion: Definite descriptions in some intensional contexts do behave differently, and that could suggest various ambiguities. Lycan took some such examples as supporting Donnellan's referential/attributional distinction. The argument for the distinction based on examples such as (2) is surely not the last word, and a lot of further investigation is required in order to make anything out of it. If my considerations are on the right track, though, Lycan's example raises a number of doubts just as Donnellan's original argument did. Nevertheless, it stresses a course of research which any one interested in the distinction should eventually take into account.

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The Differentiating Role Played by Double Negation in Linking Language to the World

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1. Linguistic studies on double negations.

Surprisingly, the linguistic studies on double negation (DN) are *few in number* with respect to the plethora of studies on a single negation. Certainly, natural languages make an unclear use of DNs. Moreover, most studies on DN, by assuming the speaker's subjective viewpoint, included this kind of linguistic device in the category of understatement; where attention is focussed on the former type of negation, irrespective of the positive or negative content of the words following.

In last decades, L. Horn devoted several papers to this kind of linguistic device. He remarks that almost every scholar of the English language believed in the "dogma" of avoiding double negations ("a Latinate phenomenon"), so that they considered "immature" languages (Spanish, Italian, Russian, etc.) that allowed them (Horn 2001, 79ff). Even Hintikka neglected DN. (Hintikka 1978, 47)

Together with a minority of linguists, Horn considers three main cases; i.e., when two negations are "in contradictory opposition", thus they fit the Law of DN (LDN), which pertains to classical logic; in such a case "Two negations affirm," as is commonly said; the case in which the two negations are "in contrary opposition" so that the previous law does not hold true (in the following, the negative words will be underlined): 1. Two negations do not affirm"; for instance, 2. "It is not impossible" ≠ "It is possibile"; 3. "A not unhappy marriage" ≠ "A happy marriage"; in this case. A third case is when the second negation reinforces the first; e.g. 4. "I cannot go no further"; 5. "I cannot get no satisfaction".

2. The relevance of double negations.

To this analysis I add four points. First point. In the second half of the last century from the studies on the foundations of mathematical logic. Contrary to the commonly shared claim, i.e. classical logic is the only relevant logic, any other logic being a "deviant logic", (Haak 1978)¹ non-classical logic is also relevant within specific contexts. Moreover, *the failure or not of LDN constitutes the best borderline between classical logic and intuitionist logic* (and moreover almost all kinds of non-classical logic). (Prawitz & Melmanaas 1968, Grize 1970, Dummett 1977).

Hence, the validity or not of the LDN, by dividing the variety of the possible kinds of logic into two classes, precedes all logical laws and, since the evaluations allowed by intuitionist logic are also true, false and undecided, even the evaluations of a single statement.

Second point. Owing to the excessive use of abstract ideas in natural languages often no attention is paid to whether a statement, and even less so a DN, is supported by evidence or not. However, the birth of modern

science required an objective experimental language in which each statement has to be supported by sufficient (experimental) evidence that is independent of the viewpoints of the two communicators. Hence, *a statement including a DN is well-justified when sufficient evidence is lacking*. This point is very clear also in Court's language; statement 6. "Acquitted owing to insufficiency of negative evidence", means that the Court lacks sufficient evidence for deciding the case definitively; doubt is not removed. I will call this kind of statement a DNS.

Notice that in the philosophy of knowledge, Leibniz suggested that our theoretical activity is based upon two distinct logico-philosophical principles, i.e. the non-contradiction principle (governing, of course, deductive arguing) and the principle of sufficient reason, itself stated by means of a DNS: 7. "Nothing is without reason". Leibniz continues as follows: "..., or everything has its reason, although we are not always capable of discovering this reason..."; admirably, the last statement cleverly explains why the affirmative statement is not equivalent to the first statement. (Leibniz 1686)²

Hence, the LDN produces two entire, separate, logical worlds and also two different linguistic worlds.

Third point. In the 18th Century Condillac's analysis of languages suggested that algebra is an exact language merely because it is founded as a well-formulated language; he suggested that even *natural language*, provided that it is well-formulated, *may be as exact as algebra*. He was unable to accomplish his program of re-formulating natural language, but he suggested that the basic question is to clarify the linguistic role played by the verb "is". (Condillac 1996, 157-165)

In the light of the above-mentioned studies on mathematical logic, I believe that Condillac's suggestion is implicit advice to consider basic the distinction between "... is..." and 8. "it is not true that is not...", or similar doubly negated linguistic expressions; i.e. *a clear differentiation between (arguing and) speaking in classical logic and non-classical logic*.

Fourth point. The previous point suggests a practicable method of *analysis of a literary text with the aim of deciding when its author is arguing in non-classical logic*; one has to establish when he makes an essential use of DNSs.

I have applied this method to a large number of texts. I discovered that what is called "negative language", actually proves to be a systematic application of DNSs. In "negative theology" the title of a book on God by Nicholas of Cusa is 9. *About No Other*. (Drago 2007) Popper's "negative philosophy of science" stressed that 10. "Science is fallible [owing to negative experiments]. (Drago & Venezia 2007) In ethics, Jonas suggested 11. "An ethics of fear [of mankind's suicide]". (Jonas 1984) In order to base

¹ This claim was shared by Popper also, although he studied non-classical logic intensively.

² He was able to found classical mechanics anew by arguing consistently with DNSs (Drago 2001).

intuitionist logic on rigorous reasoning, in 1925 Kolmogoroff defined a language composed of "pseudo-truths", i.e. precisely DNSs. (Drago 2005)

3. Typologies of double negations.

In order to achieve an accurate and general method for inspecting DNSs in a text, it is necessary to list the several cases of doubly negating a statement.

Horn offered a typology of DNs according to the speaker's subjective viewpoint. (Horn 1978; 2001, 94) As a result of my investigations on several texts, I suggest a new typology according to an objective viewpoint. First of all I discard the two cases of false DNSs:

a doubly negated statement which is an emphasised negation, i.e. the second negation reinforces the first; e.g. 4, 5;

a doubly negated statement which is merely rhetorical, because a verification of its correspondence with reality shows that its content is affirmative; i.e. the statement belongs to classical logic; e.g. 12. "I have nothing other than two hands".

A statement is a true DNSs when it includes

two negations; e.g. 13. "It is not true that it is not ...", or two negative words, e.g., 3., 14. "not unreal", 15. "without contradiction";

a word composed of two negations; e.g. 16. "un-moving" and 17. "in-variant"; neither of these words means "constant";

an idealistic word hiding a negation; which needs therefore to be restored; e.g. "create = making from nothing", "chimerical = not real", "Platonic love = love in separation", "perpetual = without an end", etc.;

an implicit negation which thus has to be discovered; e.g., 10, 11, 18. "the excessive extent of this work perhaps hindered my countrymen..." (Lobachevsky);

a word synthesising by itself a DNS (I indicate with a dotted line this kind of word); e.g. 19. "only", which means "nothing other than...";

the negation of a comparative adjective; e.g. 20. "it is not less than..." ≠ "it is greater than or equal to...", since the case of equality cannot be established without the law of excluded middle (which is not applicable in non-classical logic). The same holds true for the words 21. "no more than...";

a negation plus a question mark expecting a clearly negative answer; e.g. 22. "Am I stupid ?";

a modal word, e.g. 23. "possible = it is not true that is not..."; the same is true when an author establishes a 24. "equality up to... [some constraints]", i.e. according to a modality; in such a case the word 25. "equivalent" is commonly used without explaining its exact meaning; often this statement also includes two negations.³

a word that the author conceives of as a negative word within a specific context; e.g. the words "change", "variation" in Physics, since both require theoretical explanation,

and even "positive" in Mathematics, when it means a value "greater than zero".

4. The way of arguing through DNSs.

In the past I applied this method to several texts, (Drago and Oliva 1999; A. Drago and R. Pisano 2000; Drago 2005; Drago and Venezia 2007; Drago 2008; Drago and Bazhanov 2009?) by assuming that the intuitive meanings of negators have only been perceived by authors who were unaware of the formalism of non-classical logic and even less so of the sophisticated cases of the double negation of a statement.⁴ The application of the above typology did not meet with inconsistencies with the logical thread suggested by a direct reading of the texts; rather, it suggested unnoticed features .

From each of the texts examined, I extracted a sequence of DNSs. In many cases it is sufficient for preserving the logical thread of the author's exposition; hence, the DNSs convey arguments.

From a comparative analysis of some literary theories – in particular Nicholas Cusa's *De docta Ignorantia* – and some scientific theories – in particular, Kolmogoroff's foundation of intuitionist logic, Lobachevsky's foundation of non-Euclidean geometry, S. Carnot's foundation of thermodynamics -, I recognised a common way of rigorous arguing by means of DNSs.

Over two millennia a clear presentation of a theory, above all in science, required a systematic organisation of all its statements, derived deductively from a small number of axioms.⁵ But this kind of organization cannot include a DNS. Indeed, it is impossible to derive a DNS from an affirmative axiom, since the latter, being equivalent to its doubly negated statement, generates consequences which are classical statements only. On the other hand, a DNS cannot play the role of an axiom, because it cannot state anything with certainty, apart from a limitation to our thinking; in logical terms, a DNS, owing to the inequality between the different contents of $\neg\neg A$ and A , makes the affirmative statement A impossible . In short, even one DNS obstructs a deductive organisation of a theoretical system.

It is easy to recognise that each of the above theories is based on a significant problem; and also that the theory tries to find a method for solving it by arguing through a sequence of DNSs, for. The argument concludes by means of the words such as 28. "otherwise we obtain an absurd result " or 29. "A motion without an end is impossible"; this is an *ad absurdum* reasoning; it is of the weak kind, i.e. its final statement is a DNS. This fact suggests grouping all the DNSs of a sequence into units of reasoning, each unit starting from a sub-problem, which is then solved by an argument that is concluded with an *ad absurdum* proof of a weak kind. In the chain of units of reasoning, the final unit achieves a thesis, $\neg\neg UT$, of a universal nature.

The author then considers the said affirmative statement UT as a hypothesis from which he deductively draws, according to classical logic, all possible consequences. I conclude that the author thought that he had already collected enough evidence to promote his conclusion

³ This association is evidence of an intuitive perception by the authors of that link between intuitionistic logic and modal logic which has been established in recent times.(van Dalen 1986, 300)

⁴ Negations on quantifiers involve more specific questions to which I will devote a subsequent study; on this subject see (Horn 2008; Drago 2008a).

⁵ Beth stressed the need for discovering an alternative organization to the deductive one.(Beth 1956, ch. 1, 2) In fact, both Poincaré (Poincaré 1903) and A. Einstein (Miller 1981, 123-142) suggested two kinds of organisation among a group of past physical theories.

$\neg\neg UT$ to the corresponding affirmative statement UT ; i.e., he felt justified in changing the DNS into the corresponding affirmative one, although such a change is not allowed by non-classical logic, which he previously adhered to.⁶ This move actually causes a jump from a theoretical development based on non-classical logic to a deductive development based on classical logic.

The discovery of this new kind of organisation substantiates the idea that the LDN produces two different worlds, i.e. a world of certain truths that can be derived from certain principles, and a world of inductive searching for a new method. (Drago 2008b, Drago 2006)

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⁶ This logical move corresponds to what was independently claimed by Markoff to be a logical principle, (Markoff 1971) although this "principle" in classical logic merely applies the LDN, and in non-classical logic is formally invalid.

Correlation, Correspondence and the Bounds of Linguistic Behavior

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1. The Bounds of Linguistic behavior

My objective in this section is to show that both Quine and Davidson, as representatives of what may be described as an interaction oriented approach to language, presuppose in their theorizing a distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic behavior. However, such a distinction needs to be accounted for rather than be presupposed. I show what kind of delineation of the bounds of linguistic behavior can be given within their (respective) frameworks, but argue that the details of such an answer are in need of explicit elaboration.

One distinctive aspect of Quine's account of language, as first presented in his *Word and Object* (Quine 1960), is the way it combines a general empiricist outlook with an interaction oriented view of language. Quine views the interpersonal set-up of radical translation as exhausting whatever there is to be said about the function of language and the way it is associated with sensory stimulation. This is a major point where he breaks away from logical empiricists such as Carnap, in response to whose views he forms and defines his own.

Thus the hypothetical situation of radical translation is the starting point of Quine's (partly destructive) analysis of linguistic meaning. However, throughout the discussion of this situation Quine never asks which actions of the foreigner (whose speech needs to be translated) are linguistic utterances, and which are not. Quine's whole treatment of radical translation, from Gavagai onwards, presupposes that the translator can distinguish between language and non-language in the other's behavior. Quine never mentions a step (or aspect) of the translation process where the linguistic behavior of the other is delineated—he seems just to presuppose that the relevant input for translation is auditory, and that the translator can pick out of the stranger's auditory behavior those actions that are utterances. But what justifies this supposition? How is the delineation of language to be accounted for in this context? I claim that these are legitimate questions, that Quine seems not to be aware of them, and that therefore he does not provide an answer to them.

Donald Davidson follows Quine in this respect. He describes his thought experiment of radical interpretation (a descendant of Quine's radical translation) as providing the grounds for an answer to the question (Davidson 1984, p. xiii) "... what is it for words to mean what they do?", but never addresses the (seemingly) simpler question which acts of the person being interpreted are utterances and which are not. The bounds of linguistic behavior—i.e., behavior that is amenable to radical interpretation—are taken for granted.

In a sense, Davidson's need to face this question is even more urgent than Quine's, for the following reason. As opposed to Quine, Davidson makes room in his theory for talk about the mental, and views interpretation as involving not only the assignment of meaning to a person's utterances but rather also the assignment of propositional content to her beliefs and desires (as well as other propositional mental states). This multidimensional task is to be carried out not only on the basis of the linguistic behav-

ior of the person he is engaged with, but rather also taking into account her non-linguistic behavior, which can bear witness to her propositional attitudes (and, indirectly, to the meaning of her utterances). Thus according to Davidson all of the agent's behavior is subject to interpretation in a general sense (i.e. as being related to her mental states), but only some of this behavior is subject to interpretation in the more restricted sense of being assigned T-sentences (of a Tarskian truth theory). So, the question arises, what are the grounds for deciding which actions are subject to which type of interpretation?

Before we consider how Davidson and Quine can delineate the bounds of linguistic behavior, let us first note two kinds of grounds for such delineation that are quite often appealed to for this purpose, but that are not available to them. The first is the demarcation of linguistic behavior on the basis of its relation to internal psychological processes. According to Chomsky (2002, 2006), for example, language is essentially an internal, computational mechanism. Whatever behavior that is directly related to this internal mechanism (through phonological (or similar) encoding) is linguistic, and whichever behavior that is not so related to it is not language. Surely this is a widely accepted way to delineate the bounds of language; however, it is not available to Davidson and Quine. The reason is this. Both reject the idea that meaningfulness arises from the connection of language to internal states and processes. It follows that the domain of meaningful behavior (i.e. its extension) cannot be demarcated on the basis of an appeal to internal states and processes as well. Hence if language is characterized in the way suggested by Chomsky, an unacceptable gap is opened between what is (potentially) meaningful and what is linguistic: In principle, there could be actions that are translatable/interpretable without being linguistic, and vice versa. I take this result to be untenable.

A different avenue for grounding the bounds of language that is clearly unavailable to Davidson (and most probably cannot be pursued by Quine as well) is conventional. It is a widely accepted view (even if not by Chomskian linguists) that language is constituted by a set of social conventions. Among other things (or, rather, prior to them), these conventions determine which actions are linguistic—that is, which are legitimate moves in the conventionally constituted language game, and which are not. Now as Davidson famously rejects the view that language depends in an essential way on convention (Davidson 1984b), this way of delineating language is obviously not available to him. By the same token, it seems that this conclusion applies also to Quine (although he does not say so explicitly himself): Nothing in his radical translation depends on the translator's being able to place the foreigner within a web of social conventions, and therefore whatever is necessary for such translation—including the delineation of the bounds of language—cannot have an essential conventional basis.

Is all this to say that Quine and Davidson are left without means to distinguish between language and non-language? I argue that this is not the case. The alternative to the above mentioned ways of delimiting language is that the very same process through which language is as-

signed meaning (be it radical translation or interpretation) will be also the context where language is distinguished from non-language. This is the only way that seems to be open to Davidson and Quine: The processes that they describe as constituting meaning must also be burdened with the extra task of giving rise to the extension of the term 'language'. In other words, whatever is interpretable/translatable is linguistic.

This conclusion, though, is not enough. It still needs to be articulated *how* language is distinguished from non-language in the context of translation/interpretation. The simplistic response that this is a matter of trial and error will not do: Some indication must be given which actions are good candidates for being utterances, or else too much freedom is allowed. Similarly, the identification of linguistic behavior on the basis of its overt syntactical complexity is not enough: Such complexity is arguably discerned in (or ascribed to) some types of behavior on the basis of their characterization as linguistic rather than prior to such characterization. Without an articulation of the way language is delineated through interaction a key aspect of the projects in question (and of the whole interaction oriented perspective on language) is left standing on shaky grounds. In the next section of this paper I show (albeit in outline) how such an articulation may be provided.

2. Triangulation and the Identification of Language

In a series of papers from the early nineties onwards Donald Davidson presents an application of the notion of triangulation to the analysis of the fundamentals of language (Davidson 1991). The objective of this section is to present a brief outline of Davidson's use of this notion, and then to show how it bears upon the question raised in the previous section.

One of the major concerns of Davidson's later work is the analysis of the basic inter-subjective setup that allows linguistic communication to emerge, in the form of talk about mutually accessible objects in a shared environment. (In his earlier work Davidson paid less attention to situations of this kind.) In order to pursue such analysis Davidson considers a communicative scenario that does not exhaust all there is to language (as he emphasizes), but that nevertheless can help us better understand some of the essentials of language and how it is related to more basic forms of communication. The scenario includes two creatures in a shared environment. Each creature's behavior is in partial correlation with the environment, in the sense that it forms patterns of responses to some changes in the environment. Furthermore, each creature perceives both the environment and the other creature's behavior, observing some correlations between the two, and reacting to such observed correlations. Thus each creature's behavior can be affected not only by, e.g. the appearance of predators, or by the other creature's hand movements, but also by an observed correlation between the two. Such a correlation is a necessary condition for the said movements to be signs of predators, i.e. proto-linguistic.

Davidson invokes this setup for various purposes. One is that it helps him support his claim that it is the so called *distal stimulus* that is the content of linguistic expressions: Triangulation helps pick out of the causal chain leading to my utterance the link that is its content by intersecting this chain with another, leading to my interlocutor. Another use of this scenario is to point out how social ex-

ternalism with respect to language (that Davidson, following Wittgenstein, endorses) comes into play: One creature's behavior can be described as regularly correlated with the environment only from another creature's perspective.

I propose to use this conceptual construction in order to answer the question raised in the first section (which, as argued above, Davidson fails to consider). The characteristics of acts *vis-à-vis* this setup are those that must be appealed to in order to delineate language, rather than connections of acts to some internal psychological reality, or their conformity to social convention of some kind. Thus we get the result that those actions of a creature that may be correlated with the environment by another creature are those that are potentially linguistic. There are several ways in which this characterization may be developed and elaborated. Let me conclude by indicating two of them.

First, note that correlation is a relatively weak connection. Potential utterances need not be efficacious in bringing about the changes in the environment they are correlated with, nor need they be acts that are necessary responses to such changes (in the sense of ensuring survival). There are things that we do in order to change the environment (such as building fences) or to face changes in it (e.g., run away from danger), but utterances need not be this way—their effect on the environment is to arise from their observed correlation with the environment rather than to underlie it. This fact allows for the use of voice in order to make utterances: Our world is such that the production of sounds is typically not directly operative in, e.g., building fences or moving us away from danger, but it can be modulated so as to be correlated with fences and dangers. Indeed, actions like auditory expression—that typically do not have a direct impact on the environment nor seem to be an observable result of a direct impact from it—are arguably good candidates for being utterances. They are acts the effects of which on the environment are produced in virtue of their being correlated with it by other creatures. (This is not claimed here to be a necessary or sufficient condition, though.)

The second point is that correlation may be viewed as underlying the notion of correspondence (or infusing new content into this notion). An expression may be said to correspond to reality (i.e., the environment) not because its internal syntactic structure somehow represents a part or aspect of reality (e.g., a fact), but rather because its production (in a given context) is in accord with an established correlation pattern. Davidson (1984c) is correct in saying (with respect to full fledged language) that this way we get correspondence with the world (a.k.a. the Big Fact) rather than parts or aspects of it, but wrong in maintaining that this renders the notion useless. Indeed, the foregoing discussion indicates that such a weak notion of correspondence may be operative in answering the question this paper started with. That is, as opposed to fence constructions and flights from danger, utterances may be characterized as actions that have the potential to correspond to the environment in the sense suggested above. A translator/interpreter may say to himself: "I have seen behavior of this kind several times before, in similar contexts. It does not seem to directly change the environment, nor to be direct result from changes in it. So maybe it just corresponds to the way the environment is. Maybe it is linguistic—I'll try to figure out what it means."

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A Response to Child's Objection to Common-Sense Realism

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William Child (2002) argues that one cannot tenably hold the middle ground between constructivism and platonism. In this paper, I will argue that by relying on Stroud's notion of 'naturalness', a common-sense realist position can be maintained that avoids Child's objection. Although Child himself is somewhat sympathetic with common-sense realism, he is unable to fully endorse the view as he sees it as leaving unanswered one particularly pernicious worry. He asks:

[W]hat makes it the case that someone has grasped just *this* rule, with *these* investigation-independent standards of correctness? In particular, how is that question to be answered in a way that neither tacitly endorses the platonist idea that certain rules are objectively simpler than others nor gives up the idea of investigation-independence and lapses into constructivism? (92-93, emphasis original)

Wittgenstein tells us that it is always possible for someone to seemingly follow one rule when, in fact, he has been following a different rule, with different standards of correctness, the entire time (e.g., his odd adder in *PI* §185). Given this possibility, how are we to differentiate between erring and following another rule? The platonist can solve this worry by appealing to the notion of a rule being "objectively simpler", that there is a default or 'obvious' way to continue the series (Child, 191-92). The common-sense realist cannot invoke any equivalent idea because "any way of continuing a series can count as going on in the same way as before," (192, original emphasis). Unfortunately, we cannot argue that the technique the adder was taught will provide the answer as the premise of Child's objection is that we are uncertain which technique he is following. Because no feature of his behaviour will illuminate that question, we are consequently unable to claim that we know what his correct answers will be if he has not yet reached them.

Although the realist is apparently thwarted by this criticism, the constructivist is not. She can appeal to what the adder will do: the correct answer is available only when the rule follower performs the calculation in question, although even then we are unable to claim we have determined which rule he is following as his future actions may diverge from another rule follower's (Child, 192). This response is clearly unacceptable to both the platonist and the common-sense realist as it abandons the conception of ratification-independence, but if Child is right, the realist has no response, even though she remains convinced that there is a correct answer regarding how an addition series is to be completed after, say, 2000 or 3000. Yet, if the realist cannot appeal to a platonic idea of simplicity and cannot endorse the constructivist's view, how is she to proceed?

1. Stroud's Response

In "Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity," Stroud defends Wittgenstein from Dummett's constructivist interpretation. Although the issues with which Stroud is concerned are not precisely those of Child's, the lesson he draws should prove useful. Dummett's conclusion that Wittgenstein is a

constructivist rests upon passages (e.g., the wood-sellers or the odd adder) that tell us it is possible for someone to perform calculations identical to those that we make, but also to continue on in radically different ways than we would expect. For Dummett's Wittgenstein, there is nothing in the rules that forces us to continue on in any way other than "our having expressly decided to treat that very [rule] as unassailable" (p. 329). Such a position is clearly at odds with platonism and so Dummett concludes that Wittgenstein must be endorsing a constructivist account of rule following.

Stroud, however, rejects this interpretation of Wittgenstein. For Stroud, the notion of 'force' that Wittgenstein is criticizing is the platonic one of rails to infinity that guide our actions without our involvement, not a disavowal of ratification-independent standards of correctness. Accordingly, he surmises that Dummett has misread Wittgenstein's examples of calculating differently as mistaking an attack on platonism for a positive argument for constructivism. Stroud's project continues in the hopes of explaining "what makes the denial of a necessary truth 'impossible' or 'unintelligible'" (504) without invoking a platonic idea of truth or obviousness. It is my contention that this idea will prove useful not just in providing a common-sense realist interpretation of Wittgenstein, but also in making possible a means of defense against Child's criticism.

Stroud stresses that many of Wittgenstein's examples used by the constructivists are dead choices. Once we investigate the consequences of behaving in the way that the examples suggest, outside of their isolated contexts, we quickly understand how truly unintelligible they are (Stroud, 512). If we are to treat, for example, the wood-sellers as genuinely intelligible, we must consider how they understand the world and see if it is comprehensible. The wood-sellers, if their system is a coherent one, must also believe that carpenters use the same amount of wood in building a small, but extraordinarily tall house as when they build a house equal in area, but quite short, and this really is quite strange.

But what accounts for this strangeness? For Stroud, intelligibility stems from our common agreements and judgments, our form of life. But this agreement is not of the sort to which we could consciously decide to adhere or refute, but a *constitutive* fact about us that stems from the history of our species -- the biological, physiological and psychological facts of our evolution (Stroud, 514). Importantly, this is not an invocation of a platonic conception of agreement or rule following. What we consider natural ways of rule following might well have been otherwise if our historical development had been different. As a result, what we would consider intelligible would also change. While what we deem natural remains a contingent fact, this is commensurable with ratification-independence and requires no endorsement of a constructivist reading of Wittgenstein.

Moreover, "there are rails that we have already traveled, and we can extend them beyond their present point only by depending on those that already exist. For the rails to be navigable they must be extended in smooth and natural ways..." (Stroud, 518). What we consider to be

"smooth and natural" is a result of our shared judgements, the bedrock we must have in common in order to communicate and be mutually intelligible. Yet Stroud (and through him, Wittgenstein) is emphatic in distinguishing this sense of 'natural' from a platonic conception (Cf. Stroud, 517-518 and Wittgenstein, *PI* §241). Stroud does not allow for rules to exist 'outside' of us, nor are the ways we follow rules constructed. The extension of the rails is constrained by our shared judgements of what we consider to be intelligible and this is not open to alteration in the way the constructivist allows. By staking out this middle ground, Stroud provides an interpretation of objectivity without platonic overtones that is well-suited to common-sense realism.

Nevertheless, Child's concern that we cannot distinguish between a person following *this* rule or *that* rule cannot be outright dismissed, but we can say that the weight he attributes to it is overly strong. He is right to claim that the common-sense realist must concede that it is always possible to follow an individual rule in a different way. However, it just so happens that the likelihood of us ever only following one rule in isolation from all others is so remote as to not pose a serious problem for anyone but the most sceptical of sceptics (and it seems his worries are largely unintelligible). Furthermore, if Stroud is right in reading Wittgenstein's examples as directed against platonism and not in favour of full-blown constructivism, the crux of Child's argument is stolen from him. The examples of the wood-sellers, etc. do not point the way towards a constructivist program, but ward against platonism. To interpret them otherwise is to misread Wittgenstein, a claim that Child has lodged against the common-sense realist. Still, we must defend Stroud's account of intelligibility before we can feel secure that we have answered Child's worries.

2. Bloor's Critique

One might worry that Stroud's conception of naturalness is too close to the idea of simplicity used by platonists. This concern is raised by Bloor (1997) who views Stroud's invocation of 'naturalness' as a hackneyed attempt to refute constructivism. While Bloor is correct to reinforce the point that our biological predispositions cannot tell us how social institutions, languages, etc. will unfold, he seems to be missing the deeper point of Stroud's use of 'natural'. It is important to clarify what Stroud is not claiming: he is not suggesting that different mathematical systems are impossible, or even that some might be contradictory, but that the way we follow rules, not what those rules are, is not up for discussion. What Stroud is after is an account of *intelligibility* -- what makes something understandable or otherwise -- and provides it without claiming, as Bloor suggests, that our cultural institutions are in any way inevitable or that *all* alternatives are unthinkable.

Thus, Stroud is certainly not asserting that the systems we use to measure the world are in any way obvious or determined, nor would he disagree that they are historically contingent. He is asserting that someone who understands and equates the rule '+2 forever' with '+6 after 2000' is not differing just in systems of measurement, but engaging in a truly incomprehensible (for us) system of rule following. Therefore, Bloor's parallel between the differences in Euclidian or Einsteinian mathematics is largely irrelevant. The systems may differ in how they profess to understand the world, but their shared bedrock of rule following is similar. Einsteinian mathematics may see space as curved while for the Euclidian it is infinitely flat, but neither system suggests that '+2' could coherently entail '+6 after 2000', or that someone wouldn't be quite

idiosyncratic in making that leap. So, Bloor has attacked a strawman; must a Euclidian system have been the inevitable outcome of our biology and psychology? Of course not, but Stroud never made such a claim. The concept of 'natural' that Stroud discusses is quite specific and shares only a superficial resemblance to the view criticized by Bloor.

Moreover, as Bloor presupposes that different culturally determined institutions are intelligible, he must supply an account of that intelligibility. While his examples of Euclidean and Einsteinian mathematics do differ, they remain (with some training) understandable. Yet, it is not clear that Bloor has a theory of *this* intelligibility available to him without biting the bullet and giving a fuller account of what our bedrock agreements are and what they consist in. If cultural practices can remould our instincts and our pre-theoretical conceptions of intelligibility (and Bloor seems very close to saying exactly this), then we should be unable to experience cross-cultural intelligibility as cultures will have changed and, over time, become mutually or partially incomprehensible. But this is not the case. It may not be easy to understand another culture, but that is not to say it is impossible to do so. Unless Bloor provides an explanation of this intelligibility or denies it altogether, we can dismiss his criticism of Stroud and refocus on Stroud's account of intelligibility stemming from our shared form of life.

That is, there is some common ground that humanity shares, untouched by cultural forces. The manner in which we build on those similarities will differ according to our culture, history, etc., but we cannot alter the building blocks themselves without becoming incoherent. That Stroud lacks a detailed account of exactly what those human similarities are is frustrating (although his examples of coherency and intelligibility in rule following are illuminating), but not crippling to the defense of common-sense realism. Through the exploration of Stroud and Bloor, we are equipped with the tools needed to answer Child's objection to common-sense realism.

To briefly summarize, the lessons that Stroud has taught us are threefold. First, we must remember that Wittgenstein's examples were created to distill the incoherency of the platonist's account of rule following, not to endorse constructivism. Second, the examples were of single instances of rule following used to argue the first point; understood holistically as Stroud suggests, their unintelligibility becomes apparent. And third, there must be common bedrock elements of human psychology and biology that set the parameters for our understanding. These parameters must account for the 'natural' way we follow rules. Combined, these three are more than sufficient to answer Child's objection. Consequently, his charge that the common-sense realist is without the ability to distinguish between a person following *this* rule or *that* rule without a) appealing to what he will do in the future as a constructivist would do, or b) invoking the platonic notion of simplicity, is shown to be a false choice.

Indeed, with Stroud's account of intelligibility properly deployed, Child has *far* less room to suggest that "*any* way of continuing a series can count as going on in the same way as before," (p. 192, original emphasis). Instead, we can allow for non-platonic constraints on the way we follow rules that are built upon our common human nature and common features of the world. Additionally, once we recognize that Wittgenstein's examples are isolates used to argue against platonism and any attempt to raise a coherent and holistic system on those examples is doomed, we see Child's constructivist interpretation of Wittgenstein as being largely flawed. As a result, Child's worry is cor-

rectly diagnosed as stemming from an overly constructivist reading of Wittgenstein's program and can be safely shelved. This supplies the common-sense realist the response she needs to retain ratification-independent standards of correctness and an objective, non-platonic way of answering Child's sceptical charge. Although not above all criticism, such a response is, at the very least, a promising place to begin.

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The Multiple Complete Systems Conception as *Fil Conducteur* of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics

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I

In Manuscript (MS) 183, *Bergen Edition*, p. 16-7 (from 05.06.1930) Wittgenstein refers to *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* and claims that Spengler had “many really important thoughts” that he himself had already thought. In the passage, Wittgenstein is referring to the idea that mathematics is not to be understood in the singular (as one body of knowledge built through historical accumulation), but should be taken as several independent developments through history. Spengler talks about the mathematics of the Greek world, mathematics of the Arab world, etc., as independent closed developments. However, Wittgenstein's interest in multiple systems was not properly historical. While Spengler talks about “a multiplicity of independent, closed in themselves developments” (Spengler 2003, 82), Wittgenstein talks about “multiple closed systems” (MS 183, p. 16-7). In Wittgenstein's conception, “closed” means “complete” and expresses the idea that a system does not need to be complemented. No improvement is required for a system to stand by its own. For Wittgenstein, the idea that there are missing truths or missing rules in a mathematical system is prompted by a pseudo-perspective outside systems.

An extensional conception of mathematics assumes that infinities are totalities of objects and that there are true mathematical statements about them which may not be grasped. The intensional conception, on the other hand, assumes that infinities are only possibilities expressed by rules (or operations). In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein is, of course, already an intentionalist. There, *the* concept of number is presented as the series of numbers generated by a rule (operation). The “general form of an operation” (6.02) gives the rule of a series of which numbers are the exponents. Since numbers are not objects, in this conception, but properties of a formal series, it is nonsense to talk about all numbers. Thus, quantifiers in the *Tractatus* don't express truths about numbers at all. The talk about *the* concept of number suggests, however, that Wittgenstein had in mind one system at that time and that the idea of multiple complete systems came to his mind later.

In the Middle Period, any infinite is “the unlimited possibility of going on” (Wittgenstein 1975 §173). Possibilities are given by rules of sense, and not by true statements. ‘Grammar’ (rules of language in general) deals with the conditions of sense, while empirical science deals with what is and what is not true. Conditions of sense (rules of ‘grammar’) and conditions of truth are essentially different.

Wittgenstein expresses the idea that mathematical systems are complete in various ways. He claims that “there are no gaps in mathematics” (see MS 108, p. 20 and 22; also Wittgenstein 1993, 35), that “mathematics cannot be incomplete” (Wittgenstein 1975 §158), and that “the edifice of rules must be complete” (§154). The gap or the incompleteness would imply that there are sentences in the system that I cannot in principle understand or that there are “incomplete senses.” This is not possible. For, from Wittgenstein's viewpoint in the early thirties, understanding p is precisely understanding p 's sense. Since

“only the group of rules determines the sense of our signs” (§154; my translation), understanding p means understanding p 's rules. If p had an “incomplete sense”, therefore, p would be a sign without rules. In this case, however, p would have no system either. But what if we discover a new rule for p ? Say, p has two rules and we discover a third. This is, for Wittgenstein, the wrong description of what has taken place. The two rules of p determine what p is. With the inclusion of a third rule we have, actually, p (two rules) and p^* (three rules).

The rules of the system, which give sense to mathematical sentences, are the rules that present a method of proof that verify them (Wittgenstein 1975 §§149-50). Without a method of proof given in a system, a sentence is not really a sentence: it has no sense (§149). Thus, “it is impossible to pass simply by extension from one system to the other” (Wittgenstein 1993, 36) – since each system is in itself complete. This implies that “a question that has sense in the second system does not have to have sense, because of this, in the first system” (p. 36).

Wittgenstein's conception could have reshaped the philosophy of mathematics in the thirties, for it may be the only alternative to the extensional conception. It is clear that his conception avoids Platonism right from the beginning, for the completeness of mathematical systems implies that there are no truths to be discovered in mathematics. Changes in mathematics (seemingly extensions of old systems) are always inventions of new systems (Wittgenstein 1993, 35; 1975 §155). The system of integers, for instance, is “completely new” when compared to the system of natural numbers (see Wittgenstein 1993, 36). They only share a structure, which makes us believe that we have an extended the old system.¹

In Wittgenstein's view, not only Platonists, but also Intuitionists, were captives of an extensionalist conception. Ultimately, they confuse questions of sense with questions of truth, for they fail to see that mathematics is not a set of truths, but a set of systems each of them constituted by internal rules. For Wittgenstein, the intuitionists were mistaken in two related ways. First, for thinking that laws of logic could be applied in a limited way. If one law applies, thought Wittgenstein, all apply, since they are essentially of the same kind: tautologies that minimally determine our concept of proposition. Second, when defending that there are propositions whose truth-value is not known (for instance, “truths” concerning Brouwer's *Pendelzahl*), the intuitionists were committed to the extensional view. For if we cannot presently determine the truth-value of certain sentences, then they at least must have sense independently of how we determine its sense. Undecidability implies extensionalism, for it “presupposes a subterranean connection ... between the two sides [of an equation]” (Witt-

¹ The shared structure is the one-to-one correspondence between positive integers and natural numbers, the corresponding order (1,2... and +1, +2...) and the use of the four operations in both systems. However, +2 is not the same as 2, for plus two soldiers is completely different from 2 soldiers (see Wittgenstein 1993, 36). If we say “+2”, we are immediately allowed to say “-2” as well.

genstein 1975 §174). A "subterranean connection" is, of course, something that exists independently of being grasped, something of which we may never have knowledge. Such a connection would be an unknown rule that determines the sense of a mathematical sentence (equation) p . Since we presumably understand p 's sense, such a rule is absurd (precisely because the rules determine p 's sense). Wittgenstein explicitly attributes an extensionalist commitment to Brouwer:

If someone says (as Brouwer does) that in the case of (x) $f_1x = f_2x$, there is, as well as Yes and No, also the case of undecidability, then it means that "(x)..." is meant extensively and that we can talk of the case in which all x have an accidental property. In fact, however, we cannot talk at all about such case and "(x)" cannot be grasped extensionally in mathematics (MS 106, p. 129, my translation).

Thus, Intuitionism and Platonism accept (explicitly or implicitly) the mythology of unknown truths or rules "out there"; truths or rules that we may never be able to grasp. Wittgenstein's alternative to intuitionism is ingenious and simple. In order to be a consistent intentionalist, he thought, one has to abandon completely the idea of unknown truths and, at the same time, hold the view that all laws of logic come together. Thus, when there is a question, there is also a method to answer the question given inside a mathematical system: "It is not enough to say that p is provable, but it must mean: provable according to a determinate system" (MS 105 22-4). If there is no method of solution of a problem, then there is no problem, no undecidable question, as well. A question outside a system is not a question at all, for systems are not incomplete. If the question does not make sense, then, of course, *all* laws of logic fail to apply to it. This is precisely the point of Wittgenstein's comments on Brouwer:

Actually, if the question about the truth or falsehood of a proposition is undecidable *a priori*, then, in this way, the question loses its sense and precisely in this way the propositions of logic lose their validity for it. (MS 106, p. 249, my translation; also Wittgenstein 1975 §173).

Thus, Wittgenstein's intensionalism grounded in the multiple complete systems conception expresses an alternative theory concerning the philosophy of mathematics in the thirties: "there are no gaps in mathematics. This *contradicts* the usual view" (Wittgenstein 1975 §158; my emphasis).

II

The multiple systems conception also underlies some of the most important changes in Wittgenstein's philosophy. The conception has some, so to speak, paradoxical consequences, which will bring Wittgenstein to a milder version of it and, finally, to its abandonment. It implies that if a sentence has no method of proof inside a system, it is not meaningful and, thus, it cannot be understood. It seems, therefore, difficult to explain that our belief that once I find the proof of p , I know the proof of *that* sentence (consequence 1). Moreover, this view excludes as senseless sentences for which, we usually believe, we don't have yet a proof (consequence 2) – Goldbach's conjecture and Fermat's equation, for instance. Another consequence of the multiple systems conception is that we cannot have two proofs for the same sentence, for it is only the proof (or method of proof) that gives sense to the sequence of words (consequence 3).

In a first moment, Wittgenstein bites the bullet and defends the "paradoxical" consequences of his theory. He defends that there is no such thing as two proofs for the same sentence (MS 108, p. 14; Wittgenstein 1975 §155); that one, in fact, does not know the meaning of a mathematical sentence if one does not have a method of proof for it (Wittgenstein 1993, 35); that, for instance, Fermat's equation was senseless (Wittgenstein 1975 §§149-50).

These consequences, however, might have brought Wittgenstein to change his philosophy later. In *Philosophical Remarks*, Wittgenstein already suggests that we might think that the value of a mathematical hypothesis (conjecture) is that "it trains ... thoughts on a particular ... region" (Wittgenstein 1975 §161). In the *Big Typescript*, Wittgenstein goes further. There, mathematical conjectures are "stimulus for mathematical research" (Wittgenstein 2005, 616; also WWK, p. 144). Since it seems strange that senseless constructions can have such a role, Wittgenstein is prone to ascribe them a kind of empirical content: they have a role similar to a hypothesis in physics (see Wittgenstein 2005, 616 and 619 about the hypothetical character of Fermat's equation). Even though this might explain how sentences outside systems (without a method of proof) are not simply nonsense, it aggravates the problem of *which* sentence is proved (p is not the same before and after a proof) – consequence 1. Since the methods of verification of a sentence that is an empirical generalization and a sentence that has the *a priori* generality of mathematics are *essentially* different (empirical evidence and proof are completely different methods of verification), as Wittgenstein says in *Big Typescript* 617, we cannot have the same sentence before and after the proof. Wittgenstein thinks that two methods of verification cannot give sense to the same sentence. It is only in the *Yellow Book* that Wittgenstein dissolves this tension. Wittgenstein claims there that we can think that the same sentence undergoes "a transition between a hypothesis and a grammatical rule" (Wittgenstein 2001, 70). He also says in his lectures of 1934-5: "It is quite possible for a proposition of experience to become a rule of grammar" (Wittgenstein 2001, 160). In this case, the proof makes the empirical confirmation of the *same* sentence (hypothesis) superfluous.

The possibility of a transition between empirical and *a priori* sentences expresses an important break in Wittgenstein's philosophy. As we have seen, it was the defense of an intensionalist conception grounded in the distinction between questions of truth and questions of facts that brought him to defend the multiple complete systems conception. This strongly suggests that there is an important change in Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics after 1934. In fact, we can use the multiple systems conception to illustrate it. Concerning consequence 3, Wittgenstein claims later: "It would be, of course, nonsense to say that one sentence cannot have several proofs – for this is the way we say" (Wittgenstein 1999, p. 189). He is, then, clearly not defending the "paradoxical" consequences of his "complete systems conception" anymore. He is calling one of them "nonsense".

Even though a sympathy for the multiple systems conception never completely disappeared after many changes in the way it was presented, Wittgenstein had new plans for it in his Late Period. It should be considered merely as one conception amongst others. Wittgenstein, in his lectures from 1939, suggests that its new role is merely to oppose other views; as he says, to create new gas to spell old gas:

I may occasionally produce new interpretations, not in order to suggest they are right, but in order to show that the old interpretation and the new are *equally* arbitrary. I will only invent a new interpretation to put side by side with an old one and say, "Here, choose, take your pick." I will only make gas to expel old gas. (my emphasis; Wittgenstein 1989, 14).

If my understanding of the shift of the role of the multiple complete systems conception is correct, we need to find and explanation for why exactly it took place, why the multiple complete systems conception is "equally arbitrary", and what is the point of its new role.

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Umfasst Wittgensteins früher Bildbegriff das literarische Bild (bildliches Sprechen)?

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1. Der mathematisch-grafische Doppelcharakter von Wittgensteins frühem Bildbegriff

Der Begriff des Bildes in der Logisch-philosophischen Abhandlung (LPA) hat einen mathematisch-grafischen Doppelcharakter. Der mathematische Aspekt wurzelt in dem mathematischen Begriff der Abbildung, genauer in der Abbildung von Strukturen, nach der das Bild einer Relation zwischen Elementen einer Menge gleich der Relation der Bilder dieser Elemente ist. Dieses mathematische Verständnis der Abbildung stellt die Grundlage für die isomorphe Repräsentation von Welt durch Sprache und damit die Voraussetzung für das Klären von Sinn durch logische Analyse dar: da alle Sätze als Ergebnis der Anwendung logischer Operationen auf Elementarsätze angesehen werden, kann der Sinn von komplexen Sätzen durch die Zerlegung in deren Komponenten (Elementarsätze und logische Operatoren) geklärt und Missverständnisse aufgedeckt werden. Die Elementarsätze garantieren dabei die Eindeutigkeit und Endlichkeit der Komponentenzersetzung.

Als Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Analyse können die Elementarsätze jedoch nicht selbst analysiert, d.h. nicht durch Komponentenzersetzung geklärt werden. Es fragt sich daher, wie Elementarsätze zum Satz und wie - qua Satz - zum Bild der Wirklichkeit werden können (LPA 4.221)¹, nachdem das mathematische Bildverständnis für sie nicht mehr hinreicht. Daran schließt sich die Frage an, wie Elementarsätze verstanden werden könnten, nachdem die Klärung durch Analyse auf sie nicht mehr anwendbar ist. Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage führt Wittgenstein den grafischen Aspekt seines Bildbegriffes ein sowie die Klärung durch Erläuterungen (4.0311 und 3.263, 4.026). Der Elementarsatz bildet nicht zerlegbar ab, sondern stellt als Ganzes ein lebendiges Bild, ein Bild im gewöhnlichen Sinne dar, das mehr ist als die logische Summe seiner Teile. Dieser ganzheitliche /gestaltorientierte Bildbegriff verschmilzt in der LPA mit dem mathematischen Verständnis der isomorphen Repräsentation und macht den mathematisch-grafischen Doppelcharakter ihres Bildbegriffes aus (für ausführlichere Diskussionen dieses Doppelcharakters siehe Erbacher 2008, 2008a).

Zusammenfassend kann man sagen, dass der mathematische Aspekt des Bildbegriffes mit dem Klären von Missverständnissen korrespondiert, diese Klärung aber nur vor dem Hintergrund eines Verstehens geschehen kann, das dem Erfassen von Bildern im gewöhnlichen Sinne entspricht. Diese Bilder können nicht analysiert (in ihre Komponenten zerlegt) werden, aber ihr Sinn kann durch *Erläuterungen* geklärt werden.

2. Die Frage nach dem bildlichen Sprechen

Um herauszufinden, wie Klärung durch Erläuterung aussehen kann, ist es interessant nachzuvollziehen, wie Wittgenstein dabei verfährt. Besonders erhellend sind dabei diejenigen Stellen, an denen die Ganzheitlichkeit der Ele-

mentarsätze erklärt wird. An diesen Stellen spricht Wittgenstein z.B. von der Artikuliertheit eines musikalischen Themas (3.14) oder jenem „lebenden Bild“ (4.0311). Wittgenstein verwendet zur Erläuterung der Ganzheitlichkeit von Elementarsätzen also das, was gemeinhin als Vergleich, bildliches Sprechen oder literarisches Bild bezeichnet wird. Explizit verfährt er so bei der Erklärung des Wahrheitsbegriffs: „Ein Bild zur Erklärung des Wahrheitsbegriffs: Schwarzer Fleck auf weißem Papier;...“ (4.063).

Mit dem bildlichen Sprechen tritt, neben dem bereits angesprochenen mathematischen und dem grafischen, ein dritter Begriff von Bild hinzu, nämlich der des literarischen Bildes. Es fragt sich hier, ob der Bildbegriff der LPA auch dieses bildliche Sprechen umfasst. Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage muss zunächst geklärt werden, was genauer unter bildlichen Sprechen verstanden werden kann.

3. Ein Vorbegriff bildlichen Sprechens

Eine Untersuchung des bildlichen Sprechens in der LPA ist schon zu Beginn einer Schwierigkeit ausgesetzt, die zum Kern der Interpretation des Werkes führt. Denn welche Sätze sollen als literarische Bilder gelten und im Gegensatz wozu, wenn der Satz als Bild identifiziert wird (4.01)? Falls dieser Bildbegriff auch das literarische Bild einschließt, so könnte prinzipiell alles in der LPA Gesagte als bildlich gesprochen aufgefasst werden. Danach müsste nicht nur die Rede etwa von der Kette (2.03, 4.22) oder dem musikalischen Thema (3.14), sondern auch die etwa vom logischen Gerüst und Raum (3.42, 4.023, 6.124), und schließlich die Rede von Komplexen und der Analyse ihrer Bestandteile (2.0201, 3.24, 3.3442, 4.2211, 5.5423) als bildliches Sprechen aufgefasst werden. Wer Wittgensteins späte Schriften kennt, ist sich der Bildhaftigkeit einer solchen auf den ersten Blick begrifflich-theoretischen Sprache selbstverständlich bewusst. Auch ganze Forschungszweige beschäftigen sich mit versteckten Bildern in Alltags- und Wissenschaftssprache (stellvertretend Blumenberg, Lakoff und Johnson), und diese Forschung blüht nicht zuletzt auch auf dem Boden von Wittgensteins Einsichten. Man könnte also durchaus und auch mit Bezug auf Wittgenstein die Position vertreten, dass alles Sprechen der LPA bildlich sei. *Demnach stellte die LPA ein Bild der Sprache und der Welt dar, und zwar in einem komplexen mathematisch-grafischen und literarischen Sinne des Bildbegriffes.*

Gegen diese Position spricht allerdings die Intuition beim Lesen, dass in der LPA tatsächlich eine – ernst gemeinte – theoretisch-begriffliche Sprache vorliegt, die sich vom bildhaften Sprechen unterscheidet. Sicherlich kann diese Intuition allein die gerade skizzierte Position kaum widerlegen, da möglicherweise gerade sie als irreführend entlarvt werden soll. Gegen diesen Einwand aber steht die Tatsache, dass Wittgenstein erst im Laufe der Schriften, die in seinem Nachlass erschienen sind, die (irreführende) Bildhaftigkeit seiner frühen begrifflich-theoretischen Sprache aufdeckt (z.B. Ts-212,95-96; 272; 338-45, 918, 1786-

¹ Im Folgenden werden nur die Dezimalen der LPA zitiert.

88)². Es erscheint sehr unwahrscheinlich, dass Wittgenstein so intensiv mit etwas ringt, das ihm schon 15 Jahre früher klar war. Dieses Nachlass-genetische Argument weist darauf hin, dass eine Position, die die gesamte LPA als bildliches Sprechen auffasst, eher die Erkenntnisse des späteren Wittgenstein in seine frühen Schriften hineinliest als den Begriff des Bildes aus der LPA heraus. Dies ist je nach Erkenntnisinteresse legitim und erhellend; wenn aber das Ziel der Untersuchung in der Beschreibung von Wittgensteins Verwendung literarischer Bilder besteht, dann ist dem zu folgen, was schon in der LPA deutlich als bildliches Sprechen vorliegt.

Dieser Vorüberlegung zumindest im Anfang folgend soll hier davon ausgegangen werden, dass nicht alles Gesagte in der LPA bildliches Sprechen darstellt, sondern es eine vom literarischen Bild unterschiedene Rede gibt und der LPA die Bildhaftigkeit ihrer theoretisch-begrifflichen Rede noch nicht bewusst ist.

4. Spezifizierung des Begriffs durch die literarische Rhetorik

Für die weitere Untersuchung ist ein spezifischerer Begriff dessen nötig, was als literarisches Bild gelten soll. Ein natürlicher Ort für diese Spezifizierung stellt die literarische Rhetorik dar, die sich auf ausdifferenzierte und teilweise theoretisch erschlossene Systeme bildlichen Sprechens der klassischen Rhetorik beziehen kann. Es ist an dieser Stelle weder möglich noch notwendig, diese Systeme in Einzelheiten nachzuvollziehen. Vielmehr kann ein grobes Raster helfen, einen klareren Begriff von bildlichem Sprechen und den in der rhetorischen Tradition unterschiedenen Arten literarischer Bilder zu bekommen. Diese Zusammenfassung folgt Standardwerken der Disziplin (Aristoteles, Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik, Lausberg, Plett).

Beschränkt man sich auf die Rolle bildlichen Sprechens hinsichtlich der Stilistik, was eine in der Moderne häufig anzutreffende und auch für die vorliegende Untersuchung geeignete Verkürzung darstellt, dann werden literarische Bilder in der Kategorie der Tropen („Wendungen“) subsumiert. Das gemeinsame Kennzeichen des tropischen oder „uneigentlichen“ Sprechens besteht darin, dass an die Stelle eines eigentlichen Ausdrucks (*verbum proprium*) ein uneigentlicher (der *tropus*, *verbum translatum*) tritt. Diese Stellvertretung ist allerdings keine zufällige Ersetzung, sondern wird als Übertragung innerhalb bestimmter Beziehungen zwischen *verbum proprium* und *verbum translatum* verstanden. Anhand der Art dieser Beziehung zwischen eigentlichem Ausdruck und *tropus* können Arten des bildlichen Sprechens unterschieden werden. So unterscheiden sich etwa Metapher und Metonymie dadurch, dass bei der Metonymie eine Übertragung innerhalb eines (z.B. Sach- oder Lebens-)Bereiches stattfindet (z.B. Autor für Werk) und bei der Metapher eine Übertragung zwischen unterschiedlichen Bereichen (z.B. Haus für Werk). Wie bei der Metapher findet bei der Analogie eine Übertragung zwischen heterogenen Bereichen statt; im Gegensatz zur Metapher, bei der sich der *tropus* vornehmlich auf ein Wort beschränkt, weitet die Analogie aber die Übertragung auf den Satz aus, wodurch die Analogie nicht nur Elemente zwischen Bereichen überträgt, sondern Verhältnisse. (Eine Metapher kann auch eine Analogie voraussetzen oder sie stiften.) Ein zweiter Unter-

schied zwischen Analogie und Metapher besteht darin, dass die Übertragung bei der Metapher implizit geschieht, bei der Analogie dagegen explizit angezeigt bzw. das abgebildete Verhältnis explizit genannt werden kann. Sind noch lexikalische Spuren des eigentlichen Gedankens in der Analogie enthalten, so spricht man von einer unvollkommenen Analogie (*permixta apertis allegoria*), ansonsten von einer vollkommenen (*tota allegoria*).³

5. Literarische Bilder in der LPA

Mit diesem kurz skizzierten begrifflichen Instrumentarium aus der rhetorischen Stilistik kann Wittgensteins bildliches Sprechen in der LPA fundierter untersucht werden. Die Bestimmungen und Unterscheidungen der literarischen Rhetorik erlauben – zusammen mit der unter 3. gemachten Voraussetzung – die Identifizierung von Tropen in der LPA und deren übersichtlicher Darstellung (siehe Tabelle 1).

Die Tabelle zeigt herausstechende literarische Bilder in der LPA zusammen mit dem von ihnen zu erklärenden Zielbereich, sofern dieser explizit im gleichen oder benachbarten Satz genannt wird. Die vierte Spalte tabelliert wortgetreu die lexikalische Anzeige der Bilder, sofern vorhanden. Es sei betont, dass die Tropenbegriffe hier im Sinne eines sehr konservativen Entscheidungskriteriums angewendet wurden, d.h. zugunsten der Sicherheit, dass es sich bei den identifizierten Fällen um literarische Bilder handelt, das Risiko in Kauf genommen wurde, nicht alle Bilder zu identifizieren. Die Darstellung versteht sich also keineswegs als vollständig. Aber bereits anhand dieser unvollständigen Übersicht kann man in Bezug auf Wittgensteins Verwendung literarischer Bilder festhalten:

(a) Wittgenstein verwendet zahlreiche literarische Bilder in der LPA; selbst mit einem sehr konservativen Entscheidungskriterium sind zahlreiche Fälle zu zählen.

(b) Wenn man die Bilder in Bereiche gruppieren möchte, dann stammen sie vor allem aus den Bereichen

(i) Mathematik/Konstruktion/Physik (v.a. Mechanik/Optik),

(ii) Alltagsgegenstände

(iii) Kunst (Literatur und Musik).

Darüber hinaus scheint es favorisierte Bilder zu geben, die ausgebaut werden oder mehrmals auftauchen; zu diesen gehören die Bilder der Kette, des Körpers, des Netzes und des Maßstabs.

(a) Es fällt auf, dass in den meisten Fällen im gleichen oder benachbarten Satz neben dem Bild auch das Verhältnis in dem Zielbereich genannt ist, das erklärt werden soll. Insofern liegen hier vor allem unvollkommene Analogien vor, wobei dieses Übergewicht an Analogien natürlich auch aus dem streng konservativen Kategorisierungskriterium resultieren kann.

(b) Neben der expliziten Nennung des Zielbereichs fällt vor allem auf, dass die Bilder als Bilder explizit gekennzeichnet sind und so von Wittgenstein selbst vom Rest des Textes getrennt werden (Spalte 3 der Tabelle). Diese Kennzeichen für sprachliche Bilder umfassen

(i) den Vergleich einleitende Worte wie „wie“, „gleichsam“, „geradezu“, „sozusagen“

² Zitierweise der Nachlass-Dokumente orientiert sich an den Sigla, die am Wittgenstein-Archiv im Hyperwittgenstein- und DISCOVERY-Projekt (http://wab.aksis.uib.no/wab_discovery.page; http://wab.aksis.uib.no/wab_hw.page) entwickelt worden sind.

³ Die oben genannte „Metaphernforschung“ weist ein weniger differenziertes System stilistischer Figuren als die klassische und literarische Rhetorik auf, teilt aber die grundlegende Annahme des Übertragungsprinzips.

Tabelle 1: Literarische Bilder in der LPA

LPA-Dezimale	Literarisches Bild (verbum translatum)	Zu erklärende Elemente/Verhältnisse (verbum proprium)	Lexikalische Anzeige
2.03	Glieder einer Kette	Gegenstände im Sachverhalt	, wie
2.1512	Masstab	Bild	, wie
2.1515	Fühler	Zuordnungen	gleichsam
3.141	Musikalisches Thema	Satz	– (Wie...)
3.1431	Räumliche Gegenstände	Schriftzeichen	statt, drückt dann aus
4.002	Nicht wissen wie man die Laute hervorbringt	Nicht wissen wie und was jedes Wort bedeutet.	– Wie
4.014	Kleid und Körper Einssein im Märchen	Sprache und Gedanken logischen Bau gemein haben, in abbildenden internen Beziehung stehen	, und zwar so (Wie..)
4.031	Sachlage zusammenstellen	Sinn haben	gleichsam, geradezu
4.0311	Lebendes Bild	Das Ganze	– ... –
4.04	Hertz's Mechanik über dynamische Modelle	Gleiche logische Mannigfaltigkeit von Satz und Sachlage	(Vergleiche...)
4.04112	Sehen durch Raumbille	Idealistische Erklärung“
4.063	Schwarzer Fleck	Positive Tatsache	Bild, Gleichnis
4.112	Trübe und verschwommene Gedanken		...gleichsam,...
4.1221	Gesichtszüge	Zug, interne Eigenschaft einer Tatsachen	(In dem Sinn, in welchem wir etwa...)
4.463	fester Körper, begrenzte Raum	Satz, Bild, Modell	(..im negativen Sinne..., im positiven Sinne...)
5.143	Grenze, substanzloser Mittelpunkt	Kontradiktion, Tautologie	sozusagen
5.156	Auszug aus anderen Sätzen	Wahrscheinlichkeitssatz	gleichsam
6.341	Netze Bausteine Zahlensystem	Systeme der Weltbeschreibung Mechanische Axiome System der Mechanik	entspricht (Wie...)
6.342	Logik	Mechanik	So
6.372	Gott und Schicksal	Naturgesetze	So, ..wie
6.54	Leiter hinaufsteigen	Sätze verstehen	(...sozusagen...)

(ii) die direkte Bezeichnung „Bild“, „Gleichnis“

(iii) die Abhebung vom eigentlichen Text durch Klammern, Anführungszeichen oder Gedankenstriche

Diese lexikalischen Abhebungen vom Text unterstützen die im dritten Abschnitt gemachte Annahme, dass in der LPA ein vom literarischen Bild unterschiedener begrifflich oder eigentlich gemeinter Text vorliegt. Das Fehlen solcher Kennzeichnungen in der LPA kann auch bei Identifizierung dessen helfen, was nicht als literarisches Bild aufgefasst werden kann (4.011).

6. Fazit: literarisches Bild und Bildbegriff in der LPA

Hinsichtlich der Frage nach dem Verhältnis des Bildbegriffs in der LPA in seinem mathematisch-grafischen Doppelcharakter und dem literarischen Bild bleibt insgesamt festzuhalten: Wittgenstein verwendet in der LPA zur Klärung durch Erläuterung literarische Bilder, die sich von einem eigentlichen begrifflich-theoretischen Text unterscheiden lassen. Nicht alles Sprechen in der LPA ist also bildlich gesprochen. Wenn man allerdings von dem traditionellen und bis heute weithin anerkannten Verständnis von literarischen Bildern als Übertragung (Zuordnung) von Elementen und Strukturen zwischen (heterogenen) Bereichen (Mengen) ausgeht, dann wird auch das literarische Bild von dem komplexen Bildbegriff in der LPA umfasst, denn dieser beruht ja gerade in einer solchen Abbildung von Relationen. Insofern kann die LPA auch als ein Beitrag zur Theorie des bildlichen Sprechens im literarischen Sinn gelesen werden: *sie erörtert, was es heißt, mit Sprache ein Bild zu machen; und zwar in einem komplexen mathematisch-grafischen- und literarischen Verständnis des Bildbegriffs.*

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Understanding Architecture as Inessential

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Those versed in the architectural discipline will likely agree that architecture, as a whole and in its parts, is driven by a set of established rules, reasons and conventions – whatever they may be. From the Ancient Egyptian Pyramids to Modern housing blocks to the blobs of Greg Lynn, each adheres to some very particular sets of rules and reasons which effectively represents what they as an individual or culture take to be architecture. Yet when considering what architecture *is* across the boundaries of time, culture, or individual theories, the definition becomes abstract or reduced to metaphysical explanations in an effort to encompass all the eventualities of ‘architecture’; in order to reach its said ‘essence’. It is this description of the natural and the conventional as given by new Wittgenstein, Stanley Cavell in his text *The Claim of Reason*, that frees us from the mazes left in the wake of metaphysics and the beyond vague abstract in its finding the essence both meaningless and ultimately unattainable. This reading, I will argue, shifts our understanding of architecture towards the inessential.

The point of relevance when considering the new Wittgensteinian reading in relation to architecture is its epistemology, radical by both today’s and yesterday’s standards. It is this epistemology which is inherently inessential in its refusal to allow knowledge to be defined absolutely: “universals are neither necessary nor even useful in explaining how words and concepts apply to different things” (Cavell, 188). Whilst steadfastly avoiding accusations of relativism: “I *know* no more about the application of a word or concept than the explanations I can give, so that no universal or definition would, as it were, *represent* my knowledge [...] once we see all this, the idea of a universal no longer has its *obvious* appeal, it no longer carries a *sense* of explaining something profound” (Cavell, 188). With this, the new Wittgenstein allows for new ontologies within philosophical circles, although this possibility has not yet been explored in architecture. This paper extends this ontological shift to the architectural discipline by reinforcing the significance of the natural and conventional in architecture practice.

Founded on Cavell’s account of what counts for us as being something (see Chapter Five “Natural and Conventional”), it becomes clear that our understanding of what architecture may be, is not so much defined by textbook definitions or other such apparent authorities on the subject, but upon what we have learned through experience as having count as architecture. Given that an object counts as a particular object only when we recognise it as counting as that object, this deviates quite drastically from common methods of identifying what architecture is. For instance, an object of the built environment only counts as architecture as it fits our criteria for knowing architecture, not what the writer of the dictionary definition counts as being architecture. So, whilst what counts as architecture for me is determined by what I have learned to count as architecture in tandem with my experiences of what I hold to be architecture, this may be entirely different for every person. Yet, the striking thing is that, whilst it seems that we can never nor could we ever come to hold a common notion of architecture or at least notions which resemble one another in some way (see Wittgenstein’s notion of

family resemblance) we do actually have notions which resemble one another, which sometimes suggest commonalities.¹

Nevertheless, the implications of the complexity of difference seem to suggest that an architecture or even an architectural instance is unique in so far as the particular conception of architecture is unique (and that, according to the above will always be the case). For instance, Wittgenstein’s house, the Palais Stonborough or the Kundmannngasse, is clearly what counts as architecture for Wittgenstein; it is the closest thing we have to a manifestation of Wittgenstein’s conception of architecture.² And although this may not count as such for me or for someone of another form of life, and unless I am somehow disempowered (via political or other forms of oppression) I will maintain a different conception from Wittgenstein’s of what architecture is. That is to say, I will maintain somewhat different criteria for knowing what architecture is. Unless I somehow accept Wittgenstein’s house as being architecture with the exact same criteria for knowing architecture as Wittgenstein himself held, I and others outside of his conception of it will maintain the difference in our own individual conceptions.

Clearly though, this paradigm of the ‘other’ architecture is all the more apparent when considering groups of people that have entirely different experiences in learning what counts as architecture and for which those objects that count as architecture are entirely different. The architectures, for instance, of the Japanese people one hundred years ago in contrast with the architectures of the plains tribes of North American bear little to no resemblance to one another, and so it is easy to conclude that their very conceptions of what ‘architecture’ is are entirely different (if we can grant them the benefit of the doubt in having held identifiable, in Western terms, a concept for ‘architecture’).

In our search for an inessential understanding of architecture and in light of this anecdote, it seems that we should consider multiple architectures simultaneously. However, this is no more than paradoxical. Paradoxical because their (the Japanese and the Arapahoe) conceptions of what architecture is are founded on distinctly different criteria sets, where little to no congruencies amongst them can be expected. That is, other than their both being human and having had human experiences.

Yet, when considering the possibility of an architectural essence (amongst either a single group with resembling criteria or two or more groups with unique criteria sets), our particular conceptions of what is natural or what is held to be conventional amongst a particular group of people – or ‘form of life’ in Wittgensteinian terms – with

¹ The phrase ‘common notions’ refers to the similarities between our conceptions of things, whether a concept of a pencil or something of greater import such as a religious figure.

² Whilst semiology conflicts with the new Wittgenstein epistemology, one could argue that the notion of architecture as comprised of symbols does resonant with Cavell’s account of the criteria for knowing. That what a semiologist would call a symbol, a new Wittgenstein would refer to as something known relating to a particular criterion.

regards to architecture practice is, nor could it ever be held as being, as absolutely true for all people in all instances, despite the belief and rhetoric that might support it otherwise. Accordingly, this paper considers what the implications of knowing architecture in this manner might be. That is to say, what does it mean to say that architecture is inessential? Does this mean that the few truths we have of architecture in the form of theses, doctrines, and theories are not absolutely true?

The very conception of an architecture based upon an inessential epistemology seems to go against common notions of what architecture *is*; what we in the western world, in England, at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, professedly take architecture to be. This is maybe unsurprising for vernacularists or even historians of architecture. That for example, for the normal person living in remote isolated Russia, what is architecture goes no further than their understanding of the buildings which surround them day to day. The person, supposedly of the same form of life in St. Petersburg would, with some of the most extravagant examples of architecture present as a part of their everyday life, conceive of architecture differently than someone who has never seen or experienced in any other way the wonders of St. Petersburg. Likewise, two persons living in St. Petersburg will not have identical conceptions of architecture either as they will not have learned or experienced the architecture there in exactly the same way. As such, the inessential goes against an agreed notion of architecture within a form of life, which is further yet than the historian or vernacularist will likely agree to. It appears at surface level that the only way one would or could come to know it without reverting back to a conception of the essence, would be to literally experience, to learn about, to hear architecture described in, a different manner than they are used to.

To understand the 'other' architecture, we have to bring into our own way of life this other form of life – we have to agree with the other as it were. And if we choose to agree with the other, we simply take a step towards being a part of the other. And if we choose to disagree with the other, we simply reject the other form of life in favour of our own. Our agreeing taking in or rejecting our instances or eventualities of architecture affects our knowing of architecture. But we cannot have agreed with two ways of doing things can we? We cannot have multiple notions of architecture? Conflicting notions of architecture, can we? As an architect, how is one to practice?

Yet we are not so conflicted. We somehow resolve these differences by synthesising to some degree the experiences we have into a (hopefully) coherent conception of architecture. We may, for instance, agree to qualities of both French and Indian architecture. Given the chance to create a piece of architecture would project some design which incorporates both in some form or fashion. Le Corbusier for instance is said to have been greatly affected by the architecture of India and China, so one may argue that this influence in addition to his being trained as an artist, not an architect, were amongst the reasons why his architecture was such an innovative and unique architecture in comparison to other architects during the same period. But if synthesis is indeed the result of having experience many architectures, it is not inessential. We have not transgressed the boundaries of one architecture into a new *per se*. We have created a new eventuality or instance in it by making reference to some aspects of the old architecture and some aspects of the new architecture. Our attempt at

the inessential becomes no more than a mutation of the parent architectures.³

What is revealed here is that the inessential in architecture *cannot* be achieved in a literal sense, by coming to know many purported essences of architecture via knowing many architectures, but by knowing the limitations or boundaries of our everyday understanding of architecture as it is. That for instance, each participant of a form of life holds a unique conception of architecture and furthermore that each form of life has a unique collective conception of architecture. It has been argued accordingly that we could never come to know every eventuality in architecture from which to come to some essence of it in that way. Rather, the implications of this reading of architecture are simply that an essence of something, in this case of architecture, can never be found due to the vast complexity and varieties of criteria for knowing.

The work of Oskari Kuusela seems to speak to this point when he states: "the situation assumes the appearance that something is directly perceived, as if one simply saw in the example the inner most essence of the things it exemplifies and did not use the example as a mode of presentation" (Kuusela, 106). This implies that there is not *an* essence to be seen in the object that is architecture, that the differences and/or commonalities we see in an architectural object speak more to the *mode* of presentation or the everyday rules, reasons, and conventions employed than to any preconceived definition of architecture.

And whilst the current definition of architecture as "architecture" stands in direct conflict as it is inherently essentialist in its being (a definition), to understand architecture differently is to re-conceive of the very notion 'architecture' as is purportedly captured in such definitions. Whilst it may only superficially appear that an inessential notion of architecture would literally require knowing many essences, this has been shown not to be the case. Re-conception does not actually transgress the boundaries of a said architecture essence, but locates the *limitations of its localised notion* in the everyday.

Hence, the description of this alternative image of architecture is not attempting to provide an *alternative* image of architecture but a *description* of the ontological shift in our understanding of architecture where, "the grasping of a universal cannot perform the function it is imagined to have" (Cavell, 188). In other words, an essence of something, in this case architecture, does not exist as such. Rather 'architecture' as is conventionally defined and talked about is in and of itself an *ideal* notion whatever its context. Thus, our sense of architecture arrived at through our experiences of it, based upon our criteria for knowing architecture, tells us what architecture *is*. Phenomenal still is that there seems to exist amongst all humans some conception – some criteria for knowing – an architecture of some sort, as if it truly is one very basic and fundamental aspect of human existence.

³ This is the case when considering the way in which we create architecture, something Cavell calls the 'invitation to projective imagination'. Furthermore, the possibility of understanding architecture as inessential means accepting it as being defined by its relevant form of life, whether of another foreign culture or of a micro culture within Western culture. This view clearly, if given due attention via philosophical analysis, has strong implications on the political.

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Cavell on the Ethical Point of the *Investigations*

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1. In this paper, I will explore Stanley Cavell's account of the ethical point of the *Philosophical Investigations*. Cavell argues that we should locate Wittgenstein's later work within the tradition of what he himself has described as "moral perfectionism". Though Wittgenstein's philosophy is clearly a major influence on Cavell's understanding of perfectionism, Cavell tends to focus on other authors – most notably on Emerson – when he explicitly articulates this moral outlook. In what follows, I will try to rearrange certain themes from Cavell's reading of Wittgenstein, with the hope of making the connection of such thoughts with moral perfectionism more straightforward. In this way I aim to illustrate the way in which, in Cavell's perspective, we can make sense of the ethical significance of the *Investigations*.

A convenient place to start, in order to flesh out such an account, is the following passage of Cavell's:

We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and expect others, to be able to project them into further contexts. Nothing insures that this projection will take place (in particular, not the grasping of universals nor the grasping of book of rules), just as nothing insures that we will make, and understand, the same projections. That on the whole we do is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, senses of humour and of significance and of fulfilment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation – all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls "forms of life". Human speech and activity, sanity and community, rest upon nothing more, but nothing less, than this. It is a vision as simple as it is difficult, and as difficult as it is (and because it is) terrifying. (Cavell 1969:52)

One might begin to account for the moral relevance of this vision of language by asking why Cavell says that this vision is *terrifying*. A possible line of answer here stresses the idea that, for Cavell, Wittgenstein's vision makes us *responsible* in a peculiar way. We fear this responsibility and we want to avoid it; but since Wittgenstein is reminding us of this responsibility, we find his conception of language terrifying. Cavell writes for instance:

We understandably do not like our concepts to be based on what matters to us (something Wittgenstein once put by saying "Concepts...are the expression of our interests" (§570)); it makes our language seem unstable and the instability seems to mean what I have expressed as my being responsible for whatever stability our criteria may have, and I do not want this responsibility [...]. (Cavell 1990:92)

Let's look first of all at the idea that our concepts are expression of our interests, of what matters to us. This is really the core of Wittgenstein's vision of language, as Cavell reads it, and I can't go through the details of his reading now. One might convey very sketchily what Cavell is getting at by saying that all the complicated modes of natural response that belong to our form of life are not a matter of our psychology, separated from what is, properly speaking, the logic of our concepts. All these natural facts

about us belong the *meaning* of our concepts, and their normative dimension cannot be grasped apart from them: to *understand* a concept is to be involved in the relevant forms of life, in a natural set of interests, reactions, needs, etc.

Now, as we saw before, Cavell says that this vision of language entrusts us with a *responsibility*. How can one account for this striking remark? Just consider again the idea that our concepts are expression of interests, needs, reactions that are natural to us. The fact that we react as we do, that our form of life is the way it is, is internal to the logic of our concepts – but on the other hand is *just* a fact, a contingent fact, and it could be otherwise. In this sense, Cavell remarks that Wittgenstein's vision of language seems to deprive our concepts of their stability. Our agreement in language is an agreement in our mode of natural response: but then again there is no reason why we *must* go on responding as we do, finding interesting what we find interesting, or feeling the way we feel – there is no reason, apart from the fact that all of this is just natural to us. And *is it* really natural for us? This is, in Cavell's perspective, a *question* that Wittgenstein's vision of language imposes on us – on *each* of us *separately* – and there is no way to answer the question in advance. You must continuously try to understand whether those mode of responsiveness that make our concepts possible are really natural *for you*, are really expressing your interests, your needs, or your feelings. This constant examination of your form of life defines for Cavell the *responsibility* with which Wittgenstein is burdening us. In this sense, Cavell writes that I am responsible for whatever stability our criteria may have: each of us must face the question of whether one wants to keep on using concepts in agreement with others. We must understand whether we find natural, for instance, to call a "reason", an "inner process", a "virtue", a "marriage", a "democracy", an "illness", a "work of art", etc. what others call like that. In the application of such concepts the interests of a form of life are revealed, so we must ask ourselves whether we really share these interests: in other words, we must ask ourselves whether the form of life we inherited is really *ours*.

2. This idea of a responsibility towards one's mode of life – of a permanent examination of one's interests, desires, and needs – may in turn account for the *moral relevance* of Wittgenstein's vision of language. This moral relevance may be understood, as we've already said, through Cavell's notion of *moral perfectionism*. Cavell's use of this notion is meant to cover a broad variety of moral outlooks, and involves a complicated and elusive set of ideas: what I'll say in the remaining of this talk will therefore only scratch the surface of this concept. One might begin by noting, at any rate, that moral perfectionism individuates for Cavell a particular register of moral life, which has been widely overlooked in contemporary ethical thinking. Contemporary deontological and teleological theories, and even contemporary virtue ethics, tend to understand the question about one's mode of life in terms of a question about *what course of action* one should take. In moral perfectionism, instead, questioning one's mode of life means asking whether your mode of life is really *yours*.

The issue, in other words, is not one of finding which principles, or which conception of the virtuous character, will lead us to the right action. The issue is rather that of understanding whether the principles you follow, the character you've been inculcated with, your mode of life in general, are really yours or have been adopted out of conformity, blind habit, or illusion. Cavell expresses this point by saying that a perfectionist investigation is called for «when what is problematic in your life [...] is not the fact that between alternative courses of action the right has become hard to find» but when «in the course of your life you have lost your way» (Cavell 1990:xxx).

Now, the kind of question that Wittgenstein's vision forces on us might be seen as a version of the perfectionist question. What Wittgenstein suggests, in other words, is a peculiar way of giving content to the question whether my mode of life is really mine. In the context of Wittgensteinian perfectionism, this question becomes the question of whether the form of life that is revealed in my use of concepts is really natural for me. By attending to my natural conceptual responsiveness, I might discover an access to myself that will enable me to evaluate whether my mode of life is really mine. In this sense, the responsibility that Wittgenstein's vision confer on us may be said for Cavell to have an ethical relevance, accountable in perfectionist terms.

From what has been said so far, one can make sense of the idea that this sort of perfectionist responsibility might be, as Cavell says, *terrifying*. The question whether a given concept is natural for us is not just a question about *words*, but involves all the responses, the habits, and the desires that shape our ordinary life. If one thinks about the depth that such questions may assume, one will see what Cavell means when he remarks that we fear perfectionist responsibility, that we don't want it and we constantly try to escape it.

Since this responsibility is, according to Cavell, a feature of our form of life as language users, the impulse to escape this responsibility manifests itself as an impulse to escape our form of life with language altogether. Cavell calls this drive to transcend our form of life with language *scepticism*. The refusal will present itself with particular force in certain forms of philosophical thought. In philosophy we attempt to construct impersonal frameworks of rules, or to postulate the grasp of transcending universals, with the hope of fixing in advance the circumstances in which the application of a concept is warranted. This attempt is interpreted by Cavell as a manifestation of a sceptical desire: we want our words to mean something independently of our natural mode of response; and this, for Cavell, is a way of protecting us from the fact that, in order to apply a concept, we must rely on reactions, needs, and interests that are natural to us. Our desire to protect ourselves from this fact, in turn, depends on our wish to escape the responsibility towards our life with concepts that Wittgenstein's vision of language implies.

3. According to Cavell's diagnosis, then, philosophical problems should not be seen as merely intellectual puzzles: our inclination to fall into such problems has also an ethical root, describable through the language of moral perfectionism. What drives us into philosophy, in this perspective, is a refusal of our form of life, motivated by a fear for the responsibility that this form of life evokes. On the background of this set of thoughts, one can see how Wittgenstein's philosophical practice in the *Investigations* – a

practice that aims at the dissolution of philosophical problems – can acquire a moral significance. By pointing to the fact that we've incurred in philosophical nonsense, Wittgenstein doesn't just intend to bring out that we've been misled by certain analogies between our modes of expression, and that therefore we've been inattentive, unscrupulous and the like: in our attraction for philosophical theorizing, rather, a deep orientation of the will is revealed. The fact that we are drawn to make philosophical assertions, in this perspective, shows that we are in a peculiar relation with our form of life: one might describe such a relation by saying that we're refusing the very fact that we share certain interests, needs, and feelings with other human beings. Wittgenstein's practice of elucidation, then, aims at a reorientation of our relation with our form of life: by showing that this sceptical denial is preventing us from making sense, such a practice may lead us to recognize that, if we want to be intelligible, we are to accept our form of life, our natural mode of response.

It is important to note, though, that for Cavell the acceptance of our form of life doesn't indicate a condition in which we are not exposed anymore to philosophical questioning. Cavell remarks in this sense that «Wittgenstein's motive [...] is to put the human animal back into language and therewith back into philosophy». (Cavell 1979:207). Cavell's position, in this respect, is at odds with many discussions of the ethical point of the *Investigations*. Several interpreters, in fact, have argued that the moral significance of Wittgenstein's work lies in its envisaging a state in which we are cured of the impulse to question philosophically our mode of life. James Peterman has claimed, for instance, that Wittgenstein's therapeutic activity presupposes a teleological conception (See Peterman 1992: 23). Such conception «emphasizes the undesirability of the specific forms of life that support traditional philosophical thinking» (Peterman 1992:107): the good life, in this perspective, is then seen as a mode of life in which we are not shaken anymore by philosophical anxieties. James Edwards argues, in a similar vein, that «Wittgenstein is trying to identify and to root out the very impulse of philosophizing itself» (Edwards 1982:7), leading thus the philosopher «to live a radically new sort of life, in which the very standards of human excellence [...] are radically altered» (Edwards 1982:157).

According to such readings, the ethical point of the *Investigations* lies in our acceptance of a *particular* mode of life, characterized by a specific set of interests, needs, and feelings. A life marked by a craving for philosophy is supposedly bad, and we should therefore adopt a better mode of life, in which such philosophical impulses are overcome. In Cavell's perspective, instead, recognizing one's form of life doesn't mean recognizing a fixed set of desires, interests, and needs: it means recognizing *that* we have such a natural mode of response, and that this fact exposes us to a constant examination of our way of life. Through this idea of an examination of one's mode of life, Cavell is recalling one of the most ancient ambitions of philosophy, an ambition Cavell sometimes describes in terms of «self knowledge» (see Cavell 1969: 68-69). Wittgenstein's later work should be seen as providing a particular access to this philosophical ideal, and not as promoting a way of life in which we are eventually dispensed from such questioning. In this sense, the *Investigations* can be seen as standing in the tradition of moral perfectionism: their idea of a responsibility towards our life with concepts individuates a new way of assessing one's relation with oneself.

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Semiotische Dreiecke als Problem für den radikalen Konstruktivismus

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1. Zielsetzung und Überblick

Warum und mit welchen Argumenten ergreift der radikale Konstruktivist Glasersfeld so vehement Partei für Saussure und gegen Ogden & Richards, deren semiotisches Dreieck prägend war für eine ganze Reihe psycholog(ist)ischer Wortkonzepte? Ich vergleiche zuerst (in Kapitel 2) einige dieser semiotischen Dreiecke miteinander und dann (in Kapitel 3) mit Saussures für den Konstruktivismus attraktivem Konzept eines seiner Natur nach arbiträren und zur Gänze im Mentalen angesiedelten sprachlichen Zeichens. Die konstruktivistische Position erweist sich – in ihrer Kritik an Ogden & Richards als Wegbereiter des radikalen Behaviorismus, aber auch in ihrem Versuch, Peirce zu verinnerlichen – als inkonsistent und als letztlich folgenlose Verkehrung des Behaviorismus in sein Gegenteil (Kapitel 4). Zumindest im hier untersuchten Bereich scheinen die an den Konstruktivismus allgemein gerichteten Gegenfragen Mitterers und Birbaumers berechtigt: „What difference does it make?“ (Mitterer 1998:554) „Wozu also Konstruktivismus, wenn es auch präzise geht?“ (Birbaumer 1998:514)

2. Semiotische Dreiecke als psychologische Wortkonzepte

Das klassische Bedeutungs Dreieck von Ogden & Richards (ursprünglich 1923) war musterbildend für zahlreiche weitere semiotische Dreiecke. Um die Bandbreite zu illustrieren, ziehe ich eher untypische Vertreter zum Vergleich heran: Das zweite Dreieck (in Abbildung 1) illustriert Gehlens Ansicht des Symbols, welche bereits von der Idee einer kognitiven Ökonomie geprägt ist. Das dritte, von Gisa Rauh stammende Dreieck unterscheidet sich in vielen Hinsichten von den üblichen Konstruktionen: Während z.B. das Ogden & Richards-Dreieck praktisch nur auf Inhaltswörter gemünzt ist – was die Autoren (1985:233) im Prinzip auch einräumen – spielt im Modell von Rauh auch die Klasse der Funktionswörter eine wichtige Rolle. Trotz dieser Unterschiede folgen die Dreiecks-Konstruktionen einem gemeinsamen Prinzip: Mit dem Symbol oder Zeichen links unten meinen sie in erster Linie das Wort. Zwischen dem Symbol bzw. Zeichen und den Referenzobjekten auf der anderen Seite gibt es keine direkte Verbindung, die Basisseite ist daher strichliert. Eine wirkliche Verbindung zwischen diesen beiden Eckpunkten wird erst durch kognitive Tätigkeiten bzw. mentale Repräsentationen (an der Spitze des Dreiecks) hergestellt. Dies macht sie zu, im weiteren Sinne, „psychologischen“ (oder „psychologistischen“, vgl. Smythe 1990:51) Wortkonzepten. Den Zeichen sowie den Referenzobjekten ist, mehr oder weniger ausdrücklich und jedenfalls nicht ins Konzept des Konstruktivismus passend, eine Existenz (auch) außerhalb des Bewusstseins der Zeichenbenutzer zugeordnet.

Ogden & Richards sehen die einzig relevante Beziehung des Symbols zum Referenzobjekt

„in its being used by someone to stand for a referent. Symbol and Referent, that is to say, are not connected directly (and when, for grammatical reasons, we imply

such a relation, it will merely be an imputed, as opposed to a real relation) but only indirectly round the two sides of the triangle.“ (Ogden & Richards 1985:11f)

Im zweiten Dreieck skizziert Habermeier (1988) Gehlens (1950) Philosophie des *Symbols* bzw., bei Gehlen synonym verwendet, des *Zeichens*: Indem sich der Mensch im Symbol entäußert, entlastet er sich vom unmittelbaren Druck der gegenwärtigen Situation. Abgelöst von diesem situativen Kontext kann er im bloß symbolischen und insbesondere im sprachlichen Raum das Nichtgegebene erschließen und Handlungsmöglichkeiten erproben. Entäußerung und Entlastung sind, als primäre Beziehungen, im Dreieck solide gezeichnet, während die unterbrochene Basislinie nur für eine „abgeleitete“ Beziehung steht.

Die einzelnen Begriffe an der Spitze des Dreiecks von Rauh (1989:259) entstehen zuerst einmal durch Interaktion mit der außersprachlichen Wirklichkeit. Sobald verfügbar, können sie laut Rauh (1989:261) neue, „von der Repräsentation der sensomotorisch erfahrbaren Wirklichkeit unabhängige Kombinationen eingehen“. Dieser Prozess wird aber erst erfahrbar „über den Prozess der Versprachlichung, dessen Ergebnis eine Metapher ist.“ Die darauf basierende Begriffsbildung ist ausschließlich sprachbedingt.

Für Smythe (1990:51) ist das semiotische Dreieck von Ogden & Richards eine „der frühesten und konsequentesten Darstellungen der psychologischen Position“, welche dem Irrtum zuneige, „symbolische Interpretation als individuelle Errungenschaft zu analysieren“, wo doch die meisten Symbole Allgemeingut wären. Nachdem aber Sprache keine individuelle Errungenschaft ist, kann die Interpretation sprachlicher Zeichen durch die Sprachbenutzer m.E. ohnehin nie eine bloß individuelle Angelegenheit sein. Außerdem ist schwer zu bestreiten, dass das mehr oder weniger kollektive Verständnis sprachlicher Zeichen im Akt der Benutzung durch den individuellen Benutzer jeweils von Neuem aktiviert werden muss. Was uns wegen des hohen Automatisierungsgrades nur selten – etwa in Fällen begrifflicher Ambivalenz oder angesichts mancher Metaphern oder auch Witze – bewusst wird.

[Siehe Zeichnung 1]

3. Was ist anders in Saussures Theorie des sprachlichen Zeichens?

Saussure (1967, ursprünglich 1916) vertritt ebenfalls eine psycholog(ist)ische Theorie, beschränkt sich aber im Grunde auf das *gesprochene (Inhalts-)Wort*. Damit ist seine Domäne enger begrenzt als die der obigen Modelle und auch enger als seine Benennung „sprachliches Zeichen“ vermuten ließe. Den Terminus „Symbol“ vermeidet er, weil das Symbol im Unterschied zum sprachlichen Zeichen „niemals ganz beliebig“ sei. Das sprachliche Zeichen definiert er als „die Verbindung der Vorstellung mit dem Lautbild“ (S. 78), wobei er mit „Lautbild“ nicht den „tatsächlichen Laut“ meint, „der lediglich etwas Physikalisches ist“, sondern den psychischen Eindruck dieses Lautes und dessen Vergegenwärtigung (S.77). Präzisierend schlägt er

vor, „dass man das Wort Zeichen beibehält für das Ganze, und Vorstellung bzw. Lautbild durch Bezeichnetes und Bezeichnung (Bezeichnendes) ersetzt“ (S.78f). Die grundsätzlichen Eigenschaften des so definierten Zeichens seien die Beliebigkeit und der lineare Charakter.

Ogden & Richards (1985) bemängeln an Saussures Konzept, „that the process of interpretation is included by definition in the sign“ (S.5) und dass es all das negiert, wofür ein Zeichen steht (S.6). Genau das macht aber Saussures Konzept attraktiv für den Konstruktivismus, wie wir in Kapitel 4 sehen werden. In diesem Kapitel werden auch weitere Besonderheiten der Theorie Saussures zur Sprache kommen, sodass wir uns in den nächsten Absätzen näher mit seiner folgenreichen, in mancher Hinsicht aber auch überholten Doktrin der Beliebigkeit bzw. Arbitrarität befassen können. Um meine *These* vorweg zu nehmen: *Ein Code zeichnet sich durch Beliebigkeit in dem Sinne aus, dass er auf keinerlei Ikonizität, Motiviertheit oder Transparenz angewiesen, keinerlei Darstellungsfunktion verpflichtet ist.* Und Sprache, in Wort oder Schrift, lässt sich im Prinzip als Code verstehen. Insofern trifft Saussures Doktrin tatsächlich die „Natur“ des sprachlichen Zeichens. Das Problem: Die natürlichen Sprachen sind zwar als Code auf Ikonizität und Transparenz nicht angewiesen, machen aber davon Gebrauch. Anders als ein Geheimcode haben sie sich in einer Weise entwickelt, welche unseren kognitiven Möglichkeiten entgegenkommt. Sie müssen, für jede Generation aufs Neue, erlernbar sein und sich auch auf hohem Verwendungsniveau an unseren kognitiven Möglichkeiten orientieren. Und sie müssen, in den Anfängen ihrer Entwicklung und aus solchen Gründen, an weniger arbiträre Systeme angeknüpft haben. Da ist alles willkommen, was dazu beiträgt, dass der „Sinn“ eines Zeichens leichter erlernt, leichter erraten, leichter erinnert werden kann. Zumal dann, wenn es die sprachlichen Äußerungen und Schilderungen obendrein plastischer und sinnlicher macht.

Saussure hat die Rolle der Onomatopoesie marginalisiert, wohl auch, um seine Beliebigkeits-Doktrin möglichst überzeugend vortragen zu können: Zum einen sei die Zahl der Onomatopoeitika viel geringer als gemeinhin angenommen, bei manchen sei der lautmalende Klang nur „zufälliges Ergebnis ihrer lautgeschichtlichen Entwicklung“. Zum anderen gäbe es Beispiele dafür, dass einige der ursprünglich mehr oder weniger lautnachahmenden Zeichen „etwas von ihrem ursprünglichen Charakter verloren und dafür der allgemeinen Natur der Zeichen, die unmotiviert sind, sich angenähert haben.“ (S.81).

Dem ersten Argument könnte man entgegenhalten, dass es vielleicht doch nicht reiner Zufall ist, wenn ursprünglich nicht-lautmalende Wörter irgendwann diesen Charakter annehmen, und dass bei näherem Hinören erstaunlich viele Wörter den Eindruck des Lautmalens hinterlassen: vom Schluchzen, Schlucken, Schlürfen, Schmatzen, Niesen und Schnarchen über das Krächzen und Zwitschern oder das Gurren, Bellen und Röhren bis hin zum Wiehern und Galopp und zum Schnalzen der Peitsche. Ich erinnere in diesem Zusammenhang an offenbar sprachuniverselle Phänomene der Lautsymbolik bzw. Phonosemantik, wie die Bevorzugung der Vordervokale [i] und [e] in Diminutiva und in den Benennungen für die Geräusche kleinerer Exemplare einer Gattung, und würde vermuten, dass auch hier lautmalende Tendenzen im Spiel sind. Das klassische Experiment von Köhler (1947) hatte eine überzufällig häufige Zuordnung des Kunstwortes „maluma“ zu rundlichen Formen und von „takete“ zu sternähnlichen Formen gezeigt. Maurer et al. (2006) beobachteten vergleichbare Zuordnungen schon bei Zweieinhalbjährigen. In ihrem Artikel verweisen sie

auch auf Untersuchungen, in denen die Probanden überzufällig häufig errieten, welche der Wörter einer ihnen völlig fremden Sprache Fischarten und welche Vogelarten bezeichneten.

Die Existenz noch so vieler Onomatopoeitika liefert kein Argument dagegen, das sprachliche Zeichen zur Gänze im Mentalen anzusiedeln. Aber wenn das „Lautbild“ des Wortes dem Lautbild jener geräuschproduzierenden Aktivitäten ähnelt, welche es bezeichnet, dann stört dies die konstruktivistische Ablehnung (Glaserfeld 1987:218f) jeglicher „ikonischer Übereinstimmung“ unseres Wissens mit der Realität. (Für verwandte Argumente, jedoch auf den graphischen Bereich bezogen, vgl. Fenk 2000:38f). Es stört allerdings dann nicht mehr, wenn man auch die „Realität“ ins kognitive Subjekt hineinverlagert bzw. sie als bloße Projektion dieses Subjekts nach außen begreift (siehe Kapitel 4).

Das zweite Argument Saussures, nämlich die nachträgliche Annäherung eines ursprünglich lautmalenden Wortes an die „allgemeine Natur“ der Zeichen, lässt sich hervorragend am Beispiel der chinesischen Silbenschrift studieren. (Obwohl Saussure die sprachlichen Zeichen der Schrift, trotz besserer Quellenlage, weitgehend ausblendet.) Fazzioli (1988) hat den Werdegang der ursprünglich deutlich abbildenden, piktogrammatischen Zeichen zu den heutigen, sparsamen Zeichen eindrucksvoll belegt. All das unterstreicht die wichtige Rolle der Ikonizität zumindest in den ersten Phasen der Etablierung neuer Zeichensysteme). Erst durch häufigen Gebrauch und den damit verbundenen ökonomischen Druck kommt es, auch im lautlichen Bereich, zu den von Haiman (1985) als „erosion of iconicity“ charakterisierten Phänomenen. Aus dem relativ detailgetreu gepinselten Männchen der Chinesischen Schrift (für Rén – Mensch, Mann) wird im Laufe der Zeit ein mit zwei Pinselstrichen hingeworfenes Zeichen. Mit zunehmender Verwendungshäufigkeit sind wir immer weniger auf die assoziativen Stützen durch Ikonizität angewiesen. Ähnliches gilt für jene Reduktionen – etwa von „Automobil“ zu „Auto“ oder von „Kinematographie“ zu „Kino“ – in zunehmend häufigen Zeichen, welche sich in der bekannten negativen Korrelation zwischen Länge und Häufigkeit von Wörtern manifestieren. Der damit verbundene Verlust an Transparenz in der Wortbildung wird durch zunehmende Geläufigkeit kompensiert (Fenk & Fenk-Oczlon 1993). Am Rande vermerkt: Auch diese ökonomisch „motivierten“ Veränderungen des „Lautbildes“ wie auch des Schriftbildes sind alles andere als arbiträr!

Nach dem Gesagten ist jedoch außer Streit zu stellen: Gerade dann, wenn man Symbole bzw. sprachliche Zeichen als Codierungen von Begriffen versteht (z.B. Rauh 1989), wird auch klar, dass bloße Nachahmungen und die oben erwähnten „assoziativen Stützen“ dies für sich allein nicht leisten können. Dazu bedarf es vielmehr und in erster Linie einer, wie Keller (1995) es nennt, „regelbasierten“ Verwendung. (Die Einführung oder Präzisierung einer Verwendungsregel *per Definition* ist ein vergleichsweise seltener Spezialfall, der seinerseits bereits „gut eingeführte“ Zeichen voraussetzt.)

Mit dem Verweis auf diese regelbasierte Verwendung lässt sich auch dem – schon bei Saussure anklingenden – Missverständnis begegnen, wonach in der Erosion von Ikonizität sozusagen der Wandel vom motivierten zum echten, zum beliebigen Zeichen sichtbar werde. Beziehungsweise der Wandel vom ikonischen Zeichen zum arbiträren Symbol, wie man heute eher sagen würde, weil man mittlerweile und unter dem Einfluss von Peirce die Arbitrarität eher mit dem *Symbol* als mit dem in Peirce's (z.B. 1906) Terminologie übergeordneten Begriff des *Zeichens*

chens verbindet. Mein Einwand: Sobald irgendetwas als Codierung eines Begriffs verwendet wird, ist es (im heutigen Sinne) *Symbol*, völlig unabhängig davon, ob und in welchem Ausmaß ein lautsprachlicher, ein schriftsprachlicher oder ein gebärdensprachlicher Code von Ikonizität Gebrauch macht (Fenk 1997). Demnach haben die chinesischen Schriftzeichen keinen Wandel vom Ikon zum Symbol vollzogen, sondern waren von Anfang an auch Symbol!

4. Das folgenlose Urteil des radikalen Konstruktivismus

Wie soll man sich Glasersfelds (ursprünglich 1982) harsche Kritik an Ogden & Richards erklären, und wie vor allem sein Faible für Saussure?

Saussures Doktrin von der Beliebigkeit des Zeichens könnte vor allem deshalb attraktiv für konstruktivistisches Denken sein, weil sie jede Ähnlichkeit zwischen dem Zeichen, welches Saussure zur Gänze in unserem Kopf ansiedelt, und dem bezeichneten Ding untersagt. Dies gilt umso mehr, als bei Saussure das „Bezeichnete“ – der Sinn, der Begriff – integraler Bestandteil des Zeichens in unserem Kopfe ist, sodass die Arbitrarität auch den Sinn, den Begriff, beträfe. Das läge irgendwie auf Glasersfelds (1987:213) Linie der Ablehnung einer „ikonischen Übereinstimmung“ oder „Isomorphie“ unseres Wissens mit der Realität. Andererseits erscheint mir der Gedanke der Arbitrarität von Begriffen unvereinbar zu sein mit Glasersfelds (1987:218f) Vorstellung unterschiedlich viabler Begriffe: Was *nicht* zur Erfahrung passt, wird im Zuge der Evolution und Interpretation eliminiert. Eine Elimination nicht-viabler Begriffe entspricht aber m.E. einer Selektion viabler Begriffe, das eine verträgt sich so wenig wie das andere mit der Arbitrarität oder Beliebigkeit unserer Begriffssysteme.

Was Glasersfeld jedenfalls ins Konzept zu „passen“ scheint, ist das bei Saussure ausschließlich in der mentalen Welt des Benutzers angesiedelte Zeichen. Er zitiert (1987:255) aus Saussure (1967:18), dass die beiden Seiten des Zeichens, Sinn und Lautzeichen, gleichermaßen psychisch sind. Im Anschluss an die zitierte Passage ist bei Saussure die Rede von Sprache und Sprechen als Gegenstand konkreter Art und als „Realitäten, deren Sitz im Gehirn ist“, sowie von der Anerkennung von Assoziationen durch kollektive Übereinstimmung. Saussure erweist sich hier wie auch anderswo als lupenreiner und von der Assoziationspsychologie beeinflusster Realist. All das würde es schwer machen, ihn als Vordenker des Konstruktivismus zu präsentieren und eine übergroße Differenz zu Ogden & Richards zu „konstruieren“. Glasersfeld lässt es bemerkenswerterweise unerwähnt und „ergänzt“ stattdessen Saussures Vorstellungen durch ein Schaubild,

„welches zeigt, dass die ‚semiotische Verknüpfung‘ stets im Bereich der erfahrenden Subjekts, also diesseits der Erfahrungsschnittstelle liegt und nicht in dem, was oft die ‚objektive Umwelt‘ genannt wird“ (Glasersfeld 1987:256).

Die Realität und ihre Elemente – als Beispiel ein gezeichneter Apfel und das Wort „Apfel“ – sind in diesem Schaubild

„zwischen Anführungszeichen gesetzt, denn in der Sicht des Konstruktivisten sind sie externalisierte Perzepte eines Beobachters und nicht ‚reale‘ Dinge oder Ereignisse in einer vom Beobachter unabhängigen ontologischen Welt“ (Glasersfeld 1987:256).

Und schließlich kommt, auf derselben Seite, sein Angriff auf Ogden & Richards. Deren „simplifizierendes“ Dreieck sieht er als „Schritt in die Richtung des radikalen Behaviorismus“, der versucht habe, das Denken zu eliminieren und durch direkte Reiz-Reaktions-Verknüpfungen zu ersetzen. Erst seit Überwindung dieser Schule könne man wieder die von Saussure und von Peirce vertretene Sicht einnehmen, wonach es „zwischen Symbolen und deren Referenten keine andere Verbindung geben kann als die, die im Geiste ihrer Benutzer hergestellt wird.“ (Glasersfeld 1987:256)

Aber haben Ogden & Richards nicht ohnehin genau das gesagt (vgl. das Zitat in unserem Kapitel 2)? Allerdings erwähnen Ogden & Richards in einer Fußnote (S.12) die Onomatopoetika oder auch Zeichnungen als Ausnahme – und in einer Weise, welche an Peirce’s Konzept des Ikons erinnert. Völlig verblüffend daher auch Glasersfelds Versuch zur Vereinnahmung von Peirce. Zumindest dann, wenn man sich dessen Erläuterungen des *Zeichens* vor Augen führt:

„... every sign is determined by its object, either first, by partaking in the characters of the object, when I call the sign an Icon; secondly, by being really and in its individual existence connected with the individual object, when I call the sign an Index“ (Peirce 1906:495).

Angesichts des Saussure „ergänzenden“ Schaubilds und des Tadels für Ogden & Richards drängen sich aber weitere Gegenfragen auf:

- Wie sich Glasersfeld die „Erfahrungsschnittstelle“ vorstellt, zeigt ein anderes Schaubild, in welchem die Schnittstelle zwischen dem solide gezeichneten „erfahrenden Subjekt“ und der strichliert angedeuteten „Außenwelt“ durch Rezeptoren und Effektoren markiert ist. Müssten die Rezeptoren und Effektoren – notfalls sind sogar die *eigenen* Rezeptoren und Effektoren der Beobachtung zugänglich – nicht in der Außenwelt angesiedelt werden?

In der Legende dazu heißt es: „Die Repräsentation der Außenwelt kann daher nur ein Modell eines unzugänglichen schwarzen Kastens sein, dessen Input – die eigenen Effektorsignale – systematisch mit seinem Output – den eigenen Rezeptorsignalen – verknüpft wird.“ (Glasersfeld 1987:152) Der Behaviorismus entspricht einer automatentheoretischen Position der Psychologie, welche den Output der *black box* in Abhängigkeit vom (systematisch variierten) Input analysiert; auch sprachliche Äußerungen werden nur als Output interpretiert, d.h. als „Sprachverhalten“, und nicht als direkte Information über „innere“ Zustände der *black box*. Glasersfeld macht nun statt der Innenwelt die Außenwelt zum schwarzen Kasten, über den man – und da unterscheidet er sich von der Automatentheorie – prinzipiell nichts in Erfahrung bringen könne. Er vertritt einen radikalen Behaviorismus mit umgekehrtem Vorzeichen und bezichtigt Ogden & Richards der Nähe zum radikalen Behaviorismus!

- Mit den „externalisierten Perzepten“ meint Glasersfeld offenbar nicht „Entäußerungen“, wie sprachliche Äußerungen oder Skizzen, in denen jemand seine Wahrnehmungen zu Papier bringt, sondern Projektionen des erfahrenden Subjekts in die Außenwelt. (Den „realen Apfel“ im Schaubild auf S. 256 kann man schwerlich als Entäußerung begreifen.) Was ist der Gewinn, wenn wir statt vom wahrgenommenen Apfel vom Apfel als einem externalisierten Perzept sprechen? Ist das „externalisierte Perzept“ ein viablerer Begriff als die „Wahrnehmung“? Was ändert es, wenn man sowohl das Zeichen als auch

das Bezeichnete aus der „Außenwelt“ in das erfahrende Subjekt hinein verlegt?

Indem der radikale Konstruktivismus die Sprache ohne Not und Erkenntnisgewinn verkompliziert, präsentiert er sich – im hier untersuchten Bereich, vielleicht aber auch darüberhinaus (vgl. Kapitel 1) – als Kandidat für *Occam's razor*.

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Abbildung 1: Die Dreiecke, jeweils modifiziert, von Ogden & Richards (1985:11), von Habermeier (1988:271) zur Theorie Gehlens, und von Rauh (1989:259).

Philosophical Pictures and the Birth of ‘the Mind’

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In his *Big Typescript* (BT) Wittgenstein first moots the idea that when we are engaged in philosophical reflection pictures implicit in our language skew our interpretation of the world in ways of which we are not aware and thus generate philosophical problems: ‘We encounter [philosophical problems] only when we are guided not by practical purpose ... but by certain analogies within language’ (BT 427). Many a ‘false analogy’ has been ‘accepted into language’ (BT 409) and guides our thinking, but we do not realise it is the ‘source’ of our thought (BT 410). ‘To use [psychoanalysis] way of putting things ... [such] a simile [is] at work in the unconscious’ (Wittgenstein & Waismann 2003: 69). Such a ‘false picture’, unwittingly applied to cases where ‘there is nothing analogous’ to its crucial feature, is at the bottom of much philosophical perplexity (BT 428), which we can resolve by becoming aware of the pertinent analogy as ‘the source of [our] thought’ (BT 410).

This paper is to develop and vindicate these ideas, not through textual exegesis (as in Fischer 2010, ch.7) but with the help of recent findings and concepts from cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology. When speaking of (i) ‘false analogies’ which (ii) have been ‘accepted into language’ and (iii) are subsequently ‘at work in the unconscious’ of its speakers, Wittgenstein thought primarily of ‘misleading analogies in the use of our language’ (BT 408), in particular of analogies suggested by the shared syntactic form of different expressions (FF 100), and – briefly – of analogies implicit in the etymology of individual expressions (BT 27). We shall focus on another kind of analogies, forged by the evolution not of individual words but of whole families of related expressions.

1. Conceptual Metaphors

Decades after Wittgenstein’s death, work in diachronic cognitive linguistics identified a major process of language development: *metaphorical extension* (Traugott & Dasher 2005). We tend to conceptualise unfamiliar or abstract matters in terms initially applied literally to concrete or familiar things or actions (‘grasp a stone to throw’), whose use we extend metaphorically for application in abstract or new contexts (‘grasp the implications of a claim’). Such extension is the single most important process whereby languages become equipped to deal with the abstract. For example, much of the English mental vocabulary is recruited in this way from the domains of manipulation and perception (Jäkel 1995).

Typically, metaphorical extension is *wholesale*: The use of a whole set of related terms is extended from the initial (‘source’) domain to a new (‘target’) domain. Thus, terms initially applied in talk about visual search came to be employed, wholesale, in talk about goal-directed intellectual efforts: efforts to solve problems, answer questions, explain facts, events or actions, etc. Thus we say about efforts to understand actions:

It is *clear* or *obscure* to me why you did what you did, according to whether or not I manage to *see* any reasons for acting that way. I may *look for* reasons where these are *hidden* or *be blind* to reasons that are *in plain view*. An *illuminating* explanation which *throws new light*

on your action will let me *see* reasons I had previously *overlooked*, and thus get a *fuller picture* of these reasons, or at least let me *catch some glimpse* of them, where I was previously *completely in the dark*. A *fresh look* at the situation to which you responded may *reveal* threats *in whose light* your action no longer *looks* as out of character as it did *at first sight*.

Such wholesale extension of terms *preserves inferential relations between the several terms involved*. Whether we are talking about swallows on the roof or reasons to act, you can only ‘point out’ to me what you ‘see’ yourself, so that ‘S₁ points y out to S₂’ entails ‘S₁ sees y’, while for both birds and reasons ‘x is hidden’ entails that neither you nor I can see x, etc. etc. (see Fischer 2010, ch.4 for details). The result is a

conceptual metaphor: a systematic mapping of terms from a source- to a target-domain, which preserves relations between them.

Whether applied to elements of the source domain of visual search or elements of the target domain of intellectual effort, the perception-related terms at issue stand in the same inferential relations to each other. This preservation of inferential relations forges a structural analogy between visual search and intellectual effort:

A is *structurally analogous* to B iff a set of elements of A can be mapped onto a set a elements of B, which stand in some of the same inferential or other relations to each other.

Various related processes of metaphorical extension forge a series of structural analogies between perception and intellectual activities and achievements including reflection and knowledge. More generally, such extension systematically forges structural analogies between the target- and the source-domains of conceptual metaphors, between the more concrete and the more abstract.

These structural analogies are not ‘false’; they do actually obtain. But they can be said to have been ‘accepted into language’. And we shall presently see that they are ‘at work in the unconscious’, namely in non-intentional analogical reasoning in which even the most competent thinkers unwittingly but systematically presuppose also further, material, analogies, which are ‘false’.

2. Non-intentional Analogical Reasoning

Structural analogies play a crucial role in *non-intentional analogical reasoning*: When thinking about one thing, we may unwittingly seize on a structurally analogous thing as a model and spontaneously project properties of the model onto the other thing (the target), without being aware of using anything as a model or making any analogical inference. Under certain circumstances, thinkers are prone to make analogical inferences they are not aware of making.

A thinker makes a *non-intentional analogical inference* iff he *spontaneously* makes an inference that presupposes that some thing (the target) is in some respect like a structurally analogous other thing (the model), while *unaware* of presupposing this or invoking any model.

This happens, in particular, when

- (1) thinkers pursue no practical goal,
- (2) thinkers lack knowledge of relevant detail or context, and
- (3) a structurally similar familiar model is available.

Much philosophical reflection satisfies these three conditions. First, philosophical reflection typically not directed towards any practical goal. Second, it often involves swift generalisation or general reasoning without detailed reference to specific examples and is couched in technical terms defined without any such reference. This leaves thinkers adrift without much knowledge of detail or context, including details and features of pertinent contexts that would be relevant for determining the truth or falsity of philosophical claims they consider. Third, much philosophical reflection is about abstract matters for which pertinent models are made available by the process of metaphorical extension we have considered a moment ago: The systematic extension of terms from more to less tangible and public matters systematically forges structural analogies between simple and familiar domains (like the domain of visual search) and more abstract domains (like the domain of intellectual effort). Thus one major process of language development generates a rich store of simple models of the abstract, ready to be unwittingly seized on the moment we engage in unduly general reasoning about abstract matters and are not guided by any specific goal (Fischer 2008b).

In the experiments that established the existence of non-intentional analogical reasoning, subjects assimilated targets to models more extensively than they had warrant to do (Day & Gentner 2007). This may happen even against better knowledge: That we *spontaneously* make an inference which presupposes that the target is in some respect like the model, while *unaware* of presupposing this, implies that we may presuppose that the two are alike in ways in which we do *not want* to assimilate them, including ways in which we know the two to be different. Such spontaneous inferences strike those who make them as intuitively compelling (Fischer 2008a: 55-9). Thus we may come to find compelling a conclusion that presupposes that two things are alike in ways in which we know them to be different. Unwittingly and against better knowledge, we may excessively assimilate one thing to another, presuppose material analogies between a target and a merely structurally analogous model, e.g., between merely structurally analogous elements of the target- and the source-domains of conceptual metaphors.

All of us know full well, for example, that 'I see a swallow' implies a bird is around to be seen, that its location is within my field of vision, i.e., within suitable range of my eyes, and that I see it with my eyes. By contrast, 'I see your reasons' or 'I look at the issue from all sides' obviously do not imply anything of the sort: Neither the issue nor your reasons need be around to be looked at or seen, within appropriate range, with an organ of sense. But, under the circumstances considered, thinkers may go along with leaps of thought presupposing, e.g.

- (R) To think about, 'consider' or 'look at' something is to perceive some thing somewhere, somehow.

We have seen that this phenomenon, the excessive application of conceptual metaphors against better knowledge, is captured quite well by Wittgenstein's characterisation of philosophically pernicious pictures and analogies implicit in language (cp. end section 1). Let's define:

S is *in the grip of a philosophical picture* iff in non-intentional analogical inferences *S* unwittingly presupposes material analogies between source- and target-domains of a conceptual metaphor.

3. Positing 'Minds'

Non-intentional inferences presupposing (R) and further material analogies to the model of visual perception led thinkers to posit in us a space and organ of inner perception, called 'the mind'. In the grip of various perceptual pictures, early modern philosophers replaced 'rational' and 'sensitive souls' by 'minds' (a concept with a new extension and intension, cp. Kenny 1993).

The idea that there are such spaces of inner perception is rendered compelling by leaps of thought which proceed from truisms about the conventional metaphorical use of perception-verbs in which they are ordinarily used in talk about intellectual activities and achievements. When we say, for example, that someone 'looks at' an issue or 'contemplates' whatever he thinks about, we are precisely *not* speaking about visual perception of physical objects in our environment:

- (T₁) To 'consider', 'look at', think about something is not to perceive any thing somewhere around us, with our eyes (or any other of our five senses).

But many philosophers found it intuitively compelling to go along with an inference which presupposes (R) above, and add:

- (C) To think about something is not to perceive anything around us with our external sense-organs; it is to perceive things within us, with a further, inner, sense.

Analogous conclusions about knowing, understanding, or remembering may strike us as compelling, even though they are patently at odds with obvious facts or acknowledged definitions. As a result, thinkers spontaneously make various moves to accommodate the claims in view of such conflicts, and explicitly maintain only the results of these spontaneous moves. The present conclusion, for instance, is at odds with the conceptual truism:

- (T₂) To 'consider', 'look at' or think about something is not to perceive anything in our bodies, and is not to employ any bodily organ of sense.

The most common initial response to such conflicts is spontaneous reinterpretation of the problematic conclusions. Thinkers 'sublimate' what they want, but find inappropriate to, maintain, ideas they find compelling but which just won't do.

- A thinker *sublimates* a claim iff he spontaneously places a new interpretation on its key terms, so as to be able to maintain its expression in the face of a conflict with claims he accepts.

Frequently, such sublimation is metaphorical; we are told to interpret talk of things being 'perceived' and 'existing' within us figuratively rather than literally: '[W]hen I speak of objects as existing in the mind ... I would not be understood in the gross literal sense, as when bodies are said to exist in a place' (Berkeley 1734: 250; cp. Locke 1700: II.ix.10). The gist of many such explanations can be summed up thus:

- (E) To 'consider' or think about things is to 'perceive' something in a metaphorical sense, in an 'inner space' that is not literally, physically in us, with an 'inner sense' not to be confused with any bodily sense-organ.

Until today, the label "the mind" is frequently used to refer to that other than physical 'inner space'. Locke's contemporaries simultaneously used it to refer also to the other than bodily 'organ of sense' with which we 'look at' and 'see' the things 'in' that 'inner space':

(D₁) "the mind" = def.: (a) the inner space without physical extension or location in which we perceive the things we do not perceive with our five senses; (b) the non-bodily inner organ of sense with which we perceive the objects in that space.

(D₂) "idea" = def.: 'whatsoever the mind perceives in itself', i.e. (resolving the metonymy), whatever is perceived in the mind, with the mind (Locke 1700: II.viii.8)

Thus "the mind" is introduced as a label for the perceptual space and organ we posit when we find conclusions like (C) compelling, want to maintain them in the face of their conflict with truisms like (T₂), and therefore immediately resort to maintaining them in a metaphorical sense, through explanations like (E). The overly literal application of perceptual metaphors has us posit a perceptual space and organ in us; metaphorical sublimation removes the two from our bodies and turns them into 'minds'.

This is the first move in a long struggle with the tendency to excessively assimilate a wide range of intellectual and other target-domains to the source-domain of perception. This struggle manifests itself in lines of thought which, on the one hand, rely on tacit assumptions that treat the mind as a literally inner and physical space of perception and, on the other hand, simultaneously invoke explicit assumptions to the contrary, viz. sublimating explanations of different kinds. Such lines of thought then lead to the conclusions that the mind is a non-physical, private and transparent realm (Fischer 2009, ch.5). The apparent clash of these conclusions with a scientific world-view (and with truisms about various intellectual activities and achievements) gave rise to classical mind-body problems.

4. Wittgenstein Vindicated

'It is pictures rather than propositions, metaphors rather than statements, which determine most of our philosophical convictions' (Rorty 1980: 12). Proponents of this view typically focus on metaphors deliberately employed and on pictures actually endorsed by the philosophers guided by them, like the picture of the mind as a space of inner perception, or repository of pictures (which Locke explicitly endorses e.g. in II.xi.17) – or (more recently) as a telegraph exchange or computer. This paper developed Wittgenstein's suggestion that philosophical reflection may be shaped, more fundamentally, by 'similes at work in the unconscious': by (conceptual) metaphors we employ with-

out being aware of doing so. In non-intentional analogical reasoning we apply such metaphors more literally than we know appropriate, presuppose material analogies we know not to obtain, and are thus led to conclusions which engender philosophical perplexity. These findings vindicate Wittgenstein's further suggestion that such perplexities can be resolved by tracing them back to false analogies as their source: We can, for example, resolve perplexities engendered by the conception of the mind as a private space of perception by showing its proponents that their conception relies on 'false analogies' like (R), which they explicitly reject in giving what we called 'sublimating explanations' (like E). By reconstructing the non-intentional reasoning that decisively shapes and pre-structures philosophical reflection, we can unearth inferences that are unsound not only by the lights of some philosophical critic but of the very philosopher who unwittingly makes that move – against better knowledge.

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Über das Unaussprechliche beim frühen und späten Wittgenstein

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I.

Auf der Suche nach konkreten philosophischen Aussagen Wittgensteins hinsichtlich der Frage, was denn unter dem Begriff des Religiösen zu verstehen sei, wird in der Regel in erster Linie auf das Frühwerk verwiesen. Und in der Tat zeichnet insbesondere der *Tractatus* Wittgenstein bekanntermaßen dadurch als Religionsphilosophen aus, dass Wittgenstein im Zuge seiner Sprachkritik Begründungen für die Vorstellung des Religiösen als das mystische Unaussprechliche liefert. Wie aber ist die Lage in Hinsicht auf die Spätphilosophie zu beurteilen? Angeblich soll Wittgenstein in einem Gespräch mit Drury den Satz geäußert haben: »I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view« (vgl. Drury 1981). Kann man sagen, dass diese Selbsteinschätzung auch noch im Lichte einer in weiten Teilen geänderten Sprachkonzeption, wie sie dem Leser in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* entgegentritt, eingelöst wird?¹

In dem Versuch ein besseres Verständnis dahingehend zu erhalten, von welchen Vorstellungen des Religiösen der frühe und der späte Wittgenstein geprägt war, werde ich im folgenden zunächst die religionsphilosophischen Implikationen aus dem *Tractatus* in Verbindung mit dem *Vortrag über Ethik* skizzieren. Dem daraus entnommenen Verständnis stelle ich darauf folgend einige Aspekte in der Konzeption der Alltagssprache, wie sie in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* entworfen wird, gegenüber. Dabei wird die These leitend sein, dass mit der veränderten Sicht in der Sprachphilosophie Wittgensteins auch eine Veränderung hinsichtlich der Ausdeutung des Religiösen stattgefunden hat.

II.

Im Frühwerk, und hierbei beziehe ich mich, wie bereits gesagt, in erster Linie auf den *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* und den *Vortrag über Ethik*, lässt sich Wittgensteins Verständnis des Religiösen entlang der Fragestellung von »Sagen« und »Zeigen« verdeutlichen². Der, wie Wittgenstein selbst schreibt, »Grundgedanke« des gesamten *Tractatus* (TLP 4.0312), der der Sagen-Zeigen-Problematik zugrunde liegt, lässt sich so paraphrasieren, dass der Satz als Ausdruck des Gedankens Gegenstände und Sachverhalte in der Welt bildhaft repräsentiert und dass dasjenige, was das Bild mit der Wirklichkeit gemein haben muss, die Form der Abbildung ist (TLP 2.17). Es muss also eine Strukturgleichheit zwischen dem Satz und der Wirklichkeit vorhanden sein, in der die Verhältnisse der

Dinge in der Welt ebenso strukturiert sind, wie die Verhältnisse der Elemente des Satzes als Abbild der Welt.

Bekanntermaßen ist nun der entscheidenden Gedanke hinsichtlich der Isomorphie der »logischen Form« (TLP 2.18) von Satz und Wirklichkeit, dass diese wiederum nicht propositional mit dem Satz ausgesagt wird. Vielmehr stellt die logische Form die Bedingung der Möglichkeit für das Ausbilden und Darstellen von Sätzen überhaupt dar (vgl. Lange 1996, S. 72)³. »Seine Form der Abbildung [...] kann das Bild nicht abbilden; es weist sie auf« (TLP 2.172).

In der Unterscheidung von »Sagen« und »Zeigen« vollzieht sich eine logische Grenzziehung »im Ausdruck der Gedanken«, wie Wittgenstein sie im Vorwort des *Tractatus* angekündigt hat. »Der Satz zeigt, wie es sich verhält, wenn er wahr ist. Und er sagt, dass es sich so verhält« (TLP 4.022) und »was gezeigt werden kann, kann nicht gesagt werden« (TLP 4.1212). Wenn versucht wird, dasjenige propositional auszudrücken, was jenseits der Grenze des sprachlich Artikulierbaren liegt, weil es sich eben nur zeigt und nicht gesagt werden kann, dann wird dieses »einfach Unsinn sein«. Jenseits der logischen Grenze liegen, Wittgenstein gemäß, all diejenigen Bereiche unseres Daseins, die, im Gegensatz zu den Sätzen der Naturwissenschaften, keine Tatsachenbehauptung über innerweltliche Sachverhalte zulassen. Zu dem, was sich sinnlogisch nicht sagen lässt, gehören Aussagen im Bereich des täglichen Lebens, der Ethik oder eben des Religiösen. Damit ist natürlich nicht gesagt, dass diese Bereiche *per se* unsinnig sind, sondern dass es prinzipiell aus logischen Gründen nicht möglich ist, hier sinnvolle Aussagen zu treffen, weil sich alltägliche, ethische und religiöse Phänomene eben nur zeigen und nicht sinnvoll als Tatsache aussagen lassen. »Wir fühlen, dass, selbst wenn alle möglichen wissenschaftlichen Fragen beantwortet sind, unsere Lebensprobleme noch gar nicht berührt sind« (TLP 6.52), notiert Wittgenstein.

Dass faktische Urteile nicht den Bereich des Ethischen erschließen, geht ebenfalls auf eindrucksvolle Weise aus dem »Vortrag über Ethik« hervor, den Wittgenstein laut Rush Rhees zwischen September 1929 und Dezember 1930 in Cambridge gehalten hat (vgl. Wittgenstein 1989, S. 141). Wittgenstein führt hier seinem Auditorium vor Augen, dass, selbst wenn das gesamte Menschheitswissen in einem Buch zusammengetragen würde »dieses Buch nichts enthielte, was wir ein *ethisches* Urteil nennen würden« (Ebd., S. 12). Zur Begründung führt Wittgenstein eine Unterscheidung an, die analog zur Unterscheidung von »Sagen« und »Zeigen« verläuft. Werturteile können unterschieden werden in *relative* Werturteile, die bloß Aussagen über Faktisches sind (»ein guter Pianist«, »die richtige Strasse«, »ein schlechtes Spiel«, etc.) und *absolute* Werturteile. Erstere sind keine Urteile in der Weise wie sie in der Ethik verwendet werden, denn ethische Urteile ver-

¹ Dieser Frage widmet sich auch ein Aufsatz von John V. Canfield (vgl. ders. 2005, S. 258). Er kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Aussage Wittgensteins auch für die Spätphilosophie fruchtbar gemacht werden kann. Allerdings interpretiert er das Ergebnis dahingehend, dass Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie von der Motivation geleitet ist, das Unsagbare »vor metaphysisch begrifflicher Erfassung zu schützen«. Das trifft sicherlich auf einzelne Probleme der philosophischen Psychologie zu. Insgesamt scheint mir aber doch die Unterscheidung von Beschreibbaren und Unbeschreiblichen in der Spätphilosophie ein ganz anderes Begründungsfundament zu bekommen als es im Frühwerk der Fall ist, so dass sich damit auch die Frage nach einer durchgehenden Motivation kritisch stellt.

² Die nachfolgenden Zitate aus dem *Tractatus* gebe ich mit TLP und der entsprechenden Ziffernfolge aus dem *Tractatus* an.

³ Lange behauptet, dass Wittgenstein in der Bildtheorie nach den Bedingungen der Möglichkeit von Darstellung überhaupt frage, und damit eine transzendente Frage stelle. Darauf deutet auch Wittgenstein selbst hin, wenn er sagt, die Logik sei »transzendental« (TLP 6.13). Mit Verweis auf McDonough weist Lange allerdings darauf hin, dass Wittgenstein keine transzendentalphilosophische Antwort gibt.

weisen eben auf das Absolute. Insofern ist Wittgenstein der Überzeugung, dass »keine Faktenaussage [...] je ein absolutes Werturteil abgeben oder implizieren« kann (Ebd.).

Wie aber lässt sich dann eine sinnvolle Antwort auf die Frage nach dem ontologischen Status des Absoluten geben? Nach dem Gesagten ist deutlich geworden, dass hier eine sinnvolle Antwort nicht artikuliert werden kann. Folglich gibt auch Wittgenstein keine direkte Antwort, sondern verweist behelfsmäßig auf Erlebnisse, in dem sich eine mögliche Antwort *zeigt*. Gemeint sind Erlebnisse, wie das des »Stauens über die Existenz der Welt« oder das Erlebnis der »absoluten Sicherheit«. »Und da muß ich als allererstes feststellen«, so Wittgenstein, »dass der sprachliche Ausdruck dieser Erlebnisse Unsinn ist!« (Ebd. S. 15).

Spätestens hier wird der Anschluss an die Argumentation des *Tractatus* deutlich. Die Sprache wird missbraucht, wenn versucht wird, dasjenige, was über die Tatsachenbeschreibung der Welt hinausgeht und sich nur zeigt, propositional in Tatsachenbeschreibungen ausdrücken zu wollen. Dieser Missbrauch, so Wittgenstein, zieht sich durch alle ethischen und religiösen Ausdrucksformen hindurch. Um ihn zu vermeiden muss man, so der berühmte Schlusssatz des *Tractatus*, darüber schweigen wovon man nicht sprechen kann. Die Philosophie stößt aus dieser positivistischen Perspektive in der Reflexion über Ethik, Ästhetik und das Religiöse an die Grenzen des sinnvoll sagbaren und kann hier mit den Mitteln der Sprache keine sinnvollen Aussagen treffen, weil eben diese Mittel in ihrer Sinnhaftigkeit begrenzt sind, während die ethische, ästhetische und religiöse Phänomene über Sinn Grenzen hinausweisen (vgl. Rentsch 2005, S. 165).

III.

Die Vorstellung des frühen Wittgenstein über das Religiöse hängt eng mit der sprachkritischen Unterscheidung zusammen, zwischen einerseits dem was sich in Tatsachenaussagen sinnvoll über die Welt sagen lässt und andererseits dem, was der isomorphen Beziehung zwischen Tatsache und weltlichem Sachverhalt bereits zugrunde liegt und deshalb nicht sinnvoll noch einmal in einem Satz festgehalten werden kann. Die logischen Bedingungen des Abbildens von Sachverhalten können nicht sinnvoll propositional verankert werden. Aus dieser, von einer Abbildtheorie der Sprache her entwickelten Perspektive erklärt sich Wittgensteins Entdeckung der »Autonomie der Logik«, wie Wilhelm Vossenkuhl es genannt hat (vgl. Vossenkuhl 1995, 2001). Ihr autonomer Charakter besteht darin, um es noch einmal zu sagen, dass die logische Form eines Satzes bzw. Sachverhalts nicht propositional in der Sprache ausgedrückt wird, also nicht innerhalb der Grenzen der Sprache (und gleichbedeutend: des Denkens) verortet werden kann. Der Gedanke des Unausprechlichen, den Wittgenstein seinen logischen Untersuchungen über die Sprache entnimmt, lässt sich dann für den Begriff des Religiösen fruchtbar machen. »Es gibt allerdings Unausprechliches. Dies zeigt sich, es ist das Mystische« (TLP 6.522).

Von daher wird deutlich, dass die Entdeckung des unausprechlich Religiösen nur aus einer Perspektive einholbar ist, die sich von der Abbildtheorie des *Tractatus* her gewinnen lässt. Ohne die Annahme eines die weltlichen Sachverhalte abbildenden Symbolismus, ließe sich die Vorstellung nicht entwickeln, dass einerseits Innerweltliches vertreten wird und es andererseits logische Konstanten gibt, die keine Vertreterfunktion haben, sondern als autonom zu betrachten sind. Dieser Zusammenhang wird noch deutlicher, wenn man mit Hans Julius Schneider

annimmt, dass der Abbildtheorie des *Tractatus* die Idee der natürlichen Sprache als einem Notationssystem zugrunde liegt (vgl. Schneider 2006). Betrachtet man die Notenschrift als Paradigma eines Notationssystems, so wird klar, dass die Noten ebenfalls eine Vertreterfunktion einnehmen, indem sie jeweils Töne einer Partitur vertreten. Andere Symbole, wie z. B. die Notenlinien, der Violschlüssel etc., haben selbst keine stellvertretende Funktion. Sie bilden den nicht hintergehbaren Rahmen, der notwendig ist, damit eine Note ihre Vertretung für einen konkreten Ton vollziehen kann. Der Rahmen selbst ist demnach Bedingung für die Möglichkeit der Darstellung von Tönen als Noten und kann selbst keine sinnvolle Vertreterfunktion einnehmen. Die »Logik der Darstellung«, wie Schneider es nennt, die bei der Vertretung der Töne durch Noten zum Tragen kommt, entspricht dem, was Wittgenstein im *Tractatus* die »Logik der Tatsachen« genannt hat. Dasjenige, was man vor dem Hintergrund eines Notationssystems als das Religiöse bezeichnen kann, kann selbst nicht dargestellt werden. »Gott offenbart sich nicht in der Welt« (TLP 6.432). Unter der Perspektive, dass innerweltliche Gegenstände sprachlich abgebildet werden, ist das Religiöse die Bedingung der Darstellung in der Welt und kommt dabei selbst nicht zur ausdrücklichen Darstellung, sondern zeigt sich eben in den von Wittgenstein beschriebenen Sinn Grenzerfahrungen als unhintergebar Rahmen des Darstellungsvollzuges.

Von der Idee einer logischen Isomorphie von innerweltlichen Gegenständen und Sprache ist Wittgenstein in den Philosophischen Untersuchungen konzeptionell abgewichen⁴. Das Proprium der semantischen Eindeutigkeit eines Notationssystems, das eine eineindeutige Abbildbeziehung zwischen Welt und Sprache ermöglicht lässt er fallen. Statt der Vorstellung, dass sich die Sprache eineindeutig auf innerweltlichen Gegenständen und Sachverhalten beziehen lässt, bietet er an, die Sprache an der Praxis unseres alltäglichen Handelns zu orientieren. Die Sprache hat nun nicht mehr Abbildungscharakter, sondern sie bekommt Werkzeugcharakter. Bezeichnend geht die Sprache nicht vor, indem wir »einem Ding ein Namenstäfelchen anheften« (PU 15), sondern indem die Sprache innerhalb eines Zusammenhanges, den er bekanntlich mit dem Begriff »Sprachspiel« (vgl. PU 6) bezeichnet, korrekt verwendet wird. Der Bezug von Sprache und Welt wird nicht mehr durch die gemeinsame Strukturgleichheit hergestellt, sondern liegt nunmehr in der bloßen Verwendung von Sprache selbst (vgl. PU 43), innerhalb der man nicht mehr von abbildprägenden Äquivalenzen sprechen kann, sondern vielmehr von »Ähnlichkeiten« der Verwendung (vgl. PU 11 und PU 23) sprechen muss.

Wittgensteins Veränderung der Vorstellung davon, wie wir auf innerweltliches sprachlich Bezug nehmen, ist besonders in Hinsicht auf das Phänomen des Zeigens interessant. Im *Tractatus* zeigte sich das Unausprechliche als Bedingung sprachlicher Bezugnahme und war deshalb prinzipiell sprachlich unverfügbar. In den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* hält sich das Phänomen des Zeigens weiterhin durch, bezieht sich in seiner Unausprechlichkeit⁵ allerdings nicht mehr auf die logische Form, sondern auf die sprachliche Praxis und ihre Verwendungsweisen. In dem Abschnitt PU 66 heißt es:

⁴ Die nachfolgenden Zitate aus den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* gebe ich mit PU und der entsprechenden Abschnittsnummerierung aus den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* an.

⁵ An der paradoxen Redeweise der »Bezugnahme auf Unausprechliches« wird deutlich, was Wittgenstein im *Tractatus* gemeint hat, wenn er von der Leiter gesprochen hat, die wegzuwerfen sei, nachdem man sie hinaufgestiegen ist (TLP 6.54).

»Betrachte z.B. einmal die Vorgänge die wir ›Spiele‹ nennen. Ich meine Brettspiele, Kartenspiele, Ballspiele, Kampfspiele, usw. Was ist allen diesen gemeinsam? – Sag nicht: ›Es muß ihnen etwas gemeinsam sein, sonst hießen sie nicht ›Spiele‹ – sondern *schau*, ob ihnen allen etwas gemeinsam ist. – Denn wenn du sie anschaut, wirst du zwar nicht etwas sehen, was *allen* gemeinsam wäre, aber du wirst Ähnlichkeiten, Verwandtschaften sehen, und zwar eine ganze Reihe. Wie gesagt: denk nicht, sondern schau!«

Wittgensteins wiederholte Aufforderung auf die Verwendung der Sprache zu schauen um zu verstehen wie sie arbeitet, entbehrt nur dann einen Sinn, wenn vorausgesetzt ist, dass die Sprache uns etwas zeigen kann. Was zeigt uns die Sprache im Sinne des späten Wittgensteins? Sie zeigt uns wie der Ausdruck in einem Sprachspiel verwendet wird. Sie zeigt nicht die logische Struktur der Gegenstände in der Welt auf, sondern sie zeigt die menschliche Verwendungsweise der Sprache in einem Netz von Ähnlichkeiten auf und macht in diesem Zuge einzelne »Lebensformen« sichtbar (vgl. PU 19; PU 23; PU 241). Die Bedeutung eines Wortes wird nicht durch die eindeutige Zuordnung zum Gegenstand hergestellt, sondern sie ist »das, was die Erklärung der Bedeutung erklärt« (PU 560). Wittgenstein hätte hier vielleicht auch sagen können: was sich in der Erklärung der Bedeutung, d. h. in der Sprachverwendung, *zeigt*.

IV.

Welche Auswirkungen hat es für den Begriff des Religiösen, wenn die Sprache nicht auf die Gegenständen und Sachverhalten in der Welt direkt bezogen ist, sondern sich an der Verwendungsweise der Sprache selbst und an den Lebensformen der einzelnen Sprachteilnehmer orientiert?

Der späte Wittgenstein hat erkannt, so scheint es, dass mit der Sprachphilosophie des *Tractatus* eine Ontologie vorausgesetzt wird, deren Geltungsansprüche sich tatsächlich nicht einlösen lassen. Die Voraussetzung einer Ontologie aber erlaubte es erst, eine Unterscheidung zwischen Dingen in der Welt und außerhalb der Welt einzuführen. Das Abrücken von einer festen Ontologie hat denn auch Auswirkungen auf den Begriff des Religiösen, wie er im *Tractatus* entwickelt wurde, weil der mystische Rahmen für die Bezugnahme von Sprache und auf Welt obsolet geworden ist.

Stattdessen rückt in der Spätphilosophie Wittgensteins die Sprachpraxis selbst in den Vordergrund, die die sprachliche Bezugnahme auf Welt begründet und konzipiert. Auch mit dem Blick auf die Sprachverwendung lassen sich Aspekte ausfindig machen, die im praktischen Sprachvollzug selbst athematisch bleiben und sich nur zeigen. Diese sind beispielsweise Aspekte des Regelfolgens, der Familienähnlichkeiten und der Lebensform. Der entscheidende Unterschied zur Abbildtheorie des *Tractatus* scheint nun zu sein, dass dasjenige, was sich zeigt, nach dem Wegfall einer festen Ontologie nicht mehr au-

ßerhalb der Sprache verortet werden kann. Die Sprache ist, so die Vorstellung des späten Wittgensteins, nicht etwas durch die logische Form der Sachverhalte bestimmtes, so dass sie auf etwas mystisches verweisen könnte, sondern sie ist etwas, das sich durch die öffentliche Praxis der Sprachgemeinschaft, durch die regelgeleitete und Regeln hervorbringende Sprachspielverwendung, selbst konstituiert. Durch diese »kopernikanische Wende« innerhalb der Sprachphilosophie Wittgensteins verlagert sich der Sitz des Religiösen in die Sprachpraxis der Teilnehmer. Entgegen der Aussage des *Tractatus*, dass Gott sich nicht *in* der Welt offenbare (vgl. TLP 6.432), ließe sich mit dem späten Wittgenstein folglich konstatieren, dass Gott mitten unter uns, mithin im praktischen Vollzug unseres Sprachgebrauchs selbst zu finden ist. Aber auch aus dieser Perspektive bleibt das Religiöse dem wissenschaftlichen Zugriff in Form definitorischer Bestimmungen oder etwaiger Beweisverfahren prinzipiell unzugänglich. Denn, so betont Wittgensteins in einer seiner Vorlesungen über den religiösen Glauben, der religiöse Glaube zeige sich eben nicht durch Vernunftschlüsse oder durch Anruf von gewöhnlichen Glaubensgründen, sondern vielmehr dadurch, dass er das ganze Leben des gläubigen Menschen regelte (vgl. Wittgenstein 2001, S. 76). Das Religiöse ist mit dem späten Wittgenstein nicht jenseits der Lebensform, sondern von ihr ausgehend zu denken.

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Is 'a = a' Apriori?

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In the beginning of his 'On Sense and Reference', Frege states the following, claiming it to give rise to the puzzle of informative identity:

$a = a$ and $a = b$ are obviously statements of different epistemic value: $a = a$ is valid apriori and has to be called, according to Kant, analytic, while statements of the form $a = b$ often contain very valuable extensions of our cognitions and are not always justifiable apriori. (Frege 1994 [1892], p. 40)

Frege states that ' $a = a$ ' is apriori, while ' $a = b$ ' is not. Hence there are informative identity statements. His problem is then to explain how informative identity is possible. Frege's solution is notorious; he proposes a form of semantic dualism via the distinction between sense and reference. The *reference* of a name is the object referred to. A *sense* is the mode of presentation of the reference. It has at least two functions: (i) it determines the reference of the name, and (ii) it contributes to the cognitive value of any expression in which the name occurs. The informativity problem is solved with respect to (ii). Co-referring names may have different senses and hence different cognitive values, which makes the resulting identity informative.

We may draw two different conclusions from the Frege quotation:

(F1) There are identity statements with different epistemic values, some being apriori, others being aposteriori.

(F2) Identity statements of the form ' $a = a$ ' are apriori and identity statements of the form ' $a = b$ ' are aposteriori.

(F1), if true, causes the trouble for identity. (F2), if true, transfers the trouble to the difference in names; the use of different names makes for informativity; the use of the same name twice makes for apriority. Though the dispute around informativity concerns (F1), namely, whether it is true and, if so, what consequences to take, the discussion is usually led with respect to the stronger claim (F2).¹ I wish to remain neutral about (F1) and claim with respect to (F2) that, given there are aposteriori identities of the form ' $a = b$ ', there are aposteriori identities of the form ' $a = a$ '. After analysing the general reason for this in terms of type conditions for name tokens, I will show that sense alone does not fulfil its function (i): it does not furnish the reference for a name.

1. Arguments for the apriority of ' $a = a$ '

Let me begin with the arguments for the apriority of ' $a = a$ '. Such arguments are scant; usually, they are alluded to only perfunctorily, as if to satisfy the *formal* requirement of giving some argumentation where the conclusion of the argument is not in need of any support. Two such arguments can be identified.

¹ (F2) is stronger only if there are identity statements of the two forms. Grant me this presupposition.

First argument: ' $a = a$ ' is a truth of logic in the sense of being valid in all logical calculi. Truths of logic are apriori. Hence ' $a = a$ ' is apriori.

Replies: Firstly, ' $a = a$ ' can be a truth only in logical systems with identity. If there is no identity sign in the system, there will not be an identity truth. Secondly, even considering only logical systems with identity, there may be logical systems in which ' $a = a$ ' is not apriori. These will be systems which, e.g., allow different tokens of ' a ' to refer to different objects. Thirdly, and most importantly, Frege's thesis is, I think, not a thesis about identity in logical systems. It is a thesis about identity in *ordinary* language. At present, we want to know whether '*Hesperus = Hesperus*' or '*Fred is identical to Fred*', as statements of ordinary English, are apriori.

Second argument: ' a is self-identical' is true because of the meaning of the self-identity predicate alone. A sentence of the form ' a is F ' which is true because of the meaning of the predicate ' F ' alone is apriori. Hence ' a is self-identical' is apriori.²

Reply: The argument seems cogent to me, but it is not relevant for our discussion. Even if ' a is self-identical' is apriori, the apriority of ' $a = a$ ' does not follow: ' $a = a$ ' does not state that a is identical to itself. It says that a is identical to a . There isn't any reflexive term like 'itself' involved in the identity statement. There is only the identity sign and two tokens of the graphic type ' a '. Differently put, 'self-identical' is a monadic predicate, while ' $=$ ' is a dyadic predicate.³ Of course, one might *define* self-identity in terms of identity. With the help of, e.g., lambda-abstraction we can define ' a is self-identical' as ' $(\lambda x)(x = x)(a)$ ' from which lambda-conversion gives us ' $a = a$ '. But given that the epistemic status of a defined statement is derived from that of the defining statement, the apriority of ' a is self-identical' would have to be grounded in, and could not itself ground, the apriority of ' $a = a$ '.

2. Arguments against the apriority of ' $a = a$ '

Perhaps there are, as yet, no good arguments for the apriority of ' $a = a$ '. The *onus probandi*, however, is on the opponent of the apriority of ' $a = a$ '. So what are the arguments?

First argument: ' $a = a$ ' might be false. Suppose that the ' a ' is multi-referential,⁴ i.e., is a name of several objects. Suppose further that the left occurrence of ' a ' refers to a different object than the right occurrence of ' a '. Then ' $a = a$ ' is false. Thus it is not true and therefore not apriori true. Identities of the form ' $a = a$ ' need not be apriori.

² Arguments of this type can be derived from, e.g., Barcan Marcus 1981, pp. 505–506, and Tichy 1983, p. 232. They even claim that ' $a = b$ ' is no more than stating the self-identity of an object.

³ A similar point is made by Salmon 1991, who furthermore claims the propositions to be expressed to contain two constituents in the self-identity case, and three in the identity case.

⁴ I hesitate to call such names 'ambiguous', in order not to provoke discussion on points tangential to my thesis.

There is an obvious reply: Since different objects may have the same name in ordinary languages, this argument is certainly cogent, but equally certainly Frege's intentions are based on the exclusion of aposteriority due to such possible falsity. We may simply conditionalise (F2) on *true* identities and obtain

(F2*) 'a = a' is – if true – apriori and 'a = b' is – if true – aposteriori.

This weakening of (F2) is not vulnerable to the first argument.

Second argument: Is (F2*) indisputable? I do not think so – at least not if we accept that 'a = b' can be aposteriori (something I assume for the sake of the argument). Consider the following scenario:

A philosophy student hears about Saul Kripke twice a week, once in his seminar on modal logic and once in his class on Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. He rightly wonders whether it is one and the same person having such extraordinary thoughts. Upon looking in the Web, he finds out that this is indeed the case. 'Kripke = Kripke' has been found out aposteriori.⁵

So 'a = a' is, at least in some cases, aposteriori. In claiming that it is (always) apriori, Frege must assume that different tokens of the same name have the same sense. But as our example shows, this is in general not true. If one accepts the Fregean Hesperus–Phosphorus identity as informative, then one must accept that there are informative identities of the form 'Phosphorus = Phosphorus'.⁶

I have modelled a case of 'a = a' to one of 'a = b'. But we may also make the reverse move, by claiming that 'a = b' can be apriori as 'a = a' can be. Suppose that the philosophy professor introduces not only the name 'Saul Kripke', but also – in the same breath, as it were – the name 'Pierre' for our genius. The student, possibly confused by his professor's using two names for the same individual, but not about the co-referentiality of these names, will find 'Pierre = Saul Kripke' to be a noninformative statement with respect to nonlinguistic facts. A Fregean will have to say the following: 'a = b' is apriori, when 'a' and 'b' have the same sense.⁷

3. Name tokens and their types

Let me discuss why

(1) a = a and

(2) a = b

may both be aposteriori or, in general, can take the same epistemic values. Identity statements combine three different elements. They are composed of the identity sign, flanked by two different name tokens. Let 't₁', ..., 't_n' stand for name tokens. An identity statement has the form

t_x = t_y, with x, y ∈ {1, ..., n} and x ≠ y.

Let 't₁', ..., 't₄' stand for the name tokens in (1) and (2), then we get

(1*) t₁ = t₂,

(2*) t₃ = t₄.

What is the difference between (1) and (2)? One answer would be to say that, in (1), the tokens are, while, in (2), the tokens aren't of the same name type. The truth of this depends of course on one's theory of name types. But let us ignore this question. More generally, we may say that there is a *graphic* type φ, such that both, t₁ and t₂ are of the type φ. t₃ and t₄ are of different graphic types. In short, we may say that 'a = a' is a *homographical* identity, while 'a = b' is a *heterographical* one.

Identities can be classified not only with respect to graphic types. Because of this, I shall make the general distinction between *homotypical* and *heterotypical* identities. (1) is homo- and (2) is heterotypical with respect to sorts of graphic type. With respect to a given sort of type, any identity is either homotypical or heterotypical.⁸ An identity statement may also be homotypical with respect to one sort of type and heterotypical with respect to another. E.g., 'colour = color' is homotypical with respect to phonetic types, but heterotypical with respect to spelling types.

There are many different sorts of type. Besides graphic and phonetic types, there may be speaker-relative types, positional types, etc. These all form different sorts of *non-semantic* type. But there are also sorts of *semantic* type: Semantic types subsume their tokens via their semantic values. We may, e.g., speak of the *reference* types: t_x and t_y are of the same reference type if and only if they refer to the same object. Reference-homotypical identities are true, reference-heterotypical identities are false. For Fregeans, there are also *sense* types. Since, according to Frege, sense determines reference, sense-homotypical identities are always true. Sense-heterotypical identities may be true or false.

Presumably, the following covers Frege's intentions with (F2*):

(F3) There is a sort of non-semantic type τ such that the τ-homotypical identities – if true – are apriori and the τ-heterotypical identities are – if true – aposteriori.

If we were to allow 'τ' to range also over sorts of semantic type, then the corresponding version of (F3) could be true: If τ is the sort of sense type, then the τ-homotypical identities are apriori⁹ and the τ-heterotypical identities are aposteriori. Irrespective of theory, however, allowing sorts of semantic type would make Frege's examples irrelevant as support for (F3). Whether 'Hesperus = Hesperus' is sense-homotypical and 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' is not cannot be determined from the identity statements alone. We must therefore restrict the possible values for τ to sorts of non-semantic type. But, since we may construct Kripke–Kripke examples for all sorts of non-semantic type τ, (F3) is false. τ-homotypical and τ-heterotypical identities can both be equally informative and noninformative. One may therefore introduce Frege's puzzle not only with cases like 'Hesperus = Phosphorus', but also with cases like 'Phosphorus = Phosphorus'.

(F3) is motivated with the common presumption that there are sorts of non-semantic type which are neverthe-

⁵ The case is analogous to the famous Paderewski case of Kripke 1979, pp. 265 f.

⁶ Wettstein 1989 also argues for the informativity of 'a = a'. He claims all identities to be informative in the sense that one need not know that the respective terms are co-referential. This, according to Wettstein, dissolves the Fregean puzzle. I agree with the point that all identities may be informative in the sense discussed by Wettstein, but think, with Salmon 1991, that this notion of informativity is not the one intended in Frege's discussion. Frege's problem arises from the (alleged) fact that there are identities which are nonlinguistically, say astronomically, geographically etc., informative. This type of informativity cannot be accounted for by Wettstein. The question is, of course, whether there is such informativity, a matter not to be decided here.

⁷ A similar point is made already in Kripke 1979, p. 245.

⁸ Ignore the complication introduced by vagueness.

⁹ Actually, this statement would have to be qualified in view of the later discussion.

less semantically authoritative in that types of such sort are able to provide constraints on the semantic values of their tokens. Most philosophers, Fregean and non-Fregean alike, seem to think that there is a sort of non-semantic type such that all tokens of a type of this sort have – in virtue of this very type! – the same semantic value, so that homotypical identities with respect to this sort of type are apriori indeed. But this is mistaken. Different tokens of non-semantic types always might (but need not) have different semantic values. In this way, homographic identities like 'a = a' may be as aposteriori as heterographic identities like 'a = b'

4. Sense and reference determination

Frege's senses have two different functions. They are supposed to account for informativity of (true) identities and to determine the reference of names. It will now be argued that a name's sense does not determine its reference. The sense determines *some* reference. But the sense does not determine the reference of a name token, since it does not determine *itself* to be the sense of this name token. Different tokens of the same non-semantic type may be of a different sense type. Sense-homotypicality does not supervene on non-semantic homotypicality. This alone does not preclude that sense determines reference for a name; different name tokens of a certain nonsemantic type may be of different sense types but still of the same reference type. So, even given different senses, the reference for a name might be determined.¹⁰ But as I have argued, in the same way as all homotypical identities with respect to a sort of non-semantic type may be reference-homotypical, i.e., true, they may be reference-heterotypical, i.e., false. Therefore, although the sense determines *some* reference, the sense does not determine the reference for a given name.¹¹ Different name tokens may have different senses determining different reference objects.

The sense of a name, the mode of presentation, is – according to Frege – an objective thing, denizen of an abstract realm. The semantic gap between a name and its sense surely is as big as that between a name and its reference. The question therefore is: what determines the sense of a name? There are two possibilities for the Fregean: (a) He might claim that the sense of a name is determined by another sense, a sense of second order.¹² But since the second-order sense type of a token will also not supervene on its non-semantic type, this idea, repeated for the determination of sense of whatever level, will lead to an infinite, vicious regress of senses. (b) He might refer to Millianism for the determination of sense, the theory of an unmediated link between a name and its semantic value. In neither case, appeal to a second semantic dimension, that of sense, is sufficient to explain the reference determination for names. Hence senses cannot fulfil one crucial task assigned to them by Frege: The theory of sense is insufficient to explain the relation between a name and its reference. The *semantic* motivation for introducing senses is misguided; at some point, even the Fregean needs to take a Millian step.¹³

Conclusion

In the discussion of Frege's puzzle it is often assumed that different tokens of a non-semantic type are of the same semantic type, have the same reference and/or the same sense. But neither is necessarily true. This leads directly to the demonstration that senses cannot fulfil one important function that Frege assigns to them, namely that of determining the reference of a name. What are the consequences for the problem of informative identity? To deny (F-2) is not to deny (F-1). So my claim does not count against the possibility of informative identity statements and hence not against Frege's puzzle. Even worse, my considerations may be seen as a first step to generalise the problem; perhaps *all* identities, homotypical and heterotypical (with respect to some sort of non-semantic type), are informative alike. This would make a solution to Frege's puzzle an even more urgent matter. A Fregean might claim that *each* name token has a sense of its own. But we might also develop a different perspective on the puzzle. If informativity is not linked to *heterotypical* identities, specifically, one might consider the problem of informativity as unrelated to 'ways of referring' and, therefore, as independent of 'modes of presentation'; it might be seen as bound up with reference *simpliciter*. The Fregean claim that the informativity contained in identities is non-linguistic – something that I have granted here for the sake of my limited purposes – may exert less power over our minds, so that the various non-Fregean accounts of names may appear more plausible.

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¹⁰ I owe this point to Alexandra Zinke.

¹¹ Note that even if the non-semantic type were to determine that all its tokens are of the *same* sense type, it would not determine of *which* sense type they are.

¹² Let me remark that the introduction of senses of second order would allow for the possibility of nonlinguistic informativity of identities which are homotypical with respect to first-order sense types.

¹³ Analogous considerations apply to the description theory of reference.

Das Wesen der Negation

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Was entspricht dem linguistischen Phänomen der Negation in der Welt? Der Ausgangspunkt, der mir geeignet scheint, um diese Frage zu beantworten, ist das genannte Problem der negativen singulären Existenzsätze. Dieses Problem besteht, kurz gesagt, darin, dass aus einem Satz, der die Existenz irgendeines Gegenstandes verneint, unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen zu folgen scheint, dass dieser Gegenstand existiert. Ein Vergleich mit der Alltagssprache ergibt, dass es hier überhaupt kein Problem zu sein scheint, die Existenz irgendwelcher Gegenstände zu verneinen. Man sagt beispielsweise, dass es Peter Pan nicht gibt, da er nur eine Romanfigur ist. Auch Bruno Kreisky gibt es nicht mehr und den Yeti hat es wahrscheinlich nie gegeben. Probleme treten allenfalls dann auf, wenn es nicht klar ist, ob ein bestimmter Gegenstand existiert, wie dies bei Gott oder Elvis der Fall ist. Ist man aber einmal der Meinung, dass es einen Gegenstand nicht gibt, so scheint es auch völlig unproblematisch zu sein, zu sagen, dass es diesen Gegenstand nicht gibt.

Das Problem der negativen singulären Existenzsätze ist unter anderem mit der Frage verknüpft, ob Existenz ein logisches Prädikat ist oder nicht. Verneint man diese Frage, so ist man damit in der Lage, das Problem der negativen singulären Existenzsätze auf vergleichsweise einfache Art zu lösen. Doch man könnte vorerst auch hartnäckig bleiben. Selbst wenn Existenz kein logisches Prädikat sein sollte, so ist es doch zumindest ein grammatikalisches Prädikat. Ich möchte in diesem Beitrag unter anderem erörtern, inwieweit in diesem Punkt das alltägliche Sprachverständnis trägt und im Zuge dieser Erörterung zu einer speziellen Interpretation der Negation kommen. Das Ergebnis kann man folgendermaßen kurz umreißen: Die Lösung des Problems der negativen singulären Existenzsätze liegt im Wesen der Negation, bzw. genauer gesagt, in der Interpretation der Negation als Satznegation einerseits und als Teil der Metasprache andererseits.

Das Problem der negativen singulären Existenzsätze

Man kann die intuitiv sehr plausible Auffassung vertreten, dass man auf die Existenz eines Gegenstandes schließen kann, wenn man diesem Gegenstand eine Eigenschaft zuschreibt oder abspricht. Wenn ich behaupte, dass ein Gegenstand irgendeine Eigenschaft hat oder nicht hat, scheint es absurd zu sein, gleichzeitig zu behaupten, dass es diesen Gegenstand gar nicht gibt. Wenn ich beispielsweise behaupte, dass Werner Faymann Bundeskanzler ist, dann schreibe ich ihm die Eigenschaft Bundeskanzler-zu-sein zu und muss daher auch bejahen, dass Werner Faymann existiert. Wenn ich behaupte, dass Werner Faymann nicht Vorsitzender der KPÖ ist, dann spreche ich ihm die Eigenschaft Vorsitzender-der-KPÖ-zu-sein ab, und kann ebenso darauf schließen, dass Werner Faymann existiert. Diese Schlüsse sind intuitiv sehr plausibel und in Ordnung; jedenfalls solange der Gegenstand, über den ich spreche, existiert. Wenn ich nämlich behaupte, dass Peter Pan nicht existiert, dann könnte man analog zu Gesagtem feststellen, ich spreche ihm die Eigenschaft der Existenz ab oder die Eigenschaft der Nichtexistenz zu. Die analoge Folgerung darauf, dass Peter Pan existiert, stünde jedoch in Widerspruch zum ursprünglichen Satz. Somit scheint man

feststellen zu müssen, dass es einen substantiellen Unterschied zwischen den folgenden beiden Sätzen gibt.

(1) Peter Pan existiert nicht.

(2) Werner Faymann ist nicht Vorsitzender der KPÖ.

Die Sätze (1) und (2) sind Negationen. Während es unproblematisch ist vom Satz (2) darauf zu schließen, dass Werner Faymann existiert, gelangt man zu einem Widerspruch, wenn man von Satz (1) ausgehend darauf schließen würde, dass Peter Pan existiert.

Das Problem der negativen singulären Existenzsätze kann man beispielsweise bewältigen, indem man behauptet, dass Existenz kein logisches Prädikat ist. Die Sätze (1) und (2) hätten zwar eine ähnliche grammatikalische Struktur, ihre logische Struktur wäre jedoch unterschiedlich. Nach dieser Auflösung hat der Satz (2) die Form einer Negation einer Prädikation $\neg Fa$, nicht aber Satz (1). Dieser hat die logische Form einer Negation einer Existenzquantifikation $\neg \exists xFx$. Dessen ungeachtet kann man wiederholt fragen, ob Existenz tatsächlich kein logisches Prädikat ist, nicht einmal ein redundantes.

Die Lösung des Problems

Zur Lösung des Problems der negativen singulären Existenzsätze betrachte man die Wahrheitsbedingungen von Sätzen. Dazu werde ich Folgenden analysieren, was es heißt, dass ein elementarer Satz wahr ist. Elementare Sätze seien Sätze, die einem Gegenstand eine Eigenschaft zuschreiben bzw. zuzuschreiben scheinen. Elementare Sätze sind Sätze der Art „Werner Faymann ist Bundeskanzler“ oder „Der Yeti ist ein Einzelgänger“, also Prädikationen, die in der formalen Logik üblicherweise durch 'Fa' dargestellt werden. Um nicht vorauszusetzen, dass Existenz kein Prädikat ist, seien auch Existenzsätze elementare Sätze, da man sagen könnte, einem Gegenstand wird die Eigenschaft der Existenz zu- bzw. abgesprochen. Vorerst werde ich mich auch auf die Frage beschränken, wann ein elementarer Existenzsatz wahr bzw. falsch ist. Hierzu muss ich noch eine Erläuterung zur üblichen Interpretation der Negation machen. Man betrachte abermals Satz (2).

(2) Werner Faymann ist nicht Vorsitzender der KPÖ.

Der Satz (2) ist mehrdeutig, und zwar deshalb, weil es nicht ganz klar ist, worauf sich das Wort 'nicht' bezieht. Die Negation kann als Prädikatnegation oder als Satznegation interpretiert werden.

(2a) Werner Faymann (ist nicht) Vorsitzender der KPÖ.

(2b) Nicht: (Werner Faymann ist Vorsitzender der KPÖ).

Die Sätze (2a) und (2b) sind nicht äquivalent. In Satz (2a) erfolgt die Auflösung der Mehrdeutigkeit derart, dass das Resultat eine Negation des Prädikats ist, in Satz (2b) eine Satznegation. Eine Schlüsselfrage ist hier, ob durch das 'nicht' in Satz (2) nur das 'ist' negiert wird, oder ob der gesamte Satz negiert wird. Diese Frage ist für die folgenden Überlegungen wichtig. Man kann sich überlegen, wie die Sichtweise der Logik wäre. Würde man den Satz (2) in

eine formale Sprache übertragen, so wäre das Ergebnis eindeutig, nämlich:

(2c) $\neg Fa$

In einer formalen Sprache wird die Negation richtigerweise als Satzoperator verstanden. Eine Möglichkeit die Wahrheitsbedingungen für Sätze der Art 'Fa' anzugeben ist, zu sagen, dass ein Satz der Art 'Fa' genau dann wahr ist, wenn das Prädikat F auf den Gegenstand a zutrifft. Und weiter: Ein Satz der Art 'Fa' ist genau dann falsch, wenn das Prädikat F nicht auf den Gegenstand a zutrifft. Die Frage nach den Wahrheitsbedingungen eines Satzes 'Fa' ist keine andere als die Frage, ob – zurück zum Beispiel – Werner Faymann (ist oder ist nicht) Vorsitzender der KPÖ. Wenn Werner Faymann Vorsitzender der KPÖ ist, ist der Satz (2) wahr. Ist Werner Faymann nicht Vorsitzender der KPÖ, dann ist Satz (2) falsch. In dieser Art der Angabe der Wahrheitsbedingungen klingt die Paraphrasierung (2a) an und genau hier liegt das Problem. Interpretiert man die Negation in Satz (2) als Negation der Kopula 'ist' dann ist es klar, dass sowohl für eine positive Antwort als auch für eine negative Antwort die Existenz des Gegenstandes, über den geurteilt wird, erforderlich ist. Damit können zwei Voraussetzungen des Problems der negativen singulären Existenzsätze identifiziert werden, nämlich (1.) eine inadäquate Interpretation der Negation, die die Mehrdeutigkeit nicht berücksichtigt und (2.) die damit zusammenhängende Angabe der Wahrheitsbedingungen von Sätzen der Form 'Fa'. Die zweckmäßigste Alternative ist, dass man sich an die formale Schreibweise hält und die Negation durchwegs als Satzoperator auffasst, das heißt sowohl für die Übertragung in eine formale Schreibweise, als auch bei der Suche nach den Wahrheitsbedingungen. Ist die Negation eine Satznegation, muss man sich nach anderen Wahrheitsbedingungen für Negationen umsehen, was ich im Folgenden tun möchte.

Nach einer Abbildtheorie der Wahrheit ist ein Satz wahr genau dann, wenn er mit der Wirklichkeit übereinstimmt. Für den hier beabsichtigten Zweck kann man sagen, dass es für jeden wahren Satz einen so genannten Wahrmacher geben muss. Aus den obigen Überlegungen zur Negation ergibt sich, dass ein Wahrmacher etwas sein muss, was einen Satz, als Ganzes gesehen, wahr macht. Ein Wahrmacher für einen elementaren Satz kann nur ein konkreter Gegenstand sein, der irgendwelche Eigenschaften hat. Für den Fall der elementaren Existenzsätze muss der Wahrmacher nur die Eigenschaft der Existenz haben. Damit ist auch gleich zu erkennen, dass es nur Wahrmacher für positive Sätze geben kann, also solche Sätze, die behaupten, dass irgendein Gegenstand irgendeine Eigenschaft hat. Fehlt ein solcher Wahrmacher, so ist der in Frage stehende Satz falsch. (Vgl. Lewis 2001) Das Gesagte kann man sich an folgenden vier Sätzen klarmachen.

(3) Der Yeti existiert.

(4) Werner Faymann existiert.

(5) Der Yeti existiert nicht.

(6) Werner Faymann existiert nicht.

Der Satz (3) ist falsch, da es nichts in der Wirklichkeit gibt, was ihn wahr macht, denn der einzige Gegenstand, der Satz (3) wahr machen könnte, wäre der Yeti, der aber nicht existiert. Eine Besonderheit von singulären Existenzsätzen ist, dass sie behaupten, dass ihr Wahrmacher existiert. Der Wahrmacher von Satz (4) ist Werner Faymann. Fragt man nun nach den Wahrmachern der Sätze (5) und (6), so wird man feststellen, dass diese Sätze erstens keine elementaren Sätze sind und zweitens die Besonderheit aufweisen, dass sie das Wort 'nicht' enthalten. Die Sätze

(5) und (6) sind negative singuläre Existenzsätze, die, wie man oben gesehen hat, zu Widersprüchen führen können.

Die obigen Überlegungen zur Interpretation der Negation und der Mehrdeutigkeit der Negation in der Alltagssprache kann man auf die Sätze (5) und (6) übertragen, womit man zu den folgenden Paraphrasierungen kommt, welche die ursprünglichen Sätze auf elementare Sätze zurückführen.

(5a) „Der Yeti existiert“ ist falsch.

(6a) „Werner Faymann existiert“ ist falsch.

Die Paraphrasierungen (5a) und (6a) interpretieren die Negation in besonderer Weise, nämlich einerseits als Satzoperator und andererseits als Teil der Metasprache. Dies könnte man als eine Strategie des semantischen Aufstiegs (vgl. Quine 1980) in der Alltagssprache sehen. Außerdem erstreckt sich der Skopus des Negators auf den gesamten Satz, nicht nur auf das Prädikat. Die Frage, ob eine solche Paraphrasierung zulässig ist oder nicht, werde ich gleich beantworten, doch zuvor komme ich zu den Wahrheitswerten der übrigen Sätze. Der Satz (5a) behauptet, dass es für den Satz „Der Yeti existiert“ keinen Wahrmacher gibt. Wenn man den Satz (5a) genau betrachtet, dann sieht man, dass er dem Satz (3) sehr ähnlich ist. Der einzige Unterschied ist, dass zusätzlich der Wahrheitswert von Satz (3) explizit angeführt wird. Wenn jemand Satz (3) behauptet, dann sagt er etwas Falsches, was er dadurch ausdrücken könnte, dass er an Satz (3) 'ist falsch' hinzufügt. Das Resultat wäre Satz (5a). Mit Satz (5a) sagt man etwas Wahres, was man wiederum dadurch ausdrücken könnte, dass man 'ist wahr' hinzufügt.

Wie steht es um Satz (6a)? Der Satz (6a) behauptet, dass es für den Satz „Werner Faymann existiert“ keinen Wahrmacher gibt. Da Werner Faymann existiert, kommt es zu einer Art Spannung. Einerseits gibt es einen Wahrmacher, andererseits wird behauptet, dass es keinen Wahrmacher gibt. Genauer gesagt ist dies ein Widerspruch, weshalb der gesamte Satz (6a) falsch ist. Der Teilsatz „Werner Faymann existiert“ ist wahr, weil es für diesen Satz einen Wahrmacher gibt. Zum selben Ergebnis könnte man auch über rein syntaktische Überlegungen kommen, indem man die Regel der doppelten Negation anwendet.

Die Schlüsselfrage ist, ob es zulässig ist, die Negation als Teil der Metasprache zu interpretieren. Man könnte einwenden, dass man im Alltag über die Wirklichkeit spricht und nicht über die Sprache. Dabei vergisst man allerdings, dass man auch im Alltag über die Sprache spricht. In einem beliebigen Dialog könnte einer der Gesprächspartner sagen „Was du gerade gesagt hast, ist Unsinn“ oder „Du lügst“, wobei letzteres etwa als „Was du gerade gesagt hast, ist falsch“ zu verstehen ist. Und in diesem Sinn kann man mutatis mutandis auch sagen, dass es falsch ist, dass Peter Pan existiert, ohne sich zu widersprechen.

Für die philosophische Frage bedeutet dies, dass das Problem der negativen singulären Existenzsätze gelöst sein könnte. Mit dieser Lösung stellt sich aber sogleich die nächste Frage, nämlich die Frage nach dem Wahrmacher des wahren Satzes

(7) „Werner Faymann existiert“ ist wahr.

bzw.

(8) „Der Yeti existiert“ ist falsch“ ist wahr.

Es handelt sich bei den Sätzen (7) und (8) offensichtlich um wahre Sätze, es müssten sich also auch Wahrmacher

finden lassen, die die Sätze wahr machen. Im Fall von Satz (7) könnte man allenfalls an Werner Faymann denken, doch wenn man Satz (8) betrachtet, dann wird sofort klar, dass hier der Yeti nicht als Wahrmacher in Frage kommt, denn der Yeti existiert nicht. Bei der Beantwortung dieser Frage, also danach, was Sätze wie „Werner Faymann ist Bundeskanzler‘ ist wahr“ wahr macht, kommt die Redundanztheorie der Wahrheit zur Anwendung. Nach der Redundanztheorie der Wahrheit gilt in etwa Folgendes: Wenn man von einem Satz sagt, dass er wahr ist, so sagt man nicht mehr, als das, was der Satz selbst behauptet.

Der Satz (8) wäre somit äquivalent mit dem Satz (8a), der wiederum seinerseits nichts anderes ist, als der Satz (5a).

(8a) „Der Yeti existiert“ ist falsch.

Für Satz (8a) gilt, wie vorhin, dass es keinen Wahrmacher für „Der Yeti existiert“ gibt, was durch das angehängte 'ist falsch' ausgedrückt wird.

Gelangt man einmal zu einem Satz, der mit 'ist wahr' endet, so kann man mit der Suche des Wahrheitswertes aufhören, denn wie viele 'ist wahr' ich auch hinzufüge, ich füge keine neue Information hinzu. Das Resultat einer Wahrheitswertsuche ist also entweder ein wahrer elementarer Satz oder ein Satz, der mit 'ist falsch' endet.

Weitere elementare Sätze

Bisher habe ich nur elementare Existenzsätze behandelt; nun komme ich zur Analyse von elementaren Sätzen, in denen einem Gegenstand nicht nur Existenz, sondern auch eine Eigenschaft zugesprochen wird.

(9) Der Yeti ist ein Einzelgänger.

(10) Werner Faymann ist Bundeskanzler.

(11) Der Yeti lebt nicht in den Alpen.

(12) Werner Faymann ist nicht Vorsitzender der KPÖ.

Um die Frage nach der Wahrheit der Sätze (9) bis (12) zu beantworten, sucht man, wie vorhin, nach den Wahrmachern dieser Sätze. Ein Wahrmacher kann wiederum nur ein konkreter Gegenstand sein, wobei hier seine Existenz nicht ausreichend ist, sondern er muss auch die Eigenschaft haben, die der Satz behauptet, also – beispielsweise für Satz (10) – Werner Faymann, sofern er Bundeskanzler ist. Einen solchen Wahrmacher könnte man einen wirksamen Wahrmacher nennen. Wie man sieht, sind wieder zwei der Sätze zu paraphrasieren sind, da sie das Wort 'nicht' enthalten.

(11a) „Der Yeti lebt in den Alpen“ ist falsch.

(12a) „Werner Faymann ist Vorsitzender der KPÖ“ ist falsch.

Für den Satz (11a) gibt es keinen Wahrmacher, weshalb das 'ist falsch' zu Recht dasteht. Der Wahrmacher des Satzes (12a) kann nur Werner Faymann sein, den es auch gibt. Jedoch hat Werner Faymann nicht die Eigenschaft, die der Satz behauptet. Es handelt sich also um keinen wirksamen Wahrmacher, was so ist, als ob es keinen Wahrmacher gäbe. Wenn ein Satz keinen Wahrmacher hat und auch behauptet wird, dass der Satz falsch ist, so wäre der gesamte Satz wieder wahr. Das 'ist wahr' ist jedoch, wie oben, redundant. Der Gesamtsatz behauptet nicht mehr als (11a) bzw. (12a).

Der Satz (9) ist falsch, da es keinen Wahrmacher für ihn gibt. Der Satz (10) ist wahr, da es einen wirksamen Wahrmacher für ihn gibt, nämlich Werner Faymann, und dieser auch die von Satz (10) behauptete Eigenschaft 'Bundeskanzler-zu-sein' hat.

Schlusswort

Das Ziel meines Beitrags war es, die Beziehung von Negation und Wirklichkeit zu beleuchten. Das Ergebnis ist eine Interpretation, die die Negation einerseits als Satznegation und andererseits als Teil einer Metasprache ansieht. Für elementare positive Sätze gibt es Wahrmacher. Einige Beispiele auf grundlegendem Niveau haben gezeigt, wie man im Rahmen dieser Wahrmacher-Theorie zur Wahrheit bzw. Falschheit von elementaren Sätzen kommt. Für komplexe Sätze kann dies nur in Aussicht gestellt werden. Was die Ausgangsfrage betrifft, so kann man abschließend feststellen, dass die Negation, im Rahmen der hier versuchten Interpretation, nichts als ein sprachliches Phänomen ist.

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Wittgenstein Repudiates Metaphysical Chatter, Not Metaphysics *per se*

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For Wittgenstein,¹ grammar creates human reality (*PI* §371, §373). Grammar delineates object-referents (*PI*, p. 193ff). The grammar of one's language shapes one's perception of the world; and that shaping comes in the form of leading one to "see-as" (*PI*, p. 194). Grammar is an inherent property of language. And language is an activity borne of the human form of life.

There certainly are different accounts of what Wittgenstein might mean by the term 'form of life'. There is the "ethnographic account," where it is equated with culture or social formation, which in turn is equated with language (Glock 1996, 125). But Wittgenstein also speaks of the "pre-linguistic" basis of a language-game (*Z*, 541), as if suggesting that language is, as it were, a superstructure that stands on a base, which is that animalistic form of life (*OC*, 358-9). Hence there is the "organic account." On this account, the term 'form of life' refers to the "complicated organic adaptation that enables [humans] to use a word" (Hunter 1968, 237). But the expression 'complicated organic adaptation' is itself in need of definition. Considering that Wittgenstein speaks of language as part of human *natural* history, one is tempted to think of human biological nature. Humans, by evolutionary happenstance, became what they are: animals with a large brain, extremely complex nervous system, highly flexible vocal chords, dexterous upper limbs, and so on. Obviously, human physiological characteristics are among the necessary conditions to doing, or to learning to do, certain activities, such as conceptualizing and articulating. All these are among the enablers that humans need in order to use, or to learn to use, words. Accordingly, to talk of complicated organic adaptation is to talk of "that which forms part of our nature, that which determines how we spontaneously find ourselves reacting... *our natural propensities*" (McGinn 1984, 55).

The capability to conceptualize and to be articulate is natural to the human species, its naturalness on a par with walking, eating, drinking and playing (*PI*, §25). It is a biological endowment that a human being is at all capable of acquiring capabilities such as, or especially, complex linguistic capability. This capability includes polysyllabic vocalisation, gesticulation, emotion, symbolization, ratiocination, and so on. To be able to do all these, one must have certain physical equipments that only nature provides.

Words are a product of biology. Birds chirp and dogs bark as a matter of course to communicate. Birds and dogs just are being what they are when they respectively chirp and bark. Similarly, when humans use words, they are just being what they are. Just as chirps and barks are respectively to the avian and the canine ways of living, words are to the human way of living (*PG*, p. 66); or, one may rather say, the human *act* of living. In that sense, then, words, just like chirps and barks, are a product of biology.

Concept formation has a biological background (*Z*, 64). Language-games regarding virtually all things are characterized both by natural human capabilities and inabilities (*Z*, 345, 368). One can imagine that had humans evolved to be slightly different than what they actually are, they would be having a form of life slightly but significantly different from what they currently have (*PI*, p. 230), with slightly different capabilities and interests. Had humans evolved differently, they would have formed a different conception of the world.

One can imagine the difference it would make had the organic human form of life evolved differently. Wittgenstein does suggest that it makes sense to think of alternative realities coinciding with alternative forms of life, and that concepts, or conceptual systems, are contingent on "certain very general facts of nature" (*PI*, p. 230); this, presumably, includes facts about *human* nature. If one imagines that only human nature, and not the rest of nature, differs from what it currently is, then one can arrive at the position that humans will have, for example, a different colour system, and even different human perception of the world in the area of colours (*Z*, 357). Accordingly, one can say that to imagine beings whose nature is different from that which humans currently have is to imagine that to them the world will appear differently coloured. And one can push the matter a little further by positing that not only in terms of colour but also in terms of shapes, consistency, temperature, and other qualities that the world will appear differently. One say that colour, shape, consistency, temperature, and other qualities in the world are not contingent on human linguistic practice; but this only means that, for instance, regardless of the status of human existence marble slabs would still reflect light in the usual way, spherical objects would still roll on level surfaces when applied with sufficient force, a falling meteor would still crush a coconut fruit equal its size, and lava would still burn lines of trees they flow over. Still, this does not preclude one from also granting that the colour, shape, consistency, temperature, and other qualities of objects would be perceived differently and would convey different significance to beings whose nature differs from humans in their current nature. This shows that the aforementioned qualities of objects, *as humans can ever be cognizant of them*, are contingent to a significant extent on human nature.

This point leads to the suggestion, which is: If *human* reality is created by the grammar of language, and if language is itself borne of the human form of life, then it follows that reality *as it is spoken of* is to some significant extent humanly created.

Be that as it may, Wittgenstein unmistakably acknowledges that there is such a thing as human-independent reality: e.g. that the earth existed long before sentient beings on it did, that the physical universe is independent of human perception, and so on, are, he argues, *certainities*. They are immune from doubt and have no need for justification for they precede both doubt and justification. They are the scaffolding of human thought, the foundation of language-games, the inherited background against which true and false is distinguished, the hinges against which questions and doubts turn (*OC*, §§94-5, 136, 211, 308, 341-3, 401-3, 614, 655). It is a matter of certainty

¹ The following are abbreviations of Wittgenstein's works cited here: CV = Culture and Value, LC = Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Beliefs, OC = On Certainty, PI = Philosophical Investigations, PG = Philosophical Grammar, PR = Philosophical Remarks, Z = Zettel.

that the world, and all the things that might constitute it, exists independently of human perception. So, for instance, “the existence of [horses and giraffes, colours and shapes] is not [a product of human linguistic practice], either in fact or in Wittgenstein” (Anscombe 1981, 121); as far as Wittgenstein goes, their substantive existence is a certainty.

Immanuel Kant famously proposed that knowledge of the world is necessarily mediated by the categories of human understanding, and as a necessary consequence the world that humans could ever know is, as it were, the world that is re-presented by and in accordance with the said categories; thus, the world as it appears to humans is quite different from the world *per se*. The human take on the world is already a re-presentation, and such a representation may not be the only legitimate take on the world. By replacing the Kantian buzz word ‘categories’ with ‘form of life’ a position analogous to Kant’s can be plausibly read into Wittgenstein; and this is a tempting prospect when one considers Wittgenstein’s remark: “We are involved here with the Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy” (CV, p. 13). The suggestion is clear that there is, for Wittgenstein (*a la* Kant), the human-supervening reality on the one hand, and human-independent natural reality on other.

Wittgenstein observes: “I want to say: an education quite different from ours might also be the foundation for quite different concepts” (Z, 387). “For here life would run on differently.—What interests us would no longer interests *them*. Here different concepts would no longer be unimaginable. In fact, this is the only way in which essentially different concepts are imaginable” (Z, 388). Here Wittgenstein in effect says that what is of interest to a people is contingent on the form of life they happen to be raised in. (What is of interest is that which excites natural attention, affectation or concern, especially in respect of beneficence or detriment: anything that could possibly be within the realm of human sensual perception, knowledge, imagination, appreciation, desire, will, or way of articulation is of human interest.) This particular passages just quoted at least suggests the ethnographic form of life as directing human interest; but one can take by extension that the organic form of life, too, directs human interest, and do so in an even more fundamental way. The organic human form of life determines what is of interest to an organism (PI, §570). This means that the human form of life sets the extent of human interest; and the extent of human interest is certainly not limitless.

If there is a limit, then there is that which transcends it. The transcendent, on this score, is that which is beyond the reach of the normal provisions of the organic form of life (the *given* of a form of life: e.g. the range of a species’ physiological equipments, capabilities, adaptation, and behaviour.) All that humans can be interested in are those things that can be given to them, which means those that are already mediated by their organic form of life. The contingency of reality as humans grasp it on human nature opens up a temptation to posit a dimension of the world that humans are cognizant of, and a dimension of that same world untinged by the mediation of the human form of life. The position may be stated thus: “The world *per se* is different from the world as it appears.” Therefore, there is definitely that which transcends human, or indeed creaturely, discourse. It cannot be helped that that which is transcendent cannot simply be dismissed as a “nothing.” (A “nothing” in this sense is a purported *entity* that actually does not exist; its opposite is a “something,” an existing entity).

To posit a transcendent not only makes sense but is also called for: It does not make sense to speak of a limit without that which transcends it. Yet that which is transcendent is of no epistemological interest for it is in principle inscrutable; and it is of no semantic interest for statements that purport to refer to it cannot really do so. Thus is the transcendent: it transcends scrutability and expressibility.

Any chatter about that which is beyond the normal provisions of the human form of life, such as talk about the transcendent (the so-called Ultimate Reality, or the Essence of the World, or even the Other Mind) is *metaphysical chatter*, a chatter that, as it were, bumps against the limits of language. It is chatter about that which cannot be of real human interest, given the human form of life. Wittgenstein shuns it, not because of the lack of truth of the statements that are issued in it, but because the said statements are otiose as speaking of the transcendent is ultimately futile. There cannot be any point at all in making metaphysical claims for such a claim cannot in principle be tested for verisimilitude. For example, the metaphysical statement ‘Possibly everyone is in pain but does not show it’: if a pain cannot be known to exist by anyone other than the subject who feels it, then there is in principle no way this statement can be checked for verisimilitude, and as such can never be useful as a claim. Any bet made on a metaphysical “claim,” unlike the bet made on the most trivial empirical claim, can never produce results. It does not matter if there is or there is not an essence of an object (or of colour, or whatever), or whether or not a number signifies an entity in some trans-material realm, or that a certain unexpressed inner process is occurring: they are of no interest to humans, i.e. they have absolutely no bearing on their natural (including scientific) concerns. Making a stand on these matters, whether it is an affirmative or a negative one, produces claims that are otiose. If the essence of an object, of a number, or of whatever else, happens to be a “something,” then at best it is a “something about which nothing could be said” and for all significant human interest and purposes could serve no better than a “nothing” (PI, §304).

It must be noted that the main concern of the (mature) Wittgenstein is a linguistic matter: the description or clarification of the nature of language. “Philosophy,” so says Wittgenstein, “is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language” (PI, §109). It is his view that a good number of the issues in philosophy are borne of “grammatical illusions” (PI, §110). His purpose for describing or clarifying the nature of language is for the disentanglement of misunderstandings from which many a philosophical puzzle proceeds in the hope that the disentanglement would ease out these puzzles (PI, §§124-133).

But while Wittgenstein lays down his position on matters that are for all intents and purposes linguistic matters, points that properly belong to ontology rather than mere linguistics are, rightly or wrongly, drawn from his position. It seems fair enough to take his positions in linguistics to be carrying implications relevant to ontology. But it also seems easy, in representing him, to confuse linguistic matters with ontological ones (and as a result of such confusion there are those misguided issues about him being an “idealist,” or “anti-realist,” or “fideist”). Actually, all he wants to do is to show how language represents reality, and apropos to that, how far language can represent reality. He shows no inclination to deal with the issue of how far reality goes. He does unmistakably suggest that the world *per se* is independent of human perception; and his position clearly leads to the further suggestion

that reality may have dimensions other than that which is given to, and are transcendent of, human perception.

However, about explicitly making declarations that appropriately belong to ontology his philosophy dictates that he must be very reticent, for “[w]hat belongs to the essence of the world cannot be expressed in language.... Language can only say those things we could also imagine otherwise” (PR, 83). So to extend the characterization of his linguistics to ontology is going a parlous step too far. If his anthropocentric and sociocentric linguistics lead him anywhere at all, it is not towards ontological pluralism or a proliferation of ontologies but towards, as it were, ontological aphasia. About the transcendent, the mature Wittgenstein simply opts for silence. Or rather, amid circulating talk about the transcendent, he calls for silence. Being unable to make any affirmation or denial about metaphysical matters without straying into otiosity, the mature Wittgenstein, not unlike the Tractarian Wittgenstein who sought for the “transference of all metaphysical essences to the realm of the unutterable... *without a denial of metaphysical beliefs*” (Engelmann 1967, 143; italics added), simply consigns ontological (or metaphysical) matters to silence.

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A Study in Bi-logic (a Reflection on Wittgenstein)

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1. World, Psychoanalysis, and Mathematical Logic

Proposition 1.1. (Wittgenstein) The world is all that is the case.

Proposition 1.2. (Blanco, 1975) It is reasonable to study the relation between Psychoanalysis and Logic.

Proposition 1.3. (Blanco, 1975) Psychology and Logic deals with a totality.

Argument:

If Proposition 1.1 holds with a clear fact that "both Psychoanalysis (Psychology) and Mathematical logic (Logic) both belong to the world in Wittgenstein's sense", then the task of Logic and Psychology will start with the world and end with the world. Hence, the task of Logic and Psychology are both to deal with a sort of 'totality', that is Proposition 1.3 could hold. Obviously, it follows a reason to support studying the relation between these two disciplines, i.e., Proposition 1.2 holds.

Remark.1.4

Matte Blanco, a psychoanalyst who is interested and works on the reformulation of Freud's theory by means of mathematical logic, named *bi-logic*, provides his reason owning from Wittgenstein's conception on the world to support his own work. By this, he tries to make a connection with "some concepts which stand at the foundations of modern logic" (Blanco 1975, p.358), one of which is Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*. Of course, as he states,

"I must say that I do not know whether Wittgenstein would have agreed with these reflections. But the opening phrase of his famous treatise seems to convey this meaning. (ibid.)

2. Reformulate Freud's Unconscious manifestations into logical theory

It is well known that Freud's greatest contribution was probably to show the importance of unconscious process in mental life. We know that there are five characteristics of unconscious, *timelessness*, *replacement of external by internal reality*, *condensation*, *displacement*, and *absence of mutual contradiction*.

Interestingly, all these characteristics have been re-explained by Matte Blanco's bi-logical point of view. Matte Blanco follows Freud and argues how the main characteristics of unconscious functioning can be seen as arising out of symmetrized thought. We all agree that our human mind follows a conventional logic and it seems to be that part of human mind behaves as it does not be governed by conventional logic but another type of logic, if there is any. What Blanco does is to develop this logic and to argue this is helpful in Psychoanalysis. In fact, we can view Matte Blanco's work as a reformulation of Freudian unconscious logic, even Freud himself also drew attention to the importance he attached to his recognition of the different logic of the unconscious.

Blanco presents a reformulation of Freud's theory by two main principles. Matte Blanco's theory (MBT, thereafter) consists of two parts, one is logical, and the other is set-theoretical.¹ Former is to consider *principle of symmetry*, latter is to consider *principle of generalization*. His idea comes from the individual's experience of infinity. In unconscious system (Unc, thereafter)², it is observed that *part = whole relation* occurs, and it is also well-known that a proper subset of A is equal to set A when A is an infinite set. Because of this, Matte Blanco tries to discuss logic of unconscious by set theory. First of all, he formulated two principles to characterize the logic of Unc.

(i) Principle of generalization

The system Unc. treats an individual thing (person, object, concept) as if it were a member or element of a set or class which contains other members; it treats this set or class as a subclass of a more general class, and this more general class as a subclass or subset of a still more general class, and so on. (Blanco, 1975, p.38)

(ii) Principle of symmetry

The system Unc. treats the converse of any relation as identical with the relation. In other words, it treats asymmetrical relations as if they were symmetrical. (ibid.)

According to MBT, our daily experiences are full of the *part=whole relation*, which is a consequence of these two principles, e.g. given a whole object *K* and a part of it *k*, there is a relation *o* is a part of *K*, by (ii) we derive *K* is also a part of *k*. Hence, '*k* is a part of *K* and *K* is a part of *k*'. It seems 'space' disappears. Same argument could be applied to many other concrete examples, such as an arm is a part of a body = a body is a part of arm, furthermore, implies any other part of a body = a body is a part of any other part. Matte Blanco claims,

"Consequently a subclass may be identical with any other subclass of the same class. All these assertions may appear absurd, but according to what we may call the logic of symmetrical thinking they are perfectly legitimate. (Blanco 1975, p.43)

Remark. 2.1. Although he has defended for this using previously, actually he still makes some mistakes here. For example, given an object *A*, it must be a member of a set Δ containing other members, i.e. $A \in \Delta$ where \in is an asymmetric relation between *A* and Δ . However, by principle (ii), even if we get $\Delta \in A$, we still can not conclude $A = \Delta$, unless 'part' here means 'subset'. It seems to be a special case for part = whole relation in MBT. In other words, MBT confuses \in with subset relation.

¹ We won't get involve into debates and the borderline of the relation between set-theory and logic.

² Unconscious system in MBT refers to Freud's unconscious system. We will not discuss whether Freud's unconscious is well-defined.

3. World, *Being* through Facts

Proposition 3.1. (Wittgenstein) The world divides into facts.

Proposition 3.2. (Blanco, 1975) The fact that the world divides into facts corresponds to something of the nature of the world itself and to something of our own nature.

Remark 3.3. Proposition 3.1 is seen as Wittgenstein's conception of the world. This conception of world could be embedded into Blanco's *principle of generalization*, which describes a mode of being as follow:

P: The world divides into facts. (Proposition 3.1.)

Q: P is a statement about the world, and P is also a way of looking at the world.

R: We see "P".

S: We are part of the world.

T: The fact that "R" must correspond to something of our own nature.

Clearly, Wittgenstein considers the world divides into facts. This statement is a statement about the world. And this statement is also a way of seeing the world. We see *Wittgenstein's consideration*. And we are part of the world. The fact, which states "We see *Wittgenstein's consideration*," must correspond to something of our own nature.

As Blanco states,

"Wittgenstein's divisibility of the world is easily. And it is no wonder shown since man is a part of the world. On the other hand, his principle is also a reflection of a form of reality of the world." (Blanco, 1975, p.359)

We could find an explicitly implication from Wittgenstein's conception of world to a conception of a mode of being, which is in the other side of the worlds.

4. Concluding Remark

It is worth of considering whether to take the concepts of Mathematical Logic is suitable or not to treat the studies of unconscious, as Matte Blanco did (See *Appendix A*). But, undoubtedly, Mathematical Logic plays its role in modern Analytic Philosophy. Moderate using these concepts might make some notions clearer, even on other disciplines.

Matte Blanco makes a connection between Mathematical Logic with Psychoanalysis, that is MBT. Further, we could make MBT be related to some philosophical works, especially those caring about *philosophy of logic* and extremely effecting modern Analytical Philosophy. Studying Wittgenstein is such an example. Moreover, through this study, we cast new light on the possible relationship between Wittgenstein and Psychoanalysis, both of which are belong to a sense in *cure*.

Appendix A: Bi-Logical Structure

0. Structural analysis of mental structure

Reflection 0.1.

Question: How does this theory elucidate mental life (structure)?

Method: Conscious & Unconscious Distinction



Note.

Matte Blanco concluded that the mind can usefully be conceived as partly functioning by the combination of at least two distinct modes of knowing which are often polarized. (Blanco, 1975, 1988; Rayner, 1995)

Remark 0.2.

Freud's contribution is to show the importance of unconscious process in mental life and how they could be understood.

Remark 0.3.

We adopt Matte Blanco's method which follows Freud's analysis on unconscious in terms of the interaction of a very few *precisely* defined fundamental processes to produce highly complex dynamic mental structure.

Remark 0.4

Precisely defined fundamental processes refer to some pure mathematical concepts, such as *sets, numeration, symmetry, asymmetry, dimension* and *infinity*. Matte Blanco use these concepts to characterize unconscious structure, and then produces the so called *logic*³. Combine with conventional logic he asserts we could describe the whole mental life which is *stratified*.

Note.

All people are assumed having a universal mental structure⁴, including psychic ill.



Note.

It is important for psychoanalysis in realizing patient's mental. It will be helpful if we realize its logical structure. But how to use it clinically is still unknown here.

1. Psychology and Mathematic

Reflection 1.1.

Question: Is there any relation between psychology and mathematic?

Remark 1.2.

This question is raised because of the individual's experience of infinity. In unconscious system, it is observed that there is *part = whole relation* occurs, and it is also well-known that a proper subset of A is equal to set A when A is an infinite set.

³ Logic here means system different from convention logic in conscious.

⁴ This is a common assumption and is a common mistake to view human owing similar or identical mental structure, including the same cognitive processes in western history from Hume, Locke, Mill to modern cognitive scientists. However, it is widely challenged by cultural psychologists these years, e.g., Richard Nisbett (Nisbett et al. 2001; Nisbett, 2003).

Matte Blanco's theory is to discuss logical structure by *set theory*. Hence, it seems to be that we bridge the connection between two subjects.

Matte Blanco's contribution

- 1.) See the psychological importance of asymmetry, symmetry, and symmetrization.
- 2.) Note the frequent presence of part = whole identities in unconscious process to the part = whole property of a mathematically infinite set.

For 1.), we consider 'symmetrized elements', which hold in different mental structures, such as. *emotion, preconscious structure, conscious structure*. In other words, the mind has some sense of the 'proportion' of symmetrization in any experience. From bi-logical point of view, mental life is stratified. It is not discrete but *continuous*. Mental life changes by the increase or decrease of symmetrized elements.


Reflection 1.2.

Question: How do we understand 'symmetrization occurring'?

This question is due to an observation from transferring unconscious state into conscious state. When an individual has a transformation from unconscious state to conscious state, there is *repetition*. (See *Appendix B*.)

Appendix B.

Matte Blanco notes that conscious can only think in 3+1dimensional (3 spatial and 1 time dimensions). Unconscious appears to be able to contain many more dimensions than this, but it cannot consistently combine them together. When unconscious state enters into preconscious or conscious state, there will be repetitions, therefore symmetrization occurs. Mathematical ideas about the consequence of multidimensional spaces to fewer dimensional spaces help overcome the logical difficulty when we assert an object can feel at two or more places at once, i.e. such dimensional transformation can produce consequence that are equivalent to 'symmetrization'.



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Phenomenal Concepts and the Hard Problem

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1. Outline of the PCS

One well-known objection to Jackson's knowledge argument is the so-called *two-modes-of-presentation-reply* famously developed e.g. in Loar's influential paper "Phenomenal States" (Loar 1990). This reply is based on the Fregean idea that one single, ontological entity can be known under different modes of presentation and aims at saving physicalism by granting just a conceptual gap. Obviously, this idea can be easily formulated on the level of concepts – a move which in this case leads to the notion of *phenomenal concepts* on the one hand and the notion of *physical concepts* on the other hand. Once granted these two sorts of concepts defenders of the PCS want to construe the Mary-scenario in analogy to standard cases of co-reference. For the knowledge argument this means that according to the defenders of the PCS the scientist Mary possessed all physical concepts when being confined to her achromatic environment, but acquired new phenomenal ones when seeing for the first time the blue sky. The key-move of the PCS is the claim that these new concepts pick out one single supposed physical referent; e.g. a brain state.

Since the PCS aims at giving an explanation of the Mary-scenario one premise of this strategy is that phenomenal concepts can not be a priori deduced from physical concepts. In other words: The phenomenal concepts Mary gains because of enjoying her first colour-experience are *conceptually isolated* (Carruthers, Veillet 2007) from all other concepts she had before. Therefore, an explanation why phenomenal concepts are conceptually isolated from physical ones – although both sorts of concepts are taken to pick out one and the same referent – has to be given. Defenders of the PCS hold that such an explanation can be found in important particularities of phenomenal concepts. Hence, according to this account no metaphysical entities such as irreducible Qualia have to be invoked to explain Mary's new knowledge – it suffices to point out the uniqueness of phenomenal concepts. For this strategy to work in a first step the decisive features of phenomenal concepts have to be elaborated. In a second step it has to be shown that these particularities can explain away the so-called hard problem, viz. the intuition that qualitative experience is not reducible to physical states.

In the following I analyze what happens exactly when Mary gains new knowledge and thereby acquires new concepts. Next, I show that physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts do not meet the constraint to explain Mary's epistemic progress and the closely connected dualistic intuitions. Finally, this is compared to my own account of phenomenal concepts labelled the *encapsulation account*. This account offers an explanation of the brilliant scientist gaining new knowledge but implies decisive features of phenomenal concepts which indicate phenomenal referents. Hence, the PCS fails on both interpretations.

2. The Cognitive Role of Phenomenal Concepts

According to the PCS Mary gains a new concept concerning blue colour-vision when seeing for the first time the blue sky. Since she could not deduce this new phenomenal concept from the other concepts she had before, an explanation for this conceptual isolation has to be given. One explanation is found in the special acquisition-conditions of phenomenal concepts, namely that a person gains a new phenomenal concept iff she undergoes attentively the relevant new experience. This means that phenomenal concepts can not be acquired by description – in fact this is what Jackson's scenario tells us. All the information about colour vision available to unreleased Mary do not help her in knowing what it is like to see blue and forming the relevant concept.

This way of putting things leads to a second point: When Mary attentively looks at the blue sky and thereby acquires the phenomenal blue-concept she *simultaneously* makes an epistemic progress, viz. she gains *knowledge* about the qualitative character of blue-experiences. Therefore, we can conclude that the new phenomenal concept carries information which explains the epistemic development of the scientist. This information has to be about the qualitative character of the blue-experience since this is precisely the information Mary lacked when being confined to her achromatic room and gained when seeing the blue sky. Hence to explain the Mary-scenario, it has to be granted that the new concept carries information about the qualitative character of blue colour-vision and that this information has to be introspectively accessible to Mary.

To sum up the crucial points: The cognitive role of a phenomenal concept is carrying information about qualitative experience and to make this information introspectively available to the person possessing the concept.

Next, let me investigate if physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts capture this cognitive role. Consider, for example, the *demonstrative account* of phenomenal concepts, such as the one developed by Levin (2007). The problem of demonstrative accounts is the following: Standard demonstrative concepts typically refer to the item currently demonstrated at and hence their referents differ from one use to another. Therefore, the demonstrative phenomenal concept does not carry itself the relevant information. Furthermore, as Chalmers (2003) pointed out, one can imagine the experience currently demonstrated at as having different character – a thought experiment which can *not* be performed when employing phenomenal concepts which necessarily carry information about a specific experience.

Next, let me consider the *quotational account* of the sort invoked by Papineau (2007): On this account phenomenal concepts embed experiences just as quotation marks embed words. How should this analogy be understood? Papineau holds that phenomenal concepts *use* experiences – hence their particularity can be explained by the special neuronal vehicle in virtue of which the phenomenal concept is realized: "We can helpfully think of perceptual concepts as involving stored *sensory tem-*

plates. These templates will be set up on initial encounters with the relevant referents.” (Papineau 2007, 114)

Here the uniqueness of phenomenal concepts is their involving “stored sensory templates”. This particularity aims at explaining the conceptual isolation and the cognitive role of carrying information about qualitative experiences. But the latter constraint can not be met by a physicalist interpretation of the quotational account. Let me explain why:

On a physicalist interpretation the stored sensory template which is activated in every employing of a phenomenal concept obviously has to be understood as a physical item. Therefore, the pressing question arises: What is meant by “involving” these templates? If this phrase points just at a *simultaneous occurrence* of concept and neural template, then the phenomenal concept itself does not carry the relevant information. Second, if the neural template should be literally *part* of the concept then one may wonder a) how a neuronal template can be a constitutive part of a concept and b) how it can carry the information Mary lacked in her achromatic environment. We have to bear in mind that the relevant information is not information about a neural template, but information about a *qualitative experience*. Obviously, a physical description of a neuronal template leaves the relevant sort of information out. Therefore the physicalist quotational account, which can be interpreted as solely co-occurring with experiences or as involving physical items described in physical terms, fails on both interpretations to explain the cognitive role of phenomenal concepts.

We can conclude that no account of phenomenal concepts which fails to posit an intimate link between these concepts and qualitative experiences can successfully explain the Mary-scenario and our intuitions concerning the hard problem. Therefore, we have to search for an alternative account of phenomenal concepts pointing at specific features which can explain the cognitive role of these concepts and hence also the Mary-scenario.

3. A Proposal

Investigating the Mary-scenario carefully might help working out the crucial particularities of phenomenal concepts. Therefore, let me focus the attention to what Jackson’s knowledge argument teaches us:

In a first step the argument illustrates that a person can gain a new phenomenal concept only under the condition of attentively undergoing the qualitative experience the concept refers to. So concerning the acquisition-conditions of phenomenal concept we can hold that one has to stand in an intimate relationship to the referent. This particularity (which explains also the conceptual isolation) mirrors the fact that no descriptive knowledge suffices to gain a phenomenal concept – it rather requires a sort of *acquaintance* with the referent itself. Acquaintance is often held as a primitive relation that resists further explanation. But in my opinion some elucidation concerning the process of being acquainted with an item and forming a concept on the basis of this can be given. Let me analyze this process in detail: Mary, who is aware of her very first blue-experience, *discriminates* this experience from all other current experiences. This act of attentive discrimination immediately yields a concept referring to the particular experience.

The interesting point is what this insight regarding the process of the concept-acquisition tells us about the *nature* of phenomenal concepts. The situation is the following: Even defenders of the PCS grant that one has to un-

dergo an experience to acquire a phenomenal concept. This condition posits an intimate link between the experience and the phenomenal concept. As we have seen this postulate of an intimate connection between experience and concept is in perfect accordance with the cognitive role of phenomenal concepts. Please remember that phenomenal concepts have to carry information about the qualitative experience to explain Mary’s new knowledge. Hence, the claim of an intimate link between experience and concept is desirable for more than one reason: on the one hand it offers a perfect account of the cognitive role of these concepts and on the other hand it explains their special acquisition-conditions and the closely related feature of conceptual isolation. How can this intimate connection be spelled out in detail?

According to my account only the fact that an experience is *self-presenting*, i.e. that it serves as its own mode of presentation, enables our awareness of it. As it has been argued this awareness is part of the acquisition-condition of phenomenal concepts – therefore it can be concluded that a person can gain a phenomenal concept only under the condition of being aware of a self-presenting item. The detailed acquisition-process goes the following way: When Mary discriminates a new experience this process of isolation implies giving the experience itself a conceptual structure and hence forming a concept which *encapsulates* the experience itself. The notion of encapsulation is based on the idea that the experience itself is the core of the phenomenal concept referring to it. Therefore, a careful analysis of the acquisition-process reveals an *encapsulation relation* between phenomenal concepts and their referents. Obviously, on the proposed account, both concept and referent are mental entities and their relation is constitutive.

Importantly, a concept which encapsulates an item without involving any separate mode of presentation has particular consequences: First, the self-presenting character of the experience guarantees the direct reference of the concept formed on the basis of it. Second, these concepts pick out their referents directly and in all possible worlds – facts which are due to the internal constitution of encapsulation. Decisively, since the reference of phenomenal concepts is fixed by their internal constitution and not by external factors, they carry essential information about the relevant experience. And this is exactly what the knowledge argument tells us about the cognitive role of phenomenal concepts: Mary’s new concepts carry information about the *qualitative character* of experiences.

The reader might have the impression that the proposed account of phenomenal concepts encapsulating experiences is the same as the above analyzed quotational account. It isn’t. For clarification let me finally work out the decisive differences between these two accounts.

The quotational account which seems to share the herein elaborated interpretation intends to draw a physicalist conclusion. This attempt fails because defending encapsulation implies that phenomenal concepts pick out phenomenal referents. The reasons why are the following: If phenomenal concepts are interpreted as encapsulating their referents, then this unique reference-relation has to be explained. Only an explanation referring to the self-presenting character of experiences can do this explanatory work. If a defender of the quotational accounts grants encapsulation but nevertheless intends to draw a physicalist conclusion from this, she has to give a physicalist account of how a concept can encapsulate a physical item and how this item can carry introspectively accessible information about qualitative experiences. It seems myste-

rious how this can be done without invoking self-presentation. But self-presentation is a mark of phenomenal entities where there can not be made a distinction between presented and presenting item. Moreover, as we have seen in Papineaus' work, most defenders of the quotational account abstain to interpret it in analogy to a constitutive encapsulation. They do not refer to an internal constitution of concept and experience but rather to some sort of co-occurrence or unclear notion of the concept "using" the experience.

4. Conclusion

I demonstrated in accordance with the PCS that the new concepts in the Mary-scenario differ in several respects significantly from any other concept-type. Jackson's knowledge argument teaches us that phenomenal concepts are conceptually isolated and have the cognitive role of carrying introspectively available information about qualitative experiences. I combined this with another outcome of the Mary-scenario; namely that phenomenal concepts have very special acquisition-conditions. Both of these insights are granted by defenders of the PCS and require an explanation. I argued that if defenders of the PCS grant this, they also have to accept that these particularities of phenomenal concepts imply phenomenal referents - since any other physicalist account can not meet the constraint of explaining the decisive particularities of phenomenal concepts; such as their cognitive role. Therefore, if we take the uniqueness of phenomenal concepts seriously, the PCS can not explain away the hard problem – it rather reinforces it.

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Aspects of Modernism and Modernity in Wittgenstein's Early Thought

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1. Introduction

The issue of Wittgenstein's relation to his times has not escaped the attention of Wittgenstein scholarship, especially after 1973 when Janik and Toulmin's *Wittgenstein's Vienna* was published, a work that constitutes the first contextual approach to his life and thought to have wide impact. We can discern two main themes in this area, the first being the relation of Wittgenstein to various facets of modernism (Janik and Toulmin 1973, Eagleton 1993, Perloff 1996, Puchner 2005, Paden 2007), and the second his stance toward modernity (von Wright 1982, Bouveresse 1991, DeAngelis 2007). Despite the diversity of the above-mentioned works, there are two general theses that appear to emerge from them. First, that Wittgenstein's philosophizing fits in several intriguing ways with the modernist agenda, and, second, that Wittgenstein constitutes a typical example of a thinker alienated from, or even hostile to, modernity. What I suggest in this paper, by focusing on Wittgenstein's early phase, is that while both claims illuminate significant features of his work and personality, they can not be accepted without qualification.

Before moving to the main discussion, just a few words about the way in which "modernism" and "modernity", terms that are both extensively discussed and diversely characterized, will be used in this paper. The term "modernism", like the vast majority of "-isms", is a characteristic instance of a family-resemblance term, as it covers a multiplicity of cultural movements, intellectuals, and historic periods which are rather connected through a series of overlapping similarities than by a single common trait – in fact, certain modernist movements and intellectuals are in orthogonal opposition or even flat-out contradiction with each other. Hence, "modernism" as it is used in this paper does not designate a set of shared properties that constitute the essence of modernism, but indicates the existence of certain attributes, such as ahistoricity, self-referential autonomy, and constructional impulses, that allow for the categorization of movements, works and individuals of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century under it. Regarding "modernity", similar remarks apply to it, and here the term is used as indicating a socio-historico-cultural concept that covers the period from the rise of the Enlightenment up to the first half of the 20th century, exhibiting features such as the rise of liberalism, the dogmatization of the Enlightenment principles, and the exclusive authority of reason in the form of scientific rationality.

2. Early Wittgenstein and Modernism

Existing works on the relation of early Wittgenstein to modernism offer us sundry approaches that highlight the various modernist qualities of his work. Thus, we find the Tractatus treated as "the first great work of philosophical modernism" (Eagleton 1993, p. 5), since its self-referential autonomy – one of the principal features and ideals of various forms of modernism, and one that is demonstrated in the Tractatus by the attempt to delimit language from within - is pushed to the extreme in its penultimate remark, leading finally to the work's illuminating self-destruction. The literary style of the Tractatus is another characteristic that is often viewed as exhibiting modernist traits. The

fusion of a hierarchical, numbered structure with non-argumentative aphorisms together with the polemical content of the text, link the Tractatus to the tradition of manifestos – a common literal medium for conveying the theses of various modernist and avant-garde movements – with its aphorisms playing a double role as both polemic/programmatic declarations and revelatory manifestations (Puchner 2005). For Janik and Toulmin, it is actually the whole of Wittgenstein's philosophical agenda - but again especially his early work - that is shaped by the modernist context of late 19th/early 20th century Vienna. More specifically, their study relates Wittgenstein to the works and views of Kraus, Loos, Mauthner, Schoenberg, Weininger, Hertz and Boltzmann among others, with the problematics of communication in general and of language in particular playing a central role, and the fact/value distinction being another of its important aspects (see Janik and Toulmin 1973). Janik would later explicitly distinguish two strata of Viennese modernism, namely aesthetic (the Secession, "*Jugendstil*") and critical (Kraus, Loos, Weininger), and would categorize Wittgenstein as a critical modernist (Janik 2001a, 2001b).¹ The viewpoint of Janik and Toulmin is adopted by Paden, albeit in slightly modified terms, in his discussion of Wittgenstein's architectural endeavor, where he treats critical and aesthetic modernism as reflections of the worldviews of the Enlightenment and of Romanticism respectively. Paden also discerns characteristics of aesthetic modernism in Wittgenstein's life and work, especially during and after his military service in WWI (Paden 2007, p. 189-195).

Although the above approaches offer us valuable insights regarding the position of Wittgenstein in relation to the diverse faces of modernism, we should not fail to notice that without further qualification they do not do full justice to his stance, as they are not unproblematic from both a systematic and an historical-biographical point of view. Janik and Toulmin, for example, in their attempt to differentiate their "ethical" reading of the Tractatus from the, at the time, standard positivist readings of the work, tend to overemphasize Wittgenstein's Viennese modernist influences in comparison to the rest, like those of Frege and Russell. Hence, they do not only follow, although from a different viewpoint, the positivist readings in their attempt to resolve the intrinsic tension between the logical and the ethical aspects of the work, but they also, principally through their claim that Wittgenstein's philosophical problematics was already formed before his arrival at Cambridge, appear to downplay the various changes in Wittgenstein's approach, in particular those that occurred during WWI.

3. Early Wittgenstein and Modernity

Wittgenstein's antipathy to the spirit of the modern Western civilization, as this is manifested in the aesthetics and intellectual activity of the time, in the vital role of industriali-

¹ Note that for Janik, both aesthetic and critical modernism originate in the failure of Austrian liberalism and thus are critical of modernity, with the former totally rejecting it and the latter being after "an immanent critique of its limits" (Janik 2001b, p. 40).

zation for the societies, in the idolization of progress, and in the imperialism of science (see Wittgenstein 1998, p. 8-11), at first sight may appear to constitute one of his constant reference points, especially when combined with the remarks in the *Tractatus* (§6.371 - §6.372 and §6.52) on the role and the status of science in the modern world. A closer look at later Wittgenstein's retrospective (self)critical remarks, however, shows that this is not the case, as there are several traces of scientism that can be found in his early work. Also, two of the prime targets of his later critique, namely, dogmatism and essentialism, characterize not only modernity (and aspects of modernism), but the *Tractatus* itself as well.²

On the one hand, the maintenance of the fact/value dichotomy in the *Tractatus* seems to achieve its goal of safeguarding ethics and aesthetics from disputes and speculation. On the other hand, the identification of what can be meaningfully said with the propositions of natural science overestimates science's role, reinforcing its imperialistic tendencies over the other aspects of human thought and life (see Wittgenstein 1998, p. 70). This, together with Tractarian logical analysis being modelled on the scientific modes of analysis (Wittgenstein 1979, p. 11), provide us two of the most characteristic instances of scientific lapses in Wittgenstein's early thought. Regarding dogmatism, we can discern its main manifestations in the idea of 'future discovery' that the quasi-scientific Tractarian logical analysis maintains, e.g., of elementary propositions (*ibid.*), and the ideal not functioning as a unit of measurement, but as "a preconception to which everything must conform" (Wittgenstein 1998, p. 30). Early Wittgenstein's conception of the general form of the proposition is a telling example. Finally, as far as essentialism is concerned, there are three interrelated themes that we can distinguish in relation to the *Tractatus*: the "craving for generality" (Wittgenstein 1969, p. 17-19), i.e., the disposition to look for properties that are, or rather *must* be, common to all the instances of the application of a general term; the presupposed "formal unity" that the rules of the logical calculus that governs language and reflects the logical construction of the world are taken to display in the form of the "crystalline purity" of logic (Wittgenstein 2001, §108 p. 40); and the idea of the existence of a hidden essence behind our everyday use of language, an essence that is identified in the *Tractatus* with the notion of logical form. It is important to note that due to the high internal coherence of the text these signs of scientism, dogmatism and essentialism appear diffused across the various parts of the work, e.g., in the theses on the determinacy of sense and the uniqueness and completeness of logical analysis, in the picture theory of meaning, and in logical atomism. It is from this perspective that Wittgenstein's later rejection (Wittgenstein 1998, p.10) of the ladder-scheme (§6.54) that is so crucial for the Tractarian enterprise and its goal of the adoption of a God's eye viewpoint, has strong implications for the philosophical approach that the work expresses and can thus be treated as an exemplar case of "turning our whole examination round" (Wittgenstein 2001, §108 p. 40), i.e. as a radical shift in Wittgenstein's philosophizing.

4. Conclusion

What I hope to have made clear by the, unavoidably sketchy, discussion above is the intriguing position that the *Tractatus* occupies as far as the historical-intellectual context of the era is concerned. Once the proper viewpoints are adopted, many of its features are seen to fit firmly with parts of the agendas of both modernism and modernity, while at the same time this very fact – the coexistence of elements from both and the subsequently emerging tensions between them – disqualifies any attempt to categorize early Wittgenstein as either a typical modernist or modernity thinker. Even more interestingly, the tension between the modernist and the modernity components of the *Tractatus* gains a dialectical character. For the opposition to certain aspects of modernity exhibited in numerous modernist endeavours shares to a significant extent some of modernity's prerequisite qualities. Thus, the whole dispute is based on a common background in which chronic tendencies like essentialism and dogmatism can be clearly discerned.³ The above picture appears to do more justice to Wittgenstein's early work since its modernist and anti-modernity traits are simultaneous with scientific lapses and an overall essentialist and dogmatic approach. The *Tractatus* is not so much an attempt to *put an end* to metaphysics as the point where traditional philosophy is forced to its limits and turns against itself. It is an attempt to *be itself the end* of traditional philosophizing, to be its *teleiosis*. The full-frontal polemics of the *Tractatus* does not constitute the radical break with the past that its author intended it to be. It tries, so to speak, to fight the system from within, to change the rules of the game by following these very same rules. Wittgenstein's real radical break with the tradition of modernity comes later on, with the guerrilla warfare approach of his later writings, where the centralized and unified approach of his early work is replaced by a multiplicity of approaches focusing on specific cases, by his unique kind of philosophical therapeutic pluralism.

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² For a detailed discussion of the scientific, essentialistic and dogmatic elements of Wittgenstein's early thought see Kitching (2003).

³ Are not the modernist manifestos – propagandistic media par excellence – indicative of a dogmatic stance? Or are not the diverse aspects of formalism and the embraced abstract fundamentals in modernist art, philosophy and science, instantiations of the long-lasting influence of the essentialist tradition? See Foucault (1984) and Toulmin (1990, p. 145-160) for discussions of modernity in which its shared basis with modernism stands out, while for a discussion of a specific instance of this convergence, which partially covers the case of early Wittgenstein too, see Galison (1990).

I would like to thank Martin Stokhof for his valuable contribution in the preparation of this paper

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On the Origin and Compilation of ‘Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness’

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1. A puzzling preface

MS 119 was written between September and November 1937 and consists of almost 300 pages. ‘Cause and Effect’ successively selected pages 1-5, 100-155, 21-26, 28-31, and 51-59. Based on his preface to the 1976 edition, Rhees’ general procedure appeared to be to publish those passages of MS 119 that did not end up in the typescript that is now printed as Part I of *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*:

this typescript did not include any of the passages we are printing, except the three we have placed at the end (Wittgenstein, (1976), 391).

These last three remarks cover three topics: the machine as a symbol (pages 28-31); a medicine and its effect (pages 51-56); and the procedure of weighing objects (pages 56-59). Surprisingly, in the last sentence of his preface Rhees noted that two of these three remarks ‘have not been published before’. So, what are we to conclude? Did Wittgenstein select these two remarks for RFM I, or did he not?

The puzzlement disappears if we consider that Rhees fails to mention which typescript he is referring to. The suggestion is that Wittgenstein prepared only one typescript on the basis of the manuscript material on mathematics - one of these manuscripts being MS 119 -, namely the typescript that is published as Part I of RFM. However, Wittgenstein assembled two closely related typescripts, TS 221 and TS 222. The editors of RFM nowhere say that Part I is printed from TS 222, but Von Wright is more specific elsewhere (Von Wright 1982, 118); TS 221 originally existed in three copies, one of which Wittgenstein cut up into ‘Zettel’. This typescript of cuttings, TS 222, was printed posthumously as Part I of RFM I. TS 222 thus consists of cuttings from TS 221. In looking at the entries on the medicine and its effect and weighing objects, we see that Wittgenstein selected these from MS 119 for inclusion in TS 221, *but he left them out of TS 222*. With this in mind, Rhees’ remarks gain some sense: if we substitute TS 221 for ‘typescript’ in ‘the typescript did not include any of the passages we are printing, except the three we have placed at the end’, Rhees is right, but only if we replace ‘three’ with ‘two’, for TS 221 includes the two passages on the medicine and the weighing of objects, which are also included in ‘Cause and Effect’. The other remark on the machine was selected both for TS 221 and TS 222. In addition, we need to add a phrase to Rhees’ second statement that ‘the other two have not been published before’: namely, ‘as these were not selected for TS 222 and thus are not printed in RFM I part I’. Without knowledge of the existence of these two manuscripts, Rhees’ editorial comments are difficult to understand.

There is more. At first sight, the preface suggests a rather pragmatic approach to editing the source text, the primary motive seeming to be to print those passages which are not printed before. However, the inclusion of the remark on the machine as a symbol does not fit this criterion. Why did Rhees decide to print it again? Klagge and Nordmann suggest that Rhees aimed to underscore the

interconnections of Wittgenstein’s various concerns as they first appeared in a single manuscript volume (Wittgenstein 1993, 369). This may be so, but it says little about which interconnections Rhees aimed to bring forward, and why he considered this entry important in this context. This lack of a clear editorial strategy is also illustrated by the omission and rearrangement of several other passages. It is not necessary to mention all discrepancies between the source text and the publication, for this would not help us in understanding Rhees’ considerations. Nevertheless, to gain a clearer picture of Wittgenstein’s considerations, it is worthwhile to analyse the relationship between MS 119 and ‘Cause and Effect’ in some detail. This will be done in the following.

2. Pages 1-5

The first pages of ‘Cause and Effect’ are identical to MS 119, with one important exception. Rhees omits the first remark of MS 119, indicating that this is *Philosophical Investigations* 415 yet failing to mention that this entry is also included in TSS 221 & 222. The exclusion of this remark from ‘Cause and Effect’ is unfortunate, as the entry provides a key to Wittgenstein’s later philosophical method:

What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings; we are not contributing curiosities however, but observations which no one has doubted, but which have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes.

Like the first 5 pages of MS 119, this entry originates from a notebook written in February 1937 (MS 157b). For a proper understanding of the development of Wittgenstein’s thoughts it is essential to know that this thought then emerges. Klagge and Nordmann fortunately add the entry in a footnote to the second edition of ‘Cause and Effect’ – in my view, it should have been added to the primary text. A great part of MS 119 focuses on the notion of the basic form of the language-game, Wittgenstein clarifying that our language-games are bound up with the facts of our natural history. ‘Cause and Effect’ partly aims to elaborate upon these connections, taking language-games with cause and effect as an example. For example, a fact of nature is that humans respond to the cries of their children, trying to comfort and nurse them as good as they can. These reactions are essential of the language-game with cause and effect.

The omitted remark also connects to Wittgenstein’s reflections on mathematics. According to Wittgenstein, as far as we can say that it is a property of ‘9’ that it follows after ‘3 x 3’, this ‘property’ is found in the functioning of our intellect, in facts of our natural history. That is, to say that it is a property of 9 to be the result of 3 x 3 is to say that 9 is at the end of this chain, and it is a fact of our natural history that we calculate as such. A major goal of MS 119 is to elaborate the distinction between rules and empirical propositions, and a clarification of the role and function of logical and mathematical propositions is a means to this end. Wittgenstein tries to break free of the idea that these

propositions are necessarily true. The idea of necessity does not lie in the rule itself, but in the fact that we apply it as a rule. And this is a fact of our natural history.

So, the remark that Rhees excluded from 'Cause and Effect' is crucial for understanding Wittgenstein's considerations on language-games, rules, empirical and mathematical propositions, cause and effect, and doubt and certainty. Without any knowledge of the source text, these considerations lose their coherence.

Pages 100-155 of 'Cause and Effect' largely follow the source text – for that reason I will not pay attention to these pages here. I will now turn to pages 21-26 and 28-31.

3. Pages 21-26 & 28-31

These pages allow for two interpretations; one becomes apparent only when we turn to Wittgenstein's remarks on mathematics. Pages 21-26 discuss the relation between plants and seeds. In Wittgenstein's view, this example illustrates the 'powerful urge' to see everything in terms of cause and effect. Take two plants, A and B, and take a seed from both. Both seeds look identical and examinations reveal no difference between them. Nevertheless, a seed of the A plant always produces an A plant, and the seed of a B plant always produces a B plant. So, we can say which plant will grow from which seed only if we know the history or origin of the seed. However, says Wittgenstein, we are inclined to think that there *must* be a difference in the seeds themselves to account for this distinction. The origin, we say, *cannot* be the cause. What this means, Wittgenstein explains, is that biologists do not count the history or origin of the seed as a cause. The 'cannot' and 'must' express the ideal of the causal scheme, which guides us in our research, and this causal scheme does not allow for saying that the previous experience causally determines the outcome of the seed.

If we consult the original context of the discussion on plants and seeds, a striking contrast between external or empirical relations, and internal or grammatical relations emerges. As mentioned, MS 119 argued that the inexorability with which '9' follows '3 x 3' is something that lies with *us*, and not so much in the system that allegedly functions independently of us. We are inclined to say that 9 *must* be the result of the calculation. This 'must', says Wittgenstein, is the expression of an internal relation. That is, the relation between 3 x 3 and 9 is laid down in grammar. When we ask a child to calculate '3 x 3' and it submits '9', we say that it has calculated correctly. If however the child submits '10', we say that it has not calculated correctly, and precisely this answer, says Wittgenstein, illustrates that we reckon the result among the rule. So, the relation between 3 x 3 and 9 is found in grammar, and this is what is expressed by saying that the result *must* be present in what precedes it. This 'must' points at a grammatical or logical or internal relationship between a calculation and its result.

In contrast, the relation between the seed and the plant is external; we can set up an experiment to find out whether there is a difference between the seeds, but the result we may find is external to the cause. So, the relation between cause and effect is external, and the possible difference between the seeds is something to be established empirically by performing an experiment. This contrast between internal and external relations has disappeared in 'Cause and Effect'.

After pages 21-26, MS 119 continues for 5 more pages on the example of a machine, while 'Cause and

Effect' separates these notes. The connection between the example of the plants and the example of the machine is apparent; as much as we are inclined to think that the A plant is already present in the seed of the A plant, we are also inclined to think that the movements of the machine are determined in advance. Wittgenstein warns us not to be misled by expressions such as 'I know how the machine works' into thinking that it is a priori determined what movement follows. If we think that something is determined a priori we are dealing with a conceptual relation.

These examples indicate that something is to be gained from consulting the underlying manuscript for our understanding of 'Cause and Effect'. As mentioned, a central purpose of Wittgenstein's reflections on mathematics is to elucidate the distinction between rules and empirical propositions and, as a corollary, to elucidate the distinction between internal and external relations. The remarks on causation in MS 119 partly function as an illustration of this very distinction between internal and external relations. Without any knowledge of MS 119, several remarks in 'Cause and Effect' lose an important dimension. A discussion of the last pages of MS 119 that Rhees selected for 'Cause and Effect' displays this point once more.

4. Pages 51-59

These pages discuss two examples, one on the relation between a medicine and its working, the other on weighing objects. It is worthwhile to examine these examples briefly, as they nicely illustrate one of Wittgenstein's major concerns, namely to remind us of the way in which our language is connected to our actions and, in addition, the way in which the sense of certain expressions in our language becomes unclear when they are disconnected from these actions. In this way, these remarks prepare for the later examination in pages 100-155 of MS 119, in which the connection between actions, reactions and language is further examined. 'Cause and Effect' blurs the fact that pages 51-59 are a preparation for what follows, as these two examples are now given at the very end of the printed text. Also, since these entries do not return elsewhere in the *Nachlass* and are not discussed in the literature on 'Cause and Effect', it is worthwhile to discuss them.

The first example relates to the invention of a new medicine, which is said to prolong life with a month when taken for several months. A critic might say that we cannot *know* whether it was really the medicine that prolonged the life of the patient; the patient might just as well have lived just as long without it. This expression is misleading, says Wittgenstein, for the language-game with this sentence misses the essential point which makes the game useful. That is, the essential point of the game with the concepts of 'new medicine' and 'prolongation of life' is that the medicine can be *tested*. There is a connection between these words and our actions in the sense that we can set up an experiment; we can select 300 people with the same disease, give the medicine to half of the group and withhold it to the other half, and check whether the last group of patients dies a month earlier than the other half. This is what would be called a proper test - not to mention the cruelty of it - of the claim about the medicine. The expression 'we cannot know....', which is something a philosopher might typically say, lacks this context of testing a claim by means of an experiment. The expression at hand seems to be an ordinary expression, but on closer scrutiny it appears to be wholly disconnected from the ordinary language-game with this expression and the actions that accompany it.

The second example makes a similar point, though from a slightly different angle. Wittgenstein imagines dif-

ferent language-games with weighing objects. For example, we can imagine a game in which we say that a body has weight only when it is actually weighed on a scale. In this case, an expression as follows makes sense: 'the object has no definite weight except when it is measured'. Or, we can imagine a custom in which some material is weighed every 5 minutes, and we calculate the price according to the result, say after half an hour, of the last weighing. Then it makes sense to say 'I do not know how much it will cost yet, we are only halfway measuring'. Wittgenstein's point is again to emphasise the connection between language and our actions. If the practice of weighing objects is different, the expressions that accompany it are different accordingly.

With this example on weighing objects the main text of 'Cause and Effect' has come to an end. Clearly, this publication is very much a motley of remarks, presumably compiled both with pragmatic and substantial reasons in mind. As mentioned, Rhees' general aim in compiling this text might have been to bring out the interconnections between Wittgenstein's thoughts. This goal is only partly established, for several of his decisions actually blur con-

nections, for example between Wittgenstein's overall methodology and the examples of language-games that he discusses, and between the concern for rules or grammatical propositions, and empirical propositions. By focusing on these connections, we have seen in what way 'Cause and Effect' is embedded in several other of Wittgenstein's ongoing concerns.

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The Philosophical Problem of Transparent-White Objects

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1. Introduction

"Why can't we imagine transparent-white glass"? (RC I, 31) -- Confronted with the claim that nothing can be both transparent and white, I have many times sought counter-examples and pondered their validity. Such attempts to refute the claim indicate a certain understanding of those words and I believe one is naturally inclined to respond in a way similar to this. I am not interested in psychological facts explaining why this might be so, but in the specific conception of the claim that is reflected in such attempts. Evidently, what solution we entertain as viable will depend on our understanding of the problem and we can get a fairly good picture of what has been considered to be the problem, if we take a look at responses to Wittgenstein's remarks.

There has been little controversy about the legitimacy of counter-examples taken from everyday life like frosted glass, white light bulbs, the reflection of a piece of paper in a window, or very thin white cloth. When they are brought up at all, they are not usually considered proper counter-examples or are quickly dismissed as such. Rather surprisingly, the examples Wittgenstein himself considers in *Remarks on Colour* are hardly ever taken seriously either. Apparently, Wittgenstein's examples must either be believed to be genuine refutations or not believed to be so. If they are believed to be so, then the problem ought to be considered solved and no further attempts to refute or defend the claim are needed, as its falsity has been shown by Wittgenstein himself. Every attempt to defend or refute the claim therefore indicates that the examples in *Remarks on Colour* are not considered proper counter-examples. It is rarely discussed, however, why they should not be so considered. Then, there are more elaborate counter-examples like David Sanford's bull-window, or Colin McGinn's inverted spectrum argument. Those attempts convey the impression, had Wittgenstein known of them, he would have acknowledged the resolution of his struggle. Against this, I will try to show that counter-examples given in secondary literature so far have been mislead and if successful it will become clear from this in how far affirmative responses, such as Jonathan Westphal's physicalist explanation, have been similarly misguided.

2. Understanding the claim

To judge the merit of any counter-example, we need to agree on what the original claim states. Clearly, its intention is not to deny the possibility of labelling some phenomenological experience as "transparent-white". We are free to name anything any way we want. The claim is neither, that it cannot possibly make sense to call something "transparent-white". We can give sense to such a statement, if we see fit to do so. (Remember that we can give meaning to such statements as "I am in pain, but I don't feel anything." by explaining, e.g., that I meant to express: "I would be in pain, if not for the painkillers I took half an hour ago.") In fact, there even *are* sensible ways of talking about transparent white. For these possibilities not to refute the claim at hand, it needs to be shown that something different is proposed.

For this, consider the assertion that nothing can be both round and square. Now, imagine a cylindrical object: Viewed from above it has the shape of a circle and viewed from the side it has the shape of a square, therefore it is both round and square. One might be tempted to argue that, although this is true, it must be admitted that a single figure cannot be both round and square. However, any compound figure composed of a circle and a square seems to refute this claim. Regardless of how passionately we might insist on there being a contradiction, it is most unlikely that we will be able to narrow down what we meant in such a way, that every possible misinterpretation is ruled out. The same applies, maybe even more convincingly, to the case of colours said to exclude one another. Take certain shimmering surfaces that seem to possess more than one colour or certain ways of talking about mixed colours. ("Compare two shades of violet by their respective amounts of blue and red.") Not surprisingly, in the case of transparency and whiteness too, plenty of examples can be given for materials that might reasonably be called transparent and white (see above).

Still, it seems, we could defend the claimed incompatibility with the following argument: When I said nothing can be both round and square, I meant to say that the notion of roundness *entails* (conceptually) a lack of corners. However, we are not concerned with roundness as an abstract entity, but with the ascription of roundness and squareness as properties to an entity. The same holds true for transparent white. We are not inquiring into whiteness as an abstract entity but into the *modal aspects* of ascribing whiteness and transparency to an entity. Put another way, it is not the ascription of transparency to the colour white that is being investigated.

It follows from this that we can only hint at a certain *understanding* of the claim. We *cannot* argue for its *truth*. By accepting the incompatibility of transparency and whiteness we accept a certain meaning of those words. What the difference in understanding amounts to, still needs to be seen. Regardless of this, the importance of the claim clearly does not stem from its truth, but its metaphysical implications for our beliefs about coloured objects. This is also the reason, why it does not suffice to say, that the incompatibility rests on definitions we give in order to derive certain propositions from them. Meaning is not a matter of definitions. If it were, the problem would be resolved by pointing out how we defined "white" and "transparent". The impossibility of transparent white would then be due to the extensions of those concepts being disjoint sets, but in that case, the claimed impossibility would be contingent rather than necessary; after all, our definitions could be otherwise.

3. The nature of the question

If the question why nothing can be both transparent and white is to make sense, we must have agreed already that we do not understand "white" and "transparent" in any way, so that they could possibly be compatible. We can ask the question, *why* something is so-and-so only after having presupposed that it *is*. One might challenge this by saying that it must always be possible to convince some-

one of the contrary. If I wonder why there isn't a single bird in the garden and someone points out to me that there are, I just have not seen them, I would not exclaim "Impossible! The way I meant the question, you cannot point out the contrary." Given this, why should it be appropriate to say: "How I meant the words "white" and "transparent" it is impossible that something should be both transparent and white."?

I suggest it to be appropriate due to the nature of the question. Asking why there are no birds in the garden implies an empirical claim about the presence of birds in the garden. Asking why there is nothing transparent-white, by contrast, implies a grammatical claim about a certain understanding of "white" and "transparent". Although the two propositions exhibit the same syntactical structure, their implications are fundamentally different. (This is merely another way to state the conclusion arrived at above, that we are not dealing with the truth or falsity of the claim, but a certain understanding of it.) Paul Gilbert and Elisabeth Horner are among the few commentators aware of this. However, their attempts to emphasize the relevance of Wittgenstein's remarks are based on reproducing certain grammatical remarks and lack a conclusive account of the problem. They take the investigation of word-use to be an end, while it is only a means. That is, we have not solved the problem by pointing out grammatical features of "white" and "transparent". We have only begun to understand what the problem is *not*, namely empirical.

What is excluded by this? (1) We are not interested in the question, whether people would affirm, that nothing can be transparent-white. We are concerned with a philosophical problem, and although we therefore have to rely on conceptual analysis, a study of linguistic intuitions of any number of people won't resolve the issue. Were we to try answering our question by an empirical study, the philosopher could rightly point out to us, that, although we might have found an answer, it is not an answer to the question we originally asked. (2) Neither are we concerned with the physical possibility of an empirical object being or appearing to be transparent and white, (3) nor with biological facts about the perception and recognition of colours.

What are Wittgenstein's remarks aimed at then? Giving a clear answer to this is a difficult task. Then again, that is not at all exceptional for philosophical problems. Think of the sceptical challenge: if we wonder, whether there are external objects, we aren't usually satisfied with a Moorean answer. That is, pointing out certain objects to the sceptic usually does not alleviate the problem. The sceptical question, whether there is anything at all, is not just more general and abstract than the everyday question, whether there is still milk in the fridge, but it is of a different kind altogether. Nevertheless, if we are to express what this difference amounts to, we face serious difficulties. Exactly this kind of difficulty is what we are facing, when dealing with the problem of transparent-white.

4. Philosophical relevance

To understand Wittgenstein's remarks we need to comprehend the purpose of the counter-examples given by him. It seems unlikely that they are supposed to refute of the claim. If they were, we would be concerned with the truth and falsity of the claim. However, what but a refutation of the claim could they possibly be intended for? After all, they clearly are an attempt to imagine something being both transparent and white -- the opposite of what has been claimed.

For a moment, consider the statement "Julius Caesar is a prime number". According to one view, the statement is false, because it is not true that Julius Caesar is prime. According to another view, the statement is nonsensical, because it can neither be said that Julius Caesar is prime nor that he is not. That the statement is nonsensical can be argued by insisting, that we cannot imagine what would have to be the case, in order for Julius Caesar to be prime. The criteria for deciding whether a number is prime, namely that it is divisible only by 1 and itself, cannot sensibly be applied.

"This white object is transparent" is not so obviously nonsense. Nevertheless, the statement cannot be asserted under our current understanding of those words. It seems we lack the relevant criteria. "[O]ne doesn't know what one should imagine here." (RC I, 27) However, if the assertion that something is transparent-white is senseless, what sense does it make to claim the opposite? What is excluded by the claim? The *Philosophical Investigations* contain considerations closely related to such questions: "What does it mean when we say: "I can't imagine the opposite of this." (...) These words are a defence against something whose form makes it look like an empirical proposition, but which is really a grammatical one. (...) But why do we say: "I can't imagine the opposite"? Why not: "I can't imagine the thing itself"?" (PI 251)

It becomes clear from this, that the *Remarks on Colour* take up a theme which reoccurs in Wittgenstein's later works over and over and is central also to *On Certainty*, namely the status of grammatical sentences. The connection between the *Remarks on Colour* and *On Certainty*, however, has largely been neglected, although David Stern pointed out their contiguity more than a decade ago. He stated rightly that "there is no indication that Wittgenstein conceived of it as separate pieces of work, nor was he responsible for the titles of the separate works we now have." (Stern 1996:447) Regardless of this, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, to mention but one recent example, speaks of "wholly self-standing works that are *On Certainty*, *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology* and *Remarks on Colour*." (Moyal-Sharrock 2004:2). I hope the above deliberations on the problem of transparent white have exposed such assessments of the *Remarks on Colour* as myopic.

Regardless, it must be admitted, that our understanding of the original question still remains vague. Yet, some things should nevertheless have become clear. If we are naturally inclined to respond to the claim that nothing can be both transparent and white in an empirical fashion, this just points to the important fact that the claim *seems* to be empirical. "[T]he philosopher (...) may well think that he is expressing a kind of scientific truth" (BB, p. 55), while in fact his statement belongs to grammar. Eventually, what we are concerned with is the demarcation of the empirical and the philosophical sphere. "Sentences are often used on the borderline between logic and the empirical, so that their meaning changes back and forth and they count now as expressions of norms, now as expressions of experience." (RC I, 32) This is, I believe, at the heart of *Remarks on Colour* and also the key to understanding (at least part of) *On Certainty*.

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Private Sensation and Private Language

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The issue of private language raised by Wittgenstein in his late work *Philosophical Investigation* (1953) is an important one open to long-term debating. Wittgenstein's private language argument which negatives it runs on discussing inner sensations, especially the "pain" in the human body. Is Wittgenstein argument successful or un-successful? My short paper argues that the Wittgenstein's argument is not successful. In order to explore the cause we need to begin from private sensation which is the starting point of the issue of private language in Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein defines private language through the discussion of private sensations. In Wittgenstein's philosophy, private language is concerned with private sensation. In terms of the objects of human senses, objects can be classified into two sorts: public ones and private ones. Language used to describe such public objects as external natural objects, mountains, rivers, vast land and etc. is undoubtedly of the public nature.

Private objects of human senses in contrast with the public are in the private sector, such as inner sensations, inherent personal feelings, including physical sensitivity. These sensations or feelings are private experiences. Appropriate language is needed to describe such feelings, sensations and experiences. For instance, the word "pain" describes the human inner experience, expressing the personal inner feeling or experience. Here, two basic elements are entailed: symbols of language and the objects that the symbols stand for. The connection between them is not one out of fabrication, but one all people who use the language can grasp through the use of that particular words. In a sense, the connection between the two elements is determined by language rules. The reference function of a Descriptive Noun or a Demonstrative Pronoun is the basic function of a language, which is guaranteed by grammar rules. So, in this point, expressions of private sensations share the same public language or the rules. Then in this sense, private sensations are expressed through public language.

However, how do we understand private sensations or personal inner experiences in other persons? We can or can't? That is to say, lots (if not all) of private inner feelings, sensations or personal inner experiences are not public. You may not understand my feelings, nor do I understand yours. It is well proved by the human experiences that people in different social positions, or with different psychologies, different personalities and different social experiences can have quite different feelings and sensations. Personal inner feelings are rather private, for each individual is a lonely unique being. If so, would there be an expression of personal feelings or inner sensation, which could be called as private language? i.e., I just want to express my own personal, unique feelings by the language that could not be shared by others and not follow the rule of public language. Wittgenstein denies the existence of such private language, but his argument is not a good one.

To understand how Wittgenstein shows private language falsely, first of all, let us look at his definition of private language. Wittgenstein puts, "could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences - his feel-

ings, moods, and the rest - for his private use? - Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language? - But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking, to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language."¹ This definition of private language entails three perspectives. 1. the reference of the vocabulary in that language is just what the speaker himself knows, or the speaker's direct and private feelings and inner experience;

2. such a language can not be used for inter-subjective communication, but only for his personal use; and 3. no one else can understand this language except the language user himself. Hence private language is private in that it can not be understood by anyone else except by the first person "I". Therefore, private language is the sounds or written symbols that are exclusive in the understanding or understood by the only person who invented. Here the "do not understand" is a matter of logic rather than one in the factual or technological sense, for it excludes subjective intentions (password, code word) which makes understanding impossible for others, and incapability of language (foreign language, professional language). For instance, a person who does not understand the codes of a telegraph is able to understand them when told. Inability to understand the language in such a case is not what Wittgenstein intends to put forward as private language.

According to the first perspective of Wittgenstein's definition of private language, we need to classify the language reference as either the private language or the public one. The so-called private language does not refer to the public object, but the private one. In the second level, the use of language is the private rather than the public. In the third perspective, the private language is only and solely for the private user. The use of the private language for the user "alone" does not mean that the user talks to himself. If the private talking to himself is heard by others who are able to understand, it does not mean that it is a private language. The so-called private language is the one which can not possibly be understood by any other at all even if I speak out and make explanation. Suppose I use X to refer to one of my inner feelings. If I associate the X with my feeling that X stands for, and establish a certain connection between them, then others can understand what I have said and understand the meaning of the symbol X after I have told them what X stands for. In this sense, X is not the private language. Therefore, the private language is one kind of one which is in the sense of logic that the user can only understand it. If so, is there such a private language?

Wittgenstein has performed a Reduction to Absurdity for the position that a private language is logically possible or conceptually coherent. In the first step, Wittgenstein points out that any inner feeling or inner experience of consciousness can only be expressed in some kind of language if it is to be expressed or described, and the

¹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, Blackwell Publishing company, 2001; §243 p.75e.

language used must be public rather than private in nature. Secondly, the most important point in his Reduction to Absurdity is memory.

Wittgenstein puts forward his argument primarily through discussing "pain" as a person's inner sensation or intrinsic experience. Everyone has inner sensation or inner experience, but how do we express our inner sensation or inner feeling? How is there any possible that a person's inner experience can be grasped or expressed only through something similar to language but uniquely grasped by the language user himself rather than through the public language? Wittgenstein invites us to imagine that a child intends to describe his personal feeling of toothache and wants to name such a personal feeling but without the usual vocabulary, for example, Y was named to his experience. The word that child uses to describe his toothache cannot be understood by anyone else. When he used the word or symbol others can not understand what he said.

Wittgenstein asks: "does he understand the name, without being able to explain its meaning to anyone? "And" what does it mean to say that he has' named his pain ' "? In other words, once the child explains to others what he has said, others must understand the meaning of the new name for his tooth-ache.

Therefore, the invention of the new name can not be as one kind of private language. When one says, " He gave a name to his sensation "; one forgets that a great deal of stage setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense. And when we speak of a name given to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word 'pain'; it shows the post where the new word is stationed.² You can invent some new words or new sign substitution for old use, but it does not mean that you have some private language. It only means that you have put some new words or signs into the system of public language. What is more, the grammar system, which you use, determines how the new words or signs are used.

We can also assume that I use the sign "S" to keep one of my inner sensations which often recurs, and I put the sign in a calendar each day when I have the sensation, but I cannot formulate the sign and I can only give myself a kind of ostensive definition. Therefore, Wittgenstein thinks that we cannot point to the sensation in the ordinary sense if we can not give a clear definition referring to its use. So the only thing I can do is "when I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation and so, as it were, point to it inwardly ... for in this way I impress on myself the connection between the sign and the sensation.—But 'I impress it on myself 'can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness."³

What Wittgenstein said is that if we can give the sign "S" a definite formulation, we have made a criterion of its use. Is it necessary that one word or sign needs one definition for its use? For example, J.E. Moore argues that the concept of good cannot be defined or formulated, but almost everyone knows how to use it. From Wittgenstein's point of view, without the definition, we only use the sign by remembering the connection between the sign and sensation. But there are no rules or criteria for correctness

for private terms or signs. If the memory is well kept, then it may replace the definition to determine the link.

Therefore, what Wittgenstein puts here is not the same as or consistent with what he said in § 257. In § 257, he said, if you create a new word, the rules of grammar of the entire language or syntax of the usage determine how to use the new word. Now Wittgenstein adds one more point: definition of new words or signs. Therefore, the definition by Wittgenstein is also concerned with the way the sign is used in the language system. What is more, the definition shows how the connection of the sign and the thing, which it stands for, is stable. In particular, Wittgenstein believes that the definition is embodied in the thing that can be shared by all. So it is public language, rather than private one. Precisely, the word or sign can not be defined by anything, which is the characteristic of a private language. So, memory must be only relied on to determine how the symbols and the inner experience are connected. Therefore, private language at most has the impression of rules.

If the memory is reliable, the private language can be established. However, Wittgenstein argues that the memory of human beings is not stable, therefore it is uncertain to keep the relation between the symbol and the object that the symbol refers to, which has necessarily no epistemic warranting results. Therefore, the private language can not be established. Wittgenstein argues, "surely I can appeal from one memory to another. For example, I don't know if I have remembered the time of departure of a train right and to check it I call to mind how a page of the time-table looked. Isn't it the same here? 'No; for this process has got to produce a memory which is actually correct. If the mental image of the time-table could not itself be tested for correctness, how could it confirm the correctness of the first memory? "⁴

Wittgenstein argues that the justification of public language consists in appealing to something or rules independent of the subjective area; but the justification of private language can only appeal to something, namely, memory, in the subjective area in which agents' memory always changes so that the variation results in failing stable connection between signs and inner experiences which it stand for.

The problem thus occurs here the argument of private language could not invoke skepticism with regard to all memory judgments. If it did, it would prove that neither private language nor public one is reliable. So in this sense, the true value of all languages is questionable. If this claim could be made about the argument of private language, it would cast as much doubt on public memory. By Wittgenstein's logic, the agent's memory is variant, and unwarrantable, and the agent is not only some individual, but also all individuals of humankind. And not only private language, but also public language, needs the support from agent memory. In order to get any warranted information about the past, it is impossible that if we do not invoke some memory judgment. If we need to check the use of some kind of language whether or not consistency with past usage, we must invoke some memory judgment, no matter whether it is private language or public one. If we want to know whether use a public word is used correctly, we need to refer to the dictionary, which help our memory, or ask other people whether their memory is consistence with ours.

² ²Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, Blackwell Publishing company, 2001; §257 p.78e.

³ ³Ibid. §258.p.78e.

⁴ ⁴Ibid. §265.p.79e

However, Wittgenstein's point is that private language solely appeals to memory, but public language appeals both to memory and to rules, or the grammar of language, the way of life and cultural background. However, do the language rules and language games or ways of life have no relation with memory? Is the proper use of our language not based on our memory? Can we properly use the rules of grammar or rule of society without the role of memory? If a person suffers amnesia, does he possibly have the concept of language game? Therefore, memory is not irrelevant with public language. If private language is based on memory so that it is not reliable, then the public language is also not reliable.

Thought Experimentation and Conceivable Experiences: the Chinese Room Case

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Introduction

While experiments count as cognitive tools that test scientific theories via the gathering of empirical evidence, thought experiments can be regarded as tools that attempt to establish a conclusion by making an agent envisage a particularly contrived situation, one that usually undermines a well-known theory. Despite this remarkable difference, both kinds of experiments help researchers reach a conclusion, although only the former make the scientific community arrive at a broad consensus. Philosophers, on the other hand, frequently disagree, and thus a constant debate rather than a growing consensus is the rule when philosophical thought experiments are in the spotlight.

Amongst contemporary thought experiments, Searle's Chinese Room stands up as one of the most controversial arguments against Turing Machine Functionalism and what he calls Strong Artificial Intelligence. Like in most philosophical thought experiments, a specific 'what if' situation is proposed to convince one that both Turing Machine Functionalism and Strong AI are false.

Put simply, Searle's *Gedankenexperiment* makes the experimenters examine what would happen if their minds were only computer programs that manipulated symbols without semantic content. Specifically, the Chinese Room helps one imagine a scenario in which a clerk shuffles Chinese symbols and gives appropriate answers with the aid of a rulebook, and despite not knowing a word of Chinese. In this very particular situation, the assessment of linguistic understanding plays a crucial role, since the associated experience is what remains missing. But is this assessment of linguistic understanding reliable?

In this article, I will argue that linguistic understanding boils down to the recognition of a very specific *quale*, one that belongs to the realm of a conscious experience, and which often appears in daily life. Moreover, I will argue that the operation Searle describes, on top of aiming at a conceivable conscious experience, has a characteristic that most thought experiments on the nature of mind share. That is, they are based upon the ability of consciousness to test what the mind would be like under certain conditions, that is, those described by a specific theoretical context. But, as I will argue, since assessing linguistic understanding as well as what one's mind is and is not are based on certain valuable conceivable experiences, neither should be discarded for their alleged unreliability. Naturally, the same goes for Searle's Chinese Room.

1. What do thought experiments on the mind have in common?

Like scientific thought experiments, philosophical thought experiments have to satisfy certain conditions in order to be successful. At least three should not raise any important objection. Firstly, a philosophical thought experiment has to describe a particular operation from which the experimenter arrives at a conclusion, after assuming a theoretical context. Secondly, the imagined situation is put into words through conditional or even counterfactual state-

ments. Lastly, the described operation has to be *relevant* to answer the question that originated the experiment. If not, the thought experiment is said to be flawed or unreliable.

Thought experiments on the mind are, unlike others, very special in the sense that they are influenced by what it is like to have a mind, and how this internal assessment serves to understand what it is not. That is, while standard scientific experiments put one's mind in contact with the world, thought experiments on mental states put one's mind in contact with itself. Three famous thought experiments illustrate this point very well: Mary, the color scientist (Jackson 1982), Nagel's bat (1974), and Searle's Chinese Room (1980 and 1990). All of them emphasize the ability of one's mind to assess what would happen if one were in Mary's shoes, imagined being a bat, or were in a room correlating an endless chain of Chinese symbols with the aid of a rulebook. In addition, all the operations described by these thought experiments arise from one's ability to examine what would happen from an internal point of view, and thus they put forward conceivable experiences. Consequently, the operations work well insofar as the actual experience of having certain mental states serves to project the conceivable experiences described in such thought experiments and their operations.

Whether or not these are reliable is an issue that has ever caused disagreement amongst philosophers. As a number of scientists maintain that thought experiments are unreliable tools, the philosophical controversy should not be a surprise at all (see, for instance, Duhem 1954). However, philosophers have very few tools and armchair methods such as mental experimentation don't come a dime a dozen, and aren't harmful for doing philosophy (Massey 1991); hence, dismissing mental experimentation only for their alleged unreliability seems unjustified. Instead, one should only concentrate on the relevance of a thought experiment operation to address a philosophical problem. And the same desideratum can be proposed for thought experiments on the nature of mind, because all of them assume that the mind is the laboratory in which its own nature can be discovered by testing different hypotheses.

From the viewpoint of the operations described, such thought experiments do not seem to be unreliable. As all these thought experiments show what would happen to one's mind under the conditions described by a particular theory —be it Physicalism, Turing Machine Functionalism or the like, they should not be discarded so hastily and shallowly. For they put one's mind in contact with itself, and help one evaluate what the mind would be like if such theories were right.

It is usually considered that a particular experiment is decisive when the question that originated it gets answered. In case that it doesn't, the specific experiment is thought to be useless and meaningless. With regard to this point, it is important to bear in mind that both meaning and understanding are two conditions that have to be satisfied when a decisive thought experiment is under scrutiny.

Successful thought experiments allow grasping much better the nature of things, to a degree that one is said to gain knowledge (Brown 2008). For this reason, a useless thought experiment gives rise to a puzzle that can neither be solved nor be understood well, which shows that both meaning and understanding are two crucial conditions to be met when thought experimentation is performed.

Now, the point about the specific thought experiments described by Jackson (1982), Nagel (1974) and Searle (1980 and 1990) is that they all permit gaining knowledge about the very nature of mind. Surely, those who disagree will contend that they all resort to a Cartesian internal viewpoint from which the mind supposedly knows itself far better. But such complaints neglect that important hypotheses about the mind can be tested by the experiences that stem from the operations described in those thought experiments. That is precisely what happens with the Chinese Room, and why the experimenters who run this *gedankenexperiment* can gather evidence in favor of the claim that the mind isn't just a computer program.

2. The crucial role of the conceivable experiences in thought experiments on the mind

As said in the former section, one of the most common complaints against the Chinese Room is that it relies on linguistic understanding, and that the only way to ascertain whether someone understands something is by resorting to the so-called privileged viewpoint of the mind. This alleged drawback is closely linked to the accusations of Cartesianism, as will be examined in due course.

For the time being, it is interesting to focus on the operation that the Chinese Room thought experiment describes, and how it can be performed by anyone who engages in running the experiment. From the viewpoint of the cognitive agents who perform the experiment, that is, from the perspective of the experimenters themselves, the sort of understanding to which the thought experiment aims can only be noticed from an internal viewpoint. This feature of the experiment is related to its design, and linked to Searle's notion of intentionality, which stipulates the conditions of satisfaction that all intentional mental states have to satisfy. For instance, how do you know whether Mary's belief that it's going to be sunny tomorrow counts as an authentic intentional mental state? Well, Mary has to *know* the conditions under which the proposition *p* turns out to be true. Likewise, she has to know when *p* is false.

The same occurs with the Chinese Room. Once one assumes for the sake of argument that Turing Machine Functionalism is true, and performs the crucial operation of this *gedankenexperiment*, which involves placing oneself in the room and correlating all the symbols with aid of the rulebook, one realizes that no authentic understanding really emerges. A subjective experience by which linguistic understanding is detected remains missing.

To understand the importance of the operation and how it aims at this subjective experience, one has to re-examine Searle's rebuttal of the Systems Reply (1980, p. 73). Although one may get rid of all the elements inside the room, and put them into one's own mind, there is an element that can't be internalized, because it's 'already' internal: the very cognitive agent who carries out the thought experiment, and assesses whether or not any understanding takes place. Only the experimenters can assess if they grasp what the shuffled symbols mean. But, is there any other way to detect such linguistic understanding? Undoubtedly, the operation of the mind described in this thought experiment can only be carried out by those who

run the experiment. As said above, through this *gedankenexperiment* one conducts an operation that looks at what would occur if one's mind worked on the principles of Strong AI. Then, who else may realize whether or not linguistic understanding takes place? The System? If so, how would one *know* that the System really understands anything? Again, one's own mind can evaluate what it would understand provided that it worked as a symbolic processor. For the thought experiment allows one to compare authentic actual understanding, of one's own mind, an operation performed in daily life, and the outcome of *pure* symbolic processing. In view of this simple comparison, it is quite clear that understanding is a *quale*, like pain; one has privileged access to what pain and understanding really are. This construal of the Chinese Room shows very well in what sense linguistic understanding is always accompanied by a *quale*:

- i) Suppose that linguistic understanding necessarily entails the subjective experience of understanding
- ii) The Chinese Room is a case of an absent experience of language understanding
- iii) Therefore, the Chinese Room can't understand natural language

Additionally, this analysis of Searle's *gedankenexperiment* suggests what thought experiments on the nature of mind should satisfy. They are to be considered reliable if able to portray conceivable experiences, that is, those conditioned by one's actual experiences. As Kripke puts it (1980), *qualia* involve a deictic factor when meaning is concerned; thus, the phenomenological component is crucial. This element elucidates why thought experiments that allude to conceivable experiences are so appealing: they all emphasize the role of the experimenter in testing hypotheses about the mind, which even suggests a criterion for deciding when conceivable experiences are granted, and thought experiments that involve them turn out to be reliable.

Deixis provides a good criterion for distinguishing conceivable experiences from plain fantasies. For instance, the alleged sort of understanding of the Systems Reply is beyond one's comprehension, for even postulating an experience like that sounds meaningless. How can one think of the System understanding anything, unless one's own understanding is projected to the whole room? Certainly, the impossibility to establish in what sense my linguistic understanding and the System's differ shows that the latter is only a projection; hence, this counter thought experiment is only tempting for those who are already convinced about the Strong AI's ideology.

Nevertheless, the first-person perspective involved in the Chinese Room, which detects the *quale* of understanding and counts as the basis upon which the thought experiment stands, has given rise to a series of accusations of Cartesianism. Unsurprisingly, such charges can also be extended to thought experiments on the nature of mind, because they all take the mind as the laboratory where hypotheses about its own nature are put to test.

3. The alleged Cartesianism of the Chinese Room and the communicability of understanding

Most thought experiments on the mind have been criticized as Cartesian enterprises, a reason for which Dennett (1988, 1991 and 1995) calls them 'intuition pumps.' On several occasions, such experiments have fiercely been attacked for relying on introspection and the first-person viewpoint, two cognitive tools that only resort to the intui-

tions that emerge from the so-called ghost in the machine. This additionally explains why the Chinese Room has been charged with a form of Cartesianism by philosophers such as Dennett (1987), Copeland (2002), Hauser (2002), amongst others.

Before dealing with this issue, it is important to say something about Descartes's alleged Substance Dualism, and how the French philosopher postulates a thought experiment in which mind and body seem to have different properties, and evince two different natures. In relation to this idea, Descartes postulates this argument: "[...] it is possible for me to think I am seeing or walking, though my eyes are closed and I am not moving about; such thoughts might even be possible if I had no body at all." (Descartes 1991, p. 30)

This thought experiment has traditionally taken to count as evidence for Descartes's Substance Dualism. Although this issue has sparked one of the most heated scholarly debates, it is crucial to bear in mind that what Descartes means by the term 'substance' is neither clear nor unambiguous. Clarke (2003), for instance, argues that Descartes considers that substances aren't *substrata* from which clusters of properties hang. And, as substances are always linked to the properties by which things are identified, substances and properties match. Thus, Descartes may hold a form of Property Dualism rather than of Substance Dualism.

This debate has also to do with the fact that Searle takes the first-person viewpoint of the mind as non reducible (see, for example, Searle 2004). However, there is an element in the operation described by the Chinese Room that suggests that the Cartesianism attributed to it is unjustified. Besides rejecting Descartes's dualism, Searle's Chinese Room seeks to mimic the very same conditions of the Turing Test (Turing 1950). By doing so, his thought experiment attempts to show that merely assessing linguistic understanding and intelligence on the basis of linguistic behavior is doomed to failure. The crucial point that the thought experiment makes, then, is that one is never *entirely* justified in believing that an agent understands something on the basis of the publicly displayed behavior. Rather, detecting authentic understanding requires ascertaining a very specific conscious subjective experience. This hindrance elucidates why the Turing Test can be regarded as a philosophical dogma that unreasonably equates the simulation of intelligence with its duplication *qua* property (González 2007, pp. 271-80).

Such difficulties are also reminiscent of the complex communicability of understanding, and how linguistic expressions are never up to the task. Since understanding is a *quale*, like pain, no linguistic expression is able to provide compelling evidence of its existence, just like no behavior can offer undisputable evidence for the existence of pain or any other *qualia*. Both linguistic understanding and pain suffer from what I call 'the Batman comic effect': when it comes to communicability, uttering linguistic expressions such as 'pow', 'argh', 'aha', 'huh' and the like does not offer any compelling evidence in favor of the existence of the mental states involved.

All in all, the Chinese Room *gedankenexperiment* should not be considered a Cartesian enterprise, but a careful exploration into Turing Machine Functionalism and into any view of the mind that neglects its first-person viewpoint. Despite the abundant criticisms of the Chinese Room, the first-person viewpoint, which detects the *quale* of linguistic understanding, explains why this thought experiment has sparked as much debate as the Turing Test, and why neither has brought a philosophical consensus.

Indeed, the conceivable experience pointed out by Searle's thought experiment, which reminds one of how thought experiments on the mind posit such conceivable experiences, suggests that the burden of proof still lies on those who intend to get rid of the issue of consciousness, and its relation to experience, language and the world.

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The Argument from Normativity against Dispositional Analyses of Meaning

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A number of philosophers maintain that dispositional analyses of meaning (such as those of Dretske 1981, Fodor 1990 and Heil & Martin 1998) cannot work simply because meaning is normative (see, e. g., Blackburn 1984, Kripke 1982 and McDowell 1984). Both the validity of the argument and the truth of its premise have been widely questioned (you can see, on the one hand, Boghossian 1989 and, on the other hand, Boghossian 2005 and Heil & Martin 1998). In my opinion, the limited popularity of this “argument from normativity” is due to the fact that its proponents have not clarified enough either what it means to say that meaning is normative, or what are the consequences of this claim, or what supports it. In what follows, I will try to throw some light on each of these points.

Well, what does it mean to say that meaning is normative?

It should be clear that it means something stronger than:

(1) A sentence has a meaning only if its utterances can be divided (at least in principle, approximately and for the most part) into correct and incorrect

(both here and in what follows, by “sentence” I mean *declarative sentence*; in order to deal with non-declarative sentences, some minor adjustments are enough; moreover, most of what I maintain can be easily adapted to the case of subsentential expressions). After all, (1) is rather uncontroversial (Dretske – not exactly a supporter of the normativity of meaning – practically states it explicitly – 1981, p. 190).

Some may think that it means the same as:

(2) A sentence has a meaning only if there are correctness criteria for its use, that is: only if there is a rule for its use.

Both Blackburn and Boghossian seem to conflate (2) with (1) (Blackburn 1984, p. 281 and Boghossian 1989, p. 517), but, in fact, (2) is stronger than (1). I could grant that if the utterances of, say, “There’s glory for you!” could not be divided (not even in principle, approximately and for the most part) into correct and incorrect, “There’s glory for you!” would have no meaning and still stress that in order to label one of these utterances “correct” or “incorrect”, no correctness criterion for the use of the corresponding *sentence* is needed: for example, I could maintain that all that is needed is that the speaker attaches to the *utterance* in question a thought and that a thought is something that, by its very nature, can be labelled “correct” or “incorrect” (alternatively, I could tell some story about notions like those of causal relation and communicative intention, or I could maintain, like Humpty Dumpty, that all that is needed is that the speaker chooses what that occurrence means – Carroll 2000, p. 213). Of course, nothing prevents the friend of (2) from acknowledging that a full-blooded analysis of the concept of meaning calls for some “mentalist” concept (after all, in order to follow a rule, you have to be a person, that is: a thing with a mind); but instead of saying

that for a sentence to have a meaning is for it to be used to convey a thought, the friend of (2) will likely say that it is because a sentence has a meaning that it can be used to convey a thought (see Sellars 1969, p. 523) (this is to say that the expression of thought depends on language, not that thought itself does, nor that the concept of thought depends on that of language – for this latter idea, see Geach²1971, pp. 75-117 and Sellars 1981).

No doubt, (2) links meaning to something more than mere regular behaviour (such as that of a well-trained parrot), but, in spite of what Davidson seems to have thought (1992), this is not to say that it links meaning to explicitly stated rules; (2) links meaning to rule-following, and even if rule-following is something more than mere regular behaviour, this is not to say that one can follow only explicitly stated rules (see Sellars 1954, pp. 204-209). In a certain sense, (2) only says that a sentence has a meaning only if it has a character (see Kaplan 1989, p. 505) (without saying anything about the meaning of utterances and without saying exactly what the nature of the relation between the character of a sentence and its meaning is), and this claim seems to follow straightforwardly from the link *meaning-communication*: that of meaning is a theoretical concept, and its aim is that of explaining communicative phenomena (entertaining a conversation, obeying an order, reviewing your notes for the talk, etc...); hence, it is a conceptual truth that a sentence has a meaning only if it can be used to communicate; but a sentence can be used to communicate only if it has a character, or so it seems. Be that as it may, also (2) is rather uncontroversial (even though Grice maintained that it links meaning and value – 1989, pp. 297-303 –, Fodor – like Dretske, not exactly a supporter of the normativity of meaning – seems to endorse it without hesitation, albeit only implicitly – 1990). Therefore, it should be clear that saying that meaning is normative means, once again, something stronger.

As far as I can see, the following hint is on the right track:

(3) A sentence has a meaning only if there are correctness criteria for its use, and something can determine these criteria only if it can motivate the use that a speaker makes of the sentence.

That (3) is strong enough can be seen from the fact that it allows us to build the following argument:

First premise: dispositional analyses of meaning maintain that what determines the correctness criteria for the use of a sentence is a set of dispositions; different analyses deem relevant different sets, but they all agree that the relevant set must count, among its elements, also some unmanifested dispositions.

Second premise: something can determine these criteria only if it can motivate the use that a speaker makes of the sentence.

First lemma: something can determine these criteria only if speakers can have non-inferential knowledge of it.

Second lemma: dispositional analyses of meaning are committed to the view that speakers can have non-inferential knowledge of unmanifested dispositions.

Third premise: speakers cannot have non-inferential knowledge of unmanifested dispositions.

Conclusion: dispositional analyses of meaning cannot work.

Namely, what seems to be a valid version of the argument from normativity (it is worth noting that this version of the argument is somewhat related to Wright's "epistemological argument" – see, e. g., Wright 1989, pp. 175-176, but also Wittgenstein 1953, § 153).

The derivation of the conclusion and that of the second lemma are trivial, while that of the first lemma is warranted by what seems to be a truism concerning the epistemology of motivations (some may be inclined to see this truism as an hidden premise and the argument as an enthymeme; for present purposes, nothing of importance hinges on this point). Therefore, I believe there is little point in questioning the validity of the argument. But what about the truth of its premises? I do not see a dispositionalist questioning the first one. And the third one seems to rest on a sound argument; even if we restrict our consideration to *the speakers' own past* dispositions, it seems clear that (in the sense of "can" relevant here) speakers cannot have non-inferential knowledge of unmanifested dispositions. Philosophers sympathetic to Sellars' conception of observational knowledge (see, e. g., Sellars 1997, pp. 68-79) may suggest that (roughly speaking) in order to non-inferentially know that at a certain time I had a certain disposition, it is sufficient to non-inferentially know that at that time my brain was in a state that, together with a certain stimulus, causes a certain response; however, as a matter of fact, speakers do not keep track of their own past brain history. Philosophers sympathetic to Ryle's conception of dispositions (see Ryle 2000) may suggest that (roughly speaking) in order to non-inferentially know that at a certain time I had a certain disposition, it is sufficient to non-inferentially know that at that time I underwent a certain stimulus, to which I gave a certain response; however, it is apparent that such a strategy would not be able to supply non-inferential knowledge of *unmanifested* dispositions. We are left with the second premise, which is what (3) adds to (2). Therefore, the question is: given that (2) is rather uncontroversial, what supports (3)?

In my opinion, the answer is: the very same evidence that supports (2). If (2) is rightly understood, what (3) "adds" to it is in fact something that is already implicit in (2) itself.

As I said before, (2) links meaning to rule-following, and rule-following must be distinguished from both mere

regular behaviour and following a rule explicitly stated. If we identify rule-following with mere regular behaviour, the "theory" of the meaning of utterances that fits (2) best (an utterance has a meaning only if the speaker follows a rule in performing it) forces us to the cumbersome conclusion that the utterances performed by a well-trained parrot have a meaning (note that as applied to utterances, "meaning" means *content* – see Kaplan 1989, pp. 523-524); if, on the other hand, we identify rule-following with following a rule explicitly stated, (2) leads us to an infinite regress, or to a vicious circle (see Davidson 1992, as well as Sellars 1954, pp. 204-207). So much for what "rule-following" *does not* mean; we can now turn to what it *does* mean. Martin and Heil give the following characterization:

An agent who follows a rule acts *on* the rule, his action is based on or motivated by a commitment to the rule (1998, p. 284).

But what does it mean that the agent's action is motivated by a commitment to the rule? For present purposes, we can focus on those cases in which the agent's action is a speaker's utterance and the rule is a rule for the use of the corresponding sentence. For the sake of simplicity, we can then focus on the case of an utterance of the one-word sentence "Carmine!", which can be conceived of as an answer to a question about the colour of a certain object (I assume that the character of this sentence is identical with that of its sole subsentential component – the word "carmine"). Finally, it is useful to formulate a possible rule for the use of the word "carmine"; here is something that a dispositionalist should appreciate: an application of "carmine" is correct if and only if it is in accordance with the relevant set of dispositions. And so, the question is: what does it mean that my utterance of "Carmine!" is motivated by a commitment to this rule? Well, saying that this utterance is motivated by a commitment to this rule is saying that it is motivated by "the relevant set of dispositions". But these dispositions are, according to the dispositionalist, *what determines the correctness criteria for the use of "carmine"*. As soon as we try to clarify the concept of rule-following, we are forced to acknowledge that it is a conceptual truth that something can determine the correctness criteria for the use of a sentence only if it can motivate the use that a speaker makes of the sentence; it is in this sense that what (3) "adds" to (2) is in fact something that is already implicit in (2) itself.

Well, I have sketched what I believe is a valid version of the argument from normativity. I have also tried to show that it rests on plausible assumptions. I do not want to leave you with the misleading impression that I believe that dispositional concepts should play *no* role in an account of the concept of meaning. I do not believe that. Still, I do not think that such an account can be reduced to a dispositional analysis of meaning.

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Language and Second Order Thinking: the False Belief Task

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1. Introduction.

In contemporary debates on the relation between thought and language there is a wide-spread conviction, that „reflexive thoughts can only be possible if the target thoughts have vehicles that allow them to be the objects of further thoughts” (Bermudez, 2003) and that “much of human conscious thinking is necessarily conducted in the medium of natural-language sentences”(Carruthers 1996, 1998). Starting from convictions of that kind one makes a hypothesis that a constitutive component of thinking about thoughts (the second order thinking) is natural language. (Clark, 1998, 2006, Bermúdez, 2003; Carruthers, 1996). A moderate version of this view is well expressed by Clark.

“Perhaps it is public language which is responsible for a complex of rather distinctive feature of human thought – viz, our ability to display *second-order cognitive dynamics*. By second-order cognitive dynamics I mean a cluster of powerful capacities involving self-evaluation, self-criticism and finely honed remedial responses [...]. The list could be continued, but the pattern should be clear. In all these cases, we are effectively thinking about our own cognitive profiles or about specific thoughts. This ‘thinking about thinking’ is a good candidate for a distinctively human capacity – one not evidently shared by the other, non-language-using animals who share our planet. Public language and the inner rehearsal of sentences would, on this model, act like the aerial roots of the Mangrove tree – the words would serve as fixed points capable of attracting and positioning additional intellectual matter, creating the islands of second-order thought so characteristic of the cognitive landscape of *Homo sapiens* (Clark, 1998).

It seems that anybody who makes claims like those quoted above clearly asserts, that in the emergence of second order cognitive dynamics language is not merely involved as a means to widen the scope and to heighten the efficiency of some thoughts and abilities, but that it plays a role of a generator on which the very existence of those thoughts depends. Thus, at the basis of this view there is an assumption that thoughts can be objects of further thoughts only if they have suitable vehicles, and public language sentences are the only suitable vehicles (Bermúdez, 2003). This approach can be grasped in the claim, that “only creatures who are able to make their thoughts into stable, attendable scrutinizable objects, by explicitly vehicling them in some way, can then turn the apparatus of thinking onto the act of thinking itself” (Clark, 2002).

When we think of a typical set of examples of second order thinking in which language would play such a great role, first of all we think about situations when we appraise our own thoughts, correct our own plans and monitor relations between our thoughts. We also mean such situations in which we find ourselves attributing thoughts to other subjects. Proponents of the thesis that second order cognitive dynamics would not be possible without natural language pay special attention to situations in which we ascribe thoughts to other subjects. Some claim that only within this context we may discover proper presuppositions related to second order thinking and can fully understand how crucial natural language is for this

realm of our cognitive undertakings. Within this area many philosophers and psychologists made an effort to test the general idea that the acquisition of proper formulas of natural language is a condition which allows thinking about thoughts of other subjects. All such issues were gathered under a common heading of research on the false belief task.

2. Mindreading and a „naive” theory of mind.

Let us begin with a general observation that the issue of attributing thoughts and desires to other subjects is considered an important aspect of a commonsense ability to read states of mind of other subjects (mindreading). Most often it is taken for granted that attributing mental states like *beliefs, wishes, emotions, forebodings* and *fears* to others is evidence for our possession of a popular or naive “theory of mind”. This term refers to the ability to reason and make inferences about mental states of others, and it presupposes the ability to hold beliefs about another’s beliefs, or to represent mentally another’s mental representation. We might therefore say that the possession of a naive theory of mind is equivalent to the ability to attribute thoughts to other beings. In this context many authors believe that the appropriate test of having a “theory of mind” is the ability to understand that another person has a false belief (de Villiers, de Villiers, 2003).

3. The false belief tests.

On the basis of these presuppositions it has been noticed that in a certain important aspect research on children’s theories of mind and especially analysis of the false belief test may be an important factor in evaluation of expressed intuitions on conditions of attributing thoughts to other subjects. It seems that the concentration of psychological research on the false belief tests was in a certain way correlated with several deeply rooted philosophical presuppositions: The first of them states that attributing thoughts requires a certain intentional ascent, remaining in relation to a thought itself. The second presupposition - going a step further - claims that the ability to possess thoughts is based upon the ability to have a concept of thought. The third one claims that attributing thoughts requires introducing a distinction between transparent and nontransparent context. The fourth presupposition states that any attribution of a thought assumes openness to situations that it might turn out that an attributed thought is false. The relevance of these claims in the context of our investigation is decided by two facts: first, by the fact that within a philosophical debate an intentional ascent was coupled with a semantic ascent, and second that the ability to have the notion of thought was coupled with the ability to use language. Before we move further, let us recall an example of a false belief task:

Maxi puts the chocolate in a container A, from which it is later, in Maxi’s absence, unexpectedly moved to a container B. Children are asked where Maxi will look for the chocolate on his return. Younger children typically answer incorrectly that he will look in a container B.

4. Cognitive conditions of passing the false belief test.

In a number of psychological research it was noticed that children, who do not cope well with the false belief test are not capable of focusing their attention on a thought itself. One also observed that they are not able to make any difference between a thought and an external situation which that thought concerns (Astington, Gopnik, 1998). As Gopnik, Meltzoff and Kuhl stress, children who are not able to pass the false belief test manifested a tendency to think that thoughts are attached to reality, and they could not grasp the difference between a real change taking place in the outer world and a change on the side of thoughts concerning the world. Wimmer and Perner observed that children who had problems to cope successfully with the false belief test did not perceive a conflict between two epistemic states in which a subject can be. M. Siegel and K. Beattie stress in turn that problems that children encountered in coping successfully with the false belief task may originate in a failure to notice the difference between a thought and the needs – according to direction to fit. Some researchers claim that children do not realize that a thought can have a logical value different than the one which is ascribed to it by a person who has the thought (de Villiers, de Villiers, 2003). Grasping the issue more specifically, Perner stresses that the effective coping with the false belief test requires something more, namely perceiving the distinction between „representing” (representing something) and “representing as” (representing something as being a certain way) (Perner, 1995). The above findings, which describe conditions for successful coping with the false belief test, can be presented as follows:

- (1) The ability to focus on a thought: on its content and form;
- (2) Capturing the difference between a thought and an object of that thought;
- (3) Distinguishing an attitude from a content (one can *think that p* or *wish that p*);
- (4) Distinguishing a thought from a desire;
- (5) Being aware that a thought can represent a thing in many ways;
- (6) Distinguishing representing something in the aspect of referring and representing something in the aspect of sense;
- (7) Realizing that thoughts can represent something erroneously;
- (8) Realizing that a thought (representation) can have a logical value different than the one ascribed to that thought by a person having it;
- (9) Mastering the notion of *thought*.

Determining these cognitive conditions which are necessary to cope well with the false belief test allows us to ask the question about relationship of the cognitive conditions

identified above and an acquired language. To be more precise, the crucial point is to find an answer to the question of whether it is possible to acquire the ability to identify a representation as ontically and structurally distinct – together with the ability to classify it as false, and additionally as incoherent with life needs – without developed linguistic skills. It should be here remembered that the conditions [from (1) to (9)] formulated when analyzing the false belief test, are seen as crucial for our ability to perform second order thinking. Thus, those arguments which show that coping well with the false belief test requires developed linguistic competence are seen as the evidence that our second order thinking is a language-dependent ability.

5 Functions of natural language.

Within the framework of the approach here presented one accepts that there are powerful reasons for the claim that there obtains a strong correlation between an immature theory of mind, judged by failing the false belief tests, and an immature grasp of syntactic structure of attitude reports (Segal 1998). In the strong version of this view it is argued that a child first assimilates language - in particular those sentence forms which we call sentential complements of verbs relative to communication in such constructions as “x said that p”, or of psychological verbs in constructions like “x thought that p”, in order to use this language in his or her inner discourse (Bloom, 2000, de Villiers, de Villiers, 2003). However, for solving the problem it is crucial the statement that the use of a language, in which the key role is played by sentential complements of main clauses with verbs denoting mental functions, is a means which enables one to carry out the required mental operations. A clear hypothesis here emerges: the cognitive faculty uses the representational resources of language faculty (Segal, 1998).

In order to justify the above hypothesis it is pointed out that children who did not cope well with the false belief test: (a) manifest an immature understanding of the syntactic structure of sentences about attitudes; (b) do not comprehend a specificity of using mental verbs, substituting in those verb's objects one expression by another; (c) children at this period make no difference between the questions “can you remember what was inside?” and “can you remember what you thought there was inside?”; then (d) employing constructions with mental verbs they use them in a referential manner, as a type of a *de re* statement. Having this in mind Astington claims that “the acquisition of syntax of complementation that provides representational format needed for false-belief understanding (Astington 2001).

Many authors accept that the results established in this research area clearly show that the cognitive abilities described in points (1) to (9) make use of representations provided by the linguistic faculty, and that the syntax of attitude reports is a necessary precursor of thinking about thoughts (de Villiers, de Villiers, 2003).

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Schoenberg and Wittgenstein: the Odd Couple

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In a lecture titled "Philosophy and the Unheard" delivered exactly a decade ago at Harvard on the occasion of a conference on Arnold Schoenberg's chamber music, Stanley Cavell suggested that "the Schoenbergian idea of the row with its unforeseen yet pervasive consequences is a serviceable image of the Wittgensteinian idea of grammar and its elaboration of criteria of judgment, which shadow our expressions and which reveal pervasive yet unforeseen conditions of our existence..." (Cavell 2000). What kind of light might Schoenberg's conception of the 12-tone row throw on Wittgenstein's conception of grammar? The real question is actually whether the relentless striving for communicability, or rather for comprehensibility—to use Schoenberg's own technical term (Schoenberg 1975)—which propels Schoenberg's dodecaphonic compositional procedures is on a par with, or might be a serviceable image of Wittgenstein's relentless, genuinely philosophical striving for the surveyability of grammar. Here one cannot hope for a real answer before considering seriously what a truly Wittgensteinian response to Schoenberg's work might consist in.

Yet such a response is not palpably within reach. We shall begin our inquiry with what I consider a glaring omission which is common among those who wish to yoke Schoenberg and Wittgenstein together: Wittgenstein's philosophically entrenched rejection of modern music. His fierce animosity toward modern music is well documented. Yet it is this explicit rejection of modern music that is being patently suppressed when Wittgenstein and Schoenberg are brought together, rather than serving as a major premise in any attempt to spell out the true nature of whatever relation that may obtain between their respective projects. Indeed Cavell gives us a fair disclosure upon inviting us to entertain his suggestion "even knowing that Wittgenstein in person shunned most forms of modernism in the arts and in modern intellectual life generally" (Cavell 2000). Let me simply state that, to my mind, here we actually have no choice but to consider very seriously philosophically what Wittgenstein in person shunned.

So how philosophically entrenched is Wittgenstein's rejection of modern music? Wittgenstein's philosophical conception of music, as seen most fully in his later work, is deeply informed by his sophisticated response to the Romantic conception of musical profundity with its threefold emphasis on the specificity of musical expression, on musical 'aboutness', and on the exalted epistemic status of music. Wittgenstein appropriates the focus on the specificity of musical expression by means of his idea that musical gesture consists in, and moreover actually exemplifies an interrelation between language games. That is, understanding what a musical passage is about logically presupposes a myriad of other language games, and ultimately, "the whole range of our language games" (CV 51-2). Wittgenstein explicates the notion of musical aboutness in terms of an internal relation that conjoins musical gesture and our entire life in practice, whereupon the related concepts cannot be identified independently of the relation which holds them together. Thus he maintains that "understanding music is a manifestation of the life of mankind" (MS 137, 20). Wittgenstein coaches the notion of gesture in terms of the melody and the language being in recipro-

cal action (CV 52). The specificity of the musical expression, implied in the notion of gesture, marks a vertical shift in the language game played. The melody becomes, in Wittgenstein's words, "a new part of our language", which can be understood only against the backdrop of correlate moves in logically-prior games.

Against the backdrop of this peculiar philosophical conception of music, it is easy to see how susceptible Wittgenstein was to Oswald Spengler's cultural pessimism, seeing in progressive modern music an aspect of cultural decline—the dissolution of the resemblances which unite a culture's ways of life. While Wittgenstein's intellectual affinity with Spengler's views has already been widely acknowledged, his curious, little-known engagement with Schenker's theory of music remained by and large under the scholarly radar heretofore (Guter 2009). Schenker was not merely a musical epigone of Spengler. His pessimism concerning the prospects of modern music is intrinsically related to his unique view of musical composition. Schenker theorized that works of music that are tonal and exhibit mastery are temporal projections of a single element: the tonic triad. Hearing music as an exfoliation of this fundamental structure is part of the phenomenology of musical perception. At the heart of his abstract notion of music, one finds the conviction that the masterworks of Western music teach us that hearing music consists in recognizing a structural standard, which is shared by anything that we may rightfully call music. Thus it becomes a matter of analytic truth that all works of music that digress from triadic tonality must patently be rejected as unsuccessful, superficial, or altogether musically nonsensical, depending on how severe the digression is. Schenker's hostility toward modern music was fueled by his conviction that the results of his theory betoken a disintegration of musical culture on all fronts. Irreverence toward the laws of tonal effect, he believed, reflects a loss of musical instinct for the inner complexities of the masterworks of Western music among performers and composers alike, which in turn hinders the musician's almost sacred mission to provide access to the world of human experience contained in such masterworks (Snarrenberg 1997).

Wittgenstein augmented Schenker's view by construing musical meaning as an internal relation. Wittgenstein asked: "Could *one* reason be given at all for why the theory of harmony is the way it is? And, first and foremost, *must* such a reason be given?" And his answer is straightforward: "[The reason] is here and it is part of our entire life". (MS 157a, 24-26) For Wittgenstein, tonality—the way we experience and express certain relationships between musical tones—is effected by the way we recognize and describe things, and ultimately by the kind of beings we are, the purposes we have, our shared discriminatory capacities and certain general features of the world we inhabit. Thus he wrote: "The theory of harmony is at least in part phenomenology and therefore grammar" (PR 4).

Wittgenstein brought his philosophical conception of music to bear on modern music in a curious diary entry from 1931, where he made a distinction between three categories of modern music: the good, the bad, and the vacuous (PPO 67-9). At least two of them—the first and the third—are of genuine philosophical interest. According

to Wittgenstein, bad modern music is conceived in accordance with prevailing contemporary principles, which are equally ill conceived. Most probably, Wittgenstein refers here to the predominant maxim of progress for which he had the deepest mistrust. Such was indeed the case with the emancipators of the dissonance in the name of progress during the first two decades of the 20th Century, and Wittgenstein clearly had no patience with their senseless musical gesticulation, which Schenker has shown to be a result of inability to bind their empty sonorities together as elaborations of a single chord. For both Schenker and Wittgenstein, such music was plain rubbish, to wit, something which insofar as it presents itself as non-musical clatter from a mere technical perspective, it is not even an interesting problem. It is noteworthy that Schoenberg's pre-1923 compositions, certainly those from his so-called "atonal period", fall squarely in this category.

The category of "the vacuous", or "the unattractive absurd" is exemplified by the music of Josef Labor, a rather minor turn-of-the-century conservative composer, who was a protégé of the Wittgenstein family. It denotes the problematic, somewhat tragic situation of a composer who shuns the illusion and peril of progress and yet is patently barred from artistic greatness. It is noteworthy that this idea expresses a familiar train of thought which is ultimately traceable back to Schenker, who felt that the great tradition of Austro-German music had come to an end with Brahms. Here, as elsewhere, Wittgenstein decisively transcends the Brahms-Wagner controversy by rejecting the noble yet vacuous rehash of classicism of the conservative composer and the base, contrapuntal tinkering with harmony of the progressive composer as being both symptomatic of cultural decline (Guter 2009). This leaves us with the last alternative—good modern music—which, according to Wittgenstein, is actually no alternative at all. Incommensurability entailed by cultural decline renders the very idea of good modern music as an absurd, albeit, as Wittgenstein admits, an *attractive* absurd. One cannot, or at least one is not clever enough to formulate the right maxim or principle for our times—for what principle could be coherently pronounced amidst a dissolution of the resemblances which unite a culture's ways of life?—so *ipso facto* one cannot conceive of music that would correspond to the unpronounced. Thus, the precious little that Wittgenstein has to say about the category of good modern music is that it is conceptually paradoxical.

We are now in a suitable position to inquire about the place of Schoenberg's 12-tone music within Wittgenstein's scheme of modern music. And the answer is pretty straightforward: it has no place at all. In Wittgenstein's scheme, Schoenberg's 12-tone music is neither good, nor bad, nor vacuous. It is an empty set. Discouraging as this may seem, this null-result is of significant philosophical importance, as we shall see.

We should first observe that Schoenberg conceived the 12-tone method as a device to regain conscious control over his own unruly compositional procedures as he felt that he had exhausted the resources of his earlier free atonal style. Schoenberg's conception of the 12-tone row is steeped in his theoretical and practical emphasis on logic, which has taken the form of a relentless quest for musical coherence; coherence that was lost when tonality was dissolved (Schoenberg 1975). Schoenberg used the term "coherence" to designate relationships that justify connections or meaningful interactions between the components of a sonic object. His attempt to emulate language is most explicit in his focus on finding and devising musical connectives akin to connectives in logic, which, so he believed, regulate the element of fluency in music and clarify

the logic of its formal progression. He maintained that musical material should be both coherent and varied and the 12-tone method was designed expressly to provide both coherence and variation in the musical material. At the heart of the system there is the 12-tone row, which is an abstract structure, a set of potential relationships without any motivic content that is logically prior to the actual composition. Schoenberg conceived the 12-tone row as a pre-compositional fund for motivic possibilities, whereupon springs its sense of musical omnipresence.

In Schoenberg's philosophy of composition, the notion of coherence is complemented by the notion of comprehensibility, which denotes the conditions that allow the listener to grasp something as a whole, to bind impressions together into a form. The contrived nature of 12-tone composition, in contradistinction to tonal composition, gives this notion of comprehensibility primary importance. Schoenberg pointed out that while compositions executed tonally proceed so as to bring every occurring tone into a direct or indirect relationship to the tonic, 12-tone composition presupposes knowledge of these relationships and does not render them as a problem still to be worked out (Schoenberg 1995). In this sense, 12-tone composition works with whole complexes akin to "a language that works with comprehensive concepts [umfassenden Begriffen], whose scope and meaning as generally known are presupposed" (ibid). In the last analysis, comprehensibility is the ability to grasp and retain such fixed concept-complexes, whose meaning is semantically rigid like labels or name tags, and to follow their implications and consequences.

At this point, two immediate observations suggest themselves from Wittgenstein's perspective. First, Schoenberg's "truth-functional" conception of music is clearly in the grip of the "Augustinian picture of language". Second, Schoenberg and Wittgenstein have taken the analogy between music and language in opposite directions. Whereas Wittgenstein maintained that "understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding a theme in music than one may think" (PI 527), Schoenberg sought to transfix the musical material by means of logic. But these are merely symptoms of the deep chasm, which is now before us. Having drawn varied, complex and coherent material from an initial pitch collection by means of logical manipulation, Schoenberg proceeds to compose music using this material in the good old traditional way. He vehemently rejected the idea that the 12-tone method is a different method of composing. In Schoenberg's view of the music of future, the 12-tone system is a necessary step in the evolution of Western music, and he designed it for the sole purpose of replacing the structural differentiations formerly furnished by tonality. Schoenberg firmly believed that this phantom return to the old Western tradition of composing would insure the supremacy of German music for the next hundred years.

Schoenberg's 12-tone compositional practice, in particular its pretense to inherit music, enraged Schenker. He wrote: "The great proof against Schoenberg is the people... There are not two summits in an art. Schoenberg has already experienced the one, a second, like the one now being cultivated, cannot blossom. Schoenberg produces a homunculus in music; it is a machine... but never can there be a surrogate for the soul" (quoted in Snarrenberg 1997). This passage captures precisely why Schoenberg's 12-tone music is virtually off Wittgenstein's chart of modern music. Let us consider Wittgenstein's own vision of the music of the future: "I should not be surprised if the music of the future were in unison [einstimmig]... If something comes it will have to be—I think—simple, *transpar-*

ent. In a certain sense, naked" (*PPO* 49). Wittgenstein's own formulation of the music of the future is informed by Spengler's notion of epochal rejuvenation, hence it also transcends the aforementioned scheme of modern music. Yet it encapsulates precisely that which sets Wittgenstein's philosophical conception of music apart from Schoenberg's musical evolution: that music is physiognomic, intransitively transparent to human beings. There is simply no reason for the rules of 12-tone composition to be what they are, given the kind of beings we are, the purposes we have, our shared discriminatory capacities and so forth. The kind of musical distinctions called for by dodecaphonic composition—for instance, identifying a certain passage as based on a certain transposition of the inverted retrograde form of the original 12-tone row used in the given piece—are not just very difficult to make; they are simply not important in our lives, certainly not in the sense that questions and answers, introductions and conclusions are.

There is no wonder, then, that the rules of 12-tone composition aim at nothing other than creating the conditions of comprehensibility. A comparison between Schoenberg's standard of comprehensibility and Wittgenstein's standard of transparency or "nakedness" points at their crucial difference. According to Wittgenstein, a musical gesture is not transparent by virtue of the correct applications of "rules of transparency"; rather, its transparency resides precisely in their absence, indeed in the vacuity of the very notion of such rules. Transparency in this sense is not an epistemic notion. A musical gesture is transparent because it is already given to us with a familiar physiognomy, already vertically related to our world of thoughts and feelings, whereupon there is no sense in which we can say that it needs to be *made* comprehensible. Only a surrogate for the soul would be in need of being made comprehensible.

Perhaps the most adequate Wittgensteinian response to Schoenberg's idea of 12-tone music would be akin to his response to Zamenhof's Esperanto (*CV* 52): the 12-tone row is cold, lacking in associations and yet it plays at being music. "A system of purely written signs would not disgust us so much", said Wittgenstein, and yet Schoenberg's compositions were made to be played. The analogy between Esperanto and Schoenberg's 12-tone system yields a conclusive answer to the question how far removed Schoenberg's 12-tone music is from Wittgenstein's vision of the music of the future. From Wittgenstein's perspective, Schoenberg's 12-tone music would be music for

the meaning-blind, modeled on a conception of language as an artificial edifice, whose conditions of meaningfulness primarily consist in deriving a wealth of forms from musically barren sonic material by means of rules of coherence and comprehensibility; a kind of music, whose very essence shuns the familiar expanse of our *Menschenkenntnis*, where tonal music naturally roams. If understanding music is a manifestation of the life of mankind, then an actual performance of such music for the meaning-blind, enfolded by the gestural bravado of classically trained musicians, would be genuinely abominable from Wittgenstein's point of view.

We may conclude now that in light of Wittgenstein's own well-founded philosophy of music, there is nothing in Schoenberg's 12-tone row, the pre-compositional repository of musical thoughts, and in our presumed ability to comprehend these thoughts, that could compare to the power of grammar—as Cavell so aptly put it—to reveal pervasive yet unforeseen conditions of our existence. If the image of Schoenberg's row is serviceable at all for our understanding of Wittgenstein's idea of grammar, it would be merely as a foil for showing precisely what is philosophically outstanding about Wittgenstein's suggestion that understanding a sentence is akin to understanding a melody; that is, by way of a philosophically acute contrast, and this would actually be very much like Wittgenstein's own manner of handling such matters.

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Ian Hacking über die Sprachabhängigkeit von Handlungen und das „Erfinden“ von Leuten

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Ian Hacking hat in einer Reihe von Publikationen (vgl. insbes. Hacking 1995, 1995a, 1999, 2002, 2007) die These entwickelt, dass sich die Humanwissenschaften von den Naturwissenschaften signifikant dadurch unterscheiden, dass ihre begrifflichen Beschreibungsversuche ihren Gegenstandsbereich in charakteristischer Weise beeinflussen und verändern können. Zwischen der sozialen Realität und den wissenschaftlichen Beschreibungen, die sie zum Gegenstand haben, können „Loopingeffekte“ (Hacking 1995a) auftreten. Menschen *nehmen wahr*, wie sie wissenschaftlich beschrieben, erklärt, klassifiziert werden und ändern unter dem Einfluss dieser Wahrnehmung nicht nur ihr Verhalten, sondern sie werden ein Stück weit sogar zu anderen Personen. Für diesen Prozess hat Hacking die Formel „making up people“ geprägt (von Joachim Schulte (in Hacking 2006a) mit „Leute erfinden“ übersetzt). Humanwissenschaften sind demnach „engines for making up people“ (Hacking 2007, 293). Ihre „Gegenstände“ erweisen sich als „moving targets“ (Hacking 2007); es handelt sich sogar zum Teil um „objects or their effects which do not exist in any recognizable form until they are objects of scientific study“ (Hacking 2002, 11).

Hacking (u.a. 1995, 234ff.) stützt seine Thesen u.a. auf handlungstheoretische Argumente, deren Ursprünge insbesondere in Elizabeth Anscombes Studie über Absichten (Anscombe 1957) liegen. Hacking argumentiert, intentionale Handlungen seien Handlungen unter bestimmten Beschreibungen („under a description“). Wenn den Handlungssubjekten nun – z.B. durch neue wissenschaftliche Begriffe, neue Theorien usw. – neue begriffliche Beschreibungsmöglichkeiten zur Verfügung gestellt werden, so ergäben sich für sie neue Handlungsoptionen: sie können jetzt Handlungen vollziehen, die vorher schlicht nicht möglich waren. Und da es – zwar sicherlich nicht nur, aber auch – die von Menschen vollzogenen intentionalen Handlungen seien, die sie zu den Personen werden lassen, die sie sind, könnten neue Begriffe neue „Personentypen“ ermöglichen.

Entsprechend hat Rachel Cooper (2004, 81; 2005, 62) Hacking's Argument (A) so dargestellt:

„1. Intentional actions are actions under a description.

2. Intentional actions make us the kind of person we are.

[Therefore:] New descriptions allow new intentional actions which allow new kinds of persons.“

Im Folgenden werde ich diese Darstellung zunächst als zumindest teilweise angemessene Rekonstruktion der Argumentation Hacking's, so wie sie in einigen seiner Texte entwickelt wird, akzeptieren. Cooper weist das Argument (A) jedoch zurück, wobei ihre Kritik daran zum Teil nicht unberechtigt ist. Ziel meines Beitrags ist es, zunächst das Argument und ebenso Coopers Einwände kritisch zu rekapitulieren und in einen größeren philosophischen Diskussionskontext einzuordnen. Darüber hinaus sollen Perspektiven aufgezeigt werden, wie (A) so modifiziert werden könnte, dass die Kritik daran entkräftet wird. Abschließend will ich auf den von Hacking verwendeten Personenbegriff eingehen.

Cooper (2004, 80ff.; 2005, 61ff.) wirft Hacking vor, Anscombes Formel „under a description“ missverstanden zu haben. Anscombe habe nämlich nicht sagen wollen, dass nur ein sprachfähiges Wesen überhaupt Absichten haben und Handlungen vollziehen kann. Die Formel „under a description“ ist vielmehr verbunden mit dem „Warum-Test“, der *eine* Möglichkeit (nicht die einzige) darstellt, um herauszufinden, inwiefern dem Tun eines Subjekts eine absichtliche Handlung entspricht. In der Tat verweist Anscombe (1979) auf einen – nicht sprachfähigen – Vogel, dem man durchaus sinnvoll die Absicht zuschreiben könne, z.B. auf einem Zweig landen zu wollen, während sein Verhalten unter der Beschreibung „auf einem mit Vogel-leim bestrichenen Zweig landen“ *nicht* absichtlich ist. Die Anwendbarkeit der under-a-description-Formel ist also unabhängig davon, ob das Handlungssubjekt selbst sprachfähig ist.

Damit ist nun aber soweit nur gezeigt, dass Hacking's Anscombe-Exegese fehlerhaft war, nicht, dass das Argument sachlich falsch ist. Vielleicht lässt sich das Beweisziel auf anderem Weg zeigen! Schließlich gibt es neben Anscombe zahlreiche weitere Autoren, die andere Auffassungen zur Sprachabhängigkeit von Absichten entwickelt haben, auf die Hacking sein Argument eher stützen könnte. Im Folgenden möchte ich vor diesem Hintergrund einige Bemerkungen zu möglichen alternativen Argumentationsstrategien und zu Aspekten, die dabei m.E. zu berücksichtigen wären, machen.

Zunächst ist anzuerkennen – dies räumt auch Cooper (2004, 83) ein –, dass Handlungsabsichten zumindest bestimmter Typen existieren, bei denen eine Sprachabhängigkeit der gesuchten Art unstrittig ist. Cooper gibt einige deklarative Sprechakte als Beispiel. Ein Versprechen zu geben oder zu heiraten ist offenbar daran gekoppelt, dass die entsprechenden Sprechakte vollzogen werden, das heißt, die betroffenen Personen müssen auch in der Lage sein, diese Sprechakte zu vollziehen. Derartige, in „pseudo-legal ways“ (ebd.) definierte Handlungen hält sie aber für Sonderfälle. Angesichts der Tatsache, dass es Humanwissenschaften insbesondere mit der Erforschung sozialer Realität zu tun haben und diese nach gängiger sozialontologischer Lesart zu einem nicht unerheblichen Maß durch deklarative Sprechakte und verwandte Mechanismen (kollektive Intentionalität, konstitutive Regeln) konstituiert ist (vgl. Searle 1995), sollte dieser „Sonderfall“ allerdings nicht unterschätzt werden. Im Kontext der Hacking'schen Argumentation wäre dabei vielleicht an so etwas wie „institutionelle Arten“ zu denken, d.h. Klassen von Individuen, die aufgrund von institutionellen Eigenschaften dieser Individuen zustande kommen, z.B. die Nationalitäten oder Religionen (soweit die Mitgliedschaft institutionalisiert ist).

Darüber hinaus scheint es sinnvoll zu sein, die Fokussierung allein auf Handlungsabsichten zu überwinden und mindestens weitere mentale, intentionale Zustände im weiteren Sinne in den Blick zu nehmen (und als Prämisse 2 in Argument (A) einzusetzen (wobei natürlich die Formulierung der Prämisse 1 und der Konklusion ebenfalls entsprechend angepasst werden muss)). Es ist nicht einzuse-

hen, wieso Menschen nur durch Handlungsabsichten, bzw. die Fähigkeit, solche zu entwickeln, zu den Personen, die sie sind, werden sollen. Vielmehr scheinen mir dabei zahlreiche weitere Typen intentionaler und mentaler Zustände relevant zu sein, insbesondere emotionale, konative und, vielleicht etwas weniger bedeutsam, doxastische Zustände. Es geht mithin um große Teile des psychologischen Lebens von Subjekten und den Zusammenhang mit den psychologischen Vokabularen, über das diese Subjekte verfügen. Zu klären wäre demnach nicht oder nicht nur, inwiefern die sinnvolle Zuschreibung von Handlungsabsichten abhängig ist vom intentionalen Vokabular des Handlungssubjekts, sondern ob es zutrifft, dass, wie bspw. Kusch (1999, 248) formuliert, „our psychological classifications are constitutive of our mental states and events. Our psychological vocabulary does not classify mental states and events that exist wholly independently of the vocabulary. Instead having *this* vocabulary rather than *that* vocabulary causes us to have – or be more likely to have – one kind of mental experience rather than another.“

Die philosophische Diskussion darüber, in welcher Form unterschiedliche mentale Zustände sprachabhängig sind, ist freilich sehr vielfältig und kann hier nicht im einzelnen nachvollzogen werden. Es geht mir hier lediglich darum, die grundlegenden Bahnen dieser Debatte mit Blick auf das Problem Hackings nachzuzeichnen und grundlegende zu beachtende Unterscheidungen einzuführen. Eine erste solche Unterscheidung ist die zwischen „einfachen“ und „komplexen“ Zuständen. Während erstere nicht an Sprache gekoppelt sein mögen, könnte das bei letzteren durchaus der Fall sein. Cooper (2005, 64) nennt als Beispiel das Kochen eines komplizierten Gerichts, das nur erfolgreich vollzogen werden kann, wenn ein – sprachlich verfasstes – Rezept beachtet wird. Grundsätzlich findet sich in der philosophischen Diskussion ein breites Spektrum an Positionen zur Sprachabhängigkeit mentaler Zustände, von Armstrong (1973), der keinerlei derartige Abhängigkeit erkennen kann, über Wittgenstein (1984), Searle (1995) oder Bennett (1976), die Mittelpositionen einnehmen, bis hin zu Brandom (1994), der eine verhältnismäßig starke Sprachabhängigkeitsthese vertritt (vgl. auch Knell 2004, 179ff.). Eine entscheidende Frage ist, ob die Kopplung höherstufiger, komplexerer intentionaler Zustände und Sprache – sofern sie besteht – lediglich kontingent und empirisch ist (das meint Cooper mit Blick auf ihr Beispiel des Kochens), oder ob sie fundamentaler, logischer, begrifflicher Natur ist. So ist Armstrong der Auffassung, noch nicht einmal die Überzeugung, die Goldbachsche Vermutung sei wahr, setze Sprachfähigkeit logisch voraus. Searle nennt zumindest einen einfachen arithmetischen Gedanken ($371 + 248 = 619$), bei dem es zwar empirisch unwahrscheinlich, nicht aber logisch ausgeschlossen sei, dass ein sprachunfähiges Wesen ihn fassen könnte. Demgegenüber gebe es bei kalendarischen Angaben eine logische Sprachabhängigkeit: „That is why my dog cannot think ‚Today is Tuesday the 26th of October.‘“ (Searle 1995, 64) Bereits Wittgenstein hatte in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* ähnliche Überlegungen angestellt: In § 647 und § 650 räumt er ein, dass sprachunfähige Tiere einfache Handlungsabsichten und konative Zustände haben können. Andererseits hält er ein hoffendes Tier und – wie Searle – ebenso ein Tier, dass in kalendarischen Kategorien denkt, für unmöglich: „Man kann sich ein Tier zornig, furchtsam, traurig, freudig, erschrocken vorstellen. Aber hoffend? Und warum nicht? Der Hund glaubt, sein Herr sei an der Tür. Aber kann er auch glauben, sein Herr werde übermorgen kommen?“ (Wittgenstein 1984, 489)

Neben der Unterscheidung zwischen einfachen und komplexen Zuständen ist eine zweite wichtige Unterscheidung,

auf die ich hier eingehen möchte, die zwischen der Abhängigkeit eines mentalen Zustands vom Vorhandensein eines *einzelnen Begriffs* im Vokabular des Handlungssubjekts und der Abhängigkeit von *komplexen Sprachspielen*, die das Subjekt beherrscht. An Wittgensteins Sprachspielbegriff anknüpfend könnte man in diesem Sinne eine holistische (im Gegensatz zu einer atomistischen) Version der Sprachabhängigkeitsthese in Erwägung ziehen. In Bezug auf Wittgensteins Beispiel erscheint es etwa ausgesprochen unplausibel, dass die sinnvolle Zuschreibung des mentalen Zustands allein davon abhängen soll, ob die Vokabeln „Hoffnung“ oder „hoffen“ im Sprachschatz des Subjekts vorkommen; man könnte sich eine natürliche Sprache vorstellen, in der keine derartige Vokabel vorkommt, ohne dass daraus zwingend folgen müsste, dass die Subjekte, denen diese als Muttersprache dient, unfähig wären, so etwas wie „Hoffnung“ zu empfinden. Denn „Hoffnung“ steht nicht isoliert da, sondern ist auf komplexe Weise in ein Netz von Begriffen und menschlichen Praktiken eingebunden. Beispielsweise könnte man jemandem, der nicht über diesen Begriff verfügt, erläutern, was „Hoffnung“ ist, indem man andere, ihm bekannte Wörter verwendet („etwas zu wünschen und zugleich erwarten, dass es eintreten wird oder eintreten könnte“ o.ä.), oder indem man auf Praktiken verweist („hoffen ist, wenn Du z.B. in folgender Situation bist...“).

Dem pragmatischen Aspekt räumt auch Hacking in seinen jüngsten Ausführungen größeren Raum ein (vgl. Hacking 2006, 2007); er wirft sich selbst vor, in früheren Texten – wie zahlreiche andere Philosophen – zu sehr auf Wörter und Gegenstände fixiert gewesen zu sein. Stärkere Beachtung müsse man dagegen den (insbesondere auch sozialen, institutionellen) Interaktionen, Praktiken schenken, in denen die Dinge und Wörter vorkommen. Man kann vermuten, dass Hacking in diese Kritik auch sein Argument (A) mit einschließt, was er aber nicht explizit deutlich macht. „Loopingeffekte“ finden demnach nicht einfach statt zwischen Menschen und (neu von den Humanwissenschaften eingeführten) Begriffen – schon gar nicht einzelnen, isolierten Vokabeln –, sondern zwischen Begriffen (Klassifikationen), Menschen, Institutionen, gesellschaftlichen Wissensformen und Experten (Hacking 2007, 298).

Abschließend will ich kurz auf die Frage eingehen, was es eigentlich in diesem Zusammenhang heißen kann, dass Personen bzw. Personentypen oder -arten („kinds of people/persons“) „erfunden“ werden. In (A) wird vorausgesetzt, dass die Zugehörigkeit einer Person zu einer bestimmten „Art“ von bestimmten Eigenschaften – bei denen sich dann die Frage stellt, welches ihre Möglichkeitsbedingungen sind – dieser Person abhängt. Hier ist klärungsbedürftig, was „kinds of people“ genau sind und durch welche Eigenschaften genau die Zugehörigkeit eines Subjekts festgelegt wird. Der Ausdruck „kind of people“, so wie Hacking ihn gebraucht, entspricht nicht einfach schlichtweg der Klasse der Individuen, die irgendeine beliebige – mentale oder nicht mentale, sprachabhängige oder -unabhängige – Eigenschaft aufweisen. Menschen weisen unzählige Eigenschaften auf, aber nicht jeder dieser Eigenschaften entspricht eine „kind of people“; deren Anzahl ist überschaubar. Das kann an einem von Hacking bemühten Beispiel für eine solche „Art von Leuten“ veranschaulicht werden, das auf den ersten Blick den bisherigen Erörterungen zuwiderzulaufen scheint, nämlich der Fettleibigkeit (vgl. Hacking 2007). Obwohl diese Eigenschaft freilich immer schon in der Geschichte und in allen Kulturen von bestimmten Individuen aufgewiesen wurde, existierte doch der *Personentyp* „Fettleibiger“ erst seit geraumer Zeit, nämlich nicht bevor dieses Merkmal in der Wissenschaft und in der Folge der Gesellschaft allgemein mit einiger

Intensität diskutiert wurde. Nun handelt es sich bei „Fettleibigkeit“ um eine rein biologische Eigenschaft (die gemäß der offiziellen Definition bei einem „Body Maß Index“ größer 30 vorliegt), während der Fokus bislang auf mentalen Eigenschaften lag (ohne dass allerdings ausgeschlossen worden wäre, dass auch nicht-mentale Eigenschaften konstitutiv für Personentypen sein könnten). Was macht, so muss man also fragen, eine Person, die die biologische Eigenschaft, fettleibig zu sein, aufweist, zu „einem Fettleibigen“, also zu jemandem, der zu dieser konkreten „kind of people“ gehört. Hacking's Verwendungsweise dieses Begriffs weist gewisse Parallelen zu einem anderen, in der gegenwärtigen Diskussion sehr populären und schillernden Begriff auf, nämlich dem der („persönlichen“, „kollektiven“) „Identität“. So spricht er davon, bei „kinds of people“ gehe es u.a. darum, dass Menschen sich auf eine bestimmte Art und Weise erleben, ein bestimmtes Selbstbild, einen bestimmten Begriff von sich besitzen (vgl. Hacking 2007, 295 und 304). Beim „Selbstbild einer Person“, beim „sich auf eine bestimmte Weise erleben“, handelt es sich nun sicherlich um mentale Eigenschaften. Eine Person kann die biologische Eigenschaft der Fettleibigkeit aufweisen, ohne eine Identität, ein Bild, einen Begriff von sich selbst „als Fettleibiger“ haben zu müssen.

Prämisse 2 in (A) ist also noch in einer weiteren Hinsicht unvollständig: Dass Subjekte bestimmte (mentale oder sonstige) Eigenschaften aufweisen, ist sicher eine notwendige Bedingung für die Zuordnung zu einem Personentyp, aber es reicht nicht hin. Hinzu kommen muss offenbar, dass eine Person dieser Eigenschaft einen hinreichend großen Stellenwert in ihrem Selbstbild eingeräumt.

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'Meaning as Use' in Psychotherapy: How to Understand 'You have my Mind in the Drawer of your Desk.'

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Most commentators on Wittgenstein agree that his first remark in his 1914-16 Notebooks: *Logic must take care of itself* set the stage for much of his later work. As he wrote a few sentences later: *This is an extremely profound and important insight*. It led him away from the common realist belief that there is a system of pre-given truths in the world for which we must select the corresponding signs. The assumption that language merely reflects certain fundamental features of the world; the temptation to think that meaning is something that is correlated with a word. Instead we should attend to the use of words within the context of our life; the meaning of a word is its use in the language game.

There is no explanation possible as to the relation between language and reality. Instead we have to clarify the workings of language from within to see how logic takes care of itself. We have to recognise how a symbol symbolizes and for this we cannot go outside language and inspect language and the world from there.

Philosophy is purely descriptive. Its problems are not the same as scientific ones. These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognise those workings; in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. (PI. 109)

I will not argue for this, as Wittgenstein does and many commentators (eg. McGinn 2006) I will briefly show that most psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, and cognitive therapists (CBT) assume a realist position. They assume the logical structure of language is imposed from outside, by the ultimate structure of reality, and this picture influences their therapy.

Instead of understanding language as autonomous, they assume there is a direct link between bits of language (words) and bits of the world (objects). For example, that we learn the meaning of the word 'red' by applying it correctly to our visual experience of red. Thus the concept of 'red' seems to point in two directions; to something public, the colour red, and to something in my mind that I know by introspection, this experience of red that I have. This belief, that there is an outer world that is real and objective, and an inner world of my psychological experiences that must correctly fit the outer world if I am sane, has a profound influence on their picture of therapy.

To make this discussion as concrete as possible we will discuss a particular patient who insisted that her mind was in the draw of her therapist's desk. I will briefly discuss the theoretical approach of psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and CBT to this phenomenon and then discuss a purely descriptive understanding of it.

To the psychiatrist there is clearly a misfit between the patient's belief that her mind is in the drawer of a desk and the objective fact that minds cannot be in drawers. So there is obviously something wrong with the person's mind, or rather brain, because the mind is assumed to be a causal product of the brain. So the psychiatrist would not be interested in talking to the person to understand what

they mean, but would go straight to what he thought as the cause of the trouble. He would treat the cause by means of a drug, inferring that there is something wrong with the patient's brain chemistry.

To the psychoanalyst too, there is an obvious misfit between the patient's beliefs and reality. Freud thought that external reality, the external world, is correctly described by science, but the pleasure principle, which rules the unconscious and so is internal, tends to replace the reality principle. We easily become ruled by wishes and so our beliefs become wish fulfilments. To cure the patient we have to transform his pleasure ego into a reality ego. This is a difficult process and certainly involves talking to the patient, but it is directed by psychoanalytic theory. It is not descriptive, attending to the use of the words spoken by the patient in the context of his life.

CBT grew out of traditional behaviour therapy. It assumes there are internal covert processes called 'thinking' or 'cognition' that occur in the mind and these mediate behaviour change. These processes can be monitored and altered and so desirable behaviour change may be effected through cognitive change. It assumes that emotions are caused by beliefs and these are represented in the mind as words and images. Obviously, to get angry with your therapist for having your mind in her drawer is undesirable and unreasonable, so various methods to change the beliefs causing this behaviour would be designed. Once again the therapist has an external relation to what is spoken by the patient; he has a theory of the mind that he applies, assuming that their words, beliefs, and behaviour are wrongly correlated with external reality.

Meaning as use.

The notion of an internal relation is an idea that Wittgenstein employs throughout his philosophical career. He argued that language stands in an internal relation of depicting to the world. An external relation is a relation between two items that can be conceived independently of one another and it is a matter of discovery or hypothesis. Thus if someone has a sore throat caused by streptococci, then there is an external relation between the bacteria and the sore throat which has been discovered.

On the other hand, Wittgenstein held that the relation between language and the world that it depicts is not a hypothetical relation between items that can be grasped independently of one another. Language does not reflect features of the world but is in an internal relation to it. Language is a form of life. The link between a sentence and what it means is not to be discovered by means of a hypothesis but rather by seeing the rules that enable us to derive one from the other. Thus the propositional sign 'p' is distinct from the fact that 'p' but they are internally related in so far as we use the propositional sign 'p' to represent the fact that 'p' is the case. We come to see the relation between language and the world it represents more clearly, not by discovering something deep in the mind' but by clarifying the rules of grammar in virtue of which we use

propositional signs to say how things stand. To discern the details of language as use, the structure and function of a particular piece of our language, we need to look and see how the language is actually used in the person's life.

How are we to use this insight in understanding our patient who was so angry that her therapist kept her mind in the drawer of her desk? If there is an internal relation between words and what they signify then it is their use that shows their significance. For language and world are not two interdependent notions if they are internally related. As it is in language that subject and world meet, then it makes no sense to have a notion of a thinking subject that is independent of the language in which a subject represents some state of affairs. Therefore we must reject the idea of a substantial determinate conception of a subject who we can talk to and possibly correct, that is independent of how they represent states of affairs. Similarly we must reject the notion of an object that can be pointed at independently of a subject that represents it. For example, to open the drawer and demonstrate that there is no mind in it, would be dropping back into having an external relation to the subject's world. For our world is within the cognitive grasp of anyone who understands the states of affairs represented by the propositions of our language. *Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain.* (Pl. 126)

What we do is to encourage the person to talk freely and we respond 'internally' to them. That is, we do not apply any theory of the mind or of its disorders upon them, that would be to have an external relation to them. It would be treating them as if they were an entity apart from their use of language. But this is much more easily said than done.

Human beings are deeply imbedded in philosophical, i.e. grammatical, confusions. And freeing them from these presupposes extricating them from the immensely diverse associations they are caught up in. One must, as it were, regroup their entire language.- But of course this language developed as it did because human beings had -and have- the tendency to think in this way .Therefore extracting them only works with those who live in an instinctive state of dissatisfaction with language. Not with those who, following all their instincts, live within the very herd that has created this language as its proper expression. (BT. p.311)

In our society the expectation is that we have a theory of the mind and its disorders and that we apply this to the patient. This works fairly well in ordinary medicine. We describe what is troubling us to the doctor and he then gives us the treatment and we obey, mostly. The doctor here has an external relation with what has been said by the patient. The patient uses language to refer to something he feels is wrong, and the doctor takes what he refers to as true and uses a method, usually giving a drug, to alter it.

But supposing someone says that they are depressed, unhappy, fearful, obsessed, addicted, in despair. Does this fit the simple picture of there being some thing wrong with them and that this thing simply needs correcting? I do not have the space to go into this but note that people typically say, 'I am depressed' etc. In other words they have named themselves as being depressed, etc. Now as I have indicated above, when we have an internal relation to our world there is no self, as an entity, that is in relation with the world. *The world and life are one. I am my world.* (Tract. 5.621-5.63)

Wittgenstein goes on to say that no part of our experience is at the same time a priori. Whatever we see could be other than it is.

Whatever we can describe at all could be other than it is.

There is no a priori order of things. (Tract. 5.634)

But this, of course, is precisely what the patient does not understand. When he says 'I am depressed' etc. he has a picture of an entity 'I' which is a priori and this is in a fixed role in a particular system of language. He has created an intellectual monster that controls him. It is the task of therapy to loosen the grip of this picture by allowing him free reign to say what comes to mind and so find the emptiness of the pictures that have been constructed. Instead of passively accepting a particular interpretation of experience he comes to see differences in experience.

B. Latham.

A woman came to see me.

She said she did not exist, insisting she was not a proper person and was tired of pretending. She could not go on watching other people to see how to behave to be a person.

Occasionally she shouted at me 'Don't talk to me as if I'm a person'.

Week after week she insisted she was the wrong kind of person for therapy and that she had a bit missing, she would never manage to do what was expected of her.

The level of frustration in sessions was very high and she seemed in considerable fear in my room. She jumped at any small noise, then shook as if it was still going through her long after the noise had stopped. She spoke often of her longing for a sealed box where she could find respite.

The day I found myself trying to catch noise before it hit her, I realised how I was trying to be in her mind and out of myself, and that I had better sit in my own body rather than try to meet her disembodied demands.

When she realised I'd shifted, it unleashed her fury. She wanted to smash me and my room to bits. It had to be her mind or mine. If I wasn't trying to be in her mind it was hopeless, she insisted, and began accusing me of keeping her mind and not letting her have it.

This became the certainty that her mind was in my drawer.

We went through several difficult weeks. She was either furious or shaky. One day she said accusingly 'You have a new car'. She had seen my husband drive up as she arrived. Unknown to me she had been coming past the house daily to check the car, to reassure herself that I was looking after her mind in the drawer. The car had been gone for weeks and she had been in a bad way assuming I was never at home.

This enabled a fragile exchange between us, the tiny beginning of a meeting of minds.

I concede two things to her that she wanted, to escort her right out of the house to the street and to give up a Friday time that she knew I wanted free.

These seemed to break the impasse of power, her mind or mine. Conversation became possible.

I began to understand . Her mother, as a professional expert, wrote articles on how to bring up children. She used to prepare a timetable of activities for every half-hour for her own children, even play was strictly specified. She also wrote accounts of these activities which were far from truthful. The children lived in fear that they could not show for the mother raged at any failure to be as she required.

It began to make sense that the woman believed herself to be only a thought in her mother's mind and so not a proper person.

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Form – Wirklichkeit – Repräsentation

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Einleitung

In diesem Referat analysiere ich den Sinn der Bezeichnung „Form der Wirklichkeit“ aus These 2.18 von Wittgensteins *Tractatus*. Die Form der Wirklichkeit bildet, wie es scheint, den Kern der Wirklichkeit. Die Schwierigkeit beruht darin, dass dieser Begriff in Nachbarschaft anderer Begriffe mit scheinbar ähnlicher Bedeutung steht: „Form der Abbildung“, „Form der Darstellung“ oder „logische Form“. Was nun unterscheidet die Form der Wirklichkeit von den übrigen Formen?

Zweifel begleiten auch Wittgensteins Auffassung des Begriffs der „Wirklichkeit“, insbesondere bezüglich der rätselhaften Unterscheidung von „Wirklichkeit“ und „Welt“ (TLP 2.04; 2.05; 2.06; 2.063).

Die Reihenfolge meiner Überlegungen ist folgende: Zuerst erörtere ich verschiedene Arten des Verständnisses der Wirklichkeit. Danach versuche ich zu bestimmen, welche Arten des Verständnisses der Wirklichkeit im *Tractatus* auftreten. Schließlich stelle ich die Frage nach der hinreichenden Begründung für die Berechtigung der Wittgensteinschen Unterscheidung von „Wirklichkeit“ und „Welt“. Im zweiten Teil erörtere ich den Begriff „Form der Wirklichkeit“ vor dem Hintergrund der Methode der so genannten Sinnprojektion. Zum Abschluss stelle ich die Frage, ob der Begriff der Repräsentation im *Tractatus* für eine transzendente Interpretation spricht oder für eine realistische.

1

Die Wirklichkeit – wie leicht festzustellen ist – kann verschiedenartig aufgefasst werden. Der Begriff „Wirklichkeit“ bzw. „wirklich“ offenbart seine Bedeutungsnuancen, wenn er Gegenbegriffen gegenübergestellt wird. So lassen sich etwas die folgenden Begriffspaare unterscheiden:

- (1) Wirklichkeit – Fiktion (Nichtwirklichkeit)
- (2) Wirklichkeit – Erscheinung
- (3a) Wirklichkeit – Möglichkeit
- (3b) Wirklichkeit – Notwendigkeit
- (4) Wirklichkeit – Erfahrung
- (5) Wirklichkeit als Wahrheit – Nichtwirklichkeit als Falschheit
- (6) Wirklichkeit als das, was handelt – Ergebnis des Handelns

In einem kurzen Kommentar zu einigen der oben genannten Unterscheidungen sind folgende Punkte zu beachten: In Fall (2) kann man vom Begriff der Dinge in ihrem Wesen ausgehen in Opposition zu dem, was gewissermaßen an ihrer Oberfläche liegt, sekundär ist (entsprechend der Kantschen Unterscheidung „Dinge an sich“ – „Phänomene“). In den Fällen (3a) und (3b) ist sichtbar, dass der Begriff der Wirklichkeit mit dem Begriff des Bestehens, der Existenz verknüpft ist; darüber hinaus ist die Wirklichkeit das, was der Fall ist (Tatsache/Ereignis) im Gegensatz zur reinen Möglichkeit, dass ein Fall eintritt, und zu den Gesetzen, gemäß

derer Ereignisse eintreten. Die Wirklichkeit steht hier dem Sein gegenüber, da wir im Fall des letzteren Begriffs vom Bestehen/Nichtbestehen abstrahieren, was bedeutet, dass der Begriff des Seins sich gegenüber dieser Unterscheidung neutral verhält. Hegel wiederum definiert in seiner *Wissenschaft der Logik* die Wirklichkeit als „Einheit von Wesen und Existenz“, was darauf hinweist, dass Existenz selbst an sich nur ein abstrakter Moment einer gewissen Gesamtheit ist. Bradley hingegen – ähnlich wie Hume – unterstreicht die wesenhafte Identität von Erscheinung und Wirklichkeit; die Wirklichkeit ist nichts anderes und nicht mehr als die Gesamtheit der Erscheinungen.

Welche Anschauung von der Wirklichkeit tritt im *Tractatus* auf? Auf den ersten Blick mag scheinen, dass nach Wittgenstein Welt und Wirklichkeit eins sind. Die Welt als Gesamtheit der Tatsachen (TLP 1.1) ist dem gegenübergestellt, was rein möglich ist, das heißt dem logischen Raum (TLP 1.13). Wittgenstein bedient sich eines Begriffs der „Welt“, der sein Verständnis als „mögliche Welt“ ausschließt. Die Welt ist demnach das, was wirklich ist, im Gegensatz zum logischen Raum, also dem, was möglich ist, und in Hinsicht auf das, was notwendig ist, also zur Tautologie. Weiterhin wird die Welt als „Gesamtheit der bestehenden Sachverhalte“ definiert (TLP 2.04). So könnte es scheinen, dass dieses existenzielle Moment – das Bestehen – ein Synonym zu „wirklich sein“ darstellt, dass also Welt und Wirklichkeit für Wittgenstein identisch sind.

Jedoch wird die Beziehung zwischen Wirklichkeit und Welt durch zwei andere Thesen des *Tractatus* problematisiert: „Das Bestehen Und Nichtbestehen von Sachverhalten ist die Wirklichkeit. (Das Bestehen von Sachverhalten nennen wir auch eine positive, das Nichtbestehen eine negative Tatsache.)“ (TLP 2.06) „Die gesamte Wirklichkeit ist die Welt.“ (TLP 2.063) These 2.06 suggeriert, dass die Wirklichkeit in einem bestimmten Sinn mehr ist als die Welt, wohingegen These 2.063 deutlich feststellt, dass die Wirklichkeit nicht über die Welt hinausreicht; man kann nicht von irgendeiner Transzendenz (im starken Sinne) der Wirklichkeit gegenüber der Welt sprechen. Wittgenstein gibt einen Hinweis, wie der begriffliche Unterschied zwischen Welt und Wirklichkeit zu verstehen ist „Die Gesamtheit der bestehenden Sachverhalte ist die Welt.“ (TLP 2.04) „Die Gesamtheit der bestehenden Sachverhalte bestimmt auch, welche Sachverhalte nicht bestehen.“ (TLP 2.05) Anders gesagt, die nicht bestehenden Sachverhalte – die für den Unterschied zwischen Wirklichkeit und Welt entscheidend sind, tauchen gewissermaßen automatisch auf; sie sind ein Nebenprodukt einer vollständigen Erfassung der Welt.

Als entscheidender Punkt, was den Unterschied zwischen Welt und Wirklichkeit anbelangt, erweist sich der Begriff der Negation. Eine Konsequenz daraus ist die besondere Weise des Erfassens der Welt. Wenn wir von den bestehenden und nichtbestehenden Sachverhalten sprechen, unterscheiden wir die Welt (die Gesamtheit der positiven Tatsachen) und ihren „Schatten“, ihre Ergänzung (die Gesamtheit der negativen Tatsachen). Dank dieser Negation wird der Antagonismus von Existieren – Nichtexistieren (der Sachverhalte) zunächst begründet, um daraufhin im Rahmen des Wirklichkeitsbegriffs „aufgehoben“ zu werden (um mit Hegel zu sprechen).

Wittgenstein behauptet, dass das Subjekt nicht zur Welt gehört (TLP 5.632), sondern seine Bedingung darstellt. Kann man diesem Subjekt die Durchführung der Operation der dualen Einteilung und der Reflexion zuschreiben? Mit anderen Worten: Ist das Subjekt als „Grenze der Welt“ und Bedingung der Welt nur/lediglich ein abstraktes Moment der Welt? Oder ist das Subjekt ein authentisch handelndes metaphysisches Sein? An dieser Stelle ergeben sich weitere Interpretationen. Nach der ersten ist das Subjekt die Sprache als Gesamtheit der Sätze (Hintikka 1958). Die zweite Interpretation, die an die Lesart der Thesen des *Tractatus* durch das Prisma der Metaphysik Schopenhauers anknüpft, erkennt das Subjekt als Subjekt des Willens (Birk 2006). Wie dem auch sei, entweder (1) in der Sprache als Subjekt ist die begriffliche Unterscheidung von Welt und Wirklichkeit enthalten, oder (2) das denkende transzendente/metaphysische Subjekt ist Voraussetzung nicht nur der Welt, sondern auch der begrifflich von der Welt unterscheidbaren Wirklichkeit.

2

Zuweilen wird die Welt nicht von der Wirklichkeit unterschieden (Mc Guinness 1981) und werden diese Begriffe synonym gebraucht. Wittgenstein jedoch bedient sich der Begriffe „Form der Welt“ und „Form der Wirklichkeit“, die er deutlich voneinander abgrenzt, was auf einen wesentlichen Unterschied zwischen dem Begriff der Welt und dem Begriff der Wirklichkeit hinweist. Die Form der Welt sind die Gegenstände (TLP 2.022; 2.023), die seine Substanz bilden (TLP 2.021). Der Begriff der Welt und seiner Form beinhaltet jedoch keine Dimension, die aus dem Auftreten der Repräsentation sich ergeben würde. In These 2.1 stellt Wittgenstein fest: „Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen.“ Unter dem Gesichtspunkt des empirischen Realismus bedeutet dies, dass der Mensch als konkretes empirisches, erkennendes Subjekt eine Art Verdoppelung oder Spaltung der Welt vollzieht. Um mit den Worten Whiteheads zu sprechen, bedeutet diese „Bifurkation“, dass die ursprüngliche Gesamtheit in Fakten (Originale) und ihre Repräsentationen zerfällt. Bei transzendentaler Betrachtung jedoch sind sowohl die Tatsachen/Situationen in der Welt als auch ihre Bilder Tatsachen (TLP 2.141). Es gilt also die transzendentalen Voraussetzungen zu untersuchen, die jene Spaltung ermöglichen und bestimmen, die also die Möglichkeiten des Auftretens von Tatsachen zweifacher Art bedingen. Unabhängig dazu sind die Begriffe des transzendentalen (oder metaphysischen) Subjekts (TLP 5.633), der Wirklichkeit (TLP 2.06) und der Form der Abbildung (TLP 2.15 -2.151). Der Begriff der Wirklichkeit, der es erlaubt, den zweifachen Aspekt der Welt – den positiven und den negativen – auszudrücken, sowie der Begriff der Form der Wirklichkeit stecken eine rein transzendente Perspektive ab, die es erlaubt, den ganzen Nuancenreichtum in den Relationen von „Bild“ und „Tatsache“ darzustellen. Kurz gesagt, „Negation“, „Bestehen“ und „Identität“ sind reflexive Begriffe, die erst aus der transzendentalen Perspektive, in welcher der Begriff der Wirklichkeit gründet, sich vollständig artikulieren lassen.

Die „Form der Wirklichkeit“ gehört zu den schwierigsten Begriffen im *Tractatus*. Er verweist auf die „Form der Abbildung und die „logische Form“. Die „Form der Welt“ hingegen verweist auf die Form der einfachen Gegenstände (TLP 2.0141; 2.026). Die „Form der Wirklichkeit“ begründet demnach die Spaltung/Bifurkation der Welt, die „Form der Welt“ nicht.

Die Form der Wirklichkeit ist – durch die Form der Abbildung mit dem Begriff der Identität verknüpft. „Die Tatsache muss, um Bild zu sein, etwas mit dem Abgebildeten gemeinsam haben.“ (TLP 2.16) „In Bild und Abgebildeten

muß etwas identisch sein, damit das eine überhaupt ein Bild des anderen sein kann.“ (TLP 2.161) „Was das Bild mit der Wirklichkeit gemein haben muß, um sie auf eine Art und Weise – richtig oder falsch – abbilden zu können, ist seine Form der Abbildung.“ (TLP 2.17)

In den Thesen 2.17 - 2.18 behauptet Wittgenstein: Logische Form und Form der Wirklichkeit sind ein und dasselbe. J. Hintikka meint, dass diese Behauptung eines Beweises bedürfe. (Hintikka 1996, 161). Wittgenstein liefert keine ausführliche Argumentation, die sich als Beweis ansehen ließe. Man kann jedoch versuchen einen solchen Beweis zu skizzieren. Die „logische Form“ ist ein Begriff, der auf Sätze, Urteile anzuwenden ist. In These 3.315 beschreibt Wittgenstein die Prozedur der Verwandlung in Variablen, durch die wir die logische Form gewinnen, die er auch als „Urbild“ bezeichnet. Diese Auffassung der logischen Form hat Wittgenstein von Russell entlehnt (Russell 1992, 113). Die logische Form ist demnach eine Art Schema, das eine „Klasse von Sätzen“ generiert, also einen konkreten Satz ermöglicht. Die logische Form situiert sich auf der Seite der Sprache und des Denkens; ein Gedanke nämlich ist ein „sinnvoller Satz“ (TLP 4).

Auf der anderen Seite haben wir die Wirklichkeit, die sich aus positiven und negativen Tatsachen – bestehenden und nicht bestehenden Sachverhalten – zusammensetzt. Die Möglichkeit des Bestehens und Nichtbestehens von Sachverhalten hingegen ist eine Form der Wirklichkeit. Die logische Form ist eine syntaktisch bestimmte Form, wohingegen die Form der Wirklichkeit ontologisch bestimmt ist. Die Identität beider Formen wird durch die Form der Abbildung gewährleistet. Letztere gründet sich auf „Zuordnungen“ (TLP 2.1513 - 2.1515) unter der Bedingung, dass „die gleiche Mannigfaltigkeit“ der Strukturelemente auftritt (TLP 4.04). Die Hauptvoraussetzung für die Identität der logischen Form und der Form der Wirklichkeit kommt in der folgenden These zum Ausdruck: „Die Möglichkeit des Satzes beruht auf dem Prinzip der Vertretung von Gegenständen durch Zeichen.“ (TLP 4.0312) Wenn eine Repräsentation der Gegenstände/Tatsachen unmöglich wäre, würde die Sprache nicht die Welt/Wirklichkeit repräsentieren. Angesichts dieser Tatsache wäre die logische Form nicht die Form der Wirklichkeit.

Die logische Form, das heißt die Form der Wirklichkeit, ist nichts Drittes, also unterschiedlich sowohl vom Satz als Bild der Wirklichkeit wie auch von der abgebildeten Tatsache. Entschieden lehnt Wittgenstein die an den Platonismus anknüpfende Auffassung ab, wie sie bei Russell zu finden ist. Dieser betrachtete in seiner *Theory of Knowledge* die logischen Formen für eigene Seinsformen, die – analog zu den platonischen Ideen – den Urteilen/Sätzen Einheit verleihen (Russell 1992, 116). Russells Standpunkt führt zu einem infiniten Regress.

Wittgensteins Lösung des Problems der Natur der logischen Form ist eher im Stil Aristoteles' als Platons. Der Beweis der Identität der logischen Form der Sätze und der Formen der Wirklichkeit erfordert eine Berufung auf den transzendenten Punkt hinsichtlich des Satzes und der Tatsache, in dem sich die Identität beider Formen erkennen lässt. Jedoch sind diese Formen selbst (oder eigentlich dieselbe Form!) gegenwärtig im Satz und in der Tatsache. Wittgenstein sagt nämlich, dass die Form sich nicht darstellen oder aussprechen lässt, sondern sich im Satz „spiegelt“ (TLP 4.121). Angesichts dessen ist das Einzige, was man tun kann, sie zu „sehen“, sie als dieselben zu zeigen. Dieser transzendente Punkt, in dem man einen solchen Vergleich vollziehen und die Identität der beiden Formen feststellen kann, ist das transzendente Subjekt, also das philosophische Ich. (TLP 5.641)

Ähnlich wie Aristoteles betrachtete es den Intellekt als „Ort der Form“ – denn er vermag es die Form vom Gegenstand zu abstrahieren. So ist das metaphysische Subjekt im Stande die Identität der Strukturen des Bildes, also der Sätze, und der Tatsache zu erkennen. „Die Wirklichkeit wird mit dem Satz verglichen.“ (TLP 4.05) Das Problem der Möglichkeit des Vergleichs der Wirklichkeit mit einem Satz ist seinem Wesen das Problem der Identität der logischen Form, das heißt der Form der Wirklichkeit. „Auf den ersten Blick scheint der Satz – wie er etwa auf dem Papier gedruckt steht – kein Bild der Wirklichkeit zu sein, von der er handelt. Aber auch die Notenschrift scheint auf den ersten Blick kein Bild der Musik zu sein...“ (TLP 4.011) Die „innere Ähnlichkeit“ des Satzzeichens und der Tatsache, also die Identität der logischen Form, ist nicht etwas Natürliches, sondern wird garantiert dank einer Regel, die von Wittgenstein als „Projektionsmethode“ bezeichnet wird (TLP 4.0141). Mit anderen Worten, nur dank der Projektionsmethode lässt sich die gleiche Struktur des Satzes und des Sachverhalts erkennen. Jenes ungreifbare *etwas* – die logische Form, das heißt die Form der Wirklichkeit – ist nicht möglich ohne das metaphysische Subjekt und die transzendente Regel, also die Projektionsmethode. Das, was identisch ist, ist eben jene Form (TLP 4.04), die sich nicht „abbilden“ oder „darstellen“ lässt (TLP 4.041; 4.12; 4.121).

Die Frage kehrt zurück: Warum eigentlich lässt sich die logische Form nicht darstellen? Wittgenstein gibt natürlich eine Antwort, die aber eher ein Hinweis zum Weiterdenken ist als eine endgültige Lösung. Er stellt fest: „Um die logische Form darstellen zu können, müssten wir uns mit dem Satze außerhalb der Logik aufstellen können, das heißt außerhalb der Welt.“ (TLP 4.12). Es könnte scheinen, dass das Subjekt, eben dadurch, dass es sich der Regeln der Interpretation bedient (Projektionsmethode), diese außerweltliche Position einnimmt. Dann jedoch könnte das Subjekt wohl die logische Form darstellen. Da aber eine solche Lösung von Wittgenstein ausgeschlossen wird, könnte dies entweder (1) eine totale Kritik des Begriffs des Subjekts oder (2) eine innere Inkohärenz im *Tractatus* bedeuten. (Haller, 1989). Ist es also für irgendein Subjekt möglich, auf die Welt „sub specie aeterni“ zu blicken (TLP 6.45), oder ist dies nur ein unerfüllbarer Traum?

Das transzendente Subjekt, das sich der Projektionsmethode bedient, und die logische Form / die Form der Wirklichkeit zu zeigen und zu sehen vermag, ist jedoch nicht im Stande diese Form darzustellen. Als Grenze und Bedingung der Welt/Wirklichkeit ist es selbst etwas Sekundäres, ein Produkt der Spaltung, der Bifurkation, des ursprünglichen Ganzen. Davon spricht These 5.64, wo das „Ich“ auftaucht, also ein „ausdehnungsloser Punkt“ sowie „die ihm koordinierte Realität“. Andererseits ist gemäß These 5.63 das Subjekt – Ich – mit der Welt identisch. Die logische Form, die Form der Wirklichkeit ist das, was identisch ist (für Welt und Denken/Subjekt). Aber Identität setzt Unterschied voraus und Unterschied – Identität. Dies ist der der Unterschied zwischen Momenten desselben, das heißt des ursprünglichen Ganzen.

Wittgenstein hebt hervor, dass „die Identität keine Relation zwischen Gegenständen ist“ (TLP 5.5301) und fügt hinzu: „Beiläufig gesprochen: Von zwei Dingen zu sagen, sie seien identisch, ist ein Unsinn, und von Einem zu sagen, es sei identisch mit sich selbst, sagt gar nichts.“ (TLP 5.5303) Diese Thesen belegen, dass Wittgenstein die Identität ähnlich versteht wie Parmenides und Frege. Identität – im engeren Sinne – kann nur im Rahmen eines Ganzen auftreten, in dem zwei gegensätzliche Momente unterschieden werden können. Parmenides verkündet: „Denn dasselbe ist Denken

und Sein.“ Sein und Denken sind nicht zwei gesonderte Gegenstände, sondern Aspekte des Einen. So ähnlich sind Abend- und Morgenstern zwei verschiedene Aspekte, verschiedene Perspektiven, in denen wir denselben Gegenstand, den Planeten Venus, sehen, sagt Frege.

Die Wirklichkeit hat eine solche Natur, dass sie, beginnend mit dem ursprünglichen Ganzen, also dem Einen, sich durch die Spaltung entfaltet und dadurch die in ihr steckenden verschiedenen Momente offenbart, woraufhin die Spaltung aufgehoben wird; das bedeutet, die gegensätzlichen Momente Sprache/Gedanke und Tatsachen/Welt werden erneut miteinander gleichgesetzt. Dieser zweite Schritt jedoch – jene Gleichsetzung dessen, was zuvor voneinander geschieden war – lässt sich nicht in der Sprache ausdrücken. Er lässt sich sehen, „zeigen“, aber nicht aussprechen – so sieht es Wittgenstein.

Sprache und Welt, Subjekt und Wirklichkeit, sind zwei Gegenpole desselben. Die Identität, die zwischen diesen Polen besteht, ist keine Relation im eigenen Sinn, also ein äußerer Bezug (external relation), sondern eine uneigentliche Relation, also ein innerer Bezug (internal relation) (TLP 4.122), transzendental im scholastischen Sinn. Jene Quasi-Relation, also die Identität, ist die die logische Form und die Form der Wirklichkeit, die erkannt wird als Grundlage der Einheit der Einzelmomente im ursprünglichen Ganzen. Gleichzeitig offenbart sich diese Identität als Form der Wirklichkeit dank der Spaltung des ursprünglichen Ganzen, des Einen. Es gibt keine Form der Wirklichkeit jenseits der Wirklichkeit, das bedeutet, die Form der Wirklichkeit – die logische Form – ist nicht von außen oktroyiert dem, was wir Wirklichkeit nennen. Wittgenstein geht den von Aristoteles vorgezeichneten Weg, nicht den Platons und Russells.

Schlussbemerkungen

Ist Wittgenstein ein Realist? Das heißt: Sind Wirklichkeit (Welt) und Sprache (Gedanke) nach der im *Tractatus* dargelegten Konzeption gegenseitig autonom und lediglich im transzendentalen Subjekt zusammengefügt? Mit anderen Worten, ist die Relation zwischen Wirklichkeit und Sprache eine äußere Relation im Russellschen Sinn? Diese Ausführungen haben gezeigt, dass dem nicht so ist. Es lässt sich hingegen von einer gegenseitigen Abhängigkeit von Sprache und Wirklichkeit sprechen, und die Wirklichkeit erweist sich als Funktion der Natur der Sprache selbst (Morrison 1968, 29). Dies bestätigt die transzendente Interpretation des *Tractatus*.

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Language Change and Imagination

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63. If we imagine the facts otherwise than as they are, certain language-games lose some of their importance, while others become important. And in this way there is an alteration – a gradual one – in the use of the vocabulary of a language.
(OC §63)

This remark from Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* shall be the starting point for some considerations on what at a first glance seems to be a converse intention: change in language and its relation to imagination.

§§ 61-65 of *On Certainty* present a compact account of Wittgenstein's concept of meaning in respect of alteration of language use: A meaning of a word (there may be several ones) is defined as "a kind of employment of it". It is tightly linked to the initial process of learning to employ a word (within a language game), when "the word is [first] incorporated into our language" (OC § 61). The conception of language learning to be primarily adopting language behaviour supports the "correspondence between the concepts 'rule' and 'meaning'" stated in §62.

From this point of view on language, which is backed in a social framework and the conceptual affinity of meaning and rule, alteration is defined as a gradual one; happening bit for bit ("allmählich") in a process of change that is just observable in the long run. One could even find an ironic undertone in the comparison of "the meaning of a word with the 'function' of an official" (OC § 64): if there is change at all, it is slow.

On Certainty focuses on what is characterized as "world-picture", the "river-bed of thoughts" to take up Wittgenstein's metaphor (OC § 97) as opposed to more fluid and changeable sentences (though he concedes there is no sharp division). Therefore alteration of meaning is conceptualized on a broad social and diachronic scope. Change in respect to those sentences that make up a world-picture rather becomes apparent retrospectively as a *fait accompli* than as a current social process.

Staying within the analogy of the 'stream' and 'river bed of thoughts', as opposed to Wittgenstein I want to accentuate the aspect of 'fluidity'. That is not confined to empirical statements as the more fluid sentences guided by logics in accordance to a world-picture. But it does as well imply the possibility of established common beliefs and meanings to "change back into a state of flux" (OC § 97).

Within this short section of *On Certainty* alteration of meaning is described in a double manner. On one hand in a kind of referential way: Meaning is understood in relation to multiple language games, alteration as a shift in importance among these (cf. OC §63). On the other hand in §65 the possibility of language games themselves to change is stated, which consequently results in an alteration of concepts and meanings. This leaves open as well the possibility of a new language game to be established.

Hence there is a dynamics of meaning, which appears from two different perspectives: firstly, from the point of learning a set of language games and practices which are common to a language community in order to be able

to interact through them. This includes learning to assert common evidence and avoid questioning what cannot be rationally doubted among people sharing a similar world-picture. From this point of view alteration of meaning mainly appears on a broad scale as a shift in the relevance commonly attached to different language games. This is the more important argumentation line concerning the question of certainty.

Secondly, beyond this characteristic there is the capability to change language games or establish new ones and alter meanings within them. That now does not refer to the point of view of a language learner, of someone who first needs to become able to act within a language, but of language users adapting familiar language games within actually practising them.

Although the process of meaning change in this case is a social one too, it does not necessitate a broad scale assertion as the transformation of 'hardening' sentences into common evidence or certain ones does. Alteration in this sense appears on a more local than global scope as a new use of vocabulary within a specific context by a partial group of speakers. It does not obligatory have to be gradually. Possibly even a spontaneous character could be ascribed to it.

But what is meant by something as a 'new language game'? The progression from a constructed 'language game' with a limited set of expressions to another more complex one (cf. PI §1-8)? The term is not really helpful to confine a new entity within the 'manifold' of language games. It does just point out a novel practice: a change in the use of language, which can't be fully justified by previous conventions of meaning.

To come back to the quotation from *On Certainty* I started with, there is a remarkable linguistic peculiarity:

"If we imagine the facts otherwise than they are [...]" (OC §63).

Is this more than a figure of speech? Imagination does not appear as a central term to Wittgenstein's line of argumentation, although it is used as a tool within his reasoning in the form of thought experiments. If imagination is discussed explicitly it often appears as a source of wrong conclusions.

Nevertheless the thought experiment on the impossibility of a private language gives an important clue on the relation of language (as essentially social) and imagination. It demonstrates the failure of knowledge claims based on what is considered a 'private sensation', as those cannot be communicated as such, but actually have to be spoken upon by expressions whose meaning is determined socially. But at the same time in the discussion of pain and its expression or substitution within language ("the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it" PI §244), imagination is assigned a role which is in a way complementary to the abstraction performed within linguistic meaning being primarily constrained by its use in language games.

Abstraction here refers to the ability to employ concepts independently from the concrete context in which they were acquired or any phenomenal experience associated with them. As well as we are capable to use the concept of an apple, without necessarily thinking of it as red or yellow ..., or to make up a concept of pain that is independent from a peculiar sensation and applicable to different pain behaviour, there is still room and actual use for the ability to picture an apple as red and to imagine, how it feels to be in pain. In regard to language both abilities play an important role in understanding and acting. A key passage in Wittgenstein in respect of this aspect is:

"If one has to imagine someone else's pain on the model of one's own, this is none too easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine pain which I do not feel on the model of the pain which I do feel." (PI §302)

Wittgenstein lays clear the problematic of knowledge claims relying on imagination. But still imagination takes a certain roll within language practice. In regard to questions of epistemology or meaning it seems to be a rather confusing one.

But may imagination support us in a case when apparently no acquired rules of language games fit someone other's utterance? Is it involved into alteration within language by providing the ability to act within an emerging language game, whose rules are (even implicitly) yet unknown?

In this sense, is imagination linked to 'fluidity' within the river analogy? Can it be thought of as means to bring the hardened sentences of the river-bed into flux again (cf. OC §97)?

Wittgenstein's views discussed so far mainly focused on language and it's relation to epistemological questions. Now I want to have a closer look on the topic of alteration of meaning in another field: the use of language in (poetic) metaphors.

In *What Metaphors mean* (Davidson 1981) Donald Davidson gave an account of metaphor, that later was took up by Richard Rorty, who explicitly linked it with the use of metaphor in poetry and its interpretation (cf. Rorty 1991). Davidson rejects the idea of a specific metaphorical meaning or a genuine cognitive content conveyed by metaphors.

"We must give up the idea that a metaphor carries a message, that it has a content or meaning (except, of course, its literal meaning). The various theories we have been considering mistake their goal. Where they think they provide a method for deciphering an encoded content, they actually tell us (or try to tell us) something about the effects metaphors have on us." (Davidson 1981, p. 216)

While this way no 'metaphorical' meaning is assumed, metaphors can be thought to evoke some peculiar strategies in attempt to cope with them, which are actually grasped by the different theoretical approaches to metaphor. Hence metaphor and 'metaphorical' use of language are linked to specific practices of language use and understanding. Davidson's concept of metaphor and his negation of 'metaphorical' meaning show similarities to Wittgenstein's account in *Philosophical Investigations*.

Wittgenstein as well denies 'metaphorical' meaning (and avoids the question of truth conditions arising from this assumption). At the same time he makes a distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' meaning.

„Here one might speak of a 'primary' and 'secondary' sense of a word. It is only if the word has the primary sense for you that you use it in the secondary one.[...]

The secondary sense is not a 'metaphorical' sense. If I say "For me the vowel e is yellow" I do not mean: 'yellow' in a metaphorical sense, – for I could not express what I want to say in any other way than by means of the idea 'yellow'." (PI, p. 184e)

While in this example to know the 'primary' sense (which is more common) is necessary to make use of a 'secondary' one (you would not explain 'yellow' by referring to 'the colour of the vowel e'), 'secondary' meaning within the specific situation of its use can't be reduced to the former. The impossibility to be paraphrased makes a characteristic of metaphor in Wittgenstein's and Davidson's conception. This is not due to a particular 'metaphorical' meaning, but the actual use which differs from its more common employment constitutes that 'secondary' meaning in this specific case. Metaphors thus mark the tangential point of customary language use and the development of new practices of language employment, limited to specific situations and small speaker groups.

In Wittgenstein's example of assigning the words 'fat' and 'lean' to Mondays and Tuesdays (cf. PI, p. 184e) the choice of the words and which to attribute to which day of week seems arbitrarily. Its actual use in this way is not justified by any more than deliberation:

„Now have "fat" and "lean" some different meaning here from their usual one? - They have a different use. - So ought I really to have used different words? Certainly not that. - I want to use *these* words (with their familiar meanings) *here*." (PI, p. 184e)

The words "fat" and "lean" themselves may just be explained by their usual employment. Nevertheless this does not clear up how they are employed here and why in this manner. Obviously there is no way to deduct it from their use in more common language games.

But indeed there is some hint by Wittgenstein, an assumption, which is rather futile in the search for a definite meaning, but enough to keep up interaction: "Now, I say nothing about the causes of this phenomenon. They *might* be associations from my childhood. But that is a hypothesis." (PI, p.184e)

Here the role of imagination sets in. While imagination turns out to be tricky and misleading on the ideas of knowledge and private sensations, it can prove important as means to cope with such an unfamiliar language use. Maybe it even enables us to encounter or create a new language game within interaction (as for this it takes at least two persons not only one).

When facing an uncommon utterance in conversation there actually is the possibility of asking for an explanation, a paraphrase (even if that way what is exactly grasped by describing the vowel e as 'yellow' may be lost). This resort is not available regarding metaphors in written language, especially in poetry.

To classify an utterance as 'metaphorical' is a strategy to cope with an expression that is beyond customary language use and irritating to assert as a literal truth, but not yet considered senseless. Instead it is assigned to a specific situation of employment, having a 'secondary' meaning on a local scope. In this case imagination, associations and the construction of analogies are allowed to be more actively involved in the attempt of understanding

apart from checking the conformity to some well-known language games.

Davidson suggests theories of metaphors and metaphorical meaning to actually relate to the effects that metaphors have on us. In this sense one could understand theoretical accounts of metaphor as describing the practice of dealing with those utterances.

An interesting approach on metaphorical expression, especially as it is not constrained to language but takes into account metaphors in different branches of art, has been proposed by Nelson Goodman.

To give a very brief account, Goodman (cf. 1976, p. 45-95) opposes denotation with his concept of exemplification or expression. The example he uses are colour patches (also referred to by Wittgenstein). Colour patches materially *exemplify* a property (as 'being red', 'being yellow' ...). Exemplification is matched by a denotative sentence as its counterpart. ('The colour patch is red. It exemplifies redness.') By analogy expression (as "expressing sadness") is matched by a denotation, which can be called metaphorical because we would hesitate to call it literally true ('This picture is sad. The picture expresses sadness.')

The interesting point about this conception (most evidently in the case of Goodman's example of a painting) is that it hands over the task of denotation, to determine a meaning, to the observer. So it does well fit a conception

of metaphor as an artistic, poetic or linguistic practice that leads into a creative process of interpretation, where by means of imagination explanations are developed and an 'unfamiliar noise' may not only be imitated as a practice as Richard Rorty said (cf. Rorty 1991, p. 170); But within social interaction it may become part of new language game evolving, bringing along with a different use a change of meaning.

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A Lexicological Study on Animal Fixed Expressions

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1. Introduction

Compositionality is a universal characteristic of language (Brighton 2005: 13, cf. Wittgenstein 1953). Books were compiled for the purpose of clarifying this issue (e.g., Machery, Werning and Schurz 2005). Among linguists, the methodological status of compositionality in semantics has been intensively investigated (e.g., Partee 1984, Janssen 1986, 1997). This paper presents the research results of a project "A Lexicological Study on Animal Fixed Expressions in Mandarin Chinese, Taiwanese, German and English" (NSC 91-2411-H-218-003) financially supported by National Science Council in Taiwan. Four corpora are compiled during the research, they are, a Mandarin Chinese (MCh) animal fixed expressions (AEs), a German AEs, a Taiwanese mythical AEs and an English mythical AEs. The AEs in the corpora include: metaphors, similes, proverbs, sayings, frozen collocations, grammatically ill-formed collocations and routine formulae, all of which are fixed expressions (Alexander 1978, Carter 1987, Moon 1998), not ad-hoc terms or freely generated phrases, and contain at least one animal name that has metaphorical meaning. The Chinese corpus contains 2980 and the German corpus 2630 written and spoken AEs. The Taiwanese and English Corpora have 254 mythical AEs. The data are categorized by the animal names in alphabetical order in EXCEL. Different kinds of data relating to individual AEs were recorded in up to 12 separate fields.

This project aims to sketch a figure of how the AEs are derived from the vehicles (the animal names), to examine the primitive semantic features of the collected AEs, and then to map the metaphorical tenors (the meaning of the AEs) to the underlying conceit (the relation between the vehicle and the tenor). On the other hand, we observe the lexical change, the linguistic and social functions of the AEs and at the end the language ideologies.

2. The derivation of animal fixed expressions

Wierzbicka (1985:167) proposes that animal terms are developed from the animals' appearances, habits, and relations to people. Our data provide further information. Many AEs are arbitrary inventions (15% in MCh and 9% in German) and have nothing to do with the animals themselves. The arbitrary inventions of the AEs can be from fairy tales (*hu²jia³hu³wei¹* 狐假虎威), superstition (*Ich habe ein Vögelchen davon singen hören*), from transliteration (*xiong²xiong²* 熊熊) or loan translation (*qian¹xi¹chong²* 千禧蟲), etc. They have their roots in traditional, rural society and language contact.

The meaning of a word contains a word's meaning, grammatical properties and our general cultural knowledge about the world (Wittgenstein 1978, Fillmore and Atkins 1992). The same animal appearance or behaviour can be perceived and interpreted differently by different peoples of various cultures. Fig. 1 sketches an image of how the animal words "live" in people's mind.




Fig. 1. The derivation of animal expressions

The corpora further indicate that Chinese tend to generate more AEs from animal appearances and apply them to the basic-need domain (see Table 1), e.g. that a snail carries a shell is observed by Chinese people, thus, *wu²ke²gua¹niu²* 無殼蝸牛 (no-shell-snail – people who are not capable of purchasing houses) is produced, to apply to the basic housing need. On the other hand, the Germans tend to generate more AEs from animal behaviours or habits and apply them to an emotional domain, in addition to applying to basic need domain. That a snail carries its shell is also observed by the Germans, but the behaviour that it withdraws into its shell when encountering danger is the underlying conceit of the AEs: *sich in sein Schneckenhaus zurückziehen* (self-in-one's-snail shell-withdraw) and *jemanden zur Schnecke machen* (someone-to-snail-make). They are composed to denote "to go into one's shell" and "to come down on someone like a ton of bricks", respectively. Table 1 counts the percentages of different types of underlying conceits and the share of metaphorical tenors in the MCh and German corpora.

[Please confer to table 1]

3. The primitive semantic features

Having been influenced by Labov's (1973) denotation conditions approach, Wierzbicka (1985) studied animal terms in the way of stating explication that contains many semantically complex words. Goddard (1998) then develops Wierzbicka's proposal and concludes that, for example, the *tiger* explication "contains many semantically complex words... they function as units" (p.247), and are "composed directly of 'primitive semantic features,'" (p.255). The linguistic evidence of these features is, e.g., *a game of cat and mouse*, *a cat-nap*, *catfight*, etc. (Goddard 1998:249).

The primitive semantic features of AEs are abstracted in this research. Here we take MCh and German *wolf*-AEs as examples. In MCh *wolf* stands for +malevolent and +cruelty. An arbitrary feature of *wolf* assigned by the speakers is +lecherous: *se⁴lang²* 色狼 (color-wolf – sexual maniac) and *lang²wen³* 狼吻 (wolf-kiss – to be raped). According to *Jiyun* (The Book of Rhymes), the *bei* (猥) is an

animal of wolf genus. Wolf and bei often collaborate by walking or working together. The blending of *wolf* and *bei* is highlighted in MCh: *lang²bei⁴wef²jian¹* 狼狽為奸 (wolf-bei-do-evil – act in collusion with each other), *lang²bei⁴* 狼狽 (wolf-bei – embarrassed; in a difficult position) and so on.

The *wolf* in German stands for +greed and +malevolent. Even the adjective *wölfisch* (wolfish – greedy, cruel) was generated. The combination of *wolf* and *sheep* gave rise to several AEs: *Wer sich zum Schaf macht, den fressen die Wölfe* (who acts like a sheep will be eaten by wolves), *ein Wolf im Schafspelz* (the wolf in sheep's skin – the wolf in sheep's clothing), etc. In reality the predator is after the sheep because it is a simple prey. In the Bible and in fairy tales wolf and sheep appear side-by-side; their relationship represents the contrast [+good] vs. [+evil] or [+weak] vs. [+strong].

As wild animals are hard to tame, people deal with them in a respectful manner. Consequently there are no tiger-AEs referring to the human-animal relations. This is completely different from that of domestic animals. Table 2 lists the primitive semantic features of some vehicles. The percentages in the table indicate the more salient features. Those in brackets are out-of-date ones that can be found only in literature.

[Please confer to table 2]

4. Lexical change

Dragon-AEs occupy about 9% of the MCh corpus. While lexical meaning changes from concrete to abstract (Traugott 1995: 32), the lexemes contain *long* 龍 (dragon) develops in a different way: abstract > concrete, high > low. The semantic element *long* can now serve as a popular phonetic representation stands for the phonological unit [+liquids] + [-front vowels] + [+nasal consonant] due to the language contact, e.g., *sha¹long²* 沙龍 (salon) and *nai¹long²* 耐龍 (nylon). This is a new tendency for many Chinese characters when loaning words from other languages by the way of transliteration. Homonyms play a key role here. A transliteration can be so widely used that it becomes an affix underwent grammaticalization.

Grammaticalization is observed in animal name usage in both languages. They reinforce the meaning of their heads in the compounds or the phrases and serve as intensifiers, e.g., the *Affen* in *Affenschande* (monkey shame – absolute scandal) doesn't mean "monkey" and the *Bären* in *Bärenkälte* (bear-cold – big cold) doesn't refer to "bear". They lost or mitigated their own semantic function and work as grammatical units.

5. Vocabulary of values

The corpora show that about 80% of AEs are used to scorn or warn people. AEs are not used for bad purposes but rather due to the ignorance of animal's nature (Schenda 1998:13). In other words, the metaphorical vehicles that people adopted to produce AEs and people's knowledge of animals are often based on different cognitive levels. For example, zoological research (e.g., Grzimek 1988:20) reports that pigs are smart, but *ben²zhu¹* 笨豬 (dumb pig; idiot) is a popular AE.

As a matter of fact, AEs are our vocabulary of values; AEs express positive and negative sanctions in the

societies. Praise and reprimand help the process of adaptation to the norms and rules of the society. For instance, when one is called a *falscher Hund* (a false dog – a false man; a liar), he should know that his behaviour is considered to be "false, underhanded, insidious" and should change his attitude accordingly. When being called a *gen¹pi⁴chong²* 跟屁蟲 (follow-butt-worm – bluebottle) one knows that it is improper to cling to someone like a leech.

6. Semantic, social functions and language ideology

Why do we need AEs? AEs possess semantic and sociolinguistic functions. One semantic function is that we need metaphorical vehicles to express our social norms and emotions. The animals live close to men and we are close biologically too. Human beings make good use of the names of other animal species and create AEs to express our values or criticisms in a poetic, entertaining and imaginative way. On the other hand, AEs are the terms to convey emotions. There are many secular benedictions and terms of endearments in the form of AEs. Secular benedictions satisfy peoples' superstition or help express their imagination. Endearments help convey emotions.

AEs also show the different ways of thinking and traditional philosophy of the peoples, e.g., the Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism in a Chinese speaking society and Christianity in Germany. AEs indicate that the MCh speakers tend to think group-centrally while the Germans think individualistically or egocentrically.

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Underlying Conceit	Percentage		Metaphorical tenor	Percentage	
	Chinese	German		Chinese	German
Appearance	27%	21%	basic need domain	25.8%	10.6%
			emotion	5.1%	8.4%
			amusement	5.4%	8.4%
			society	14.2%	9.0%
			work, sport, etc.	49.5%	63.6%
Behaviour	25%	27%	basic need domain	29.2%	10.9%
			emotion	11.1%	13.5%
			amusement	5.5%	4.3%
			society	11.1%	3.6%
			work, sport, etc.	43.2%	67.7%
Habit	18%	21%	basic need domain	22.2%	9.8%
			emotion	9.5%	14.5%
			amusement	5.1%	4.4%
			society	16.0%	5.7%
			work, sport, etc.	47.2%	65.1%
Human-Animal Relation	21%	20%			
Arbitrary	15%	9%			
Unknown	8%	12%			

Table 1. The underlying conceits and metaphorical tenors in MCh and German corpora

Vehicles	Mandarin Chinese	German
Tiger	strength/power 24.4%, danger 22.1%, wickedness 15.1%, cruelty 9.3%, leader 12.3%, courage/boldness 7.6%, greed 5.5%, big, great, swallowing, jumping, vitality, proud, significant, valuable, energetic, robust, awfully, auspicious, superstitious	strength/power 66.7%, courage, hunt, protector, rapidity, gasoline, (jealousy)
Wolf	malevolence 26.9%, cruelty 15.4%, lecherous, thankless, yammers, cunning	cruelty 27.8%, destruction 22.2%, malevolence 16.7%, hunger 16.7%, greed 16.7%, evil, strong, intensifier
Bird	gain 10.3%, loving couple 10.1%, messenger, girl, someone, something, unpleasant person, followers, penis, free, nice voice, timid, stupid, small, inexperienced, parroting, crazy, awkwardly, useless, determination, goal, (sun)	comic 11.1%, confidential messenger, free, goal, small, light weight, cute, eat little, rapidity, loosely, unsteady, mad, strange, confusing thought, merrily, sexual intercourse, defect, sacrifices
Fish	profit 17.1%, fecundity 12.2%, person in danger 7.3%, lover 5.6%, well, swim well, goal, work, chance, ability, someone, something, friend, society/group, message, innocent, joke, (acrobatics)	someone 13.7%, profit/purpose 11.8%, event 11.8%, cold-blooded, uncertainty, unreliability, (no intelligence)
Worm	damage 64%, laze 28%, inferiority 24%, small, insignificant, flattering, hungry, enthusiast, poisonous, disease, scatterbrain, (decomposition, other animal)	parasite 25%, small size 20%, defenselessness 20%, trouble 18%, defect 15%, danger 15%, bad conscience 9%, shape of a thread, restless, anger, poor, addiction, mad idea, mystery/secret, disturbing, (wriggling forward, grave)

Table 2. Primitive semantic features of some wild animal names in Mandarin Chinese and German

Re-defining the Relation Between World-picture and Life-form in Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*

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1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to discuss how Wittgenstein's concepts of "life-form" (*Lebensform*) and "world-picture" (*Weltbild*) are conjoined together. The idea is originally presented by G. H. von Wright who suggests that in its practical or *pre-propositional* stage world-picture could be called a form of life (1982). In contrast to Wright's view which emphasizes the epistemological nature of the work (cf. especially von Wright 1982, 165-168) Wittgenstein's other literary executor Rush Rhees defends a different interpretation. According to him, *On Certainty* is above all a work on *logic* (Rhees 2003, 48-51), although logic is here understood as an activity which concerns the instructions for our uses of words (ibid. cf. OC §36).

I will propose a combination of these two early readings of *On Certainty* by defining world-picture as a logical concept that Wittgenstein adopts in order to describe life-form as a group of sentences. Chapter 2 is a brief discussion on why Wittgenstein thinks that certainties constitute a life-form after which in chapter 3 I will compare his use of "world-picture" and the so called "hinge propositions" with the notions of "certainty" and "life-form".

2. I would like to regard this certainty as a form of life (OC §358)

It is well known that in OC Wittgenstein draws a distinction between certainty and knowledge, mainly in order to criticize Moore's considerations according to which we may gain knowledge that is absolutely certain. In OC §23 Wittgenstein says that if someone claims to know that he has two hands it can only signify that he has been able to become sure of it. Thus, if something is claimed to be knowledge there has to be logical possibility to answer the question "how do you know it" (cf. OC §520). Some things of which we are certain, for example the certainty that the language I am speaking is English, are such that there is no possibility to ask how do you know it nor to answer such a question. Hence certainties cannot be knowledge. It is rather, as Wittgenstein puts it, that "my *life* shews that I am certain" (OC §7).

A serious weakness of individual certainties is that any single characterization of them can be logically denied. Take, for example, any "obvious truism" that Moore in his essay "A Defence of Common Sense" claims to know. It can be logically negated that "There exists at present a living human body, which is my body" (Moore 1925, 107) by only placing "it is not so that..." in front of the sentence. For this reason Wittgenstein states that "when we first begin to *believe* anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions" (OC §141). Wittgenstein also points out that in order to be in its place within language, also the doubt(s) must form or be part of a system (cf. OC §126).

Wittgenstein is not, however, any happier to say that a system of propositions is certain as such. In OC §110 he says that the end of testing (of empirical propositions) "is an ungrounded way of *acting*" (emphasis mine) and in OC §174 that "I *act* with *complete* certainty" (first emphasis mine).

Stressing the pre-linguistic character of our certainty gains its high water mark in Wittgenstein's statement:

Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life. (That is very badly expressed and probably badly thought as well.) (OC §358)

The similar point is also made already in the *Investigations* §241 Where Wittgenstein says: "It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the *language* they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life".

Though discussed widely amongst scholars, the term "life-form" does not occur that often in Wittgenstein's philosophy. Yet of the few remarks Wittgenstein makes on it, each seem to point in the same direction: life-form is the widest imaginable framework of language. In the first remark concerning the concept in *Investigations* Wittgenstein points out that "to imagine a language means to imagine a life-form" (PI §19). As such it is also a group of differing language-games that together form what is called language and a couple of paragraphs later Wittgenstein says that his conception of language-game is meant to bring into prominence that *speaking* of the language is part of an *activity* or of a life-form (PI §23).

Hans-Johann Glock has characterized this concept by saying that it is "an intertwining of culture, world-view and language" (Glock 1996, 124). Similar to this characterization is also that of Baker's and Hacker's, according to which it is i) a way of living and pattern of ii) activities, iii) actions, iv) interactions, v) and feelings which are inextricably interwoven with and also constituted by language. They also go further by saying that it includes shared natural and linguistic responses, broad agreement in definitions and judgments and corresponding behaviour. (Baker and Hacker 2005, 74)

When he says that he wants to regard certainty as life-form Wittgenstein wants to point out both that life-form is certain and that the individual certainties manifest in our form of life within individual acts. The reason for him to say that it is badly said and badly thought as well is that it sounds like there is some indubitable or a priori ground to which we can appeal whenever we try to settle our disputes or disagreements. Though it is apparently true that if we want to give the full explanations of meaning we must in the end refer to the intertwining of culture, world-view and language, it cannot provide any sufficient ground for our conversation to begin with. And again, the task of philosophy is not to provide any such grounds: "Language-game is [...] not based on grounds. It is there, like our life" (OC §559).

Rather, Wittgenstein tries to elucidate some logical aspects and relations within our ordinary language. For this task there needs to be some logical device to help us to take every single sentence of the language, if needed, under scrutiny. In the next chapter I will suggest that Wittgenstein's conception of world-picture can partially be considered as to fulfill this task. It, so to say, translates our life-form into a system of propositions.

3. Constructing World-picture

In contrast to life-form, world-picture is a set of sentences, which is also a key idea in von Wright's reading. If life-form is the pre-propositional counterpart of world-picture there also needs to be something *propositional* whose counterpart it is. Moreover, von Wright explicitly says that "the core of Wittgenstein's thoughts [In *On Certainty*] could be paraphrased as follows. In every situation where a claim to knowledge is being established [...] a bulk of propositions stand fast, are taken for granted. They form a kind of system" (von Wright 1982, 171). Some pages later when he first refers to *Weltbild* he adds: "The bulk of propositions belonging to our pre-knowledge [Which is von Wright's term referring to certainties] can also be said to constitute a world-picture" (Ibid. 176). Now while von Wright's emphasis on certainty as *pre-knowledge* surely presupposes that they are conceived as a part of an activity and cannot as such be propositional knowledge, there definitely is in von Wright's opinion a possibility to treat them as a bulk of sentences after the practice is acquired.

One problem with this approach is that Wittgenstein is not always very consistent when he talks of the notion "world-picture". In OC §94 he says that world-picture is "the inherited background" and in OC §167 that world-picture is a foundation and as such it also goes unmentioned. But these characterizations are consequences of at least following reasons. Firstly, *On Certainty* is a work-in-progress which Wittgenstein never had enough time to finish which might have caused him to use some concepts loosely. Secondly, world-picture refers to the *Tractarian* concept of language according to which a proposition is a picture of the fact. As such, the language can also be seen to form a *picture of the world*. With his later concept of "world-picture" Wittgenstein points out how his earlier concept has been wrong and what should be noted instead is that language is a part of a life-form or an activity. Thirdly, if world-picture is introduced to characterize some elements of life-form within language, it is natural to sometimes use these concepts as if they meant the same.

When Wittgenstein starts to talk about his conception of *Weltbild* he says that nothing in it seems to suggest something opposite to Moore's obvious truisms (OC §93). And this world-picture is not something we choose to have after being satisfied of its correctness, but rather the inherited background against which one can distinguish between true and false (OC §94). These first brief characterizations point very clearly towards the idea that the role of world-picture is very similar to that of life-form. Yet there is one clear difference that I want to emphasize: world-picture is, at least partly, the logical counterpart of life-form in the *language*:

"The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game [...]" (OC §95)

It is in practice where we learn to speak, but these actions can be described as the rules of a game. While describing rules also world-picture or a *mythology* is defined.

When this is compared with Wittgenstein's famous metaphor according to which some "sentences are like hinges on which [questions that we raise and our doubts] turn" (OC §341) it seems natural to suggest that these hinge propositions attempt to characterize basic certainties in a language. That some propositions are like hinges is yet again a new characterization of Moore-type certainties, but with the difference that they are sentences and as such part of a language. Certainty, on the other hand, is an attitude

manifesting in actions we make, it is like direct taking hold of something:

"If I say 'Of course I know that that's a towel' [...] It is just like direct taking hold of something, as I take hold of my towel without having doubts." (OC §510)

The hinges should be conceived as the expressions of these certainties, axioms that we need in order to explain their status in life-form. Yet Wittgenstein is not interested in the content of these axioms, but he merely describes the logical relation between them and other sentences. Without any supporting system any single hinge lacks the convincing power: "it is not the single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which consequences and premises give one another *mutual* support" (OC § 142).

Wittgenstein presents an illuminating metaphor of world-picture as a riverbed of thoughts which enables us to see how some individual certainties of life-form can be treated as sentences which constitute world-picture:

"It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid [...]" (OC §96)

The Moore-type utterances are those grammatical fixing points, the riverbed, that logically determine (channel) the use of the empirical sentences (fluid propositions) in world-picture.

It should be clear that world-picture can never capture the whole essence of life-form: "not only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing a practice. Our rules leave loop-holes open, and the practice must speak for itself. We do not learn the practice of making empirical judgments by learning rules" (OC §§139-140). Yet what is legitimate, after acquiring the practice, is to make logical observation of the rules that constitute it. Wittgenstein himself observes how "There is no sharp boundary between propositions of logic and empirical propositions" (OC §319) and suggests that "the lack of sharpness *is* that of the boundary between *rule* and empirical proposition" (Ibid.) For me it seems that only within a context can we show whether some sentence like "I have a hand", to give an example, is functioning as a empirical proposition or a rule. And world-picture is this context.

In conclusion, I will present a few possible implications that I think might follow if we start to treat Wittgenstein's "world-picture" as a logical concept though I admit that these claims require further investigations. The first implication is that I do not believe that we need to use world-picture to show some insights within our actual life-form, but rather that the whole idea of introducing such a concept is intertwined with another deep Wittgensteinian insight according to which philosophical investigation is a logical or grammatical one (cf. PI §90). The second implication is that if we consider these logical investigations within the framework of "world-picture", his conception of what can be said of language should be concerned holistic and also totally revisable, which furthermore may provide grounds to link him to more recent philosophical studies of language and epistemology. Third implication is that if hinges should be conceived as belonging to the language, it will have an effect especially on those recent studies of *On Certainty* which follow mainly von Wright's reading. Fourth and finally, world-picture can be used as a device which helps us to maintain common grounds by defining such a bulk of axioms and rules of which everyone is certain after which they can be used as a framework to which some of our claims under discussion are compared.

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Metaphysics of the Language and the Language of Metaphysics

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Let's start here with an important comment by Kant. In his "Critique of Pure Reason", he says that human mind is naturally disposed to metaphysics (*metaphysica naturalis*), and that human reason progresses while urged by its own demand to arise and solve questions that are beyond possible experience¹. Hence, metaphysics is carried out by our reason speculation which surpasses possible experience and exceeds the limits of a current 'physical' situation. And it is the *metaphysica naturalis* conceived as human possibility to perform transcendental acts that composes, in our opinion, the very essence of the being of men, and a man can be defined as a *homo metaphysicum*. However, Kant, postulating existence of *metaphysica naturalis*, does not raise the question of its transcendental conditions, he does not pose the question of "how a *homo metaphysicum* is possible"?

I

Our first thesis is that metaphysical ability of a man is rooted in his language (at least, in the languages of the European type, under SAE by Whorf), and the very structure of human language inclines us towards metaphysics.

The simple basic fact of it is that the thing and the word do not generally coincide, and there is always a certain tension between them since the word prescribed for the learning of the thing never totally apprehends it. The thing permanently changes while the word apprehends only the static section cut, the 'trait' it left, not being able to grasp every next change in the thing. In this sense, the thing is always richer than the word which is never able to describe a particular thing in its totality, in abundance of its content, and multiplicity of changes. But in other aspect, the word becomes richer than the thing. Let's study an elementary cognitive act. For example, we can see a house in the vicinity, and we are fixing this in a description as "This is a house". Let's try to reveal in this example the main points that form metaphysics of our language.

First of all, we pay attention to the point that, accurately speaking, we have no right to call a [one] thing what we perceive in experience. Something which is behind me is rather a "This 1". The next moment, (due to my and its change) "This 1" turns into "This 2", etc. To fix all those (multiple) temporal modi as one thing (a *house*, in this case), we must undertake Kantian synthesis of apprehension which turns manifold of sensitive intuition into the *image* of a thing (unity vs. multiplicity). Meanwhile, a transfer to another, more expanded range of observation takes place: from various color spots generating in our eye's retina (resp. on the TV screen) we synthesize images of these or those objects (sensitivity vs. imagination). And although our cognitive ability to form images (i.e. *imagina-*

tion) is represented as a pre-language activity, nevertheless it is a necessary premise for fixing the metaphysical "fact" that *the house is (Being)*, and that it is (as) a *Unity*².

Secondly, the *notion* "house" is wider than we can perceive here and now, of *this-very-house*. The notion "house" applies to not only this one thing but also to other *such* things. This generalizing notion subordinates not only *today* and here situated house but also *yesterday's* and/or *tomorrow's* one as well as houses situated in other places. Moreover, the *notion* applies to *possible* objects of the type. And our description is fixing the fact of perception not of a particular house but rather a *house in general* (scheme of a house, under Kant), which can be expressed, for example, in the English grammar by the indefinite article ("a house").

Thirdly, let's note that in our description the "house" is a term of a definite type, namely a noun. This is due to the fact that a language is a *heterogenous* formation, and, while "operating", it *categorically marks out* the reality distinguishing among the apprehended content what we call *things (essences)*. As Wittgenstein notes, in his "Philosophical Investigations" (§§ 11 – 14), a language resembles a tool-box with various tools each assigned to a diverse function: a saw is used quite in a different way compared with a ruler³. Furthermore, to put it precisely, we do not perceive things, and even less their essences; human senses apprehend not the *essences* (or things per se) but only their *properties* (noun vs. adjective). For example, our eyes can perceive grey color but the language fixes this metaphysically telling that "*something grey*" is perceived, where *something* acts as an essence (substance) for the properties perceived in experience. In further sentences like "This is a grey break house..." (category of *quality*) and/or "This house is three meters high" (category of *quantity*), we specify this metaphysical act distinguishing and fixing different types of category.

One more manifestation of non-physical character of our language, its non-coincidence with reality is displayed by the presence in it of so-called *language fictions* or *ideal elements* (Hilbert) that do not have precise "physical" sense. It is clear that a language as an autonomous system needs some technical terms for its functioning, and this fact indicates the possibility of existence, in the language, of such not-denotative words that might perform significant elements of the system (problem of "nominalism vs. realism"). It is shown in contemporary logics that introduction of logico-mathematical calculi of ideal elements into a language, e.g. the *epsilon substitution method* (Hilbert) or the *method of dummy/meta-variables* (Prawitz/Kanger), gradually increases their effectiveness⁴.

¹ «... Metaphysics must be considered as really existing, if not as a science, nevertheless as a natural disposition of the human mind (*metaphysica naturalis*). For human reason..., unceasingly progresses, urged on by its own feeling of need, towards such questions as cannot be answered by any empirical application of reason, or principles derived therefrom; and so there has ever really existed in every man some system of metaphysics. It will always exist, so soon as reason awakes to the exercise of its power of speculation. And now the question arises: "How is metaphysics, as a natural disposition, possible?"...» (B 21).

² See analysis of notions of *Being* and *Unity* by Aristotle (Metaphysics, 998b, 1045a, 1054a).

³ «Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, nails and screws. — The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects...» (§ 11).

⁴ Hilbert D., Bernays P., *Grundlagen der Mathematik*, Bd.2, Springer, Berlin, 1970; Kanger S., *A simplified proof method for elementary logic* //Computer programming and formal systems. — Amsterdam, 1963.

Developing the thesis of conceptual and categorical nature of language, let's indicate such an important language expression as *sense*, explicated in Frege's theory of meaning⁵, which postulates that not only (physical) *reference* (denotation, significate, *Bedeutung*) but also (meta-physical) *sense* (connotation, *Sinn*) is available in expressions⁶. Sense in words refers us to not physical but rather to some intentional – *metaphysical* – reality, to some “third world” (Frege; Popper). Our ability for symbolic apprehension is also connected with sense, i.e. we can extract additional — non-physical — senses of, for instance, socio-cultural character.

Animal reason can hardly recognize in a wooden or break construction what we call a house, and in a small piece of colored paper a bank note, as well as it will not see a possible tool in a stick. Furthermore, senses tend to bring about new senses turning into senses several cuts above, and a man, accordingly, to identify (resp. bring about) senses several cuts above, producing thus secondary language systems, where the previous level [ordinary] senses serve as references [Barthes 1965].

Besides, senses within a connected system, can “interact” in a particular way which leads to their changing and even emerging of new senses (*sense resonance phenomenon*)⁷.

Let's complete our analysis with the following remark: metaphysical character of a language is related not only with its semantic (conceptual and categorial) nature. Any language is a *connected structure*, and it contains some *logic structure* (resp. *logic form*), having an a priori character. Under Kant, coherence intrinsic in our language (thinking) is brought into the environment by us. E.g. all the laws of classical physics that express this or that *causality* are predetermined by a logical form of implication in language: “if... then...”. Of course, no law can be formulated without specific experimental content but, had our language lacked a particular logic form to express laws, we could not formulate any law *in principle*. And if our language contained any different logic forms then the laws would have quite a different display. In this case, we accept, to counterbalance Wittgenstein, Sapir-Whorf linguistic relativity hypothesis which argues that our vision of the Universe (resp. structure of the physical world) is predetermined by the language we use (resp. logical structure of the language). Metaphysics of the language predetermines metaphysics of the Universe.

Instead of conclusion. It may seem possible to pose a question on transcendental conditions of metaphysics of the language but this is not impossible since “the limit [of our thought] can only be drawn in language (L. Wittgenstein, TLP): e.g. new *questing* for grounds of language is a language procedure as well.

II

In “*Culture and Value*” (n. 74) Wittgenstein says that existence in a language of definite terms (like *space*, *time*, the verb *to be*), inclines us to metaphysics. This thesis may be intensified. Above we've shown that it is not only separate language structures that are metaphysical but, also, that the language as a whole possesses its own metaphysics.

⁵ See also Ogden-Richards's triangle for Meaning.

⁶ In Fregean terminology, a language expression (*name*) is said to *express* its sense (as “mode of presentation [of reference]”), and *denote* or *refer* to its reference.

⁷ Sense resonance manifests in the phenomenon of allquote notes in music that are absent in the original score but emerge while being played.

Research of this metaphysics of the language is the subject of *metaphysics* (in the specific sense of this word), or the *first philosophy* going back to Aristotle's “*Metaphysics*”. Thus, metaphysics per se is *metaphysics of [language] metaphysics*.

Let's clarify this thesis. We can single out two main types of language practices: scientific and artistic discourse. The first one is connected with the study of objective reality, the second — with the study of our inner world. Let's note, that in both cases we deal with a denotative type of language which denotes to definite objects of physical or mental reality. These types of discourse seem to cover the whole field of language but this is false, since any language has some initial notions unidentified in a standard way, e.g. by ostensive definitions. In particular, most primary genera which we use to determine other notions of this or that language system will stay unidentified. Let's draw attention that no object of physical or mental reality can be put in accordance with these primary genera. These metaphysical objects take marginal — *transcendental* — position between subjectivity and objectivity. Example of this is presented by Parmenides' *being* which acts as the condition of “openness” for cognition of all other things (“to exist means to be available for thinking”) which, accordingly, coincide with thinking. Parmenides' thesis on identity of being and thinking means that the Being (1) is not material, like the type of Milesian *physis* (things do not *consist* of Parmenides being), and (2) is not our mental essence, in the sense that Being is not our “inner” emotional experience: considering things existing we go beyond the limits of thinking and break through to transcendental world. And although metaphysical objects, because of their symbolic character, do not have direct references both in physical and mental world, they, situating on the margins of these worlds, act as transcendental conditions of denotivity of other terms. Let's note, that under their denotivity they are like hollow notions of a *round quarter* type, nevertheless they principally differ from them as possessing maximum of sense which allows to give senses to other names of language.

Hence, metaphysics operates not with signs, as denotative types of languages do, but with symbols that are characterized by minimum of denotation and maximum of sense: symbols are “homes” of metaphysics. Specifics of this symbol language is that it has not a three-dimension (name — sense — reference) but a two-dimension semantics (name — sense). On the one hand, this limits possibilities of philosophical discourse: we cannot apply here to experience as we do at scientific discourse. On the other hand, it considerable expands possibilities of philosophic discourse, since metaphysics tells not only of our virtual world but also of the structure of any possible worlds (Leibnitz).

Let's study Kant's ideas of reason, particularly his idea of the Universe, as a more developed type of metaphysical objects. In sensual experience, we are given only definite objects existing in the world, and not the world in itself. That is why the Universe is not a physical but a metaphysical “object” not given in any possible experience. More over, the Universe, in the precise meaning of the word, is not even an *object* since we call objects that what opposes us as a subject of cognition, and, in the case with the Universe, we are “inside” it, and we cannot take an observer's position towards it (see first Kant's antinomy). We postulate the Universe as condition of existing of things because it's obvious that things exist not by themselves, they are connected with each other, and the connecting environment is the Universe (comp. with Kant's notion “*transcendental matter*”). Then, the Universe acts as

a *totality* for things (comp. with *totality* of K. Jaspers). Any metaphysical "object" is a similar *unity*: e.g. Plato's ideas are local unities for a number of similar objects. More accurate characteristic of metaphysical symbols is their transcendental status, they perform as transcendental conditions for some rank of private phenomena.

In this respect, any philosophic system may be interpreted as a definite system of symbols, and the history of philosophy as change of systems of the kind.

With such understanding of philosophy as metaphysics [Katrechko 1998], the problem of comprehension of new metaphysical concepts emerges, since ordinary ostensive procedure of the "Look" type does not work here. The method of language-game going back to Wittgenstein can serve as an appropriate procedure. Contrary to *pragmatic* Wittgenstein's language-game, our method might be named *semantic* (or *sense*) language-game, with its goal to conceive a separate metaphysical concept by its correlation with other concepts of philosophic system. For, as Plato said in his "Parmenides", "... those absolute ideas which are relative to one another have their own nature in relation to themselves, and not in relation to the likenesses [things], which are amongst us" (133 c–d).

Such language-games where the sense of the used metaphysical concepts is explained are indispensable component of philosophic texts. And the concepts introduced by this or that philosopher have their unique sense content which differs from the sense of conventionally used terms as well as of similar concepts of their predecessors. For example, interpretation of the concept of soul in Plato's "Phaedo" and Aristotle's "De Anima" principally differs: the Plato's soul acts as the organ of cognition of the world of ideas, while the Aristotle's one — as the organ of cognition of the world of things. As a current example of conceptual novelty we can indicate "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" by L. Wittgenstein where the notions "Ding" (thing), "Tatsache" (fact), "Sachlage/Sachverhalt" (state of affairs) beget assume ever new sense [Katrechko 2008].

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Zwei Dilemmata – McDowell und Davidson über Sprache, Erfahrung und Welt

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1.

In *Mind and World* formuliert John McDowell folgendes, für die neuzeitliche Erkenntnistheorie grundlegendes Dilemma: „Entweder besteht man darauf [...], daß die Erfahrung nur kausal und nicht rational mit dem empirischen Denken verbunden ist; oder man verfällt [...] dem Mythos des Gegebenen und versucht der Erfahrung, die man sich dann als etwas Außerbegriffliches vorstellt, rationale Beziehungen zum empirischen Denken zuzuschreiben“ (McDowell 2001, 87). Als Beispiel für das erste Horn dieses Dilemmas führt er die kohärentistische Position von Donald Davidson an. Sie bietet keinen überzeugenden Ausweg aus diesem Dilemma, sondern lädt dazu ein, in den Mythos des Gegebenen zurückzufallen: „Es gibt nichts, was verhindern könnte, daß das Pendel wieder in die andere Richtung auszuschlagen beginnt. Davidsons Bild stellt unser Denken so dar, als sei es keiner äußeren Kontrolle ausgesetzt, sondern nur einem äußeren kausalen Einfluß“ (ebd., 38).

Im Folgenden möchte ich zeigen, dass diese Einschätzung nicht zutrifft. Davidsons Kohärentismus nötigt keineswegs zu einer Rückkehr zum Mythos des Gegebenen und ist daher auch kein gutes Beispiel für das kohärentistische Horn des Dilemmas.

2.

McDowells Vorgehensweise gegen Davidson ist facettenreich, aber nicht immer leicht zu durchschauen. Das hängt mit dem therapeutischen Ansatz von *Mind and World* zusammen. Es geht nicht darum, gegnerische Positionen durch Argumente zu widerlegen, sondern eine Sichtweise anzuspüren, die einen Ausweg aus dem Dilemma verspricht. Dazu müssen die Motive ermittelt werden, durch die das Dilemma überhaupt erst aufkommt. Ganz allgemein formuliert geht es um das Verhältnis von Freiheit und Natur. Die neuzeitliche Philosophie ist von der vergeblichen Suche nach einer Antwort auf die Frage getrieben, wie unsere Spontaneität als Begriffe verwendende Wesen den Realitätsbezug von Sprechen und Denken garantieren kann, so dass die Ausübung von Spontaneität als rational kontrolliert erscheint. Kohärenztheorien sind im Lichte dieser Einschätzung „der explizite Ausdruck des deprimierenden Gedankens, daß die Spontaneität des empirischen Denkens keiner externen rationalen Kontrolle unterworfen ist“ (ebd., 39). McDowell sucht einen Ausweg aus dem neuzeitlichen szientistischen Naturalismus. Er ist das Grundübel, auf den der Mythos des Gegebenen sowie der Kohärentismus unzureichende, wenn auch für dieses Grundübel symptomatische, erkenntnistheoretische Reaktionen sind. Beide wollen den Gedanken einer Spontaneität gegenüber rein kausalen Prozessen in der Natur geltend machen. Jedoch scheitern sie daran, dass sie die Motivation für die eigene Theoriebildung nicht reflektieren und damit auf halbem Wege stecken bleiben.

Auch Davidson unterschätzt die Motive für den Rückzug in den Mythos des Gegebenen. Deshalb kommen seine kohärentistischen Argumente gegen den erkenntnistheoretischen Fundamentalismus, so raffiniert sie im Ein-

zelen sein mögen, zu spät. Wie kann die Ausübung der Spontaneität die Welt repräsentieren, wenn die Spontaneität keiner rationalen Kontrolle unterliegt? Wie können begriffliche Fähigkeiten in der Sinnlichkeit wirksam sein? Diese Fragen beantwortet Davidson nicht. Er müsste sie aber beantworten, um einen überzeugenden Weg aus dem Dilemma zu weisen.

Das ist die Grundlinie von McDowells Gedankenführung. Versucht man daraus einen diskutablen Einwand zu destillieren, dann lautet er, dass Davidson nicht erklären kann, wie eine Überzeugung empirischen Gehalt haben kann, der diese Überzeugung rechtfertigt. Davidson manövriert sich in dieses Problem, weil er bestreitet, dass Erfahrung epistemologisch bedeutsam ist. Dass Davidson das bestreitet, ist richtig. Doch folgt daraus wirklich, dass er den empirischen Gehalt von Überzeugungen nicht erklären kann, so dass der Gehalt die Überzeugung rechtfertigt?

3.

Man könnte diesen Einwand allgemeiner fassen: McDowell macht geltend, dass man aus dem Dilemma nur herauskommt, wenn man zugesteht, dass Erfahrungen propositional strukturiert sind, also informationsübermittelnd, und epistemologisch bedeutsam sind.

Genau das bestreitet Davidson. Doch warum bestreitet er es? Weil er einen Ausweg aus einem ganz anderen Dilemma sucht, das durch einen skeptischen Einwand provoziert wird. In *Eine Kohärenztheorie der Wahrheit und der Erkenntnis* formuliert er es folgendermaßen: „Die Suche nach einer empirischen Grundlage der Bedeutung oder der Erkenntnis führt zum Skeptizismus, während eine Kohärenztheorie außerstande zu sein scheint, dem Überzeugungsträger einen Grund zu nennen, warum, er glauben sollte, daß seine Überzeugungen – sofern kohärent – wahr seien. Wir sitzen fest zwischen einer falschen Antwort an die Adresse des Skeptikers und gar keiner Antwort“ (Davidson 2004a, 249). Was wäre damit gewonnen, fragt Davidson, Erfahrungen einen propositionalen Gehalt zuzusprechen und sie davon ausgehend zu epistemischen Mittlern zwischen Ereignissen und Gegenständen in der Welt auf der einen und Überzeugungen auf der anderen zu erheben? Damit ist gar nichts gewonnen: „Wenn man Zwischenschritte oder Zwischenentitäten wie Empfindungen oder Wahrnehmungen in die Kausalkette einführt, dient das nur dazu, das erkenntnistheoretische Problem offenkundiger zu machen. Denn wenn die Vermittlungsinstanzen nichts weiter als Ursachen sind, dienen sie keineswegs der Begründung der von ihnen verursachten Überzeugungen, während sie dann, wenn sie Informationen liefern, womöglich lügen“ (ebd., 245) Deshalb ist Davidsons Begriff der Erfahrung auch ein anderer als derjenige McDowells: Nach McDowell ist Erfahrung „nicht als schlichte Einwirkung eines außerbegrifflich Gegebenen [zu] verstehen, sondern als eine Art von Ereignis oder Zustand, der bereits über begrifflichen Inhalt verfügt. In der Erfahrung erfasst man (man sieht z.B.), daß die Dinge so und so sind“ (McDowell 2001, 33). Davidson spricht dage-

gen unspezifisch vom „Zeugnis der Sinne“ (Davidson 2004a, 241). Dazu gehören „Sinnesempfindungen, Wahrnehmungen, das Gegebene, die Erfahrung, Sinnesdaten oder eine vorüberziehende Darbietung“ (ebd.). Es ist dabei nicht immer klar, ob und vor allem wie Davidson zwischen Erfahrung ganz allgemein und besonderen Erlebnissen wie Sinnesempfindungen unterscheidet. Da seine Argumentation darauf hinausläuft, eine propositionale Deutung von Erfahrung abzuweisen, schränkt er die Diskussion sogleich konsequent auf Sinnesempfindungen ein. Wenn Erfahrungen nämlich propositional strukturiert wären, könnte nicht sichergestellt werden, dass sie auch wahr sind. Es könnte ja sein, dass sie größtenteils falsch sind, womit dem Skeptizismus Tür und Tor geöffnet würden. Nimmt man also an, dass Erfahrungen propositionalen Gehalt haben und gleichzeitig epistemologische Grundlage unseres Systems von Überzeugungen sind, dann bliebe die Möglichkeit, dass diese Erfahrungen falsch und damit unsere Überzeugungen nicht mehr gerechtfertigt sind: „Da wir nicht dazu imstande sind, Vermittlungsinstanzen auf Wahrhaftigkeit zu vereidigen, sollten wir keine Vermittlungsinstanzen zwischen unseren Überzeugungen und deren Gegenstände in der Welt zulassen. Freilich gibt es kausale Vermittlungsinstanzen. Das wovon wir uns hüten müssen, sind epistemische Vermittlungsinstanzen“ (ebd., 245).

Es sieht so aus als hätte diese Erinnerung an die Motive für Davidsons Kohärenzismus McDowells Einwände nur bestätigt: Um dem skeptischen Einwand zu entgehen, schlägt Davidson vor, genau jene Konjunktion aufzugeben, nämlich dass Erfahrungen propositional strukturiert und zugleich epistemologisch bedeutsam sind, von der McDowell behauptet hatte, dass man sie aufrecht erhalten muss, wenn man seinem scheinbar grundlegenden Dilemma entkommen will. Was McDowell nicht sieht – das sei hier beiläufig angemerkt – ist, dass Davidson die Existenz von Erfahrungen mit propositionalem Gehalt gar nicht bestreiten muss. Sein Kohärenzismus wäre damit durchaus verträglich, solange solche Erfahrungen keine epistemologische Bedeutung beanspruchen. Davidson kann deshalb auch bei der Formulierung seines Erfahrungsbegriffs lässiger sein und ihn für seine Zwecke gegen jede phänomenologische Plausibilität auf Sinnesempfindungen einschränken. Erfahrungen mit propositionalem Gehalt würden in seinem kohärenzistischen Modell schlicht keine Rolle spielen, vorausgesetzt sie werden nicht als epistemische Zwischenglieder in Anspruch genommen. Es fragt sich daher, ob sich Davidson überhaupt durch McDowells Einwand beunruhigen lassen muss, es sei ein Fehler, den Kontakt zwischen Erfahrung und Wirklichkeit rein kausal zu konzipieren und damit die Grenze zwischen der Erfahrung und dem Raum der Gründe falsch gezogen zu haben. Man muss nun sehen, dass McDowell die Fragestellung unter der Hand von Überzeugungen hin zu Erfahrungen verschoben hat, weil die Motivation für sein Dilemma eine andere ist als die für Davidsons Dilemma.

4.

Ich komme auf diesen Punkt am Ende zurück. An dieser Stelle genügt es daran zu erinnern, dass sich McDowells Einwand nicht gegen Davidsons These richtet, wonach nur geistige Zustände mit propositionalem Gehalt epistemologisch bedeutsam sind. Dem stimmt er ausdrücklich zu. Er gesteht sogar zu, dass Davidsons Argument gegen den Skeptiker überzeugend ist. Sein Einwand war, dass Davidson mit seinem Argument zu spät kommt, weil er den empirischen Gehalt von Überzeugungen nicht erklären kann, so dass der Gehalt diese Überzeugung rechtfertigt.

Dass Davidson mit dem ersten Punkt keine Probleme hat, ist leicht zu zeigen. In dem Aufsatz *Empirischer Gehalt* schreibt er: „die kausalen Beziehungen zwischen unseren Überzeugungen, unseren sprachlichen Äußerungen und der Welt [liefern] auch die Interpretation unserer Sprache und unserer Überzeugungen [...]. In diesem recht speziellen Sinn ist „Erfahrung“ tatsächlich die Quelle der Erkenntnis. Das ist allerdings ein Sinn, der uns keineswegs dazu ermuntert, eine mentale oder inferentielle Brücke zwischen äußeren Ereignissen und normalen Überzeugungen ausfindig zu machen. Die Brücke gibt es allerdings wirklich – es ist eine kausale Brücke, welche die Sinnesorgane voraussetzt“ (Davidson 2004b, 295). Damit wäre McDowell nicht zufrieden. Zwar gelingt es Davidson zu zeigen, wie Überzeugungen empirisch gehaltvoll sein können. Sein Fehler besteht aber darin, zwischen der Quelle des empirischen Gehalts und der Quelle rationaler Einschränkungen für diesen Gehalt so zu unterscheiden, dass – um es in McDowells kantianisierender Terminologie zu sagen – die Rezeptivität als Quelle des empirischen Gehalts, aber nicht als Quelle für rationale Kontrolle dieses Gehalts erscheint. Genau darauf käme es aber an.

Daher ist ein Blick auf Davidsons Rechtfertigungstheorie in Sachen Erfahrung erforderlich. Davidsons Plädoyer für den Kohärenzismus beruht bekanntlich auf seiner Interpretationstheorie und damit zusammenhängend auf der Annahme, „daß Überzeugungen in ihrem innersten Wesen zur Wahrheit tendieren“ (Davidson 2004a, 265). Diese Wahrheitspräsumtion ist die Grundlage von Davidsons kohärenzistischem Argument gegen die skeptische Anfechtung. In einem ersten Schritt wird die Wahrheitsvermutung aus dem richtigen Verständnis der Zuschreibung propositionaler Einstellungen gewonnen. In einem zweiten Schritt wird der daraus resultierende Holismus durch eine externalistische Bedingung eingeschränkt. Man kann einen anderen Sprecher nur verstehen, wenn man ihm überwiegend wahre Überzeugungen im Allgemeinen und über die mit ihm geteilte Umwelt zuschreibt.

Davidsons Argument, das eine notwendige Bedingung dafür, ein Sprecher zu sein, formuliert, lässt sich folgendermaßen rekonstruieren (vgl. Lepore/Ludwig 2005, 329f.):

- 1) Ein Sprecher zu sein, heißt für andere Sprecher interpretierbar zu sein
- 2) Um für andere interpretierbar zu sein, muss man nicht nur überwiegend wahre Überzeugungen im Allgemeinen haben, sondern auch überwiegend wahre Überzeugungen über die eigene Umwelt
- 3) Daher: Ein Sprecher zu sein, heißt nicht nur überwiegend wahre Überzeugungen im Allgemeinen zu haben, sondern auch überwiegend wahre Überzeugungen über die eigene Umwelt.

Die allgemeine Wahrheitsvermutung wird dabei auf jede einzelne Überzeugung übertragen, die mit einer signifikanten Teilmenge des gesamten Meinungssystems kohärent ist. Deshalb kann Davidson folgern, dass „die Tendenz zur Wahrheit in der Natur der Überzeugung liegt“ (ebd., 250). Die Rechtfertigung empirisch gehaltvoller Überzeugungen erfolgt demnach holistisch, wobei der Holismus nicht uneingeschränkt ist, sondern an eine externalistische Bedingung geknüpft ist. Die Überzeugungen sollen sich unmittelbar auf eine von Sprecher und Interpret geteilte Welt beziehen: „Die Sprache ist kein Medium, durch das wir hindurchschauen; sie vermittelt nicht zwischen uns und der Welt. Wir sollten die Vorstellung verbannen, die Sprache gleiche in epistemischer Hinsicht den Sinnesdaten und verkörpere das, was wir aufnehmen können, sei aber ih-

rerseits nur ein Zeichen oder ein Stellvertreter dessen, was draußen existiere [...]. Wir sehen die Welt genauso wenig durch die Sprache, wie wir die Welt durch unsere Augen sehen“ (Davidson 2008, 211). Die Rechtfertigung von Überzeugungen hängt demnach immer auch von der Beschaffenheit der Welt ab, wie sie Interpret und Sprecher zugänglich ist, und nicht nur von den Gründen, die der Interpret für die Zuschreibung einer Überzeugung hat. Genau diese Unterscheidung zwischen Gründen, die nur dem Interpreten zugänglich sind und einer davon unabhängigen Welt, hatte Davidson bekanntlich mit seiner Kritik am dritten Dogma des Empirismus verworfen. Überzeugungen werden in grundlegenden Fällen verursacht durch Gegenstände und Ereignisse in einer Sprecher und Interpret öffentlich zugänglichen Welt. Die holistische Struktur wird zugänglich ausgehend vom externalistisch bestimmaren empirischen Gehalt von Überzeugungen: „Kommunikation setzt dort ein, wo die Ursachen konvergieren“ (Davidson 2004a, 258)

McDowell scheint Davidsons Holismus rein inferentiell zu deuten. Anders kann ich mir seinen Einwand, dass Davidsons Kohärentismus zu einem Rückfall in den Mythos des Gegebenen verleitet, nicht erklären. Davidson hat aber alle Mittel, um einem reinen Kohärentismus ohne Weltanschluss zu entgehen. Auch wenn sein Konzept in signifikanten Punkten von demjenigen McDowells abweicht, überzeugt der Einwand daher nicht.

Davidson verfügt sogar über eine sehr elegante Lösung für die Frage, wie die Wahrheit von Überzeugungen mit ihrer Rechtfertigung zusammenhängt: beides ist gar nicht zu trennen. Diese Verbindung wird bei McDowell aufgelöst. Denn was garantiert die Wahrheit von Überzeugungen, wenn ein epistemisches Subjekt die Erfahrung im Sinne McDowells macht, dass die Dinge so und so sind? Es soll sich das auf der Ebene von Urteilen entscheiden: „Über diese Art von Ding kann man dann z.B. auch ein Urteil fällen“ (McDowell 2001, 33). Die Frage ist hier, welchen Grund es für die Annahme gibt, dass Erfahrungen im Sinne McDowells in analoger Weise zur Wahrheit tendieren wie das Überzeugungen in Davidsons Modell tun.

Man kann Vorzüge und Nachteile beider Ansätze noch weiter gegeneinander abwägen. Dabei müsste man über rechtfertigungstheoretische Fragen diskutieren sowie über den Zusammenhang von Erfahrung und Überzeugung. Ich habe angedeutet, dass beide Autoren miteinander unverträgliche Ansätze vertreten. Grundsätzlich kam es mir aber lediglich darauf an deutlich zu machen, dass Davidson kein gutes Beispiel für das kohärentistische Horn von McDowells Dilemma ist.

5.

Es wird Zeit für ein abschließendes Fazit. McDowell und Davidson entwickeln ihre erkenntnistheoretischen Positionen ausgehend von unterschiedlichen Dilemmata. Die Konfrontation beider Ansätze legt die Vermutung nahe, dass McDowells Dilemma durch eine ganz andere Frage als dasjenige Davidsons motiviert ist: Es ist die Kritik am unverblühten Naturalismus. Das wird insbesondere in den letzten drei Vorlesungen von *Mind and World* deutlich. Auch Davidson wird dort noch einmal thematisch, dieses Mal sein anomaler Monismus als Antwort auf Versuche einer „unverblüht naturalistischen Zähmung dessen, was praktisch die Idee der Spontaneität ist“ (ebd. 99). Die Diskussion verschiebt sich auf die Ebene der Philosophie des Geistes und möglicher Rationalitätskonzeptionen sowie deren Verhältnis zum Naturalismus. Die Konfrontation von McDowell und Davidson müsste also hier ansetzen.

Bemerkenswert ist allerdings, dass McDowell das damit aufgeworfene Problem nicht als ein ontologisches, sondern als ein ideologisches bezeichnet (ebd., 103 Fn. 8). Wenn das so wäre, bestünde – zumindest dann, wenn man McDowells ideologische Sorgen nicht teilt – auch kein Grund, sich vor seinem Dilemma zu fürchten. Doch auch dann, wenn man diese Sorgen teilt, ist die Frage nach dem Umgang mit Herausforderungen des Naturalismus durch McDowells Antworten keineswegs endgültig geklärt.

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John Divers on Quine's Critique of *De Re* Necessity

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1. Introduction

In this paper, I discuss a recent answer to Quine's argument that quantified modal logic and the notion of *de re* necessity are unintelligible. John Divers (2007) uses the strategy of setting up a dialectic between Quine's argument and David Lewis' counterpart-theoretic approach to modality, in order to expose a flaw in Quine's argumentation. According to Divers, once a distinction between semantic and metaphysical issues is properly heeded, it is seen that the allegedly problematic examples Quine invokes only illustrate a semantic phenomenon; such examples do not establish anything about the metaphysical level of modal reality.

I argue that Divers' strategy fails as an answer to Quine's critique, because Divers does not take into account Quine's view of objects as theoretical posits. Once this aspect of Quine's philosophy is observed, it is seen that the very distinction between semantic and metaphysical issues on which Divers' answer turns is rejected by Quine. Since Divers' response to Quine simply assumes a metaphysically realistic position regarding objects, it fails to reach its target.

This paper is structured as follows: In section 2, I outline Quine's main argument against quantified modal logic. In section 3, I explain the central point in Divers' answer to Quine. In section 4, I give a brief account of Quine's view of objects as theoretical posits, whose relevance for Divers' response is explained in section 5.

2. Quine's Critique of Quantified Modal Logic

According to Quine, quantified modal logic involves a *de re* notion of necessity:

When predication in the mode of necessity is directed upon a variable, the necessity is *de re*: the predicate is meant to be true of the value of the variable by whatever name, there being indeed no name at hand. (1999b, 114)

Quine also describes quantified modal logic as assuming the doctrine that

some of the attributes of a thing (quite independently of the language in which the thing is referred to, if at all) may be essential to the thing, and others accidental. (1976, 175-176)

For Quine, an attribute's being essential to a thing means that the predicate expressing the attribute is, in the mode of necessity, true of the thing, and true of that thing independently of how it is linguistically specified or referred to. Quantified modal logic affords a way of making statements about the essential attributes of things (Fitting and Mendelsohn 1998, 89, fn. 15). Quine argues that such statements make no sense.

Quine's critique of quantified modal logic is based on invoking problematic examples, such as the following (2001a, 149): We can specify the number nine by means of two predicates,

$$(i) x = \sqrt{x} + \sqrt{x} + \sqrt{x} \neq \sqrt{x}$$

and

(ii) there are exactly x planets.

When the number nine is specified using (i), we are inclined to say that it satisfies the predicate

(iii) necessarily ($x > 7$),

but not so when the very same number is specified using (ii). Quine uses this example to show that necessary greatness than seven makes no sense as applied to an *object* (in this case a number) x . He takes the example to illustrate how necessity attaches only to the *connection* between the open sentence " $x > 7$ " and the particular method (i), as opposed to (ii), of linguistically specifying x . The very notion of satisfaction does not seem to be applicable to open sentences in the scope of the modal operator. It is not *purely* a matter of whether or not (iii) is true of an object, but *also* of how the object is linguistically specified. Quine takes this situation to show that open sentences in the scope of a modal operator are meaningless, and that quantification into modal contexts makes no sense.

3. Divers on Quine's Critique of *De Re* Necessity

John Divers (2007) sets up a dialectic between Quine's critique of quantified modal logic and David Lewis' counterpart theory in order to point out a flaw in Quine's argumentation. The "mistake at the heart of the Quinean critique", exposed by the Quine-Lewis dialectic, is the sin of "confusing or conflating the metaphysical with the semantic" (52). According to Divers, Quine aims to establish that the only metaphysical sense that might be made of *de re* modal predication is "idealist" sense: The putative *de re* modal properties emerge as hopelessly inconstant and language-dependent (41-42). The Lewisian reply to Quine's critique consists in pointing out that changes in truth value of modal predications induced by different ways of linguistically specifying the same object are changes in semantic content only – the different linguistic specifications of an object select different counterpart relations as semantically relevant. This kind of change in semantic content should not be confused with change in the underlying modal reality, the objective, language-independent similarity relations in which objects stand to one another (48-49).

Divers finds Quine conflating the metaphysical with the semantic also in the following passage (Quine 2001a, 139):

One of the fundamental principles governing identity is that of substitutivity – or, as it might well be called, that of indiscernibility of identicals. It provides that, given a true statement of identity, one of its two terms may be

substituted for the other in any true statement and the result will be true.

According to Divers, this passage shows a "non-negotiated shift" from talk about the semantic principle of substitutivity to talk about the metaphysical principle of indiscernibility (52-53). *Prima facie*, it seems Divers is right: Identity is a relation between entities, and indiscernibility is a principle governing identity. Substitutivity is a semantic principle governing terms and sentences of a language. But Quine seems to regard substitutivity and indiscernibility as one and the same principle, saying for example that *substitutivity* governs *identity*. If Quine were indeed confused on such a basic issue, Divers' diagnosis of the flaw in his critique of *de re* modality would seem quite plausible.

4. Quine's View of Objects as Theoretical Posits

According to Quine, naturalized epistemology studies the relation between sensory evidence and theory. Quine construes sensory evidence in terms of action potentials in receptor cells, as neural intake. Naturalized epistemology studies the question how we can have projected our everyday and scientific theories about the world from the mere basis of our sensory intake (1990, 2-4). In particular, Quine has concentrated on one aspect of our theories, namely, on reference to objects. According to Quine, objects are theoretical posits of a theory of the world. He connects the positing of objects to linguistic reference (1999a, 2), in particular to quantification in a theory couched in the notation of first-order logic (1990, 100; 1999, 29-31). (Focusing on unregimented natural language would be self-defeating: According to Quine, clear boundaries of ontological commitment and non-commitment are not inherent in ordinary language (1999a, 9-10).)

Quine's epistemological investigation is based on the idea that the relation between theory and sensory intake can be studied by focusing on the acquisition of cognitive language (Quine says that the evidential relation "is virtually enacted" in the learning of language (2004, 294)). This is the main idea behind his *genetic* program in epistemology. On Quine's view, the acquisition of language starts from associations of holophrastic units with ranges of neural intake, that is, from the acquisition of some observation sentences. Observation sentences are expressions which can be learned inductively, in other words by operant conditioning. Not all observation sentences are, of course, learned in this way – what is essential about them is that their conditions of assent and dissent *can* be acquired thus. Observation sentences are the linguistic expressions most directly associated with ranges of neural intake. Quine speculates on how constructions on observation sentences can be learned by first learning some instances by direct or transferred conditioning and then abstracting the construction by a psychological process called *analogical synthesis* (2001, 9). The *free observation categorical* construction can be learned this way (1990, 66-67; 1999, 25). The free observation categorical is of special importance to Quine's epistemology: Compounds of observation sentences assuming this form are the ultimate evidential checkpoints of theories. A free observation categorical is of the form *When F, G*, where *F* and *G* are observation sentences. A free observation categorical is, according to Quine, "a direct expression of inductive expectation" (1999, 25). It expresses the expectation of concomitance or close succession of two kinds of occasions, specified by the component observation sentences. A theory is ultimately tested by the observation categoricals it implies – if a prediction expressed by an observation cate-

gorical fails, the theory as a whole is faced with infirming evidence (1992, 10-11; 1999, 44-45).

The constructions of free observation categorical and predication achieve no reference to objects (1999, 25-26). In Quine's genetic story, reference to objects arises only by an "irreducible leap" in language acquisition (1990, 99). By analogical synthesis, the constructions of free observation categorical and relative clause are combined into a construction called the *focal* observation categorical (1990, 97; 1999, 29-30). This is the familiar quantificational form $\Box x(Fx \Box Gx)$, where the observation sentences *F* and *G* have now turned into predicate terms true of the freshly posited objects. The reason why the acquisition of this construction amounts to an irreducible leap is that the learning of it does not proceed by first learning some instances and then abstracting the construction (1990, 94-95). This aspect of Quine's genetic account corresponds to the following point in his view of the evidence relation: Sensory intake bears on observation categoricals only as *free* ones. This can be illustrated with the following example (Quine 1999, 27-29): Assume a theory implies the observation categorical

(iv) $x(x \text{ is a raven} \Box x \text{ is black})$.

Considered as a *focal* observation categorical, (iv) contains no component observation sentences, thus no components directly associated with sensory intake (Quine 1992, 10-11). However, as a *free* one, written in an explicitly free form as

(v) When raven, black raven

it does contain component observation sentences, and thus links the theory to sensory intake. Quine's view of objects as theoretical posits now emerges as a difference in strength between (iv) and (v). (v) holds as long as each occasion on which assent to the observation sentence "raven" is reinforced in a language community is also one on which assent to the observational predication "black raven" is, too. As Quine notes, (v) is compatible with albino ravens as long as they keep close company with black ones (1999, 27). As a free one, an observation categorical is just "a generality compounded of observables", in the manner "Whenever this, that" (1992, 10). Focal observation categoricals, as statements about objects and their traits, are underdetermined by sensory evidence.

5. Quine and the Semantic-Metaphysical Distinction

Objects being theoretical posits, the principles they are subject to also come from the theory in which they are posited. The principle of indiscernibility of identicals is, in this Quinean framework, a principle concerning theoretical posits. Quine's formulation of this principle (see section 3) comes in a semantic guise, as a principle of interchangeability *salva veritate* of terms in sentences. It can then be questioned, echoing Divers, whether such a semantic formulation of the principle has anything to do with identity as a relation between language-independent objects. But from the point of view of Quine's conception of objects as theoretical posits, *if* a theory obeys the semantic formulation of the principle, then identical objects *are* indiscernible. (From the point of view of that theory, of course; but it is a central point of Quine's philosophy that we can do no better than occupy the point of view of some theory or another (2001, 22).) There is no further independent metaphysical side to the issue – no question of whether theory-independent objects obey the principle of indiscernibility. I think the shift between semantic and metaphysical talk in the passage quoted in section 3 is not non-negotiated,

once we appreciate Quine's view of objects as theoretical posits.

Similarly, *if* a theory is such that the truth value of modal predication depends on the way of linguistically specifying the object of which something is predicated in the mode of necessity, then the modal traits of objects are hopelessly inconstant and language-dependent, and consequently quantification into modal contexts makes no sense. In Quine's epistemology, there is no sense to a notion of an object as independent of our ways of linguistic specification within a theory; and it is nonsensical to appeal to an "unmasked" reality of objects and their similarity relations (Divers 2007, 49), which would provide a theory-independent metaphysical basis for modal semantics.

The answer to Quine's critique of *de re* necessity which Divers constructs from the Quine-Lewis dialectic is insufficient to challenge Quine's critique. This shortcoming is due to a failure to take into account Quine's view of objects as theoretical posits. Contrary to Quine's view, Divers' answer assumes a metaphysically realistic position according to which it makes sense to speak of objects as independent of any theory. Because of this, Divers' response fails to address Quine's critique in its proper philosophical framework – in order to hit its target, the response would need to be accompanied by an argument against Quine's view of objects as theoretical posits.

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From Practical Attitude to Normative Status: Defending Brandom's Solution of the Rule-Following Problem

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1. How do we institute (and bind ourselves to) norms?

The enlightenment has equipped us with a strong intuition that there would be no right and wrong in the world, were it not for the attitudes of intentional beings like us. Norms, we now insist, are “our creatures” (Brandom 1994, 626). Unfortunately, however, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s “rule-following considerations” (PI 138-242) have since destabilised our confidence in our capacity to beget such creatures – to frame them, to follow them, and to base our assessments of one another’s behaviour on them.

The problem is that anything that can be said or done in an attempt to fix the demands of a norm can be interpreted in such a way that *any* (future) course of action not (yet) explicitly considered turns out to accord with it. The trouble, of course, is that an interpretation of what is said or done in order to fix a norm is itself subject to norms, producing the same problem over again and threatening an infinite regress. At the same time, it won’t do to equate a norm with a piece of, say, neurological machinery, as this approach either begs the question how we tell whether the machinery is working *properly*, or fails to capture the fact that a norm specifies what *should* happen, not what *will* happen. We are left wondering whether it is at all possible to fix a norm and bind oneself (and others) to it.

Today, the debate on rule-following is dominated by community verdict theories (Kripke 1982, Wright 2001), by dispositionalist accounts (e.g. Pettit 1990), and by quietist or therapeutic takes (McDowell 1998). However, the first seem overly revisionary, the second seem unable to capture the normativity of norms, and the third seem to reject a quite legitimate call for elucidation. In this essay, I want to discuss a recent approach which seeks to avoid the problems of its competitors, namely the strategy adopted by Robert Brandom in his *Making It Explicit* (“MIE”, Brandom 1994).

2. From practical attitudes to normative statuses

Brandom’s strategy to demystify normativity rests on the idea that an agent’s *normative status* – i.e. the property of being bound to a norm, so that some of her performances count as correct, and others count as incorrect – can be explained in terms of her and her peers’ *practical attitudes*. If true, this would be good news for naturalists, because practical attitudes are easier to place in a naturalistically conceived world than normative statuses are.

Practical attitudes are dispositions of differential response to or interaction with specified patterns of stimuli. They can involve complex algorithms (and thus require the availability of memory) but they can also be very simple. At any rate, we can specify them without relying on intentional notions. Brandom’s account starts with the idea of multiple beings displaying practical attitudes towards one another (MIE, 30ff.) and revolves around the claim that if the attitudes have the right structure, we can see them as giving rise to actual normative statuses, i.e. to *proprieties* and *improprieties* in the beings’ conduct. Since Brandom takes

treating as correct/incorrect to be a legitimate description of an attitude, he writes that it is possible for beings who mutually *treat each other as correct/incorrect* to make it the case that their performances *are* or *become* correct or incorrect.

Initially, the strategy’s prospects seem dim. In particular, it is hard not to be impressed by the dilemma which is standardly diagnosed as its main problem (see Rosen 1997): If practical attitudes are really just dispositions of the sketched kind, then all we can hope to get from them is *regularity*, not *normativity*. This is true even if they involve sanctioning manoeuvres (Hattiangadi 2003). In order to get *proprieties* and *improprieties* of conduct, it seems, we have to interpret practical attitudes as *already* endowed with normative significance, i.e. see them as *properly* or *improperly* adopted. If we do this, however, the account becomes viciously circular. In the end, it is hardly more illuminating than the statement “[T]hat is an authentic Vermeer just in case it is correctly attributed to Vermeer” (Rosen 1997, 167).

3. The theorist as bearer of attitudes

Brandom, however, is not only aware of this charge, but actually has a two-part response to it. The first part is to take sides for one of the supposedly dilemmatic theses:

The work done by talk of ... statuses cannot be done by talk of ... attitudes actually adopted ... nor by regularities exhibited by such adoption... Talk of ... statuses can in general be traded in only for talk of proprieties governing adoption and alteration of ... attitudes – proprieties implicit in social score keeping practices. (MIE, 626, see also xiii and 58ff.)

From the perspective of his critics, of course, this stance pushes Brandom’s story right into the pit of vicious circularity. Brandom’s reaction to *this* charge (his response’s second part) consists in a trick pulled off in the last few pages of *MIE*, namely to change the theorist’s position from one of detached observer to one *within* the social phenomenon theorised about:

We are always already inside the game of giving and asking for reasons. We inhabit a normative space, and it is from within those implicitly normative practices that we frame our questions, interpret each other, and assess proprieties of the application of concepts. ... With the collapse of the external interpretation [which pictures the theorist as a detached observer of essentially alien agents practically relating to each other] ... those proprieties are assimilated to the score-keeping proprieties in our own discursive practices. The norms turn out to be ... here. (MIE, 648)

Now, this passage certainly provokes the suspicion that Brandom falls back on a form of quietism or even platonism. However, I do not think that this is the case, and I want to propose a reading which actually strengthens Brandom’s official strategy. It rests on two ideas. Firstly, practical attitudes can be jointly self-validating. Secondly,

normative statements, including the theorist's statements about the appropriateness of practical attitudes, *themselves* exhibit practical attitudes. It is in *this* sense that we are "always already inside the game". There is still circularity in this proposal, but it is not vicious. Let me elucidate the proposal with a simple example, paper money, and then apply it to the phenomenon of language.

4. Paper money and value

It is quite obvious that in order to carry value, a Euro note (say) need not be edible (or consumable in any other way). Also, it hardly relies on people with guns. All that a Euro note needs in order to be valuable is to be widely valued, where "valuing a note" signifies the disposition to exchange it for goods or (other) notes which are designated as of equal value (or more for buyers and less for sellers). The qualification "widely" is meant to block the idea that my privately valuing a piece of paper is sufficient to confer value on it all by itself. What is needed, in addition to me, are other agents with the same disposition. After all, I can only buy something for a Euro if there are sellers, and sell something for a Euro if there are buyers.

As soon as these others are present and equipped with the right dispositions, we can speak of a qualitative change. It now becomes warranted to say that the Euro note carries actual *value*. What this means, among other things, is that if I stopped valuing it accordingly, I would be making a mistake, whether or not the mistake was noticed – let alone sanctioned – by anyone. In fact, once the Euro note has attained value, this fact underwrites (in an unassuming way) an *infinite* number of proprieties and improprieties: a buyer can always try to demand more goods for her money, and a seller try to offer less.

By now, it is probably clear that the idea I am after is that a paper note's *value* exemplifies a normative status, while *valuing the note* exemplifies a practical attitude, and that in an unproblematic way, the latter explains the former. More precisely, it looks as though multiple agents' *attitudes* towards paper money are jointly sufficient for the latter to attain the *status* of being valuable. Its *status* of being valuable, in turn, is sufficient to make it appropriate for each agent to take the *attitude* of valuing it. What we see, here, is a circle, but not a vicious circle, for it is not our explanation which manifests it, but the system of jointly self-validating attitudes. Of course, the circular pragmatic system rests on various layers of non-normative matter. These layers are economic subjects with property rights and market strategies, the neurological bases of the relevant algorithms, the neurons' chemical make-up, and so on. In an obvious way, the emergence of value relies on the stability of these layers of structured matter. However, it is clear that value cannot be *reduced* to any of it.

One important feature of the example is that it elucidates the theorist's position within the system. This was the second part of my defence of Brandom's strategy. The point is that the theorist's claim that a Euro note is (now) worth, say, one loaf of bread, occupies the same logical space as other people's valuing of it and is thus best interpreted as an explication of her own valuing. Consider a theorist who comments on a particular marketplace and its paper currency. Imagine that she claims that a note is worth one loaf of bread, while other people consider it worth two loaves. In this situation, people would rush to make deals with our theorist – bringing it about, if the market was small enough, that the note *becomes* worth something like one loaf, or if it is big, that she gets poor. The theorist has no reason to ward them off with the remark that she is "just a theorist": if her statement about the value

of the note is truthful, and if she is rational, then she must be happy to make the deals.

5. Language and meaning

I want to claim, now, that the phenomenon of meaning can be demystified in quite the same way. My private disposition to use an expression in a particular way – inferentially, substitutionally or non-inferentially – by itself hardly confers *meaning* on the expression. But if my disposition interacts with the relevant dispositions of other speakers in such a way that we can speak of an ongoing conversation, then it is quite appropriate for me to say that the expression carries a particular meaning settling the correctness or incorrectness of my uses of it. Moreover, my *statement about* the meaning of the expression itself exhibits a linguistic disposition, thereby affecting the meaning and hence contributing towards its own appropriateness. We thus have another circular pragmatic system of attitudes (this time: linguistic dispositions) and statuses (this time: meanings), and once again, the theorist's place is right within it. On this reading, the social function of meaning talk is the mutual calibration of speakers' linguistic dispositions, just like the social function of money (and value talk) is the mutual calibration of buyers' and sellers' exchanging dispositions.

Consider a group of speakers whose communication runs quite well, but who are also used to utterances which are surprising and slightly off the mark, sometimes indicating real errors. They are all used, that is, to people talking about the "Sahara Dessert" or saying that "dolphins are majestic fish". They are also used to people telling their doctors that they have "arthritis in their thighs". The first type of utterance is best interpreted as a malapropism, the second as involving an irrelevant error, and the third as involving a mistake important enough to be pointed out. Of course, the group of speakers is nobody else but *us*.

In order to find out whether a speaker just speaks weirdly, whether she makes a real but irrelevant mistake, or whether she makes a mistake relevant to the purpose of the conversation – and if so, where the mistake lies –, we have developed a range of techniques. One of them is meaning talk. We ask each other questions of the form "Do you mean A by B?" or short: "Does B mean A?" In our answers, we make statements of the form "I mean A by B" or short: "B means A.". Imagine that you just ordered water in a restaurant, and the waiter brought tea. On complaining that you ordered water, he replies (with a puzzled face): "Well, this *is* water." In this situation, it is natural to ask: "By 'water', do you perhaps mean any mixture which has more than 99% of H₂O in it?" – and the reply may well be "Yes, 'water' means mostly H₂O".

What is interesting in this context is the direct analogy to what we have seen in the money example. By replying something like "But 'water' means *clear* H₂O", we *make it the case* (albeit defeasibly) that the exhibited use of the relevant terms becomes the *appropriate* use of the relevant terms – namely by inducing our interlocutors to use *them* (substitutionally, inferentially, non-inferentially) *in the way indicated in our meaning statement*, at least when dealing with *us*. Not only do we induce our waiter to bring us *water* when we order "water", we also enable him to translate his own remarks into our ways of speaking. What he formerly meant by "water", he will, when talking to us, express (perhaps) as "water or tea or juice".

In order to avoid three obvious complaints, let me enter three equally obvious provisos: Firstly, it is – of course – true that the term "water" is used differently in different settings. Nothing I have said is meant to deny

this; it makes sense, however, to speak of *different concepts* in this context. Secondly, in my scenario, I made common parlance win out against weird parlance. However, I could just as well have had you reply something like: "Oh, if *that* is what you mean by 'water', then I would like to order *cold bottled H₂O without any added substances*." Within the little language game between you and the waiter, something being "water" would then be compatible with it being "tea", again showing that the practical attitude exhibited by the meaning statement – this time the waiter's – contributed to its own appropriateness. Thirdly, while in private conversations, people are substantially more free to adjust even to extremely inefficient meaning statements of their interlocutors (perhaps involving terms such as "*grue*"), in larger conversations with more than two speakers, there are often good reasons to refrain from giving in too much. Here, it is much more likely that a speaker's individual meaning statement *fails* in the sense that it is *not* validated by other speakers. My proposal is not meant to hide this fact; indeed it shows something interesting, namely that the appropriateness (in *our* judgement) of a meaning statement depends on what is taken to be the relevant language game (that of all English speakers? or just yours and the waiter's?).

6. Conclusion

Of course, much more remains to be said about the emerging picture of normativity. But I do want to claim that the two ideas – the joint self-validation of attitudes, and the attitude-explicating nature of normative talk – give us a way to rescue Brandom's strategy and, in fact, to render our capacity to *mean* our words in particular ways as unmysterious as our capacity to use money.

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Second Thoughts on Wittgenstein's Secondary Sense

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What Wittgenstein says

Wittgenstein uses the terms 'sekundäre Verwendung' (secondary use) and 'sekundärer Bedeutung' (secondary sense/meaning) in *Philosophical Investigations* (PI 282, p. 216) and in LWPP I (797-798) in relation to the following cases:

- using the concept of pain or pity when playing with dolls (PI 282). In the same remark Wittgenstein discusses applying words like *see*, *hear*, *talk* to inanimate objects in fairy tales or when children play at trains. Playing trains is also discussed in LWPP I 800.
- saying that Wednesday is fat and Tuesday lean and that the vowel *e* is yellow (PI p. 216, LWPP I 795-799).
- calculating in the head (PI p. 216, LWPP I 801, 802, 804) and reading silently (LWPP I 803)¹.

Wittgenstein distinguishes between primary and secondary sense and says that words, like *fat* and *lean* have a secondary sense when applied to days of the week and a primary sense when applied, for instance, to human beings. The word *yellow* has a secondary sense when applied to sounds and a primary one when applied to ordinary perceptions of coloured objects. The same distinction holds of psychological words in their use for human beings (primary use) and inanimate objects (secondary use) as well as of words which refer to activities publicly visible (primary) or inner (secondary).

While it may seem natural to extend the uses of words which we have learned in relation to human beings and overt behaviour to inanimate objects and inner processes, it sounds unintelligible to call days of the week fat and lean or vowels yellow. It seems as if people using these words are talking nonsense. Cato Wittusen, without differentiating between cases, interprets Wittgenstein as saying that secondary uses are, in general, devoid of meaning. "We actually fail to say anything when using words in a secondary mode" (2001, p. 387)².

Now, Wittgenstein, *pace* Wittusen, does not maintain that secondary sense is nonsense (a proposition which is itself nonsensical) for any of the aforementioned cases. About secondary sense he says the following things:

1. that words used in a secondary mode do not have a different meaning from the usual one (the primary one), but a different use. They have their familiar meanings.
2. that this different use is not like the different use we find in ambiguous words such as *bank* and, so one cannot employ different words for the two different uses. One needs to use the same word in primary and secondary use.

¹ Calculating in the head and pretend play appear in many other places in the Wittgenstein corpus but not in an explicit or close relation to secondary sense. In the *Brown Book* (pp. 135-143) Wittgenstein speaks of coloured, darker and lighter vowels without mentioning, again, secondary sense.

² Wittusen assimilates his talk of nonsense in relation to secondary sense to the discussion of nonsense in the context of the so-called "New Wittgenstein" interpretation.

3. that this different use is not metaphorical.

If meaning is understood as use, then a tension already emerges: How could a word have a different use and yet the same meaning (cf., PI, p. 215)? And if meaning is the same in primary and secondary use, in what sense is the secondary meaning different from the primary to deserve a different label, i.e., "secondary meaning"?

Some problems of Diamond's interpretation

Cora Diamond, who is one of the very few scholars who have addressed the issue of secondary sense³, eases the above tension by saying that "when we talk about meaning, we do not always mean use" (1991, p. 240). She appeals to Wittgenstein's remarks that we cannot always explain meaning as use (PI 43), and that, in relation to "is", he would say that the word has two different meanings (as copula and as sign for identity) but not two different uses (PI 561). The exceptions Wittgenstein is alluding to in PI 43 most probably relate to using the word "mean" in expressions such as "I mean what I say" (cf. Wittgenstein 1988, p. 182). If this is correct, then what he says in PI 43 is not really relevant to resolving the tension mentioned above. In PI 561 Wittgenstein is discussing ambiguous words where the same term stands, as a matter of coincidence, for two different uses and two different meanings. Here Wittgenstein does make a distinction between use and meaning but only in relation to a particular occasion, namely, whether we would prefer to say that the term "is" has two different meanings rather than two different kinds of use. But he does not really say that meaning is independent of use. Consequently, the passage is again irrelevant to our original problem, i.e., the clash between explaining meaning as use and understanding secondary sense as involving the same meaning but a different use.

The rest of Diamond's article, which applies Wittgenstein's considerations about secondary sense to ethical language, does not really clarify what secondary sense is and the role it has in Wittgenstein's work. Her thesis is that ethical uses of expressions involve secondary uses of words. For instance, speaking of "absolute ought" is a secondary use compared to the relative and primary use of ought (e.g., in relation to some task). We first learn the primary use of words and then learn to master the secondary. She concentrates on Wittgenstein's distinction between secondary use and metaphor stressing that secondary uses, unlike metaphors, cannot be paraphrased. She is interested to show that ethical language cannot be reduced to descriptions of some special sort of facts using words in the primary mode. Ethical language, according to Diamond, is "forced on us", we are "impelled" to use it, we do not choose (pp.233, 235-237). But there are several problems and some inconsistencies in this account, at least, if it is taken to be exegetical of Wittgenstein's view:

- Diamond takes the amenability of metaphor to paraphrase in words in their primary sense to mark the dif-

³ Discussion of secondary sense can also be found in Hark ((2007), Johnston (1993, pp. 120-125), Mulhall (2001, pp. 163-182), Wittusen (2001).

ference between secondary use and metaphor when, according to Wittgenstein, the difference is that figurative use, but not secondary use, is up to us. Wittgenstein insists that in secondary use words have their primary meaning which means that paraphrasing, as Diamond understands it, is not even an option.

- Although Diamond underlines the distinction between secondary use and metaphor she says that “[t]here is no harm in saying that a secondary use is *in a sense* metaphorical, provided we are aware of the differences” (emphasis in the original, Diamond 1991, p. 227). As noted, the differences concern paraphrasing, but it is not clear what this *sense* is which allows secondary use to be considered metaphorical⁴. She also, indirectly, takes secondary use to be figurative (1991, pp. 236-237), contrary to what Wittgenstein explicitly says (PI, p. 216; LWPP I, 799, 800)⁵.

- As long as Diamond does not explain why Wittgenstein notes the spontaneity of the secondary use of words (PI pp. 197, 204, 215; cf., Wittgenstein 1988, p. 148), it may be taken that secondary uses are somehow mysterious⁶. This is reinforced by the following passage (Diamond 1991, p. 229): “to recognize that expressions may be used in a secondary sense is to see that they are not meaningless in these secondary uses even if we cannot give an account of what they mean in words used in their primary sense.” According to Diamond, words in secondary mode are not meaningless, they have a sense, but we cannot give an account of it in primary terms or in any other way. Earlier in the text, however, she says that in the case of secondary use, “there is no question of giving you an explanation of how I meant the words, different from the ‘perfectly ordinary one’” (ibid., p. 228).

- Diamond (1991, p. 228) is not again clear as regards the meaning of words in secondary use. First she says that in secondary use, as opposed to metaphor, there is no shift of meaning. But later she notes that “if I think of the shift from the usual range, I may be inclined to say that the meaning must be different; while if I recognize that there is no question of giving you an explanation of how I meant the words, different from the ‘perfectly ordinary one’, I may say that the words mean what they always mean.”

How Wittgenstein understands secondary sense

It is the contention of this paper that all cases discussed by Wittgenstein in relation to secondary sense present an increasing difficulty to his statement that meaning is use and this is the reason he considers them. They all involve a reference to some experience or inner process which,

purportedly, is connected to meaning. Wittgenstein rejects this view.

Saying that vowels are light, dark or coloured is a clear case of synaesthesia, that is, involuntary cross modal sensation, and in particular grapheme-colour and sound-colour synaesthesia. In cases of synaesthesia, one may be inclined to say that synaesthetes are describing their peculiar perceptions and it is these idiosyncratic experiences that give their reports meaning. Wittgenstein says that even in these extreme cases, where one can indeed say that queer experiences are being spontaneously described, the meaning of linguistic expressions is given by the primary use of words, i.e., use which has been learned prior to the current experience. Meaning is still use and secondary meaning is parasitic upon ordinary primary use. The difference from metaphor is important in this respect. For one, synaesthetic experience is involuntary, so it is not up to us to use certain expressions as it happens with metaphor. Certain concepts are forced on us (PI, p. 204). Secondly, if reports of synaesthetic experiences were assimilated to metaphor, then there wouldn't be anything really special about this phenomenon, nothing that would connect the use of words to particular experiences. So, it wouldn't be an extreme case for Wittgenstein to consider in relation to his view that meaning is use.

The examples of other cases, i.e., calculating in the head and reading silently, are considered by Wittgenstein in order to make the same point, namely, that even when our words are supposedly referring to inner processes, their meaning is not given by some inner facts but by the past uses of words in ordinary overt behaviour.

So, if the meaning in secondary use is the same as the primary, how does secondary use differ from primary use and how can we say, at the same time, that meaning is use? Every particular application of words is a new use which is assimilated or not to previous applications establishing the words' meaning. Wittgenstein says that some new uses of words, in new surroundings, may, or may not, start a new game (cf. BB, pp. 139-140). There is no principled way to determine in advance when this will happen. Wittgenstein speaks of secondary sense, not in order to mark a particular kind of use with certain characteristics, but to point out that certain uses of words, which seem idiosyncratic and dependent upon some inherently hidden entity, are actually parasitic upon primary use. “It is most enormously important that first we learn ‘is red’ and then ‘seems red’. This is fundamental. There is a tendency and temptation to say that all we have are our impressions” (Wittgenstein 1988, p. 151; cf. p. 61; Z 182). Secondary use is dependent upon primary use the way, one might say, secondary qualities are dependent upon primary qualities or secondary signs upon primary signs⁷ (Wittgenstein 2005, pp. 40-47). The secondary simply presupposes the primary.

⁴ Wittgenstein says that “one might want to call the secondary meaning ‘metaphorical’” (LWPP I 798), but, note, that he has the word in scare quotes. He takes it in the literal sense of transposition, given what he says immediately before: “the secondary use consists in applying the word with *this* primary use in new surroundings” (LWPP I 797).

⁵ Diamond says that ethical language involves the secondary use of words and that ethical statements are figurative expressions. She invokes Wittgenstein's view that some figurative expressions are forced on us. But the figurative expression “In my heart I understood when you said that”, which Wittgenstein discusses, does not involve a secondary use of words. Cavell (1979, p. 189) also brings together figurative and secondary use.

⁶ Johnston (1993, pp. 120-121) calls the use of expressions in the secondary mode pathological and a strange form of madness. He says that, in relation to the inner, we use language in a spontaneous non-rule-governed way (ibid., 123). What stops these apparently nonsensical utterances from being nonsense is that, in his view, they are like gestures to which we respond without learning rules. Mulhall (2001, p. 178) also finds a close connection between secondary sense and gestures. But according to Wittgenstein, gestures form languages and they may require rules to be learned and understood.

⁷ Wittgenstein allows for a distinction between primary and secondary signs within one particular game (2005, p. 47), even though he is opposed to generically distinguishing between colour chips and gestures as primary signs and words as secondary.

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Reality and Construction, Linguistic or Otherwise: The Case of Biological Functional Explanations

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1. Introduction

There are many variants of constructionism or constructivism. Loosely speaking, one of their claims is that what (some) people say about reality or validity is not how reality objectively is or about something objectively valid, but rather how we conceive of those things. Opponents, diverse realists, also regard all hypotheses as human constructions, but argue that objectively insubstantial ones will be sifted out.

Thorough-going constructivists in epistemology were the British empiricists and Kant. For Berger and Luckmann, the entire social reality is a social construction. The Strong Programme in the sociology of knowledge has claimed that even the content of scientific knowledge is socially constructed. For Derrida, all is text, nothing outside of it.

Furthermore, very often, views or institutions of one party or group have been criticized or attacked by another party for being merely or mainly, sometimes even willful, constructions, and thus unreal or invalid. Think of the feminist critique of all the ways – linguistic, institutional, scientific – in which women have been misrepresented and oppressed. Or think of eliminative materialists arguing that folk psychology has been explanatorily sterile and should be replaced by scientific approaches.

Comparable replacements or abandonments indeed took place. Animistic views will no longer be found in rationalistic circles. Teleological (Aristotelian) accounts of processes in the non-living world, while still present in everyday thought, have been discarded in modern mechanistic physical sciences. The question is whether they can or should also be discarded *regarding the living world*. Here, the relevant debates among philosophers and biologists have revolved about the notions of biological functions and functional explanation.

So, the questions I want to deal with are whether talk of biological functions and so-called functional explanations have some objective content or rather are mere human construals. Of course, I cannot take up all ramifications of these questions (cf. McLaughlin 2001; Wouters 2003, 2005a, 2005b).

As to the parties involved, almost everyone uses some intuitive notion of function, engrained in vernacular speech. Biologists, professionally, talk of 'functional analysis' and 'functional explanation'. Philosophers have their own diverging, often metaphysical, agendas; some naturalists, for instance, are attracted to function language in the hope that it will solve problems in the philosophy of mind.

2. Some (Philosophical) Views of Functions and Biological Functional Explanations

Talk of functions commonly applies to artifacts: the function of the battery is to start the car. It is a means to an end, as intended by the designer and user. Its presence and structure are readily explained in intentional-teleological terms. Artifacts are literally human "construc-

tions". Thus, there is no question of whether they are mere construals or objectively real (although non-literal, e.g. anthropomorphic, construals might get added, as in 'my car *does not want* to start').

We take it that there *no intentional* goals in the biological world, as anchors for function talk. Notions of unintended goals or purposes remain somewhat shady. Why not describe everything that happens in the biological world as just so many processes? Processes and their stages can be seen, functions are not visible, also because 'function' is being used in some "normative" sense: the function of an item is something it *should* perform, but perhaps not (always) does.

Yet, biology is unthinkable without the investigation of functions, in combination with structures, of traits or behaviors of organisms. Also, medical science is unthinkable without ideas of functions and malfunctions of organs. In both fields, function talk seems to be more than common parlance or metaphorical projection. Which processes, then, could count as functions, which structures as function bearers?

Much philosophical discussion of functional explanations focuses on possible claims like 'we have a heart with its particular structure *because* of its function of pumping and circulating blood'. The immediate objection is: an effect does not explain its cause! The claim would be an inversion of causal explanation, a return to a teleology of nature.

However, there also are other models of explanation, like the more general deductive-nomological model of Hempel and Nagel. Can functional explanations be validated in its terms? Perhaps surprisingly, the two philosophers gave different answers (cf. McLaughlin 2001, 66ff.). Nagel concluded that they were valid explanations, Hempel that they were not.

In fact, the two philosophers were treating different kinds of possible functional explanations. Hempel took them as proposals to explain *why the function bearer exists*, Nagel as explanations of *what good it does*. Both hold that functions are relative to the system or organism in which they are performed, to its self-maintenance (Hempel) or its characteristic activity (Nagel). For both, too, as for many others, functional *analysis* is uncontroversial as a heuristic technique of gaining a better understanding of a system and directing the search for relevant causal connections.

For Hempel, so-called functional explanation could not explain why a particular function bearer exists, because he accepted the (possible) existence of functional equivalents. Yet, subsequent philosophers insisted that function ascriptions were only acceptable if functional explanations could be shown to be legitimate.

Nagel wrongly denied the existence of functional equivalents; he could only do so by *assuming* in his account the presence of the particular function bearer in question. Thus, he stayed aloof from philosophers' con-

cern with a possible causal explanation of function bearers. Also, for many, his account is much too liberal, allowing functional explanations for any somehow goal-directed network of causes and effects, even purely physical and deterministic ones (McLaughlin 2001, 73f.).

Among more recent approaches to functions (McLaughlin 2001; Wouters 2005b), the two main ones can be considered as further developments or improvements of the two presented above: the etiological view (succeeding Hempel) and the dispositional view (succeeding Nagel). Both lean heavily on evolutionary theory.

Etiological positions attempt to explain the origin of the function bearer and mostly, against Hempel, interpret functional explanation as legitimate. Hempel's analysis of 'trait X of system S has function Y' had two elements: *Disposition*: X does or enables Y, and *Welfare*: Y is beneficial to S. Etiologists commonly (McLaughlin 2001, 83) added a *Feedback* condition: Y leads to the (re)occurrence of X, supposed to be provided by natural selection. For some, 'X has a function' simply means 'X is an adaptation', which would imply that the term 'function' could be dispensed with.

In principle, an etiological view can distinguish between the function and other (mere or side) effects of X: between the heart's function to circulate blood, for which it was selected, and its making thumping sounds. Yet, the line drawn appears to be too narrow. On its first occurrence, X would not yet have its function: its function does actually not explain its origin, but rather its preservation in following generations. Also, exaptations would in some etiological views not be attributed functions: flippers of turtles would not have the function of digging in sand and burying eggs, since they were selected for swimming. Both implications as well as others (McLaughlin 2001, 84ff.) clash with intuitive and biologists' notions of functions.

Dispositional views avoid the problem of explaining the presence and structure of function bearers. Instead of looking backwards (to past selection), they look forward. According to one dispositional view (cf. McLaughlin 2001, 120ff.), the "systemic approach" (Wouters 2005b, 135ff.), the function of X denotes a capacity (disposition) of X, singled out by its role in an analysis of some capacity of the containing system. This view still is too liberal. It cannot distinguish between functions of an item and its side effects, between its nonaccidental and accidental effects: making heart sounds could be just as much a function of the heart as pumping blood. Also, a tumor could be ascribed a function in an analysis of an organism's capacity to die of cancer. Lastly, this view is outspokenly reductionistic, whereas capacities of the containing systems, organisms, seem to me to be often emergent with respect to contributory capacities of its parts.

Some shortcomings of the systemic approach can be attributed to its avoidance of a welfare condition, present in another dispositional view, the propensity view (McLaughlin 2001, 125ff.) or "life chances approach" (Wouters 2005b, 139ff.). In analogy to the propensity view of fitness, it says that a trait has a function whenever it confers a survival-enhancing propensity on the organism. Propensity is a probability notion, referring to possibilities. Assessing enhancing propensity will thus involve counterfactual comparisons: by how much would the propensity of survival be lower, if vertebrates had a somewhat different heart? Such quantitative assessments are almost impossible to make, as are decisions on whether survival is explained by a trait-based propensity or by chance. Furthermore, on the propensity view, a polar bear's fur would no longer have the function of reducing heat loss, if it resided

in a zoo in the tropics. Finally, sometimes what is meant is the propensity of survival *and* reproduction. In this case, counterintuitively, the heart of mules would have no function.

3. Different Notions of Biological Function – "Design Explanations"

My brief discussion of the two views above suggests that they concern quite different notions of biological functions, stipulated for different *philosophical* reasons. Yet, how do *biologists*, generally use function talk? According to A. Wouters (2003, 635), there are at least four different ways in which 'function' is used in the study of living organisms

- (1) function as activity – what an organism, part, organ, or substance by itself does or is capable of doing;
- (2) function as biological role – the way in which an item or activity contributes to a complex activity or capacity of an organism;
- (3) function as biological advantage – the advantages to an organism of a certain item or behavior being present or having a certain character;
- (4) function as selected effect – the effects for which a certain trait was selected in the past which explain its current presence in the population.

These notions are correlated to different kinds of questions that can be asked. (1) What does the heart do by itself? – It contracts rhythmically. (2) What is its role in the organism? – It pumps, circulates blood. While these answers are not explanations, they give rise to questions, like 'how does the heart do that?', which ask for explanations, usually *causal* explanations, often involving (intra-organismal, "cybernetic", *not* evolutionary) feedback mechanisms.

(3) What is the biological utility or advantage of a trait or behavior with a given biological role? Biologists usually call answers hereto 'functional explanations'; Wouters calls them "design explanations", to avoid confusions. Design explanations specify interdependencies between traits, behavior, environment, and regularly appeal to counterfactual reasons. As for the advantage of a blood circulatory system, one relevant consideration is that mere diffusion of oxygen and carbon dioxide would not work for organisms of the size of vertebrates.

A nice further example, regarding behavior, is the explanation of why electric fish swim backwards. Only in doing so, can they successfully scan a prey with their electric sense, which does not provide much focus. Such answers are *explanations of their own kind*, different from deductive-nomological or causal explanations. They are explanatory in that they show how a trait or behavior fits into the structure of functional interdependencies within organisms and of organisms and environment.

Moreover, as Wouters notes, design explanations would be valid, *no matter* whether existing organisms came about through evolution or by accident or by divine creation. This contrasts with etiological positions, which have tied biological functions to natural selection. Nevertheless, of course, the insights supplied by the identification of biological roles and design explanations are important data for treating, or rather speculating about, question (4): How and why did a particular item or behavior evolve and acquire the character it has?

4. Conclusions

'Function' is definitely being used in rather different senses. Also, 'functional explanation' or just 'functional analysis' has been given rather different meanings, depending on the questions asked. Debates about the "correct" notions are somewhat moot, involving a great variety of arguments and counterexamples.

'Function', in all usages, denotes a general relational (meta)category, unlike 'mass' or 'velocity', which occur in empirically verifiable object statements or in laws or explanations. In that sense, it is comparable to 'cause'. Witness comparable philosophical debates about the nature of causal explanations.

One great difference is the "normativity" of function ascriptions, which follows from the welfare condition: a functional trait is supposed to be beneficial to an organism, at least to its survival. Design explanations, clearly, stand in the context of the assumption of such a goal: the electric fish tries to catch its prey in order to maintain its own biological organization. The life of organisms is not just so many purposeless physical happenings. Design explanations are valid explanations in their own right. They refer not just to actually existing causes, but also to real and unreal possibilities in the living world.

One dispositional view, we saw, dispenses with the welfare condition, but thus practically also with the notion of function. Etiological views tend to naturalize any teleological-reeking "normativity" by defining function as selected effect, ignoring the importance of design explanations.

The "normativity" of function ascriptions, which seems to me to be ineliminable, also shows that they are human constructions. A value realist could maintain that this "normativity" is grounded in an objective good of organisms, subserved by the many functions of their traits and behavior. In this view, one could envision, among the human constructions, one objectively "correct" notion of function, and also several (question-dependent) "correct" notions of valid functional explanations.

Yet, the "normativity" or purposiveness involved in functional explanations can always be doubted. We know that reproaches like 'you pushed me on purpose' can be always be countered by saying 'it was an accident'. Purposiveness, in this case purposefulness, "can always be mimicked by accident" (McLaughlin 2001, 67).

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Zum Phaenomen der semantischen Negativität: Nietzsche und Gerber

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Die deutsche Sprachphilosophie der zweiten Haelfte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts erlebt sich im Besitz von neuen und entscheidenden Erkenntnissen. Die Natur und der Ursprung dieser neuen Erkenntnisse ist divers, ihre Konsequenzen weisen aber in einer und derselben Richtung. Sie bringen grosse Anstrengungen auf, die Sprache in die Vermittlungskette eines erkenntnistheoretischen Gedankenganges unterzubringen, mit anderen Worten, sie tun alles, die Sprache in der nunmehr als endgültig gedachten Erkenntnistheorie zu positionieren. In dieser Grundbestrebung sehen sich die Vertreter dieser Richtung mit Kant konfrontiert.

Diese Aufwertung der Sprache, sowie die Suche nach ihrem möglichen Ort in der wirklich funktionierenden Kette der Erkenntnis konfrontiert sich gleich in zwei Punkten mit Kant. Der damalige Stand der Kant-Kenntnisse, aber auch die Zusammensetzung derselben machte es für diese Richtung plausibel, dass eine Positionierung dieser Art möglich ist. So erscheint ihnen die Sprache (in mehreren Formen) in der Stellung einer „Alternative“ zur Kants Erkenntniskritik. Hinter dieser Verallgemeinerung stehen durchaus verschiedene Phaenomene, denn ihre Kant-Kenntnisse, die die konkrete Entwicklung der philosophiehistorischen Entwicklung als eine objektive Realitaet ihr Wissen bestimmt hat, ihnen durchaus verschiedene Kant-Kenntnisse vermittelt haben.

Ihr umfassender philosophischer Gedanke galt in ihren Augen zweifellos als umfassend. Dieser Beurteilung können wir nicht beipflichten, auch dann nicht, wenn diese Einstellung historisch, unter jenen historischen und wissenschaftsgeschichtlichen Bedingungen vollkommen verstaendlich war. In dieser Beurteilung soll jede Vernunft-Kritik (die ja implizite auch eine Verstand-Kritik ist) mit einer philosophischen Kritik der Sprache zusammenfallen, woraus freilich auch folgt, dass auch die Philosophie generell mit der Sprachkritik auch identisch sein muss.

Die gewaltigen neuen Ergebnisse in der Sprachgeschichte über die Entstehung der Sprache begründeten das Vertrauen, dadurch könnte man die Erkenntnistheorie umfunktionieren. Diese Revolution galt gleichzeitig aber auch als ruhige und selbstsichere Einsicht auf der Basis einer als endgültig erlebten Wandlung der entscheidenden Grundbedingungen. Aus den Spielarten dieser neuen Einsicht liesse sich eine ganze Typologie aufstellen. Kant erscheint vor diesem Horizont schon als einer, dessen Begrifflichkeit letzten Endes schon eigentlich das Problem der Sprache mobilisierte. Daraus folgte (konsequenterweise wieder in vielen Variationen), dass auch die (realen oder vermeintlichen) Dilemmen von Kant allein durch eine neue und adaequate Positionierung der Sprache nur aufzulösen waeren.

In diesen sprachphilosophischen Bestrebungen wird vor allem die Vermittlungskette der Erkenntnis grundsatzlich verlaengert. Mit relativer Haeufigkeit erscheint im Zentrum dieser verlaengerten Vermittlungskette die Vorstellung, sowohl als Phaenomen als auch Begriff. Die Vorstellung hat die Funktion, aber auch die Potenz, die Kluft zwischen der nicht-sprachliche Natur der Erkenntnis und der

sprachlichen Natur der Begriffsbildung zu überbrücken. In diesem Rahmen erscheint der Kern von Gustav *Gerbers* Sprachkonzepten schon im Zusammenhang einer plastischen Typologie.

In einer Phase seiner unermüdlichen sprachphilosophischen Ansaetze versucht Gerber in der Gegenüberstellung des Kennens und des Erkennens die Sprachproblematik zu situieren. Die Attribute des Kennens sind die Rezeptivitaet, die Abhaengigkeit vom Gegenstand, die praktische Nützlichkei und die Reproduktion des Seins. Demgegenüber exzelliert das Erkennen im Verstehen der Welt, womit es der Erkenntnisfunktion der Sprache auch den entscheidenden Raum öffnet. Es benennt die die Elemente der gegenstaendlichen Welt verbindenden Verbindungen. Es ist klar, dass dieser Ansatz nicht einen primær erkenntnistheoretischen Charakter aufweist. Der Bewegungs- und Aktionsradius des Kennens setzt das so verstandene Erkennen naemlich in aller Deutlichkeit voraus. Gerade die Klaerung dieser Reihenfolge waere die spezifisch erkenntnistheoretische Aufgabe gewesen. Es ist auch klar, dass diese Gegenüberstellung noch zahlreiche positive Entfaltungsmöglichkeiten hat, uns liegt aber hier vor allem um das Aufzeigen des fehlenden primæren erkenntnistheoretischen Charakters.¹

Der aufrichtige, nicht selten sogar enthusiastische Erkenntniswille und das historisch bedingte Fehlen der Einsicht in die strengere Erkenntnistheorie zeitigt eine durchgehende Spannung in diesem Denken. Darauf baut sich aber auch ein anderer Mangel auf, und zwar der Mangel der Gleichzeitigkeit. Waehrend die Einschaltung der Sprache in die Vermittlungskette der Erkenntnis in jedem Fall ein zeitgemaesser, aktueller und dem eigentlichen Geist des Kritizismus keineswegs gegenüberstehende Idee ist, erweist sich die Einschaltung des Ichs (in der von Gerber vorgeschlagenen konkreten Form) in dieselbe Vermittlungskette als inadaequat. Es heisst, dass eine bereits überalterte philosophische Objekt-Subjekt-Relation in den Kontext eines aktuellen und auch logisch zeitgemaessen Ansaetzes hineingehoben wird.

Gerade in diesem Punkt hatten diese Linguisten und Philosophen keinen richtigen Verdacht, sie dachten nicht daran, dass eine in den Kritizismus neigende genealogische Denkweise nicht mehr mit der traditionellen Objektum-Subjektum-Relation zusammengeht. Es ist freilich eine andere Frage, dass auf diese systematische Frage der Hinweis auf den realen Vorgang des philosophiehistorischen Prozesse auch keine akzeptable Antwort abgeben kann.

Selbst aber diese traditionell anmutende Objekt-Subjekt-Relation hatte eine positive Konsequenz für diese Sprachphilosophen. Durch diese Auffassung des Ich hat sich das Ich in dem Erkenntnisprozess aufgewertet. Auf diesem Faden baute sich in diesen Konzept das Individuelle, sogar auch der methodologische Individualismus auf. Wenn die Auffassung des Ich noch undifferenziert genug

¹ So könnten wir beispielsweise fragen, warum *Kennen* etwa sprachlos ist, etc.

ist, kann die Sprache stark aufgewertet werden, beispielsweise auf dem einfachen Wege, dass die Sprache das Ich auch konstituieren kann und wenn so, steht gleich die Sprache hinter Erkenntnis und Erkenntnistheorie.

In diesem sprachphilosophischen Ansatz des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts erscheinen auch naturwissenschaftliche Analogien intensiv, sie sind aber auch sehr an diese Zeit gebunden, heute grösstenteils schon unverstänlich, obwohl die frischen Werturteile und die epistemologische Originalität selbst in diesen naturwissenschaftlichen Hinweisen deutlich zu erkennen sind.

Auch Gerber stellt innerhalb der Erkenntniskette das Ich in den Mittelpunkt. Das Ich wird aufgestellt inmitten der philosophischen Differenz von Sprache und Wirklichkeit. Auf dieser Grundlage erstet bei ihm eine Art philosophischer Perspektivismus, der von Nietzsches Perspektivismus auch nicht mehr fern steht. Nicht die Dinge erscheinen im Bewusstsein, sondern das, wie wir uns zu den Dingen verhalten. Immer ergreifen wir die Wirklichkeit in Dimensionen, in denen wir zu ihnen verhalten und in denen sie auf uns wirken.² Zu der Kant-Interpretation jener Zeit passt die Einsicht hinein, dass wir nie fähig werden, das wahre Wesen der Dinge zu erfassen. Auch in Gerbers Perspektivismus wird Erkenntnis relational, von Anfang an nicht essentialistisch und auch der Interpretationscharakter des Wirklichen macht sich in ihm sichtbar.³

Die so aufgefasste Sprachinterpretation ist organischer Bestandteil des klassischen Positivismus in Deutschland. Die sich hier artikulierenden Inhalte des klassischen Positivismus werden auch durch die selektive Kant-Interpretation beeinträchtigt, wiewohl es auch allgemein gilt, dass der klassische Positivismus der zweiten Hälfte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts generell ohne eine gerade in der Richtung des klassischen Positivismus weisende Kant-Interpretation auskommen muss. Das ist auch der Grund dessen, dass als diese sprachphilosophische Orientierung die Vermittlungskette verlängert, sie es sehr richtig tut, selbst der Wille ist produktiv und legitim, die Sprache besser als bisher in dieser Vermittlung zu positionieren. Gerade das Fehlen einer tieferen erkenntnistheoretischen Orientierung führt (die wir sowohl symbolisch als auch konkret mit der Kant-Interpretation in Verbindung bringen) aber dazu, dass dieser an sich durchaus fehlerhafte Konzept sich letztlich nicht vollständig legitimieren kann.

Fragt man nach der prinzipiellen Möglichkeit, warum die Differenz zwischen Sprache und Wirklichkeit nicht schon im neunzehnten Jahrhundert in der Richtung einer wie immer auch verstandenen Dekonstruktion geführt habe, müssen wir zunächst sagen, dass so eine Möglichkeit den damaligen Forschern der Wissenschaft und der Philosophie überhaupt nicht eingefallen ist. Andererseits hätte diese Lösung auch keine gegenständliche Grundlage. Das Phänomen der sprachlichen Differenz stellt eine wirkliche Differenz dar, das in der Sprache liegende Moment der Differenz macht aber die diskursive Erkenntnis überhaupt nicht unmöglich. An diesem Punkt nehmen die Sprachdenker des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts eine merkwürdige Zwischenstellung ein. Sie nehmen die Differenz wahr (man muss die Sprache in die Vermittlungskette der Erkenntnis, bzw. der Erkenntnistheorie sehr nachdrücklich positionieren), sie denken die Lösung mit dieser Positionie-

rung der Sprache, durch welche sie gerade diese Differenz zu überbrücken suchen. Gerade dadurch verschliessen sie sich aber den Weg in der Richtung eines frühen Differenzdenkens (ihre Lösung ist höchstens sprachbetont, weil sie, wie wir es betonten, sich in der Erkenntnistheorie nur selektiv orientieren konnten).

Die von Gerber inaugurierte Sprachphilosophie ist eine ernstzunehmende Komponente im Denken des jungen Nietzsche.⁴ Zum Teil erklärt sich diese Tatsache auch aus dem philosophischen Vakuum der fünfziger und sechziger Jahre, in denen auch dieser Neuanfang eine hohe Plausibilität genießen konnte. Wir müssen freilich stets darauf achten, dass jegliche Sprachreflexion den Philologen und den Philosophen Nietzsches zur gleichen Zeit betroffen haben dürfte, darüber auch noch ganz zu schweigen, dass auch der Philologie eine starke Reflexionssphäre herausarbeitete und auch der Philosoph die Philologie mehrfach und in mehreren Kontexten instrumentalisierte.

Als hervorragender junger Philologe steht Nietzsche grundsätzlich auch auf dem sehr allgemeinen Standpunkt der Sprachdifferenz. Als solche, wird sein Ansatz, wie bei Gerber, unmittelbar eine hermeneutisch orientierte Philosophie. Die damalige Dualität dieser Sprachinterpretation wirft die verdoppelte Struktur des reifen kritizistischen Positivismus von Friedrich Nietzsche, die Einheit von Hermeneutik und Genealogie in einem kritizistischen Rahmen, voraus.

Diese Voraussetzung begründet bei Nietzsche die zunächst überraschende, bei späterem Zusehen aber frappante Metapher, in welchem die „Philologie“ zum methodologischen und moralischen Ideal der „Philosophie“, des Denkens, sogar auch des adäquaten menschlichen Verhaltens wird. Man muss eingangs unterstreichen, es ist nicht der Philologe Nietzsche, der die „Philologie“ zum Massstab musterhaften intellektuellen und moralischen Verhaltens macht (wiewohl er sich, wie bekannt, auch mit den theoretischen Problemen der Philologie selber gründlich auseinandersetzt). Es ist der Philosoph Nietzsche, der die Philologie zur umgreifenden Metapher erhebt. Wie es bei Nietzsche nicht selten der Fall ist, erscheint es auf den ersten Augenblick als privater Sprachgebrauch, während es in der Ausführung einen grossen heuristischen Wert für ihn zu haben anfangt.

Die so aufgefasste Philologie als adäquates und qualifiziertes Verfahren wird zur Metapher auch der Erkenntnistheorie.⁵ Sie kann es sein wegen ihrer Sorgfalt und Ehrlichkeit, die Achtung der kleinen Tatsachen und Zusammenhänge sind Momente, die auf eine ausgezeichnete Weise die methodologischen und die ethischen Elemente des richtigen Weges zur richtigen Erkenntnis vereinen. In der Philologie-Deutung Nietzsches vereinen sich Intellektualität und Ethik restlos. Die Metapher der richtigen Methodologie ist gleichzeitig das Mittel der Kritik, werden den Bedingungen und den Regeln dieses richtigen Verfahrens nicht entspricht, wird auch in seiner Moralität schuldig.

Die Möglichkeit der Verallgemeinerbarkeit der Philologie wird letztlich auch vom dem Stellenwert der Sprache

² Meijers, A., Gustav Gerber und Friedrich Nietzsche. Zum historischen Hintergrund der sprachphilosophischen Auffassungen des frühen Nietzsche. in: *Nietzsche-Studien*, Bd. 17. 1987.

³ S. darüber ausführlich: Endre Kiss, *Friedrich Nietzsche evilági filozófiája. Életreform és kritizmus közzét.* Budapest, 2005 (Gondolat).

⁴ S. darüber Anna Hartmann Cavalcanti, *Die Geburt von Nietzsches Sprachauffassung.* in: <http://sammelpunkt.philo.at:8080/591/3/Cavalcanti.pdf> (downloading: 20. November 2008)

⁵ Diese Situation erlaubt einen Einblick auch generell in die intellektuelle Werkstatt von Friedrich Nietzsche. Obwohl er von der üblichen Systematik in seiner Argumentation fern steht, werden unter anderen auch solche Metapher die fehlende explizite systematische Dimension ersetzen.

in einer Differenzrelation herbeigeschafft: „Man ist nicht umsonst Philologe gewesen, man ist es vielleicht noch, das will sagen, ein Lehrer des langsamen Lesens: - endlich schreibt man auch langsam...Philologie naemlich ist jene ehrwürdige Kunst, welche von ihrem Verehrer vor Allem Eins heischt, bei Seite gehn, sich Zeit lassen, still werden, langsam werden -, als eine Goldschmiedekunst und – Kennerschaft des Wortes...“⁶

Das „gute“ Lesen ist moralische, gleichzeitig aber auch intellektuelle Pflicht. Ein besonderes Spezifikum Nietzsches ist, dass er diese Pflicht (die er als Philosoph generell verkündet) für sich (als einen konkreten Philosophen) auch einfordert. Dies zeigt: Die Komplexität von Nietzsches Perspektivismus erreicht einen Grad, auf welchem seine auktoriale Persönlichkeit sich auch zweigeteilt wird. Diese Metapher wird auch weiterhin zum allgemeinen Massstab erhoben und wird gleich dem Christentum gegenüber instrumentalisiert. Die Unterscheidung zwischen „guter“ und „schlechter“ Philologie wird zum Schiedsrichter der wichtigsten Fragestellungen erhoben.

Die problematische Seite des christlichen Sinnes für „Ehrlichkeit“ und „Gerechtigkeit“ wird durch den Charakter der christlichen Philologie versinnbildlicht. Diese Philologie macht keine Unterschiede zwischen Ahnungen und Dogma, ihr Verfahren führt zur „schamlosen Willkürlichkeit“, zu einer hohen Kunst des „schlechten Lesens“, die in Nietzsches Augen vor allem in der tendenziösen Interpretation des Alten Testaments ihr Ziel findet.⁷

Eine weitere Entfaltung dieser von dem klassischen Positivismus und vor allem von Gerber inspirierten Sprachauffassung besteht im Begriff und Phänomen der *semantischen Negativität*, bzw. des *semantischen Defizits*. Bei dieser wohl bedeutenden eigenen Errungenschaft Nietzsches geht es darum, dass die ursprüngliche und sehr allgemeine Idee der Sprachdifferenz in der Richtung des semantischen Mangels, des semantischen Defizits, sogar auch in der semantischen Negativität weiterentwickelt wird. Das Phänomen umfasst also einen Mangel, ein Defizit und die aus ihnen herauswachsende Negativität. Innerhalb des Erkenntnisystems des klassischen Positivismus bedeutet es den steten Mangel an Sprachzeichen den gegenständlichen Momenten gegenübergestellt. Daher betont es Nietzsche, dass wir unsere Gedanken immer mit Worten ausdrücken, die uns zur Verfügung stehen, wir können nicht einmal ganz ausschliessen, dass wir gerade solche Gedanken formulieren, wie wir formulieren, weil wir gerade für sie die sprachlichen Mittel zur Verfügung gehabt haben.⁸

Dieser grundsätzliche Gedanke Nietzsches gilt gerade als *kritische Umkehr* jener Erwartungen, die – wie wir sahen, in einer keineswegs unverständlichen Situation und überhaupt nicht ohne eine ausreichende Begründung – die Sprache inmitten der Vermittlungskette der Erkenntnis so positionieren wollten, dass sie der Sprache eine zentrale Rolle in dieser Vermittlungskette zuweisen wollten. Nietzsche macht die *Umkehr*: Nicht der Sprache schreibt er die bestimmende Rolle in der Erkenntnis zu, er macht gerade darauf aufmerksam, dass uns keine ausreichenden sprachlichen Mittel zur Erfüllung der Erkenntnisfunktionen zur Verfügung stehen.

Die semantische Negativität wird in mehreren Kontexten zur natürlichen philosophischen Anschauungsweise

bei Friedrich Nietzsche. Dabei wird es spezifisch, dass ausser den produktiven analytischen Ansätzen Nietzsches auch den Kampf gegen dieses Phänomen aufnimmt. Nietzsche macht naemlich nicht seinen Frieden mit dieser für jeden Philosophen unüberwindlichen Situation! Nachdem er festgestellt hat, dass der semantische Defizit die Erkenntnis durchaus handgreiflich hindern kann, entdeckt er auch, dass er die erkennende Arbeit auch noch in falsche Bahnen zu lenken imstande ist. Nachdem wir mit unseren Worten nur die entfaltetsten Spielarten von Phänomenen und Gefühlen bezeichnen können (die „superlativistischen“ Zustände, wie Nietzsche es ausdrückt), verlieren wir die Übergänge und die Abschattungen von unseren Augen. Auf unser Unglück können diese Übergänge gerade diejenigen Stufen sein, die gegebenenfalls für unser Erkennen die allerwichtigsten sind. Die Sprache widergibt also die wahren Stufen der Phänomene nicht.⁹

In einer für Nietzsche typischen Manier der Sensibilität entdeckt er auch im Phänomen der semantischen Negativität *ernstzunehmende Gefahren*. Gerade wegen unserer Unfähigkeit, die Übergänge der Phänomene weltweit wahrheits- und wirklichkeitsgemäss zu artikulieren, laufen wir Gefahr, dass wir das Ich auch verlieren können. Der Ich-Verlust gilt aber für Nietzsche (nicht wie primär für Ernst Mach) eine wissenschaftstheoretische Herausforderung, bei ihm ist diese Erscheinung auch deshalb alarmierend, weil dadurch die historische, die ökumenische und die individuelle Identität auch in unmittelbare Gefahr gerät. Die semantische Negativität wird dadurch zur fleischgewordenen Negation der Universalität der Kommunikation und als solche zur Erschütterung der wirklichen Identität. Wie erwähnt, dies schafft nicht nur neue Situationen in der desanthropomorphierenden Seite der Wissenschaftstheorie, sondern auch bei den Chancen des menschlichen Glücks.¹⁰

Bereits Friedrich Albert Lange artikulierte, dass die (bei ihm nicht so genannte) semantische Negativität die Philosophie der Kunst naeherbringt, indem sie den Philosophen bis zu einem gewissen Grade in eine sprachschöpferische Rolle zwingt. Ob auf die konkrete Wirkung von Lange (die durchaus eine wahrscheinliche Hypothese ist), ob ohne sie, führte (unter anderen auch) das Phänomen der semantischen Negativität auch Nietzsche zu einer sprachschöpferisch kreativen Philosophie.¹¹

⁹ „Das sogenannte 'Ich' - Die Sprache und die Vorurteile, auf denen die Sprache aufgebaut ist, sind uns vielfach in der Ergründung innerer Vorgänge und Triebe hinderlich: zum Beispiel dadurch, dass eigentlich Worte allein für *superlativistische* Grade dieser Vorgänge und Triebe da sind - ; nun aber sind wir gewohnt, dort, wo uns Worte fehlen, nicht mehr genau zu beobachten, weil es peinlich ist, dort noch genau zu denken; ja, ehemals schloss man unwillkürlich, so dass Reich der Worte aufhöre, höre auch das Reich des Daseins auf. Zorn, Hass, Liebe, Mitleid, Begehren, Erkennen, Freude, Schmerz, das sind alles Namen für *extreme* Zustände: die milderen mittleren oder gar die immerwährend spielenden niederen Grade entgehen uns, und doch weben sie das Gespinnt unseres Charakters und Schicksals.“ Ugyanott, 107-108. (Kiemelések az eredetiben.)

¹⁰ Der Kern des Phänomens der semantischen Negativität ist beliebter Gegenstand der schönen Literatur.

¹¹ Über die Sprachdifferenz s. bei Lange: „Jeder Versuch, Dinge zu definieren, schlaegt fehl; man kann den Sprachgebrauch eines Wortes willkürlich fixieren, aber wenn dies Wort eine Klasse von Gegenständen nach ihrem gemeinsamen Wesen bezeichnen soll, so zeigt sich stets früher oder später, dass die Dinge anders zusammengehören und andere massgebenden Eigenschaften haben, als ursprünglich angenommen wird...Keine Definition eines Fixsterns kann diesen verhindern, sich zu bewegen...“ Ld. Fr. A. Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus. Zweite Ausgabe. é.n. (1881). Erste Ausgabe: Iserlohn, 1866. 55.- S. darüber auch Cavalcanti (<http://sammelpunkt.philo.at:8080/5913/Cavalcanti.pdf>). Auf Lange kommt auch der spätere Gerber zu sprechen (Gustav Gerber, *Sprache als Kunst*. Berlin 1886.), auch Fritz Mauthner registriert Lange als „Voriaeufser“, es wird ferner auch von Mauthners Nachfolgern heute noch bestaetigt (<http://euro.mein-serva.de/mauthner2004/mauthner/hist/gerb2a1.html> (downloading 1. August 2008)).

⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Werke*. Kritische Studienausgabe. Bd. 3. S. 17. (Sperrung im Original – E.K.9)

⁷ Wir erinnern an dieser Stelle an das Jesus-Bild des *Anti-Christ* című műben).

⁸ Ugyanott, 208.l.

Die daraus entstehende sprachliche Kreativität soll freilich nicht mit den vielen anderen „literarisch“ organisierten Elementen von Nietzsches Philosophie verwechselt werden. Diese Sprachschöpfung ist höchstens nur sehr fern verwandt mit Nietzsches Gedichten, mit den Liedern des Zarathustra, mit der aphoristischen und deshalb literarisch anmutenden Intonation dieser Philosophie! Die semantische Negativität ist nur ein Moment aus der Vielfalt der schwerwiegenden Probleme der philosophischen Kommunikation bei Nietzsche!

Nietzsche erkennt das differentielle Moment der Sprache. Er versucht es aber keineswegs, die so interpretierte Sprache in eine zentrale Position der extrem verlängerten Vermittlungskette des Erkenntnisprozesses hineinzuzwingen. Er baut aber die Sprache vielschichtig, positiv wie negativ, in seine kritische Erkenntnistheorie ein, indem er diese mit einem komplexen *theoretischen* Ansatz der semantischen Negativität, sowie mit einer kreativen sprachschöpferischen *Praxis* bereichert.

Mind, Language, Activity: the Problem of Consciousness and Cultural-Activity Theory

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In one of the most famous paragraphs in *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein poses a question "...if a lion could speak, we could not understand him."¹ This remark is also one of the most puzzling and the most commented observations in this book. Language, consciousness, and activity seem to be connected, but it is not easy to disentangle their relation. The puzzle of Wittgenstein's remark is a sign of the difficulties which contemporary philosophy approaches the problem of consciousness.

The problem of consciousness, which was always one of the crucial issues of philosophy and psychology, has recently received new attention in the light of genetic and neuropsychological discoveries with so deep extension as to quantum theory. But even if some thinkers try to avoid accepting the necessity to choose between "dualism" (parallelism) and materialism, they have to cling anyway to at least a version of either category. For breaking up this vicious circle I would like to refer to the cultural-activity theory and to show its relevance for contemporary discussion on consciousness.

I believe that the origin of cultural-activity theory was connected with overcoming the difficulties of the then existing versions of dualism and materialism. L. S. Vygotsky and G.H. Mead believe that it is possible to maintain the objective standpoint in psychology and still accept the existence of the subjective states of mind. From a methodological point of view, they can be easily compared with the contemporary theories of consciousness that also seek objective correlates of consciousness or even try to explain its features by reducing its more "hard" facts of natural sciences. However, the founders of cultural-activity theory focus on different kinds of objectivity: objectivity of language, activity, interactions, and culture. In these spheres they look for an explanation of consciousness. Although it is hardly possible to speak of a coherent theory of consciousness developed by the founders of the cultural-activity theory, one cannot believe that they formulate some points of departure which could be useful for making an intervention in the recent controversies in this field.

I think that at least three types of such a contribution can be enumerated. First, the insights from the cultural-activity theory reveals almost entirely neglected spheres of language and social interactions. Second, they allow the bridging of the two tendencies in consciousness research. Besides this trend I have described at the beginning of my paper, there is a powerful tradition of investigating links to Freudian heritage where Lacanian ideas seem to be of the greatest importance. His idea of the close connection between unconsciousness, consciousness, and language were presented in the early works of Bakhtin on Freudianism. Third, the originators of the cultural-activity theory show the complicated relationships between activity, sensations, and higher mental functions, including language.

This notion of consciousness nevertheless demands a different concept of objectivity than is currently taken for

granted in analytic philosophy. In this paradigm, objectivity is associated solely with a scientific naturalistic approach which nowadays takes the form borrowed from different sciences. In the case of consciousness, the war is waged between the proponents of the physical paradigm and the biological paradigm, including as doubtful a science as evolutionary psychology. The founders of cultural-activity theory have been aware that for psychology we need a special kind of objectivity that can encompass the natural side of psychic life, as well as higher mental functions.

In L.S. Vygotsky's late treatise on Descartes' and Spinoza's teachings on emotions, he tries to solve the fundamental question of subjective (descriptive) and objective (explanatory) psychology; that is, he is involved precisely in the discussion of what contemporary philosophers call the relationship between first and third person approaches to mental states. Vygotsky seeks in Spinoza's philosophy an inspiration for overcoming the discrepancy between emotions understood as an expression of the higher mental functions and emotions comprehended as a result of biological mechanisms.

In this task, he was to some extent in accordance with M.M. Bakhtin whose book on Freudianism contains the main motives of the dialogical and social notion of consciousness in relatively rudimentary form.² Starting from the obvious paradox of psychological research that psychological phenomena are at the same time of subjective (first person) and objective characters (third person), he argues that the only way of overcoming this contradiction is to substitute verbal correlates for sensations. Then in fact the problem of consciousness becomes a problem of language and of different usages of language.

Bakhtin insists that what Freud takes as the struggle of motives is in reality an effect of the very complicated social situation of therapy. A therapist and a patient create a social event in which both sides have their particular interests.

Here we have at least two main points of the dialogical concept of consciousness. First, the idea that any psychological sensation has to take a form of language; and second, that any utterance is a product of a complicated social situation. Therefore, one can state that the objectivity of the mind is guaranteed by the objectivity of language, which in turn is assured by the objectivity of the social world and culture.

For psychology, the task of overcoming this apparently unbreakable obstacle is of the highest importance. I think that both L.S. Vygotsky and G.H. Mead, each of them in his own theoretical language, take on the challenge which was at their time posed by the distinction between explanatory and descriptive psychology. On the one hand, they had to confront behaviorism with its idea of the reduc-

¹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, p.223

² This book *Freudianism* [Frejdysm] was published under the name of Bakhtin's disciple V.N. Voloshynov. I use the original Russian version published by Labyrinth in the series "Bakhtin pod maskoj" (Bakhtin under the mask) in 1993 with the commentaries by W. Makhlin. All translations are mine.

tion of all psychological functions to biologically understand activity; but on the other hand, they did not dismiss the idea of autonomy of human self and the independent existence of psychological phenomena. So I believe that their common purpose was to invent a unified scheme of explanation which could account for higher mental phenomena, as well as for elementary psychological occurrences from sensation to action.

Objective instances of culture remain for them the main point of reference for the concrete activity of an individual. For Vygotsky, they took the forms of scientific concepts and objective situation, which is a frame for the interaction between a child and an adult. G.H. Mead uses the category "biological process" for the frame of interactions at the level of biological organism and "social process" for communications at the level of conscious human being. For both thinkers, these objective instances of culture play a role of a *a priori* framework which encompasses all individual human interactions

For both Vygotsky and Mead, consciousness emerges from behavior and human interactions. Therefore it is not a separate substance or natural phenomenon, but rather a derivate of our social behavior. To some extent both develop the famous notion of consciousness as given by William James in his paper "Does Consciousness Exist?", however substituted Jamesian concept of consciousness as existing in the world with concrete social relationships and their meaning for the emergence of consciousness.

Naturally I would not like to suggest that their conceptions are equal or even equivalent, but I would advocate the idea that they are supplementary. In his speculative psychology, G.H. Mead is preoccupied mainly with the emergence of the self as specific human phenomena whereas L.S. Vygotsky builds up developmental psychology which shows the complications of the ways of forming higher mental function. However, I have decided to abstract from these differences in order to show that their conceptions can form a point of departure for the dialogical notion of consciousness which would be in opposition to the majority of the contemporary views on consciousness.

They propose a unified scheme of explanation of human behavior which could integrate biological endowment into higher mental functions. In other words, they claim that it is possible to form a definite whole from different qualitative elements. In this respect, they can be opposed to dominant theories of human behavior and consciousness in the same degree to those which state that behavior and consciousness is accounted for by a naturalistic scheme of explanation, and to those which claim that these phenomena can be interpreted but not explained.

It assumes that social reality, objectified in the world of culture, is a frame which organizes interactions and gives them objectivity. Objectivity of culture is, of course, different from objectivity of nature, but from the point of view of an individual entering the world of culture, the social world this difference is in fact meaningless. She or he has to take for granted both worlds: that of nature and that of culture in order to participate in the world of adults.

Thomas Nagel in his influential paper *What Is Like to Be a Bat*³ discusses a question of the possibility of understanding another's state of mind. His example is of a

bat. On the one hand, a bat is a mammal, with an obvious biological connection to humankind; however, with very different type of senses (they use a kind of sonar). According to Nagel, a bat is a useful example of the difficulties we encounter when we try to approach the phenomenon of consciousness. One can understand other's experiences only through imagination which bases one's own experience. However "...it tells me only what it would be like for me to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to know what is like for a bat to be a bat."⁴

I assume that in this passage we encounter a typical reasoning of the problem of consciousness in contemporary philosophy. On the one hand, we have experiences which are beyond the reach of science, and on the other hand, we have the "hard" reality of physical, and to some extent, biological sciences. These two realities can be reduced to each other (physicalism, or the lesser popular panschism) or separated, and then we have various forms of dualism.

It is interesting that Thomas Nagel seems to come close to dualistic concept of consciousness suggesting that we should find an objective concept of experience independent of our subjectivity. At the end of his paper after noticed "At present we are completely unequipped to think about the subjective character of experience without relying on the imagination – without taking up the point of view of the experiential subject. This should be regarded as a challenge to form new concepts and devise a new method – an objective phenomenology not dependent on empathy or the imagination."⁵ However he is not able to find the ways in which such a concept could be constructed.

Answer to this question which we can find in Vygotsky's work is quite clear. He observes that theory of *Ein-führung* is wrong in stating that "...we know others insofar as we know ourselves".⁶ In fact it is also Nagel's point of view, our main obstacle to understanding what is like to be a bat lies in the impossibility for humans to imagine specific experience of bats. Vygotsky contradicts this thesis showing: "In reality it would be more correct to put it the other way around. We are conscious of ourselves because we are conscious of others and by the same method as we are conscious of others, because we are the same vis-à-vis ourselves as we are others are vis-à-vis us."⁷ Of course this concept of consciousness assumes an intimate connection between language, social world, and sensations which is rejected by the majority of analytical philosophers. Thomas Nagel gives for a support of his idea of the new notion of experience a situation of a person blind from birth. "One might try...to develop concepts that could be used to explain to a person blind from birth what it was like to see... it should be possible to devise a method of expressing in objective terms..."⁸

L.S. Vygotsky observes in his paper on consciousness that the development of speech in deaf-mutes and the development of tactile reactions in blind persons confirms the thesis that consciousness is closely connected to the development of speech and social interactions. He writes: "...the most remarkable thing is that *conscious awareness of speech and social experience emerge simultaneously and completely in parallel*...The deaf-mute

⁴ Ibidem, p. 161

⁵ Ibidem, p. 166

⁶ L.S. Vygotsky, op.cit. p. 77

⁷ Ibidem, p. 77

⁸ Th. Nagel, op.cit. p. 166

³ Thomas Nagel, „What Is Like to Be a Bat“ [in:] *Readings in Psychology of Psychology vol.1* ed. By Neil Block, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts 1980

learns to become conscious of himself and his movements to the extent he learns to become conscious of others.”⁹

This close relationship between language and consciousness deals also with imagination which ceases to be merely an extension of our sensation but becomes very complicated phenomenon of the intersection of sensation and knowledge. In New York Times of 16 of September 2008 there is a paper on the winners of Lasker Medical Prizes. One of them Stanley Falkow “...was honored for his discoveries that grew out of an extraordinary ability to imagine himself as a bacterium so he could view the world from the microbiological perspective.”¹⁰ It is hardly possible that this “extraordinary ability” could emerge just from intensifying sensations of normal human being. It is a complex experience which grows out of the deep knowledge of microbiological world, the ways how bacterium acts, and capacity to transfer such a knowledge into intuitive experience of what is like to be a bacterium.

The dialogical concept of consciousness is directed at overcoming this vicious circle of philosophy, but of course at a price of changing the question. We cannot understand what it is like to be a bat unless a bat is a part of our shared enterprise. A lion can speak but we do not understand him unless he cooperates with us and uses the same tools.

⁹ L.S. Vygotsky, *op.cit.* p. 78

¹⁰ Lawrence K. Altman, 5 Pioneers Receive Laser Medical Prizes, New York Times, 16 September 2008

Beyond Mental Representation: Dualism Revisited

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In this paper, I suggest that the perennial endeavour to understand how language and thought work leads to a major recurrent fallacy: the introduction of new entities/conceptual variables with misleading and elusive functions, apparently helpful, but in the event difficult, or indeed impossible, to grasp. It is obvious that the oft-quoted mental discomfort felt by Wittgenstein is due to this kind of counterfeit invention. And in the momentous complementary case of Wilfrid Sellars, it becomes conspicuous that we have no chance at all to find a satisfactory way to provide a synoptic view of commonsensical versus scientific descriptions of the world within the framework of a traditional dualistic and verbalist approach. In a desperate attempt to step out of this framework, i.e. to connect mental and physical processes, I will focus on the notion of motor activity, relying on conceptual metaphor theory and the enactive approach in cognitive studies.

1. Mental Discomfort

Wittgenstein's analysis of language makes obvious the anomalies we face in the traditional dualistic framework of philosophy. He believes that although language is very effective and useful in everyday life, it is capable of creating unsolvable puzzles in the realm of philosophy due to misleading analogies and its grammar. (Think of the well-known example of Wittgenstein, viz. the confusion in philosophy caused by the phrase "in the mind".) Wittgenstein speaks about gaps between rule and its application (Wittgenstein 1932/35, 90), thought and reality (Wittgenstein 30/32, 37), words and their meaning (Wittgenstein 30/32, 23), and words and things (Wittgenstein 30/32, 38). These issues touch upon the necessity of a meta-language. And this necessity leads to an infinite regress.

In *The Blue Book*, Wittgenstein calls attention to the hopelessness of the attempt to gain access to mental processes through language. Let me quote him at length.

"I have been trying ... to remove the temptation to think that there 'must be' what is called a mental process of thinking, hoping, wishing, believing, etc., independent of the process of expressing a thought, a hope, a wish, etc. And I want to give you the following rule of thumb: if you are puzzled about the nature of thought, belief, knowledge and the like, substitute for the thought the expression of the thought, etc. The difficulty which lies in this substitution, and at the same time the whole point of it, is this: the expression of belief, thought, etc., is just a sentence; – and the sentence has sense only as a member of a system of language; as one expression within a calculus." (41f.)

That is, it is not possible to solve the puzzle: mental processes are in conjunction with language and "[l]anguage is connected with reality by picturing it, but that connection cannot be made in language, explained by language". (Wittgenstein 30/32, 12) Thus we have no access to the states of affairs which are pictured by the sentences of language.

These gaps and puzzles, I suggest, derive from the traditional Cartesian dualism of the extended/physical and thinking/mental entities. There were many endeavours to

overcome this split throughout the history of philosophy and it seems to me that Wittgenstein himself suffered from this duality. With the help of common sense experience (he believes explicating language works well in everyday discourse, emphasising the importance of usage) he hoped to be able to provide an alternative.

Wittgenstein's statement that "[t]he world we live in is the world of sense-data; but the world we talk about is the world of physical objects" (Wittgenstein 30/32, 82) clearly shows the tension between the mental and physical, though not in the accustomed manner, but rather in a special reversed order of the conceptual and the physical. Since "[s]ense-data are the source of our concepts" (Wittgenstein 30/32, 81), and we have pseudo-concepts (Wittgenstein 30/32, 12) (such as colour, primary colour, etc. which I suggest as being super-ordinate categories) as well, and at the same time we are engaged in different activities related to physical objects, we have no means to relate the mental and physical to each other. But as I will suggest, we do not live in the world of sense-data. Rather, we live in the world in an active and responsive manner. I believe that only in this way it is possible to overcome the traditional split.

William M. Ivins' views relate this split to language. As he writes, "it is impossible for us to go with words, for the ipseity, the particularity of the object, its this-and-no-otherness, cannot be communicated by the use of class names". (Ivins, 53) That is, concepts/words are class names, which means we use these words on the basis of similar features. Comparing words with objects, it is clear that "the object is a unity that cannot be broken into separate qualities without becoming merely a collection of abstractions that have only conceptual existence and no actuality." (Ivins, 63) At this point, it is undoubtedly clear that the world has been divided into two separate spheres: the world of actuality populated by objects, and the world of verbal symbols which are merely conceptual. Thus, if we do not reach beyond language, the traditional split remains.

2. Dualism Unresolved

The gaps/puzzles explicated by Sellars remained mostly un-resolvable because he has been devoted to verbalism, and thus to dualism. (In light of Ivins' considerations, verbalism and dualism belong together.) Sellars attempt to bridge the gap between privacy and intersubjectivity seems to be a successful enterprise, since he considers conceptual thinking as having a social character. That is, he tries to embed thinking in "common standards of correctness and relevance". (Sellars 1963a, 16f.) But his attempt to resolve the duality of the *manifest and scientific image of man* makes the difficulties arising from dualism clearly visible. In harmony with the idea that thinking is related to social intercourse, Sellars believes that the meaning of a word is not a kind of relation to entities, a kind of correspondence, but rather it is the *role* which the word plays in the given context. Accordingly, the dualism of the body and mind is indeed a dualism of two different ways in which we are related to the world. (Sellars 1963a, 11)

In the case of the *manifest and scientific image of man*, we find a *circulus vitiosus*: it is not possible to set order either in time (which is the primordial) or in function (which can be complete in itself). The endeavour of perennial philosophy provides continuity between them: it attempts to understand the structure of the former and at the same time to understand the achievements of the latter. (Sellars 1963a, 18f.) Beside this circularity, the main difficulty is “how an image of the world transcends in some way the individual thinkers” and moreover “how an image of the world, which, after all, is a way of thinking, can transcend the individual thinker which it influences”. (Sellars 1963a, 14) To formulate this in a more pedestrian way: how is it possible that an image of the world has impact on the way people think while at the same time this image is under construction by them? A further difficulty arises from the fact that “*ex hypothesi* sensations are essential to the explanation of how we come to construct the ‘appearance’ which is the manifest world”, which provides a certain homogeneity, and since “scientific image presents itself as a closed system of explanation ... the explanation will be in terms of the constructs of neurophysiology, which ... do not involve the ultimate homogeneity, the appearance of which in the manifest image is to be explained”. (Sellars 1963a, 36)

There is a contrast between the concept that does not reach beyond “correlational techniques [which] can tell us about perceptible and introspectible events” and the concept that “postulates imperceptible objects and events for the purpose of explaining correlations among perceptibles”. (Sellars 1963a, 19) Though the communal character of concepts, and the historical and communal character of the worldview along which we take the world into account, widen the horizon of the investigation, within the dualistic framework of verbalism there may arise the question of the ontological status of abstract and theoretical entities. Although Sellars is aware that “the problem of meaning is not only the problem of abstract entities, but the mind-body problem as well” (Sellars 1963b, 464), and he introduces the term *role* to escape the difficulties raised by correspondence, he could not offer a solution to resolve the duality of sensations and concepts, and thus, the different ways of sensation as dependent on the conceptual framework.

3. Motor Activity

I will conclude with an attempt to highlight how it is possible to reach beyond language and anchor concepts in the world of perceptible objects. In this manner, I hope to offer a solution to eliminate mental representation.

As opposed to traditional dualism, I am emphasizing rather the coupling of the body and mind on the basis of embeddedness. I suggest that conceptual thinking is deeply embedded in the perceiving and acting body, this active body is embedded in its physical environment, and both are embedded in a cultural milieu which limits our thought processes through its expressional means, limits our physical capabilities via its technical inventions, and determines the horizon of desires, aims, plans, etc. by customs and institutions.

Concentrating on the cognitive part of embeddedness, first, I will briefly recapitulate how cognitive metaphor theory relates conceptual processing to bodily experiences, then, relying on the notion of embodiment and the enactive approach, I will highlight the interconnectedness of perception, action, and their environment; finally, in conclusion, I will attempt to offer an alternative to mental representation.

The main idea of cognitive/conceptual metaphor theory is that “knowledge must be understood in terms of structures of embodied human understanding, as an interaction of a human organism with its environment”. (Johnson 209) Embodied understanding is based on a conceptual system which is “plugged into’ our most relevant experiences very accurately at two levels”: the *basic level* and the *image-schematic level*. (Johnson 208) The former is mostly based on kinaesthetic bodily experiences (using a chair requires a certain sequence of movements) and emerges in overall general forms; the latter “gives general form to our understanding in terms of structures such as *container, path, cycle, link, balance*, etc. This is the level that defines form itself, and allows us to make sense of the relations among diverse experiences”. (*Ibid.*)

The enactive approach and the notion of embodiment treat perception and action as inseparable. As Valera *et al.* formulated, “the enactive approach consists of two points: (1) perception consists in perceptually guided action and (2) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided”. (Valera *et al.*, 173) Accordingly, “cognition ... consists in the enactment or bringing forth of a world by a viable history of structural coupling”. Structural coupling refers to intentionality, where intentionality is to be understood in the light of the possibilities of a given action and its fulfilment. (Valera *et al.*, 205f.) A more recent approach by Alva Noë similarly suggests that “[t]o discover how things are, from how they appear, is to discover an order or pattern in their appearances. The process of perceiving, of finding out how things are, is a process of meeting the world; it is an activity of skilful exploration”. (Noë, 164) Thanks to the enactive approach, the traditional input-output model of action and perception has changed and the environment/the world became an integrated part of human cognitive processes. Shaun Gallagher goes a bit further when he maintains that the boundary of the body and its environment vanishes in certain cases. His clarifying distinction of body image and body schema sheds light on the holistic nature of body schema. “I suggested”, writes Gallagher, “that when body appears in consciousness, it normally appears as clearly differentiated from its environment. In experimental situations, body-image boundaries, for example, tend to be clearly defined. When I am immersed in experience, however, the limits of the body and environment are obscured. ... [T]he body schema includes information that goes beyond the narrow boundaries defined by body image”. (Gallagher 36f.)

As we can see, the enactive approach suggests we perceive the world in an active manner, and Gallagher thinks that moving in and acting upon the world presuppose unconscious functions in which there is no sharp boundary between the body and its environment. Both ideas provide ground for an attempt to eliminate mental representation. As Noë calls our attention, “it is not just clear ... why an internal representation would be any better than access to the world itself. This harkens back to Wittgenstein’s idea that anything’s picture in the head could do could be done by a picture held in the hand. We go a step further: Why do we need a picture at all? The world is right there, after all. We are in *the world*.” (Noë, 218f.)

To go one more step further: memory, the recollection of some impressions of the past, appears to challenge the enterprise to eliminate mental representation. But the results of research on picture viewing and picture description with the help of eye-tracking seems to prove that recalling an image is recalling the eye-movements previously related to the image. The experiments as Jana Holsanova described them suggest that “subjects visualize the spatial

configuration of the scene as a support for their description from memory. The effect we measured is strong. More than half of all picture elements mentioned had correct eye movements". (Holsanova, 252)

That is, recalling a picture is heavily based on eye-movements. Against the background of embeddedness and with the help of picture viewing and picture description combined with eye-tracking, we might hope to gain immediate access to the phenomena which earlier were called mental representation.

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Bertrand Russell's Transformative Analysis and Incomplete Symbol

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There is no much research on contextuality in Bertrand Russell. I will explain how the conception of contextuality that is contextual definition was aim of Russell's transformative method of analysis. How contextual definition was understood in the beginning of analytic philosophy?

I will concentrate on the notion of contextual definition in Russell. This leads to one remark about analysis of propositional function "x such as x is ϕ ". According to Gregory Landini, two months after OD Russell denies explicitly the ontology of propositional functions (Landini 1998, 128). Propositional functions can be seen ontologically more fundamental than classes later on in Russell's work, but I will not consider this here (Hylton 2005, 120). My note concerns how the role of propositional function and incomplete symbol affected the notion of philosophical analysis in 1905. It is possible to see lots of aspects in transformative analysis. Now I am making some remarks about one of them: contextualizing propositional functions. Giving one tentative notion of this large question will help to see what is the heart of transformative analysis for Russell.

The general view of transformative method of analysis for Russell is the translation from proposition to the right logical form of proposition. For example Peter Hacker, Peter Hylton and Michael Beaney have written on the different types of analysis and transformative or interpretive analysis. I begin by presenting how transformation in the Russellian sense should be understood from the point of view of contextualization of the paradoxical propositions. The idea that language is misleading from the world was a side effect of the OD. Secondly, I suggest that contextualisation of an incomplete symbol (for example "a man") in OD is the definite characteristic of Russell's transformation. An incomplete symbol is $(\lambda x)\phi x$ which is read "the x such that x is ϕ ". In general level, contextual definition did not change Russell's metaphysical realism. Contextual definition influenced, nevertheless, the role of propositional functions. In my opinion, "transformation" in Russell's analysis was developed at this point.

1. Transformation as contextualization

Ludwig Wittgenstein notes that Russell shows that the apparent logical form of a proposition does not need to be its real one. For TLP:s Wittgenstein this meant critique of language, in a sense that linguistic structure does not correspond always with right logical form (TLP, 37/ (4.011). Russell made a precise distinction between a "proposition" and "its right logical form". In OD Russell's analysis concerns propositions that can have a verbal expression as well (OD, 416).

In the beginning of OD the starting point of analysis is presented to be an unclear, definite, or ambiguous proposition (OD, 415). The unclear proposition does not have accurate denoting. Here, it is illuminating to look OD with year's 1905 manuscript "On Fundamentals" (OF) which precedes OD. From this point of view the "unclear" starting point for analysis in OF and more general level in OD means that proposition might have paradoxical logical form. The starting point for analysis is unclear in a sense

that it includes a "contradiction" or "paradox". In the following paragraphs I point out some arguments for this interpretation of Russell's transformation in OD.

In OF Russell developed his new theory of denoting (OF, 372-373). That is why development for the Russellian transformative analysis can be found partly from OF. For example in the beginning of OF it is seen that the most fundamental aims of Russellian analysis are the paradoxical propositions, such as liar paradox "the truthful man who says he sometimes lies". When dealing the liar paradox Russell says that "We avoid contradictions by writing $(C)(\hat{x})$ for a mode of combination, and refusing to vary C." (OF, 360). Here $(C)(\hat{x})$ can be understood as a propositional function that is ϕx . Propositional functions have a structure "x such that x is ϕ ". For Russell's OF $(C)(x)$ is an instance of this open propositional function. I will speak about $(C)(x)$ as an open propositional function, as it is in OD. It has been shown from different authors that mathematical functionality is not fundamental for Russell's OD (Hylton 2005, 131). The question of the role of the propositional function is crucial for new analysis.

When we come back to the first pages of OD, we notice that Russell is speaking vaguely of $C(x)$ as a proposition, and more exactly as a propositional function. $C(\dots)$ is a structure which becomes a proposition when the variable is filled. Though Russell says that he uses " $C(x)$ for propositional function, he often uses distinct notions under 'propositional functionality'. According to Landini's interpretation, $C(x)$ is not here understood as terms or ontological entities, but used schematically (Landini 1998, 86).

The connection between a propositional function and the aim to resolve "contradictory" propositions is important for Russell's theory of definite descriptions in OD as well. In the linguistic level the expression "The King of France" is paradoxical, because it presents that something has property, thought this entity does not exist. In OD, contextual definition is needed in analysis, when some part of a whole proposition seems to be misleading, because its structure is not presented in a right way. We are transforming the paradoxical proposition to a form or structure, where certain parts of the proposition are presented in the context.

The question for Russell contextual definition is: how $(C)(x)$ should be understood? Propositional functions have the structure. Is this structure an ontological structure? In OF the "general principle" for Russell is that propositional functions "x s such that x is ϕ " are fundamental in a sense that they cannot be analyzed further. This question is considered in OF (OF, 371). If $C(x)$ is used schematically in OD as Landini says, then what is its role in analysis (Landini 1998, 86)?

The definite description "The author of Waverley" or the indefinite description "a man" are both understood as incomplete symbols. In OF Russell says that "The author of Waverley" or $W(x)$ has no significance itself, but the propositions in which it occurs have significance." (OF 384). This is a general presentation for Russell's contextual definition. The same idea appears in OD (OD, 416). My suggestion is that in the history of analytic philosophy,

the important features of Russell's transformative analysis should be understood from this point of view as well, not only from that of the distinction between proposition's linguistic form, which might be misleading and right logical form. Michael Beaney says that Frege's development of quantificational logic was important for the transformative or interpretive analysis (Beaney 2007, 199). This is the core of Russellian transformation as well.

Furthermore, Russell's transformative analysis should be understood in the following way: Russell is using quantification for contextualizing the notion of propositional functions in a way that we can see what is the role of a certain propositional function in a proposition. In Russell's case, transformation was driven by the idea that by applying quantificational logic we could transform paradoxical propositions by contextualizing propositional functions. If $C(x)$ is schema in OD we could call it as an incomplete symbol.

2. Incomplete symbol

An incomplete symbol for Russell is $(\lambda x)\phi x$ which is read "the x such that x is ϕ ". For example "the x such that x is King of France" is incomplete symbol. Symbol " λ " marks the article "the". Now both, the class expressions and the definite descriptions are incomplete symbols. They appear in the level of semantics and logic.

In the level of logic Russell wanted to get rid of classes; the way to do this was to analyze sentences containing class expressions, so that classes were not required by the semantics of these sentences. In Russellian semantics this means that class expressions do not have any meaning on their own. Thus, Russell has here some kind of contextuality. On the other hand, Russell's contextuality was incidental to the elimination of class expressions as complete symbols.

Always when we deal with the incomplete symbol, we deal with a context. We find contextuality, because symbols have no meaning in isolation. Yet, their constituent symbols contribute to the meaning of the sentences in which they occur. This means that the constituents of an incomplete symbol become meaningful, when they are interpreted in context. Because Russell's desire was mainly to eliminate classes, we could say that this was the motivation of his contextual definition in OD.

In OD Russell says that propositional functions are undetermined (OD, 416). Propositional functions are understood as incomplete. Russell explicitly says that what is essential in his theory is variable. This does not mean that the variable or the propositional function would be ontologically fundamental. In OF Russell explained the idea the incomplete symbol in logical symbols. In OD he speaks of the same idea of incomplete symbol, but does not mention the technical details. I repeat Russell's formulation in OF and in OD:

" $(\lambda x)(\phi x)$ and $z(\phi z)$ are the only undefinable unambiguously denoting complexes that occur in our work; hence when they are dealt with, the rest offer no new difficulty.

The above theory leads to the result that all denoting functions are meaningless in themselves, and are only significant when they occur as constituents of propositions. Hence all complexes become undenoting: they will be such as propositional functions, modes of combination, etc. (OF, 384)".

"What I affirm, according to the theory I advocate:

"'I met x , and x is human' is not always false",

Generally, defining the class of men as the class of objects having the predicate *human*, we say that:

" $C(a \text{ man})$ " means "' $C(x)$ and x is human' is not always false".

This leaves "a man" by itself, wholly destitute of meaning, but gives a meaning to every proposition in whose verbal expression "a man" occurs." (OD 416).

What is the definition of contextuality in this paragraph of OD? He speaks about "class of men" in the case of the indefinite description "a man". The connection of class-theory and Russell's semantics is explicitly presented with the incomplete symbol. Russell argues that propositional functions such as expressions "a man" in a linguistic level should be understood to give a meaning to every proposition where the verbal expression "a man" occurs (OD 416). In this way "denoting function" that is Russell's one variation of the propositional function in OF are in OF understood as incomplete symbols. In OD or OF, Russell is not speaking about the "incomplete symbols" exactly but in OF already he is using this symbolism, when he defines "The author of Waverley" by $(\lambda x)(\phi x)$ (OF, 384).

Is there a difference between propositional functions and the incomplete symbols? In OF "denoting functions" are meaningless in themselves. In OD $C(x)$ is used schematically. It does not have any kind of ontological correspondence, like set, class, or null-class in OD.

The constituents of propositions are complete. They are not incomplete in a same sense as the incomplete symbol is. (Hylton 2005, 168) The incomplete symbol had a main function as a part of the contextual definition. When Russell abandons all denoting concepts as a correspondence with propositional functions, he presents the "sense" or "Sinn" elements in the level of propositional functions. The incomplete symbol may have had this idea as well: we have intension or "sense" when the incomplete parts are contextualized in transformative analysis.

When Russell's analysis changed, he did not abandon his object based metaphysics (Hylton 2005, 273.). Nevertheless, unreal entities, such as "The king of France" do not have denoting concepts. The OD theory enables us to present analysis which helps to eliminate classes in Russell's explanation of status of mathematics. (OD, 426) When "a man" is an incomplete symbol in OD, it is merely a schema. In 1905, for the first time, a clear distinction between Russell shows the difference between two logical analyses: The first assumes compositionality in substitution, and is decompositional analysis. The second assumes contextuality in the case of determination of incomplete symbol.

3. Conclusion

With this paper I have presented the following: If we do not want to concentrate on rough transformation from linguistic form to logical form, there is still transformation from paradoxical propositions to the expressions where these propositions are presented in a different way. Russell's contextual definition is a part of the process of transformative analysis in which an incomplete symbol is defined by quantifiers. While studying Russell's transformation, the elimination of paradoxical propositions should be kept in mind.

Russell's metaphysics is realistic metaphysics even after OD. Russell argues about compositional metaphysics

and contextualization of some symbols simultaneously. The reason why contextuality is the key for transformation is that propositional function, and its application in the form of incomplete symbol means that " ϕx " cannot be seen as an ontological entity. Open sentences like "x is wise" are schemas in OD.

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Practical Norms of Linguistic Entities

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The contemporary philosophical analysis of language goes as an analysis of speech, language in use. The analysis of locutionary language is not effective, it is fruitful to analyze illocutionary speech (even descriptions have illocutionary power and it corresponds to the principle of economy in language: we speak about something when what we are speaking about provokes us, is extraordinary). Locutionary language is abstract, in analyzing it one cannot be aware about semantic changes due to the accomplishment of the contents of linguistic units (LU) involved into the speech in a given pragmatic context.

Speech is an action. It can be considered in the field of Practical Philosophy, as philosophy of action. Practical philosophy presupposes analysis of something in the perspective of its realization (accomplishment) with its goals etc. The rehabilitation of practical philosophy goes, among other factors, under the 'linguistic turn', which stresses all the philosophical discipline and traditions. Linguistic turn is connected with methodological and thematic transformations in philosophy and it lead attention of the philosophical investigations to the context of linguistic accomplishment of theoretical argumentation. Linguistic and pragmatic turns show complementary character of theoretical and practical reasons. Linguistic turn can be divided into 3 stages: 1. interest in the artificial language of natural science, attempts to reduce to it everyday language; 2. interest in everyday language, understanding of its irreducibility to the artificial one; 3. interest in speech, understanding that we are not dealing with language, deduced from speech stream. So, further I am using language and speech as synonymous. In this perspective I am investigating the constituting and accomplishing of LUs as speech facts due to norms.

Language can be differentiated by linguistic entities in the forms of LUs. They are separately functionally defined classes applied to express (realize) complete thought (that is why they can be called entities), for example – utterance, sentence, statement, propositional attitude, etc. The unified typology of them is not defined, and, probably cannot be formulated. The attempts was tried to be given from the time of Austin's theory of speech acts. As we are dealing with speech and not language in a mentioned sense, it seems ineffective and redundant to give such typology, because we cannot view all the types in possible contexts, they can overlap each other, and it could need routine job. But reflecting about speech can bring some of them to be transparent for us.

LUs have content in a given context. Whether the LU has a factual content is a subject of its evaluation, which is possible due to practical norm inherent to this unit. LUs express our ideas, for instance, facts about reality. We describe reality by facts. This corresponds to the classical logical atomism of Russell and Wittgenstein and general views of fenomenalism about the possibility of description of the reality by sense data without stating that the previous can be completely reduced to the latter. Facts are descriptions of portions of reality. They represent reality tessellated in a form of mosaic, the elements of which are facts. Such description is intended to be a discovery of something new, unknown before the realizing of this description. In a way we create reality, mentally construct it,

but we strive to expose reality, not just to invent it. So, facts do not coincide with reality, but correspond to it. Facts are the contents of appropriate LUs. So, cognition can be defined as modeling of reality in terms of factuality. Language as speech is a constitutive and regulative cognitive description of reality by facts as contents of LU.

The content of LUs corresponds to their norms as functional constitutive and regulative capacities. The norm constitutes LU as a fact of speech and is a criterion for evaluation of its content. Norms are practical and have ontological significance for LU as entities. The priority role of practical norm is constitutive, it makes LU possible. The norm in its regulative role as a criterion of it evaluation supports accomplishment of LU. Negative value (for example, falsehood for statement) does not destroy the norm and LU, it justifies its inappropriateness in a given context.

Practical norms are, generally speaking, rules for linguistic actions. They have epistemic sense and are internal: status of norm as a condition of the possibility of LU is provided by internal link between the norm and this LU, they define each other. Internal norm would not be doxa: it is not a subject of belief, it is epistemically necessary.

Practical norms of LU are not intentions (in meaning widely advocated by Paul Grice). An intention to utter something is external (it does not mean that it has to be explicit), it leads to the utterance, which is possible due to the practical internal norms. The latter epistemically allows LU, supports its "right to be".

Practical internal norms are proper inherent to LUs, make LUs possible, necessary accompany LUs. They differ from explicit norms, which only regulate their objects. Practical internal norms are implicit, they constitute their LU by making them possible, they are rules of the accomplishment of LU, but their explication actualizes their regulative role. Available in a given context LUs are not only constituted by their practical norms, but also are regulated by them.

Allowing LU practical norm of it also allows, but not defines, 'normative background' which accompanies LU's realization. 'Normative background' means syntactic, semantic, phonetic, grammatical etc. norms, which together with pragmatic context supply instrumental control of accomplishment of LU by its constitutive practical norm in this context.

The justification of LU by practical norm does not go before realization of LU. Practical norms are not conventions, they cannot be substituted by alternative conventions. Practical norms make their LUs valid.

Formal definition of practical norm for LU p – rule of 'evidence':

accomplishment of the content of p is 'evident'.

The speaker, who realizes p implicitly grasps rule of 'evidence', analogically to the case when a player implicitly knows the rules of game. 'Evidence' is schematic. Speakers are receptively sensible to implicit "rule of 'evidence'", they grasp it implicitly when 'make' LU. So, it is not evidence in a proper sense, 'evidence' is schematic in the

rule. Thus, practical norm claims the content of LU to be 'evident' for the speaker, who accomplishes this LU.

Distorted, or false LUs can be realized because their practical norms allow them as such, or we can reflect about them and their practical norms, which were relevant in a context, and conclude about their incorrectness, but they were done with, and because of some 'evidence' obvious to their bearers in that context.

Take statement as an example of the type of LU. Practical norm (rule of 'evidence') for a statement p , accomplished by A :

accomplishment of the content of p is 'evident' for A .

It means that A should be receptively sensible to the content, he is going to state by p , he should conceive the content of p as if he would have known p . Thus, practical norm for a statement p , accomplished by A :

A knows the content of p .

This means that to state p presupposes to know p .

'To know p ' here is not conceptually prior to p , the approach is not antirealist.

So, the practical norm for a statement is implicit knowledge as 'evidence' of what is stated. Knowledge as a practical norm does not presuppose, for example, certainty or some other characteristic as a norm, although it could be condition of knowledge.

Within the frame of presented conception, a 'practical norm' is a fundamental hypothesis about the possibility of a linguistic entity, which makes possible to accomplish a correspondent LU together with the other norms of it in a suitable pragmatic context, which regulates its appropriateness and, in its turn, provides for its interpretation.

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Keeping Conceivability and Reference Apart

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1. Two Dimensional Semantics: Chalmers

One of the key contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind revolves around the so called conceivability argument. The argument hinges on, what I will call, the CP Principle: conceivability is a reliable guide to possibility. Armed with this principle some philosophers argue that the conceivability of zombies entails the possibility of zombies and consequently that physicalism is false.

A fairly standard response to this argument is to reject CP based on considerations of Kripkean A Posteriori Necessities (KPNs). Since KPNs are a posteriori, they argue, their negations must be conceivable. And since KPNs are necessary their negations must be impossible. So it seems we have a set of straightforward counterexamples to CP, namely the negations of KPNs. To see this consider a standard KPN:

(i) Water is H₂O.

We all learned from Kripke that (i) is *necessarily* true since (i) is true and the terms flanking the identity operator, 'water' and 'H₂O', are rigid designators. Nevertheless (i) is a *posteriori* – it was an empirical discovery of great moment in the history of science. As a result ~ (i) is a counterexample to CP.

In response David Chalmers has offered an explanation of KPNs that preserves CP. Chalmers argues that terms have two dimensions of meaning: a primary intension and a secondary intension. Intensions associated with individual terms are functions from possible worlds to extensions. The primary intension of a term *t* maps a possible world *w* to a set of extensions when considering *w* as *actual*. The secondary intension of *t* maps *w* to a set of extensions when considering *w* as *counterfactual*. So the primary intension of 'water' will map the actual world to H₂O but will map Twin Earth to XYZ. On the other hand the secondary intension of 'water' will map the actual world to H₂O and it will also map Twin Earth to H₂O. Indeed the secondary intension of 'water' will map every possible world to H₂O. When applied to entire statements, intensions map possible worlds to truth values. Hence the primary intension of (i) will map the actual world to T (true) but will map Twin Earth to F (false). In other words, (i) is primarily contingent. The secondary intension of (i), however, will map both the actual world and Twin Earth to T. Indeed the secondary intension of (i) will map every possible world to T since the secondary intensions of 'water' and 'H₂O' coincide. We can say that (i) is secondarily necessary.

Based on these observations Chalmers makes the following claim: a statement *S* is conceivable if and only if *S* is primarily possible, that is, the primary intension of *S* maps at least one possible world to T. So he offers us a tidy explanation of the conceivability and impossibility of ~ (i). ~ (i) is conceivable because ~ (i) is primarily possible and ~ (i) is impossible because ~ (i) is secondarily impossible. This rehabilitates the link between conceivability and possibility since conceivability, while it does not guarantee secondary possibility, guarantees primary possibility. Applying the 2D framework to the conceivability of zombies, Chalmers argues, yields the primary possibility of zombies. That is, there are worlds, considered as *actual*, where

physical duplicates of ordinary human beings do not enjoy conscious experiences. As such physicalism must be false.

2. The Non-Exceptionalist Response: Levine and Papineau

According to Joseph Levine, depending on the way they respond to Chalmers, physicalists can be categorized in one of two ways: as Exceptionalists (E-Type) or as Non-Exceptionalists (NE-Type). E-Types concede that the 2D framework is, in general, correct but argue that it is not applicable for statements involving zombies. Statements involving zombies are *exceptions* to, what is otherwise, a perfectly good model of analyzing a posteriori necessities. NE-Types reject the 2D framework in general. They argue that KPNs and statements involving zombies are on a par and should be explained on a different model altogether.

Levine develops the NE-Type position by arguing that the conceivability of a statement does not rest on its primary possibility. Instead the conceivability of a statement rests on the fact that there are *no* semantic constraints on the interpretation of terms like 'water'. 'Water' is nothing more than a tag used by a speaker to refer to water. What this means, in essence, is that the conceivability of a situation described by a given statement is nothing over and above the logical consistency of the symbols that occur in the statement. Levine writes:

"There is very little, if anything, like conceptual content, or cognitive significance, over and above the actual symbols of the relevant representations and their referents." (Levine 2001, p. 53)

Of course, those sympathetic to the 2D framework will balk at this because, they claim, our grasp of the meaning of 'water' does constrain the way we interpret situations.

How is one to adjudicate between these positions? In order to make his case Levine argues that (ii) is not a priori.

(ii) "Water is potable, falls from the sky, and is found in lakes."

His contention is that there is nothing more to the content of 'water' than the property of being water. And being competent with the term 'water' does not entail anything about the agent's semantic knowledge. Competence with 'water' is simply the ability to refer to water with 'water'. He writes:

"What then is the content of ['water']? ... the content of the term ['water'] is merely the property of being [water], and one's competence consists in one's ability to use the term so as to refer to [water]." (Levine 2001, p. 53)

Let's call the kind of competence Levine is referring to as *referential competence* (R-Competence). According to him, R-Competence does not entail having access to sufficient a priori information in order to secure reference in a possible world considered as actual. That is, being able to refer to water using 'water' does not depend on having knowledge that water is potable, falls from the sky, and is found

in lakes. Instead being able to refer to water using 'water' depends on different factors altogether (e.g. the linguistic community the speaker is a part of, the causal / historical chain of communication) – factors that are, so to speak, 'outside of the head'.

So far nothing really controversial has been said, but Levine has a further claim. R-Competence, though insufficient for having a priori reference-fixing information, is sufficient for concept possession. He writes, "if ones' ['water']-term *refers* to [water], then one has the *concept* of [water]" (Levine 2001, p. 53, my emphasis). We might say that R-Competence entails *conceptual competence* (C-Competence). Let's give this assertion a name: the Conceptual Competence Thesis (CC Thesis).

According to the NE-Type physicalist the terms 'water' and 'H₂O' behave like mere tags in (i). Consequently (i) amounts to the following:

(iii) "x is not y."

When we imagine that water is not H₂O we are imagining that x is not y. After all there is nothing more to the content of 'water' and 'H₂O' than being water and being H₂O.

David Papineau (2002, 2007) develops a similar line of thought by relying on examples that involve proper names. Take for instance, the names 'Cicero' and 'Tully'. David may have acquired these names in conversation with some friends, but he did not pick up any descriptions to go along with these names. Nevertheless he is able to refer to Cicero with these names because *inter alia* he is appropriately embedded in a linguistic community. Consequently it is possible for David to conceive of the situation described by the statement 'Cicero is not Tully'. Even though there is no world where Cicero is not Tully, it is still possible to conceive that Cicero and Tully are not co-referential. Papineau is essentially asserting the CC Thesis:

"But one clear lesson of the last thirty years of work in [the theory of names] is surely that [David's] **conceptual competence** with 'Cicero' and 'Tully' need owe nothing to any specific ideas she associates with these terms. Rather it will be enough if she has picked up the names 'Cicero' and 'Tully' from competent speakers, and intends to use them as they do. And this clearly doesn't require that she associate any further descriptions with these names." (Papineau 2002, p. 91-92, my emphasis)

Papineau's claim is that R-Competence is all that is needed to secure C-Competence. Even if David has no substantive descriptions associated with 'Cicero' and 'Tully' he is still able to *refer* to Cicero through these two different names. Consequently he is able to *conceive* of Cicero in two different ways.

3. Rejecting Non-Exceptionalism

But is the CC Thesis plausible? I don't think that it is. It is appropriate to ask *what* exactly is being conceived when a speaker wonders whether or not water is H₂O or David entertains the thought that Cicero is not Tully. If, as Papineau stipulates, David does not associate *any* descriptive information with the names 'Cicero' and 'Tully' then it is difficult to see how David can even make Cicero an object of his thought. It seems correct to say that we conceptualize an object by thinking about the object via one or more of its properties. I can't simply think about water. When I think about water I necessarily think about it based on some aspect of it. Perhaps I think about how it is able to quench my thirst or how it is able to reflect light in certain

interesting ways. I agree with much of what Frank Jackson writes on this matter:

"... you cannot give information about objects without giving information about their properties. Finding, identifying, or locating an object, and more generally, making an object a subject of discussion, is necessarily finding, identifying, locating, or making it a subject of discussion *under one or more of its guises*... we access objects via their properties." (Jackson 1998, p. 216)

If this is right then the NE-Type strategy cannot work. To rebut the conceivability argument by arguing that conceptualizing objects like water and Cicero is akin to having 'nothing' in mind is to do violence to our notion of conceivability. To say that conceiving water under the guises of 'water' and 'H₂O' is like entertaining the variables 'x' and 'y' does not seem to be an act of conceptualization at all.

But even if we grant that the CC Thesis there seems to be a glaring problem. When we acquire *phenomenal* concepts what we acquire is not something as thin as the conceptualization of a mere variable. When Mary sees a rose for the first time she doesn't simply gain a new label for something she already knew about in the black-and-white room. She gains a substantive concept of what it is like to see red. When she compares her phenomenal concept of what it is like to see red with her scientific concept of a particular brain state she is not merely acknowledging that they are logically distinct. Surely Mary entertains a thought that is richer than the mere contemplation of the statement 'x is not y'. Therefore, I think it is a mistake to reduce C-Competence to R-Competence in order to explain the conceivability of zombies.

4. Rejecting Primary Intensions

A bit of reflection on the relationship between R-Competence and C-Competence shows that the two competencies are orthogonal with respect to each other. R-Competence does not entail C-Competence nor does C-Competence entail R-Competence. As already mentioned above, there are a conspiracy of external factors that make linguistic reference possible. I can refer to David Papineau with 'David Papineau', not because I associate the right properties with the name, but because I am causally related to him in the right way. If I don't associate any properties with 'David Papineau' then it's difficult to see how I can conceive him. So it does not seem that C-Competence is entailed by R-Competence.

On the other hand, R-Competence is not entailed C-Competence either. Consider my twin, Leinad, who lives on Twin Earth. He has no causal connection with David Papineau. In fact he is not even embedded in a linguistic community. Nevertheless he is able to bring a person who works as a philosopher and is named 'David Papineau' to mind. That is, Leinad is able to form veridical conception of David Papineau even though he is unable to refer to him. So C-Competence does not entail R-Competence.

This poses a problem for Chalmers' notion of a primary intension. Primary intensions provide competent speakers with an a priori way of determining reference in a world considered as actual. It is hard to see, however, how a primary intension can both: be a priori available to the speaker and allow the speaker to secure reference in a world considered as actual by reflecting on the primary intension. If reference is, at least partly, an external matter then it is impossible for a speaker to have a priori access to enough information to determine reference in a world considered as actual. Chalmers is trying to pack too much

into a primary intension and for this reason I believe his 2D framework is fundamentally flawed. His mistake, which is similar to Levine's and Papineau's mistake, is to treat issues regarding reference together with issues regarding conceivability when they should carefully be kept apart.

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Marks of Mathematical Concepts

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The *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* of Ludwig Wittgenstein is a “surprisingly insignificant product of a sparkling mind”, Kreisel maintained, his surprise evidently being due to a contrast he perceived between the written output posthumously published and his own conversations with Wittgenstein after 1942.¹ But evidence in the notebooks Wittgenstein kept during the first two years of the conversations Kreisel remembers reveals a not insignificant product.

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In a pocket notebook entry dated 9 March 1943 Wittgenstein wrote: “A number is, as Frege says, a property of a concept—but in mathematics it is a mark of a mathematical concept. \aleph_0 is a *mark* of the concept of natural number; and the *property* of a technique. 2^{\aleph_0} is a mark of the concept of an infinite decimal, but what is this number a property of? That is to say: of what kind of concept can one assert it empirically?”² The text can be found in the second edition of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, part VII, section 42, paragraph 5.

The pocket notebook entry is typical of the to and fro that characterizes Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. The words ‘mark’ and ‘property’, traditional terms in the philosophy of mathematics, are italicized in the original. A remarkable feature of this passage is the issue of empirical assertions about the continuum, a concept marked by 2^{\aleph_0} . After all, the real numbers are incommensurable with the natural numbers.

That makes startling the opening of the pocket notebook entry, since Frege is noted for his anti-empiricism. The opening is even more startling for what it says about Frege’s definition of number. Wittgenstein’s topic is number. He mentions Frege, so the reader anticipates objects because of Frege’s thesis that numbers are objects.³ But Wittgenstein does not turn to objects but instead to properties of concepts, while for Frege a number would be a second-level concept, if it were a property.

Of course, in regard to such properties Wittgenstein had once said: “Relations and properties, etc., are objects too”.⁴ He wrote that in a notebook on 16 June 1915; however, he would later come to criticize that view. It does not seem likely that Wittgenstein was confused about Frege’s theory, given Peter Geach’s report. Geach reports that Wittgenstein said, “The last time I saw Frege, as we were waiting at the station for my train, I said to him ‘Don’t you ever find any difficulty in your theory that numbers are objects?’ He replied ‘Sometimes I *seem* to see a difficulty—but then again I *don’t* see it’.”⁵ That suggests that Wittgenstein was critical of Frege’s theory.

In fine, Wittgenstein begins with a puzzle about the definition of number. The subject matter is not ideas or

objects but the formation of the concept, which Rush Rhees emphasizes. Mathematical advances, and proofs in particular, modify concepts, as Crispin Wright says.⁶ That modification should be open to empirical study. That is the point of the technical term ‘technique’, which is a method of a language game. I am taking proof to be the method of mathematics.

Of course, one’s idea of infinite divisibility is not itself infinitely divisible, nor does one have access over the course of life to each of the natural numbers in turn, so the use of ‘empirical’ here will not solve the traditional problem of the nature of the continuum or of the natural numbers. Wittgenstein focuses rather on the multiplicity of concepts all captured by the concept of number than on justification. He asks of what kind of concept one can assert 2^{\aleph_0} empirically. In what follows I want to suggest some possible answers. But I first admit that Wittgenstein’s question could also be taken rhetorically.

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Paul Bernays writes in 1935 that “it is not absolutely indubitable that the domain of complete evidence extends to all of intuitionism”, pointing out that for “very large numbers, the operations required by the recursive method of constructing numbers can cease to have a concrete meaning”.⁷ Numbers produced by the operation of exponentiation “are far larger than any occurring in experience, e.g., 67^{257723} ”. Georg Kreisel calls a position like that described by Bernays “strict finitism”. In their reviews of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, Bernays and Kreisel attribute this position to Wittgenstein, although Bernays discusses a Kantian tendency he observes in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, as well.

Hao Wang follows Bernays.⁸ He adumbrates a bifurcation in foundational methods, the constructive over and against the nonconstructive, then correlates this with the difference between potential infinity and actual infinity. Wang distinguishes five foundational approaches. In doing so he restricts the “finitism in the narrower sense” specified by Bernays to anthropologism, a reduction to processes that are “feasible”. Those five foundational domains in order of increasing inclusivity are: anthropologism, finitism, intuitionism, predicativism, and platonism. Hao Wang points out that the “prevalent mood nowadays is not to choose a life mate from among the five ‘schools’ but to treat them as useful reports about a same grand structure which can help us to construct a whole picture that would be more adequate than each taken alone”.

Anthropologism is for Wang the investigation of theoretical possibilities for human activity, what a person “can” do. A proof is “that which one can actually grasp”, as Kreisel says.⁹ Wang offers the example that with only the stroke notation it becomes difficult to manipulate numbers

¹ Wittgenstein (1978), Kreisel (1958, sec. 13).

² MS 127, 69f.

³ Parsons (1983, secs. 1-5, 9), v. Frege (1953, pp. 71-81, 116f.).

⁴ Wittgenstein (1979), v. Hintikka and Hintikka (1986, ch. 2).

⁵ V. Wright (1983, p. xii).

⁶ Wright (1980, ch. 3).

⁷ Bernays (1935, p. 265) and (1959)

⁸ Wang (1958, pp. 473ff.).

⁹ Kreisel (1958, sec. 7).

larger than ten. He makes use of anthropologism to explain some of Wittgenstein's most "cryptic" remarks.¹⁰ Wang says in a passage reminiscent of a remark Wittgenstein made in a 1939 lecture on the foundations of mathematics: "if we reflect on the human elements involved, it is doubtful that a contradiction can lead to a bridge collapsing". The traditional interpretation of Wittgenstein as a strict finitist emanates from the readings of Bernays, Kreisel, Wang, and Dummett in 1958 and 1959 and is refined by Crispin Wright in 1980 and 1982.¹¹

In Kirchberg am Wechsel in the summer of 1992 Mathieu Marion spoke on the "dark cellar of platonism". Then in 1995 he first published his striking finitist interpretation of the later Wittgenstein, following three years later with a trenchant book on the foundations of mathematics. Marion says that overall the later Wittgenstein is a finitist, thereby posing a challenge to the restrictive traditional interpretation of Wittgenstein's later philosophy of mathematics as being anthropological or strictly finitistic. Two additional influences Marion mentions are Michael Wrigley and Jaakko Hintikka.

At the extreme are narrow conditions for mathematical proof, a radical antirealism that requires "producing" the proof. Marion last year published a radical antirealist reading of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*.¹² But in earlier works Marion broadens the traditional reading by drawing in particular on the texts Wittgenstein wrote during his transitional middle period. His position is that Wittgenstein is a finitist, not a strict finitist. In a footnote Mathieu Marion compares Wittgenstein's purported finitism to the case William Tait describes.¹³

The account of finitism by Tait gives a sense to proofs of propositions quantifying over the natural numbers without assuming the axiom of infinity, roughly Russell and Ramsey's view of the status of elementary arithmetic in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.¹⁴ Tait depicts finitism as primitive recursive arithmetic: finitism is based on the finite sequence, thereby fulfilling what Hilbert requires, that the methods be secure, without necessarily fulfilling the same intuitions. Tait's minimal account of primitive recursive arithmetic is a form of platonism.

In 6.02 of the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein has something like the general form of the finite sequence: $[x, \xi, \Omega\xi]$ presents a series of ξ having a first element x , a next element determined by the Ω operation Ωx , a next element following that determined in the same way $\Omega'\Omega'x$, and so on in that fashion until the final element of the series is reached. That is a diaphanous sense in which \aleph_0 is the property of the method of a language game. Dedekind himself had used a finite sequence construction to elucidate the meaning of the natural numbers.

The problems Wittgenstein identifies with the axiom of infinity are related to the assumption that \aleph_0 is part of logic. \aleph_0 is for Wittgenstein a property of an operation. An operation is not itself a concept of logic for Wittgenstein, since its existence is not established by its essence alone. Under these circumstances the second sentence of our main quotation suggests that succession is not in doubt

empirically at any stage; that, however, is unlike strict finitism. Actually, one can take the development of Wittgenstein's thought from the *Tractatus* as a response to the (what were for Wittgenstein) unexpectedly realistic interpretations of Russell and Ramsey.

Marion maintains that for Wittgenstein some of the real numbers are unreal, to vary Chaitin's phrase from his talk here two years ago.¹⁵ But Wittgenstein does contemplate the differences of order Cantor defines. The difference between \aleph_0 and 2^{\aleph_0} is a difference of higher order, he says. In the third sentence of the main quotation Wittgenstein addresses the number of the continuum 2^{\aleph_0} , which marks the concept of real number.

According to Tait's elucidatory review of Saul Kripke's book, Wittgenstein avoids the skeptical paradoxes by identifying and clarifying distinctions, not by capitulating and then taking up the strict finitism, in our case, as a default. If Wittgenstein does not concede the skeptical argument, the alleged motivation that drives the adoption of strict finitism is lost. Tait identifies four key distinctions made by Wittgenstein: understanding an expression, the meaning of an expression, my idea of the meaning, and the warrant for the expression. The skeptical paradox of sections 198–201 of the *Philosophical Investigations*, that each new step in a numeric series can be made out to accord with a rule no matter what number actually occurs, collapses these distinctions. To avoid the paradox the slogan is: interpretations do not determine meanings.

Wittgenstein considers the constructive nature of diagonal proof not only in the work we are considering but in other manuscripts written during the 1930's, as well. He uses his old operation symbols from the *Tractatus* in some of these same places. Wittgenstein did not formalize his discussion of diagonalization, but he gives a fairly accurate description. Kreisel's main objection in his ninth section is that Wittgenstein does not state that there are denumerable models of set theoretic realities that cannot be enumerated. But Wittgenstein is forcing a dialectical attack on multiple fronts.

To return to the end of the main quotation: the conception of Frege is accurate for many local cases. How far can one go with it empirically? Not too far according to strict finitism, but 2^{\aleph_0} marks the concept of real number. Of what is it a property? To put it plainly, many would take Wittgenstein's last question in the quotation rhetorically, but instead of not answering it, or conceding that it cannot be answered, one can provide multiple answers: 2^{\aleph_0} is a property of diagonalization, also a property of taking segments on a ray in Euclidean space or sets of initial segments, and so forth. In those cases an infinite number need not be "a property of a property". "Because we would not know what has that property. Yet Frege's definition has made an enormous amount clear".¹⁶

Burton Dreben says that the anthropological reading is not dialectical enough, an interpretation I associate with Mi-

¹⁰ Wang (1962, pp. 38, 40f.).

¹¹ Dummett (1959), and Wright (1980) and (1982).

¹² Marion (2008, 4th para.) and (2003); cf. Wittgenstein (1978, III.1 and III.5).

¹³ (1998, p. 99 n.), also (1995).

¹⁴ Tait (1981, sec. 1, 5, 13, 2, 4, 14), also (1986, sec. 1, 7th para.). Tait himself is not a finitist.

¹⁵ Marion (1995, p. 163); cf. Wittgenstein (1978, II.34f.). For the diagonal proof that successively produces the digits of a new real number v . Cantor (1874) and Kanamori (1996, sec. 1.1).

¹⁶ Wittgenstein (1976, p. 168).

chael Wrigley and Juliet Floyd, as well.¹⁷ By that Dreben means that Wittgenstein's presentation is the *via negativa*: no explanations are permitted. Wittgenstein has no perfect counterbalance, no ground nor core account, not even an ideal frame. He had left that last option behind in the *Tractatus*.

But again one does not need to begin in that stance to see that there are significant internal problems with the other alternatives, especially when it comes to passages by Wittgenstein like the one about marks of mathematical concepts. For that pocket notebook entry need not be taken as containing a denial of the real numbers. So, on balance Ludwig Wittgenstein can be cleared of the charges of strict finitism and finitism.

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¹⁷ V. Parsons (1998, p. 21 nn. 41f.), Wrigley (1977), Floyd (1991).

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Wittgenstein, Turing, and the ‘Finitude’ of Language

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My aim in this paper is to consider the sense in which language is ‘finite’ for Wittgenstein, and also some of the implications of this question for Alan Turing’s definition of the basic architecture of a universal computing machine. I shall argue that similar considerations about the relationship between finitude and infinity in symbolism play a decisive role in two of these thinkers’ most important results, the “rule-following considerations” for Wittgenstein and the proof of the insolubility of Hilbert’s decision problem for Turing. Fortuitously, there is a recorded historical encounter between Wittgenstein and Turing, for Turing participated in Wittgenstein’s “lectures” on the foundations of mathematics in Cambridge in 1939. Although my aim here is not to adduce biographical details, I think their exchange nevertheless evinces a deep and interesting problem of concern to both. We may put this problem as that of the relationship of language’s finite symbolic *corpus* to (what may seem to be) the infinity of its meaning.

Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics has sometimes been described as a finitist; but, as I shall argue here, his actual and consistent position on the question of the finite and infinite in mathematics and language is already well expressed by a remark in his wartime *Notebooks*, written down on the eleventh of October, 1914: “Remember that the ‘propositions about infinite numbers’ are all represented by means of finite signs!” (Wittgenstein 1978, p. 10) The point is neither that signs cannot refer to infinite numbers nor that propositions referring to them are meaningless. It is, rather, that *even* propositions referring to infinite numbers – for instance the hierarchy of transfinite cardinals discovered by Cantor – must *have* their sense (and hence their capability to represent ‘infinite quantities’) by and through a finite symbolization. Thus, the problem of the meaning of the infinite is a problem of the *logic* or *grammar* of finite signs – of how, in other words, the (formal) possibilities of signification in a finite, combinatorial language can give us whatever access we can have to infinite structures and procedures.

In the 1939 lectures, Wittgenstein emphasizes that in speaking of understanding a mathematical structure, for instance a regular series of numbers or indeed the sequence of counting numbers themselves, we may speak of coming to “understand” the sequence; we may also speak of gaining a capability or mastering a ‘technique.’ Yet what it is to ‘understand’ (to “know how to,” or “to be able to,” continue “in the same way”) is not clear. The issue is the occasion for Turing’s first entrance into the discussion, in lecture number II:

Wittgenstein: We have all been taught a technique of counting in Arabic numerals. We have all of us learned to count – we have learned to construct one numeral after another. Now how many numerals have you learned to write down?

Turing: Well, if I were not here, I should say \aleph_0 .

Wittgenstein: I entirely agree, but that answer shows something.

There might be many answers to my question. For instance, someone might answer, “The number of numerals I have in fact written down.” Or a finitist might say that one cannot learn to write down more numerals than one does

in fact write down, and so might reply, ‘the number of numerals which I will ever write down’. Or of course, one could reply “ \aleph_0 ”, as Turing did.

...

I did not ask “How many numerals are there?” This is immensely important. I asked a question about a human being, namely, “How many numerals did you learn to write down?” Turing answered “ \aleph_0 ” and I agreed. In agreeing, I meant that that is the way in which the number \aleph_0 is used.

It does not mean that Turing has learned to write down an enormous number. \aleph_0 is not an enormous number. (Diamond 1976, p. 31)

Notably, Wittgenstein does not, here, *at all* deny the validity of the response that Turing initially (if guardedly) offers to the question about the capacity to write down numbers. Indeed, he distinguishes himself quite clearly from the finitist who would hold that the grammar of “can” goes no farther than that of “is,” that I cannot justifiably say that my capacity includes any more than actually has occurred or will occur. In knowing how to write down Arabic numerals, a capacity we gain at an early age and maintain throughout our rational lives, we possess a capacity that is rightly described as the capacity to write down \aleph_0 different numbers. The attribution of this capacity is not, moreover, an answer to the “meta-physical” question of how many numbers there *are*; the question is, rather, what we, as human beings possessing this familiar capacity, are thereby capable of.

Yet how is this recognizably infinitary capacity underlain by our actual contact, in learning or communication, with a finite number of discrete signs (or sign-types) and a finite number of symbolic expressions of the rules for using them? It is not difficult to see this as the central question of the so-called “Rule-Following Considerations” of the *Philosophical Investigations*, some of which was already extant in manuscript by 1939 (see, e.g., PI 143-155; 185-240). However, we may also, I think, see this very question as *already* decisive in Turing’s remarkable “On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem” published three years earlier, in 1936. Turing’s aim is to settle the question whether there are numbers or functions that are not computable; that is, whether there are real numbers whose decimals are not “calculable by finite means” (Turing 1936, p. 58). He reaches the affirmative answer by defining a “computing machine” that works to transform given symbolic inputs, under the guidance of internal symbolic “standard descriptions”, into symbolic outputs.

According to what has come to be called “Turing’s thesis,” (or sometimes the “Church-Turing” thesis), what it is for anything (function or number) to be calculable at all is for it to be calculable by “finite means,” (here, using only a finite number of lexicographically distinct symbols and finitely many symbolically expressible rules for their inscription and transformation). Twice in the article (p. 59 and pp. 75-76), Turing justifies these restrictions by reference to the finitary nature of human cognition, either in memory or in terms of the (necessarily finite) number of possible “states of mind.” Accordingly, a Turing machine can have only finitely many distinct states or operative configurations, and that its total “program” can be specified by a finite string of symbols.

These restrictions prove fruitful in the central argument of "On Computable Numbers," to show that there are numbers and functions that are *not* computable in this sense. The first step is to show how to construct a *universal* Turing machine, that is, a machine which, when given the standard description of any particular Turing machine, will mimic its behavior by producing the same outputs. Because each standard description is captured by a *finite* string of symbols, it is possible to enumerate them and to work with the numbers (Turing calls them "description numbers") directly (pp. 67-68). Given that we know how to construct a universal machine, we now assume for *reductio* that there is a machine, H, that will test each such description number to determine whether it is the description number of a machine that halts when given its own description number as an input. (p. 73). It does this by simulating the behavior of each machine when it is given its own description number as an input. We also know that H itself, since it always produces a decision, always halts. However, the machine H itself has a description number, K. Now we consider what happens when the hypothesized machine considers "itself," that is evaluates whether the machine corresponding to the description number K halts. We know by hypothesis that the machine H halts; however, as Turing shows, it cannot. For in considering K, the machine enters into an unbreakable circle, calling for it to carry out its own procedure on itself endlessly. We have a contradiction, and therefore must conclude that there can be no such machine H (p. 73).

Turing's central result is thus an application of the general metalogical procedure, first discovered by Cantor, known as "diagonalization." This procedure underlies Cantor's own identification of the transfinite cardinals, as well as Gödel's two incompleteness theorems. In particular, the results of Gödel and Turing alike depend on the possibility of "numbering" symbolic strings in order to produce a *reflexive* structure that (in some sense) "says something" about itself. In that it always depends on the possibility of such enumeration, diagonalization (whatever else it may be) is *always an intervention on symbolic expressions*; that is, it depends decisively on the fact that formalizable procedures – for instance formalizable methods of proof or calculation -- are *necessarily* captured, if at all, in a *finite* combinatorial symbolic expression. In this sense, diagonalization and its results depend *essentially* on the fact that language must make use of a finite stock of symbols and a finite expression of rules in order to accomplish its powers of symbolization.

Now, it is familiar that Wittgenstein held, in general, a dim view of the purported *results* of various forms of the "diagonal procedure," including both Cantor's multiple infinities and the truth of Gödel's "self-referential" sentence. Do these doubts, expressed prominently in the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, imply that there is not a very similar concern about the relationship of finite symbolism to infinitary techniques operative in Wittgenstein's own thought about rules and symbols? I think not, for the following reasons. In his critical remarks about the Gödel sentence as well as about Cantor's multiple infinities, Wittgenstein emphasizes that the existence of a procedure – even one with no fixed end, like the procedure of writing down numbers in Arabic numerals – does not imply the existence of a superlative *object*, either a "huge number" or a completed list of decimal expansions that itself contains "infinitely many" members. However, Wittgenstein does not deny that there *is* such a procedure, and even that we can speak of it, with some justice, as one that shows (by giving sense to the proposition) that there is, for any enumerable set of decimal expansions, one that is not in this set. (RFM II-29). Indeed, he emphasizes the extent to which the procedure of diagonalization, as infinitary as it is, has a place, and a sense, within a human life (RFM VII – 43).

Gödel himself thought (e.g., van Atten 2006, p. 256) that diagonalization could demonstrate a *superlative* capacity of the human mind: that the existence of the Gödel sentence G shows that the human mind has access to a mathematical "truth" that no formal system such as *Principia Mathematica* can prove. However, as Gödel himself pointed out, we reach this conclusion about the system-excessive capacities of the human mind to grasp truth only through an essentially *informal* argument. Many subsequent commentators have followed Gödel in drawing this conclusion; but as Floyd and Putnam (2000) have recently argued, it is not obligatory to do so. In particular, we may agree with the negative side of Gödel's result – there are formulable propositions of PM that are undecidable in the sense of being neither provable nor non-provable in PM, *if* PM is not ω -inconsistent – without affirming, as Gödel himself did, the mysterious capacity of human minds to grasp what is "forever" beyond the reach of formal methods. There are indeed strong indications in *RFM* (e.g. III-8) and elsewhere that this is the interpretation that Wittgenstein favors.

Returning to Turing, the analogue is to take Turing's result wholly negatively – that is, as showing that *there must be* infinitary procedures that are not capturable by any Turing machine (as Putnam (1991, p. 118) puts it, that "reason can go beyond whatever reason can formalize") – without doing anything to show *what* these procedures actually are, or to guarantee our access to them. But such infinitary techniques, fixtures of human life that are not fixed, in their totality, by any finite symbolism, may be just what Wittgenstein is alluding to when, resolving the rule-following paradox of the *Philosophical Investigations*, he suggests that:

201. There is a way of grasping a rule which is *not an interpretation*, but which is shown in what we call 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it' from case to case.

And:

199. To understand a language means to be master of a technique.

There are, I think, two conclusions that can be drawn from this. The first is exegetical: Wittgenstein was certainly not in 1939, and probably never was, a finitist. That is, he *never* held that the finite character of language implied the non-existence or non-reality of infinite procedures. Rather, his focus is uniformly on the problem of the *grammar* of the infinite procedure: that is, just *how it is* that finite signs handled by finite beings gain the sense of infinity. This is none other than the radically posed question of the later Wittgenstein's thought: the question of the nature of a technique or practice. And it leads to the second conclusion, which is not exegetical but philosophical: that the infinity of technique is not an extension or intensification of the finite; nor is it a superlative or transcendent object that lies "beyond" all finite procedures. The infinity of technique enters a human life, rather, at the point of what might seem at first a radical paradox: that of its capture in finite signs, the crossing of syntax and semantics wherever the infinite rule is thought and symbolized as finite.

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“Reality” and “Construction” as Equivalent Evaluation-Functions in Algebra of Formal Axiology: A New Attitude to the Controversy between Logicism-Formalism and Intuitionism-Constructivism

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In general, the formal-logical equivalence between “existence of a” and “existence of the algorithm of (construction of) a” is not true. Nevertheless, terms “formal-logical equivalence” and “formal equivalence (equivalence of forms)” are not synonyms. Consequently, there is a possibility of existence of such a formal equivalence of “being” and “being of the algorithm of constructing”, which does not imply (logically) their formal-logical equivalence. The article demonstrates just such an unusual (hitherto unknown) formal equivalence of “existence of a” and “existence of the algorithm of construction of a”. This result is obtained within two-valued algebra of formal axiology. In this algebra formal-axiological meanings of the words “existence” and “algorithm” are considered as formal-axiological operations. The evaluation-functional sense of these operations is defined by tables. A formal-axiological equivalence relation is defined strictly. By means of these definitions it is demonstrated that there is the formal-axiological equivalence between axiological forms of “being” and “being of the algorithm”. As, in general, there is no logical identity between the notions “axiological forms” and “logical forms” (of “being” and “being of the algorithm”), there is no logical contradiction between the above-affirmed hitherto unknown formal-axiological equivalence and the famous mathematical facts underlying the controversy between formalism-logicism and intuitionism-constructivism. The submitted result is elementary from the proper mathematical point of view as the technical aspect of it is basic one, but the result is very important for illuminating hitherto unknown (ignored on principle) properly philosophical (axiological) grounds of the controversy between the two kinds of philosophies of logic and mathematics.

According to one of the most influential traditions in studying philosophical foundations of mathematics, there is the following triple of intellectually respectable trends in this studying: the formalism; the logicism and the intuitionism-constructivism. However there are serious problems in the mentioned three-sided tradition. For example, reducing L.E.J. Brouwer’s intuitionism (Brouwer 1913) to A. Heyting’s one (Heyting 1975) is a very strong simplification: probably, Brouwer himself would like to protest against this reducing. Moreover, the constructivists used to manifest and emphasize the existence of significant distinctions between their philosophy of mathematics and the intuitionists’ one.

In spite of the expectations, the submitted paper is not devoted to direct discussing the mentioned three-sided tradition. The paper presents an attempt to jump out from the dominating paradigm by means of concentration on “ethicism” – the “well-forgotten-old” (ancient) aspect of investigating the properly philosophical grounds of human creative work in sphere of mathematics. Probably, the word “ethicism” (in philosophy of mathematics) is a hitherto unknown (not used) one. Nevertheless the direction of research it stands for exists from Pythagoras and Plato to

A.N. Whitehead. I mean investigating the properly ethical aspect of mathematical activity which deals with the good and the bad (evil) sides of it. (The words “good” and “bad (evil)” are used in their moral meanings.) The Pythagorean Union insisted upon the existence of not only logical and aesthetical but also ethical foundations of mathematics. Being under the strong influence of Pythagoreans, Plato tried necessarily to combine notions “mathematics” and “the good”. According to A.N. Whitehead, Plato’s attempt was not successful. The attempt of B. Spinoza was not successful too. Nevertheless a small finite set of not successful attempts is not a strict proof of the impossibility on principle. In XX century the relevance (and even indispensability) of a fundamental uniting “mathematics” and “the good” was substantiated by A.N. Whitehead. He insisted upon the relevance of continuing the attempts to unite the two. However he did not submit a concrete variant of such uniting. He suggested the realization of the mentioned idea to other researchers. Being inspired by the above-indicated reasons, in present paper I submit a concrete variant of moving forward in direction of combining “mathematics” and “the good”. First of all it is necessary to make clear that I imply transition from the ethics to a formal one, and then from the formal ethics to a mathematical (mathematized) formal one. At the end of this transition I am to apply the mathematical (mathematized) formal ethics to philosophical foundations of mathematics and to study results of this application. From the history viewpoint, the logicism emerged in the same (analogous) way.

Now let us make agreements about meanings (rules of using) the words involved in our discourse. Let the term “formal ethics” stand for such a branch of ethics, which study moral forms of (any) free human activity deprived of their specific contents. Thus the abstraction from specific contents of moral forms (of activity) is accepted and used systematically. Let the term “mathematical (mathematized) ethics” stand for such a branch of formal ethics, which study mathematical simulations of formal ethics. The present paper exploits two-valued algebra of (moral) actions – the most elementary discrete mathematical simulation of formal ethics. (It is a simulation of the moral rigor, which is the most primitive moral attitude. However this basic attitude does exist in reality.)

Let us define basic notions of two-valued algebra of formal ethics. This algebra is based upon the set of actions (moral ones) and their moral forms deprived of the contents. (Subjects of actions are reduced to their actions.) By definition, actions are such operations, which are either good or bad (in moral sense). (Subjects of actions are also either good or bad.) Elements of the set {g (good), b (bad)} are called moral values of actions (and of action subjects). As subjects of actions can be reduced to their actions, for the sake of simplicity, below we shall talk only about actions. Let symbols x , y stand for moral forms of actions deprived of their contents. Moral forms of simple actions play the role of independent axiological (evaluative) variables. Axiological variables take their values from the above-mentioned set {g (good), b (bad)}. Moral forms of

compound actions represent moral evaluation-functions. These functions take their values from the set {g (good), b (bad)} as well. Complex moral action forms (compound moral evaluation functions) are obtained by applying formal-axiological connectives to the axiological variables. Below we introduce only such formal-axiological connectives, which are relevant to the theme of the paper, namely, only such, which are necessary for the explication of moral (formal-ethical) foundations of mathematical activity. Symbols standing for the unary moral operations under discussion are introduced by means of the following glossary.

Glossary for the below given table 1. The symbol Bx stands for the moral evaluation function determined by one variable "being (existence) of x ". Nx – "non-being (non-existence) of x ". Cx – "construction (production, creation) of x ". Dx – "deconstruction (destruction, extermination) of x ". Ax – "algorithm of (what, whom) x ". Mx – "machine of (what, whom) x ". $A^F x$ – "algorithm for (instead of) x ". $M^F x$ – "machine for (instead of) x ". Ox – "opposite (opposition) for x ". Px – "process of x ". Rx – "reality (actuality) of x ". Fx – "completeness (fullness) of x ". Ux – "incompleteness of x ". Ix – "contradiction in x , i.e. inconsistency (contradictoriness) of x ". Gx – "consistency (non-contradictoriness) of x ". The moral-evaluation-functional sense of these unary formal-ethical operations is defined by the following table 1.

x	Bx	Nx	Cx	Dx	Ax	Mx	$A^F x$	$M^F x$
g	g	b	g	b	g	g	b	b
b	b	g	b	g	b	b	g	g

x	Ox	Px	Rx	Fx	Ux	Ix	Gx
g	b	g	g	g	b	b	G
b	g	b	b	b	g	g	B

In the two-valued formal-ethics algebra, by definition, moral action forms (x and y) are called formally-ethically equivalent if and only if they (x and y) acquire identical moral values under any possible combination of moral values of variables occurring in x and y . Let the symbol " $x=+y$ " stand for the formal-ethical equivalence of action forms x and y . By means of the above definitions it is easy to demonstrate the following formal-ethical equations. To the right from each equation I have placed its translation from the symbolic language into the natural one. In these translations the word-homonym "is" stands not for the formal-logical connective but for the above-defined equivalence relation " $=+="$ ".

- 1) $Ix=+Nx$: contradiction in x is nonbeing of x (D. Hilbert).
- 2) $Rx=+Bx=+Nx=+Gx$: reality (being) of x is nonbeing of contradiction in x (D. Hilbert).
- 3) $Bx=+Cx$: being of x is construction of x (intuitionists-constructivists).
- 4) $Cx=+Ax$: construction of x is algorithm of x (constructivists).
- 5) $Bx=+Ax$: being of x is algorithm of x (constructivists).
- 6) $Bx=+BCx$: being of x is being of construction of x (constructivists).

7) $Bx=+BAx$: being of x is being of algorithm of x (constructivists).

8) $Bx=+BACx$: being of x is being of algorithm of construction of x (constructivists).

9) $NACx=+Nx$: nonbeing of algorithm of construction of x is nonbeing of x (constructivists).

10) $Rx=+PCx$: reality of x is process of construction of x .

11) $Rx=+Cx$: reality of x is construction of x . (This statement is directly relevant to the theme of the symposium section which I have submitted the paper to.)

12) $Gx=+Fx$: consistency (non-contradictoriness) of x is equivalent to completeness of x .

At first glance many of the above equations seem extremely paradoxical (even crazy). For instance, being formulated in general, the last equivalence seems to be an evident absurdity – a logical contradiction with the obvious (well-established) facts – K. Gödel's famous meta-theorems about the formal arithmetic. However this "contradiction" is nothing but a logic-linguistic illusion, as the equation 12 means not the formal-logical equivalence of the fact of non-contradictoriness and the fact of completeness, but the formal-ethical (formal-axiological) equivalence of the value of non-contradictoriness and the value of completeness. One commits a strictly forbidden blunder when he/she replaces the term "formal-ethical equivalence of values" by the term "formal-logical equivalence of propositions affirming that the values are realized". Committing this blunder necessarily results in the impression that the equation 12 logically contradicts to the meta-theorems of K. Gödel. But the rule A—D, precisely formulated below prohibits committing this blunder. From $x=+y$ it does not follow logically that the proposition informing that x is real, and the proposition informing that y is real, are logically equivalent. Truth of the universal statement of formal-ethical equivalence of moral-evaluation-functions "consistency" and "completeness" is logically compatible with falsity of the universal statement of formal-logical equivalence between affirming that consistency is real and affirming that completeness is real.

Another strong illusion of an evident paradox concerns the above equations 3-11 *establishing a fundamental formal unity (even identity) of reality and construction*. In respect to this formal identification there was the famous psychological explosion (intuition-language one) in philosophy of mathematics. The paradox impression has caused the famous sharp conflicts between the formalists-logicists and the intuitionists-constructivists. However, from the viewpoint of above-submitted algebra this famous controversy is a result of logic-linguistic confusion. I repeat that in the above translations of the equations into the natural language the word-homonym "is" stands for the relation " $=+="$ ". Chaotic mixing and substituting (for each other) the formal-logical and the formal-ethical meanings of the word "is" is strictly forbidden by the principle of formal-logical autonomy (i.e. nonbeing of valid formal-logical inferences) between corresponding facts and evaluations. The formal-logical gap between them is absolutely unbridgeable. In algebra of formal ethics this autonomy principle is mathematically represented by the following rule.

Let Ex stand for an act of informing (true or false affirming) that x takes place in reality. The above-said (about " $=+="$ " and the formal-logical connectives) may be formulated as the following rule A—D. (A) From the truth of $x=+y$ it does not follow logically that the logical equivalence of Ex and Ey is true. (B) From the truth of the logical

equivalence of Ex and Ey it does not follow logically that $x=+y$ is true. (C) From the truth of $x=+y$ it does not follow logically that [either (Ex logically entails Ey , or (Ey logically entails Ex)] is true. (D) From the fact that [either (Ex logically entails Ey), or (Ey logically entails Ex)] is true, it does not follow logically that $x=+y$ is true.

This rule is an effective remedy for the naturally emerging impression (illusion) that the above-listed formal-ethical sentences are paradoxical. To produce and use this remedy the above observation recognizing the homonymy of "is" is indispensable.

By means of the submitted discrete mathematical simulation of formal ethics it is easy to see that the above list of equations is logically consistent. In particular, even generally speaking, the equations 2 and 8 are logically compatible. The first impression of their incompatibility (in general) is a logic-linguistic illusion generated by violating the above-formulated rule of formal-logical autonomy of

facts and evaluations. Hence, according to the present paper, in relation to the moral ideal of creative work in mathematics, the formalists and the constructivists are together: their distinctions are not significant. Consequently, the equations 1-11 mathematically represent important ethical foundations of mathematics as creative activity – one and the same moral ideal of mathematicians belonging to both parties: to the one of Hilbert-Russel and to the one of Brouwer–Heyting. Thus after the split mathematicians are united again.

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Metaphor: Perceiving an Internal Relation

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Many authors have noticed a link between metaphor and perception. Aristotle says that "to make metaphors well is to observe what is like [something else]" (Aristotle 1987, 1459a). The most significant recent studies on this topic, given by Max Black and Donald Davidson, conclude that the metaphor is to be likened to *seeing-as*. Davidson furthermore mentions Wittgenstein's "duck-rabbit" and maintains that "seeing as is not seeing that" (Davidson 2001, 263). In the metaphor "A is B" thus the subject A is *seen* as the predicate B. To be sure, such a comparison may be conceived as metaphor as well. The seeing-as in a metaphor should be alike or somehow analogous to the seeing-as in visual perception. My intention in this essay is as follows: to elaborate an account of how such an analogy is to be conceived. How far does the analogy between these two similar structures go? Or are we misled by that analogy? These are general questions about the philosophical inquiry which Wittgenstein asks himself in his *Blue Book* (cf. Dc 309, 45). I begin by stating Wittgenstein's basic views about the "seeing-as" or "seeing an aspect" which might be transposed to the metaphor; I am going then to discuss recent accounts of Hester and White, showing why neither of them conforms to my requirements; then I shall give grounds in favor of my view of the analogy; and finally I will briefly indicate the consequences of my view for a theory of the metaphor.

Wittgenstein used the duck-rabbit figure to show an example of a rare phenomenon which makes the expression "something is seen as something else" meaningful in everyday language. That led him to distinguish between the "continuous seeing" of an aspect and the "dawning" of an aspect. The distinctive feature about the figure is its intentional ambiguity on the author's part. Furthermore, the aspects of the ambiguous figure have to be mutually exclusive: you can successfully see it in either way, but you can never see it in both ways at once. Davidson (2001, 263) emphasizes that a concrete seeing-as can be caused by a literal statement. The statement "It's a duck" can cause one's seeing of the figure as a duck. Due to a holistic trait of the aspect, it is sufficient to point to a part of a duck, e.g. the nib or the neck; a part determines the whole. These causal and holistic characteristics of perception are to be transposed to the metaphor. However, there are problems which hold an immediate transposition back. There are metaphors concerning abstract terms which cannot be literally *seen*. How can justice be seen as a blind woman with a twin-pan balance? Another difficulty is the author's intentional ambiguity of the figure. Would it mean that all metaphors are ambiguous in our analogy as well?

There are three items: the duck, the rabbit and the duck/rabbit figure. What is corresponding to them in our analogy? Let me first discuss an account of Marcus Hester (Hester 1967, 179). He claims that in Wittgenstein's example we are given the duck/rabbit and the problem is to see the duck and the rabbit in it. In the metaphor, on the other hand, we are given the duck and the rabbit and the problem is to see the duck/rabbit. In the metaphor "A is B", the concepts (or images of) A and B should blend in order to discover the common *Gestalt* between them. For example, in Keats'

metaphor of his imagination as a monastery¹ both elements should merge into a single image which can be seen as imagination or monastery. This resembles Francis Galton's process of *composite photography* merging several portraits into a single one in order to reveal common qualities of the group.

Hester's account cannot deal with abstract terms: How can an image be imagined that is to be seen as imagination and monastery? It cannot be an image which will have common properties of both terms. There are no such properties for the most metaphors. This is the question from the very beginning and Hester's account gives us no answer. Furthermore, both aspects are mutually exclusive and so the merged image cannot be seen both ways *simultaneously*, for then the holistic trait of the aspect would not be preserved.

Another account of the analogy is offered by Roger White: "We may [...] regard the metaphorical sentence as a 'Duck-Rabbit'; it is a sentence that may simultaneously be regarded as presenting two different situations; looked at one way, it describes the actual situation, and looked at the other way, an hypothetical situation with which that situation is being compared." (White 1996, 115). So we are supposed to take the abovementioned metaphor of Keats, in analogy to the duck/rabbit ambiguity, as presenting in one reading the imagination (i.e. the actual situation) and in another reading a monastery (a hypothetical situation). The holistic trait of the aspect remains preserved here. But the recipient won't be dubious about the two aspects. Both of them are given together with the duck/rabbit. And now we are told that both situations, i.e. aspects, should be compared. Also, what the analogy yields is only that in the metaphor "A is B" both terms should be compared. If all three elements are already given, why should the reader compare the situations? I do not want to question that White gives a plausible explanation of such comparison, but it is not a consequence of this analogy.

Nevertheless, both accounts share, in my view, the same defect: there are given two situations/aspects which should be compared or merged. But we do not know how. Furthermore, both authors do not use Wittgenstein's subsequent reflections about the dawning of an aspect and about the role played by concepts in the perception. A dawning of an aspect is for Wittgenstein "half visual experience, half thought" (Ms 144, 45 [PI II, xi]), it is "an amalgam of the two" (ibid, 46). These considerations have to be employed in our analogy.

Let me outline my positive view. As aforesaid, Wittgenstein uses the duck/rabbit as an example for a potential experience of a change (or dawning) of aspect: "Only through the phenomenon of change of aspect does the aspect seem to be detached from the rest of the seeing. It is as if, after the experience of change of aspect, one could say 'So there was an aspect there!'" (Ts 229, 228 [RPP I, § 415]). But aspects can change without getting this specific experience, e.g. someone can fail in recognizing the ambi-

¹ "My imagination is a monastery, and I am its monk." *Letter to Percy Bysshe Shelley*, August 1820.

guity of the figure. He cannot speak of aspects, but something has changed which is Wittgenstein calling "conception" or "way of taking" (Auffassung): "If there were no change of aspect then there would only be a *way of taking*" (Ms 137, 9b, original italics [RPP II, § 436]). Aspect-blind people never see an aspect but only various conceptions. If someone wants to report an aspect, he has to take a conception. Thus: "An aspect has admittedly a name of a conception, but a conception can persist without the persisting of an aspect." (Ms 132, 182, my translation). The aspect coincides with the conception on the language side. The statement "It's a duck." can stand either for (an exclamation of) the aspect or only for (a report of) the conception.

Being equipped with this distinction, we can more precisely analyze the concept of aspect. Wittgenstein says: "what I perceive in the dawning of an aspect is not a property of the object, but an *internal relation* between it and other objects." (Ms 137, 128a, mine italics [PI II, xi]; cf. Ms 138, 5a). The concept of the internal relation is not as eminent in Wittgenstein's late writings as in the *Tractatus*. In his early writings, an internal relation is a relation between the sign and the thing signified (or between proposition and its reference). There are, in addition, internal relations between two or more propositions, e.g. logical relations. It is impossible for a thing not to have some internal relations. For Wittgenstein's late philosophy holds up that there is an internal relation between thinking and seeing which can be perceived in the dawning of an aspect.

But from the last quotation it is difficult to infer what the objects involved are. Ter Hark is considering three possibilities: "(i) One object is the geometrical constellation, the other is either the duck or the rabbit. (ii) One object is the duck, the other is the rabbit. (iii) One object is the change of aspect, the other is either the duck or the rabbit." (Ter Hark 1990, 182f.). The second possibility is out of the question because the duck and the rabbit are two exclusive ways of seeing. Ter Hark argues against (i) also as follows: (a) the duck/rabbit can be identified independently of the duck or the rabbit and (b) the duck/rabbit is not necessary to describe the aspects. Therefore, there has to be an external relation between the duck/rabbit and the duck or the rabbit. These objections are valid only if the constellation would be seen neither as the duck, nor as the rabbit (cf. Jantschek 1996, fn. 75). But then the duck and the rabbit are standing for conceptions, not for aspects and thus there would be no relation at all, neither internal, nor external. Ter Hark concludes in favor of (iii). Surely, there must be an internal relation between the experience of the change of aspect and the conceptions involved. But this is not the relation Wittgenstein means. The quotation above implies that one term in the relation is the perceived object, i.e. the duck/rabbit. The formulation (i) should be thus refined so that in the dawning of the aspect there is perceived an internal relation between the considered object (i.e. the duck/rabbit) and the duck-aspect or the rabbit-aspect respectively.

Before we go back to our analogy, I would like to emphasize a connection between an internal relation and the concept of the organization. There are many kinds of internal relations and many kinds of aspects. In the seeing-as, we are dealing with aspects of organization: "One *kind* of aspect might be called 'aspects of organization'." (Ms 144, 64, original italics [PI II, xi]). In one his manuscript, Wittgenstein notes in a cryptic remark: "The internal relation of structures is the organization which generates the one from the other one." (Ms 127, 215, my translation). We can infer that in an internal relation, one term is *organizing* the other one.

How can these considerations be related to the seeing-as in the metaphor? We have to get over the intentional ambiguity of the duck/rabbit figure. A spectator does not need to know about the ambiguity of the figure. They might consider it at first as a duck and only later on experience the change of aspect. In such cases they might say: "Now I see this duck as a rabbit" or more metaphor-like "this duck is now a rabbit". Anyway, we do not need to suppose that a spectator would identify the figure as duck/rabbit, but only as tangle of lines (cf., e.g., Ms 137, 14b; Ms 144, 47).

I propose the analogy as follows: The subject A of the metaphor "A is B" corresponds to the duck/rabbit and the predicate B is one of the aspects, e.g. the duck. From our reformulation of (i) it follows that what is perceived in the metaphor is an internal relation between the subject A and the predicate B insofar they are both perceived and thought of. Moreover, it is perceived a conceptual relation between the involved terms which has an irreducible subjective side as well. This means that in a metaphor, the predicate B organizes the subject A. In our example above, the concept of a monastery organizes the concept of Keats' or even someone else's imagination.

Due to the notion of the aspect, the causal as well as the holistic trait of the seeing-as is preserved in the analogy. My first consequence for a theory of the metaphor is that metaphors cannot be fully paraphrased in literal language because of the subjective experience of the change of aspect. Further, an internal relation cannot be predicated or *said*, it can be only *shown*. The consequence is that there cannot be a secondary metaphorical meaning expressed in the metaphor. The main objection against theories of a metaphorical meaning is that they are reducing the aspect to a conception and leaving aside the subjective experience of the change of aspect. On the other hand, there are theories that see the function of the metaphor in the evoking of an emotive or perlocutionary effect. They are reducing the aspect to the subjective side leaving the language part aside. Furthermore, if the point of the metaphor is an experience of the change of aspect, then it would be perceived only an external relation in the metaphor because the experience is a concrete event which is causally linked to the metaphor.

The aim of my analysis was to demonstrate that elaborating Wittgenstein's notion of the seeing of an aspect can be profitably used in an analogy to the seeing-as in the metaphor. Let me finish with a paraphrase of Aristotle that to make metaphors well is to observe internal relations.

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Language and the Problem of Decolonization of African Philosophy

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1. Introduction

In his "Opening Address" to the Colloquium of the Second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC) held in Lagos in 1977, the Nigerian Head of State at that time, General Olusegun Obasanjo, lamented:

For most people who assert the Africanness of themselves or of things, there is a standing tragedy. The psycho-physiology of knowledge would confirm a built-in handicap for any human group who cannot work in their indigenous language form. The standing tragedy of all Blacks and Africans wherever they may be is that their tongues have been pulled out and they must speak in strange tongues (Obasanjo 1980: 103).

He then charged African scholars to:

Give attention to the question of the medium in which your thought process is encapsulated. Have we lost our tongues for ever? Must we think and work in the languages of Europe for ever? (Obasanjo 1980: 105).

It is no longer news that (Western) European values, languages, political and economic systems, as well as scientific and technological achievements – all these have permeated into the remotest corners of the world and have become part of the collective experience of humanity. Recently, the term "globalization" has become the vogue. However, many African scholars believe that globalization is merely another name for the continued Western domination of the world (Maduagwu and Onu 2003).

Africans, confronted with this reality have reacted and are still reacting in different ways to the situation. In response to the charge of Obasanjo, Wole Soyinka (1977: 46), a participant at the Colloquium, narrated how as far back as 1959, African scholars had recommended that one African language, Swahili, should be adopted as the medium of communication among all Africans. According to him, it was the "timidity" of African policy makers that stood on the way of its implementation.

In the meantime, the issue of decolonization of African systems of thought has been taken up by scholars from diverse fields. The most popular voices came from the field of literature (Chinweizu et. al. 1983). In most of these calls the use of European languages is often at the centre of discussion. It is claimed in some quarters that modern African thinkers lack originality since they have to communicate their ideas in foreign languages. This paper, however, addresses this problem from a philosophical perspective.

2. The Question of the Existence of African Philosophy

In the field of philosophy, the demand for decolonization has also received strong voices (e.g. Wiredu 1998). First of all, it should be noted that unlike literature, philosophy, started on a very shaky ground in Africa. Makinde (1998) has observed that in the early 1970s, "philosophy appeared to be serious luxury in Africa." Even today, many universities in Nigeria, for example, do not have departments of philosophy and where there is one, it is usually housed with religion.

There were initial misgivings about the existence of African philosophy or in fact whether Africans were capable of philosophizing (Levy-Bruhl 1923). However, already in 1959 there were two publications on African philosophy, one by a European, Tempels (1959) and the other by an African, Mbiti (1959). These two publications generated intense debate on the nature of African philosophy, especially by African philosophers.

Some African philosophers initially rejected the works of the likes of Tempels and Mbiti as examples of "African philosophy" for the simple reason that the contents of those publications are no more than sociological or anthropological accounts or "ethno-philosophy" (Wiredu, 1980:37, Okere, 1983). For them, African philosophy will emerge with time when sufficient individual Africans have challenged common beliefs that are embedded in African customs and traditions. Wiredu (1980:37) puts it this way:

For African philosophy the distinction may be formulated as being between the varieties of folk world-view and philosophy as the results of the work of individual Africans using the intellectual resources of the modern world to grapple with philosophical problems.

This writer does not intend to dwell further on this issue, which Nwala (2007: 37), has called "The Great Debate". In any case, it would seem that the debate on whether there is African Philosophy or not has been settled in the affirmative (Nwala 2007: 39). It is now generally agreed that there are two levels of African philosophy, ethno-philosophy and critical philosophy. Nwala (1997: 24-25) also calls the two levels "first order" and "second order" philosophical activities while Wiredu (1998) calls them "traditional African philosophy" and "modern philosophy," respectively. Today, it would seem that the debate on African philosophy has shifted to the issue of its decolonization, especially given the fact that modern African philosophers must of necessity be philosophizing in European languages. This is the central concern of this paper

3. Language and African Philosophy

Wiredu in his decolonization of African philosophy enterprise has also grappled with the consequences of the use of European languages by African philosophers. According to him if one learns philosophy in a given language, that would be the language in which one would naturally philosophize, "not just during the learning period but also, all things being equal, for life" (Wiredu 1998). He asserts:

But language, most assuredly, is not conceptually neutral; syntax and vocabulary are apt to suggest definite modes of conceptualization. ... [Thus] the starting point of the problem is that the African who has learned philosophy in English, for example, has most likely become conceptually westernized to a large extent not by choice but by the force of historical circumstances. To that same extent he may have become de-Africanized. (Wiredu 1998).

Wiredu argues that it does not matter if the philosophy the African learned was African philosophy. If that philosophy was formulated in English, for example, the message was

already substantially westernized. He suggests various ways of decolonizing African philosophy, including comparative approach by which he means that African philosophers should always “bring their African conceptual resources to bear on their treatments of issues” (Wiredu 1998). Furthermore, “whether it be in logic, or epistemology, or ethics, or metaphysics, or whatever, they must introduce African inputs wherever feasible.” Again, “exorcising of the colonial mentality in African philosophy is going to involve conceptually critical studies of African traditional philosophies.” I have no problem with Wiredu’s approach to decolonizing African philosophy, so long as it entails comparative approach or the attempt to bring African perspective, where possible, to bear on the issue of discourse. The problem arises with the role that language is supposed to play in the decolonization enterprise. According to Wiredu, “decolonization is a highly conceptual process” and for that reason:

One cannot hope to disentangle the conceptual impositions that have historically been made upon African thought-formations without a close understanding of the indigenous languages concerned. ... [This] stipulates that emphasis should be given to detailed, in-depth, studies of the traditional philosophies of specific African peoples by researchers who know the languages involved well (Wiredu 1998; emphasis added).

With this prescription, Wiredu goes on to demonstrate how an African indigenous language could be used in assessing the claims made of African philosophy. He used his *Akan* language to analyze one major claim made by Tempels in his *Bantu Philosophy*. Tempels (1959) had claimed that in Western philosophy, the concept of *being* is static while in African philosophy *being* is dynamic. Thus for Africans, “Being is force and force is being”. To ascertain the validity of such a claim, Wiredu sought to translate the concept of “being” in *Akan* language and discovered that “there is no such thing as the existential verb ‘to be’ in that language. According to him, the late Alexis Kagame, a Bantu philosopher and scientific linguist, had also argued that the existential verb “to be” does not occur in the *Bantu* group of languages. The implication of the linguistic analysis of the concept of being, at least with regard to the two African languages, is that:

whatever it was that Tempels noticed about Bantu thought was radically mis-stated by the use of an inapplicable Western category of thought, namely, the concept of being as existentially construed. It is a concept that was obviously deeply ingrained in Tempel’s own manner of thinking, and he very well may have thought it universal to all human thinking (Wiredu 1998).

Thus, Tempels’ claim about African thought in his *Bantu Philosophy* is a clear case of “conceptual superimpositions” and “any Africans who go about disseminating Tempels’ claim without confronting the conceptual issue are simply advertising their colonial mentality for all who have eyes to see” (Wiredu 1998).

This raises the crucial question: Is it really practicable or even necessary, in the present-day circumstances, to demand that researchers into any particular communal African philosophies must *know their languages* in order to be able to correctly re-present such philosophies? This rejoins a number of issues usually addressed in the philosophy of language, including the *origin, nature and purpose of language; language and thought, and the problem of translation*. To these should also be added the question of *globalization and language*. It will not be possible to address these issues at length in this short paper.

My position, however, is that fundamentally language is only a tool, very much like the carpenter’s tool, invented by human beings, for the solution of their existential problems (see, e.g. Popper 1972). I believe that it does not really matter in what language one thinks, one can still be very original in one’s thought. If an African is able to make any scientific discovery today (recently Phillip Emeagwali invented the fastest computer) – even if s/he uses European technologies and communicates the finding in a European language that would not diminish its originality. Why should that not equally apply to thought or philosophy?

Today, more than ever before, the world is facing a situation in which several thousands of languages would sooner or later become extinct. On the effect of globalization on languages, the views of the contributors to the question, “What Will Globalization Do to Languages” (Dubner 2008) is worth noting. One of the contributors, Henry Hitchings (as reported in Dubner 2008), has graphically painted the future of world languages in the light of the onslaught of globalization. Of the 6,500 different natural languages currently being spoken in the world, 11 of them account for the speech of more than half the world’s population. These are English, Mandarin Chinese, Spanish, Hindi, French, Bengali, Portuguese, Russian, German, Japanese and Arabic. Of all these, English is rapidly becoming the most important world’s language, not only in the universities but also in the areas of computing, diplomacy, medicine, shipping and entertainment. Currently, there are about 2 billion people actively learning English across the world. In fact, according to Hitchings, given its outreach and domestication around the world, “nobody owns English any more.” Finally, here is Hitchings prognosis:

Realistically, fifty years from now the world’s big languages may be as few as three: Mandarin Chinese, Spanish, and English. ... At the other end of the scale, many languages will have disappeared, irrecoverably, and with them will have disappeared their cultures (Dubner 2008)

For my part, while I believe that some time in the future, many world’s languages, including African languages, would disappear or be confined only in Archives, it does not necessarily follow that African cultures would also disappear. If educated Africans continue to articulate various aspects of their cultures in literature, history, sociology and philosophy, for example, those cultures will continue to survive, and be recognized as distinct, even when they are documented in European languages. Thus, my position in this paper is that I do not believe that the originality of African thought or the decolonization of African philosophy would necessarily require that contemporary or future African philosophers or other scholars must be knowledgeable in their African languages. I believe that African philosophers or other scholars would be quite capable of researching and communicating African philosophy or any other fields of African studies in any language they have been educated in. I believe that this position is supported by the schools of thought that espouse the idea of “language as a universal means of communication”, and that individual languages are translatable into other languages.

4. Conclusion

This paper has discussed the issue of the place of language in the quest for decolonization of African philosophy. It acknowledged the fact that due to historical circumstances (particularly colonialism), modern educated Africans must of necessity use European languages in their

thoughts. Despite this, the paper disagrees with the school of thought that claims that mastery of a particular African language would be necessary for an African researcher to be able to represent the philosophy of that particular language group. Rather, the paper agrees with the schools of thought that believe that language is basically like a tool invented by human beings for the solution of their existential problems; that language is translatable; and that language is a universal means of communication. The consequences of the present-day globalization for world's languages should be food for thought for those Africans who still lament their inability to work in their mother-tongues. The paper concludes that it does not really matter in which language an African scholar develops his/her ideas. The originality of those ideas would not be diminished.

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'Viewing my *Night*': a Comparison between the Thinking of Max Beckmann and Ludwig Wittgenstein

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1. Introduction

'It is surely the most foolhardy and unsatisfactory endeavour to wish to express things about art in words or writing; since whether they wish to or not, each person speaks only for their own house, their own soul, and absolute objectivity or justice is impossible.' With these words the important 20th century German painter Max Beckmann begins his 1948 lecture at Columbia University, *Three Letters to a Woman Painter*. In those instances where he has transgressed against this motto and expressed himself with regard to his painting, I would like to view such passages from the preserved writings and conversations to a certain degree in the light of his contemporary Ludwig Wittgenstein.

It is easy to point to a number of biographical correspondences between Beckmann and Wittgenstein. First of all, their dates: Beckmann 1884 to 1950, Wittgenstein 1889 to 1951. In the First World War Beckmann was a volunteer medical auxiliary, Wittgenstein an Austrian volunteer. Beckmann's impressions of the First World War were crucial for the further development of his painting, and during the same period Wittgenstein was preparing his first work, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. It is also important to mention that both engaged intensively with Kant and Schopenhauer.

2. On the picture

In his *Six Aphorisms on the Composition of Pictures*, the foreword to a catalogue written in 1924, Beckmann gives some very precise information about his painting. 'The construction of the image is conditioned by the alteration of the visual impression of the world of objects by a transcendental mathematics in the soul of the subject. In principle, therefore, any modification of the object is permitted which can prove itself through adequate powers of organisation. The decisive factor is the consistent use of a formal principle which is related to this modification.' This is a remarkably precise and philosophical, stylistically terse formulation of his thoughts on the matter, whose form and content recalls many propositions of the *Tractatus*, the picture theory, and the general proposition form. At various times and in various circumstances, for example during lectures, Beckmann finds a new home for these precise words from his first aphorism, quoting it even when he had achieved a vivid and powerfully visual type of language to describe his work. It seems as though he wanted to create a sober theoretical basis for the potential of painting. Knowing the impossibility of communicating his intentions linguistically, he confines his theory to an observation of this kind, in order then to disregard it and refer to feelings and circumstances (he writes of the enjoyment of beauty, intoxication, dance, ecstasy, nature, music, God, etc.) which, by their mere enumeration alone, are intended to determine his work more specifically. This manner of proceeding very closely resembles certain interpretations of the *Tractatus*, if one thinks of the relationship of the picture theory and linguistic analysis to questions of ethics and

aesthetics in Wittgenstein's work, for example on the problem of boundaries.

Beckmann developed a style characterised by strong figures and explicitly sought to point towards the invisible through the visible. Or, as he says in his lecture *On my Painting*, given in London in 1938, 'However, it is in fact *reality* – which forms the actual mystery of existence!' In a note which has been preserved, written on 2 February 1937, he writes: 'All things which exist are there *only* so that we can learn to get by (to cope?) without them.' One notes that Beckmann was concerned with a representational form of painting; on this point, here is a quotation from Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*: '6.4321 All of the facts belong only to the task, not to the solution.' The proximity of these two ideas strikes one at once. But does it also reveal itself clearly in Beckmann's actual work, in his painting? Yes, it does indeed *reveal* itself; if one will, almost in Wittgenstein's sense of the word and, from the point of view of painterly technique, quite explicitly.

3. Out of the picture

In a letter written in 1919 to Ludwig von Ficker, Wittgenstein writes the following with regard to the *Tractatus*: '... the book's meaning is an ethical one'. By restricting itself to meaningful propositions, it points indirectly towards all the non-meaningful things that can be said, and moreover at that which reveals itself in this: ethics and logic which, as precondition of the possibility of linguistic expression *per se*, cannot be judged true or false. Once again in his talk *On my Painting* – after some observations 'roughly' concerning good and evil and their unity in God – Beckmann declares: 'Therefore, almost without wishing it, I moved on from formal principles to transcendental ideas – an area which is definitely not 'my field' ... In my view, all essential aspects of art ... have always arisen out of the deepest feelings for the mystery of BEING.' By comparison, we find the following in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* (6.44): 'Not *how* the world is, but *that* it is – that is the mystical.' Logic is transcendental and precedes the *how* (perhaps as aesthetics does in Beckmann's case).

This configuration still lacks what is possibly the connecting factor: the metaphysical subject as boundary of the world. On this point, here is Beckmann in his *Address for the Friends and Philosophical Faculty of Washington University, St Louis*, given in 1950: 'Important and ever again the most important: ruthless recognition and criticism of one's own ego.' What might be implied here perhaps becomes somewhat clearer with the help of one of Beckmann's paintings, one which occupies a key position in his life's work. It dates from 1918-9, in other words from the same period as Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. The picture is called *The Night*.

What we perceive in it are, to a certain extent, actual forms. It is a stark portrait of a complex process. In his afterword to *Die Realität der Träume in den Bildern* ('The Reality of Dreams in Pictures') Rudolf Pillep notes that the scene takes place '... in a "civilian" city district, in a mean,

convoluted attic room belonging to poor people, in which perpetrators and victims are penned in together'. Besides the powerful, and also cryptic, symbolic language of the picture – which I will not go into here – there are also elements which project questions out of the picture towards the viewer. The essential question is that of the light. As we know from a conversation with Reinhard Piper, the latter had already asked Beckmann in 1919 which direction the light was coming from, since the candles in the foreground would not be adequate for this purpose. Beckmann's answer was: 'You are right. But I imagine the whole scene illuminated by electric light, which is burning outside the scene.' Pillep comments on this as follows: 'Remarkable – we too, the picture's viewers, are outside the scene. Perhaps we must imagine that a door into the room or a curtain has been opened for the viewers, and in the light entering from outside the gruesome events suddenly reveal themselves.' The light source is therefore not 'on stage'. The lighting points to an observer outside the picture. This is the explanation in terms of painterly technique which I mentioned earlier, and an unmistakable reference to the subject which – as boundary of the world, not belonging to it – first allows good and evil to enter. But it is much more important to keep in mind Beckmann's claim to reveal the invisible through representational painting, or as he puts it, to disclose the 'magic of reality'.

In his afterword Pillep also speaks of Beckmann himself: 'The painter could be described as a "moralist" in a deeply human sense ... In their absoluteness, his pictures are moral entities.' *The Night* processes war experiences and makes a strong anti-war statement. According to Pillep it is concerned with the exposure of crimes of violence – murder, torture, rape and capture which, by

virtue of the fact that they are located in a civilian space, not only show how such everyday vicissitudes of war are perceived in themselves, but also put life and war on an equal footing. Pillep also notes that 'the captive's beseeching hand and the status of the dying man as witness reach out of the picture: out towards us, the viewers. This is all the more astounding since nothing else, not a single glance, is projected beyond the pictorial space.'

4. Viewing my Night

It is not *in spite of* the two elements reaching out of the picture just mentioned, but *by means of* these, perhaps humble, clues on the part of the painter that we can recognise that the painting, like Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, acts indirectly. The viewer, for their own part, must arrive at insights by their own efforts, after they have 'thrown away' the individual, unreal, unwieldy representations of the picture, like Wittgenstein's ladder.

In the conversation with Reinhard Piper about *The Night* already mentioned, Beckmann also said: 'Everything must remain representational' and '... when viewing my *Night* you must forget the representational through the metaphysical'.

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Similitudo – Wittgenstein and the Beauty of Connection

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E.M. Forster once gave a motto to his famous novel *Howards End*: Only connect. What meant the numerous connections and intertwining of different spheres of life in different times here is also relevant for the philosophical work of Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Connections can be made in different ways. They may show inconsistencies in thinking or differences to other peoples' lifestyles. Sometimes the result of trying to connect the different shows an underlying unity or a sameness one did not recognize before.

Wittgenstein, too, tried to connect the different in his writings – even by „teaching differences“ – and he connected them in a very successful and convincing way. „Connection“ has to do with making comparisons before you connect. These comparisons show, if the things compared share qualities or differ in their most important constitutional elements. I would like to suggest a reference here, which belongs to the tradition of making comparisons in order to connect things not being connected before: similitudo.

1. A Renaissance Category of Thought

In his book *Les Mots et les Choses* Foucault demonstrates how a fruitful category that stems from the long time past, the Renaissance, is still valid today. Similitudo is the key concept of what people thought in that former time, how they organized the knowledge that was to gain in ordinary life, how – in short – they looked at the world.

I would like to use the similitudo category as a means for helping to talk about Wittgenstein's later philosophy. As Cavell put it, this later philosophy, any philosophy, „like art, is and should be, powerless to *prove* its relevance...“ (Cavell 1976, 96) Bringing in normativity here means – against Cavell's own intentions in this quotation – reminding us of the others, who are able to sanction our behaviour when expressing thoughts. This sheds light on how we depend on our categories, seeing them not as fate, but constructions. I do not want to follow this direction too much (if something is a construction or not). But keeping in mind that *ego* needs *alter* in a process of communication reminds us of the inevitable consequences one has to face not agreeing with common practices: Being secluded from what you know or think to know. The implicit aim of famous categories is to secure synchronicity in connecting things, synchronicity in experiencing daily life in a way comparable to others. It is not surprising, then, that the Renaissance category of similitudo has been successful in shaping our contemporary thought at an unconscious level – we see similarities in common landscapes and common feelings of our peers, the blue sky and the things happening below. Similitudo is not bound to Renaissance times specifically, it is a universal tool to understand what is not clear at first sight, what needs explanation in the form of human practices. To give an example: If I live in a time where God appears absent and the secular presents itself as the individual, I cling to this individualistic stance to save my actions from the pain of being wrong in the eyes of others. Where the eyes of God are gone. The end of the geocentric system, and the theocentric system, too, marks

such a situation of Copernican uncertainty. The Renaissance man looked at the sky not to find transcendent consolation, but emptiness to be filled up with strong notions of a new self.

Foucault's description of similitudo reads as following: „Jusqu' à la fin du xvi siècle, la ressemblance a joué un rôle bâtisseur dans le savoir de la culture occidentale. C'est elle qui a conduit pour un grande part l'exégèse et l'interprétation des textes: c'est elle qui a organisé le jeu des symboles, permis la connaissance de choses visibles et invisibles, guidé l'art de les représenter. Le monde s'enroulait sur lui-même: la terre répétant le ciel, les visages se mirant dans les étoiles, et l'herbe enveloppant dans ses tiges les secrets qui servaient à l'homme.“ (Foucault 1966, 32)

The identification of similitudo appears as a process of applying the concept of a mirror. Not argumentation, but resemblance, mirroring, constitutes a realm of meaningful explanations, explanations which are meaningful, because of their applicability to what people perceive as being the truth. Truth is not only *adaequatio*, stating conditions for *x* being truthful in situation *y* (let alone truth conditions in Tarski's sense). Truth is rather a description that fits where there has not been an epistemological gap before. Understanding ideas like similitudo as ideas describing our lives enriches these lives for a certain time, the time of discussion, in which „our lives“ play the role of substances being organized by an abstract principle. Similitudo is furthermore a form of an explanatory description coining practices of language use as play. The „jeu des symboles“ Foucault has in mind transforms the seriousness of a scientific notion (similitudo) to a situation of trying to catch some sense, getting rid of a hidden law that separates self and play in scientific discourse. Wittgenstein can serve as a witness to the test of bringing in playful elements, introducing a strong inclination to see language as game, as test, as rehearsal. This is a thought connected with Foucault's emphasizing the world as a place that mirrors itself in itself. „La terre répétant le ciel“. Self-repetition of the world (or the earth repeating the sky) leads to philosophically interesting circumstances: The unity of world pictures consists in the possibility to connect the elements constituting world views in a reliable way. Consistent world-views do not leave the inherited room of signs and symbols, they redefine them in a quiet, common way – the principle of mirroring repeats the construction of human eyes watching things. All in all, we possess a kind of ontogenetic inheritance we can find in phylogenetic discourse – our organic endowment is speaking when people are using and looking for principles explaining the complexity of human life in the simplicity of what entails its own understanding, because seeing (in the case of similitudo) is something we already do and cannot fail to do.

2. Likeness, not Sameness as the Guiding Principle of Language Use

Likeness, resemblance, not sameness is the principle language is based on. Sameness – as a principle structuring the world – would indicate a constant need for identity, being identified as being the same by others. Identity is, so

to speak, a category somewhat overestimated. One must live in the diversity of things, in the diversity of forms of life in which the occurrence and recurrence of common language games is likely to take place. „Common“ means: shared by others and the fact of sharing conditions of daily life with others can be comforting when confronted with deep differences inherited, as it were, from „the elders“.

The language game reassures someone uttering sentences (the pragmatic dimension!) to be part of a much larger occasion – the combination of talking, feeling, thinking as a constant anthropological basis of human communication. The relation of a language game and its form of life – the form of life in which it occurs – is contingent and reliable at the same time. Reliability stems from the fact that a form of life is framing language games so calmly. (I cannot avoid the singular here, but I tend to disagree with Garver, agreeing with Haller) Contingency is not only the frightening modern disease Wittgenstein called the „darkness of this time“ /of our time, but a field to be explored without too many limitations. Something may happen, if something else happens. Language is shared by many. It seems to be a gentle illusion to believe in intersubjectivity as Habermas does – language use is far more difficult, contaminated with aspirations of power and hate, place of vivid self-descriptions often unknown to the people uttering them. In short, language is the place where descriptions cross, descriptions of the self, of others, of ideal landscapes, of poetic images of these landscapes. In using language we seem to look for similarity, resemblance, likeness because its identification comforts the human heart. This is not a kitschy overdose of romanticism, but stating a mere fact. Wittgenstein's hypotheses in the *Philosophical Investigations* combine a remarkable understanding of the ethical needs of his readers with an awareness of the necessity to find things (matching other things) as a structure of our use of language.

3. Wittgenstein's Grammatical Turn in Considering the Similitudo Principle

Approaching similitudo the grammatical way is, at first glance, not surprising. But there are indeed some changes the category has to face when grammatically addressed: the similarities (between the sky and the world below) no longer have the status of ontologically fixed elements. The components of the comparison sky-life below are shifting – from ontological privilege of the higher spheres to looking at the sky as a criterion of everyday language use. If – to illustrate the grammatical turn pragmatically – the sky is just a dreamy expression of imagination, not confronting me with the rain pouring on my head, the similarities that can be drawn from the sky to my head are limited. Of course there are modal differences of, say, poetic language and pragmatic language, the latter being used with the aim of entailing changes in the day to day life. Understanding similitudo grammatically means excluding such understandings of similitudo that forget about the actual language use – the shortest definition of „grammatical“ is: „explaining how a word is used.“ Thus, approaching similitudo grammatical means to employ this similarity for showing how similar things are used in everyday life, how I speak of the sky when differentiating it from poetic descriptions (as in the *spleen* poems of Charles Baudelaire). The sky mirrors the circumstances below, but it does not define them any longer – and it is precisely this quality of indefiniteness (some say: „uncanny“, thinking of Freud), of things resembling each other where the grammatical point comes in. Grammar: to look at similar things with the intention of connecting them with actual language use. Wittgenstein does so in PI 66 and 67 and following paragraphs. PI

66 contains the famous imperative „Denk nicht sondern schau“/English: „Don't think, but look“. It is striking how strong the topicalization of similarity is bound to language use here. The main intention of this paragraph seems to be bringing the similitudo category „back to the rough ground“ (PI 107). The rough ground can be identified with the things one can perceive while watching language working in actual language games. Watching instead of thinking makes sure not to miss the crossing similarities in utterances meant to play a role in contexts already established. The role-playing quality of utterances ties them up with what others are expecting and, on the other hand, what the speaker may expect. Expectations, to be realistic, need former contexts showing that the fulfilment of an expectation is possible. So the task is, in Wittgenstein's case, not to use similarities for confirming existing world views being right, but showing how similarities lie at the core of processes constituting meaningful sentences and utterances.

When Wittgenstein talks about games in PI 66, he applies a concept of family resemblances described in the following paragraph. Olympic games are no card games, ball games do not match the game „patience“. The notion of family resemblance sums up a number of singular thoughts – it is, so to say, the non-essentialist essence of a theoretical step from stressing a onesided nature of „the“ game to stressing the shifting boundaries of different games meeting in the criterion of being governed by implicit and explicit rules. Someone who desires to know what a game is, shall look at *games*. The development from one to many contains a whole change of theoretical orientation: It is not only the adieu to words like substance, essence, *Wesen*, but also the fulfilment of a program, which contains a new vision of how philosophy is based on the similarity concept. The intention is (to use this contaminated word) to find „a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.“ (PI 66) Not the number of similarities to be found plays a decisive role here. It is the application of a concept well-known in former times. Wittgenstein reintroduces it – without tracing its origin back to his philosophical ancestors. Two effects of this prominent reference are: Firstly, the redefinition of the similitudo concept (some may prefer „description“ instead of „definition“ thinking of PI 109) reminds the reader of the great chain of being which connects thinking of the past and thinking of the present. An utopian approach to the question of meaning is only possible, because former times such as the Renaissance laid the basis for our linguistic escape from old models of meaning like the Augustinian picture of language pointed out in PI 1. Secondly, the similitudo category is rather used as a question than as an answer in this paper. This question functions as a defence of the need of such philosophical thoughts which are like „indistinct photographs“ (PI 71). Praising the indistinct is praising the possibility of connecting; there is finally an ethical point in making connections insofar as connections embody a strong belief that the different can be useful without being degraded to blunt identity. In other words, the possibility to connect the unknown until a state of knowing is not beyond reach anymore secures ordinary lives with ordinary language use – not only with the use of ordinary language. Especially in Foucault's words quoted above the emphasis is on a capacity of imagination. Poetic language (language used in poetry) is usually aware of the beauty of connection. Beauty is the possibility to alter a given state of affairs to a better one. Better in the sense of advanced aesthetics, better in the sense of ethical refinement. The philosophical notion of similitudo (Foucault) and similarity (Wittgenstein) is part of a larger movement to-

ward imagination even in non-poetical circumstances. The simplified version of the Renaissance era that I presented by quoting Foucault's French words is that renaissance people took their material and mental world seriously. They did not care to sound exaggerating, while relying on things like the sky you cannot define. This is their ethical advance, because life resists to definitions and tends to go on silently. In the end, grammar serves as a reminder of our ethical duties – without neglecting singularities of expressions in the field of aesthetics, of which Wittgenstein was well aware of.

4. Forster and the Rainbow Bridge

Wittgenstein probably believed in the necessity of founding philosophical thinking in everyday life as well as saving the world of imagination from anti-individualistic, cheap esteem, like Wittgenstein criticizing the cliché of English literature professors constantly praising Shakespeare. Artistic expression has to abstain from mediocrity and stubborn principles, never daring to face true change. Literary expression sometimes meets this requirement of true vision without an all too fashionable vocabulary. E.M. Forster speaking of the rainbow bridge in his novel *Howards End* returns to Foucault mentioning the sky as an object of reference for making comparisons and drawing connections. The paragraph, which illuminates the motto „Only connect“ appears in the beginning of chapter 22. I would like to quote the passage here to illustrate the wider aspects of human behaviour that Forster takes into account – as well as Wittgenstein: (Margaret about her fiancé) „Mature as he was, she might yet be able to help him to the building of the rainbow bridge that should connect the prose in us with the passion. Without it we are meaningless fragments, half monks, half beasts, unconnected arches that have never joined into a man. With it love is born, and alights on the highest curve, glowing against the grey, sober against the fire. (...) Only connect! That was the whole of her sermon. Only connect the prose and the passion, and both will be exalted, and human love will be seen at its height. Live in fragments no longer. Only connect, and the beast and the monk, robbed of the isolation that is life to either, will die.“ (Forster 2007, 201-203)

Grammatical investigations in Wittgenstein's sense (not easy to grasp in its full meaning) refer to us living in/as fragments not as an infelicity, but as a normal state of affairs. Prose and passion merge and similarities are the way to describe the language dome constituted by the two. Connections signify things that would have a different meaning without linguistic brothers. Grammar and imagination are siblings of the distant kind; similitudo is the key notion, when Forster puts Foucault's central passage about the philosophically promising sky in the perspective of interaction practice, representing an old dream of wholeness and semantic peace: (Margaret is speaking) „Nor was the message difficult to give. It need not take the form of a good ‚talking‘. By quiet indications the bridge would be built and span their lives with beauty.“ (Forster 2007, 202-203)

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Ist die Intentionalität eine notwendige Bedingung für die Satzbedeutung?

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Einleitung

Wittgenstein entwickelt eine Auffassung davon, wie die Sprache funktioniert, ohne jeglichen Rekurs auf die Notion der Intentionalität. Im Gegensatz dazu spielt die Intentionalität eine wichtige Rolle in der Bedeutungstheorie von John Searle. Ziel dieser Arbeit ist eine Nachkonstruktion einer „Debatte“ zwischen beiden sowie eine systematische Bewertung ihrer Argumentation.

1. Searles Theorie

1.1 Intentionalität

Searle definiert (*Intentionality*: 1983) die Intentionalität als ein Merkmal einiger mentaler Zustände, durch das sie auf andere Gegenstände und Sachverhalte gerichtet sind. Intentionalität ist *Gerichtetheit*. Er unterscheidet die *intrinsic* Intentionalität von der *abgeleiteten* Intentionalität. Die *intrinsic* Intentionalität ist die Intentionalität des Geistes, die von anderen Formen der Intentionalität nicht abgeleitet ist und unabhängig von einem Beobachter ist. Die Tatsache, dass ein Individuum A Hunger hat, ist unabhängig davon, was ein Beobachter B darüber denkt. Im Gegensatz dazu ist die abgeleitete Intentionalität abhängig vom Beobachter. Ein Satz wie „Chove“ ergibt nur Sinn in Bezug auf Beobachtern, die Portugiesisch können.

Die intentionalen Zustände legen ihre Erfüllungsbedingungen fest, weil sie ihre Rolle vor einem Hintergrund des „know-how“ spielen. Unter „Hintergrund“ versteht man die Menge von Fähigkeiten, Dispositionen, Gewohnheiten und allgemein „know-how“, die uns in die Lage versetzt, mit der Welt in Beziehung zu treten. Es gibt (i) den *tiefen* Hintergrund und (ii) den *lokalen* Hintergrund. Der erste umfasst die Hintergrund-Voraussetzungen, die biologisch universell sind, wie z. B. unsere Fähigkeit zu laufen. Der zweite umfasst die Hintergrund-Voraussetzungen, die kulturell unterschiedlich sein können.

1.2 Sprechakte

Die Sprechakte sind die grundlegenden Einheiten der Kommunikation. Searle unterscheidet *illokutionäre*, *lokutionäre* und *perlokutionäre* Akte. Die illokutionären Akte sind die Sprechakte, die absichtlich durchgeführt werden und eine Wirkung auf einen Hörenden haben. Wenn A sagt „es regnet“, weil es regnet, haben wir einen illokutionären Akt. Die lokutionären Akte sind dagegen die Sprechakte, die kommunikativ unabsichtlich durchgeführt werden und keine inhaltliche Wirkung auf einen Hörenden haben. Wenn A sagt „es regnet“, um die Aussprache dieses Satzes auf deutsch zu üben, haben wir hier lediglich einen lokutionären Akt, der keine Bedeutung hat. Die perlokutionären Akte sind die Sprechakte, die eine Wirkung auf einen Hörenden zu haben versuchen, z. B. überzeugen, trösten usw. wollen. Die Sprechakte werden als Handlungen, die von einer Menge von konstitutiven Regeln geleitet sind, angesehen, wie z.B. die Regeln, die einem Fußballspiel zu Grunde liegen.

1.3 Bedeutungstheorie

Das wichtigste Merkmal, das die Sprache von der Intentionalität der mentalen Zustände ableitet, ist die Fähigkeit, etwas anderes zu repräsentieren. Die Wortbedeutungen, Kennzeichnungen, Symbole usw. haben eine Art abgeleiteter Intentionalität (I: 27). Ohne Intentionalität hätten unsere Sprechhandlungen keine Bedeutung.

Searle unterscheidet *die wörtliche Bedeutung eines Satzes* und *die Sprecherbedeutung oder Äußerungsbedeutung*. Die wörtliche Bedeutung hängt sowohl von der Wortbedeutung und den Konventionen des Sprechers ab, als auch von der Sprechsituation und dem *Hintergrund*. Wenn der Hintergrund eines Satzes sich verändert, bestimmt dieselbe wörtliche Bedeutung verschiedene Erfüllungsbedingungen. Betrachten wir einige Beispiele Searles:

1. „Der Chirurg öffnete die Wunde“
2. „Sally öffnete die Augen“
3. „Sally öffnete die Tür“
4. „Sally öffnete die Sonne“

Obwohl das Verb „öffnete“ in den Sätzen 1, 2 und 3 den gleichen semantischen Gehalt hat, wird der semantische Gehalt dieses Verbs unterschiedlich verstanden, denn der semantische Gehalt bestimmt in jedem Satz verschiedene Erfüllungsbedingungen. Wenn der Arzt den Patienten bittet, die Augen zu öffnen, würde der Patient nicht denken, dass er die Augen mit einem Messer aufschneiden muss, wie ein Chirurg eine Wunde öffnet. Das Verständnis eines Satzes setzt mehr voraus, als seine wörtliche Bedeutung zu kennen. Bei dem Satz 4 kann man alle Wörter, aus denen dieser Satz besteht, verstehen und trotzdem bleibt die Satzbedeutung unverständlich.

Die Sprecherbedeutung oder Äußerungsbedeutung ist diejenige Satzbedeutung, die durch die *intrinsic* Intentionalität des Sprechers bestimmt wird. In der eigentlichen Sprachverwendung ist die wörtliche Bedeutung gleich mit der Äußerungsbedeutung. Wenn ein Individuum A sagt: „es regnet“ und damit sagen will, dass es regnet, ist die wörtliche Bedeutung dieser Aussage gleich mit der Äußerungsbedeutung dieser Aussage. Aber in der metaphorischen Sprachverwendung ist die wörtliche Bedeutung von der Äußerungsbedeutung zu unterscheiden. Wenn A sagt „es regnet“, weil ein anderes Individuum B wegen der Sonne einen Regenschirm über seinen Kopf hält und A einfach nur einen Spaß mit B machen will, hat die Aussage „es regnet“ eine wörtliche Bedeutung und eine Äußerungsbedeutung, die nicht gleich mit der wörtlichen Bedeutung dieses Satzes ist. Das bedeutet nicht, dass die wörtliche Bedeutung sich verändert hat, sondern dass der Sprecher durch solche Sprechakte etwas anderes zu sagen beabsichtigt. Die wörtliche Bedeutung bleibt so immer gleich und nur die Sprecherbedeutung variiert. In diesem Fall wird die metaphorische Bedeutung von den Sprecherintentionen festgelegt. Wer die Äußerungsbedeutung versteht, der weiß auch, was der Sprecher mit dem Satz meint.

2. Bedeutungstheorie in der Perspektive von Wittgenstein

2.1 Analogie zwischen Sprache und Spiel

In den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* (1953) vergleicht Wittgenstein die Sprache mit einem Spiel. Die erste Ähnlichkeit zwischen beiden ist die Art und Weise, wie man die Bedeutung der Wörter bzw. ein Spiel lernt, denn in beiden Fällen lernt man durch den *Gebrauch*. Deswegen sollte man nicht nach der Bedeutung der Wörter fragen, sondern nach ihrem Gebrauch. Die zweite Ähnlichkeit besteht darin, dass der Gebrauch einer Sprache wie ein Spiel, durch die *Regeln* bestimmt wird. Die dritte Ähnlichkeit ist die, dass einen Satz auszusprechen einem Spielzug entspricht. Ein Satz ergibt nur in einer bestimmten *Situation* einen Sinn.

Der Begriff *Sprachspiel* wird in vier verschiedenen Weisen angewendet: (i) praktische Anweisungen, die in Beziehung mit dem Spracherwerb stehen; (ii) fiktive Sprachspiele, die als Vergleichsobjekte der Sprache dienen können; (iii) Tätigkeiten der Sprache wie Befehlen, Danken, einen Witz erzählen usw., und (iv) das Ganze der Sprache und der Tätigkeit, mit denen sie verbunden ist. Die Sprachspiele sind miteinander in vielen verschiedenen Weisen verwandt und lassen sich nur in einer *Lebensform* verstehen. „Lebensform“ bezeichnet hier die Gesamtheit der Handlungsmuster einer Kultur. Die nichtsprachlichen Kontexte und die sprachlichen Tätigkeiten haben die *Tatsachen der Natur* als Bedingung. Diese umfassen sowohl die allgemeinen Gleichmäßigkeiten der Welt als auch die biologischen, anthropologischen und gesellschaftlichen Tatsachen (PU: §242). Die Tatsachen der Natur und der Lebensformen lassen uns die Sprachspiele spielen. Wenn die Gegenstände unserer Welt immer verschwinden würden, wäre das Spiel des Abzählens sinnlos. Die Bemerkungen über die Tatsachen der Natur waren die Inspiration für die Begriffe „Netzwerk“ und „Hintergrund“ in der Theorie Searles.

2.2 Privatsprache

Unter „Privatsprache“ versteht man nicht eine Sprache, die ein Monolog ist, wie beispielweise der Monolog von Robinson Crusoe, sondern eine Sprache, die nicht mitteilbar ist. Die Existenz einer Privatsprache ist unmöglich, denn die Verwendung der Wörter einer Privatsprache wäre sinnlos. Man kann nicht einer Regel „privatim“ folgen, weil es sonst kein Kriterium für ihre Richtigkeit oder für den Unterschied zwischen einer Regel folgen und einer Regel zu folgen glauben geben würde. Das bedeutet aber nicht, dass Wittgenstein einfach skeptisch ist, ob das Gedächtnis ein gutes Kriterium für die Richtigkeit der Regeln einer Sprache ist. In einer solchen Sprache gäbe es kein Kriterium. Einer Regel zu folgen ist eine Praxis, eine Institution oder eine Gepflogenheit. Da einer Regel zu folgen eine Praxis ist, kann man auch nicht ein einziges Mal einer Regel folgen. Das Muster der Korrektheit einer Regel muss gemeinsam und verifizierbar sein.

2.3 Die psychologischen Begriffe

Nach Wittgenstein beziehen sich die psychologischen Begriffe nicht auf private Episoden, denn die Bedeutungen dieser Begriffe werden auch in den intersubjektiven Sprachspielen begriffen. Man muss nicht die Erfahrung einer Empfindung wie z. B. eines Kopfschmerzes haben, um zu verstehen, was das Wort „Kopfschmerzen“ bedeutet. Der Umgang mit psychologischen Vorgängen ist so nicht intern und subjektiv, sondern intersubjektiv.

Außerdem scheint er zu sagen, dass die mentalen Zustände nicht notwendig für die Bedeutung unserer Sätze

sind. Wenn ein Sprecher durch einen Satz etwas bedeuten will, muss er nicht die Gesamtform seines Satzes im Kopf haben, bevor er spricht. Die Fähigkeit eines Sprechers, seine intentionalen Phänomene wie Glaube, Wünsche, Ängste usw. auszudrücken, hat schon die intentionalen Haltungen als Basis. Wenn ein Sprecher sagt: „a b c d“ und meint „das Wetter ist schön“ und ein Hörer versteht, was der Sprecher gemeint hat, ist diese Sprechsituation ungewöhnlich. Trotzdem heißt es nicht, dass der Satz in diesem Fall einen mentalen Zustand voraussetzt, der die Bedeutung dieses Satzes festlegt, sondern, dass die Regelmenge, die den Gebrauch des Satzes „a b c d“ leitet, in diesem Kontext „das Wetter ist schön“ als Bedeutung zulässt (PU: §509).

3. Schlussbemerkungen

Was uns hier von Bedeutung ist, ist Searles These, dass die Intentionalität eine notwendige Bedingung für die Bedeutung ist, die wahrscheinlich nicht von Wittgenstein akzeptiert worden wäre. Nehmen wir das folgende Beispiel an: während eines heftigen Streites, sagt Hans zu Anna: „Du bist so süß wie Honig“. In diesem Fall würde Anna wahrscheinlich nicht denken, dass er ihr geschmeichelt hat, sondern das Gegenteil annehmen. Man kann sagen: Der Satz „Du bist so süß wie Honig“ hat eine wörtliche Bedeutung. Dieser Satz meint nicht, dass Anna wirklich einen bestimmten Geschmack hat, der dem Geschmack des Zuckers nahe kommt. Üblicherweise wird damit ausgedrückt, dass jemand nett und freundlich ist. Das wäre die normale Bedeutung dieses Satzes und die Sprecherbedeutung wäre hier, aufgrund der evidenten Ironie, das Gegenteil davon.

Man könnte dagegen argumentieren, dass ein Sprecher nicht irgendetwas sagen kann und damit alles bedeuten, was er will. Außerdem muss der Sprecher nicht unbedingt die Gesamtform seines Satzes im Kopf haben, bevor er etwas sagt. Das meint Searle aber nicht. Wie gesehen: Die Sprecherbedeutung wird von der wörtlichen Bedeutung eines Satzes und vom Hintergrund begrenzt. Außerdem sagt er nicht, dass die Sprecher einfache Gedanken haben, die dann in Wörter umgewandelt werden. Das wäre eine grobe Vereinfachung seiner Erklärung.

Trotzdem kann man sagen, dass die Bedeutung dieses Satzes nur von dem Hintergrund und der Sprechsituation bestimmt wird. Die Intentionalität ist nicht notwendig für die Bedeutung. Das besagt aber nicht, dass der Sprecher mit dem Satz etwas zu sagen beabsichtigt. Der Satz „Du bist so süß wie Honig“ kann nur das Gegenteil bedeuten, weil es das Sprachspiel der Ironie in unserer Kultur gibt, d.h., weil die Menschen schon gewohnt sind, bestimmte Sätze ironisch zu interpretieren. Die Bedeutungen der ironischen Sätze werden von dem Gebrauch dieser Sätze in einer bestimmten Situation festgelegt. Das ist möglich, weil die Sätze oder die Wörter keine feste Bedeutung haben und die Satzbedeutung immer von einem Kontext abhängt. Das wäre eine Antwort aus der Perspektive von Wittgenstein.

Nach Searle ist der Begriff „Gebrauch“ so verwirrend und vage, dass diese Konzeption uns viel mehr Andeutungen als richtige Erklärungen liefert. Es ist falsch zu denken, dass wir die Bedeutung eines Wortes „A“ durch die Anwendung dieses Wortes in einem Sprechakt „A ist B“ begreifen können. Das entspricht dem *Fehlschluss des Sprechakts*. Man verwirft hier auch die notwendigen Bedingungen für die Realisierung einer assertorischen Aussage mit der Anwendung eines Wortes. Das nennt Searle den *Fehlschluss der assertorischen Aussagen*. Beide Fehlschlüsse des Sprechakts tauchen auf, weil die Vertre-

ter dieser Konzeption den Gebrauch eines Wortes „A“ von dem Gebrauch eines Satzes, der das Wort „A“ enthält, nicht unterscheiden können.

Wittgenstein behauptet aber nicht, dass der Gebrauch die Bedeutung aller Wörter bestimmt, sondern, dass sich die Bedeutung eines Wortes *in den meisten Fällen* durch den Gebrauch dieses Wortes begreifen lässt (PU: §43). Trotz der Familienähnlichkeit von „Gebrauch“ und „Bedeutung“ gibt es zwischen beiden einige Unterschiede. Erstens gibt es Ausdrücke, die einen Gebrauch haben, und trotzdem keine Bedeutung. Ein Beispiel dafür ist „oder“. Zweitens können die Ausdrücke elegant oder unelegant sein, obwohl sie exakt die gleiche Bedeutung haben, wie z.B. „voll“ und „satt“. Solche Charakteristika haben die Bedeutungen nicht. Drittens gibt es Ausdrücke, die dieselbe Bedeutung haben und trotzdem unterschiedlich gebraucht werden, wie z.B. die „blonde Frau“ und „Blondine“. Außerdem, falls man das Kontextprinzip akzeptiert, sollte man auch erkennen, dass die Bedeutung eines Wortes besser erklärt wird, wenn man verschiedene Sätze, die dieses Wort enthalten, betrachtet. Wittgenstein erklärt den Begriff „Bedeutung“ durch die Verbindung dieses Begriffes mit anderen Begriffen wie „Erläuterung“ und „Verständnis“. Die Wortbedeutung wird durch die Erläuterung einer Beschreibung seiner Bedeutung, die klar macht, wie dieses Wort sinnvoll gebraucht wird, gezeigt. So ist der Grund für die Untersuchung der Wortbedeutung durch seine Anwendung in verschiedenen Sätzen und Kontexten unproblematisch.

Der entscheidende Grund für die Ablehnung der Intentionalität für die Bedeutungstheorie ist dieser: Wenn die Intentionalität unserer mentalen Zustände notwendig für die Satzbedeutung wäre, dann gäbe es kein Kriterium für die Richtigkeit der Regeln, die die Satzbedeutung leiten, denn das Kriterium muss verifizierbar sein. Die Sprecherbedeutung eines Satzes hat aber die wörtliche Bedeutung dieses Satzes und den Hintergrund als Grenze. So gibt es doch ein Kriterium für die Richtigkeit der Regeln: der Hintergrund und die Regel des Bestimmens der Bedeutung des Satzes. Wenn es so ist, ist zu fragen, ob die Intentionalität hier nicht überflüssig ist.

Man könnte aber sagen, dass der Unterschied zwischen lokutionären Akten und illokutionären Akten ohne die Intentionalität nicht möglich wäre. Selbst wenn ein Papagei „Bom dia“ sagt, geht es hier um einen reinen lokutionären Akt, denn man kann nicht sagen, dass der Papagei die Absicht hatte, etwas bedeutungsvolles zu sagen. Es ist schwierig zu vermuten, wie sich Wittgenstein dazu äußern würde. Man könnte aber vermuten, dass der Satz

„Bom dia“ eine Bedeutung unabhängig von der „Absicht“ des Papageis hat. Auf der einen Seite hat wahrscheinlich dieser Ausdruck keine Bedeutung aus der Perspektive des Papageis, denn er folgt nicht den Regeln des portugiesischen Sprachspiels, vielleicht spielt er nur ein anderes primitives Spiel, das Nachahmungsspiel. Auf der anderen Seite hat aber dieser Ausdruck eine Bedeutung für die Sprecher des Portugiesischen.

In dem Kontext des Satzes „Du bist so süß wie Honig“ war es klar, dass Hans es ironisch meinte. Eine Ironie ist ein Sprachmittel, bei dem man *bewusst* das Gegenteil von dem sagt, was man meint. Natürlich können wir Ironien ausdrücken, weil sie zu unserer sprachlichen Tätigkeit gehören und allerdings scheinen die Grenzen (der Hintergrund und die Regel der Sprache) der „Sprechbedeutung“ für die Bedeutung wichtiger zu sein als die Intentionalität. Trotzdem ist es noch zu überlegen, ob die Rolle der Intentionalität, die sie in diesem Fall in der Sprache spielt, nicht nur wichtig für die Kommunikation unserer mentalen Zustände ist, sondern auch für das Bestimmen der Sprecherbedeutung mit einer bestimmten Grenze. Diese Searles Theorie wäre auch strengenommen keine Ablehnung der „Theorie“ Wittgensteins, sondern eine Erweiterung, denn die Erklärungen von Wittgenstein über die Bedeutung beziehen sich viel mehr auf die „wörtliche“ Bedeutung eines Wortes oder eines Satzes, während Searle sich mehr auf die Sprecherbedeutung eines Satzes konzentriert.

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Elucidation in Transition of Wittgenstein's Philosophy

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1. Introduction

Wittgenstein never talked about 'elucidation' in the later period. He used the term only three times even in the *Tractatus*. 'Elucidation' is, however, an important concept for his early philosophy. It is 'elucidation' that he appealed to when he characterized his philosophy in the *Tractatus*. Then, does it mean that elucidation is never important in his later philosophy? I will argue that he carried over some features of elucidation as crucial elements in his transition from the early to the later philosophy.

2. Elucidation in the *Tractatus*

Despite its importance, interpreters of Wittgenstein have been puzzled with his uses of 'elucidation.' It is partly because what he means by elucidations is not clear, partly because his three cases seem inconsistent. 'Elucidation' appears in the following sections in the *Tractatus*:

3.263 The meanings of primitive signs can be explained by means of elucidations. Elucidations are propositions that contain the primitive signs. So they can only be understood if the meanings of those signs are already known.

4.112 Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts.

Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions. Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries.

6.54 My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.

Elucidations are propositions that include primitive signs, which are explained by means of elucidations. Max Black is puzzled with this relation between elucidations and primitive signs: only if primitive signs are already known, elucidations are understood while such primitive signs are explained by means of elucidations (Black 1964, 114-5). It is mysterious, according to Black, how speaker and hearer achieve common reference because the meanings of primitive signs are only shown in propositions without explicit explanation. He assumes that Wittgenstein points out a fact concerning mutual understanding in psychology or sociology, and that there can be no philosophical concern. In section 4.112, however, Wittgenstein states that elucidations are essential for philosophy that aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Moreover, in section 6.54, he illustrates his philosophical propositions with elucidations, which are nonsensical, but with which he helps someone see the world aright. Then, how can we have a consistent picture of Wittgenstein's uses of 'elucidation'? P. M. S. Hacker tells us to notice the difference between the first

case and the last two cases (Hacker 1975, 605, fn. 1). On the other hand, James Conant demonstrates a consistent view of Tractarian elucidation by focusing on its nonsensical but therapeutic role (Conant 2000). I shall discuss what Wittgenstein finds common to the uses of 'elucidation' in the three cases.

'Elucidation' is not original to Wittgenstein. He critically takes it over from Gottlob Frege, who committed himself to a program known as logicism. This was an attempt to reduce mathematics to a logical system. In order to accomplish his program of logicism, Frege allows only two ways to introduce terms into the system. One is definition and the other is elucidation. Definition can introduce the logically complex but not the logically simple. Only elucidation can reach something primitive.

Elucidation is given a limited but necessary role in Frege's logicist program. He excludes elucidation from a system because elucidation is not precise. But he claims that it necessarily comes before constructing a system (Frege 1997, 313). Elucidation is carried out in ordinary language, in which precise meanings are not always indicated. Thus, elucidation is not suitable for science. At the beginning of constructing a discipline, however, a scientist needs to have a basis for communication with others. Even though elucidation is not precise enough, it is required for that pragmatic reason. Elucidation sets out a system, but should not belong to the system because of its vagueness. Elucidation relies on someone else's guessing. It is accomplished by "an understanding willing to meet one halfway." (Frege 1969, 254)

Wittgenstein critically takes over 'elucidation' from Frege. Indeed he objects to the fact that Frege considers categorical notions and pieces of logical equipment as indefinables (TLP 4.1272 and 5.4) and claims that only *Names* are primitive signs (TLP 3.202 and 3.26). They still share the idea that elucidation differs from definition and explains the meanings of primitive signs.

While both Frege and Wittgenstein also agree that elucidations are not included within a science, the roles are different. The Fregean elucidations are necessary as a propaedeutic to a science. Since elucidations cannot be precise, they have to rely on someone else's guessing. For Wittgenstein, elucidations are required only when the logic of thought is not clear or is misunderstood. Elucidations are used temporarily and to be thrown away after the logic is understood because they are nonsensical pseudo-propositions.

Thus the whole picture of the Tractarian elucidation can be illustrated with the motif of showing. The task of the Tractarian elucidation is to show what can not be said. In TLP 3.263, the unsayable is the meanings of primitive signs. In order to show the meanings of primitive signs, elucidations talk about the signs. In TLP 4.112, it is emphasized that philosophy is an activity of clarifying thoughts. Philosophy makes the boundary of thoughts clear by talking about the sayable and showing the unsayable. Since the way of clarification essentially includes showing, Wittgenstein believes that propositions in a philosophical work should be elucidations. In TLP 6.54,

quoted above, he explains his propositions in particular, that is, the work of the *Tractatus* itself. The propositions of this work are nonsensical—he attempts to talk about the unsayable, but they are allowed to be used because they serve as an activity of clarification. Not what is said but what is (being) done is essential for philosophy. But again, since his propositions are nonsensical, they are to be thrown away after his readers get the point. Elucidations are used only when you have the intention of showing. Showing is working on someone who does not see what you see; philosophy teaches one to see the world aright. Wittgenstein describes the only correct method of philosophy: to say nothing except what can be said, and to show (*nachweisen*) that someone failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions whenever he wants to say something metaphysical; “he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—this method would be the only strictly correct one” (TLP 6.53).

3. Ostensive Teaching As Elucidation

When Wittgenstein restarted philosophy at the beginning of the early thirties, he was developing a new and deeper thought about elucidation:

If I explain the meaning of a word ‘A’ to someone by pointing to something and saying ‘This is A’, then this expression may be meant in two different ways. Either it is itself a proposition already, in which case it can only be understood once the meaning of ‘A’ is known, i.e. I must now leave it to chance whether he takes it as I meant it or not. Or the sentence is a definition. (PR, sec. 6)

The first case is quite similar to the Tractarian elucidation. Whether or not an elucidation can be understood depends on the previous knowledge of the person to whom you are talking. The second case, however, is not a definition in the Tractarian sense. It is another characteristic of elucidation even though he calls it a definition. He continues:

Or the sentence is a definition. Suppose I have said to someone ‘A is ill’, but he doesn’t know who I mean by ‘A’, and I now point at a man, saying ‘This is A’. Here the expression is a definition, but this can only be understood if he has already gathered what kind of object it is through his understanding of the grammar of the proposition ‘A is ill’. But this means that any kind of explanation of a language presupposes a language already. And in a certain sense, the use of language is something that cannot be taught, i.e. I cannot use language to teach it in the way in which language could be used to teach someone to play the piano. —And that of course is just another way of saying: I cannot use language to get outside language.

Wittgenstein later calls the second case *ostensive teaching*. The characteristic of the second case is what the early Wittgenstein implied in his Tractarian elucidation but he was unaware of it at that early date. Wittgenstein has not yet reached an answer in the passage above. But he recognizes that in the *Tractatus* he did not think enough about how he can show the unsayable. The early Wittgenstein may have implicitly believed that, when someone does not know the meaning of a Name, we can make him know the meaning by showing him the object. But now in the early thirties he suspects that showing the object may not fix the meaning. The example of the difficulty of teaching suggests that the function of showing in elucidation is not certain. His consideration of the difficulty of teaching came to dominate his discussions in the later period. The case of

ostensive definition or teaching is a major example of them.

4. *Übersicht* As an Elucidating Method

According to G. E. Moore, Wittgenstein found a new method of philosophy in the early thirties (PO, 113-4). He did not fully explain what it was. He merely said that he was not teaching new facts but telling what you already know. Telling those things, he tried to have students get a synopsis of them in order to remove their intellectual discomfort; he wanted to teach (or show) how to get a synopsis of trivial things.

The original German word of ‘synopsis’ is *Übersicht*. There is no one appropriate word in English and it is not easy to understand *Übersicht* as a method. The interpreters claim, however, that the notion of *Übersicht* is prominent in all Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and is of paramount importance (Baker and Hacker 1983, 296).

Wittgenstein’s discussion on *Übersicht* appears in his objection to Frazer’s attempt to explain primitive rituals in terms of scientific, historical or causal explanation. The problem with the scientific explanation, according to Wittgenstein, is that it makes the magical and religious views of primitive people look like errors (PO, 119). For example, Frazer explains that a savage stabs the picture of his enemy apparently in order to kill him. Frazer finds stupidity in their way of thinking. But it is only because he attempts to explain rituals from his own scientific view. Wittgenstein gives an example of someone who kisses the picture of his beloved. This is not based on the belief that it will have some specific effect on the object but it rather aims at satisfaction. In the same way, rituals are not instrumental but symbolic or expressive.

Wittgenstein claims that every explanation is only a hypothesis. It is one of many different ways of seeing collected facts. He wrote:

“And so the chorus points to a secret law” one feels like saying to Frazer’s collection of facts. I *can* represent this law, this idea, by means of an evolutionary hypothesis, or also, analogously to the schema of a plant, by means of the schema of a religious ceremony, but also by means of the arrangement of its factual content alone, in a ‘*perspicuous*’ representation.

The concept of perspicuous representation is of fundamental importance for us. It denotes the form of our representation, the way we see things. (PO, 133)

Scientific explanations have an assumption, like ‘progress’ or ‘evolution’ as a secret law. Facts are explained by means of progress or evolution. Wittgenstein does not deny the possibility of an explanation. There are different approaches to the collected facts, for example, morphological representation, which Goethe had, and perspicuous representation, which Wittgenstein recommends us to have. Then, how can perspicuous representation be an alternative to see strange forms of life?

Perspicuous representation is made by the arrangement of factual contents alone, without adding any explanation to it. Then, how can we have a clear view by arranging the facts? Wittgenstein’s answer is that we can find connecting links between the facts. By finding the links between the seemingly isolated facts, we understand them.

Wittgenstein holds *Übersicht* as a philosophical method in the *Philosophical Investigations*. He describes many different language games as examples in the *Investigations* and expects readers to command a clear view of them. "The [philosophical] problems are solved, not giving new information, but by arranging what we have already known" (PI, sec. 109). Wittgenstein encourages us to find a link among trivial things in order that we can see the world differently and that we can be freed from pictures that we are held captive. How to show/teach the way out of a current dominant situation is the main concern of his philosophy, as he wrote, "What is your aim in philosophy?—To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (PI, sec. 309).

5. Conclusion

The Later Wittgenstein never used the term 'elucidation.' As we have seen, some features of Tractarian elucidation are crucial in his later philosophy. Elucidation is one of keys to understand not only his early philosophy but also the development and consistency of his philosophy.

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"Facts, Facts, and Facts but No Ethics": a Philosophical Remark on Dethroning

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Philosophy is not destroyed by the remark which dethrones the words 'sense', 'language', 'world', etc., rather the remark itself is a philosophical remark. (F. Waismann)

The end of the 20s and the beginning of the 30s were a transition period in Wittgenstein's thought. As such, this period has rightly served as a kind of laboratory in which one could gain fresh insights into Wittgenstein's ideas by emphasizing either the similarities and continuities within his oeuvre as a whole or the marked differences between "the early" and "the later" Wittgenstein. My own reading focuses on the transition period as revealing some discrepancy between the later Wittgenstein's approach to language and world and his insufficiently-revolutionized approach to ethics. Wittgenstein indeed acknowledged the fact that his new views about language and world must have resulted in abandoning his pure and ascetic conception of ethics; yet his notion of philosophy still obeyed the central dogma that reigned over the early, traditional worldview, and as a result he did not realize that the linkage he had forged between meaning and action must yield a blatantly political attitude to matters ethical.

Wittgenstein gave his lecture on ethics in Cambridge on November 1929. He is reported by Waismann to have conveyed similar thoughts, similarly phrased, a month later in Schlick's house in Vienna. It has convincingly been argued, especially in light of Wittgenstein's famous letter to Ficker, that despite the relatively minor place allocated to the topic in his oeuvre, Wittgenstein's fundamental motivation, at least in writing the *Tractatus* but probably throughout his life, was ethical. The sources just mentioned reinforce this reading; they point at the strong connection between the early Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and his view of ethics. Indeed, the thoughts expressed in the "Lecture on Ethics" seem to echo, and complement, the following famous tenets of the *Tractatus*:

All propositions are of equal value. (6.4) The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists--and if it did exist, it would have no value. If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental. It must lie outside the world. (6.41) So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics. Propositions can express nothing that is higher. (6.42) It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.) (6.421)

This conclusion about our inherent inability to put ethics into words recurs, in a somewhat melancholic tone, in the "Lecture on Ethics":

My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. (PO: 44)

And although Wittgenstein sympathizes with the human desire to cross these boundaries, to reach in discourse the realm of the ethical, he dims this attempt nonsensical, as he did in the *Tractatus*. Note his particular way of justifying this result here:

I hold that it is truly important that one put an end to all the idle talk about Ethics – whether there be knowledge, whether there be values, whether the Good can be defined, etc. In Ethics one is always making the attempt to say something that does not concern the essence of the matter and never can concern it. It is a priori certain that whatever one might offer as a definition of the Good, it is always simply a misunderstanding to think that it *corresponds in expression to the authentic matter* one actually means (Moore). (WVC: 80, my emphasis)

In his *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein aimed at presenting the metaphysical picture which had governed Western thought with utmost clarity, by exposing the condition of its possibility, i.e., the representational essence of language. It is crucial to see that the conception of ethics in the *Tractatus* cannot be detached from its notions of world and language. That ethics does not offer itself to speech – which can only describe "facts, facts, and facts but no Ethics" (PO: 40) – is no less a consequence of the nature of facts than that of ethical (or metaphysical) discourse; and these "essences" are intimately interwoven with the view of language as aiming at correspondence and the assumed "authenticity" of the intentional content to which linguistic signs must correspond.

These assumptions reflect a host of distinctions: between accidental and necessary, relative and absolute, fact and value; between what is internal to language and world and what lies beyond their boundaries, between utterances that are factual and those that do not represent any state of affairs, and also between literal and metaphorical meaning, genuine and parasitic discourse. All these are crucial rungs in the ladder that leads to the silencing of the ethical discourse, not only in the *Tractatus* but also in the "Lecture on Ethics":

Thus in ethical and religious language we seem constantly to be using similes. But a simile must be the simile for *something*. And if I can describe a fact by means of a simile I must also be able to drop the simile and to describe the facts without it. Now in our case as soon as we try to drop the simile and simply to state the facts which stand behind it, we find that there are no such facts. And so, what at first appeared to be a simile now seems to be mere nonsense. (PO 43)

While Wittgenstein's thought as expressed at the end of 1929 is still totally governed by Tractarian assumptions, the writings of the early 30s already manifest the emergence of the later conceptions of language and world. It is interesting to examine, then, whether and to what extent the notion of ethics changes accordingly. We find several occurrences of the words 'ethics' and 'good' in some sources dating from that period, such as Wittgenstein's lectures as reported by Moore and others. We also find relevant paragraphs from Wittgenstein's remarks on Fra-

zer's *Golden Bough* connected to these. After that period, in the later writings, these words hardly ever appear, and when they do, it is never in relation with the "transcendental" or the "ineffable", but rather in the context of a comparison of the new way of thinking about concepts versus the old one. Upon introducing the notion of family resemblance, the pinnacle of Wittgenstein's new approach to meaning, where the quest for definition is exposed as often inadequate, the paramount example is that of ethical discourse. Although it is still inconceivable to think of a definition of the good that would "correspond in expression to the authentic matter one actually means", as Wittgenstein said in his conversation with Schlick and Waismann on December 1929, the reason for this inconceivability has now nothing to do with the distinction between internal and external, accidental and absolute. Wittgenstein equates the attempt to draw a sharp picture corresponding to a blurred one with "the position you are in if you look for definitions corresponding to our concepts in ethics or aesthetics" (PI 77). He continues by urging us to dethrone the words we used to think of as representing pure essences:

In such a difficulty, always ask yourself: How did we learn the meaning of this word ('good' for instance)? From what sort of examples? In what language-games? Then it will be easier for you to see that the word must have a family of meanings. (ibid.)

Thus it is not, any longer, the external or absolute essence of ethics that frustrates any effort of talking analytically about it, but its being intrinsically blurred and interwoven with other discourses, practices and learning procedures. The new conception of language, world and the relations between them is no longer representational, and consequently the dividing lines between internal and external lose their vigor. Instead, we get a picture of meaning that is gained through action, of language and world intertwining; and at least one of the ways to dethrone the relevant concepts and understand their meaning is by tracing their origins in our actual learning procedures. Ethical discourse may thus be regained, albeit in a totally new guise.

But here we should be careful – for not every account of our practices and learning procedures is equally approved by Wittgenstein. This is made clear already in the transition period, in the remarks on Frazer. "The very idea of wanting to explain a practice – for example, the killing of the priest-king – seems wrong to me", Wittgenstein remarks about Frazer's scientific method. When Frazer traces the origins of a habit in order to understand its meaning, he looks for the reason, or motive, which leads people to perform a particular action (PO 104); but Wittgenstein offers an alternative:

The historical explanation... is only one way of assembling the data – of their synopsis. It is just as possible to see the data in their relation to one another and to embrace them in a general picture without putting it in the form of an hypothesis about temporal development. (PO 131)

Or, to be more exact, what may be taken as hypothetical in Wittgenstein's preferred approach does not bear the dogmatic, fixated character of the scientific, historical hypothesis. It is a hypothetical connecting link, and it

should in this case do nothing but direct the attention to the similarity, the relatedness, of the facts. As one might illustrate an internal relation of a circle to an ellipse by gradually converting an ellipse into a circle; but not in order to assert that a certain ellipse actually, historically, had originated from a circle (evolutionary hypothesis),

but only in order to sharpen our eye for a formal connection. (PO 133, original emphases)

This paragraph in the *Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough* comes right after Wittgenstein's famous discussion – repeated later in *Philosophical Investigations* – of the nature of philosophy and the concept of perspicuous representation, which "is of fundamental importance to us". It is clear that Wittgenstein makes a sharp distinction between two forms of investigation: an explanatory, scientific one, which relies on hypotheses and discovers causes, and a descriptive one. The latter is appropriate for philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, and so on; the former *eo ipso* distorts these discourses. "An error arises only when magic is interpreted scientifically" (125), Wittgenstein remarks; and "magic" should certainly include life, language, and world, as the "Lecture on Ethics" suggests.

A lot has been written on the distinction between explanation and description and the role it plays in Wittgenstein's oeuvre. My present interest in it arises from the way it is connected with the later Wittgenstein's attempt – and what I take as his partial failure – at dethroning the word 'ethics'. Wittgenstein's notion of 'description' aims at creating a special sort of discourse, which is open and imaginative, attentive to particularities and "connecting links", and is hence non-theoretic. This new discourse – of philosophy, ethics, aesthetics – is the direct successor of the previous silence, which resulted from the early, representational attitude to language and world. It is certainly a dethroning discourse; it leaves behind the transcendental and absolute purity of the former concepts and their representational motivation. Yet it bears significant similarities with its silent predecessor.

When Wittgenstein introduced his new conception of philosophy, in the 30s, he spoke in his lectures about a "new subject" with a "new method". According to Moore, he said that

[T]he "new subject" consisted in "something like putting in order our notions as to what can be said about the world"... He also said that he was not trying to teach us any new facts: that he would only tell us "trivial" things – "things which we all know already"; but that the difficult thing was to get a "synopsis" of these trivialities... In this connection he said it was misleading to say that what we wanted was an "analysis", since in science to "analyse" water means to discover some new fact about it... whereas in philosophy "we know at the start all the facts we need to know". (PO 114)

"I imagine", Moore comments, "that it was in this respect of needing a 'synopsis' of trivialities that he thought that philosophy was similar to Ethics and Aesthetics" (ibid.)

This text is a "connecting link" between the earlier and the later Wittgenstein and it somehow conveys both views indeed. On the one hand, the rupture from the old notions cannot be ignored – it is explicit, *said*; yet on the other, it reveals Wittgenstein's relentless desire to draw boundaries, to police the realm of facts, either by posing its limits from the outside or, later, by putting it "in order", by splitting it internally between "new facts" and "trivialities".

I mentioned earlier that I find readings of Wittgenstein's motivation as primarily ethical convincing; and indeed I believe that although there is scarcely any mention of the word 'ethics' in the later writings, the point of the "new subject" is ethical. This again is seen clearly in the transition period, e.g., in Moore's emphases of the similarity in Wittgenstein's attitude towards ethics and aesthetics and towards philosophy, and in such dissenting remarks

on Frazer's *Golden Bough* as "here one can only describe and say: this is what human life is like" (PO 121, original emphasis). The "new method" endorses sensitivity to the minute details, the similarities and differences that compose human experience – and this particular and novel sensitivity is fundamentally and deliberately moral. As Antonia Soulez has argued, Wittgenstein's emphasis on the procedures in which meaning is developed through action, his appeal to imagination and his insistence on the fragility and contingency of the given circumstances aim at shedding light on the human capacity of changing what seems as fixated. I thus agree with her that Wittgenstein's term 'description' should not be read as a passive and conservative adherence to the given, and that it can open the horizon for alternatives

Yet the insistence on marking sharply the limits between different discourses, despite its indubitable benefits, has its own limitations. When John Austin collapsed the distinction between constative and performative, he realized that it entailed also the collapse of the fact-value distinction – a distinction that Wittgenstein never relinquished. Understanding the inner connection between language and action means also recognizing that "new facts" are necessarily interlaced with "trivialities"; that an internal and formal relation may fuse with a material, historical one; that science, history, sociology, psychology cannot be detached from ethics and philosophy, and all these are always laden with ideology, even with power-relations. Dethroning ethics is thus not merely attending to minute details, refusing dogmas, developing the imagination and opening the horizon for change; it is also realizing that such ethical sensitivity always obfuscates certain traits and emphasizes others and is thus ideologically colored, as is the wish to ignore this very fact and concentrate on "pure" ethics. Dethroning ethics is therefore renouncing the asceticism of ethics altogether and adopting instead the muddiness of the political.

The later Wittgenstein's implicit ethics reveals that he never succeeded in overcoming one fundamental – *hypothetical, fixated* – dogma, regarding the ascetic essence of philosophy. It is as if he feared that philosophy is destroyed when we dethrone – *truly* dethrone – ethics, aesthetics and itself, by acknowledging the fusion of discourses and the softness of their margins. This actually shows that even his more thoroughly revolutionized conceptions – those of language and world – should be conceived more radically. The first step would require the understanding that philosophy is not destroyed by this suggestion – since it is itself a philosophical suggestion.

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Morals in the World-Picture

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1. In *On Certainty* Wittgenstein has illustrated that what we are most certain of are “norm[s] of description” (OC 167). As Michael Kober (1996, sec. IV) argues, the basic sentences Wittgenstein analyses in his text are “constitutive norms” that form our “world-picture”. So particularly what we usually do not describe as normative, an expression of “what is the case” can also be an expression of “what should be the case”, for then it “prescribes the true or correct use of the word” (Kober 1996, 426). What then follows for the “traditionally” normative? Can we extend the concept of the world-picture to include moral beliefs?

Let us recall what we have learned about “world-pictures” in *On Certainty*: Whatever we say and do we rely on a world-picture, i.e. that which stands fast for us and enables us to speak and act sensibly. However, these contents of the world-picture have not always stood fast and might lose this status in the future. This is illustrated by Wittgenstein’s famous picture of beliefs becoming solid and forming a “bedrock” for less solid beliefs but the movement of the latter might in turn dissolve the former again (OC 96). Furthermore, that which stands fast has nothing in itself that makes it so, only being intertwined in a web of beliefs gives its “solidity”—here Wittgenstein uses the image of a “nest” (OC 225) where the straws fixate each other without hierarchic structure. However, *relying* on these beliefs does not mean “mere” reliance, or establishing that one can rely on them before doing so, but it is simply what we do in relation to the world-picture (OC 509)¹. These world-pictures cannot be private, they are shared, commonly held beliefs (Schulte 1990, 116; Kober 1996, 419-20). And finally a world picture is nowhere to be seen nor does it simply exist, instead it only becomes manifest in the actions of those who share it. So the inherent dynamics of the world-picture, the constant movement of solidifying and dissolving happens because every action of a person might enforce or challenge a belief that she shares. Generally, this paper is based on a rather coherentist than foundationalist reading of *On Certainty*, informed particularly by thoughts of Kober’s (1993) and Andreas Krebs’ (2007) interpretations.

All of this applies quite well to moral beliefs: they change with time and region, practices once deemed wrong can become accepted, they are intertwined and make sense only as a web of beliefs that “hinges” on the common practice in a community or society. However, here we deal with *mores*, mere customs and beliefs, and ethics usually has higher aims than only describing what people do. Of course, the *Witz* of moral “world-pictures” would be to transfer to ethics Wittgenstein’s result, that the relative certainty we have is all we can have but also all that we need.

So, let us consider the analogy: If somebody acts *contra* our world-picture, we either deem her or him wrong, not willing to partake, stupid, even mentally ill—more abstract: we exclude—or we change our world-picture, which may be done sensibly and not arbitrarily because “the other straws of the nest” still can give stability, even if we move some of them. This also shows that beliefs can be changed only when relying on other aspects of the world-picture. By

the same mechanism, assuming a moral world-picture, we can deem a deed wrong or evil, or adjust. (Here, but as well in Wittgenstein’s text, a certain idea of spontaneity or event is moving in the background, for without actions that contradict a world-picture it would never change.)

Dealing with morals, however, we have to cope with a more instable quality. A scientific discovery or technical development that might lead to behavior contradicting and eventually changing a world-picture usually has material references that can make it intelligible. The moral perpetrator instead can talk of e.g. intentions, or refer to a set of values. Moreover, Foucault and others have shown how evil the mechanisms of exclusion that are applied to non-standard behavior can look if seen from an ethical standpoint. After all, the person contradicting the world picture could be interested in doing so, or could want us to rely on something. This critique would vanish if morals were only a matter of conformity. Thomas Wachtendorf (2008, 230) has shown in his book on Wittgenstein and ethics that already on the level of conformity value judgements exist, but only pertaining to *behavior*, whereas humans are also capable of *action*, where the acting person must be sure whether she could take responsibility for the act, and not only rely on its conformity with the world-picture. However, where do the standards of this judgment come from? Again, from the moral world-picture. Admitting anything else would undermine Wittgenstein’s concept and thus our endeavor. Yet, we have glimpsed a new element in the discussion: the acting persons and their relation to the world-picture. For example, in many views or beliefs that could be part of a moral world-picture, these relations figure as intentions of an act. To include them in our view, we need a much more refined concept of the others than that which we get from *On Certainty*, were the others are almost objectively there, they do things and these acts establish a world. (Cf. for example OC 476, where Wittgenstein explains that a child does not learn that there are books and armchairs, but to fetch books and to sit in armchairs.) The others seem to rely smoothly on the world-picture, one could almost say execute it. They do not appear as subjects with needs and desires, let alone intentions or virtues.

2. To get a more refined view on the others, I want to argue for combining Wittgenstein’s views with Hannah Arendt’s conception of subjects and their common world in *The Human Condition* (1998). She as well is convinced that last certainties cannot be had, and moreover, that even our human-made certainty, namely tradition, eventually fell apart. In our vocabulary this would be seen as the demise of a well and widely established world-picture.

In her analysis of human affairs, the notion of reliance plays a prominent part as well. However, concerning human beings living together, matters are not as easy as in the factual world of *On Certainty* where we cannot but rely on—and thus have—a world picture (OC 509). On the contrary, Arendt warns against the dangers of importing the certainty of “nature” where fact and necessity rule into the realm of human interaction. Some aspects of human life can best be grasped under the paradigm of necessity, Arendt calls them “labor” (HC Ch. 13). The realm of human interactions, however, is the realm of “actions” that have a spontaneous character, and thus all “natural” certainty could only be pre-

¹ Concerning OC 509 I use “to rely on” for the German “verlassen auf”, which is translated as “to trust” in the English edition.

sumptive, and needs mechanisms of exclusion or violence to remain forceful. Yet, even in the “plural” realm of spontaneous human action, a common world is established and we meet other individuals, not only random events. (The following reading is informed mainly by one “side” of what Seyla Benhabib calls the tension between “agonal” and “narrative” respectively “essentialist” and “constructivist” passages in *The human condition* (Benhabib 1996, 125-6). This “side” is prominent in the interpretations of Dana Villa (1996), and Bonnie Honig (1988), whereas Benhabib (1996), and Margaret Canovan (1992) among several others disagree.) That individual, the “who” one is, compared to the “what” that pertains to the realm of nature, is the result of actions. These actions stem neither from an essential “who” nor from a deliberate choice “who” one wants to be. On the contrary, the “who” is established in the “stories” others tell of one’s acts. (HC 184. Although it is not clear in Arendt, I think it is important to note that the actors themselves tell such a story as well. However, this story is by no means privileged. Wittgenstein’s thought on first-person knowledge in the *Philosophical Investigations* can help explaining this.) Of course, one will figure in many such stories that constantly change. However, over time and with relatively coherent actions, an individual emerges, a “person-picture” one could say. The requisite of coherence here is problematic not only because human action is spontaneous, but because every human being from the very beginning lives and acts in a preexisting “web of relations”. Again, this web has no essence, it is established by human action and “overgrows” the “world”, a concept more akin to culture and “world-picture” and distinguished from nature (HC 182-3). The consequences of one’s actions within this web are never fully foreseeable. To cope with this predicament Arendt analyses two basic moral acts: promising and forgiving. The first, to “cast islands in the sea of uncertainty” (HC 244) need not be a formal promise or even a contract. Indeed, speaking and acting would not be possible without interpreting the entry of a person into a community as “promise” to generally continue acting according to the world-picture. Forgiving is necessary because even with the best intentions we are not master of our acts (HC 236-7). Here again the person is the only reference, we have to attribute to her that she did not want what happened or other reasons for forgiving. So we need a quite stable established person whose relation to the act makes the idea intelligible that she will live up to her promise or, respectively, deserves to be forgiven. (Arendt notes that punishment is another mode to relieve a person from the consequences of her deeds. Here as well a relation between person and act is the reference.) So in the end, it is the “person-picture” established in action that enables moral judgement. But of course, this “person-picture” can only be established and “tell” us something about “who” is acting in relation to our world-picture.

3. The others that enact and thus guarantee the world(-picture) have themselves become something quite frail by now. Wittgenstein’s observation still holds that we always act according to a world-picture and that we cannot give it up without having a new one. But it is no longer simply visible in what “people” do, but these “people” themselves can become visible as persons in their acting. These persons and their features “taint” the world-picture held by them, thus relying on a world-picture entails always reliance on persons. The relations that are necessary to enable this reliance are moderated by promising and forgiving. These actions are a support for morals that are in a certain sense “more than the total sum of *mores*” as they help maintain the relation to people and world that makes morality intelligible. Yet promising and forgiving are not applied from a “supposedly higher faculty” outside of action (HC 245-6), because their only reference are the mutually established persons

and world. More generally speaking, with the world and actors thus established, the relying can happen in different modes. Particularly because of the inherent frailty one can deprive the other of possibilities of relation to the world. This is a most wicked thing because the world is established in the very actions of human beings, and thus that means to deprive the other of a part of the world. This “world alienation” is prominent in Arendt’s book (HC Ch. 35), but only with recourse to Wittgenstein can we see, how profound the consequences of such an act are that potentially can destroy the most basic features of one’s world. For example, Arendt talks about the “naturalization” of human existence, i.e. something deemed necessary when it really is the product of a particular world view (Villa 1996, 201). However, for someone sharing this view, this is a real necessity until one can get another view, either by spontaneous action or by contact with another world-picture—a possibility I do not deal with in this paper. Thus, in our combined view of world(-picture) and person, moral beliefs become certain by the same mechanism as those about the world.

As reader of *On Certainty* one could still object that moral views do not belong to the world-picture which only contains beliefs so firmly held that we cannot imagine otherwise and if they change, this happens slowly over long periods of time. Somehow, this is correct, yet the difference here entailed is not supportable: For example, a whole branch of sciences has appeared that struggle with the belief that there “are” men and women or races with particular features. But one need not support post-modern identity theory (I think Arendt would not have done so) to note (as Arendt did, HC 232, cf. also Villa 1996, 123) that the aforementioned frailty is propagated into the very bedrock of our world. Although she maintains the second realm of “nature”, even the factual “truths” of science become “political” as soon as they should have any influence on human life (HC 3-4). So, concerning the aforementioned objection, the problem is not making morals more certain than they are but considering the world-picture more stable than it is. Our combined view shows not only the stability of moral views but also their frailty, which in the end is the frailty of the entire world-picture – insofar as relying on people makes something frail.

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Is the Resolute Reading Really Inconsistent?: Trying to Get Clear on Hacker vs. Diamond/Conant

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For over two decades the Resolute Reading of the *Tractatus* has attempted to create an awareness of the fact that readings which traditionally focus on the topic of ineffability are methodologically inconsistent and do not truly reveal the dialectical movement of Wittgenstein's early masterpiece. In what follows my intention is to shed light on the question of whether the Resolute Reading is methodologically inconsistent in itself, as is held by Peter Hacker, the most influential opponent of this position.

Two Paradigms for Reading the *Tractatus*

Ineffability Readers share a transcendental approach to Wittgenstein's early masterpiece: the philosophical critique of the *Tractatus* draws the limits of language by leading its reader into grasping an "ineffable metaphysics" (Hacker, 1998, 13) that lays bare the necessary conditions of possibility of meaningful discourse, i.e. the logical syntax of language. On their account, the *stricto sensu* nonsensical sentences of the *Tractatus* manage to echo ('whistle') the metaphysical melody of what cannot be uttered for an insightful reader. To be able to walk this baffling tightrope, the sentences of the *Tractatus* are categorised as "illuminating nonsense" (Hacker, 1997, 18) which – although strictly speaking nonsensical – is able to convey insights into the hidden nature of reality. In ineffability interpretations, the notion of important nonsense represents the fundamental paradox of the book's self-destructive mode of announcing the nonsensicality of its own sentences, and these very sentences have established the limit between 'sense' and 'nonsense'.

Resolute Readers strongly reject this interpretation, given that it is based on a hermeneutics that takes "the target of the work for its doctrine" (Conant, 2002, 381). In accordance with their account, the author of the *Tractatus* was not (indirectly) in favor of any philosophical doctrines or theses, because philosophy for him is an activity that essentially consists of an elucidative process whose aim is the "logical clarification of thoughts" (TLP 4.112). Perceiving the early Wittgenstein as someone who is trying to *show* what cannot be *said*, for the Resolute Readers evokes an incapacity to understand the subtle method of the work. The hermeneutic strategy of Ineffability Readers seems to be "constantly at odds with [their] interpretation of the work" (Conant, 1991, 339): while preaching the unsayability of the *Tractatus*' doctrines, they have written lengthy and in-depth texts, extensively explaining such doctrines. In Cora Diamond's words they "pretend to throw away the [Tractarian] ladder, while standing firmly, or as firmly as one can, on it" (Diamond, 1991a, 194). Sticking to the intelligibility of an inexpressible 'something' (*shown* in the *Tractatus*' nonsensical sentences), implies an irresolute "*chickening out*" (Diamond, 1991a, 181) before the challenges encountered by any serious reader of the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein's verdict that anyone who understands him eventually recognizes his propositions as nonsensical (TLP 6.54) must be taken seriously (i.e., resolutely). Consequently, the exegesis of the so-called New Wittgensteinians denies the existence of different kinds of nonsense: "All the nonsense there is[,] is old-fashioned,

straightforward, garden variety, completely incomprehensible gibberish." (Conant, 1989, 253) Therefore they have a completely different picture of the philosophical activity to which the author of the *Tractatus* was profoundly committed in his work: his aim is not to show inexpressible deep truths that represent the metaphysical features of reality, but to free the philosophically inclined reader from the illusory meaningfulness of such obsessive pictures. Throwing away the Tractarian ladder – after having undergone the dialectical process of climbing it – means to have fully dissolved the philosophical problems produced by the logic of our language from within. Being able to read the *Tractatus* with understanding "supposes a particular kind of imaginative activity, the imaginative taking of what is nonsense for sense" (Diamond, 2000, 158). The answer at the top of the Tractarian ladder does not lie in the clouds of a metaphysical realm outside of language, but in the reader's awareness that "[h]e was prone to an illusion of meaning something when [h]e mean[t] nothing" (Conant, 2002, 381). The reader eventually recognizes the sentences of the *Tractatus* as plain nonsense and is, thereby, freed from the obsessive seductiveness of the metaphysical statements the book contains. The solution of the problems then lies in their disappearance. The goal achieved after leaving behind the last rung of the Tractarian ladder is not the (silent) appropriation of ineffable metaphysical truths, but the ethical transformation of the reader who has undergone the process of a philosophical therapy.

After this incomplete sketch of the two interpretative factions in recent *Tractatus* research, I will now go straight to the main point of the present paper. In order to keep them from sweeping the philosophical inconsistency of their interpretation under the carpet, Ineffability Readers of the *Tractatus* like Peter Hacker, have chosen to address this inconsistency in the early Wittgenstein by drawing from his later criticism of his early work. Hacker holds that the *Tractatus* is a philosophically interesting but misguided attempt which cannot be interpreted coherently. Consequently, Hacker has tried to show that the resolute account suffers from the same aporetic fate (Hacker, 2000, 360–370) as does the traditional reading he has contributed to in the past.

Hacker on Tractarian Nonsense

In his article "Was He Trying to Whistle It?", it is argued that the "post-modernist defence" (Hacker, 2000, 356) of the New Wittgensteinians is itself an unsustainable attempt to give coherence to the paradox inherent in Wittgenstein's early endeavors. This recent defence suffers from embarrassing exegetical faults – internal as well as external – which, to date, Resolute Readers have only been able to cover up by resolutely ignoring them. In what follows I will not try to debilitate his admittedly well argued criticism in all of its facets, but to concentrate on analyzing his claim that Cora Diamond's interpretation of the *Tractatus* unconsciously reintroduces the notion of 'important nonsense' through the back-door.

To get me right: my aim is not to strengthen the thesis that the Resolute Reading is the *right* interpretation, but to visit the scene of a battle-field of metaphysics on which two hermeneutically incommensurable schools of interpretations have been at war with each other. Hacker claims that Diamond's account of Tractarian nonsense – against her previous conviction that there is only one kind of nonsense, i.e. plain nonsense – can not be sustained without resorting to the paradoxical notion of 'important nonsense'. According to this view, Diamond *herself* can not keep from 'chickening out' and, thus, her interpretation does not save "Wittgenstein from the embarrassment of sawing off the branch upon which he is sitting" (Hacker, 2000, 362). These are his words:

"Finally, those among them [the Resolute Readers, M. M.] who contend that some of the propositions of the *Tractatus* are 'transitional ways of talking' in a 'dialectic' in effect distinguish between two kinds of nonsense: plain nonsense and transitional nonsense. Assuming that it is important that we come to realize that apparent sentences that we think make sense are actually nonsense, then transitional nonsense is important nonsense, unlike plain nonsense." (Hacker, 2000, 361)

Hacker's account here is undoubtedly motivated by his own earlier contribution to the understanding of the illuminative character of Tractarian nonsense. Let us, for the sake of clarification, take a closer look at what he wrote some time ago:

"Within the domain of nonsense we may distinguish overt from covert nonsense. Overt nonsense can be seen to be nonsense immediately. (...) But most of philosophy does not obviously violate the bounds of sense. It is covert nonsense for, in a way that is not perspicuous in ordinary language to the untutored mind, it violates the principles of the logical syntax of language. (...) Nevertheless, even within the range of philosophical, covert nonsense can we distinguish (...) between what might (somewhat confusingly) be called illuminating nonsense, and misleading nonsense. Illuminating nonsense will guide the attentive reader to apprehend what is shown by other propositions which do purport to be philosophical; moreover it will intimate, to those who grasp what is meant, its own illegitimacy." (Hacker, 1997, 18–19)

In order to make sense of the paradoxical setting that the sentences of the *Tractatus* are nonsensical and, at the same time, must be understood by their reader, Hacker invents a complete ontology of various kinds of nonsense, reserving the contradictory category of 'illuminating nonsense' for the *Tractatus*' sentences. The confusions characteristic of traditional philosophy are supposedly examples of 'misleading nonsense', whereas the *Tractatus*, "the swansong of metaphysics" (Hacker, 1997, 27), contains a different kind of nonsense that mystically ushers its reader into the correct logical point of view. What is happening here, I think, is that the grammatical categories of Hackerian language generate the imaginary existence of ontological ones. Hacker's approach, as I read it, disregards the first fundamental principle of Frege's *Grundlagen der Arithmetik*, which Resolute Readers are deeply committed to in their interpretation of the *Tractatus*. Hacker commingles the logical with the psychological when he classifies different kinds of nonsense as 'overt', 'covert', 'misleading' or 'illuminating'. The mental accompaniments a hypothetical reader of nonsensical sentences might have, are to be distinguished from the logical status of those very sentences.

I furthermore think that Hacker is wrong when he accuses Diamond of secretly using a variant of 'important nonsense' in her reading of the *Tractatus*. Trapped within the internal structure of his own approach, he misunderstands the way in which the dynamic relationship between the logical and the psychological, shapes Diamond's description of the method in the *Tractatus*.¹ He is projecting his characteristically categorizing style of thought onto Diamond's view of the Tractarian method, which lies at the heart of the Resolute Reading. As a result, Hacker becomes prey to his own confusions as he misunderstands the surface grammar in Diamond's use of language.

Let me further clarify what I wish to convey: As mentioned above, the Resolute account broaches the issue of how the reader's language usage enters into a relatedness with the sentences of the *Tractatus*. The book operates on the basis of a self-destructive pedagogy: the reader has to fully enter the illusory meaningfulness of the metaphysical statements until their deceptive character has become fully visible and effective to him. The Tractarian sentences are – seen from a logical point of view – plainly nonsensical; it's *the reader* who fails to be aware of this fact since he is confused by the logic of his own language. The sentences in question can not be classified as 'illuminating nonsense', although they are made of nonsense, a nonsense which for the reader of insight becomes visible in the transitional process of climbing the Tractarian ladder. The logical structure of Hacker's final phrase in the first quote above illustrates how he fails to trace the *New Wittgensteinians*' style of thought. The Resolute Reading strictly follows the Fregean spirit which sharply separates the domain of the psychological from that of the logical, whereas Hacker ends up mingling both spheres, thus melting everything down to what he calls 'important nonsense'. The (psychological) fact that metaphysical nonsense is *important* for those who are philosophically inclined, does not imply the existence of a (logical) category for '*important nonsense*' within which the sentences of the *Tractatus* can be standardly classified. The *illumination* or *elucidation* that the early Wittgenstein strove to promote in his reader, can not, regarding the sentences of the *Tractatus*, be statically institutionalized. This is so because the Tractarian method is actually based on a dynamic and dialectical interaction between the book and its reader's consciousness.² The responsibility for becoming aware of the nonsensicality, which our attempts to transcend the limits of language lead to, can not be forced into imaginary (categories of) linguistic signs.

Cora Diamond's thesis that climbing the Tractarian ladder requires the reader's imaginative activity of transitionally taking nonsense for sense, does not at all mean that she is using the notion of 'important nonsense'. The fact that metaphysical nonsense is temporarily important, for both author and reader of the work, by no means implies that the book's sentences fit into the peculiar and paradoxical notion referred to as 'important nonsense'. Hacker's misunderstanding of how the dynamics of the resolute approach works, as I have tried to show, allows him to claim that this approach suffers from exactly the same methodological inconsistency as do the standard interpretations. Despite all of the criticism that the herme-

¹ There are various kinds of misunderstandings regarding how the relationship between the logical and the psychological shapes the way Resolute Readers describe the deconstructive dialectics of the *Tractatus*. Such misunderstandings are highly relevant when critics address the uncertainty of the frame-body distinction or the seemingly self-contradictory fact that the argumentation of Resolute Readers is evidently based on argumentation taken from sentences of the *Tractatus* they previously judged to be nonsensical.

² CV, 77: „Anything your reader can do for himself leave to him.“

neutics of the Resolute Reading can be subjected to, it has in fact solved the fundamental paradox voiced in TLP 6.54 (i.e., that the sentences of the *Tractatus* are nonsensical, while at the same time it is possible to gain insights from reading the book). It has done so by producing a shift in paradigm from a static point of view to an understanding of the book's method as a piece of dialectical therapeutics.

Transcendental Ineffabilists versus Wittgensteinian Therapists

The "Hacker versus Diamond and Conant controversy" (Wallgren, 2006) is not a mere discussion of differing approaches within the history of *Tractatus* research: it is indeed the arena in which two conceptions of philosophy have come into conflict with each other in current philosophical culture. I believe that the exegetical conflict at stake is subcutaneously bound to the transitional process from analytical to post-analytical philosophy. The main point revolves around the question of the extent to which elements linked to the psychological dimension of the human mind (metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic, etc.) are negotiable through philosophical argumentation. The Ineffability Reading strikes me as the final and ultimate way of defending the paradigms of enlightenment Modernity. This defensive positioning subconsciously holds on to the idea that theoretical enquiry can provide substantive answers to philosophical problems by transferring metaphysical answers into a mute realm which lies beyond the limits of language.

In contrast, the Resolute Reading is willing to radically deconstruct such attempts as hopelessly confused, thus opting for a shift from knowledge to self-knowledge. Whether one thinks that the complexity of the Resolute Reading reveals the genius of the early Wittgenstein, or is an imaginary construction of consistency for a work which, conventionally interpreted, falls victim to a *reductio ad absurdum*, does not only depend on the perceived degree of continuity in Wittgenstein's writings, but also on one's understanding of what it means to be a philosopher. Regardless of the validity one may attribute to the two interpretations addressed in this paper, discussing the tension between elements in the *Tractatus* that express some sort of transcendental mysticism and those that allude to a deconstructive dialectics, will amount to a clearer understanding of the task and nature of philosophy.

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Ways of "Creating" Worlds

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1. Wittgenstein's "worlds" and Carnap's "state-descriptions"

Let us begin with a very small "Tractarian" world: $\{aRb, bRb\}$. This world contains exactly two facts: aRb and bRb . It shows that its *substance* consists of a set of *things* (here: individual constants) $\{a, b\}$. It shows that it contains only one binary configuration (logical form) indicated by "R". As a whole (closed world) it shows that there are no such things like "c, d, ..." and there is no "F" which is different from "R".

The unrestricted syntax for atomic (elementary) formulas is: If i_1, \dots, i_n are individual terms – not necessarily different – and F^n is any n-placed configuration symbol then $F^n i_1 \dots i_n$ is an atomic formula. One special case is: If $i, j \in \{a, b\}$ are individual constants and R is a binary configuration symbol then iRj is an atomic formula. Our small world shows that aRa , bRa are not parts/facts of this world but they could be – because they are well-formed atomic formulas! Therefore, this world also shows that its *states of affairs* (*Sachverhalte*) are aRa , aRb , bRa , bRb and that these are all of them.

Firstly, knowing the thing "a" completely means knowing all of the atomic formulas – in accordance with the given syntax – in which it can occur: aRa , aRb , bRa (aRa and bRa are negative facts/non-existent states of affairs: T 2.06). Secondly, we see the symbol "b" and have to accept that bRb is a state of affair as well. Perfectly knowing "a" means knowing all of the states of affairs and therefore all possible subsets of it as possible worlds. To be clear: If another super-small world is $\{bRb\}$ then there is no chance to get some information about "a"! The syntax would be: If $i \in \{b\}$ is an individual constant and R is a binary configuration symbol then iRi is an atomic formula. "aRb" would be ill-formed! The modes of speaking about syntax, the world, the facts, the things are indistinguishable from a holistic point of view! There is no hierarchy between things, facts and worlds. Things and facts are not simpler than its world. Logic should be free of hierarchies because Wittgenstein is convinced that such a type of structure is a "desired" structure and leads to a misguided thinking about and an unsuccessful searching for ethics within logic.

In general a *Tractarian world* consists of any subset of well-formed atomic formulas. If this subset would be identical with the set of all the facts in this world the distinction between facts and states of affairs would disappear.¹ But this is clearly NOT Carnap's position:

"We shall introduce the L-concepts with the help of the concepts of state-descriptions and range. Some ideas of Wittgenstein were the starting-point for the development of this method.

A class of sentences in S_1 which contains for every atomic sentence either this sentence or its negation, but not both, and no other sentences, is called a *state-description* in S_1 , because it obviously gives a complete description of a possible state of the universe of indi-

viduals with respect to all properties and relations expressed by predicates of the system. Thus the state-descriptions represent Leibniz' possible worlds or Wittgenstein's possible states of affairs." [Carnap (1967), 9]

Wittgenstein does not allow the use of negation to characterize a world locally. He is not interested in maximally consistent sets of literals. $\{\neg aRa, aRb, \neg bRa, bRb\}$ is under the mentioned restriction an example of a state-description but not an example of a Tractarian world. His world would be $\{aRb, bRb\}$ and it has to show as a whole that aRa and bRa are not facts in this world. From Carnap's point of view $\{aRb, bRb\}$ is not complete. For Wittgenstein this is the only correct way of characterizing this and any arbitrary (infinite) world.²

[See Table 1 at the end of the paper]

Wittgenstein's worlds and Carnap's state-descriptions coincide only in one case: $\{aRa, aRb, bRa, bRb\}$. This is the negation-free case. But this is the logically possible case which makes the distinction between truth and false impossible. Because all of the states of affairs are realized each fact can be taken as a picture which is apriori true.³

2. Two-dimensional facts and regaining classical logic

Wittgenstein takes Frege's position that logical negation is not able to destroy/reduce the sense of a sentence (*thought*).⁴ At least semantically the complexity remains the same:

" $p(w, f)$ " – " $\neg p(f, w)$ " or better: " $(w, f)p$ " – " $(f, w)p$ " are negations of each other.⁵ Let us first look for a representation of worlds which shows the same complexity in each case. The basic idea is that we represent "thought" ("Gedanke", "Satzsinn") by a *two-dimensional expression / ordered pair* in a syntactical style which "p" as any atomic formula:

"p is true" : "p" "p is false" : $\neg p$ "sense of p" : $\langle p, \neg p \rangle$.⁶

It is easy to see that we can rewrite Wittgenstein's worlds as well as Carnap's state-descriptions in such a way that

² Carnap's and Wittgenstein's concepts can be put together and extended to get the concept **set-up** which include not only incomplete/consistent Tractarian worlds like $\{aRb\}$ but also incomplete/ inconsistent worlds like $\{aRb, \neg aRb\}$ as well as complete/inconsistent worlds like $\{aRa, aRb, \neg aRb, bRa, bRb\}$. They are used as a semantic tool for relevant/paraconsistent systems.

³ [T 2.225] "Ein a priori wahres Bild gibt es nicht."

⁴ "Demnach ist ein falscher Gedanke nicht ein nicht seiender Gedanke..." [Frege (1918/19), 147]. "Kein Ungedanke wird durch Verneinen zum Gedanken, wie kein Gedanke durch Verneinen zum Ungedanken wird." [Frege (1918/19), 147].

⁵ [T 4.0621] "Dass aber die Zeichen »p« und »¬p« das gleiche sagen können, ist wichtig. Denn es zeigt, dass dem Zeichen »¬« in der Wirklichkeit nichts entspricht. / Dass in einem Satz die Verneinung vorkommt, ist noch kein Merkmal seines Sinnes (¬¬p=p). / Die Sätze »p« und »¬p« haben entgegengesetzten Sinn, aber es entspricht ihnen eine und dieselbe Wirklichkeit." "Nennt man nun ein solches Übergehen von einem Gedanken zum entgegengesetzten Verneinen, so ist dieses Verneinen gar nicht gleichen Ranges mit dem Urteilen und gar nicht als entgegengesetzter Pol zum Urteilen aufzufassen... Frege (1918/19), 152.

⁶ This correlation is arbitrary: "p is true" : "p" / "p is false" : "¬p" / "sense of p" : " $\langle p, \neg p \rangle$ " works fine as well.

¹ [T 2.0121] "Die Logik handelt von jeder Möglichkeit und alle Möglichkeiten sind ihre Tatsachen."

the complexity regarding the number of symbols remains the same:

[See Table 2 at the end of the paper]

Positive facts are of the form $\langle A, \sim A \rangle$. Negative facts are of the opposite form $\langle \sim A, A \rangle$. Each world is characterized by using negation 4 times! There is no "real" positive world. Worlds differ only with respect to the internal order of the two dimensions. We can change the order within one ordered pair without affecting the others. This would constitute another world.⁷

The other idea is that the outer negation "-" is primarily not a function but an operator which reverses the internal order of these two-dimensional expression. This yields the *opposite thought*.

- Reduction rule for "-": $\langle \sim A, B \rangle \Rightarrow \langle B, A \rangle$.

That means that "-" yields an expression of the same syntactic complexity simply by reversing the internal order. This negation works with respect to expressions of the form $\langle A, \sim A \rangle$ like the internal classical negation in both dimensions:

$\langle \sim A, \sim A \rangle = \langle \sim A, A \rangle = \langle \sim A, \sim \sim A \rangle$. But we get a strange result if both dimensions are identical/equivalent:

$$\langle \sim A, A \rangle = \langle A, A \rangle \neq \langle \sim A, \sim A \rangle.$$

Is it possible to combine these two properties

- (1) the elementary sentences of our language are of the form $\langle p_i, \sim p_i \rangle$ and
- (2) the internal order reversing negation "-" and

getting a full logical system which is equivalent to classical logic? Yes! [Cp. Max (2003)] Here is a rough sketch:⁸

- Reduction rule for conjunction "&":
 $\langle A, B \rangle \& \langle C, D \rangle \Rightarrow \langle A \wedge C, B \vee D \rangle$.
- Reduction rule for adjunction "∇":
 $\langle A, B \rangle \nabla \langle C, D \rangle \Rightarrow \langle A \vee C, B \wedge D \rangle$.
- Reduction rule for implication "→":
 $\langle A, B \rangle \rightarrow \langle C, D \rangle \Rightarrow \langle A \supset C, \sim(D \supset B) \rangle$.
- Reduction rule for equivalence "↔":
 $\langle A, B \rangle \leftrightarrow \langle C, D \rangle \Rightarrow \langle A \equiv C, \sim(B \equiv D) \rangle$.

\Vdash_{wfl} -validity and $\dashv\vdash_{\text{wfl}}$ -inconsistency are defined simply by using classical validity (\Vdash) and classical inconsistency ($\dashv\vdash$):

- $\Vdash_{\text{wfl}} \langle A, B \rangle$ iff $\Vdash A$ and $\dashv\vdash B$.
- $\dashv\vdash_{\text{wfl}} \langle A, B \rangle$ iff $\dashv\vdash A$ and $\Vdash B$.

This looks strange but it has some nice properties:

$$\begin{aligned} \Vdash_{\text{wfl}} \langle A, B \rangle &\text{ iff } \dashv\vdash_{\text{wfl}} \langle \sim A, B \rangle \\ \dashv\vdash_{\text{wfl}} \langle A, B \rangle &\text{ iff } \Vdash_{\text{wfl}} \langle \sim A, B \rangle. \end{aligned}$$

We get an inconsistency from a tautology and vice versa simply by reversing the internal order. If we add the truth value we will see in one example that each expression (sub-formula) has the same number of "t" (true) and "f" (false) – including tautologies and contradictions. The translation rules for classical logic are:

⁷ [T1.21] "Eines kann der Fall sein oder nicht der Fall sein und alles übrige gleich bleiben."
⁸ "A" and "B" are meta-variables for classical formulas. "-", "&", "∇", "→", and "↔" are symbols for classical connectives.

$$\begin{aligned} p_i &\leftrightarrow \langle p_i, \sim p_i \rangle \\ \sim &\leftrightarrow - \\ \wedge &\leftrightarrow \& \\ \vee &\leftrightarrow \nabla \\ \supset &\leftrightarrow \rightarrow \\ \equiv &\leftrightarrow \leftrightarrow \end{aligned}$$

associated with the above listed reduction rule. Here are some examples:

- (1) Classical: $p \vee \sim p$

$$\text{Translation: } \langle p, \sim p \rangle \nabla \langle \sim p, \sim p \rangle$$

$$\text{Computation: } \langle p, \sim p \rangle \nabla \langle \sim p, p \rangle \text{ [}\dashv\vdash\text{-reduction]}$$

$$\langle p \vee \sim p, \sim p \wedge p \rangle. \nabla\text{-reduction}$$

Because of $\Vdash p \vee \sim p$ and $\dashv\vdash \sim p \wedge p$ we get $\Vdash_{\text{wfl}} \langle p \vee \sim p, \sim p \wedge p \rangle$ and $\Vdash_{\text{wfl}} \langle p, \sim p \rangle \nabla \langle \sim p, \sim p \rangle$.

- (2) Classical: $(p \wedge q) \equiv \sim(\sim p \vee \sim q)$

$$\text{Translation: } \langle p, \sim p \rangle \& \langle q, \sim q \rangle \leftrightarrow \langle \sim(\sim p), \sim(\sim q) \rangle \nabla \langle \sim q, \sim q \rangle$$

$$\text{Computation: } \langle p, \sim p \rangle \& \langle q, \sim q \rangle \leftrightarrow \langle \sim(\sim p), p \rangle \nabla \langle \sim q, q \rangle \text{ [}\dashv\vdash\text{-reduction]}$$

$$\langle p \wedge q, \sim p \vee \sim q \rangle \leftrightarrow \langle \sim(\sim p \vee \sim q), p \wedge q \rangle \text{ [}\&\nabla\text{-reduction]}$$

$$\langle p \wedge q, \sim p \vee \sim q \rangle \leftrightarrow \langle p \wedge q, \sim p \vee \sim q \rangle \text{ [}\dashv\vdash\text{-reduction]}$$

$$\langle p \wedge q \equiv p \wedge q, \sim(\sim p \vee \sim q) \equiv \sim p \vee \sim q \rangle \text{ [}\leftrightarrow\text{-reduction]}$$

Because of $\Vdash p \wedge q \equiv p \wedge q$ and $\dashv\vdash \sim(\sim p \vee \sim q) \equiv \sim p \vee \sim q$ we get

$$\Vdash_{\text{wfl}} \langle p \wedge q \equiv p \wedge q, \sim(\sim p \vee \sim q) \equiv \sim p \vee \sim q \rangle \text{ and finally}$$

$$\Vdash_{\text{wfl}} \langle p, \sim p \rangle \& \langle q, \sim q \rangle \leftrightarrow \langle \sim(\sim p), \sim(\sim q) \rangle.$$

[See Table 3 at the end of the paper]

Theorem: Let A be any classical formula and X_A its two-dimensional translation. This translation contains a number of ordered pairs of the form $\langle B, \sim B \rangle$ which can be eliminated step by step by using our reduction rules. We arrive at an ordered pair of classical formulas $\langle C_X, \sim C_X \rangle$.

For all A: $\Vdash A$ iff $\Vdash_{\text{wfl}} \langle C_X, \sim C_X \rangle$, i.e. iff $\Vdash_{\text{wfl}} X_A$.

3. Back to negation-free worlds

One important property of the above outlined system is that each modification our new two-dimensional basic expressions of the form $\langle p_i, \sim p_i \rangle$ to expressions of the form $\langle A, B \rangle$ with not $\Vdash (A \vee B)$ or not $\dashv\vdash (A \wedge B)$, not $\Vdash A$, not $\Vdash B$, not $\dashv\vdash A$, not $\dashv\vdash B$ yields a non-classical logic. Switching to $\langle p_{i(1)}, p_{i(2)} \rangle$ in the same logical environment (reduction rules, validity) leads to a logical system that is logically equivalent with the system of tautological entailments E_{ide} [cp. Max (1996)]. Maybe coordinate indexing is enough to "create" worlds:

[See Table 4 at the end of the paper]

The order of indices $\langle 1, 2 \rangle$ indicates that the elementary sentence is a (positive) fact. The reversed order $\langle 2, 1 \rangle$ identifies the ordered pair as the corresponding negative fact. But this negation is not total:

$$\langle \sim p, q \rangle = \langle q, p \rangle.$$

The only reason for a negation effect is that p and q are **different**. But

$$\text{not } \Vdash_{\text{wfl}} \langle p, q \rangle \nabla \langle \sim p, q \rangle: \langle p \vee q, q \wedge p \rangle$$

not \Vdash $\langle p, q \rangle \& \neg \langle p, q \rangle : \langle p \wedge q, q \vee p \rangle$.

Is it possible to find some classical compensation for the negation-eliminating step from $\langle p_i, \neg p_i \rangle$ to $\langle p_{i(1)}, p_{i(2)} \rangle$ by defining an even more striking concept of validity/inconsistency and define implication and equivalence using " \neg ", " $\&$ " and " ∇ "? $\langle A, B \rangle \rightarrow^* \langle C, D \rangle \stackrel{\text{df}}{=} \neg \langle A, B \rangle \nabla \langle C, D \rangle$ which yields the following reduction rule:

$\langle A, B \rangle \rightarrow^* \langle C, D \rangle \Rightarrow \langle B \vee C, A \wedge D \rangle$.

Here we have *diagonal* adjunction and conjunction but no implication " \supset "!

$\langle A, B \rangle \leftrightarrow^* \langle C, D \rangle \stackrel{\text{df}}{=} (\langle A, B \rangle \rightarrow^* \langle C, D \rangle) \& (\langle C, D \rangle \rightarrow^* \langle A, B \rangle)$. Reduction rule:

$\langle A, B \rangle \leftrightarrow^* \langle C, D \rangle \Rightarrow \langle (B \vee C) \wedge (A \vee D), (A \wedge D) \vee (B \wedge C) \rangle$

\Vdash -validity: $\Vdash \langle A, B \rangle$ iff $\vdash (B \supset A)$: internal valid implication "backwards".

∇ -inconsistency: $\nabla \langle A, B \rangle$ iff $\vdash (A \supset B)$.

This system has to guarantee that not $\vdash (A \equiv B)$. E.g., the expression $\langle p, p \rangle$ would be \Vdash -valid as well as ∇ -inconsistent!⁹ Here are some examples:

(3) Classical: $p \vee \neg p$

Translation: $\langle p_1, p_2 \rangle \nabla \neg \langle p_1, p_2 \rangle$

Computation: $\langle p_1, p_2 \rangle \nabla \langle p_2, p_1 \rangle$ [\neg -reduction]

$\langle p_1 \vee p_2, p_2 \wedge p_1 \rangle$. [∇ -reduction]

Because of $\vdash p_2 \wedge p_1 \supset p_1 \vee p_2$ we get

$\Vdash \langle p_1 \vee p_2, p_2 \wedge p_1 \rangle$ and $\nabla \langle p_1, p_2 \rangle \nabla \neg \langle p_1, p_2 \rangle$.

(4) Classical: $p \wedge \neg p$

Translation: $\langle p_1, p_2 \rangle \& \neg \langle p_1, p_2 \rangle$

Computation: $\langle p_1, p_2 \rangle \& \langle p_2, p_1 \rangle$ [\neg -reduction]

$\langle p_1 \wedge p_2, p_2 \vee p_1 \rangle$. [$\&$ -reduction]

Because of $\vdash p_1 \wedge p_2 \supset p_2 \vee p_1$ we get

$\nabla \langle p_1 \wedge p_2, p_2 \vee p_1 \rangle$ and $\nabla \langle p_1, p_2 \rangle \& \neg \langle p_1, p_2 \rangle$.

(5) Classical: $(p \supset q) \vee (q \supset p)$

Translation: $\langle p_1, p_2 \rangle \rightarrow^* \langle q_1, q_2 \rangle \nabla (\langle q_1, q_2 \rangle \rightarrow^* \langle p_1, p_2 \rangle)$

Computation: $\langle p_2 \vee q_1, p_1 \wedge q_2 \rangle \nabla \langle q_2 \vee p_1, q_1 \wedge p_2 \rangle$ [\rightarrow^* -reduction]

$\langle (p_2 \vee q_1) \vee (q_2 \vee p_1), (p_1 \wedge q_2) \wedge (q_1 \wedge p_2) \rangle$. [∇ -reduction]

Because of $\vdash (p_1 \wedge q_2) \wedge (q_1 \wedge p_2) \supset (p_2 \vee q_1) \vee (q_2 \vee p_1)$ we get

$\Vdash \langle (p_2 \vee q_1) \vee (q_2 \vee p_1), (p_1 \wedge q_2) \wedge (q_1 \wedge p_2) \rangle$ and finally

$\Vdash \langle p_1, p_2 \rangle \rightarrow^* \langle q_1, q_2 \rangle \nabla (\langle q_1, q_2 \rangle \rightarrow^* \langle p_1, p_2 \rangle)$

The following **conjecture** is open for discussion: Let A be any classical formula and X_A^* its translation into the language* $\{\langle p_{i(1)}, p_{i(2)} \rangle, \neg, \&, \nabla, \rightarrow^*, \leftrightarrow^*\}$. This translation contains a number of ordered pairs of the form $\langle B, C \rangle$ which can be eliminated step by step by using our reduction rules. We arrive at an ordered pair of classical formulas $\langle D_X^*, E_X^* \rangle$.

For all A: $\vdash A$ iff $\Vdash \langle D_X^*, E_X^* \rangle$, i.e. iff $\Vdash X_A^*$.

In our sections 2 and 3 we are not going to create new (non-classical) logics but recreating versions of classical logic in several two-dimensional environments. This shed some light on the problem of "creating" worlds from a logical point of view. "Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather – not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought)." [T, Preface]. Ethics cannot be within the world. There are no ethical sentences. Wittgenstein intends to show that there is no room for ethics within logic. Using negation internally for characterizing worlds would be an *ethical decision* for him because he is not interested in a semantic *theory*. Carnap makes a *theoretical decision* to get a new semantic framework for modal logic and a general meaning theory.

Our aim was to show that the question how to use negation for "creating" worlds does not have a yes/no-answer. We can differentiate between using classical negation internally to represent *thought* and an "outer" negation operator guided by a special reduction rule. The last one behaves classically under special logical circumstances. And we can eliminate the "inner" usage of our original classical negation in favor of an unorthodox concept of validity. Then we cannot observe negation directly because our negation " \neg " is nothing more than changing the position of two "positive" formulas within an ordered pair. We need the *whole* logic to *show* the *role* of negation.

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⁹ " \Vdash " and " ∇ " correspond to an overlapping of designated and non-designated values within a 4-valued semantics: $D+ = \{11, 10, 00\}$ and $D- = \{11, 01, 00\}$. Usually we demand $D+ \cap D- = \emptyset$.

Wittgenstein's worlds	Carnap's state-descriptions
{aRa,aRb,bRa,bRb}	{aRa,aRb,bRa,bRb}
{aRa,aRb,bRa}	{aRa,aRb,bRa,~bRb}
{aRa,aRb,bRb}	{aRa,aRb,~bRa,bRb}
{aRa,aRb}	{aRa,aRb,~bRa,~bRb}
{aRa,bRa,bRb}	{aRa,~aRb,bRa,bRb}
{aRa,bRa}	{aRa,~aRb,bRa,~bRb}
{aRa,bRb}	{aRa,~aRb,~bRa,bRb}
??? [aRa? What about "b"?	{aRa,~aRb,~bRa,~bRb}
{aRb,bRa,bRb}	{~aRa,aRb,bRa,bRb}
{aRb,bRa}	{~aRa,aRb,bRa,~bRb}
{aRb,bRb}	{~aRa,aRb,~bRa,bRb}
{aRb}	{~aRa,aRb,~bRa,~bRb}
{bRa,bRb}	{~aRa,~aRb,bRa,bRb}
{bRa}	{~aRa,~aRb,bRa,~bRb}
??? [bRb? What about "a"]	{~aRa, ~aRb, ~bRa, bRb}
??? [The empty world shows nothing!]	{~aRa, ~aRb, ~bRa, ~bRb}

Table 1

Wittgenstein's worlds	2-dimensional reconstruction
{aRa,aRb,bRa,bRb}	{<aRa,~aRa>,<aRb,~aRb>,<bRa,~bRa>,<bRb,~bRb>}
{aRa,aRb,bRa}	{<aRa,~aRa>,<aRb,~aRb>,<bRa,~bRa>,<~bRb,bRb>}
{aRa,aRb,bRb}	{<aRa,~aRa>,<aRb,~aRb>,<~bRa,bRa>,<bRb,~bRb>}
{aRa,aRb}	{<aRa,~aRa>,<aRb,~aRb>,<~bRa,bRa>,<~bRb,bRb>}
...	...
{}	{<~aRa,aRa>,<~aRb,aRb>,<~bRa,bRa>,<~bRb,bRb>}

Table 2

< p , ~ p >	&	< q , ~ q >	↔	-	(- < p , ~ p > ∇ - < q , ~ q >)
t f t	t,f	t f t	t,f	t,f	f,t t f t f,t f,t t f t
t f t	f,t	f t f	t,f	f,t	f,t t f t t,f t,f f t f
f t f	f,t	t f t	t,f	f,t	t,f f t f t,f f,t t f t
f t f	f,t	f t f	t,f	f,t	t,f f t f t,f t,f f t f

Table 3

Wittgenstein's worlds	2-dimensional reconstruction
{aRa,aRb,bRa,bRb}	{<aRa ₁ ,aRa ₂₁ ,aRb ₂₁ ,bRa ₂₁ ,bRb ₂
{aRa,aRb,bRa}	{<aRa ₁ ,aRa ₂₁ ,aRb ₂₁ ,bRa ₂₂ ,bRb ₁ >}
{aRa,aRb,bRb}	{<aRa ₁ ,aRa ₂₁ ,aRb ₂₂ ,bRa ₁₁ ,bRb ₂ >}
{aRa,aRb}	{<aRa ₁ ,aRa ₂₁ ,aRb ₂₂ ,bRa ₁₂ ,bRb ₁ >}
...	...
{}	{<aRa ₂ ,aRa ₁₂ ,aRb ₁₂ ,bRa ₁₂ ,bRb ₁ >}

Table 4

Die „Tatsache“ und das „Mystische“ – „wittgensteinische“ Annäherungen an Heimito von Doderers Roman „Die Wasserfälle von Slunj“

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„Tatsachen sind nur von vorne verständlich, aus den Wurzelbärten ihrer Genesis. Nachher nicht mehr. Sie zeigen uns dann ihren glatten Objekts-Hintern. Aber der Romancier denkt nicht daran, ihnen den Arschlecker zu machen. So weit zum ‚handlungsreichen Roman‘.“ (Doderer 1969 S 242). In voller Drastik äußert Heimito von Doderer (1896-1966) - auch mit der Fülle seiner Erfahrungen als promovierter und wissenschaftlich arbeitender Historiker - seine Ansicht dazu, wie etwas, das zur Evidenz gelangt ist in ebendieser Evidenzialisierung zu verstehen ist. In seinem letzten vollendeten Roman „Die Wasserfälle von Slunj“ - erschienen 1963 - zeigt er sich demgemäß auch höchst vorsichtig gegenüber Tatsachen, welche ihm zum Beispiel auch die Ereignisse einmaliger sexueller Begegnungen in deren - im doppelten Sinne des Wortes - „Einmaligkeit“ sind. So formuliert er hier denn auch folgerichtig: „Sie sind Tatsachen, solche Ereignisse, aber völlig alleinstehende Tatsachen, und dadurch als solche bald fragwürdig.“ (Doderer 1995/1 S 127). So geschieht es denn auch einer handelnden - und im konkreten Falle durchaus auch „behandelten“ - Person in diesem Roman, nämlich dem Gymnasiasten Zdenko von Chlamtatsch, der aufgrund eines Besuches bei einem Klassenkameraden in dessen chemischem Laboratorium einmaliger Sexualpartner der Mutter dieses Klassenkollegen - sie heißt Henriette Frehlinger - wird, dass Einzelheiten dieser Einmaligkeit „viele Jahre später von ihm eigentlich immer noch bezweifelt wurden...Aber es war doch unleugbar so gewesen.“ (Doderer 1995/1 S 226).

Der Autor macht es den Lesenden plausibel, dass die Zweifel des jungen Zdenko nicht aus der Luft gegriffen sind: sie sind begründet in den „Wurzelbärten“ und deren „Genesis“ im Bezug auf dieses einmalige intime Beisammensein.

Zdenko ist nicht sonderlich interessiert an der Chemie. Er wird durch die Frage, ob ein Ingenieur auch ein Gentleman sein könne, auf den vor ihm sitzenden Heinrich Frehlinger, Sohn des Direktors einer chemischen Fabrik, aufmerksam und sucht das Gespräch mit diesem. Das führt letztendlich zu einer sonntäglichen Einladung in die frehlingerische Wohnung, wo dem Gymnasiasten von dessen Vater ein kleines chemisches Laboratorium eingerichtet wurde, in welchem die beiden Klassenkollegen denn auch ein paar Experimente durchführen. „Zdenko war zunächst so erstaunt, als hätte er mitten in Wien einen neuen Erdteil entdeckt.“ (Doderer 1959/1 S 209). Der Konvention gemäß werden dann die beiden Gymnasiasten nebst dem Hausherrn, der sich ihnen bereits zugesellt hat, von Frau Frehlinger zur Jause gebeten, was bedeutet, dass sie das Laboratorium verlassen und durch mehrere Räume zum Speisezimmer gehen. „Zdenko schien es später, in der Erinnerung, immer, als seien sie nun sehr lange gegangen; und je mehr in die Tiefe der Zeiten ihm dieser Nachmittag und Abend entwichen, desto weiter streckte sich im Raume ein Weg, der zwar durch eine fast endlose Wohnung führte, immerhin aber im ganzen nur durch fünf oder sechs Zimmer.“ (Doderer 1995/1 S 216). Dort erwartet sie sitzend „machtvoll die Hausfrau: das heißt (und jetzt sehen

wir aus Zdenko's Augen), sie explodierte immerwährend nach allen Seiten, vernichtete den Raum um sich und machte sowohl Menschen wie Dinge unsichtbar.“ (Doderer 1995/1 S 217). Damit war „alles sofort passiert“. Am Ende wird der Gymnasiast ein Kärtchen Frau Frehlingers in seinem Mantel finden mit der Adresse, wo das einmalige Ereignis dann auch stattgefunden hat.

In seinem Spätwerk zielt der Autor auf die Verwirklichung der Idee eines „Roman muet“, einer schweigenden Prosa, deren Ziel nichts weniger ist als die „schweigend-sprechende Ausbreitung und Zusammenziehung des ‚fatalogischen Gewebes‘.“ (Weber 1995 S 272). Schweigen bedeutet in einer solchen Konzeption nichts weniger als Verschweigen, sondern ist ein probates Mittel, eine Tatsache „von vorne“ zur Evidenz zu bringen. Denn, so Doderer: „Wenn einer nicht spricht, spürt man's doch, daß er nicht spricht; wir fühlen's nun einmal, wenn beim anderen Menschen das Schweigen in seinen Riegeln ächzt.“ (Doderer 1995/1 S 282).

Dem Schreibenden kann es also innerhalb der Konzeption eines „Roman muet“ gelingen, durch das Nichtausgesprochene bei den Lesenden vollste Klarheit hervorzurufen. Denn wenn er schreibt, so befindet er sich - im Gegensatz zu den von ihm beschriebenen Personen und den Lesenden - in einem von Wittgenstein so bezeichneten „Zustand des Sich-auskennens“. (Wittgenstein 1984/7 721 S 337). Aus diesem Zustand heraus vermag der Schriftsteller demnach auch das Phänomen des Schweigens und Verstummtseins als zielführendes Mittel der Evidenzialisierung anzuwenden. Und sich dieses Zustandes bewusst seiend wird er schlüssig und mit Notwendigkeit zwei Grundsätzen gerecht:

1.) „Was sich sagen läßt, läßt sich klar sagen“

und

2.) „Wovon man nicht reden kann, darüber muß man schweigen.“ (Wittgenstein 1984/1 S 9).

Entscheidend ist hier tatsächlich das „Über-etwas-Schweigen“, dem die Fähigkeit des eindeutigen Auskunftgebens innewohnt. Zudem: im literarischen Kunstwerk gelingt es dem Schriftsteller ja, das Schweigen und das Nichtaussprechen zur Sprache zu bringen. Denn - so Wittgenstein: „Wenn man sich bemüht das Unaussprechliche auszusprechen, so geht nichts verloren. Sondern das Unaussprechliche ist, - unaussprechlich - in dem Ausgesprochenen enthalten.“ (Engelmann S 78).

Unaussprechlich ist letztendlich auch die Qualität einer Sinneswahrnehmung, auf deren Wesentlichkeit für die Evidenz Doderer in diesem Roman in diversen Exempeln geradezu leitmotivisch verweist: das Riechen. „Was sind schon alle Organe des Erkennens im Vergleich zu unserer Nase! Sie erst gibt dem Wissen einen Körper.“ (Doderer 1995/1 S 165). Es ist daher wesentlich, jemanden oder etwas - wie es der Romancier hier mehrmals ausdrückt und zur Darstellung bringt - „in den Wind zu bekommen“. Das bedeutet aber nichts anderes als Evi-

denzialisierung. Evidenzialisierung aber wovon? Wittgenstein kann eine Antwort geben: „Es gibt allerdings Unausprechliches. Dies zeigt sich, es ist das Mystische.“ (Wittgenstein 1984/1 6.522 S 85).

Sei es nun also durch das „In-den-Wind- bekommen“ oder durch die Erstreckung eines Weges im Raume, „der zwar durch eine fast endlose Wohnung führte, immerhin aber im ganzen nur durch fünf oder sechs Zimmer“ umfasst – hier werden die „Wurzelbärte der Tatsachen“ erkennbar, vor allem auch im Hinblick auf deren Funktion für das „Mystische“. Dieses „Mystische“ sind diese nämlich mitnichten, sondern ausschließlich dessen Werkzeug. Das Chemielaboratorium des Klassenkameraden Heinrich Frehlinger ist im Hinblick auf die intime Begegnung zwischen dessen Mutter und Zdenko von Chlamtatsch eine zwar hier keineswegs austauschbare, dennoch aber bloß „werkzeugliche“ Tatsache, welche im langen Gang durch die eben doch gar nicht so vielen Räume in ihrer so gearteten Bedeutung für den Lesenden deutlich wird. Den anderen Beteiligten dieser Szene – dem Ehemann der Frau Henriette und deren Sohn – kommt genau die gleiche werkzeugliche Funktion zu: Dies äußert sich darin, dass sie von den Vorgängen zwischen Zdenko und Henriette überhaupt nichts wahrnehmen und auch dann, als „alles sofort passiert“ war immer noch – wie vor dem Gang aus dem Laboratorium zum Speisezimmer - in Gesprächen über Chemie befindlich sind. So kann eben nur für Zdenko alles, was sich nach diesem letztlich doch so langen Gang durch die Räume ergibt, als ein Ereignis sui generis erkannt werden. Sogearbete Ereignisse sind gemäß Doderer „unendlich kostbar. Manchmal fragen wir zu ihnen hin. Aber sie antworten nie. Sie sind zu vornehm dazu. Sie haben sich nie unter das Volk der wimmelnden Tatsachen gemischt.“ (Doderer 1995/1 S 227). So mag es sich erweisen, dass es sich hier zwar um eine von Wittgenstein so genannte „Gesamtheit der Tatsachen“ (Wittgenstein 1984/1 1.1 S 11) handelt, aber dass ein Ereignis mehr ist als diese Gesamtheit, weil die Tatsachen gerade in ihrem „Wimmeln“ nach Gesamtheit ihre bloße Werkzeuglichkeit offenbaren.

Es wimmelt also hier das Chemielaboratorium, der Klassenkamerad samt Vater, der lange Gang, die Räume – ihre Gesamtheit finden sie aber in dem, was sich zeigt – dem „Mystischen“, als welches die solcherart zustande gekommene sexuelle Begegnung zwischen Frau Henriette Frehlinger und Zdenko von Chlamtatsch vor den Lesenden evident wird.

Eine werkzeugliche Funktion kommt in Doderers Roman auch den Namen der einzelnen Handelnden zu. Es ist eine Funktion einer akustischen Fassbarkeit, welche eine sinnliche Deckung zwischen benannter Person und Namen voraussetzt. Das bedeutet: Name und Person – soll heißen auch Wirkung der Person – müssen voll aufeinander abgestimmt sein.

Bei Wittgenstein heißt es: „Namen der Komponisten. Manchmal ist es eine Projektionsmethode, die wir als gegeben betrachten. Wenn wir uns etwa fragen: Welcher Name würde den Charakter dieses Menschen treffen? Manchmal aber projizieren wir den Charakter in den Namen und sehen diesen als das Gegebene an. So scheint es uns, daß die uns wohl bekannten großen Meister gerade die Namen haben, die zu ihrem Werk passen.“ (Wittgenstein 1989 S 484). Heimito von Doderer findet demnach passende Namen, um die intendierte Deckungsgleichheit auch für die Lesenden nachvollziehbar zu machen. Dies geht bis ins kleinste Detail. So heißt es etwa über den Hausmeister in der Wiener Villa des englischen Industriellen Robert Clayton: „Wie er eigentlich hieß, ist in

Vergessenheit geraten. Wir erfinden für ihn den Namen Broubek. So sah er aus.“ (Doderer 1995/1 S 152).

Was passieren kann, wenn der Name den Charakter eines bestimmten Menschen nicht trifft, er also nicht als das Gegebene angesehen werden kann, das demonstriert Doderer deutlichst in seiner Kurzerzählung „Die Teller“ aus dem Zyklus der „Acht Wutanfälle“ – entstanden 1954/55: „Mein Grimm erwachte, als ich feststellen mußte, daß der Dentist gänzlich anders aussah, als er hieß. Unter dem Namen Bodorenko hatte ich mir freilich ein kleines Gesicht vorgestellt, mit tiefen Schatten. Statt dessen erwartete mich die Glätte eines Ferkels bei Vollmond.“ (Doderer 1995/2 S 311). Eine solche Deckungsungleichheit erzeugt ein Loch, aus welchem ehebaldigst hervorgerufener Grimm herauswächst, weil hier plötzlich ein absolutes Manko an Werkzeuglichkeit evident wird. Die daraus resultierende Enttäuschung hat als Tatsache ihre Wurzelbärte in der durch diese Deckungsungleichheit hervorgerufenen Verhinderung des Sich-Zeigens. Um eine solche Verhinderung zu verhindern ist es demnach nur allzu verständlich, wenn der Schriftsteller bis hin zu den kleinsten Wurzelbärtchen um die notwendigen Deckungsgleichheiten bemüht ist – und im Notfall eines konstatierten Vergessenworden-Seins eben einen Namen „erfindet“, welcher den also Benannten so nennbar macht wie er aussieht. Damit erhält auch ein solch „erfundener“ Name seine Qualität, wie eben alles, was dem sich auch unaussprechlich zeigen Wollenden als Werkzeug dient. Denn – so Wittgenstein - : „Das Unausprechliche (das, was mir geheimnisvoll erscheint und ich nicht auszusprechen vermag) gibt vielleicht den Hintergrund, auf dem das, was ich aussprechen konnte, Bedeutung bekommt.“ (Wittgenstein 1989 S 472). Diese Bedeutung verweist aber auf *das*, von dem ihm die Bedeutung zukommt. In dieser Bedeutung verweist demnach das Werkzeug auf das Sich-Zeigende, *das Mystische*, welchem es als Werkzeug dient. Doderer selbst setzt einen solchen Verweis mit der „*analogia entis*“ des Thomas von Aquin gleich und zieht daraus auch eine fundamentale Konsequenz für den Romancier. „Man könnte ihn ein Individuum nennen, dem eine ferne Abspiegelung der *analogia entis* in besonders hervorstechender Weise als persönliche Eigenschaft innewohnt...Man möchte beinahe sagen, er sei so etwas wie ein geborener Thomist.“ (Doderer 1996 S 167).

Gerade dieser Thomismus Doderers setzt aber die feinsäuberliche Trennung zwischen Schöpfer und Geschöpf voraus. Aus dieser lässt sich eine ebensolche notwendige Auseinanderhaltung von Verursachendem – als welches das anzusehen ist, was sich zeigen will – und dem, was dem sich zeigen Wollenden zum Zwecke des Sich-Zeigens als Werkzeug dient, ableiten.

Gemäß den wittgensteinischen Annäherungen kann demnach Doderers Vorgehensweise als ein Plaidoyer für eine solche notwendige Auseinanderhaltung verstanden werden

Denn : Der Romancier, welcher nicht den Tatsachen den Arschlecker machen möchte, geht seinen Werkzeugen nicht auf den Leim, lässt sich von ihnen nicht dazu verleiten, sie als Phänomene der Verursachung hoch zu stilisieren und damit zu verkennen. Vielmehr weiß er sie in deren Eigenschaft als Werkzeug im Sinne der Herbeiführung eines „Sich-Zeigens“ zu handhaben. Und solche wittgensteinischen Annäherungen können die Vermutung der deutschen Literaturwissenschaftlerin Helga Blaschek-Hahn plausibel erscheinen lassen, „daß Doderers Dichtung auf poetischem Felde leistet, was Wittgenstein auf philosophischem gelang.“ (Blaschek-Hahn 1991 S 26).

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Die Musik als „ancilla philosophiae“ – Überlegungen zu Ludwig Wittgenstein und Nikolaus Cusanus

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„Licet enim Musicae scientiam habeam...“ sagt Nikolaus Cusanus von sich selbst (Cusanus 2002 Bd. 3 S 120).

„Einen dreifachen Kontrapunkt gibt es nur in einer ganz bestimmten musikalischen Umgebung.“ (Wittgenstein 1984 Bd. 8 S 566).

Ludwig Wittgensteins denkerischer Rekurs auf eines der kompliziertesten und artifizielsten kompositionstechnischen Phänomene kann als Belegstück für seine hohe musikalische Bildung und ein ausgeprägtes Verständnis für strukturelle Zusammenhänge gelten und der durchaus begründeten Selbsteinschätzung des Kusaners an die Seite gestellt werden. Kues und Wittgenstein weisen sich in solchen Aussagen und in den Zusammenhängen, in welchen dieselben innerhalb ihrer Werke stehen, durchaus kontinuierlich als Kenner der Tonkunst aus, als bewanderte und kenntnisreiche Menschen, welchen die Musik sowohl als Wissenschaft als auch in deren Manifestation als bestimmter Klang oder als dezidiert benennbares Werk Möglichkeiten gibt, eine Frage nicht nur so weit wie möglich zu verfolgen, sondern die Art und Weise eingeschlagener Wege bei deren Untersuchung und allenfalls gefundene Ergebnisse gleichsam zu „*veranhörlichen*“. Daher schreibt der Kusaner beispielhaft: „*Omnia enim universalia, generalia atque specialia in te Iuliano iulianizant, ut harmonia in luto lutinizat, in cithara citharizat, et ita de reliquis. Neque in alio hoc et in te possibile est.*“ (Cusanus 2002 Bd. 17 S 102). – Und bei Wittgenstein heißt es: „Der Satz ist kein Wortgemisch. – (Wie das musikalische Thema kein Gemisch von Tönen).“ (Wittgenstein 1985, 3.141).

An den beiden Sätzen, zwischen deren Niederschrift rund 470 Jahre liegen, fällt die Gleichsetzung des Denkergebnisses mit dessen musikalischer Umschreibung, respective mit dem dieser Umschreibung zugrunde liegenden musikalischen Phänomen auf.

Die Musik ist demnach in beiden Sätzen, bedacht und niedergeschrieben von zwei eigenständigen, durch Epochen getrennte Persönlichkeiten, etwas entscheidend Verbindendes. Und dies mag darauf deuten, dass Geschichte nicht nur als linearer Prozess, als lose verbundene Kette eines scheinbar unaufhörlichen Fortschreitens zu verstehen ist, sondern auch eine vertikale Sicht auf zeitlich auseinanderliegende Gegebenheiten ihre Berechtigung hat. Denn durch eine solche kann zwischen Persönlichkeiten und Ereignissen, als welche auch Denken und Schaffung von Kunstwerken anzusehen sind, eine bemerkenswerte Zusammengehörigkeit offenbar werden, auch wenn sie im Einzelnen im späten Mittelalter beziehungsweise im 20. Jahrhundert situiert sind. Wenn demnach die Musik berechtigterweise als verbindendes Merkmal zwischen Cusanus und Wittgenstein angesprochen werden kann, so zeigt ein Blick auf die kulturgeschichtlichen Gegebenheiten der jeweiligen Lebenszeiten weitere Parallelitäten. Sowohl in der Epoche des Kusaners als auch in jener Wittgensteins macht die Musik ein Stadium ungeheurer Veränderung durch, einen exzessiven Schub hin in Richtung auf etwas Anderes, welches mit dem Begriff der jeweiligen „*Modernität*“ nur höchst ungenau und letztendlich eher nur

im Sinne eines nach eigenen Vorstellungen wertenden Fortschrittsglaubens beschrieben wird.

Jedenfalls: Cusanus (1401-1464) erlebt ganz neue Ansätze zu einer symphonischen vielstimmigen Musik, realisiert in großen Messzyklen und geschaffen von Komponisten, die nun auch wirklich als solche bezeichnet werden wollen und die als philosophisch und theologisch gebildete Menschen die durch Autoritäten kontinuierlich überlieferten alten geheiligten Regeln aufs Genaueste und vielleicht zum allerersten Mal in aller Umfassendheit anwenden, sodass sie diese gerade deshalb nicht mehr als Fesseln empfinden, sondern als notwendige Anregungen zur Entfaltung von Freiheiten. Als Nikolaus' Zeitgenossen sind hier vor allem die beiden Niederländer Guillaume Dufay (1400 – 1474) und Jan van Ockeghem (1425-1497) zu nennen. Ihre Leistungen im Bereich der Kunst stehen natürlich in Lebenszusammenhängen und müssen beispielsweise engstens mit dem Phänomen der „*devotio moderna*“, jener hochintensiven, nach leidenschaftlichem Ausdruck und alles preisgebender Verinnerlichung gleichermaßen verlangenden spätmittelalterlichen Art katholischer Frömmigkeit zusammengesehen werden. Strengste Form und schier grenzenloser Ausdruck – das ist denn auch das, was etwa an den Messen der beiden genannten Meister von deren zeitgenössischer Kritik gleichermaßen gelobt wie gebrandmarkt wird – unter Berufung auf dieselben geheiligten Autoritäten und Regeln.

Ähnliches – und auch hier nicht losgelöst von im weitesten Sinne religiösen Implikationen – vollzieht sich im biographischen Umfeld Wittgensteins gegen Ende des 19. und in den ersten Jahrzehnten des 20. Jahrhunderts, zwischen Dekadenz und Aufbruch. Als Initium fungiert hier im Wesentlichen Richard Wagners „*Tristan und Isolde*“, das Kunstwerk der alle Grenzen sprengenden Leidenschaft schlechthin, dessen frappierende Andersheit und alles über Bord werfende Intensität aber auf gleichermaßen strengster wie exzessivster Handhabung musikalischer Mittel, die in der Theorie bestens begründet sind, beruht. Musik dieser Art – und hier sind neben dem wagner'schen Œuvre auch die Bestrebungen des Russen Aleksandr Nikolajewič Skrjabin (1872-1915) zu bedenken - nimmt für sich den Charakter einer die Religion ersetzenden, alle Lebensbereiche durchformenden Kraft in Anspruch, durch welche die Religion Kunst, die Kunst Religion wird.

Und was für die zu bisher Unbekanntem sich wendenden Meister des 15. Jahrhunderts die katholische Theologie und die auch Musiktheorie enthaltende Philosophie des Aurelius Augustinus oder des Johannes Scotus Eriugena, das ist später für Richard Wagner Beethoven, das ist danach für Arnold Schönberg Brahms und – um auf eine ganz andere Art von Gewinnung bisher unbekannter Gebiete zu verweisen – für Dmitrij Dmitrijewitsch Schostakowitsch die Musik des Josquin des Prés aus dem Spätmittelalter, sowie jene Haydns und Bruckners. Des Russen älterer Landsmann Skrjabin verkehrt in Kreisen, in welchen man sich mit dem Denken von Jakob Böhme und Meister Eckhart auseinandersetzt. Der Letztgenannte wiederum beschäftigt zur selben Zeit auch den von Wittgenstein

beachteten böhmisch-jüdischen Sprachphilosophen Fritz Mauthner.

Es ist demnach oftmals zu *beobachten* und damit zu *beachten*, dass und wie sehr sich jene, die bisher Unbekanntes entdecken und formen, auf nicht nur von ihnen selbst anerkanntes Bedeutsames der Vergangenheit berufen, sich damit rechtfertigen. So dient denn Johannes Brahms den sogenannten Konservativen als Argument gegen Wagner, von Arnold Schönberg wird er aber zum Paten eigener Radikalität. Der Theoretiker Henricus Glareanus (1488-1563) bemüht demgemäß ebenso die Bibel und Augustinus, um die leidenschaftliche Intensität in den Messen des großen Josquin des Prés (1450-1521) zu kritisieren, wie dies auch Martin Luther tut, um die Musik ebendesselben Josquin als in ihrer Großartigkeit mit jeder anderen unvergleichlich zu preisen und in ihrer hörbaren Sinnhaftigkeit und Sinnlichkeit wohlgeeignet wie keine andere als Mittel zur Erlangung religiöser Erkenntnis.

Rechtfertigende Berufung auf Anerkanntes im Kontext mit radikal anderer Orientierung und zur Gültigmachung derselben – im Bereich der Musik haben Cusanus und Wittgenstein vieles in ihrer eigenen Zeit davon mitbekommen.

Es ist eine – wiewohl kaum schlüssig zu einem Ende zu führende – Überlegung wert, inwieweit die Virulenz aktueller musikästhetischer Fragen, hinzutretend zu den persönlichen hochentwickelten musikalischen Fähigkeiten die Hinwendung zur Musik im Kontext mit philosophischem Tun gefördert hat. Vieles in den diesbezüglichen Äußerungen des Kusaners ist jedenfalls ohne die Kenntnis der altüberlieferten Theorien und gleichzeitig der aktuellen Bestrebungen in der vielstimmigen Musik seiner eigenen Zeit wenig vorstellbar. Etwa: „Quando enim audimus concinentes, voces sensu attingimus, sed differentias et concordantias ratione et disciplina mensuramus.“ (Cusanus 2002 Bd. 3 S 102). Dieser Satz reflektiert zweifelsohne das Gesamterlebnis einer zeitgenössischen vielstimmigen Komposition, wie sie etwa Guillaume Dufay verfasst hat, und damit auch eine Grundvorstellung damaligen Komponierens, nach welcher ein musikalisches Werk als Versinnlichung hochkomplexer struktureller, philosophisch-theologischer und mathematischer Zusammenhänge zu verstehen ist. Kues verpflichtet jene Grundvorstellung mit der augustiniischen Aussage, dass die Musik die Wissenschaft vom richtigen Abmessen ist.

Bei Wittgenstein wiederum, der schließlich 21 Jahre Zeitgenosse Gustav Mahlers gewesen ist, muss mit Unbedingtheit eine reflektierende Kenntnisnahme der Werke dieses seit seinem Erscheinen gerade in Wien heftig umstrittenen Komponisten angenommen werden, sodass seine verstreuten Bemerkungen über denselben keineswegs im unbedachten Raum stehen, auch wenn sie – oder gerade weil sie wie die folgende lauten: „Wenn es wahr ist, wie ich glaube, daß Mahlers Musik nichts wert ist, dann ist die Frage, was er, meines Erachtens, mit seinem Talent hätte tun sollen. Denn ganz offenbar gehört doch *eine Reihe sehr seltener Talente* dazu, diese schlechte Musik zu schreiben. Hätte er z.B. seine Symphonien schreiben und verbrennen sollen? Hätte er sich Gewalt antun, und sie nicht schreiben sollen? Hätte er sie schreiben, und einsehen sollen, daß sie nichts wert seien? Aber wie hätte er das einsehen können? Ich sehe es, weil ich seine Musik mit der der großen Komponisten vergleichen kann. Aber er konnte das nicht; denn, wem das eingefallen ist, der mag wohl gegen den Wert des Produkts *mit Strauß* sein, weil er ja wohl sieht, daß er nicht, sozusagen, die Natur der andern großen Komponisten habe, - aber die Wertlosigkeit wird er deswegen nicht einsehen; denn er kann sich immer

sagen, daß er zwar *anders* ist, als die übrigen (die er aber bewundert), aber in einer anderen Art wertvoll. Wenn Keiner, den Du bewunderst, so ist wie Du, dann glaubst Du wohl nur darum an Deinen Wert, weil *Du's bist*.“ (Wittgenstein 1984 Bd. 8 S 544f).

Wittgenstein zieht aus diesen Feststellungen samt folgenden Überlegungen immerhin noch einen Extrakt für die eigene Person: „Ich selber mache immer wieder den Fehler, von dem hier die Rede ist.“ Auch diese letzte Konsequenz hat also das konkrete Erleben der Musik Mahlers zum Ausgangspunkt.

Ein fruchtbar zu machender Unterschied zwischen dem Philosophieren anhand von Musik bei Wittgenstein und Cusanus liegt in der Art und Weise der Konkretisierung der musikalischen Phänomene. Beim spätmittelalterlichen Denker gibt es - historisch begründbar – keine Erwähnung von Komponierendennamen. Auch wenn die Tonkunst schon seit Jahrhunderten mit konkreten Namen in Verbindung gebracht werden kann, so bietet sie hier ihre verständnisfördernden Beispiele doch stets als *sie selbst* entweder in ihrer Gesamtheit, über welche die Theorie Auskunft gibt, oder in von dieser Gesamtheit abgetrennten Teilen, als welche dem Kusaner konkrete klangliche Realisierungen mittels eines Instrumentes oder menschlicher Stimmen gelten.

Bei Wittgenstein spielt einerseits die durch einen bestimmten Komponisten realisierte Musik eine Rolle, andererseits sind aber auch allgemeine musikalische Begriffe, wie etwa Melodie, Harmonie oder Kontrapunkt zentraler Ausgangspunkt für ein weiteres Nachdenken.

So zeigt sich bei ihm, wie sehr er davon geprägt ist, dass die Musik seit dem ausgehenden Mittelalter in ihren jeweils höchsten Entwicklungen zunehmend mit bestimmten Namen von Komponisten in Zusammenhang gebracht wird, dass aber auch ein Denken *in Musik schlechthin* und mit Hilfe ihrer durch die Theorie benennbaren Konstituenten weiterhin von Bedeutung ist. Ein solches abstraktes musikalisches Denken, welches sich durchaus jenseits aller klanglichen Realisierung bewegen kann, wird auch von den wesentlichen Theoretikern und Lehrern in der Zeit zwischen 1700 und 1900 beherrscht und weitervermittelt. Hier ist zumal an den „Gradus ad Parnassum“ des Johann Joseph Fux – Wien 1725 - zu denken, gestaltet als platonischer Dialog in lateinischer Sprache und an die Vorlesungen über Harmonielehre und Kontrapunkt Anton Bruckners, der sich mit höchster Energie dafür einsetzte, solche an der philosophischen Fakultät der Wiener Universität halten zu dürfen und die vorgetragene Gegenstände damit aufs Neue als philosophisch-wissenschaftliche Disziplinen zu etablieren.

Somit schlussendlich ein Versuch, einem musikalischen Phänomen unter den Denkbedingungen Wittgensteins und des Kusaners näher zu kommen: wie ist es mit dem dreifachen Kontrapunkt und seiner Einbettung in „eine ganz bestimmte musikalische Umgebung“? Wie ermöglicht ein Komponist dessen einerseits sinnliche, andererseits verstandesmäßige Wahrnehmung als Einzelerscheinungen der Stimmen respective als deren Gesamtheit, welche den dreifachen Kontrapunkt darstellen? Zunächst: die Tatsache „dreifacher Kontrapunkt“ ist gegeben durch den Sachverhalt, dass in einem mehrstimmigen Satz drei Stimmen so beschaffen sind, dass sie jeweils die Stelle jeder beliebigen anderen innerhalb dieser Dreier einnehmen können. Ein Beispiel par excellence findet sich am Ende des Streichquartetts g-moll Hob. III Nr. 74. , 4. Satz, Takte 131 – 143. Das Beispiel ist deswegen so herausragend, weil Haydn den dreifachen Kontrapunkt hier in eine vierstimmige Gesamtkonzeption hineinstellt, sodass

dieser selbst keine alleinbestimmende, sondern eine mitbestimmende Rolle einnimmt, und somit eine Einzel Tatsache in einer Gesamtheit von Tatsachen darstellt. Ein Streichquartett als Miteinander von grundsätzlich sehr ähnlich klingenden, nur durch die Parameter hoher, mittlerer und tiefer Lagen bestimmter Instrumente erfordert ein ungemein differenziertes Hören, dem Haydn als Meister des Klanges nachhaltigste Nahrung gibt. Die den dreifachen Kontrapunkt realisierenden Stimmen werden nämlich beim jeweiligen Wechsel der Stimmenzusammenhänge unterschiedlich eingesetzt, sodass etwa einmal die Bratsche höher spielt als die 2. Geige und damit ihr etwas gedackt-näselnder Klang als besonderes akustische Ereignis wahrgenommen werden kann. Eine Stimme ist jeweils synkopiert und hebt sich so merklich von den im regelmäßigen Schlag spielenden Instrumenten ab, wodurch auch auf der rhythmischen Ebene Verschiedenartigkeit gehört werden kann.

Fein ausdifferenziert ist auch die Länge der Notenwerte in den einzelnen Elementen: den langgezogen hinschreitenden Synkopenbildungen – beruhend auf Achteln und Vierteln – treten kurze Achtelmotive und ein aus 4 Sechzehnteln und zwei Achteln bestehendes Element entgegen.

Die „ganz bestimmte musikalische Umgebung“ schafft Haydn, indem er vor Beginn dieser hochkomplexen Passage eine Pause für alle Beteiligten setzt und danach durch abrupte Einführung rascher Sechzehntelfiguren, die - paarweise verteilt - die vorhergehende kontrapunktische Kompaktheit nochmals zu konterkarieren scheinen, innerhalb von drei Takten mit zwei Akkordschlägen aller vier Instrumente ans so nicht zu erwartende Ende kommt. Jene „ganz bestimmte musikalische Umgebung“, welche *nur hier genau so ist wie sie ist*, lässt es auf *nur hier* mögliche Weise zu „ut harmonia in quartetto illo quartettizat“. Durch die feinfühligkeits Klangleichheit – wie etwa die hoch geführte Bratsche - gibt Haydn seinen Zuhörenden die Möglichkeit „voces sensu attingere“, die „bestimmte musikalische Umgebung“ macht aber auch auf die Besonderheit des darin eingebetteten aufmerksam, sodass diese Zuhörenden in die Lage gesetzt werden, den dreifachen Kontrapunkt „ratione et disciplina mensurare“ und zur Erkenntnis zu gelangen, dass dessen thematische Bestandteile tatsächlich „kein Gemisch von Tönen“ sind.

Kein solches Gemisch sind auch die Elemente, welche unterschiedlich „sensus“ beziehungsweise „ratio“ ansprechen, denn – so der ausgewiesene Kenner der haydn'schen Quartette Johann Wolfgang von Goethe - „Diese seine Werke sind eine ideale Sprache der Wahrheit, in ihren Teilen notwendig zusammengehörend und lebendig.“

Cusanus und Wittgenstein waren imstande, derartiges zu hören, daraus ihre Schlüsse zu ziehen und diese Schlussfolgerungen durch Einkleidung in ein musikalisches Wortgewand allen, die ebenso hörfähig sind, zu verdeutlichen.

„Quomodo in animae profectu auditus visum praecedat....Auditum invenit quod non visus. Oculum species fefelit, auri veritas se infudit.“ (Bernhard 1994 S 432-438) – so der für Cusanus so wichtige Bernhard von Clairvaux. Akustische Wahrnehmung gibt demnach Sicherheit und in dieser Sicherheit kann der Mensch mit der Musik als einer Dienerin der Erkenntnis bekannt werden. Und: wer die Magd kennt - vermag er nicht auch besser mit der Herrin umzugehen?

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The Points of the Picture: Hertz and Wittgenstein on the Picture Theory

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Hertz's Picture Theory

Literally translated as "picture," the German word *Bild* is used by Hertz in the introduction to the *Principles of Mechanics* to denote a representation that shares the same relation among its constitutive objects as the objects it represents. In this sense pictures are models of the external world in virtue of possessing a relational identity between the picture's objects and the objects of the world. Thus pictures in the Hertzian sense are pictures of the real world because they contain an identical property, namely a specific relation between objects.

According to Hertz, a picture must meet three requirements: permissibility, correctness and appropriateness. These requirements make pictorial representation possible and are also for Hertz the general philosophical conditions of scientific investigation.

The most basic requirement is that pictures must adhere to the laws of logic. This condition is termed "logical permissibility," which simply asserts that pictures should not contain logical contradictions. Not only would a contradicting relation fail to picture, it could not be thought, for the laws of logic are derivative of the "laws of thought" such that "[w]hat enters into the pictures, in order that they may be permissible, is given by the nature of the mind" (Hertz, 1994, 325). The first requirement, then, is not a feature of representation per se, but is rather a precondition for thought in general.

The second requirement, correctness, is the definitive feature of pictorial representation. Correctness requires that "...the necessary consequents in thought of our pictures are the necessary consequents of the objects pictured" (Hertz, 1994, 323). A correct picture enables us to predict future phenomena because it shares a relation among its constitutive objects with those of the external world. Thus, for Hertz, the property of correctness grounds the practice of induction. An incorrect picture fails to have a relational identity with external phenomena, and in a strict sense is not a picture since it does not satisfy this second requirement. Nonetheless, Hertz does not claim that for each phenomenon there corresponds only one correct and permissible picture. It is possible that two permissible but different pictures entail the same inductive result. Thus there can be two (or more) permissible and correct pictures corresponding to the same phenomenon.

In order to better explain this feature of Hertz's position, it is helpful to distinguish between a strong and weak sense of pictorial representation. According to a strong interpretation, pictures share every relation among its objects with the objects represented. In this sense pictures are isomorphic to an actual state of affairs and reveal the total sum of relations between its constitutive elements. Thus, according to a strong interpretation, pictures in principle provide an open avenue to the nature of the physical world—that is, every relation between every object *can* be discovered. A weak interpretation requires that pictures do not necessarily share all of the relations between its constitutive elements and the state of affairs it represents. The weak interpretation thus claims that pictures may provide

limited access to the nature of the external world—the actual nature of the world may be in principle opaque. Hertz's theory in the Introduction promotes the weak sense. In fact, Hertz maintains an epistemic humility in regards to determining which relational features the external world and pictures share, thus denying in principle the strong interpretation:

The pictures which we here speak of are our models of things; these models are in conformity with the things themselves in *one* important respect, namely, in satisfying the above mentioned requirement [that the necessary consequents of a picture share the necessary consequents of external objects]. For our purpose it is not necessary that they should be in conformity with the things in any other respect whatsoever. As a matter of fact, we do not know, nor have we any means of knowing, whether our models of things are in conformity with the things themselves in any other than this *one* fundamental respect (Hertz, 1994, 324).

The fundamental requirement for a picture is that it shares *enough* relations between its constitutive objects with the physical world in order to act as a predictive tool. Hertz suggests that a picture's predictive value does not imply that it share a complete relational identity with the objects it represents. Rather, Hertz maintains that a picture's predictive value need only depend on a partial relational identity. Thus two (or more) pictures can represent the same phenomena since each is only required to have partial identity; that is, each picture can share different relational identities of a specific phenomenon yet still have predictive value. However, two permissible and correct pictures are not identical. They may differ in what Hertz calls "appropriateness," the third requirement of pictorial representation. A picture of greater appropriateness captures more necessary and inherent properties of objects—an appropriate picture explains the phenomena in virtue of the properties of the phenomenal objects. A Newtonian account of momentum, say, is preferable to an occasionalist view because the Newtonian position explains momentum in terms of the objects under investigation rather than the agency of God. Thus the more appropriate picture contains "...more of the essential relations of the object—the one [picture] that we may call the more distinct" (Hertz, 1994, 325).

It does not follow, however, that two pictures cannot possess the same degree of appropriateness, correctness and permissibility. The key reason for the occurrence of more than one appropriate picture is "empty relations": "[e]mpty relations cannot be avoided altogether; they enter into the pictures because they are themselves simply pictures, and indeed pictures produced by our own mind and necessarily affected by the characteristics of its mode of picturing them" (Hertz, 1994, 324). Hertz's claim that pictures "enter into" other pictures suggests that some pictures are layered—that is, composed of sub pictures. By using this term I do not mean to imply that Hertz's picture theory is matched by an ontology of separate states of affairs multiply represented through sub-pictures. Instead, Hertz claims that pictures necessarily contain internal rela-

tions that are not relationally identical to the external world (since the mind necessarily imposes empty relations onto pictures). That is, pictures do not bottom out at a set of ultimate propositions that directly mirror that world's ontology. Thus, overall, Hertz promotes a weak picture theory: since empty relations are unavoidable even a perfect science cannot produce isomorphic pictures.

Wittgenstein's Picture Theory

In its essential features, Wittgenstein's version of the picture theory is indebted to Hertz. Wittgenstein, like Hertz, believed that representation of the physical world occurs through pictorial relationships—that “[w]e make to ourselves pictures of the facts” (Wittgenstein, 1922, 2.1). However, unlike Hertz, Wittgenstein posits an ontological framework that deeply impacts his version of the picture theory. Thus what initially appears to be only an extension of Hertz's theory eventually develops opposing theoretical requirements. To see how Wittgenstein's ontological commitments affect his theory, we must first discuss propositions and how they correspond to reality.

Propositions and Pictures

The third proposition of the *Tractatus* states: “[t]he logical picture of the facts is the thought.” Thus for the early Wittgenstein the essence of thought is to relate objects according to the rules of logic. It is not inherent to thought that it be shared or even expressed. Nonetheless, when thoughts are expressed it is through a proposition: “[i]n the proposition the thought is expressed perceptibly through the sense. We use the sensibly perceptible sign (sound or written sign, etc.) of the proposition as a projection of the possible state of affairs” (Wittgenstein, 1922, 3.1 – 3.11).

Since thought—a picture—is expressed through propositions, there must be important similarities between pictures and propositions. For Wittgenstein, propositions represent a possible relation between objects—that is, they represent a possible state of affairs. The *Tractatus* illustrates this very explicitly: “[t]he essential nature of the propositional sign becomes very clear when we imagine it made up of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, books) instead of written signs. The mutual spatial position of these things then expresses the sense of the proposition” (Wittgenstein, 1922, 3.1431). The “objects” of propositions are names and the various ways names connect through grammatical means are the relations. Further, the meaning of a proposition is the state of affairs represented by names and the relations between them. Thus “[t]o the configuration of signs [names] in the propositional sign corresponds the configuration of the objects in the state of affairs” (Wittgenstein, 1922, 3.21).

A proposition is “completely analyzed” if the relations between the objects (or names) are clear and exact. Each thought and proposition, if meaningful, contains an identifiable and unique relation between the constitutive objects. Moreover, each proposition can in principle be reduced to a proposition that clearly exhibits how its constitutive objects relate to one another. Thus Wittgenstein claims that “[t]here is one and only one complete analysis of the proposition” (Wittgenstein, 1922, 3.25). Further, a completely analyzed proposition will either picture an existing state of affairs, or a merely possible state of affairs—the proposition will be true in the former case and false in the latter.

Proposition 4.01 firmly ties Wittgenstein's propositional and pictorial theories together: “[t]he proposition is a picture of reality. The proposition is a model of the reality

as we think it is.” Mirroring Hertz's terminology, a proposition is a model relating a set of objects. For Wittgenstein, however, pictures are models of the world in virtue of sharing the rules of logic with the world: “[w]hat every picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it at all—rightly or falsely—is logical form, that is, the form of reality” (Wittgenstein, 1922, 2.18). Thus it is possible for a proposition to represent the world because its specific form of representation shares, through logical laws, the form of reality—the logical form endows a proposition with the ability to share a relational identity. Thus “[t]he proposition communicates to us a state of affairs, therefore it is *essentially* connected with the state of affairs. And the connexion is, in fact, that it is its logical picture” (Wittgenstein, 1922, 4.03). In sum, a proposition represents the world by picturing a relation between objects and can be about the world by sharing logical possibilities; that is, the relations between objects of a picture and objects in the world are logical, and as such, pictures are able to represent the world.

Atomic Facts, Elementary Propositions and Pictures

For Wittgenstein, atomic facts—basic indivisible objects and the relations between them—are the ontological elements of the world. Wittgenstein's version of the picture theory claims that atomic facts can be represented through propositions, that is, through names and the relations words posit between names: “[o]ne name stands for one thing, and another for another thing, and they are connected together. And so the whole, like a living picture, presents the atomic fact” (Wittgenstein, 1922, 4.0311). This is not to say that every proposition clearly represents atomic facts. Like Hertz, Wittgenstein claims that the majority of propositions contain both relational identities *and* empty relations. Wittgenstein's statement of this claim is couched in the parlance of atomic facts, “[a] proposition presents the existence and non-existence of atomic facts” (Wittgenstein, 1922, 4.1). That is to say, the majority of propositions are composed of both non-representing relations and relational identities.

The crucial difference between Hertz and Wittgenstein's version of the picture theory is Wittgenstein's notion of elementary propositions. An elementary proposition is a completely analyzed proposition and as such does not contain a mixture of relational identities and extraneous relations, but instead either isomorphically corresponds to an atomic fact or simply fails to represent reality. Thus “[t]he simplest proposition, the elementary proposition, asserts the existence of an atomic fact” (Wittgenstein, 1922, 4.2), and since an atomic fact is nothing more than a relation between objects, “... [an] elementary proposition consists of names. It is a connexion, a concatenation, of names” (Wittgenstein, 1922, 4.22). All propositions are, in principle, reducible to a specific set of elementary propositions to the effect that we could know exactly which elementary propositions correspond to which atomic facts (and which fail to do so). Wittgenstein thus states that “...in the analysis of propositions we must come to elementary propositions, which consist of names in immediate combination” (Wittgenstein, 1922, 4.221), and “[i]f the elementary proposition is true, the atomic fact exists; if it is false the atomic fact does not exist” (Wittgenstein, 1922, 4.25). That is, a proposition's final analysis is its corresponding elementary proposition.

Wittgenstein is not stating here that we as a matter of practice reduce propositions into elementary propositions, but rather that the meaningful use of propositions demands that propositions in principle *can* be decomposed. A picture must in principle reduce to elements

which do or do not represent an atomic fact. The *Tractatus*' picture theory thus promotes a strong interpretation of pictorial representation. Wittgenstein's theory demands an isomorphic relation between a picture and what it represents, and although we may not in practice reach any proposition's complete analysis, atomic facts—and thus the ultimate constituents of the physical world—are in principle discoverable.

The Two Picture Theories

Hertz's *Bildtheorie* lacks the ontological commitment of the *Tractatus*. Hertz supports an object-relation ontology, but never makes the explicit leap to something like atomic facts. Thus, Hertz should be read as promoting a weak interpretation of pictorial representation for three reasons: 1) Hertz maintains that a picture of the actual ontological constitution is in principle not necessary; 2) empty relations necessarily occur in every picture and cannot be separated from the picture; and 3) even in an ideal world, two (or more) appropriate pictures are possible, thus a state of affairs can be represented in opposing manners (i.e. no isomorphic connection is necessary for representation). For the early Wittgenstein, pictures of the world's ontological constitution are necessary because empty relations (i.e. non-corresponding elementary propositions) can in principle be separated from non-referring pictures and for each state of affairs there corresponds a unique elementary proposition.

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Language in Dreams: A Threat to Linguistic Antiskepticism

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Some of the presumably powerful modern arguments against external world skepticism refer to the linguistic senselessness of skeptical doubts. For example, Wittgenstein writes in *On Certainty*: 'If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either.' (OC, 114) Arguments of that kind put forward that when a skeptic expresses her doubts, suggesting the possibility of being a brain in a vat, being manipulated by an evil demon, or being asleep and dreaming, she is committing a certain linguistic fallacy. Hence, the skeptical hypothesis is self-refuting and external world skepticism as a whole inconceivable. However, this conclusion is rather surprising. Have the prominent skeptics like Descartes in the long history of external world skepticism never noticed that their skeptical ideas are mere nonsense, and why do we seem to understand skeptical scenarios so easily? Obviously, there has to be a non-trivial presupposition behind the argument. As a matter of fact, it is crucial for the linguistic antiskeptic to tie the meaning of words to the external world. It is because the skeptic cuts off the links to reality that she deprives her hypothesis of meaning. But why could the language not preserve a certain independence from the outer world? If it could, then the skeptical hypothesis might still be meaningful. In what follows I discuss possible amendments for the skeptical position. I focus on the dream argument and investigate the possibility of a language in a dream. From my point of view, the skeptic might circumvent the linguistic critique with some rather strong auxiliary assumptions. Despite being rather fantastic, these assumptions bear no internal contradiction.

To begin with, I distinguish between three different versions of the dream argument for the sake of clarity: a strongly solipsistic, a moderately solipsistic, and an everyday version. The first one emphasizes that the dreamer had no contact to the external world at all, and that she has thus to create her mental content by herself. The second version describes the dreamer as someone, who had a reliable contact to the real world in the past, but at some point was completely encapsulated into her dream. Because of the former contact to the external world the assumption of an autonomous creation of mental content can be avoided. The moderately solipsistic dreamer can simply form her mental content from her former real world experiences. The third scenario provides the dreamer with a reliable periodic contact to the external world alternating with periods of dreaming. As in the second scenario the assumption of autonomous creation can be spared.

Now, taking the strongly solipsistic scenario it was granted that the dreamer can invent her own fictitious world. Consequently, the dreamer might also create a dream language therein. Yet this assumption is counterintuitive. We need our language among other things to represent entities and to communicate ideas to other people. But the strongly solipsistic dreamer has no such impediments. She can conceive of dinosaurs without using any representatives and think of a communication with her imagined fellow humans as unintermediate. Thus, the invention of a language would be idle. However, such objections need not bother a skeptic. The assumption of an autonomous creation of mental content might be simply extended to a version where the dreamer has a represent-

ing language and conceives of the dreamed people as independent from herself.

Yet the strongly solipsistic dreamer has to face the problem of having a private language. Since it is situated in the context of a dream and is originated solely from the dreamer, the dreamer might never be sure of the meaning of her dreamed language. Here the problem appears to be that the dreamer has no contact to the outer world in order to secure the meaning of her language. This drawback might be soothed by tying the dream language more to the external world.

Accordingly, since the dreamer of the second scenario had reliable contact to the external world, she is acquainted with external objects and with language as a representing and intermediating means. So, there is no need to assume an autonomous creativity for the dreamer. However, the language of such a dreamer is still private. Even if it stems from the dreamers former contact to the real world, there is still no independent authority in the context of the dream that might assure the meaning of a dreamed word. So, the dreamer could dream of a chair and dream to utter 'chair' to point at it, but she would have no assurance whether the word 'chair' is representing the entity she dreams of.

Similarly, the dreamer of the everyday version of the dream argument does not need to be capable of inventing mental content autonomously. Because of her periodic contact to the external world the meaning of her language is solidified. Yet even here the dreamer has no independent assurance of the meaning of her dreamed words. So, finally, it seems that the verdict of being a private language prevails and that a dream language is impossible.

However, from my point of view, there are still two moves for a skeptic to escape the fatal verdict. She might put more weight on the everyday experience of speaking in dreams. Accordingly, many people would be reluctant to deny the significance of what was said in their dreams. Therefore, the skeptic might argue that the periodic contact to the external world might sufficiently assure the dreamer in her usage of words for carrying them over into her dream world.

Secondly, suppose the dreamer's language is coincidentally in a perfect correlation with her dream world, i.e. every time the dreamer dreams of a certain situation and utters a sentence in that dream, this sentence is perfectly appropriate. This assumption makes the language of the dreamer reliable by hypothesis. However, one can argue that despite the assumed reliability of her language the dreamer has no *justification* for its reliability. This lack of justification is sufficient to deny the status of a proper language. But, from my point of view, in terms of linguistic practice there is no conceivable difference between a world with a perfectly parallel language and a world where the meaning can be additionally justified by relying on other persons. Suppose that the dreamer dreams of a chair and of how she describes it to some other person in her dream. Now, how does the dreamer realize that her usage of words is not justified? In the real world the speaker simply relies on the feedback from her listener

and adjusts her speech to the reaction she receives. But for the dreamer the situation is practically the same. Since the listeners in the dream are part of the dream world and their linguistic practice is thus perfectly parallel to the dream world by hypothesis, the dreamer cannot recognize that the meaning of her words lacks justification. So even if the dreamed language would be a private language in the sense of being encapsulated into a solitary mind, there is no possibility to reveal it to the dreamer in that skeptical scenario.

To sum up, different dream scenarios have differently strong assumptions to ground the possibility of a language in a dream. The gravest problem for such languages is that of being a private language. But according to the two counterarguments above, this problem is not as fatal as it might seem. A skeptic might still argue that as a dreamer she might have had reliable contact to the external world, getting properly acquainted with its objects and language and thereafter being in a dream where her language could be in an absolute concord with the dream world. In the end, her hypothesis of being possibly in a dream will still remain meaningful, linguistically at least.

A Privileged Access to Other Minds

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Introduction:

In this paper, I will argue that there is not only a privilege of first-person-reference, but also one of third-person-reference. I will show that other persons can refer to *all* mental states of a person in a way the person herself cannot. I will conclude that, therefore, the possibilities of first-person-reference from a third-person-perspective are limited.

I will proceed in the following way: I will firstly introduce a short common-sense theory about reference to mental states. I will secondly show, how this theory implies privileges for a person's reference to her *own* mental states as well as privileges for person to refer to mental states of others. Thirdly I will compare these two privileges of *first*-person-reference and *third*-person-reference. I will conclude that the possibilities of first-person-reference from a third-person-perspective are limited.

1. A simple theory about reference to mental states: RMS

I will introduce RMS, a simple theory how persons can refer *with* mental states *to* mental states. I use the term "mental state" to denote various phenomena such as beliefs, experiences, hopes or fears, although the following argumentation primarily concerns beliefs.

The theory RMS consists of the following theses:

RMS:

RMS1: Persons can have mental states.

RMS2: Persons can refer with mental states to something in the world.

RMS3: Persons can refer with mental states to *single* and to *all own* mental states.

RMS4: Persons can refer with mental states to *single* and to *all* mental states of *other* persons.

RMS5: Mental states can be self-referential.

RMS6: Every mental state belongs to exactly one person.

I will now give simple examples for each of these single theses of RMS. Most of these examples might be uncontroversial, some are possibly not.

Examples for person with mental states are:

- Peter believes that Mary's car is green.
- Robert is convinced that the earth is flat.

Peter's belief refers to Mary and her car, if they exist. Robert's conviction refers to the earth.

Examples for persons who refer with mental states to single mental states are:

- Descartes conviction that he has currently a sensation of a hand refers to his sensation of a hand.

- Henry's belief that Mary believes that the earth is round refers to Mary's belief that the earth is round.

In the first example a person refers to an own mental state, in the second example a person refers to a mental state of another person.

Examples for persons who refer with mental states to all beliefs of a person are:

- Michael's belief that all his beliefs are justified refers to all his beliefs.
- Michael's belief that everything the pope believes is true refers to all the beliefs of the pope.

In the first example, a person refers to all her *own* mental states of a particular type, in the second example a person refers to all mental states of a particular type of another person. The first example is also an example for a self-referring belief.

RMS6 states that every mental state belongs to exactly one person. On the one hand, it excludes mental states which do not belong to any person at all. On the other hand, it implies that two persons cannot share one and the same mental state: If two persons P_a and P_b believe, for example, that the earth is round, they possess mental states of the same modus "belief" and with the same content, "the earth is round", but, nevertheless the beliefs of P_a and P_b are not identical. They might be two tokens of the same type concerning modus and content of mental states, but, nevertheless, one token belongs to P_a and the other token belongs to P_b .

The theory RMS is a concise theory about reference to mental states. I think it corresponds widely to the philosophical common sense concerning this topic.

2. Implications of RMS

I will now show that the simple theory RMS implies various differences and asymmetries between the ways, persons can refer to *own* mental states and the ways they can refer to mental states of *others*. I will argue that there is a privilege of first-person-reference in the sense that a person P_a can refer to her own mental states in a way another person P_b cannot refer to the mental state of P_a . But I will also demonstrate that there is privilege of third-person-reference on the other hand: P_b can refer to mental states of P_a in a way P_a herself cannot do it.

2.1 The privilege of first-person-reference

I will, firstly, explain the privilege of first-person-reference. Generally speaking, there are two possible ways for a person to refer to own mental states MS_1, \dots :

Case 1:

- P refers with the mental state MS_e to her own mental states MS_1, \dots and MS_e is *not* identical with one of the mental states MS_1, \dots to which it refers to.

Case 2:

- P refers with the mental state MS_e to own mental states MS_1, \dots and MS_e is identical with one of the mental states MS_1, \dots to which it refers to.

In the first case, P refers *with* an *additional* mental state to her own mental states. In the second case, P refers *without* an additional mental state to them. Therefore it holds:

- P can refer *with* an additional mental state to own mental states *and* P can refer *without* an additional mental state to them.

This thesis only state that in cases of first-person reference, there are mental states, to which a person can refer without additional mental states; it does not state that this is possible for every mental state.

In case 2, MS_e is identical with one the mental states to which it refers to. Hence MS_e is self-referential in the second case. But given certain mental states, a person can refer with an additional *and* self-referential mental state to each of these mental states. Hence, self-referentiality is *necessary* but *not sufficient* for reference without additional mental states.

In a next step, I will investigate the possibilities of third-person-reference, i.e. a person's reference to mental states of other persons. RMS6 states that every mental state belongs to exactly one person. Hence, two persons cannot share one and the same mental state i.e. mental states of different persons are always distinct and never identical. This also holds in cases of reference to mental states. If a person P_2 refers with MS_e to mental states MS_1, \dots of another person P_1 , then MS_e is not identical with one of the mental states of P_1 , to which it refers. The reason is simply that MS_e is a mental state of P_2 and MS_1, \dots are mental states of P_1 . Therefore it holds:

- P_2 can refer with an additional mental state to mental states of another person P_1 but P_2 *cannot* refer to them without an additional one.

Hence, the possibilities of third-person-reference are restricted to reference *with* additional mental states.

There are two possible ways, a person can refer to own mental states: *with* and *without* additional mental states. But there is only one way a person can refer to mental states of other persons: *with* an additional mental state. If P_1 has certain mental states MS_1, \dots , then P_1 can refer to these mental states with or without an additional mental state, but P_2 can only refer to them with an additional one. Therefore, there is a way, a person can refer to own mental states, but another person cannot refer to them, namely *without* an additional mental state. I call this the privilege of first-person-reference. Hence, it has been shown that the small theory RMS implies that there is a privilege of first-person-reference.

2.2 The privilege of third-person-reference

I will next show that RMS also implies a privilege of third-person-reference: Other persons can refer to mental states of a person in a way the person herself cannot refer to them. RMS3 states that persons can refer to single *own* mental states as well as to *all* own mental states. RMS4 states the same for reference to mental states of other persons. If a person P refers with a mental state MS_e to all her own mental states, then MS_e itself is a mental state of P and P also refers to MS_e itself. If a person refers with a particular mental state to all her own mental states, then the referring mental state is identical with one of the mental states to which it refers to. Therefore it holds:

- A person can only refer to *all* her own mental states *without* an additional mental state, but *not with* an additional mental state.

This restriction only holds in cases of reference to *all* own mental states. There are no problems for person to refer with an additional mental state to single own mental states or to classes of own mental states, as long as these classes do not include *all* mental states of the person.

A person P_1 can *only* refer to all her mental states *without* an additional mental state. In contrast to this, another Person P_2 can refer to all the mental states of P_1 *with* an additional mental state. Therefore, another person can refer to all mental states of a person in a way the person herself cannot refer to them, namely *without* an additional mental state. Therefore, the possibilities for persons to refer to own mental states are restricted in cases of reference to *all* own mental states. Other persons are not restricted in the same way. I call the ability of a person to refer to all mental states of another person with an additional mental state the privilege of third-person-reference.

2.3 the privileges of first-person-reference and of third-person-reference compared

It has been shown that RMS, a simple common-sense theory about reference, implies that the possibilities for person to refer to mental states of other persons and the possibilities to refer to own mental states are both restricted, but they are restricted in different aspects. The resulting privileges of first-person-reference and of third-person-reference can be summarized and compared in the following way:

The possibilities of first-person-reference:

- A person can refer *without* an additional mental state to *single* own mental states and to *all* own mental states.
- A person can refer *with* an additional mental state to *single* own mental states but *not* to *all* own mental states.

The possibilities of third-person-reference:

- A person *cannot* refer *without* an additional mental state to single mental states or to all mental states of another person.
- A person *can* refer *with* an additional mental state to single mental states and to all mental states of another person.

The privilege of first-person-reference:

- P_1 can refer *without* an additional mental state to single own mental states and to all own mental states, but another person P_2 cannot.
- This is the privilege of first-person-reference.
- Hence, there is a privilege of first-person-reference for a person concerning reference to single mental states as well as reference to all mental states.

The privilege of third-person-reference:

- P_2 can refer *with* an *additional* mental state to all mental states of P_1 , but P_1 cannot.
- This is the privilege of third-person-reference.
- Hence, there is a privilege of third-person-reference for persons concerning reference to *all* mental states of another person.

The privilege of first-person-reference concerns reference to single mental states as well as reference to all mental states of a person. In contrast to this, the privilege of third person reference only concerns reference to all mental states of other persons.

3. The problem of first-person-reference from a third-person-perspective

It has been argued that persons can refer to own mental states with or without additional mental states. In contrast to this, persons can only refer to mental states of other person by having an *additional* mental state. Hence, it can be defined that a person refers to her own mental state from a *third-person-perspective* iff she refers to it with an additional mental state. From this definition and from the privileges of third-person-reference it follows:

- A person can refer to single own mental states from a third-person-perspective, but not to all own mental states.
- No reference of a person to all own mental states is a reference from a third-person-perspective.

The intuition behind is the following: Persons can imitate a third-person-perspective in referring to own mental states, by referring to them with an *additional* mental state. In these cases, persons step, metaphorically speaking, out of themselves in order to refer with mental states to own mental states. By doing this, a person imitates the reference of others to her own mental states.

But the possibilities of this first-person-reference from a third-person-perspective are limited: Nobody can step totally outside herself in order to refer with an additional mental state to all her own mental states. Hence, the possibilities for a first-person-reference from a third-person-perspective are limited. This is a privilege of third-person-reference.

If a certain context demands that a person can only refer to own mental states correctly, if she refers to them from a third-person-perspective, then a person cannot refer correctly to all her own mental states. One example for such a context might be the self-reflection of a person in a philosophical context. I call the impossibility for a person to refer to all own mental states from a third-person-perspective the problem of first-person-reference from a third-person-perspective.

Conclusion:

I introduced a concise common sense theory about reference to mental states and showed that this theory implies that there is a privilege of *first-person-reference* concerning single and all own mental states on the one hand and a privilege of *third-person-reference* concerning all mental states of other persons on the other hand. The privilege of *third-person-reference* implies that nobody can refer to all own mental states from a *third-person-perspective*. It is philosophically well known that persons are privileged in referring to own mental states. But it might have been neglected, that there is a way in which other persons are privileged too.

Textfraktale der nationalen Beziehungen im Kontext der Sprachspiele Ludwig Wittgensteins

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1. Selbstähnlichkeit als Verfahren zur Ermittlung von nationalen Beziehungen im „Legitimationsdiskurs“, der die Möglichkeit der Sprachspiele ausschließt.

Es fällt sofort auf, dass in der Literatur, die die Entwicklung der Nationalitäten in Russland thematisiert, das prädikative Feld der nationalen Beziehungen semantischfraktaler Natur ist. In Textfragmenten wiederholt sich unendlich oft die attributive Charakteristik „national“ in Bezug auf jedes Beziehungssubjekt. In dieser Literatur lesen wir über nationale Theater, nationale Modetage, über Wochen der nationalen Küche, ganz abgesehen von Nationalbanken, Nationalwirtschaft, Nationalstaaten und dergl. Das Bildungsschema der Textfraktale der attributiven Charakteristik „national“ ist überaus einfach und stellt eine Rekursion von Diskursen über das Nationale dar, die aus einer bestimmten Anzahl von Teilen zusammengesetzt ist, derer jeder einzelne Teil dem Gesamtdiskurs über das Nationalsubjekt ähnlich ist. (Unter Textfraktalen verstehen wir sich potentiell unendlich oft wiederholende Textelemente). Die Textanalyse hat ergeben, dass allen Völkern Russlands das Gefühl der Zugehörigkeit zu einer Familie eigen ist. Alle leben als ein Verband gleicher und freier Völker. Als gemeinsame, sich im Text wiederholende Tendenzen ihrer nationalen Entwicklung gelten ihr Aufblühen und ihre gegenseitige Annäherung. Als Nationen wurden sowohl Völker bezeichnet, die in der Welt der Industriemoderne leben, als auch die Bevölkerung der überwiegend traditionell landwirtschaftlich geprägten Regionen und sogar die im Stadium der Urgesellschaft lebenden Völker.

Die Geschichte Russlands zeugt davon, dass sogar zweihundert Jahre nach der Besiedlung Sibiriens durch die russischen Kolonisten, zu Beginn der Bildung der UdSSR „etwa 10 Mio. Bewohner der nationalen Randgebiete ein Nomadenleben führten und Züge der urgemeinschaftlichen Ordnung beibehielten“¹. In dieser Region bestanden auf der Übergangsetappe zur Idee der nationalen Beziehungen Stammes-, Sippen- und ethnische Gemeinschaftsbeziehungen nebeneinander. In jeder dieser vornationalen Gemeinschaften stellte man sich die nationalen Beziehungen hypothetisch als Voraussetzung zur Herausbildung eines gereiften Phänomens vor. Zu seiner Zeit meinte Hegel, dass die Herausbildung der Logik sich eigentlich nicht in der „Wissenschaft der Logik“, sondern in der „Phänomenologie des Geistes“ vollzieht, mit anderen Worten: das Werden eines Wesens verläuft nicht in der Lehre über das Wesen, sondern in der ihr vorhergehenden Lehre über das Sein. Diese Herangehensweise ist auch für unser Forschungsziel akzeptabel. Bei der Analyse des Feldes der rekursiven attributiven Charakteristiken der Beziehungen in vornationalen Gemeinschaften sehen wir darin bestimmte Fragmente, die der Grundidee der Existenz von Stammes-, Sippen- und ethnischer Gemeinschaft widersprechen. Heterogene Gemeinschaften, die sich durch Textfraktale beschreiben, sehen äußerst merkwürdig aus, insofern jede Gemeinschaft ihren besonderen Existenzsinn

hat, der das Prinzip der Selbstähnlichkeit der nationalen Gemeinschaft widerlegt, welches das fraktale Prinzip der Struktur der Textdefinitionen ursprünglich enthält.

2. Rekursive Verfahren, die für Textfraktalgewinnung über die nationalen Beziehungen in der „Epoche der großen Narrationen“ verwendet werden.

Indem man im Rahmen eines polyethnischen Staates unterschiedliche Sozialgemeinschaften verschiedener Art vereint, bekommt man ein implizit berechenbares Feld der attributiven Charakteristiken, das freie heterogene Lebenssinne enthält, die das Wesen eines Stammes, einer Sippe, einer ethnischen Gemeinschaft und einer werdenden Nation bestimmen. Nach jeder rekursiven Selbstbestimmung muss das Subjekt in seiner philosophischen Reflexion auf seine Grundlage zurückgreifen, um jede funktional gewonnene Definition auf Übereinstimmung mit dieser Grundlage zu überprüfen. Falls die Vollendung des Rekursionszyklus darauf hinweist, dass eine einheitliche Subjektgrundlage nicht vorhanden ist, oder, genauer gesagt, nicht auffindbar ist, so kommen die Stammes-, Sippen- und ethnische Gemeinschaften auf ihren eigenen Existenzsinn zurück. Dabei wird die einheitliche Herausbildung einer nationalen Gemeinschaft in eine Vielzahl lokaler Bildungsprozesse verschiedenartiger Subjekte zerspalten. In diesem Austausch sucht jedes Subjekt im Diskurs der Selbstbestimmung des Anderen seine eigenen Episteme und Lebenszweckkategorien; werden diese nicht gefunden, so geben die Subjekte das Bestreben zum interkulturellen Dialog auf. Der Staat versucht ständig den unterbrochenen Austausch zwischen den Subjekten zu stimulieren, er aktiviert interkulturelles Zusammenwirken ideologisch; dieses wird tatsächlich mit Unterstützung des Staates wiederaufgenommen, aber die Kommunikation der Subjekte ist dabei nicht immanent, sondern transzendent, da sie als Ergebnis der Einflussnahme von außen erfolgt und nicht durch eigene Intentionen bedingt ist.

In der „Epoche der großen Narrationen“, wenn der Staat sich anschickt, seine innere Struktur mithilfe rekursiver attributiver Charakteristiken zu bestimmen, bilden die Ideologeme der Staatseinheit eine Aussagenlogik, die entsprechend den üblichen Algorithmen und Quantoren aufgebaut ist. In der philosophischen Logik Hegels kommen Begriffe wie Zentralität oder Totalität vor². Ebendieser Algorithmus der Zentralität schafft in den Selbstbestimmungen ein Feld der sogenannten primitiv-rekursiven Funktionen, indem der bekannte Algorithmus und der Quantor der Totalität uns ständig auf die traditionelle Form der logischen Aussagen zurückführen (Alle A sind B), dabei führt die Veränderung der Quantorvariablen zu keinerlei Veränderungen im Inhalt der Aussage. Der Algorithmus der Zentralität und der Quantor der Totalität installieren in der Aussage die Beziehungen der Gegensätze (der Extreme) – einer unendlichen Zentralität und totalen Unselb-

¹ Karr E. *Geschichte des Sowjetrusslands*. Buch. I: Band 1 u. 2. - M., Progress, 1990, S. 153.

² Siehe. Hegel G.W.F. *Wissenschaft der Logik. Teil drei. Die Lehre vom Begriff*. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften. Band.1. - M., Mysl, 1974, S. 387-399. (in russischer Übersetzung).

ständigkeits der Subjekte. Auf diesem Algorithmus sind die meisten gegenwärtigen Aussagen über die nationalen Beziehungen aufgebaut, die mit Schlussfolgerungen über die Gefahr des Separatismus, über das einheitliche und unteilbare Territorium eines Staates, über die Unmöglichkeit der Abspaltung und Trennung der Teile vom Ganzen, über die unermüdliche Sorge für die Festigung der Staatsmacht als das höchste Wohl Russlands untermauert sind. Im Endeffekt bekommt die vorhandene Gesamtheit der Aussagen eine Struktur des Textfraktals, das eine Vorstellung über die Quasiganzheit mit einer primitiven Struktur schafft, die dazu unfähig ist, die bestehende Einheitlichkeit in ihren Grenzen zu bewahren und zur Eigen deformation, zur Zersplitterung in eine Vielzahl von anderen Quasiganzheiten geneigt ist, was der Zerfall der UdSSR bestätigte, der trotz der ständigen Versicherungen der unzerstörbaren Einheit des sowjetischen Imperiums erfolgt ist.

3. Sprachspiele Wittgensteins als Verfahren zur Überwindung der fraktalen Selbstähnlichkeit beim Definieren des Nationalen

Wie kann man die unendliche Selbstähnlichkeit beim Definieren des Nationalen vermeiden, wenn man einerseits als Nation ein Volk bezeichnet, das im Stadium der Urgesellschaft lebt, und zugleich ein Volk, das eine Industrierevolution unter Verwendung von Rohstoff- und Finanzmärkte vollzieht?

Nach dem Zerfall der UdSSR sind die Aussagen über Gleichberechtigung, brüderliche Freundschaft, stetiges Aufblühen und umfassende gegenseitige Annäherung nicht verschwunden, sie verschoben sich auf die Peripherie des Diskurses über das Nationale. Rekursive Definitionen sind erhaltengeblieben, haben aber einen neuen Algorithmus bekommen: Ganzheit (in der Terminologie von Hegel: unbeschädigte Ganzheit); die Fläche der Aussagen verringerte sich, dafür gewannen sie aber an Tiefe dank des neuen Quantors der Besonderheit, das den Quantor der Totalität ablöste. Seitdem das System der

Sprechkommunikationen immer komplizierter wurde, bot sich in Bezug auf das Nationale, wie Wittgenstein es auch vermutet hatte, als er den Begriff Sprachspiele eingeführt hatte, die Möglichkeit zur Analyse der semantischen Logik von möglichen Nationalwelten. Das führte zum Beispiel J. Hintikka vor, indem er die Regeln von Sprachspielen im Rahmen von Epistemologie und Semantik verglich³. Der Vergleich von Modellen der möglichen Welten stellte eine Pluralität von Diskurspraktiken fest im Gegensatz zu dem strengen ideologischen „Legitimationsdiskurs“ im Rahmen des Algorithmus der Zentralität und des Quantors der Totalität. Schon die Möglichkeit der Existenz von Diskursvielfältigkeit des Nationalen ist in der Theorie der Sprachspiele von Wittgenstein festgehalten und hat eine weitere Entwicklung in der modalen Semantik und Epistemologie erfahren. Als Sprachspiel bezeichnet Wittgenstein „...ein einheitliches Ganzes: Sprache und Handeln, mit dem sie verflochten ist“⁴. Aufgrund der Beschreibung des Autors kann das Sprachspiel als zentraler Begriff der modernen nichtklassischen Sprachphilosophie, der von Wittgenstein definiert wurde, auch als philosophisches Verfahren aufgefasst werden, das es ermöglicht, erstens, eine Vielfalt von Sprachmodellen der Welt als unbeabsichtigten sozialen Erfindungen zu schaffen und, zweitens, eine verbale Beschreibung von Modellen der realen soziokulturellen Erfahrung zu liefern, die in den neuen rekursiven Definitionen des Nationalen festgelegt ist.

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³ Siehe. Hintikka J. "Game theoretical semantics: insights and prospects" in *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, 1982, vol. 23, p. 219-241.

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Wittgenstein's Conception of Moral Universality

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A major criticism of particularist readings of Wittgenstein is arbitrariness and incommensurability. It can have no meaningful account of moral conflict because people who do not agree on a certain issue may simply have different language games and forms of life (Holtzman and Leich 1981). In such a case, they do not really disagree; they do not understand each other. They do not play the same language game or are incapable of playing the same language game because they have different forms of life. Critics claim that if they have no justification for judging as they do other than fact that they are trained or predisposed to judge that way turns their judgment into biases. While historical particularists present a communal criteria for evaluating judgments, these criteria when opposed by other practices turns out to be nothing but another preference which cannot be criticized. Thus, it becomes impossible to criticize other people's practices however unjust we think them to be (e.g. female genital mutilation, suttee, etc.)

Given this limitation, is it really accurate to interpret Wittgenstein as a particularist? Does Wittgenstein's discussion of rule following imply that morality is the mere endorsement of preferences, communal or otherwise? Given Wittgenstein's emphasis on the priority of approaching problems via particular language games does it make sense to assert that Wittgenstein has a conception of Universality at all? When we reason about morality, is it best to approach it via principles that allow us to be consistent with previous cases? Or is the very notion of consistency, of going on in the same way, different in every case?

Another look at how Wittgenstein's rule following considerations relates with the nature of language games and shared forms of life will show the falsity of this dichotomy. There are universal principles but those universal principles allow for different application in varying cases. While not excluding the possibility of identifying violations of the principle, judgment on the varying ways of responding to moral requirements need not conflict with the presence of universal principles; they are even mutually determining. This notion of moral universality, however, can at best be presented in form of a paradox.

Wittgenstein's conception of moral objectivity: the paradox of universality

We learn rules via language games and language games are possible because we share a form of life. But a form of life is not to be understood as a mere convention made possible by social pressure or human agreement. This puts human agreement in an external rather than internal relationship with the creations of rules and concepts, and confuses Wittgenstein's stand with conventionalism (Baker and Hacker 1985). In applying a concept or rule, we do not decide individually or communally. Though there are still different ways of applying the rule, we all experience a natural compulsion to apply the rule in one way rather than the other. This agreement or natural compulsion is non linguistic and inarticulate as it is part of the very framework through which language games are possible.

When we say we will use a word this way we do not just agree to it in words. There are uses of words that sound awkward or appear too artificial to be successfully put into practice. There is a natural acceptability that comes with the use of certain words that is independent of individual or communal preference. We take them for granted and notice them only when they are violated. This natural agreement on action which precede any linguistic articulation is a form of life. This agreement is the initial condition not the result of language use. In so far as, following a rule is also part of a form of life, the particular applications of a moral principle can be viewed as something that is independent of both individual and communal preference. This makes it possible to identify mistakes made by individual and community or to evaluate whether a practice is evil or not.

This is not to situate criticism and evaluation from a view that is external to human responses. What is emphasized is that there is a regularity that characterizes those responses that becomes the basis through which conventions and customs become possible. See for example the distinct human forms of life necessary for an ostensive definition to be intelligible. Does 'This' refer to the object, to a feature of the object, to the pointing gesture? (PI 6,28,38,45) Though an ostensive definition can be misunderstood in many ways, the fact that we share a form of life allows it to be understood in the same way. This is not to say that there is only one form of life or that our form of life doesn't change. It means that even differences occur within a framework of commonalities which we take for granted.

Form of life refers to the regularity in action and the world which makes the formation of concepts possible. Sometimes it is interpreted in terms of convention but it is more fundamental than convention because it is the means through which conventions become possible. There are different language games and different forms of life. Different language games may come from different or the same form of life. But all language games come from a form of life that is basic to all human beings. (Garver 1994)

Language games and forms of life are mutually determining. Language games are possible because we share a human form of life. These language games allow us to share a form of life that is unique to a community. This form of life in turn allows for the creation of new language games and forms of life and so on. We always create different types of agreements (are on our way to establishing new forms of life) when we engage in language games. Hence, the number and type of language games that can be played is determined by the forms of life or relationships that are established. Dialogues or any linguistic activity are always moves towards a shared form of life.

Moral dilemmas (what McDowell calls hard cases because they cannot be resolved by moral principles) are cases calling for attempts to share a form of life (McDowell 1981). Once we examine via language games, via different perspectives and details, our views overlap no matter how much divergence is left. So while it does call for a creative decision on what to say. This decision is not totally unguided for a shared and often inarticulate sense of what

will count as creative also emerges, such that even if we do not take the same decision we can come to understand or even agree to the decisions others take. This shared sense is also what allows for the recognition of mistakes, even from the perspective of the individual or community itself (Wright 2007). The same thing happens when we acquire the ability to recognize the varied applications of a moral principle while being able to separate it from its violations.

Human forms of life are not static. It is a complex combination of biological disposition, facts of nature, and cultural training that defies any analysis or further simplification because it will fail to give due attention to the part that other aspects play (Garver 1994). Hence, Wittgenstein's stand cannot be reduced to behaviorism, conventionalism, or solipsism. Suffice it to say that it is the changing regularity that those things make possible which allows for the formation of concepts, rules and the acquisition of language.

The only meaningful conception of universality possible is one that is grounded in a changing form of life. Universality is a family resemblance concept. It is a universality that is a matter of degree where the scope is not something fixed or predetermined and the application is always varied. Though that universality cannot be defined or articulated, it is shown in the flux of action. The fact that our criteria for going in the same way may be different and variable does not mean there is no such thing as going on in the same way.

Following a rule both consists of doing the same thing and doing something different at the same time (PI 226). While you are applying the same rule, different situations call for different applications of the rule. Given another situation the same use of the word or rule can be interpreted differently but this does not mean that no rule was followed or that we are now concerned with another rule. Rules can change and yet remain the same. Similarly, the fact that different situations seem to call for different ways of applying a universal moral principle does not mean that there is no such thing as universal moral principle. Universality is an indeterminate concept but it is not meaningless.

Universality becomes nonsensical when its demands are conceived metaphysically; confused with platonic ideals that situate right and wrong applications of a rule from a point of view outside shared human responses to act, feel and understand. Such ideals are incoherent and impossible to satisfy (Craty 2000). This view expresses itself in the notion that rules always need specification so that they will allow for less judgment because the less judgment a rule allows the more objective it becomes. This is also the ideal that inclines us to think that examples are insufficient proof of understanding and that there is something else we have to look for which will fill the gap between a rule and its application.

Wittgenstein's conception of universality and objectivity is not legalistic or deterministic in this sense. Rules even with very elaborate specifications do not pre-empt judgment for the cases where they apply and the ways they can be applied cannot be contained in the rule itself. There will always be room for style and technique in judgment and this is something that cannot be taught or explained. The best that can be done is to give examples of how to go on the same way. It is in those very examples that we are able to grasp the universal, it is in them that the universal exists. As such, Wittgenstein does not offer any thing to fill the gap between the rule and its application

because there is no sense in seeing a gap in the first place.

While Wittgenstein emphasizes judgment amidst variability and difference, he does not idealize differences. There are differences and family resemblance concepts but Wittgenstein does not say that all concepts consist of family resemblances or that family resemblance concepts can have any meaning they have. Family resemblance concepts are permissive, but they also have exclusion criteria. If this were not the case, they would cease to be concepts. There is no such thing as a concept that is totally unbounded by any rule that they can be applied in all cases. Concepts are possible because of rules. Even with family resemblance concepts, there are still rules which determine what particular applications make sense. All judgments, though distinct from rules, are made possible by means of rules.

So Wittgenstein is not saying that we do not employ rules when we attempt to understand or learn. All activities, including moral evaluation, are rule governed. But if we conceive of rules as something that comes prior to the activities, rather than as rules that are discovered or made in the course of those activities, then we will be mistaken. The applications of moral principles do not exist independently from us in the way rails of a train are already there even before the train gets there (PI 218-219). If we think in that manner, we will be unable to distinguish variations of the moral principle from their violations.

Even if the circumstances for the application of the rule are never completely the same, this does not mean that rules do not guide us at all in dealing with different cases. Even if cases are characterized by differences, they also contain similarities that allow us to treat them in the 'same' way. This also does not mean that rules do not need specifications. It means that specification may only be relevant or useful when the need arises. Precision has a limit; rules can only be as precise as the purposes they satisfy. Viewed in this manner, specifications will aid, rather than prevent, us from attending to the needs of different cases.

Thus Wittgenstein's view on how to approach morality via language games and forms of life to account for both the sensitivity to different cases and the sense of consistency to allow for accounts of justice or fairness. Appeals to language games and forms of life also allow or may even require the use of moral principles. They also do not amount to the mere endorsement of preferences because they are the brute conditions of sense. Also, they are still able to provide independent criteria for identifying mistakes which makes it possible for the community to evaluate even the morality of their own practices.

This view leaves everything as it is. It does not count as another account of moral universality and objectivity in place of Platonism. An account of universality grounded in evolving language games and forms of life should not be interpreted as a thesis on relativism or even as another thesis on objectivity. It merely undercuts unreasonable demands on how we conceive of objectivity and universality in the actual guidance and adjudication of moral judgments.

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Language and Logic in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, or Why "an Elementary Proposition Really Contains All Logical Operations in Itself" (TLP 5.47)

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1. Pictures and Truth-Functions: The 'Twofold Account' Reading

The following is a natural reading of Wittgenstein's account of elementary and molecular propositions, and thus of language and logic, in the *Tractatus*: first we have the so-called picture theory, the account of the representational nature of language, according to which propositions are logical likenesses of what they represent, because they share logical form with states of affairs. The claim that propositions are pictures, however, directly applies only to "the simplest kind of proposition" (Wittgenstein 1961, 4.21), namely to what Wittgenstein calls elementary propositions.

Wittgenstein accounts for complex (molecular) propositions by considering them as truth-functions of elementary propositions (cf. 5), the result of the application of truth-operations to elementary propositions. Truth-functionality also grounds Wittgenstein's account of logic; propositions of logic are tautologies (and contradictions), the two "extreme cases" (Wittgenstein 1961, 4.46) of the truth-functional construction of propositions out of elementary ones. In this sense, propositions of logic are simply a particular case, a sub-set, of truth-functional molecular propositions.

According to this reading of the relation between language and logic in the *Tractatus*, which I call the 'twofold account reading', therefore, Wittgenstein provides two *different* and *distinct* accounts of language (the pictorial and the truth-functional) and bases his understanding of the tautological nature of logic on a prior understanding of the nature of linguistic representation (in fact, in order to give an account of propositions in terms of truth-functions of elementary ones, one seems compelled to give a prior account of elementary propositions, and this is the purpose of the picture theory).

2. The Need for a Unified Account

The one sketched above, however, although indeed natural, cannot be a correct interpretation of Wittgenstein's conception of language and logic in the *Tractatus*. There is evidence, in fact, that Wittgenstein rejected the 'twofold account' reading.

As early as 1912, Wittgenstein wrote to Russell that the problems of logical constants and apparent variables will be solved as soon as a correct understanding of the nature of atomic (or elementary) propositions is reached (cf. Wittgenstein 1979, 121). In a 1915 entry from the *Notebooks*, Wittgenstein claims that "the problems of negation, of disjunction, of true and false, are only reflections of the one great problem" (Wittgenstein 1979, 40), where the latter amounts to "explaining the nature of the proposition" (Wittgenstein 1979, 39). In both passages Wittgenstein suggests that understanding the nature of a (atomic) proposition will put one in a position to understand the nature of logic (of logical constants) as well, for the problems of propositional and logical complexity are only by-

product of the problem of providing an account of sentential complexity. In the *Tractatus* this view, although not discussed in such general terms, is maintained; Wittgenstein gives it expression by claiming that all logical operations/constants are present in an elementary proposition:

An elementary proposition really contains all logical operations in itself. [...] Wherever there is compositeness, argument and function are present, and where these are present, we already have all the logical constants. (Wittgenstein 1961, 5.47)

All of this seems in overt opposition to the 'twofold account' reading. Wittgenstein does not seem to hold that an account of elementary propositions should differ from an account of molecular propositions; indeed, he seems to be saying that the latter is contained in the former, and that an understanding of the former problem will therefore imply an understanding of the latter as well.

Secondly, the 'double account' reading, as noted, relies on the idea that the nature of logic is to be explained by means of a prior understanding of linguistic sense (by a prior account of the sense of elementary propositions); but, since Wittgenstein claims that all logical constants are already given by an elementary proposition, then understanding the nature of the (elementary) proposition (which the *Tractatus* discusses in terms of pictorial character) will be tantamount to understanding the nature of logic, for everything that is needed for an account of logic is already implied in the workings of elementary propositions. What Wittgenstein seems to be upholding, thus, is an account of linguistic representation that is by itself able to explain the nature of logical relations between propositions.

It is by no means easy, however, to assess Wittgenstein's general idea that the nature of logic is to be made clear by a correct understanding of the nature of the proposition; in particular, the main difficulty seems to be that of providing a plausible account of what Wittgenstein really meant with his claim that all logical constants are already to be found in an elementary proposition. In the remainder of this paper I propose to outline such an account by relying on Wittgenstein's conceptions of sense and a-b function in the *Notes on Logic* and of a picture and a truth-function in the *Tractatus*.

3. Sense, Truth and Logical Operations

Although in the *Notes on Logic* Wittgenstein does not claim that all that is needed for an understanding of logic is already contained in the nature of the proposition, his discussion of the interlocked notions of sense, bipolarity and truth-function seems to provide an account of language and logic that implements that general idea.

According to the *Notes on Logic*, a proposition has a sense – and therefore is bipolar (namely essentially true or false) – because it has a form (besides names) among its components. Wittgenstein conceives of the form of a pro-

position as operating a *discrimination* between facts in the world; for this reason propositions can be metaphorically be described as being like *arrows*:

Names are points, propositions arrows – they have *sense*. The sense of a proposition is determined by the two poles *true* and *false*. The form of a proposition is like a straight line, which divides all the points of a plane into right and left. The line does this automatically, the form of a proposition only by convention. (Wittgenstein 1979, 101-102)

How does the form of a proposition make it effect a discrimination (or division) between facts? This Wittgenstein discusses in a famous (albeit rather obscure) passage from the *Notes*, where he considers the way in which the form of a proposition symbolises.

Let us consider symbols of the form 'xRy'; to these correspond primarily pairs of objects, of which one has the name 'x', the other the name 'y'. [...] I now determine the sense of 'xRy' by laying down: when the facts behave in regard to 'xRy' so that the meaning of 'x' stands in the relation *R* to the meaning of 'y', then I say that they [the facts] are of 'like sense' with the proposition 'xRy': otherwise, 'of opposite sense'; I correlate the facts to the symbol 'xRy' by thus dividing them into those of like sense and those of opposite sense. [...] Thus I understand the form 'xRy' when I know that it discriminates the behaviour of *x* and *y* according as these stand in the relation *R* or not. In this way I extract from all possible relations the relation *R*, as by a name, I extract its meaning from all possible things" (Wittgenstein 1979, 104).

As I read this passage, a proposition is given a sense by its form (which, as said, is one of its components) that discriminates between two classes of facts, of *like* and *opposite* sense. The form *xRy* discriminates couples of things related by the relation *R* from couple of things that are not so related, and thus distinguishes facts of like sense from facts of opposite sense. The form of a proposition thus gives it the *possibility* of being true or false, by means of the discrimination between facts it operates, and is thus responsible for its *bipolarity*. In order to stress that truth and falsity are intrinsic to its sense, Wittgenstein writes a proposition, *p* for instance, as *a-p-b*, where *a* and *b* are the true/false poles, and he goes on equating a proposition's true/false poles with its sense.

Every proposition is essentially true-false: to understand it, we must know both what must be the case if it is true, and what must be the case if it is false. Thus a proposition has two *poles*, corresponding to the case of its truth and the case of its falsehood. We call this the *sense* of a proposition. (Wittgenstein 1979, 98-99)

Now, this account of sense is crucial for understanding Wittgenstein's notion of propositional and logical articulation. In the *Notes on Logic* molecular propositions are called a-b functions (the *Tractatus* will call them truth-functions); a-b functions, as well as elementary propositions, have a-b poles (are essentially true/false), and therefore effect discriminations between classes of facts.

The a-b functions use the discriminations of facts, which their arguments bring forth, in order to generate new discriminations. (Wittgenstein 1979, 105)

The link between the notion of an elementary and a molecular proposition is provided by the notion of discrimination between facts, above analysed. An elementary proposition is true or false because its form discriminates between two classes of facts, of like and opposite sense. a-b functions (complex propositions) simply exploit the dis-

criminations made by the (forms of) elementary propositions occurring as truth-arguments in them. A proposition's having a-b poles, truth-conditions, is thus everything that is needed in order to account for propositional and logical articulation, because a-b functions simply operate upon elementary propositions' a-b poles to generate propositions with different a-b poles, with different truth-conditions.

In the *Tractatus*, I argue, this conception is maintained. Of course the notation and the terminology is different there. Propositions are no more said to have a-b poles, but T-F (truth-false) ones, that is, the truth-possibilities. Consequently, a-b functions become truth-functions. But Wittgenstein's general position does not change significantly on this issue. Consistently with the *Notes on Logic*, the *Tractatus* claims that it is a proposition's *sense* that makes it intrinsically related to truth and falsity; unlike the old account though, for the *Tractatus* the sense of a proposition is not given by the peculiar nature of one of its components (its form) but by its being a *picture* of a possible situation: "A proposition states something only in so far as it is a picture" (Wittgenstein 1961, 4.03). So a proposition's being a picture makes it true or false: As the *Tractatus* states: "A proposition can be true or false only in virtue of being a picture of reality (Wittgenstein 1961, 4.06).

Why is it only pictures that can be true or false? For Wittgenstein a proposition has sense, and therefore is a picture, only in virtue of being logically articulated (cf. Wittgenstein 1961, 4.032), thus in virtue of being a *structured fact*. This is consistent with the account of sense given in the *Notes on Logic*, where the interplay of names and form determines a proposition to have a (determinate) *structure*. In the *Tractatus* a proposition is more explicitly held to be a *representational* (or *pictorial*) structured fact, that is, a fact representing elements in reality to be combined in the same way as its elements are combined. Its being a representation (a picture) of reality makes therefore the proposition intrinsically true or false; if things in reality are combined as it shows them to be, then the proposition is true, and otherwise false.

In order to express its intrinsic relation to truth and falsity, Wittgenstein sometimes expresses a proposition together with its true-false poles, the proposition *p*, for instance, as T-*p*-F or (TF)(*p*), not differently from what he had done in the *Notes on Logic*. Besides, the account of logical articulation there is consistent with the old one. Complex propositions, truth-functions, do not introduce new elements, but simply, as the *Tractatus* has it, agree or disagree with the possibilities of truth and falsehood of elementary propositions (cf. Wittgenstein 1961, 4.4). Again, everything that is needed in order to account for logical articulation is already in place as soon as a proposition is assigned T-F poles, that is, as soon as a proposition has a *sense* (or, is a picture); such a proposition provides everything that is necessary (T-F poles) for logical operations to be carried out.

Elementary propositions already ensure the possibility of all logical operations, because the latter operate upon a proposition's true-false poles, and get other true-false poles as a result; truth-poles, besides, are given by, and in an important sense *coincide* to, a proposition's having sense. This is the reason why, then, Wittgenstein can claim that an account of the nature of the proposition (its having sense, and thus true-false poles) will by itself be an account of the nature of logical articulation (of logical constants and operations). Nothing more than the former is needed in order to provide an explanation of the latter; in more specific terms, then, this amounts to saying that

propositions, by their having sense and true-false poles, are already given the possibility of having all sorts of logical relations with each other, and thus contain all logical constants in themselves. As Wittgenstein sums this up:

The logical constants of the proposition are the conditions of its truth. (Wittgenstein 1979, 36)

4. Conclusion

The general conception that emerges from Wittgenstein's claim that all logical operations/constants are given by an elementary proposition sees the relation between language and logic as being, as it were, *internal*; the nature of logic is already made clear by a correct understanding of the nature of the proposition, that is, by a correct account of linguistic representation. Logic is internal to language in the sense that it is expressed in language's own capacity to convey thoughts about the world, thoughts that are true or false. Logical relations between propositions are given by propositions' expressing the sense they do, for those relations are already implied by propositions' own nature; this is the reason why the whole of logic is, for Wittgenstein, given at the level of elementary propositions, that is to say, is given as soon as propositions saying something about reality are given.

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Philosophy and Language

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1. Introduction

In the introduction to his anthology about the linguistic turn Rorty evaluates linguistic philosophy (LP). He concludes that LP's attempts, e.g. of logical positivism (cf. Rorty 1967 6), to turn philosophy into a strict science must fail. Submitting, however, that "no one is able to think of any formulations" of traditional philosophical problems which are immune to its sort of criticism, LP has left philosophy with a "merely critical, essentially dialectical, function". Reflecting upon the consequences of this "rather pessimistic" conclusion Rorty "envisages at least six possibilities for the future of philosophy, after the dissolution of the traditional problems" (Rorty 1967 33 f.). These possibilities are divided according to the "metaphilosophical struggles of the future [being centred] on the issue of [linguistic] reform versus description ["of the facts" (Rorty 1967 38)], i.e. of philosophy-as-proposal [about how to talk cf. (Rorty 1967 34); cf. Bergmann's view of philosophy as "linguistic recommendation" (Rorty 1967 8), versus philosophy-as-discovery" [of "specifically philosophical truths" (Rorty 1967 36)]. Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Waismann are assigned to the former, Husserl, Austin and Strawson to the latter camp (Rorty 1967 38, 35).

This paper focuses on the rationale for this division being positioned in the horizons of metaphilosophical struggles of the future as Rorty envisages. It is only if the earlier assessment of the current situation of LP, in view of its success in dissolving the traditional problems is correct that this positioning could be justified. Rorty's calling Strawson "the strongest rival" of Austinian style Oxford Analysis (Rorty 1967 37) adds to the relevance of this assessment.

Taking Strawson's case, I will question this assessment. This impairs the credibility of the suggestion that philosophy should, for its continuation, secure its future role and avert a "post-philosophical culture", the conceivability of which Rorty, incidentally, questions (Rorty 1967 34). This result allows for alternative divisions to the one Rorty provides, not necessarily pointing at a post-philosophical culture. However this does not affect the value of Rorty's division, it does open new battlefields for metaphilosophical struggles in the future.

2. Varieties of linguistic philosophy

Rorty singles out methodological nominalism as a distinctive metaphilosophical assumption of LP. This is the view that if philosophical questions about "concepts, subsistent universals or 'natures' ... cannot be answered by empirical inquiry concerning the behavior or properties of particulars subsumed under [them] and can be answered in *some* way, [it is] by answering questions about the use of linguistic expressions, and in no other way" (Rorty 1967 11 orig. emph.). Both branches of LP, ordinary language and ideal language philosophy (OLP, ILP) share this nominalism (Bergmann 1964 177 in Rorty 1967 8). Observing that LP itself generally does not contain a metaphilosophical justification of this assumption, Rorty preliminarily examines the measure of its being presuppositionless and of its having criteria for success which can be rationally agreed

upon (Rorty 1967 5). This examination leads Rorty to exonerate LP from the charge, advanced by its critics, of being committed to some "substantive philosophical theses". This verdict applies to OLP and ILP alike (Rorty 1967 14). It is based, mainly, on his appreciation of the aforementioned assumption as "*practical*" (Rorty 1967 9 orig. emph.). According to Rorty, this assumption boils down to "a single plausible claim: that we should not ask questions unless we can offer criteria for satisfactory answers to those questions" (Rorty 1967 14).

Thus conceived, Rorty's verdict seems fair enough, insofar as the assumption is restricted to the nature of the philosophical problems to be put on the agenda. It also captures the conventional division of labour as regards the direction of their (dis)solution, i.e. either " ... by reforming language, or by understanding more about the language we presently use" (Rorty 1967 3), as professed by ILP and OLP respectively. It seems less appropriate, however, to pass this verdict on Strawson's programme of descriptive metaphysics.

Strawson "resembles the descriptive analyst in that he wishes to make clear the actual behavior of our concepts", or to describe "the logical behavior of the linguistic expressions of natural languages" (Strawson 1967 318, 316). Strawson also seems committed to methodological nominalism, stating, "to observe our concepts in action is necessarily the only way of finding out what they can and cannot do" (Strawson 1967 319). Strawson's programme of descriptive metaphysics differs from descriptive analysis proper, however, "in scope and generality" (Strawson 1967 318). It is more generally oriented in its attempt to discover (Strawson 1967 320) and exhibit the general structure of our conceptual apparatus (Strawson 1967 318), thus trying to fill "the gap between contingent truths about linguistic behavior and necessary truths about language as such" (Rorty 1967 37). And by submitting that the "actual use of linguistic expressions remains his sole and essential point of contact with the *reality* which he wishes to understand, conceptual reality" (Strawson 1967 320 my emph.) Strawson indeed seems to extend the scope of linguistic analysis by making a, what one might call 'metaphysical ascent', i.e. a shift from a "description of linguistic usage" (Strawson 1967 313) to descriptive metaphysics (Strawson 1957 318).

Calling his endeavour "descriptive metaphysics" is not just a polemic move (cf. Rossi 1993 77) to mock the parochial muddling through of OLP, but it marks Strawson's departure from OLP as understood by Rorty (cf. Rorty 1967 37). OLP involved a reduction of philosophical problems to instances of linguistic usage. An analysis of those expressions, or Strawson's meta-analysis (Rossi 1993 77) of their presuppositions might "increase our conceptual understanding" (Strawson 1967 318, 320). Language must not be a "central *theme*" of such philosophical inquiry. Its "meticulous examin[ation]" of the use of words could be merely regarded as its "central method" (Hacker 2005 14 orig. emph.). By these lights, basic assumptions like "ordinary language is alright" (Wittgenstein 1968 §434) (which is OLP's counterpart of the Misleading Form Thesis (Gamut 1991 214) in ILP), however they presuppose some metaphysical or epistemological preconceptions (Rorty

1967, 1) about the elements or aspects to pick out for analysis ((logical) syntax, (il)locutionary acts, semantics etc.) can be seen as heuristic guidelines about a suitable method of analysis. This inquiry, therefore, remains within the confines of methodological nominalism.

Strawson's metaphysics, by contrast, involves a philosophical (proto-) theory about language. This theory is based on a unified theory of predication which holds claims about the fundamentality of basic universal-particular combinations in epistemology, logic, ontology (spatio-temporal particulars and universals) and grammar (subject and predicate), about the connection between those combinations, and their links with reality. Succinctly put: "grammar reflects logic, logic reflects reality and predication is the key relation that unifies each of the fields and also provides the links between them" (Moravcsik 1978 329 f.). This theory is the core of descriptive metaphysics (cf. "metaphysical grammar" (Ross 1974)) which "attempts to show the natural foundations of our logical, conceptual apparatus in the way things happen in the world, and in our own natures" (Strawson 1967 317). This phrasing suggests a dogmatic conceptualism that seems to take a naturalistic form (see Katz 1990 250 for this terminology). The theory, moreover, is not uncontroversial. Apart from the unclarity of the argument about the fundamentality of the aforementioned basic combinations, due to the mixture of epistemology and ontology, the argument from "*exemplification* as the basic mode of judgment" to the "fundamentality of spatiotemporal particulars", for instance, seems a *non sequitur* (Moravcsik 1978 336, 333 orig. emph.).

Strawson's view on linguistic-conceptual relations resembles "the basic premise of the philosophy of language" Katz advocates, namely "that there is a strong relation between the form and content of language and the form and content of conceptualization" (Katz 1966 4). This similarity adds to the interest of Strawson's controversy with empirical linguistics since it bears upon the demarcation between philosophy and empirical science. Strawson criticizes traditional grammar for its lack of a "general theory" that accounts for the "general principles determining the assignment of [lexical] items to grammatical categories" (Strawson 1971 137). To correct this, Strawson outlines a programme of "Research in Non-Empirical Linguistics" (Strawson 1971 148) that should give an account of the "general semantic types of expression [which] qualify for the basic subject- and predicate-roles in simplest sentences". This programme should yield a "perspicuous grammar" which aims at "finding explanatory foundations for grammar" (Strawson 1971 140, 145 f.). The vindication of this programme's entitlement to deal with this kind of explanation along with its claim to be *a priori*, non-historical (Strawson 1967 317) and to not use statistical methods (Strawson 1967a 323) amounts at the least (*pace* Rorty 1967 26 fn. 48) to a philosophical claim about the proper analysis of language. Conversely, linguistics rivals with philosophy, stating that some persistent philosophical problems can be felicitously represented as questions about the nature of language; and solved by a linguistic theory about logical form as an alternative to a philosophical theory about logical form (Katz 1967 340, 346).

Rorty concedes that his introduction is defective for not "adequately exhibit[ing] the interplay between the adoption of a metaphilosophical outlook and the adoption of substantive philosophical theses" (Rorty 1967 38 f.). By extension, Strawson's exchange with philosophy of language and empirical linguistics should alert us to his adoption of their vocabularies and the changes in the metaphilosophical vocabulary of his descriptive metaphysics that this might cause (cf. 1967 39). Thus, for instance, his no-

tion of 'logical behaviour of expressions' (cf. Rorty 1967 21) could be taken not in its traditional meaning as contrasting with 'grammatical form', nor as referring to a specific level of description like in Chomskyan grammar, but, rather linguistically, in the way it is taken by logical grammar, as the "representation of an expression that determines its meaning" (Gamut 1991 214 ff.). Strawson grants "system-construction ... an ancillary" and "limited" role in "increas[ing] our conceptual understanding" (Strawson 1967 319 f.). Accordingly, his perspicuous grammar could be taken as a version of Montague-grammar, in which "a natural language ... can be represented in its essentials as a formal language". A "modified version", that is, due to "the addition of ... pragmatic-functional factors [e.g. the need to have expressions for identifying, describing etc.]" (Moravcsik 1976 342). This addition secures the "natural foundations of our logical, conceptual apparatus" (cf. Strawson 1967 317). Corollarily, Strawson's quest for "fundamental relations ... between ... general concepts" (Strawson 1967a 321) could be viewed as a modified search for the compositionality of meaning by logical grammar (cf. Gamut 1991 215). Modified, for Strawson's principle of compositionality seems a metaphysical rephrasing of an empirical hypothesis, rather than a methodological principle (cf. Gamut 1991 219). It assumes the existence of "assertible non-relational ties between non-linguistic elements ... i.e. copulatives expanded into terms such as 'is a characteristic of'" (cf. Ross 1974 374).

Strawson's advancement of OLP could, along similar lines, be viewed as a development from a philosophical occupation with linguistic performance to a philosophico-linguistic occupation with linguistic competence (cf. for this distinction (Katz 1967 345)). Corollarily, his notion of conceptual apparatus, insofar as it covers the equipment for linguistic behaviour could be compared with linguistic competence and, incidentally, be regarded as LP's rephrasing of the Kantian transcendental apperception.

Rorty's division of coalitions of philosophers fighting metaphilosophical struggles is suggested by the least common denominator of the philosophers assigned to each group (Rorty 1967 38). Strawson's case shows that it allows on the basis of Rorty's observations for other divisions, cutting across the dichotomy of philosophy-as-proposal and philosophy-as-discovery. They might, perhaps, be more relevant to our times. Thus Strawson could, for his conceptualism, join Husserl and Heidegger, who are separated from their combatants for their repudiation (Rorty 1967 34) of methodological nominalism. Another division would start from Rorty's separation of Waismann and Wittgenstein from Austin and Strawson for their "repudiat[ing] the notion that there are philosophical truths to be discovered and demonstrated by argument" (Rorty 1967 36), but would separate Strawson, in turn, from Austin, given the former's interest in linguistics. Yet other divisions would be those according to the measure or aim by which analytical methods are deployed in the construction of an ideal language or in the analysis of ordinary language. Such a division must not match Bergmann's one between OLP and ILP. Thus, for instance, Strawson, for his acceptance of limited constructionalism in the exercise of "philosophical imagination" (Strawson 1967 317 ff.) could accompany Waismann, who favours the construction of ideal languages to create "new, interesting and fruitful ways of thinking about things in general" (Rorty 1967 34), and this constructionalism would for similar reasons even be alluring to the later Heidegger (Rorty 1967 35).

3. Concluding remarks

By calling philosophy-as-proposal the “direct heir” (Rorty 1967 36) of ILP, Rorty's division preserves, in a way, the self-proclaimed bifurcation in ILP and OLP. His evaluation, geared as it seems by this bifurcation, might perhaps be “a little thin and myopic” (Hacker 2005 10). The above considerations purport to show that the metatheoretical association of Strawson's programme of descriptive metaphysics with methodological nominalism underdetermines its character. This, however, should not lead us to overlook Rorty's highly nuanced and imaginative modulations of the received view about LP. For, as Rorty's case illustrates, a recognition of the dialectics of substantive philosophical theses and metatheoretical adaptations reveals alternative divisions and speculations about the future of philosophy, marking, perhaps, its “progress” as a movement toward a contemporary consensus” (Rorty 1967 2).

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A Contribution to the Debate on the Reference of Substance Terms

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Saul Kripke put forward his theory on the semantics of terms for chemical substances, more briefly denominated *substance terms*, in the wider framework of the semantics of natural kind terms, since the former are paradigmatic examples of the latter; for this reason, I will apply to substance terms the general considerations advanced by him on natural kind terms. Kripke mainly concentrated his considerations concerning substance terms on two of them, to wit, the terms “gold” and “water”, and proposed his theory on this sort of terms in the context of his criticism of the *description theory* and as an alternative to it. Although Kripke’s objections are addressed to the description theory considered as a theory of meaning and as a theory of reference, it is possible to distinguish, as he explicitly concedes, between the description theory regarded as a meaning theory or as a reference theory (see, e.g., Kripke 1980, 59). In the following I will assume that distinction and concentrate on Kripke’s objections against the description theory of reference – for short, *descriptivism* – on substance terms.

It is convenient, however, to add a remark beforehand. There are at least three different ways of conceiving of a substance term’s referent. First, the referent of a substance term is its extension, i.e., the set of samples of the substance in question. Second, its referent is each and every member of that set; in this case it is usually said that the term applies to the members of the set. And lastly the referent of a substance term can be identified with an abstract entity whose instances would be such members. In the following I will not emphasize the difference between those conceptions of a substance term’s referent but will use them rather *indistinctly*, as incidentally Kripke himself usually does.

Kripke’s characterization of descriptivism concerning substance terms is similar to the one regarding proper names. According to him the main thesis of descriptivism on those expressions would be the following: a proper name/substance term refers to/applies to an entity if and only if this entity satisfies most, or a weighted most, of the properties or descriptions associated by the speakers with the name/the term. It is appropriate to make three remarks concerning this thesis.

Firstly, when characterizing descriptivism Kripke talks indistinctly of properties or descriptions, as most advocates of descriptivism do, and so will I in the following. Secondly, supporters of descriptivism concerning proper names, such as Searle and Strawson, do not claim that the reference of a name is determined – as Kripke (1980, 70) claims – by “most, or a weighted most” of the properties or descriptions associated by the speakers with a name, but – in Searle’s and Strawson’s words – by “a sufficient number” of them (Searle 1969, 169; see Strawson 1959, 192), on account of which I will reckon that in the characterization mentioned above the former expression is substituted by the latter. Thirdly, Kripke assumes that the properties that according to descriptivism determine the reference of substance terms are purely general or qualitative properties to which Kripke alludes as properties concerning the external appearances of substances or *superficial properties* – thus in the case of the term “water” such properties would be those of being colourless, transparent, tasteless,

thirst-quenching, etc. –; therefore, the descriptions expressing those properties would be descriptions in purely general terms.

Kripke’s main thesis concerning the determination of the reference or extension of substance terms is that this is determined by *structural* or *underlying* properties of (the samples of) the substance, not by superficial properties. Thus entities with a different underlying property from the samples of a substance do not belong to the extension of the substance term, although they possess the same or very similar superficial properties. Well-known mental experiments presented by Kripke concerning the term “gold” – and by Putnam concerning the term “water” – aim to support that thesis. Although these experiments may be questionable, in the following I will not put such mental experiments under discussion.

The question to be posed is whether descriptivism can accept that not only superficial properties but also structural or underlying properties play a role in the determination of the reference of substance terms. My answer will be *affirmative*.

In order to justify this answer it is appropriate to mention some other features of Kripke’s reference theory on substance terms, which grounds on the extension of his proper names’ theory to such terms. According to Kripke’s theory, substance terms are introduced in an *initial baptism* in which their reference is fixed. Once a substance term has been introduced in an initial baptism, and its reference has been fixed – by structural properties of the samples of the substance involved in the baptism – the reference of the term in its use by speakers not present in the introduction of the term, and hence by most speakers, is determined by a *causal chain* grounding on the initial baptism of the term and hence on the samples of substance involved therein.

We have already mentioned the main thesis of descriptivism concerning proper names and substance terms. Taking into account some of the claims by Searle and Strawson on proper names, and extending them to substance terms, on account of which we will sometimes talk simply of terms, we should make some further remarks on such thesis. Firstly, the descriptions which play the most important role in Searle’s and Strawson’s reference theory are *identifying descriptions*, but they understand this notion in a very broad sense. Thus they include the following three types: “demonstrative presentation, unique description, mixed demonstrative and descriptive identification” (Searle 1969, 86). It is suitable to comment briefly on these three sorts of identifying descriptions. The first one is an ostensive or demonstrative presentation of an object, e.g., “that – over there”, where the space “–” has to be substituted by a general term. The second sort is a description in purely general terms which is true only of one object. The third sort is a description which combines descriptive and indexical resources, e.g., “The man we saw yesterday”. In summary, according to Searle, identifying descriptions include definite descriptions and indexical descriptions – the latter would comprise those of the first and third sort. Thus descriptions in purely general terms are merely one of the kinds of descriptions resorted to by descriptivism.

Therefore, contrary to Kripke's assumption, descriptivism accepts a broad notion of description and hence of property, and it is *not* committed to the thesis that purely general or qualitative properties are the only sort of properties which determine the reference of substance terms.

In this regard it is noteworthy that Kripke admits that descriptivism is in general true concerning initial baptisms: "only in a rare class of cases, usually initial baptisms, are all [...] [the theses of descriptivism] true" (Kripke 1980, 78). Therefore Kripke's objections against descriptivism will be mainly directed *not* to descriptivism concerning the reference of substance terms as used by the speakers that have introduced them but as employed by those to whom these terms have been *transmitted*, i.e., by most speakers or, as Kripke also says, by the average speaker.

One second remark on the main thesis of descriptivism is that the association of properties by speakers is generally tacit or *implicit* rather than explicit (see Strawson 1959, 182, n. 1). Nevertheless, those properties may become explicit in the speakers' answers to questions concerning whom or what they refer to by a term.

The third remark to be made is that the properties associated with a term by distinct speakers may be different, but these differences are not important insofar as they identify the *same* entity (Searle 1969, 171 and Strawson 1959, 183).

The fourth and last remark is that the properties or descriptions associated by a speaker with a term may involve the reference of the term as used by another speaker. This sort of descriptions was mentioned by Searle and Strawson (Searle 1959, 170 and Strawson 1959, 182, n. 1), though it plays a rather secondary role in their theories. Nevertheless, from my point of view, this sort of descriptions has to be regarded of utmost importance for descriptivism, since an average speaker who associates with a term some descriptions which are put into question may *defer* the reference of the term, and usually he will be *willing* to do so, to other speakers she considers to be more knowledgeable of that referent. Of course, that sort of descriptions will only be identifying if this process of deferring concludes in descriptions of other kind which are identifying by themselves.

In this regard it should be pointed out that if the speakers in question are those from whom a speaker learnt the term, she can probably allude to them only in a generic way because she does not remember them or is not sure who they were; but going further she can resort to the speakers of her linguistic community socially recognized as authorities on the entity referred to by the term – i.e., the *experts* –, since the average speaker knows that in her linguistic community there is such sort of speakers and how to identify some of them, although it may be conceded a certain degree of fallibility in this respect. Such considerations are related to Putnam's famous hypo(thesis) of the *division of linguistic labour* (Putnam 1975, 228).

Following Putnam, descriptivism can maintain that the resort to the notion of expert has an important role to play in a reference theory on substance terms (see Jackson 1998, 208 f.); and about the notion of expert we should indicate that experts regarding a *substance term* – as I will call them – are, in strict sense, experts about the *substance* which constitutes the referent of the term and hence about the identifying properties of that substance, that are, according to Kripke and Putnam, its structural or underlying properties.

However, though Putnam employs the notion of expert and the distinction between experts and non-experts to develop a social causal theory of reference, we can make use of that notion and of the corresponding distinction – *unlike* Putnam – to formulate a version of descriptivism that overcomes the limitations imposed to it by authors like Kripke. Descriptivism can fall back on the distinction between experts and non-experts concerning substance terms, because this distinction points out to the disposition of the average speaker to *defer* the reference of her use of many substance terms to their use by other sorts of speakers of her linguistic community, and these deferential intentions are accepted by all reference theories. Now, this version of descriptivism claims that not only experts concerning a substance term, but *all speakers* associate descriptions with the substance term they use, though *some* of the descriptions associated by non-experts have the function of deferring the reference of the term to its reference in the use by experts; these descriptions, in general *implicit* ones, will tend to become *explicit* when other descriptions associated by non-experts are called into question.

According to this version of descriptivism, non-experts implicitly associate with the term "gold" a description equivalent to the following: the substance referred to as "gold" by experts concerning gold or, in other words, the substance referred to as "gold" by experts concerning the term "gold". In regard to these descriptions two remarks should be made. On the one hand, by "experts concerning gold" non-expert speakers will allude, as a rule, to present experts of their linguistic community. On the other hand, those descriptions can be regarded as a *rational reconstruction* of the following, which does not contain the term "expert": the substance about which the members of my linguistic community socially recognized as authorities on gold speak when they utter the term "gold". And the average speaker *knows* that in her linguistic community there are such sorts of speakers.

Now, experts regarding the term "gold" will associate with it a set of properties, many of them identifying ones, as the property of being the substance with atomic number 79, and these properties – or at least some of them – will not involve the notion of reference; thus a condition demanded by Kripke from descriptivism, the non-circularity condition, is fulfilled. Come to this point, this version of descriptivism maintains that the referent of the term "gold", such as it is used by (present) experts and hence also by the rest of the members of our linguistic community, is the substance that possesses a *sufficient* number of the properties that those experts associate with it. Therefore the thesis of descriptivism according to which the reference of a substance term is determined by a sufficient number of the properties or descriptions associated with the term applies, strictly speaking, according to this version of descriptivism, *only* to (present) experts concerning the term. These will associate with the term in question not only superficial and other sort of macroscopic properties, such as those concerning the boiling and the melting point of a substance, but also structural properties. The reference of a substance term will be determined by a sufficient number of such properties.

This version of descriptivism grants more weight to *social* bonds in the determination of the reference than to *historical* bonds, the latter involving that the reference of the use of a substance term by a speaker would ultimately depend on which was the referent of the term fixed in the initial baptism that initiates the causal chain of which that speaker – or the use of the term by the speaker – becomes a link. But in order to explain the determination of

the reference of substance terms as used by the average speaker, it is reasonable to claim that the bonds that determine her reference are the *deferential* bonds that connect her uses with uses by other members of her linguistic community, lastly, of (present) expert speakers, who, in general, will not be the speakers who initially introduced the terms.

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Logic Degree Zero: Intentionality and (no[n-]) sense in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*

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In the following I develop an account of intentionality in the *Tractatus* as the connection of language and world. It is not, however, an intentionality of the speaker – what the speaker intends by the use of a word – but an intentionality that I call performative, since it is in the use of propositions as projections of reality that we can see the connection. I show how this projective relation of proposition and reality only seems to be conditioned by the idea of an internal or logical relation between language and world that holds them together *a priori*. The account of *Logic Degree Zero* that I develop is an account of such an *a priori* relation and I subsequently argue that Wittgenstein calls this relation senseless. It is also well known that Wittgenstein discards the propositions of the *Tractatus* as nonsensical at the end. The task I set myself is to give an account of how propositional signs that always already have sense turn into propositions with sense, without sense and nonsensical propositions upon being used.

Propositions with sense, according to Wittgenstein are the propositions of natural science, propositions without sense are the propositions of logic and mathematics and finally those that are nonsensical are metaphysical, ethical and aesthetic propositions. What makes propositions have sense or not or makes them nonsensical is the way they are used and this is why I claim that the later Wittgenstein's account of *Meaning as Use* is already in theory laid out in the *Tractatus*.

1. Writing Degree Zero

Roland Barthes, who was concerned with the literary tendencies of symbolism, surrealism, avant-garde and experimental literature as opposed to traditional realistic forms, writes about Poetic Writing in *Writing Degree Zero* (Barthes, 1968, p. 48):

Therefore under each word in modern poetry there lies a sort of existential geology, in which is gathered the total content of the Name, instead of a chosen content as in classical prose and poetry. The Word is no longer guided in advance by the general intention of a socialized discourse. [...] The word, here, is encyclopedic, it contains simultaneously all the acceptations from which a relational discourse might have required it to choose. It therefore achieves a state which is possible only in the dictionary or in poetry – places where the noun can live without its article – and is reduced to a sort of *zero degree*, pregnant with all past and future specifications. The word here has a generic form; it is a category. Each poetic word is thus an unexpected object, a Pandora's box from which fly out all the potentialities of language. (Barthes, *Writing Degree Zero*, p. 48, my emphasis.)

Barthes holds that in poetry words do not signify or convey specific meanings, but contain endless possibilities of meaning instead. In addition to the distinction between language and style, Barthes introduces *écriture*, which has been translated as *writing*. "Writing is an ambiguous reality," Barthes explains, because "it unquestionably arises from a confrontation of the writer with the society of his

time," but it also refers the writer back to the sources, that is, to the instruments of creation. This source or instrument of creation is what Barthes calls *Writing Degree Zero*.

He defines *Zero Degree Writing* as follows: "in polar opposites the existence of a third term makes it a neutral term or zero element." For example, the indicative is a neutral form between subjunctive and imperative. Barthes may indeed have thought of *Writing Degree Zero* as something akin to the indicative mode. There is, however, another way in which we can understand the concept of *Zero-Degree Writing*: namely as a boundary concept or as a condition for writing. On page 78 of *Writing Degree Zero* Barthes writes:

If the writing is really neutral, and if language, instead of being a cumbersome and recalcitrant act, reaches the state of a pure equation, which is no more tangible than an algebra when it confronts the innermost part of man, then Literature is vanquished, the problematic of mankind is uncovered and presented without elaboration, the writer becomes irretrievably honest.

Neutral writing, according to this passage, rediscovers the intentionality of language as pure equation. *Zero-Degree Writing* is then not just a neutral position between two extremes, but it becomes a condition for modes of writing as such. In the following I want to show that Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* contains a similar idea of a zero point or degree of Logic as an *a priori* connection between language and world.

2. Logic Degree Zero

A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the sound waves, all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world.

They are all constructed according to a common logical pattern. (...)

(Wittgenstein 1995, 4.014)

Eli Friedlander in his 2001 book *Signs of Sense* (Friedlander, 2001) introduces us to a fundamental distinction between form and structure in the *Tractatus*. He builds upon proposition 2.033, which says: "Form is the possibility of structure." Friedlander understands this as a deep connection or as the equi-primeordealty of the form of language and the form of the world. Form, according to Friedlander's interpretation, is the knowledge of the possibilities of the combination of an object, its internal properties or *what* the object is. Structure on the other hand is the *how* the object is indeed arranged, the particular combination in a state of affair. Friedlander therefore introduces two different perspectives: one of facts, and the other of the emergence of meaning.

If pictures can represent facts on the one hand, they are on the other hand facts themselves. Friedlander's main question becomes how pictures as facts can be used to represent other facts. According to Friedlander's reading pictures as facts represent facts through their structure.

Since the logical structure of the picture that expresses the fact is itself a fact, a picture can never be nonsensical. We can only ask whether a picture agrees with reality or not, whether its sense is true or false. How can we get to the point where we end up with nonsense?

We can now use Friedlander's interpretation in order to elucidate in what way the projection method is that which makes a proposition with sense, without sense or nonsensical. If we return to how Barthes paints before us the intentionality of language as pure equation: the words or poetry that are not different from the things they are about and need not be connected through likeness, we see a similarity to Friedlander's reading of Wittgenstein. There is no picturing relationship because they are not distinct in the first place.

In proposition 4.0141 Wittgenstein elucidates the similarity between propositional sign and thing by introducing a general rule through which we can read off the symphony from the lines on the record, or from the score. This rule he calls "the law of projection, which projects the symphony into the language of the musical score." But as we saw above, it looks like the projection is not needed at all for propositions to have sense. In proposition 4.064 Wittgenstein writes: "Every proposition must already have a sense, assertion cannot give it a sense, for what it asserts is the sense itself."

We need to elaborate in detail the projection method with its special case of the *Zero-Method* – the projection in which nothing is projected – in order to see that the sense is really fully dependent on that the projection take place or on that the proposition is used. In the following I present the three different kinds of propositions in case.

Propositions with sense

In proposition 2.1 of the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein says, "we picture facts to ourselves". Furthermore in 2.12 he holds that "a picture is a model of reality." He goes on to say that in order for the picture to depict it has to have something in common with reality, which he calls its "pictorial form" (2.17) and its "form of reality" or "logical form" (2.18). Finally Wittgenstein elaborates a method, which he calls the *Method of Projection*:

3.11 We use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written, etc.) as a projection of a possible situation. The method of projection is **to think of** the sense of the proposition.

3.12 [...] And a proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.

In 3.12 Wittgenstein makes an important point: only in its projective relation to the world is the when the propositional sign a proposition. It may be that in our making pictures of facts we represent a sense, as Wittgenstein puts it in 2.2221: "What a picture represents is its sense." Truth-conditions come in only by way of comparing the picture I make, the sense, with reality, as we can see in 2.222:

In the correspondence or non-correspondence of its sense with reality, consists that a picture is true or false.

We can now state that it only seems as if even if we never made the comparison, somehow the equation is always already in place: "the propositional sign together with the method of symbolizing (what it images) is identical with what is signified" that is, the sense. However, it is only when we actually use the proposition in a particular instance that the comparison can be made.

Wittgenstein makes this clear by way of claiming that no *a priori* true picture or proposition could exist, since truth lies in the comparison of the sense, "of that which the picture pictures", with reality. Thus the projection itself that makes the comparison possible is what makes the proposition true or false. Next let us turn to the case of propositions without sense.

Logical Propositions without sense

Wittgenstein develops a derivative model of the projection method: the zero method, in which nothing is projected and thus the proposition does not have sense. In the previous paragraphs I turned our attention to Wittgenstein's establishing the sense of the proposition as independent from whether this sense is true or false. The sense is what the proposition represents and the proposition represents its sense by way of the propositional sign projecting its sense onto reality. However, as we have seen in Friedlander's take, the proposition does not just represent a fact: it also is a fact itself. This fact itself is a logical proposition. Now the proposition as fact poses a problem.

Wittgenstein writes that the perceptible sign and symbolizing method together equal the signified. This is not just an equation but also a tautology. And this is exactly the problem with logical propositions or pseudo-propositions, German *Scheinsätze*: they are always true, but are nevertheless without sense. Logical propositions are senseless, German *sinnlos*, since nothing is projected in them. Given this circumstance the symbolizing method turns out to be a *Zero-Method*. In 6.121 Wittgenstein determines the *Zero Method* in the following way:

6.121 The propositions of logic demonstrate the logical properties of propositions [,] by combining them [**into propositions**] [so as to form propositions] that say nothing.

This method could [also] be called a zero-method. In a logical proposition[,] propositions are brought into equilibrium with one another, and the state of equilibrium then [**shows**] [indicates] [**how these propositions must be logically constructed**] [what the logical constitution of these propositions must be].

However, that logical propositions have no sense but are tautologies presupposes that some part of the logical proposition has sense and that is their connection with the world. This is similar to what Roland Barthes tried to do with an account of *Writing Degree Zero*. And, I hold that Kant tried to make the same move by deducing the *a priori* categories in the first *Critique*. (Kant, 1965) However, in all cases we get a metaphysical account of how our poetic words, experience or propositions can be about something, and Barthes, Wittgenstein and Kant are aware of the problematic status of such a deduction.

Logical propositions may be without sense, but they are not nonsensical. The problem with logical propositions is that they merely say something about the very form itself that they picture. Wittgenstein's attempt to say something about the general form of the proposition, results in logical propositions. I emphasized this formal trait of the *Tractatus*-propositions, since the form of the propositions in the *Tractatus* is the clue to understanding why Wittgenstein dismisses the propositions of the *Tractatus* as nonsensical. I will discuss nonsensical propositions next.

Nonsensical Propositions

5.5303 Roughly speaking, to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense

"Man", Wittgenstein says, "possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning, or what it's meaning is." (Wittgenstein, 1961, 4.001) The form of language does not reveal the form of thought, he continues, since its purpose is different from showing the form of thought. All that is wrong, Wittgenstein claims in the preface, is our understanding of the logic of our language. The *Tractatus* wants to draw a limit to the expression of thought: "the limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense." (Wittgenstein, 1961, p. 27)

That the limits are drawn in language does not, however, mean that we can speak what is unspeakable. Nonsensical propositions are not such that they try to express a sense. They are "austere nonsense", since they say something, the parts of which have not been given meaning.¹

My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless [unsinnig – nonsensical], when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (6.54) (my emphasis.)

It is not their form that makes propositions nonsensical. It is *that* they are used to say something about their own form, which makes them problematic. The clue to understanding why the *Tractatus*-propositions are to be dismissed as nonsensical is that in it Wittgenstein uses formal propositions, or propositions without sense, propositions that are about their own form.

In order to get an account of intentionality in the *Tractatus*, we cannot thus expect to find philosophical propositions that provide it, because those would have to be thrown away as nonsensical. Wittgenstein tries to elaborate a general form of the proposition in the *Tractatus*, but he realizes that whatever proposition he makes about the form of the proposition and how it relates to that which it is about is a logical proposition and therefore without sense. And to use such logical propositions to say something about how language and world are connected makes them nonsensical. The way language and mind are connected (Wittgenstein uses the Kantian term *verknüpft*) is dependent on the use of language. The connection is made in language, not by propositions that make that point, but through propositions relating to one another in a certain way.

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¹ See the reading of the *New Wittgenstein* (Crary, 2000) that makes the distinction between different forms of nonsense and does not buy into the theory of a limit to sense and whatever is outside it is nonsense.

Zur Frage nach dem „Verhältnis der Teile des Urteils“ – Freges funktionale Analyse von Prädikaten

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Einleitung

Die Frage nach *Subjekt* und *Prädikat* und deren Zusammen-Sein ist ein ausgezeichnetes Beispiel für die in der Philosophie herrschende Tendenz, jede Frage mit der Absicht zu verbinden, Aussagen über die Welt zu begründen. In der Wende zur Sprache ist dieser Neigung jedoch explizit entgegengetreten worden. Dieses Anliegen der Protagonisten dieser Wende kontrastiert allerdings in merkwürdiger Weise mit der Überzeugung, in der *allgemeinen Satzform* das zur Verfügung zu haben, kraft dessen sich Fragen nach dem Verhältnis von Denken und Welt aus dem Bereich der sinnvollen Sätze ausschließen ließen. Die Idee einer allgemeinen Satzform ist ein Erbe Gottlob Freges Analyse zur Zerlegung des Inhalts von Aussagen und auf diese möchte ich hier eingehen.

Freges Analyse der Anwendbarkeit von Prädikatsausdrücken gemäß dem Modell von *Funktion* und *Argument* erfüllt vorrangig die Funktion, eine für Schlussbeziehungen relevante Zerlegung des Aussageninhalts zu bieten; als eine Form der Abbildbarkeit der *Welt* wird sie von ihm nicht besprochen. Bedenkt man jedoch seinen Anti-Psychologismus, könnte man Freges Analyse des Zusammenhangs der Teile eines Urteils über die von ihm selbst angegebene Relevanz hinaus als maßgeblich für die Bestimmung der Struktur des beurteilbaren Inhalts, i.e. der *allgemeinen Satzform*, erachten.

Eine Konsequenz dieses Zusammenschlusses wäre, dass Freges Auffassung von Prädikatsausdrücken zur notwendigen Bedingung der Ausdrückbarkeit von Gedanken erklärt werden müsste. Für die Beurteilung von idealistischen, psychologistischen oder solipsistischen Positionen würde dies folglich bedeuten: diese sind schon deswegen nicht haltbar, weil sie der *Form* des Urteils nicht entsprechen.

Diese Interpretation findet sich auch in der Literatur zu Frege wieder. Von hier ist es nicht weit zur Idee, dass die Bedingungen der Ausdrückbarkeit zugleich ein Kriterium für die Unterscheidung zwischen sinnvollen und sinnlosen Aussagen bildeten.

Dem möchte ich hier widersprechen. Ich werde zeigen, dass nicht nur Freges Erklärung der Anwendung von Prädikatsausdrücken nicht jedwede erkenntnistheoretische Position ad absurdum führt, sondern auch dass kein Kriterium für die Unhaltbarkeit einer philosophischen Position formuliert werden kann, das sich allein auf die Darstellung des Verhältnisses der Teile einer Aussage zueinander stützt. Dazu werde ich zunächst auf Freges Begründung des Primats des Urteils vor seinen Elementen in Bezug auf Benno Erdmann eingehen. Danach werde ich Freges Vorschlag zur Zerlegung des Urteils diskutieren und abschließend eine Einschätzung über das dadurch erreichte Verständnis des Verhältnisses der Teile des Urteils zum Urteilsanzuge abgeben.

I.

Die Auffassung des Urteils als Einheit von Subjekt und Prädikat wird von Frege bekannterweise deswegen abgelehnt, weil sie ein mangelhaftes Schema für die Teilung des Urteilsinhalts sei. Die Trennung zwischen dem, worüber etwas ausgesagt wird von dem, mittels dessen dies getan wird, generiere Unterschiede, die für die Frage nach der Wahrheit irrelevant seien, verzichte aber wiederum auf für die Darstellung des lückenlosen Schließens notwendige Unterscheidungen. Frege hat bei letzterem die mittels „Subjekt“ und „Prädikat“ nicht abgedeckte Unterscheidung zwischen „Begriffsunterordnung“ und dem „Fallen eines Gegenstandes unter einen Begriff“ im Sinn. Sucht man nach Gründen für die hiermit kritisierte Ansicht, dass Einzelgegenstände und Begriffe gleichermaßen das darstellen können, worauf der Subjektausdruck sich bezieht, dann bietet sich neben der Reflexion auf den intendierten Zusammenschluss von Aussagen- und Prädikatenlogik auch jene Interpretation des Urteilsinhalts an, die nach Frege um jeden Preis vermieden werden muss: nämlich sein Verständnis als Verbindung von Begriffen – oder, um es in der Terminologie Freges zu formulieren – als Verbindung von Vorstellungen. Freges berühmtes Diktum, dass

„[...] wenn alle Subjekte und alle Prädikate Vorstellungen sind und wenn alles Denken nichts ist als Erzeugen, Verbinden, Verändern von Vorstellungen, so ist nicht einzusehen, wie jemals etwas Objektives erreicht werden könne.“ (Frege 1967: 182)

ist zwar anerkannt, stellt jedoch noch lange keine begründete Kritik dar.

Woraus ergeben sich überhaupt die von Frege monierten Konsequenzen, die es zu vermeiden gilt? Zwei Begründungen sind hier denkbar: (a) aus dem Umstand, dass die Vorstellung etwas „an sich“ habe, das es ausschließt, mittels Vorstellungen jemals etwas Objektives erreichen zu können oder (b) daraus, dass der beurteilbare Inhalt nicht als Verbindung von Vorstellungen verstanden werden kann. Im Unterschied zu (a) würde (b) bloß behaupten, dass der Vorstellung etwas fehlt, nicht dass es ihr geschuldet ist, dass sie prinzipiell vom Bereich des Inter-subjektiven oder Mitteilbaren ausgeschlossen ist. Die Rede davon, dass nicht von Vorstellungen „ausgegangen“ werden dürfe, unterscheidet hier nicht. Für Benno Erdmann ist das Urteils, das

„[...] in Subjekt und Prädikat Vorgestellte, [ist] für alle der gleiche [Gegenstand], objektiv oder allgemein gewiß, und die Aussage über den Gegenstand, die es vollzieht, denknötwendig ist.“ (Erdmann 1907: 6)

Erdmanns Standpunkt, dass die „Wirklichkeit“ nicht zu erreichen sei, ist nicht einfach die Folge dessen, dass er davon ausgeht, dass der Gegenstand des Urteils in gedanklicher Form vorliegt. Zu einer Gleichsetzung von Gegenstand und Urteilsinhalt kommt es bei Erdmann nämlich deswegen, weil die Rede „vom Gegenstand des Urteils“ dazu benutzt wird, dasjenige, worüber geurteilt wird, zu einem von den Gegenständen „an sich“ unterschiedenen Inhalt zu erklären, aber gleichzeitig dasjenige, worauf sich

ein Urteil bezieht, als Urteilsinhalt zu verstehen. Es ist dieses Vorgehen, durch welches dasjenige, worüber im Urteil eine Aussage gemacht wird, zu einem Verhältnis von Vorstellung zueinander werden lässt.

Erdmanns Bestimmung des Urteils ist eigentlich also weder einfach dadurch zu kritisieren, dass er Gegenstand und Vorstellung schlicht verwechseln würde, wie Frege ihm dies vorwirft, noch dadurch, dass Objektives nicht mittels Subjektivem erreicht werden könne. Letzterer Vorwurf wäre verkehrt, weil er nur dann eine Tautologie darstellen würde, wenn sich Denken und Objektivität durch einander ausschließende Bestimmungen charakterisieren ließen. Nimmt man nicht an, dass Frege von einem solchen Gegensatz ausgeht, dann bietet sich an, seinen Standpunkt im Sinne von (b) zu interpretieren, genauer gesagt, durch eine Kombination seiner (i) Kritik an der korrespondenztheoretischen Auffassung der Wahrheit, mit seiner (ii) Auffassung des wesentlichen Ungesättigtheit von Prädikaten an. Diese Interpretation hängt im Wesentlichen von einer Passage ab, in der Frege etwas über die Gründe der Unmöglichkeit, Vorstellung und Wirklichkeit zu vergleichen, aussagt und davon, dass Freges Rede von der „Ungesättigtheit“ im Kontext des so genannten Problems der „Einheit des Urteils“ verstanden werden kann.

„Was müssten wir [...] aber tun, um zu entscheiden, ob etwas wahr wäre? Wir müssten untersuchen, ob es wahr wäre, daß – etwa eine Vorstellung und ein Wirkliches – in der festgesetzten Hinsicht übereinstimmen. Und damit ständen wir wieder vor einer Frage derselben Art, und das Spiel könnte von neuem beginnen. So scheitert dieser Versuch, die Wahrheit als eine Übereinstimmung zu erklären. [...] Und bei der Anwendung auf einen besonderen Fall käme es dann immer darauf an, ob es wahr wäre, daß diese Merkmale zuträfen. So drehte man sich im Kreise.“ (Frege 1966)

Da Frege nicht von einem infinitem Regress, sondern von einem Zirkel spricht, könnte sich seine Argumentation so zusammenfassen lassen: es stellt eine Voraussetzung dafür dar, dass p wahr sein kann, dass der Urteilsinhalt den Maßstab dafür selbst formuliert. In jedem anderen Fall ergibt sich die Frage nach dem Vergleich mit der Wirklichkeit, der nicht zu unternehmen ist oder der Schein, dass der Vergleich des Gedankens mit dem, was über die Wirklichkeit gedacht wird, einen solchen Vergleich repräsentieren würde. Bezogen auf Erdmanns Bestimmungen zum Urteil würde dies bedeuten, dass sie verkehrt ist, weil sie sich dieses Zirkels nicht bewusst ist, zu dem sie gedrängt wird, insofern sie davon ausgeht, dass ein Teil des Urteils eine primäre Funktion hat. Ob das jetzt Vorstellungen oder Gegenstände sind, ist für die Rekonstruktion von Freges Argument irrelevant, Freges Psychologismuskritik wäre insofern auch unabhängig von seiner Auffassung von Vorstellungen. Für den „Gedanken“, der an die Stelle von Vorstellungen tritt, würde dies umgekehrt bedeuten, dass sich dieser Überlegungen verdankt, wie ein Urteilsinhalt einen Maßstab in sich selbst tragen kann, oder anders formuliert, Struktur habe.

II.

Das Anliegen, die Struktur des Gedankens oder Urteilsinhalts aufzudecken, erfordert nach Frege eine bestimmte Richtung der Analyse, deren Begründung wiederholt, was Frege auch gegen den „erkenntnistheoretischen Idealismus“ einwendet. Die Bestimmung der Teile des Urteils kann nicht von den Teilen selbst ausgehen, sondern muss dasjenige, was diese ausmacht, durch Zerlegung des ganzen Urteilsinhalts gewinnen. Auch wird die Entgegensetzung zu dem von Frege abgelehnten Standpunkt

„Statt also das Urteil aus einem Einzelding als Subjekt mit einem schon vorher gebildeten Begriff als Prädikat zusammen zu fügen, lassen wir umgekehrt den beurteilbaren Inhalt zerfallen und gewinnen so den Begriff.“ (Frege 1983a)

„Ich gehe also nicht von den Begriffen aus und setze aus ihnen den Gedanken oder das Urteil zusammen, sondern ich gewinne die Gedankenteile durch Zerfallung des Gedankens.“ (Frege 1983b)

– durch den Verweis auf ein „Bindemittel“ oder „Kitt“ abgelehnt, welches notwendige wäre, würde die Zerlegung des Urteilsinhalts nicht von dem Ganzen ausgehen. Denkt man an das in Teil I. (b i) und (b ii) Gesagte, könnte die Begründung in dem Verweis auf das nichtlösbare Problem der Grundlage der Anwendung von Begriffen auf Gegenstände bestehen. Näher an der Metapher des Urteils als aus Teilen zusammengesetztes Ganzes formuliert, könnte das Problem der Einheit des Urteils als Frage nach demjenigen verstanden werden, welches für sich abgeschlossene Teile zu einem Ganzen derart verbindet, dass die Frage nach der Wahrheit dieses Ganzen überhaupt gestellt werden kann. In der Antwort verweist Frege wieder nicht auf einen infiniten Regress – wie dies etwa Russell oder Wittgenstein tun – vielmehr zeigt er sich davon überzeugt, dass die Sichtweise von Prädikaten oder Prädikatsausdrücken als Funktionen auf beide Fragen eine Antwort bietet. Um hier noch einmal die von Frege abgelehnte Terminologie von Subjekt und Prädikat zu bemühen: der Gegenstand, worauf sich der Subjektausdruck bezieht, wird durch Freges Antwort zu einem noch zu bestimmenden x , dessen Bestimmung durch den Begriff angegeben wird, unter den er fällt. Da die Zuschreibung des Prädikats für Frege dann wahr ist, wenn der Gegenstand unter den Begriff fällt, ist das Prädikat bestimmt durch das Verhältnis, das es zum Gegenstand einnimmt. Das Prädikat ist also die Funktion zur Wahr- oder Falschheit eines Satzes dadurch beizutragen, dass es den Gegenstand ergänzt.

Dasjenige, was bei der Ersetzung der Begriffe „Subjekt“ und „Prädikat“ durch „Argument“ und „Funktion“ das wesentlich Neue ist, ist also nicht, dass die Zuschreibung von Eigenschaften strikt von Identitätsurteilen getrennt werden würde. Wenn nämlich die Anwendung einer Funktion Gegenstände zu sich selbst ins Verhältnis setzt, dann ist auch Freges Verständnis der Zuschreibung von Eigenschaften bestimmt durch das Verhältnis des Gegenstands zu sich selbst. Dieses Verhältnis wird jedoch entgegen der Tradition nicht als dasjenige vom Einzelnen und Allgemeinen verstanden, sondern als Möglichkeit, wahr oder falsch zu sein. Der Begriff ist damit nichts vom Gegenstand Unabhängiges, sondern durch den funktionalen Bezug auf Gegenstände bestimmt. Frege spricht bekannterweise vom „Ungesättigtsein“ oder von der „Ergänzungsbedürftigkeit“ von Begriffen, Prädikaten und Prädikatsausdrücken. Mit dieser Sichtweise des Gedankens/des beurteilbaren Inhalts sind (i) die Teile des Inhalts zu austauschbaren geworden und (ii) ist die Zerfallung selbst eine beliebige, die sich nicht am sprachlichen Ausdruck orientiert. Ein Beispiel möge dies verdeutlichen:

„Denken wir den Umstand, daß Wasserstoffgas leichter als Kohlendioxidgas ist, in unserer Formelsprache ausgedrückt, so können wir an die Stelle des Zeichens für Wasserstoffgas das Zeichen für Sauerstoffgas oder das für Stickstoffgas einsetzen. Hierdurch ändert sich der Sinn in der Weise, daß ‚Sauerstoffgas‘ oder ‚Stickstoffgas‘ in die Beziehungen eintritt, in denen zuvor ‚Wasserstoffgas‘ stand. Indem man einen Ausdruck in dieser Weise veränderlich denkt, zerfällt derselbe in einen bleibenden Bestandteil, der die Gesamtheit der Beziehun-

gen darstellt, und in das Zeichen, welches durch andere ersetzbar gedacht wird und welches den Gegenstand bedeutet, der in diesen Beziehungen sich befindet. Den ersten Bestandteil nenne ich Funktion, den letzteren ihr Argument.“ (Frege 1964: 15)

Heißt es anfangs, dass „Wasserstoffgas leichter als Kohlendioxidgas ist“, handelt es sich also um ein Urteil über Wasserstoff, dem die relative Eigenschaft „in gasförmigem Zustand leichter als Kohlendioxidgas“ beigemessen wird, ist dieses nur wenige Zeilen später aus dem Gedanken eliminiert. Wasserstoffgas ist zu einem beliebigen – und damit verschwindenden – Anwendungsfall der Funktion „... leichter als Kohlendioxidgas ...“ geworden. Er ist zu einem „durch andere ersetzbaren“ „Zeichen“ dessen untergeordnet worden, was nun als „bleibender Bestandteil“ des Denkens gelten soll. Das heißt, dass die Zuspriechung von Eigenschaften ausschließlich als Einordnung unter dasjenige zu verstehen, was mehr enthält als das Vorangegangene. Über Begriff und Gegenstand ist soweit nicht nur in der Begriffsschrift folgendes zu erfahren: ein jeder Gegenstand fällt unter seinen Begriff, ist also „weniger“ umfangreich als dieser. Der Begriff wiederum muss einen größeren Umfang haben, um nicht zum Gegenstand selbst zu werden:

„Als das Wesentliche für den Begriff sehe ich an, dass die Frage, ob etwas unter ihn falle, einen Sinn hat. ‚Christentum‘ z.B. würde ich nur in dem Sinne einen Begriff nennen, wie es in dem Satze ‚diese Handlungsweise ist Christentum‘ gebraucht wird, nicht aber in dem Satze ‚das Christentum verbreitet sich weiter‘.“ (Frege an Marty, 29.8. 1882. Frege: 1976)

III.

Die Auseinandersetzung mit Freges Begründung der Zerlegung des beurteilbaren Inhalts in Funktion und Argument und seiner Kritik an der Bestimmung des Urteilsinhalts von seinen Elementen ausgehend hat folgendes ergeben: die entscheidende Differenz zwischen Freges Auffassung des Urteilsinhalts und der seiner Gegner liegt in dem Anspruch, dass für Frege der Urteilsinhalt als ein Wahres oder Falsches aufgezeigt werden kann. Die Realisierung dieses Anspruchs scheint davon abzuhängen, ob dasjenige, dem die Wahrheit zukommen soll, Struktur aufweist (auch wenn Frege diesen Ausdruck nicht verwendet). Eine solche Interpretation setzt allerdings Freges Rede von Ungesättigtsein gleich mit seinen Bemerkungen darüber, dass die Anwendung eines Begriffs strikt von seiner Bildung zu unterscheiden wäre. Wie sich allerdings gezeigt hat, beruht diese Gleichsetzung auf der Voraussetzung, dass die Zerfällung des begrifflichen Inhalts die Rede von der Zuspriechung von Eigenschaften wiedergibt. Freges Vorgehen, Aussagen in Funktion und Argument zu zerlegen, tut dies aber nicht. Es leistet zwar eine „Verbindung“ von Eigenschaft und Gegenstand, jedoch macht die Zuordnung von Argumenten zu Wahrheitswerten nicht verständlich, wie man den Gedanken haben kann, dass

einem Gegenstand wahrerweise eine Eigenschaft zukommt. Prädikate als Funktionen zu verstehen, die Argumente auf Wahrheitswerte abbilden, setzt also gerade das Verständnis desjenigen voraus, für dessen Erklärung es in der Literatur gehalten wird. Damit ist freilich auch die Differenz zwischen Freges Auffassung und jenes des „erkenntnistheoretischen Idealismus“ – abgesehen von Bekenntnissen zu Wahrheit und Objektivität – in Frage gestellt. Insofern nämlich die Ungesättigkeit der Prädikate für Frege eine „Urscheinung“ darstellt, soll sie es jedoch auch gar nicht leisten, Prädikation verstehbar zu machen.

„... denn mit den Worten ‚die Beziehung des Fallens eines Gegenstandes unter einen Begriff‘ bezeichnen wir keine Beziehung, sondern einen Gegenstand, und die drei Eigennamen ‚die Zahl 2‘, ‚der Begriff Primzahl‘, ‚die Beziehung des Fallens eines Gegenstandes unter einen Begriff‘ verhalten sich ebenso spröde zueinander wie die beiden ersten allein.“ (Frege 1962)

Rückwirkend betrachtet ist damit das vorgestellte Argument (b) keines von Frege selbst dargelegtes. Freges Ansicht war nämlich offensichtlich die, dass unter der Voraussetzung, dass der beurteilbare Inhalt/Gedanke frei von subjektiven Einflüssen ist, der Zirkel, den er dem Versuch anlastet, Vorstellungen mit der Welt zu vergleichen, beim beurteilbaren Inhalt/Gedanke kein Problem darstellt.

Es ist diese Abtrennung des Gedanken vom Subjekts, durch die Objektivität gewährleistet sein soll und die Zerlegung des beurteilbaren Gedankens die Teile eines Urteils exklusiv in ihrer Funktion zur Wahrheit beizutragen bestimmen kann. Das heißt aber auch, dass es nicht die fehlende Struktur der Vorstellung ist, die die Vorstellung zu etwas mangelhaften macht. Umgekehrt würde das Haben einer solchen bloß Ausdruck dessen sein, dass Urteile beanspruchen, wahr zu sein, nicht aber dass der Anerkennung des Anspruchs auf Wahrheit etwas Objektives entspricht.

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Sensations, Conceptions and Perceptions: Remarks on Assessability for Accuracy

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How *should* we conceive perceptions to grasp their intentional contents [IC_P] as assessable for accuracy? Which are the broad relationships between this conception and intentional contents of sensations [IC_S]? I shall offer a background on this issue to answer these questions.

1.

Usually, someone who thinks that IC_S don't outrun representational content [RC]¹ claims that an accurate sensation is a first-order mental state meeting accuracy conditions to have RC (Tye, 2000). Therefore, IC_S must be about subject-independent entities coming in to be represented. We obtain *The Background Representationalist Constraint* [BRC]:

BRC: Accurate RCs cannot be about subject-dependent entities –what is represented by anyone meeting accuracy conditions is external to her.

From this view, RCs of *perceptual experiences* is what is to be conceived as assessable for accuracy and accuracy conditions serve to warrant that perceptual experiences will shape true perceptual beliefs. BRC has led many philosophers to uphold the following constrain: RCx is accurate (i.e. perceptual experience *x* in which it occurs has accurate contents) iff there exists (externally to the subject undergoing *x*) an entity *E* which is represented by RCx – this stance has been called *Content Externalism*. So, RC is a «subject independent entities»-involving-content.

Regardless if *external* entities are *x* or *Fx* entities, *intentional objects* [IO], e.g., *x* or *Fx*, are entities which ICs are about. I will adopt the *Fx* view leaving aside the problem concerning how *Fx*-entities might metaphysically be subject-independent entities; instead, I mean by 'external entities' those entities *presented as external* ones. We can join the debate specifying relationships that occur between ICs and IOs to give rise to IC_Ps and IC_Ss. I will argue that if we conceive the contents of perceptions as RCs (i.e. under BRC) then, *per se*, we accept a normative conception of 'perception', a conception that we cannot adopt with respect to IC_S. As a consequence, either we discard BRC or we try to clarify relationships between IC_P and IC_S. I'll take the second path.

As it will be accepted, IC_Ss aren't assessable for accuracy; on the contrary, they are *primitive phenomenal contents* (Chalmers, 2005). Instead, IC_Ps are assessable for accuracy. In this way, it seems reasonable to accept that if *contents of phenomenally conscious states* aren't assessable for accuracy, then, they won't be assessable for accuracy *themselves*—this description derives from a wide intentionalist approach: (a) particular states are assessable for accuracy if their contents are assessable in this way and (b) sensations are individuated by their ICs (*intentionalist approach* to sensations [IAS]). Furthermore, if sensations are first-order phenomenally conscious states, this description depends on adopting a *non-*

reductive account of sensations' ICs ([NAS]: ICs of sensations *covary* with their phenomenal characters).

From NAS, a change in phenomenal character samples a change in IC and, more narrowly, phenomenal character varies with every fine-grained change in IC. NAS, taken as a principle, allow us to distinguish sensations from other *mental* states. From IAS, one has a sensation *o* if it has a particular IC². NAS + IAS implies that sensations are individuated by their phenomenal characters (*Phenomenalism*); thus, phenomenal character is a *sui generis property* necessarily instantiated in every first-order phenomenally conscious state (*First-Order Phenomenal Character Primitivism* [PCP]³). If it weren't so and phenomenal character was to be reduced to physical or functional entities, then, what individuates sensations won't be phenomenal character itself. If we accept PCP, IC_Ss will not be assessable for accuracy, even though perceptions' do.

Otherwise, IC_P isn't individuated by phenomenal characters of sensations, but by their RCs (representational account of content of perceptions [RAP]). Thus, perceptions are individuated from a given set of accuracy conditions (normative approach to perceptions [NAP]). RAP, as a principle, allow us to distinguish perceptions from other *epistemic* states. RAP + NAP implies that perceptions are individuated by RCs meeting accuracy conditions (*Perceptual Representationalism* [PR]). Diagrammatically:

[See Diagram 1]

If we accept PCP and PR, IC_Ss differ from IC_Ps, for *what is primitive cannot be normatively regulated* even though if primitive properties nomologically supervene on physical or functional ones (Chalmers, 1996, Chap.: 7, § 1). In this case, the occurrence of phenomenal characters in IC_Ss isn't what is to be regulated, but the relations of empirical dependency between IC_P (RCs) and *non-phenomenal entities*. By definition, phenomenal entities are those properties and objects that are presented in IC_S and non-phenomenal entities are individuated under a particular *conception*, so represented (perceived) entities are non-phenomenal entities in a particular respect. Relationships between IC_P to that what is represented (i.e. *representational relations*) are what it is thought to be regulated. Representational relations cannot be the relation to what we are sensory aware of (i.e. *sensory awareness relation*), for this is also a primitive one (Pautz, 2006).

¹ I.e. that IC_P=RC.

² IAS differs from an intentionalist *approach to sensory states* [IASS] –say tasting, seeing, hearing etc.– since sensory states are also individuated by the very kind of *sensory modality* that allow us to categorize them.

³ "Primitivism does not automatically lead to the rejection of physicalism – at least if physicalism is a mere thesis of supervenience. G. E. Moore held that goodness is primitive, yet supervenient on the natural with matter of metaphysical necessity." (Pautz, (FC)).

2.

Reasons to accept PR and PCP should be presented elsewhere; however, here I'm thinking about PR as the *theoretical* conception that best mirrors our epistemic common-sense expectations and, on the other hand, I conceive PCP as a metaphysical theory of phenomenal mind. In short, PR is an epistemological theory while PCP isn't, even though its antecedents (e.g. IAS) are epistemological, perhaps.

Conveniently, I'll adopt a *dual-aspect approach* to intentional states (Searle, 1983): an intentional state (any state which is necessarily about something) has two essential features (I) its IC, and (II) a particular relation by which a creature or epistemic subject entertains IC. In other words, one aspect is the *aboutness relation* and the other one is the *subject-matter of the state*. This choice doesn't conflict with IAS, for what individuates sensations (i.e. ICs) is not all that determines them as intentional states. Intentional states depend on two *intrinsic features* to be about something, and once they have them, they differ in virtue of their ICs, even though they have the same kind of *aboutness relation*. *Aboutness relations* determine which ICs should we attribute to states (representational or primitive ones).

IC of the perception *a* in t_i is what I perceive in t_i ; the content of the visual sensation (IC_s) *v* in t_i is what I'm *sensory aware* in t_i . The *aboutness relation* of perceptions is representational, while that of sensations is *phenomenally primitive* (a matter of being sensory aware of). From this view, somebody has *a* by having a *perceptual relation* to something and somebody has *v* by having a *sensory awareness relation* to something. So, by IAS and RAP, *v* differs from *a* since its IC differs from that of *v*. Therefore, *sine qua non* conditions to have *a* differ from those to have *v* and then *individuation conditions* differ.

Once one adopts a normative conception of perceptions, I think, *representationalism* (the view that perceptions' ICs are RCs) derives. As a result, 'perception' is taken as an epistemic notion. 'Perception' (as a *theoretical* notion) is normative (contingent and stipulative) in nature, whereas 'sensation' isn't. Perceptions, in this normative sense, depend on how we conceive their contents from a regulative view (i.e. NAP), while sensations don't depend on this regulative conception, but on a *descriptive* approach (i.e. IAS).

I'm not outlining a theory of what perceptions are with respect to cognitive mind; instead, I'm defending an epistemological approach to the concept of perception since, I think, this serves to specify about what we are thinking when we are talking about regulating something by specifying accuracy conditions. Every regulative view on perceptions must sketch a way in which ICs of illusions or hallucinations are related to RCs of perceptions: sensations enter the game. IC_ss aren't the content of abnormal perceptions (e.g. hallucinations) (Siegel, 2006, p. 355-356); otherwise they are present in every phenomenal state, since they have sensory awareness relation as a necessary condition. This relation is involved in hallucination, illusion and perception cases.

Once we adopt an epistemological approach to perceptions and representations it is difficult to define whether if perception entails representation or if representation entails perception⁴. However, the normative nature of our

theoretical concept of 'perception' seems to derive from the fact that perceptions *should* provide us non-linguistic knowledge of surrounding entities. Perceptions differ from hallucinations since we have a *normative conception* of them that, in common sense, appears to be *representational*: even though I think about my perceptions as transparently informing me about the world, I believe that what I perceive is to be accurately represented by others. On the contrary, they fail to transparently represent it. I think that the next conditional must be attained:

A state *s* is assessable for accuracy if we have a *normative set of conditions* under which *s* arises, i.e. under which *s* has RC.

So, *perceptual relationships*⁵ are representational ones occurring between *S* and *Fx*. An abnormal perceptual relation will give rise to inaccurate perceptions (perception with a RC they *shouldn't* have). A possible world w_i in which *S* has *a* by meeting *C* accuracy conditions and another world w_{3d} in which she has *a* by meeting *W* accuracy conditions are conceivable. In this case, *C* and *W* could be contradictory⁶. In w_i a state *s* is *a* iff it is meeting *C* and, in w_{3d} , *s* is *a* iff it is meeting *W*. On the contrary, in every possible world *S* (a creature) has *v* only if *S* is sensory aware of *v*'s IC. Having *sensory awareness states* is a necessary condition to have sensations; on the contrary, perceptions need to meet accuracy conditions to have RC. In short, sensory awareness is intrinsic to sensations, while it isn't to perceptions (*vid.*: blindsight cases (Siewert, 1998, p. 82 and meta-contrast cases, Tye, 2009, p. 19)).

I can't describe representational relations as perceptual relationships if I lack a normative conception of relationships between representing and represented.

If RC of *a* is what I perceive, then, 'what I perceive' differs *metaphysically* from 'what I'm sensory aware of', since IC_p wouldn't *exist* if there are no beliefs and normative concepts or, they wouldn't be representational. Further on, 'what I'm sensory aware of' (IC_s) is primitive with respect to another kind of mental states, say concepts. It is an error to conceive RCs as primitive as IC_s, as has been claimed (Dretske, 1995 and Tye, 1995).

So, accuracy conditions are *extrinsic* to sensations. In this way, if IC_s is a primitive content, *v* has IC_s independently of what anyone could stipulate. Hence, the following constraint emerges:

x is assessable for accuracy iff, *x* has the content it has under accuracy conditions.

3.

What is essential to perceptions is a normative conception about their content, so what is assessable for accuracy is their RC. If we accept that RC is non-conceptual in nature (i.e., a kind of non-linguistic content) just as IC_s is, then what is assessable for accuracy doesn't need to be conceptual or propositional in nature. However, RC cannot be conceived without background beliefs on what are those entities that are to be represented and without normative

out needing that their functional-cognitive correlates are representational. I remain neutral on this topic but I think that it depends on how we conceive the relationships between the reference of our folk-psychology terms and what is to be taken as primitive in a representational theory of cognition. A representational theory of cognition can postulate representational states that don't match with those referred in folk psychology.

⁴ For a critical review of the main theories, *vid.*: Crane, 2003, Chapter 5).

⁶ This is a modal sense in which we could describe perceptual relativism.

⁴ This issue differs from whether if perceptions as *cognitive* states entail representations. In particular, we can have representational *epistemic* states with-

concepts involved in a particular conception of how things should (representationally) look like.

Searching for what is assessable for accuracy differs from searching for conceptual or propositional contents of perceptions (Siegel, 2005): RCs depends on, e.g., normative concepts, say 'should look like', but RCs themselves are supposed to be not specified in linguistic terms as happens in the case of normative concepts.


Searching for what it is assessable for accuracy depends on specifying the kind of first-order content (i.e. non-conceptual content) which is normatively individuated and attributed. In short, what is supposed to be assessable for accuracy is a kind of content which is conceived as arising only from meeting normative conditions. These conditions are specifiable in propositional formats, while such information available to comprehend them need not to be of linguistic nature. On the contrary, it is sensory and non-conceptual. Briefly, what is regulated (RCs) differs from what is regulating it (accuracy conditions). Hence, the content assessable for accuracy must be regulated to be individuated and attributed.

Perceptual Representationalism [PR] allows us to conceive ICs of perceptions as assessable for accuracy. Relationships between perception and sensations are mirrored by the relationships between primitive IC specified from *Phenomenal Character Primitivism* [PCP] and representational IC individuated from PR. PCP and PR have different *explananda*. We don't need to reject PCP or PR as a consequence. Which contents are assessable for accuracy depend on how we conceive sensations, perceptions and their ICs. This approach challenges the *repre-*

sentationalist account of sensations to identify the normative concepts that would make its *explanandum* different.¹

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Davidson on Desire and Value

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Donald Davidson famously held that it is through their triangulations with objects and events in their common environment that the contents of people's beliefs and desires are fixed and that, because of this, each person's beliefs and desires must be by and large correct. As he well understood, this committed him to a kind of *realism* about value – the situations people confront and the outcomes they produce must have evaluative properties on which they can triangulate and to which their desires can be, or fail to be, correct.¹

But the idea that *desires* are the sorts of things that could conceivably be correct to evaluative properties of situations or outcomes is one many critics find difficult to understand. And it must be said that Davidson was not especially helpful on this point. He seemed to think he could finesse such worries by claiming that there is a close connection between desires and evaluative beliefs and thus that one's desire to Φ will be correct whenever a belief that one's Φ ing would be valuable would be true.

But of course this is precisely the sort of claim that troubles the critics. They tend to take the view that a desire to Φ is, at bottom, just a disposition to act in ways one believes will increase the chances of one's Φ ing.² Clearly one could have this disposition without believing one's Φ ing would be valuable or otherwise representing the world as being a world in which one's Φ ing would be valuable. So in what sense could the truth of this belief make one's disposition *correct*?

Pretty clearly, Davidson rejected this – call it the *standard* – view of what desires are. What is considerably less clear, and in fact surprisingly contentious, is what alternative view he adopted in its place and how he defended his alternative against the critics' inevitable objections. Presumably holism is supposed to come to the rescue here by making the contents of people's desires dependent on their evaluative beliefs. But how is this dependence to be understood and defended? My aim in this paper is to sketch answers to these questions.

Introducing the View

Let us focus our discussion on a concrete example. Is my desire to win at chess really a disposition to do *whatever* I believe will increase my chances of winning?

Surely it is at least arguable that it is not. For example, I believe I could increase my chances of winning by taking care only to play against people I know I can easily beat – raw beginners, blind drunks, etc. Yet, so far as I can tell, I am not at all disposed to play against people of that sort. Moreover, this reticence would not seem difficult to explain. For I do not believe that winning against such weak opponents would realize the values that in my view make winning at chess worth aiming at in the first place. Per-

haps, then, my disposition is to act in ways that I believe will increase my chances of realizing those values.

This might suggest an *evaluative* account of what desires are: P's desire to Φ is a disposition to act in ways that she believes will increase her chances of realizing the values that she believes she can realize by Φ ing. But this would entail that P cannot desire to Φ unless she believes she *can* realize some values by Φ ing – and of course that is an old bone of contention. Surely, it will be objected, I could have desired to win at chess even if I did not believe there were any values to be realized by my doing so. Even if I believed chess to be a worthless endeavour, couldn't I have found myself wanting to win at it?

I think we must acknowledge that such possibilities are real. So long as a person has sufficiently determinate beliefs about what actions would increase her chances of winning at chess, it does seem possible that she could simply find herself with a disposition to act on those beliefs, even if she does not believe that she has any reason to. Thus I think the evaluative account of desire is mistaken. Taken one by one, the contents of people's desires are not essentially dependent on the contents of their evaluative beliefs. I do not think it follows from this, however, that the standard view of desire is correct. For a weaker connection between desires and evaluative beliefs still seems possible.

The thought animating this proposal might be introduced as follows. Suppose people could not have any beliefs with determinate content unless they had many desires conforming to the evaluative account. Then the possibility that they might also have some desires conforming to the standard account would not matter. For these "non-evaluative" desires would be importantly dependent on the "evaluative" ones. Although it wouldn't be true that, taken one by one, the contents of people's desires depend essentially on the contents of their evaluative beliefs, since there would be these exceptions, the contents of people's desires as a whole would depend importantly on the contents of their evaluative beliefs, very much – though not exactly – as the evaluative account claimed they would.

This, then, brings us to the *holistic* account of what desires are: a desire to Φ may occasionally involve a disposition to do whatever one believes will increase one's chances of Φ ing but *typically* involves a disposition to act in ways that one believes will increase one's chances of realizing the values that one believes one could realize by Φ ing. As this is becoming quite a mouthful, I will, in what follows, often abbreviate it by saying that a desire to Φ may occasionally be non-evaluative but is typically evaluative – by which I mean not that it is identical with but only that it is influenced by beliefs that the agent has about what values she can realize by Φ ing.

As I have intimated, if this account is successfully to be defended, it will be on the basis of considerations having to do with how the contents of propositional attitudes are fixed. Given how large and difficult this question is, I of course do not propose to try to provide anything like a full or definitive treatment of it here. My goal in the next sec-

¹ Though Davidson 1984 exhibits some qualms about value realism, Davidson 1995 suggests that he ultimately does embrace it.

² Those critics who prefer phenomenological views over dispositional ones are if anything even more hostile to Davidson's claim.

tion will simply be to show, in very rough outline, how the argument here might go and what sorts of obstacles it would have to overcome.

Defending the View

There are, of course, many views about how the contents of propositional attitudes are fixed, many of which would *not* lend credence to the holistic account of what desires are. One very important exception, however, is the sort of externalism espoused by Davidson himself. Let us follow Claudine Verheggen (esp. 2006) in describing it as *interpersonal* (as opposed to *social*) externalism.

The core idea here, as Davidson (e.g. 1992) explained it, is that it must be at least in part by their causes that the contents of people's empirical beliefs are initially fixed, but that solitary interactions between a person and her environment could not generate determinate contents, since objects are incapable of impressing upon people any particular way of thinking about them. It is only through their interactions with one another and with the objects in their common environment that people start thinking about these objects under some concepts and not others.

As Verheggen has emphasized, other people are necessary, not because contents must always be shared, but so that each person, upon being confronted by the often different attitudes of others, will come to appreciate the importance of specifying what her own attitudes in fact are, and hence proceed to take whatever steps are required to make her attitudes determinate. A solitary person could not understand that the contents of her attitudes might be indeterminate and so could not engage in the sorts of activities that make determinate content possible.³

Chief among these activities is the sort of verbal interaction characteristic of early learning situations. The child begins by repeating sounds she hears in a more or less scatter-shot way, slowly adjusts her usage in light of the differences she finds in her parents' usage, and in due course comes to use her words in a stable and determinate way. This may not in the end be the same way that her parents used them, but, again, the idea is that content needn't be shared in order to be determinate.

Though he intended this account of content determination to apply most centrally to empirical beliefs, Davidson always made it clear that he thought it applied to evaluative beliefs as well. He maintained that people start thinking of certain sorts of outcomes as being worth promoting, and other sorts of outcomes as being either not worth promoting or positively worth resisting, as a result of their interactions with one another and with outcomes of these sorts. People use words in the presence of the evaluative properties they think they refer to, adjusting their individual usage in light of the differences they find in other people's usage, until everyone comes to use evaluative language in a determinate – though not necessarily identical – way.

What does this account of content determination tell us about the contents of people's *desires*? Here I think it must be acknowledged that Davidson's own position was not terribly clear. Although he would occasionally insist that desires are not to be identified with evaluative beliefs, or that it would be a "distortion" to regard desires as a species of belief, he very often proceeded as if he endorsed the evaluative account of what desires are. He liked to say,

for example, that evaluative sentences are the "natural expression" of desires, and when called upon to expand on this would sometimes go so far as to say that *all* desires may be expressed by value judgements that are at least implicit (1978, p. 36).

As we have seen, however, such claims almost certainly go too far. A person surely can desire to Φ and yet believe she has no reason to Φ ; presumably she can also believe she has reason to Φ and yet not desire to Φ . The position Davidson should have endorsed, I think, is not the one I have described as the evaluative account but rather the one I have described as the holistic account – the one according to which desires are *typically* evaluative in nature but *occasionally* non-evaluative. And I say this not just because I believe the holistic account to be correct, but also because I believe it is a better fit with Davidson's own interpersonal externalism.

As I see things, the crucial point to stress here is that people would not interact in the ways Davidson thought are necessary to fix the contents of their beliefs if their formative aim was not both to grasp and to act on the truth. Why would people adjust their usage of descriptive and evaluative language in light of the differences they find in other people's usage if their aim was not to be, as Davidson himself once put it, believers of the true and lovers of the good (1970, p. 222)? Their formative interest in fixing the contents of their thoughts could hardly be purely academic; it must rather be supposed to guide and give shape to most of their endeavours.

Once again, there is nothing in this argument to suggest that exceptions are not possible. In fact, since it is primarily intended as an account of the initial determination of contents, one would expect the exceptions to become more numerous as psychologies become more complex. So we need not dispute most of the counterexamples raised against the evaluative account. The fact that people *sometimes* find themselves wanting to do things they regard as worthless does not show that their *general orientation* is not towards actions they regard as valuable.

However, there are some alleged counterexamples that cannot be accommodated in this way. Milton's Satan, for example, is often cited in this connection as an example of someone whose general orientation is precisely not towards perceived good but is rather towards perceived evil. But there are good reasons to wonder whether even Satan could aim generally at evil. How did he initially acquire evaluative beliefs, if not by aiming to love the good? But if that was his formative aim, how far could he subsequently depart from it?

The point to stress here is that the holistic account of desire cannot be refuted simply by imagining a person systematically aiming to do evil rather than to do good, just as solitary languages aren't shown to be possible simply by imagining a solitaire soliloquizing.⁴ What has to be explained in each case is how these people could have acquired propositional attitudes possessing determinate contents without aiming to love the good or having any interlocutors. And in neither case, I submit, do we really understand how that explanation might go.

As I said earlier, however, it is no part of my purpose here to *prove* that Davidson's interpersonal externalism provides the correct account of how propositional attitudes are fixed. That would obviously be an enormous undertaking far beyond the scope of a single paper. All my argu-

³ Verheggen 2007a defends this claim against standard objections.

⁴ Verheggen 2007b is especially helpful on this point.

ment requires is that Davidson's interpersonal externalism provides a *credible* account of propositional content and that it lends its credibility to the holistic account of what desires are. For that is enough to show how Davidson's realism about evaluative properties might be defended – or, in any event, how its defence might get started, since a complete defence would evidently require us to take up objections over and above those I have discussed here.

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How May the Aesthetic Language of Artwork Represent Reality?

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1. Introduction: Language, Reality and the Problem of Representation

Dealing with how our cognitions represent reality we have to inquire whether and how they can represent it truly. We start from our perceptions in order to continue to other modes of representing reality: scientific, ethical, and aesthetic. These three modes of representations echo Kant's three Critiques, although he did not see them all as modes of representing reality. Therefore we have to turn the tables on his Copernican Revolution to overcome the basic transcendental. I analyze briefly Wittgenstein's two philosophical systems as prototypes of the Analytic Philosophy of formal semantics and the Phenomenology of interpretation, show their difficulties and suggest Peircean Pragmatism as an alternative to deal with how the languages of artworks represent reality aesthetically. Aesthetic representation by allegories differs from Scientific representation by general theories and from the Ethical representation by moral norms guiding our lives. However, only through our *confrontation with reality* these three cognitive enterprises can represent reality, which cannot be explained by the Analytic Metaphysical Realism or Phenomenological Internal Realism, being severed from reality.

2. Language and Reality in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*

2.1. Wittgenstein Distinguishes between Reality and World to Explain the Meaning and the Truth

I take Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* as the prototype of the enterprise of the formal semanticists to explain through model theory our representation of external reality. The Tractarian system is embedded in a Kantian metaphysics, with the assumption of Metaphysical Objects and Metaphysical Subject which are necessary to explain how language represents reality. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein constructed his logico-philosophical semantics that attempts to explain through the concepts of *meaning* and *truth* how thoughts expressed in language represent eternal objects of external *Reality* and describe *facts* in the *World*. Wittgenstein's pictorial theory of representation is a device to show the correspondence of our propositions through the *correspondence* between the elements of the propositional signs and the objects that compose the facts that verify it. How does such correspondence hold between the senses expressed in language and states of affairs in reality and facts in the world? According to Descartes, Hume, and Kant, we cannot go outside our cognitions to compare language with external reality. According to Wittgenstein, "It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false" (T:2.224).

2.2. The Metaphysical Subject Representing Reality Pictorially and Describing Worldly Facts

How can facts in the World be known to determine whether the elementary propositions represent them truly? In the *Tractatus* the Metaphysical Subject is the only one that can use the Tractarian elementary propositions to represent reality and describe facts since there are no empirical subjects in the Tractarian *World*. The Metaphysical Subject is like the Cartesian God staying outside the World, not like

humans who are prisoners in their minds. The Metaphysical Subject has separate access to propositional facts and to bare facts, which enable it to compare their logical forms and thus to determine the truth of the elementary propositions and this it can do only from outside the *World*.

[1] Wittgenstein's Conceptions of Meaning and Truth
[See Diagram 1]

In the *Tractatus* we should distinguish between the role of Wittgenstein, as the *formal semanticist*, constructing this system with his *philosophical language* to show how language represents reality, and the role of the *Metaphysical Subject*, with the only language which it understands, the *descriptive language* of natural science (T:5.61). In this system the Metaphysical Subject relates its language to the Metaphysical objects, when both are outside the empirical *World*, like Kant's *noumena*.

2.3. Why Cannot the Pictorial Theory of Representation Explain Human Representation of Reality?

However, abstract idealizations of formal semantics cannot preserve the essential relations of mind representing reality. The interpretation of the linguistic expressions in entities of the abstract structure assigned to them by the formal semanticists from outside these idealized domains assumes a God's-eye-view which humans cannot attain, and it can only create an illusion of a theoretical solution by assuming dogmatically the existence of external objects and facts to which linguistic expressions relate. But language is human cognition, and *we are the pictures* that we cannot *compare* from outside with external reality. Can we make this comparison without "get outside our skins" (Davidson, 1986; Neshet, 2002)?

3. Language and Representation in Wittgenstein's Late Philosophy

3.1. THE Grammatical Language-Game and the Operation of Rules of Meaning and Truth

Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations are severed from empirical science, and this raises difficult questions about the relationship of the "grammatical phenomenology" of a language-game to empirical reality, hence to the entire explanation of meaning and truth. To understand this cleavage between these two domains, we must examine the distinction between the functions of the *internal relations* of meaning and those of the *external relations* of empirical propositions. The internal relations are *constitutive* and compose the *grammatical rules of meaning* forming the relation between linguistic expressions and their meaning *criteria* with *necessity* connective ! of internal relations.

[2] Grammatical Rules of Meaning:

$$\text{Meaning}(\text{Word}) = R^i(\text{Word} ! \text{Criterion}_{e/i})$$

where $M(W)$ is the meaning of W , R^i is the grammatical operator of the internal relation of meaning, W is the linguistic expression, and C is the criterion of the meaning of W (an extra-linguistic C_e or "in the language"). External relations are between empirical propositions or theories

and the *symptoms*, empirical evidence, allegedly determining their truth values. Propositional beliefs and theoretical hypotheses are connected *Inductively* to their symptoms with the *probability* connective $\epsilon>$, by external relations.

[3] Empirical Inductive Rule of Truth:

$$\text{Truth}(P) = R^e((\text{Proposition, Fact}) \epsilon>PRm/n(P !F))$$

where P is the empirical proposition, R^e is the operator of the empirical inductive rule of inference of truth, F is the symptom-fact for the truth of P, and $\epsilon>PRm/n(P !F)$ is the inductive inference of probability from the proposition P and the symptom-fact F to the "warranted assertability" that P !F confirms the truth of P. The entire operation in a language-game is the combination of the internal rule of meaning [2] with the external rule of truth [3].

[4] The Grammatical Language-Game Operation of Meaning and Truth

$$\text{Meaning}(W) = R^i(W !C_{ei}) + \text{Truth}(P(W)) = R^e((P, F) \epsilon>PRm/n(P !F))$$

Accordingly, the rules of meanings are essential constituents of the grammatical structure of empirical propositions. The truth evaluation of linguistic propositions (Ps) presupposes their meanings, hence it cannot affect the meanings but only the truth of these expressions.

3.2. Why Language-Games Cannot Represent External Reality

Are empirical evidence-symptoms elements of language-game or of reality outside it?

The thing that's so difficult to understand can be expressed like this. *As long as* we remain in the province of the true-false games a change in the grammar can only lead us from *one* such game to another and never from something true to something false. On the other hand if we go outside the province of these games, we don't any longer call it 'language' and 'grammar', and once again we don't come into contradiction with reality. (Wittgenstein, PG#68; cf. OC#191)

"The province of the true-false games" is the language-games with their criteria and evidential symptoms being our form of life, which we cannot go outside of.

But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false. (Wittgenstein, OC#94)

How do we know that the evidence or symptoms of the inherited background are true empirical propositions upon which we can prove the truth or falsity of judgments? They are given without being proved true since for this we have to confront them with external reality. Since in the autonomous language-game this confrontation is impossible we accept the inherited background as a myth, as our conventions. "The propositions describing this world picture might be part of a kind of mythology" (OC#95). This is also the status of Popper's "empirical basis" which without being proved true is only doubtful and cannot be the basis of falsification (Neshet, 2002:X).

3.3. The Problem of Mental Meaning and the Quasi-proof of Our Basic Perceptual Propositions

Wittgenstein, in efforts to overcome the subjective explanation of meaning that brought him to Solipsism in his early period, argues against the possibility of "private" lan-

guage of feelings, images, and emotions. Accordingly, inner mental states are not meaning elements of the language-game and do not affect our linguistic behavior. Hence Wittgenstein's grammatical phenomenology cannot explain our confrontation with reality since only through our mental reflective self-control of the perceptual operations we can quasi-prove the truth of our perceptual judgments representing external reality (P#293; Neshet, 1987).

4. Wittgenstein on Aesthetic Judgments of Artworks

Wittgenstein describes and compares the use of words expressing aesthetic judgments in order to understand the grammatical rules of a language-game of aesthetic words, their meaning and use.

The words we call expressions of aesthetic judgments play a very complicated role, but a very definite role, in what we call a culture of the period. To describe their use or to describe what you mean by cultured taste, you have to describe a culture. (To describe a set of aesthetic rules fully means really to describe the culture of the period). ... An entirely different game is played in different ages. (Wittgenstein, L&C:I#25)

What belongs to a language game is a whole culture... (Wittgenstein, L&C:I#26)

The context of the creation and the evaluation of artworks is essential to understanding their meaning, and thus the concept of culture in explaining aesthetic judgments is essential, but only if we can explain its epistemic function as the proof-conditions to prove the truth, hence the aesthetic beauty, of their interpretations and representations of reality (Neshet, 2007b).

I see roughly this—there is a realm of utterance of delight, when you taste pleasant food or smell a pleasant smell, etc., then there is the realm of Art which is quite different, though often you may make the same face when you hear a piece of music as when you taste good food. (L&C:I#3)

Wittgenstein feels the distinction between sensual taste and Art, but since he deals basically with our instinctive and practical reactions he does not elaborate any epistemological explanation of the cognitive function of Art in its aesthetic representation of our reality. Also, in the aesthetic language-game it is impossible for us to understand this representation while prisoners of its framework, as shown above.

5. The Meaning and Truth of Languages of Artwork Represent Reality

5.1. The epistemology of confrontation with reality to prove the truth or falsity of cognitions

The problem is to explain whether and how we confront reality to self-control the meaning and truth of artworks to determine their aesthetic beauty. The aesthetic meaning-content of artwork originates in the artist's experience, such that from the meaning-content of perceptual experience the intellectual understanding of reality is developed in interpretation by abstraction and generalization (Neshet, 2002:II). The subjective feelings of qualities and emotional reactions to them are essential components of any experiential meaning-content. They can become objective when the entire cognitive operation is synthesized in perceptual judgment, in reasoning thought, or in aesthetic judgment of taste, and through confrontation with reality proved to be true interpretation and representation (Neshet, 2005). The

meaning-content of our basic propositions evolves hierarchically in perception from pre-verbal sensory-motor **Feeling** and **Emotion** as the meaning-content of the Perceptual Judgment of **Thought**:

[4] Perceptual Experience of Interpretations and Representation and its Meaning-Content
[See Diagram 2]

The signs that eventually represent the Real Object are the **Iconic** sign, the Feeling of the Property P of the Object, the **Indexical** sign, the Emotional Reaction to Feeling: [this] K. When *coherent* they are synthesized in the **Sym-bolic** sign Thought, a perceptual judgment: "[This] K is the Object presented in P."

5.2. Artistic Creation from Intellectual Understanding of Reality to Its Aesthetic Exhibition

Aesthetic knowledge and its function in human life have the same epistemology as Science and Ethics to explain human cognitive representation of reality. Indeed, neither scientific theories nor literary artworks are fictional, but they are all human cognitions representing reality albeit in different cognitive modes. The "atom" and "electron" of science are not proper names but general names of similar objects; and the literary "Don Quixote" and "Anna Karenina" are not proper names of real persons but general names of characters and motivations of humans in general (Goodman, 1984). Artistic creations are based on human experience evolving into general intellectual ideas representing reality which are interpreted by being epitomized in aesthetic ideas as modes of representation. The aesthetic modes of representations exhibit particular characters and situations representing types in reality. Following is the Pragmatist scheme of artistic creation, the *Trio* of Abductive discovery, Deductive elaboration, and Inductive evaluation:

[5] The Sequence of Interpretation: Discovery of *Intellectual Idea* Creation of *Aesthetic Idea* Synthesized by their *Harmony* as Criterion of Judgment of *Beauty*:
[See Diagram 3]

This is an elaboration of Kantian aesthetics, but the question is about the conception of Harmony if it can be an objective criterion of beauty (Kant, *CJ*). This brings Kant's aesthetic theory to the paradox of beauty, as in Wittgenstein's paradox of the *meaning* of following rules, which if every subjective pleasure determines beauty, and every displeasure can contradict it, such subjective feelings cannot be an intersubjective Judgment of beauty. Hence, there is no phenomenal objective criterion for harmony between *intellectual ideas* and *aesthetic ideas*, and the judgment of aesthetic beauty remains arbitrary. The way out from such "internal realism" is the epistemology of pragmatist "representational realism."

5.3. Proof of Truth and Beauty of Artworks: The Nature of Aesthetic Representation of Reality.

Epistemic logic is the sequence of *trio* inferences, and is the same general method of proving the cognitive representation of reality and of the creation and evaluation of artwork. The epistemology of confrontation with Reality is the complete quasi-proof of perceptual judgments and proofs of more abstract propositions.

[6] The Structure of Complete Proof of True Interpretation and Representation of Reality:
[See Diagram 4]

Thus, \Rightarrow is a *plausibility connective* suggesting the concept, or theory, A^{Ab} from the perceptual experience C^{Ab}

and the quasi-deductive rule (**A!C**), the ! is a *necessity connective* deducing the abstract object C^{Dd} from the rule (**A!C**) and the Abductively suggested A^{Ab} ; since the abstract object C^{Dd} is contained in A^{Ab} , we evaluate the latter against the newly experienced C^{In} in Induction when \Leftarrow is a *probability connective* evaluating the relation of the concept/theory A^{Ab} and the new experiential object C^{In} to prove the proposition ($A^{Ab}!C^{In}$). With complete proof we confront reality by the Abductively discovered suggestions, Deductively elaborating them, and their Inductive evaluation, without trying in vain to justify separately any a priori concepts, principles, and rules, as Kant strives to do in his Critiques (Kant, *Logic:#II*; Neshet, 2007).

6. Epistemology of Artwork, Its Truth and Beauty Representing Reality

6.1. Artistic Creation of Artwork as Beautiful Is Self-consciously Reflective Self-controlled

The aesthetic evaluations of artistic works as beautiful are self-conscious reflective judgments by the artists of their own creative-interpretative operations and by others through their interpretations of artworks. The artists' reflective judgments are based on instinctive and practical self-control and they also reach rational intuition, to self-control the *free play* between *intellectual ideas* of understanding reality and productive imagination in creating *aesthetic ideas* to achieve their harmony in the artwork (Kant, *CJ*). The Spinozist conception of *freedom as determinate self-control* can explain the artistic operation as critically appraising the creation and completion of artwork (Neshet, 1999). This harmony can be achieved only by some objective criterion common to both kinds of ideas, the proof of their truth in representing reality.

6.2. Evaluation of Created Artwork as True Aesthetic Representation of Human Reality

We start our evaluation of the aesthetically imaginative exhibition of artworks instinctively and practically, and of their intellectual content only through the interpretation of the former. The proof of true interpretation depends on our knowledge of the artist's truth-conditions, which must be relative to our knowledge of the artist's initial "spirit," his "intellectual ideas" and the reality he endeavors to represent aesthetically. This also shows why there can be differences in interpretations of the artwork's intellectual content and its aesthetic exhibition by different people. However, without understanding the artist's language and knowing his truth-conditions we cannot understand the artwork and judge its beauty as a true representation of reality. Artists reveal their Concepts of reality in their aesthetic exhibition of artworks representing reality. The truth of artwork is not superficial imitation of reality but the aesthetic exhibition of the artist's true Conceptions of it. Since artistic imitation cannot harmonize with true Conception of reality it cannot be its true representation. Artistic imitation of reality without *spirit* is a *kitsch* and the disharmony between the artist's Conception and the aesthetic exhibition is *false* artwork.

6.3. The Artwork's Creation and Evaluation, and the Proof of Judgment of Its Truth and Beauty

Pragmatist epistemology explains how the instinctive Reflective Act of Comparison between the Iconic aesthetic feeling A^{Dd} and indexical emotional reaction to it C^{In} , and the harmony between them, amounts to the feeling of aesthetic pleasure as the beauty of the aesthetic artwork. Since this can be achieved only when the artwork aesthetically represents reality, the feeling of aesthetic beauty

is also *the sense of the Truth* indicating aesthetic knowledge of this reality.

For the whole question consists in that—what to consider as the truth. This is why the novel is written. (Dostoevsky, in Mochulsky, 1947)

The following are the threefold stages of the artistic creating and evaluation of Artwork:

[7] The Artwork's Creation and Evaluation, and the Proof of Judgment of Its Truth and Beauty:
[See Diagram 5]

This is the artist's cognitive operation from his knowledge of reality to create the artwork with its continuous evaluations against such knowledge. If the artistic intellectual idea A^{Ab} is exhibited in the Artwork's aesthetic ideas C^{Dd} , then by evaluating inductively the harmony in the meaning-content of the artwork, against the artist's knowledge of reality, he can evaluate the artwork's truth and beauty. The Inductive inference ($(A^{Ab}, C^{In}) \sim \rightarrow PRm/n (A^{Ab} \rightarrow C^{In})$) is the evaluation of the artwork C^{Dd} through the embedded intellectual artistic idea A^{Ab} as its meaning. We evaluate artworks by proving their being *true* and *beautiful* or *false* and *ugly*; artworks for which these cannot be proved are *doubtful* and *kitschy*.

[9] Success or Failure of the Aesthetic Exhibition Affects the Beauty and Truth of Artwork:
[See Diagram 6]

When we know the reality that the artist represents aesthetically, the truth-conditions of his artwork, we can inquire into this distinction between true and false aesthetic representation of reality. Still, every rational analysis of artworks starts with our experiential feelings and emotional reaction to artwork as pleasure, or displeasure, as its beauty and truth. These emotional reactions to the true aesthetic representation of reality reflect our real lives, our understanding of ourselves, and lead to preparation to self-control our future life.

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
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Diagram 1



Moore's Paradox and the Context Principle

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1. The Context Principle

The tangle Moore's paradox, a problem which first came to be widely discussed in the 1940s, is well described as resting on an insufficient understanding of the import of a "context principle". Moore's paradox, in G. E. Moore's own description, was that it is paradoxical, that it should be absurd for me to say, in an assertive way, that "I believe it is raining and it is not raining" (Moore 1993: 208).

The most commonly cited context principle is ascribed to Gottlob Frege: the principle that a word has meaning only in the context of a sentence or rather, that the meaning of a word *should be considered* only in the context of a sentence. A more general version of a context principle in circulation is that the meaning of a sentence (or any linguistic sign) is given by its context. Frege's context principle is often taken to suggest a fact: that the smallest meaning-bearing element of language is 'the proposition' (or sentence, *Satz*). From this fact, it would follow that the proposition or sentence carries its sense within itself as opposed to words. Words, it is thought, can be used in many different ways – to take an example from Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, "Green is green" is not by necessity an identity statement, but may just as well be used to say that Mr Green is not feeling well or has a particular political inclination – depending on the context (or the particular intention by the speaker in that context).

Frege's principle was introduced as a methodological rule. It was not a discovery about the proposition. Frege's aim was to create a script or language for the description of mathematics, it was not to pose a semantic theory or a theory of meaning in the sense of today's analytic philosophy of language (cf Stenlund 2002: 15).

A context principle challenges the line drawn between semantics and pragmatics by connecting the propositions (as signs or collections of signs) to the contexts of utterance which give them their particular sense. Calling upon a context principle is a challenge to compositionality, according to which signs carry their meanings in themselves and bring them into the sentence by combination according to rules (which also contribute to the sense as a whole).

There is a mistaken view of the import of the context principle in circulation, according to which the context principle gives rise to an extended compositionism: if meaning is not to be found in words, it must reside in sentences: sentences are the smallest meaning-bearing entity in language. This view underlies Donald Davidson's extension of the context principle: "only in the context of a language does the sentence (and therefore the word) have meaning" (Davidson 1967). This picture of a language has a set theoretical background: it is a set of sentences.

Cora Diamond has developed a Wittgensteinian version of Frege's context principle: words do not carry their meaning in themselves, but the structure of rules governing the composition of sentences does not either (Diamond 1981/1992). According to Diamond, nonsense is not something one can construct by combining parts in the wrong way, because this would entail that the words in some way must carry the meaning within them into any

context – in violation of the context principle. Lars Hertzberg has shown that this point can be extended to sentence-like structures – a particular sentence does not necessarily mean the same in any context. For example, "Caesar is a prime number" may work perfectly well as a judgment by a better about a pet turtle participating in a race. This is an extension of the context principle to a situation with a speaker having something to say – in contrast to Davidson's extension to an abstract concept of 'language'.

2. Moore's Paradox

The context principle in Diamond's and Hertzberg's is a criticism against the distinction between that which is said and that which is implied, or what is said as opposed to saying it. To claim that the context principle would leave the proposition or content of an utterance undefined or undetermined would backfire: that would entail the very claim that an invocation of the context principle aims to counter: the supposition that it is, or must be clear what "the proposition" as such would be, that we could understand what a proposition necessarily means by encountering it in isolation, without context, without use. The point of the context principle is exactly to take into account the lack of clarity in relation to the proposition as a philosophical-theoretical ("semantic") concept.

It may be true that I went to the cinema last Tuesday, but that I do not believe that I did. Nevertheless, Moore worries, it seems impossible for me to express this very "same proposition": "I believe it is raining and it is not raining". Someone else, however, could express it about me, and it could be true. This is Moore's paradox: that it would be absurd to express a proposition which in Moore's terms is "perfectly in order" and might very well be true.

One of the central ingredients of Moore's paradox is the idea that there could be a proposition schema void of context ('I believe that $p \ \& \ - \ p$ '), of which we (the philosophers) once and for all could judge whether it is "in order" or "assertible" or not. The particular example in the paradox ("I believe it is raining and it is not raining") is taken to be clear because the schema is in order, and the problem is the application of the instance of the use of the schema. One could describe the paradox, about which Moore wrote that "it is paradoxical that it should be absurd to say it in an assertive way, although the sentence is perfectly in order", as the dilemma that he wants to take the sentence to be in order although he realizes that it, at the same time, is problematic. And it cannot be both.

The context principle plays on two levels when it comes to Moore's paradox. On the one hand, it seems that the sentence schema is faultless and hence that there is an acceptable proposition. But a proposition is not acceptable as such, only due to the schema – the context principle is the insistence that the schema does not determine whether a string of signs can be used to communicate something ("it's content") or not, but that a context is needed. The problem in Moore's paradox is that we do not know what the content would be, what it would be for me

to both believe that it is raining and at the same time claim that it isn't.

However, it is possible to come up with a perfectly working use of the schema: suppose that I am at a party and I keep feeling behind my chair with my hand, and I explain my behavior to you: "I believe I have my purse with me but I don't have my purse with me". This is an example in which a context provides the schema a use and it shows that a schema as such is not sufficient to determine whether there could be meaningful use of a particular "sentence". The "context" – in this context – is the situation, a surrounding, the description of an event in the context of which a sentence of the sort proposed could be used. And as soon as a context is given, the oddity of the sentence, the purported non-usability of it, disappears. This is one of the interesting features of Moore's paradox – another being the "contradiction-likeness" of the sentence itself, ordinarily placed in focus by formally inclined philosophers of language.

The sentence is a blackboard construct (not something expressed in any potential "natural environment") and that feature is stunning. But when the blackboard context (also a sort of context which poses as contextlessness) is exchanged for a real one, the Moorean feature disappears.

3. The Philosophical Term "Believe" Carrying Its Meaning in Itself

Another level on which a context principle could come to play is in relation to the words or terms in the Moorean sentence (the Moorean sentence I call the problematic one – it is no longer Moorean in a context where it works). In order to achieve a contradiction-like feature to appear in a sentence like "I believe it is raining and it is not raining" the unit under scrutiny must be taken to consist of two connected parts. The "and" hence is taken to be a formal conjunction, which makes both sides valid simultaneously.

The perspective in which the problem presses includes a special philosophical-terminological use of the word "believe". The idea of a single meaning of the word "believe" which it has to have regardless of context of use is required to arrive at the contradiction-likeness: "I believe it is raining" has to retain its meaning through all contexts. It is taken to be the epistemological expression of knowledge as a state-of-mind, the opposite of "It is not raining" which would be "the expression of the belief" that it is not raining. (One example of this special use of "believe" is found in Searle 1969, cf Malcolm 1992.)

Now, does the use or assertion of a proposition always entail the expression of that belief? A "yes" here is the commitment to the terminological use of "belief". (It is not an observation but a stipulation.) What is the alternative? The relation between the word 'believe' and something expressed (a sentence) is not necessarily constant, but in the terminologized version of belief, the exclusion of ambiguous or multiple uses is required. 'Believe' can be used to modify a statement: to express emphasis, soften commitment. To describe someone as believing that it is raining is not necessarily to ascribe him belief as a state of mind or a particular piece of knowledge. When I say "I believe it is raining" it may be about me or about the rain outside, depending on the context. "Belief" in a case where the Moore paradoxical sentence is taken to be contradictory is part of the *description* of assertion as the expression of belief, not of the phenomenon itself.

One road to a better understanding of Moore's paradox could be to see that we are asked to determine once and for all whether the sentence will work or not, and that is to invoke the schema and the proposition (or its alleged given parts) as bearing their meanings in themselves.

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Rigidity and Essentialism

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1. Introduction

The notion of rigidity has been introduced and defined for singular terms by Kripke. In *Naming and Necessity* Kripke also suggests that this notion applies to some general terms – namely to natural kind terms. He does not however state precisely how general term's rigidity should be understood. Scott Soames has argued that extending the notion of rigidity from names to natural kind predicates is one of the two important pieces of "the unfinished semantic agenda that has been left to us by Saul's Kripke *Naming and Necessity*" (Soames 2002, 3).

In *Naming and Necessity* we can find two criteria of rigidity. According to the first, "*N*" is a rigid designator if in every possible world it designates the same object. According to the second, "*N*" is a rigid designator if "*N* might not have been *N*" is false (this is so called "Kripke's intuitive test"). For singular terms both criteria give the same result. Any singular term which is rigid according to the first criterion, will be rigid according to the second, and *vice versa*. However, in the case of general terms those criteria come apart. The first criterion leads to the semantic conception of rigidity, whereas the second – to the metaphysical conception. Let us look at the semantic conception first.

2. Semantic conception of rigidity

It seems that the simplest way of extending the notion of singular term's rigidity to general terms is to claim that a general term is rigid if it has the same extension in all possible worlds. However, such an interpretation is a non-starter since according to this definition barely any general terms are rigid. For instance, since the number of elephants in different possible worlds varies, the term "elephant" is not rigid on this account. The same applies to the majority of natural kind terms. The only rigid general terms would be some mathematical terms and terms which are necessarily empty. Another way of extending the first criterion to general terms is to argue that a given kind term is a rigid designator if it designates the same kind (property, category, etc.) in all possible worlds. The main problem for this conception is that all kind terms come out as rigid designators and rigidity is trivialized. Terms such as "honeybee", "the species typically farmed for honey", "bachelor", "the kind most commonly broached in discussions about analyticity" are all rigid since they refer to the same kind (HONEYBEE, THE SPECIES TYPICALLY FARMED FOR HONEY, BACHELOR, THE KIND MOST COMMONLY BROACHED IN DISCUSSIONS ABOUT ANALYTICITY respectively) in all possible worlds. In order to avoid that consequence one may distinguish between different uses of kind terms (cf. LaPorte 2006). Terms "bachelor" and "honeybee" have only rigid uses, whereas expressions "the species typically farmed for honey" and "the kind most commonly broached in discussions about analyticity" have rigid as well as non-rigid uses. "Honeybee" in all of its uses refers to the kind HONEYBEE, whereas "the species typically farmed for honey" on some uses refers to the kind THE SPECIES TYPICALLY FARMED FOR HONEY and on some to the kind HONEYBEE. So, one may argue that general terms are rigid if *in all their uses* they designate the same kind in all possible worlds. The problem with this

solution is that rigid will be the non-natural kind term "bachelor" as well as the natural kind term "honeybee". On the other hand terms such as "bald happy human" will also be rigid, for they have only rigid uses: "bald happy human kind" in each possible world refers to the BALD-HAPPY-HUMAN kind (cf. LaPorte 2000). It constitutes a problem since rigidity is supposed to be a feature that distinguishes natural-kind from non-natural kind terms.

Moreover, on the semantic conception each complex term used descriptively has a rigid use. That is why S.P. Schwartz accused LaPorte of "confusing rigidity with consistency of meaning" (Schwartz 2002, 272). LaPorte argues that although it would be "a confusion to say that an expression is rigid just because it keeps the same meaning from world to world", his view "does not fall into this confusion" (LaPorte 2006, 329). "The species typically farmed for honey" has rigid as well as non-rigid uses, so it is not rigid, although it keeps the same meaning in all worlds. However, it seems to me that on LaPorte's account any complex term has a rigid use "just because it keeps the same meaning from world to world" and this is dangerously close to confusing rigidity with constancy of meaning. In addition such a view has a bizarre consequence. Any complex term which *does not refer* to any natural kind will be rigid. For instance, the term 'bald-happy-human kind' is rigid, because BALD-HAPPY-HUMAN kind is the only kind for it to refer to. The term "large carnivorous quadrupedal feline, tawny yellow in color with blackish transverse stripes and white belly" (cf. Kripke 1980) is rigid, if there is no kind which fits that description and it is not rigid if there is a kind that does fit it. So the more gerrymandered the kind the bigger the chance of it being rigid. Such a consequence is extremely counterintuitive.

3. Metaphysical conception of rigidity

According to the metaphysical conception a kind term is a rigid applier iff it is such that if it applies to an object in any possible world, then it applies to that object in every possible world (in which the object exists) (Devitt 2005, 146).¹ On this view "bachelor" will not be rigid because someone who is a bachelor in the actual world need not be a bachelor in a nearby world. However, it has been argued that rigidity so-understood does not mark out the class of natural kind terms either, because biological kind terms will come out as non rigid. According to most contemporary conceptions of species membership in a species is not essential to its members. Recently LaPorte (2004) and Okasha (2002) have argued that on none of the viable conceptions of species intrinsic properties are decisive as far as species-membership is concerned. The essence of biological natural kinds is relational (on interbreeding and ecological conceptions) or both relational and historical (on the phylogenetic conception). Since relational properties are rarely essential to objects that have them, it is argued

¹ An alternative formulation says that "a predicate *P* is essentialist iff for all worlds *w* and any object *o*, if *P* applies to *o* in respect to *w*, then *P* applies to *o* in all worlds in which *o* exists". (Soames 2002, 251). On both formulations it is evident that rigidity is akin to essentiality.

that belonging to a particular species is not essential to its members. Therefore a member of a given species in our world may belong to another species in another possible world. So – if relational species theories are correct – on the metaphysical conception of rigidity none of biological kind terms will come out as rigid and rigidity so understood will become useless as a mean of distinguishing natural from non-natural kind terms.

However, in his recent paper Devitt tries to resurrect biological essentialism and argues that essentialism is consistent with current biology (Devitt 2008). According to Intrinsic Biological Essentialism (henceforth IBE) Linnaean taxa have essences that are, at least partly, intrinsic underlying properties. Devitt distinguishes three problems: the taxon problem, the category problem and the conspecificity problem, and claims that while relational species concepts give answers to the category problem, it is IBE that provides an answer to the taxon problem. The taxon problem (T) is a problem of what is it to be a member of any group that happens to be species. (i.e. “What makes an x an F ?”). The category problem (C) is a problem of what is it for a group to be a species (i.e. “What makes F s a species?”). And finally the conspecificity problem (CS) concerns the question “In virtue of what x s are in the same species?” Devitt argues that relational species concepts do not answer (T), for none of the conceptions appealing to relational essences of species gives any account of species identity. They say how the notion of “tiger” is to be understood (e.g. on the phylogenetic conception it is a lineage of a certain sort), but they do not say in what being a tiger consist. According to Devitt the only conception well fitted to answer (T) is IBE. Moreover, IBE can be wedded to relational species concepts so that they together are able to answer all the problems.

Devitt says that a relational nonintrinsic answer to (CS) would imply a relational nonintrinsic answer to (T) but – contrary to what might seem – a relational answer to (C) given by relational species concepts does not imply a relational nonintrinsic answer to (CS). Relational species concepts, such as e.g. Biological Species Concept (BSC), do not say in virtue of what organisms belong to the same species. According to BSC a given organism is conspecific with organisms with which it can interbreed, but – as Devitt points out – this is not to say that organisms are conspecific *in virtue of* interbreeding. This is why BSC can be wedded to IBE. IBE coupled with BSC would claim that because the members share the intrinsic properties necessary to make them conspecific, in the given environment they interbreed and hence have the property that makes them a species according to BSC (cf. Devitt, 2008, 365-6). Hence, while BSC provides an answer to the category problem, IBE answers the taxon problem and IBE and BSC together answer the conspecificity problem. Since the answer to the last two problems is (at least partly) intrinsic, the claim that belonging to a species is essential to its members can be rescued and biological kind terms may be regarded as rigid.

There is a couple of problems with this solution.² Firstly, even if it seems plausible for BSC, it is much more problematic for other relational species concepts. If we wanted to combine IBE with the ecological conception, we would be forced to defend a rather controversial claim that it is in virtue of sharing the intrinsic properties necessary to make the organisms conspecific, that they occupy the

same ecological niche. In case of the phylogenetic conception, Devitt writes that “an organism is a member of a certain species F in virtue of having a certain intrinsic property and being part of a particular genealogical nexus” (Devitt, 2008, 368). Such an answer implies that both intrinsic features and genealogical history are needed for conspecificity, and this seems inconsistent with current biological theories.

Secondly, although distinguishing (T), (C) and (CS) is indeed very important, the weight that Devitt attaches to (T) is much greater than the weight attached to it by relational species theorists. For such theorists an answer to (T) is a sort of by-product of the answer provided to (C) and (CS), whereas for Devitt (T) is of primary importance.

BSC answers the category problem (C) by saying that a group of F s is a species if they interbreed. Of course those organisms that interbreed have certain underlying intrinsic properties that are worthy of investigation. If we find out that there are intrinsic properties that are shared by all and only the members of F (although according to current biology this is unlikely) then we may say that those intrinsic properties are characteristic of the members of F and together they constitute the (partial) answer to the taxon problem (T). However, such intrinsic properties are only of secondary importance. If the organisms in question will cease to interbreed they will cease to be a species, notwithstanding the fact that they will continue to share the intrinsic properties. Similarly, if the organisms start to interbreed with other organisms that have different intrinsic properties, the species F will expand and its intrinsic characteristics will change. Hence, saying that it is intrinsic properties that make the x s the F s is misleading. If F s constitute a species, then since membership in a species depends on relational properties and such properties are not essential to members of the species, membership in F is not an essential feature of its members. They may retain all their intrinsic properties but change membership and cease being the F s.

It seems to me therefore that while Devitt’s argument is very persuasive, it does not resurrect essentialism and does not help interpret “rigidity” in such a way that it distinguishes natural from non-natural kind terms.

4. Conclusion

Both conceptions of rigidity – the semantic one and the metaphysical one – face serious difficulties. Neither fulfils Kripkean postulate that nearly all natural kind terms are rigid and most of the others are non-rigid. The prospects of resurrecting biological essentialism, which is needed to make the rigid application view viable, are dim. Hence, I agree with Soames when he says that “it might be advisable to reserve the terminology of rigidity exclusively for singular terms” (Soames 2002, 263).

² A separate problem is the worry that IBE postulates intrinsic essences not recognized by biology, but I will not address this worry here. See e.g. Okasha 2002.

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Concatenation: Wittgenstein's Logical Description of the Possible World

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Introduction

One of the constitutive contents of the 20th century philosophical occupations has been the circumspection that radically affects the problems of the consciousness of the facts that exist between human language and the human world.

The systematisation of this philosophical consciousness has given the technique of the philosophy of our time a relational character. Heidegger, for example, in his conception of 'Being and Time' (BT) gives analyzable signification of language/linguistic relational structures between the human world and human language. One can to a large extent convoke, as the totality matrix of Heidegger's 'Being and Time', to mean the philosophical struggle of '*Dasein*' in an all-encompassing involvement in articulation of intelligibility (BT: 204). Heidegger's '*Dasein*' as 'Being-in-the-World' engages the self in manipulation and utilization of worldhood entities by means of delineations and intelligible demarcations (disclosure) given through '*Dasein*'s competences and performances as –ready-at-hand- instrumentation- of language tools.

According to Heidegger (BT: 205):

What the discourse is about is a structural item that it necessarily possesses; for discourse helps to constitute the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world, and in its own structure it is modelled upon this basic state of *Dasein*.

On another note, Russell (cf. Lycan 2000:37) approaches this aspect of philosophy through a clear structure of mirroring the interrelatedness of human language and the human world through the constitutions of 'Names'. For Russell the ultimate link between language and the world is disclosed through the 'naming-claim' functions.

Calling to mind the main course of his short paper, Wittgenstein maintains in his approach that 'the' possible world and not necessarily 'a' possible world is possible through the strict games/logical games of the accomplishments of language/linguistic formal structures and their descriptive logics. The issue according to Wittgenstein is too followed up through the linkages of the world and representational language that are revealed through the picture theory. Language as such stands to be the depiction of the existing states of affairs mirrored through propositions. Names in the views of Wittgenstein also stand for objects and these objects are their meaning. To this effect 'naming function' of Russell may not be the optimal relation to worldhood states of affairs because names are expected to gain signification within the concatenation of the totality of names in propositional contexture (cf. *Tractatus*: 2.0122, 3.3, 4.23, and 5.55). The approach of this short paper is to show that Wittgenstein's logical description of the world is the methodological structural congruity of connectedness made possible through language/linguistic-concatenated contexts (cf. Okonkwo 2008:289).

Structural Congruity

It is not in any way a methodological coincidence in the writings of Wittgenstein to discover that language and the possible world are fully connected, intertwined and existentially permeate one another. This issue is what this paper calls here 'structural congruity'. For Wittgenstein a conscious talk of one heralds the excerpts of the other. The logic of language is equally the logic of the fundamental fact of the possible human world. Language and the human possible world depict an irreducible harmony. In the proceedings of both '*Zettel*' (p.55e) and '*Notebooks*' (2.8.16) we can affirm that the harmony between thought and world-reality is the grammar of language and this 'work' is the stretch from the foundations of logic to the nature of the world. In the views of the above, it can therefore follow that the world is comprehensive through the logic of human language. The essence of language in this context is that language is to be seen as 'world-language', which is constitutively comprehensive as a structural congruity proposing through propositions the naming semiotic that mirror existing states of affairs. This assertion remains substantive for instantiations of the contents of the *Tractatus* 1's and 2's. Charlesworth (1959:84) had confirmed the above by putting through the facts that the early portions of the *Tractatus* present statements about the logical conditions necessary for descriptive functions of the world. The world is thinkable through the logic that what is thinkable is possible too (*Tractatus* 3.02). Wittgenstein again reconfirms this position by stating that something unimaginable belongs to the criterion for nonsensicality (*Zettel*: 263).

Further remarks to confirm this structural congruity with regard to 'world-language-relation' can be connected with the following question asked by Wittgenstein in the 'Blue Book' (31):

How can one imagine what does not exist? The answer seems to be: If we do, we imagine non-existent combinations of existing elements...But can't we imagine an object utterly different from any one which exists?-We should be inclined to answer: No; the elements, individuals, must exist...

The strict implication here is that objects gain their meaning through the language-world-structural congruity, which we must apprehend within the conventions of constitutive and concatenated states of affairs (cf. *Tractatus*: 2.02). States of affairs on the other hand follow also the strict conventions of language as structural compositionality (cf. Okonkwo 2008). The implied possible object in effect becomes responsible and/or meaningful on the grounds of 'useable' speech-communal observable language and linguistic systems.

Under this relation, Wittgenstein proves that any given object is possible because its possibility is a relation to the totality of sensical combination or concatenation, which must be based and/or founded on the entities of the logical provisions of the 'given' speech community.

Structural congruity therefore, is only possible in a *de facto* worldhood which again is made possible by following the rules of significant and definitive total language/linguistic logical concatenation or the *compositum* of existing objects. A proposition is thinkable because it is possible. Propositions therefore present (concatenated) objects with substantive instantiated tables of meaning or content as the possible world. Following the rules of Wittgenstein's logic, 'the world' constitutively is possible. Logic in this sense becomes, according to Wittgenstein, the mirror image about the world (*Tractatus*: 6.13).

The World as a Logical Description

When logic is presented above (*Tractatus*: 6.13) as the 'mirror-image' about the world' it does not by Wittgenstein's logical necessity mean that the world as affected by logic is a functional '*re-presentation*'. Wittgenstein implies that logic 'as mirror' descriptively (i.e. by means of the given and possible human language) *represents* the world. A mirrored image depends by the structural congruity, on the object the mirror apprehends. The object so apprehended is a copy described and/or represented by the mirror. By implication therefore, the mirrored object is possible and functionally dependent on the possible presence and/or presentation of the original object before the facticity of the mirror. There is therefore a structural connectedness between the mirrored (the represented) and the mirror (the representor). This relation functions as the proposition of logic and the world as proposed. Logic in this sense tells us what can be the case in the concatenation of the presented states of affairs.

On the grounds of this confidence, Wittgenstein (*Tractatus* 6:124) confirms that:

The propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they represent it...and that is their connexion with the world.

The above position goes further to command Wittgenstein's distinction between logic and experience. Logic goes a descriptive way to reveal what can be the case in such and such concatenation (objective states of affairs) while experience reveals the 'how' objects are 'instantiated'. Logic does not engage itself in the dictation of the original or actual states of affairs of the world, but stands for the conformity of the formal structure of the world. Logic has the descriptive-elucidation function of the *de facto* possible world. Logic is by this implication the descriptive show of the use of human language in a human world.

This position guarantees Wittgenstein's premise that my language determines my world and sets its firm limits (*Tractatus*: 5.6). There is also a more necessary premise that most times seems to be fairly cited which in this connection confirms the concern of this paper. Wittgenstein says also as a follow-up that logic as such pervades the world and therefore the limit of the world is also the limit of logic (5.61).

Conversely Wittgenstein projects also the premise that the limit of my language projects likewise the limit of my logic and this is why it is necessary that logic must look after itself for reasons of 'competence and performance' with regards to capable, legitimate and possible signification of states of affairs (5.473).

On the grounds of the above confirmations, the possible world is possible and dependent on the totality of the ways and means of the dispositions of human competence and performance to effect and disclose speak-able objects

in the world-hood concatenation. On account of this therefore, the only option to elucidate the possible world and logic is the connexion and the nexus of language/linguistic structure and/or structural congruity. Logic, on account of this disposition, qualifies to be the measure for the investigation of 'language-use' with the *proviso* to avoid mistakes while on duty in world elucidation, description and investigation of the concatenated states of affairs.

From the above positions this short paper exposes the *factum* that every given and *de facto* human language guarantees the real irrefutable basement for all possible 'talks' about the projections of any possible world and the world-hood thereof. It is logic that provides as such, the formal grounds for discernable, significant and observable propositions for the truth circumstances of integrative 'world-hood-sense'.

Logic in this sense-provision of Wittgenstein's philosophy, expresses the necessity of 'concatenation-functions' of structural congruity/consistency. There is need for observable and usable coherence that must be put in place as the medium for the determination of the true character for all '*that is the case*' in the 'talks' about the world. The talk (i.e. speech or language) about the world or even possible worlds project the fact that, just as Russell may also provide, names in any given proposition have meaning and that this meaning adheres in concatenation. By implication, therefore, propositions confirm insurmountable representations/interpretations of the states of affairs in structural and descriptive mirror of logical space.

From the above *proviso*, this paper confirms Wittgenstein's uniqueness in the use of the concept of 'the world' as the complex aperture and conduit through which his philosophy sees and enters into the realm of logic. It is under this viewpoint and vintage position that 'the world' becomes the fact as it is and all that is the case as such.

With the provisions of logic as a language-game, the world is meaningfully re-presentable and presentable. This is to assert the fact that language and the world are reciprocally and intrinsically bound together. In a more strict sense, logic as a language-game permeates and at the same time constitutes the possible structural congruity of the world. The world is what it is because of language as a possibility. A philosophical review or re-visitation of the world and the states of affairs thereof is equally an investigation into the formal structures of language-use that is within the possibility of the re-viewer and/or re-visitor.

Conclusion

On account of the above *votum*, Wittgenstein maintains that to give the *logical* essence of a proposition means to give the essence of description, (cf. *Tractatus*: 5.4711) and thus the essence of the world and the propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world (*Tractatus*: 6.124). Anscombe's 'Introduction to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*' (: 165), says that:

It is essential to see that logic does not describe any facts.... But logic cannot be thought of as something quite independent of the world either.

Wittgenstein's essential position within the above issues is that logic may not be seen as the science of things as such but rather the totality of the ways and means of speaking about things. This is precisely the reason why human language as a 'given' contains the possibility of all that is possible in the given situation. The importance of logic is only comprehensive in and through the ways and means things in the states of affairs can be spoken about and not in the

things of the states of affairs themselves. Logic belongs to convention in the possible world. Logic under this provision does not command an absolute necessity; but it is of relative linguistic conventionality because there exists *mutatis mutandis* many language games. Wittgenstein proves this fact through his projections in the *Remarks* (1.141) that logic has a descriptive capacity which also suggests that language is a fact and that its reality and facticity belong to pure human social historicity. This argument gains clarity and comprehensiveness because language-games are forms of human social life history.

On account of the above, language and linguistic coherences are bound by structural validities that also guarantee the validities of the world as onto-linguistics. Sefer(1974:127) informs us that:

The ultimate justification of the logic of language is simply that this is the way language functions; its structure is a given, that which must be accepted. What has to be accepted, the given, is-so one could say- forms of life. Logic is possible because actual discourse makes it possible. If such were not the case, then the necessary character of logic would degenerate into a study of the occult, and its necessary character would be relegated to the mysterious.... Language, the world and the logic of descriptive assertions are intricately bound together, defining and determining one another reciprocally.

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Ethics and Private Language

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When Wittgenstein says that “naming is a preparation of a description” (*PI*, 49) the sharp boundary between fact and value disappears. Hence, without considering whether the word ‘good’ corresponds to a fact, whether one’s utterance pictures the reality or not, one could use the word ‘good’ in a language-game and give it a meaning within the particular language-game. Wittgenstein says that in searching for the meaning of the word ‘good’ we must look at the language-games in which this word appears (*PI*, 77). But, we must first ask: “How do we learn value words like ‘good’ in ethical and non-ethical senses?”

In addressing this issue Wittgenstein almost always used two cases as examples. The first concerns how a child learns words like good, the second, how an adult learns them in a foreign language. Let us consider the case of a child and ask “How does a child learn the use of words like ‘chair’, ‘pain’ and ‘good’?”

The most common answer to how a child learns a language is given in terms of ‘ostensive teaching of words’. In principle, ostensive teaching is establishing “an association between the word and the thing” (*PI*, 6). Hence, when a child directs its attention to an object, say to a chair, one points at the chair and utter the name of the object and say ‘chair’. This seems to be a simple protocol in such teaching and learning and seems to be alike in the application of words like chair, table, etc. Yet, things get more complicated when it comes to names of colours and numbers. If one considers value names, the problem appears in its full complexity.

Ostensive teaching of words must have its limits in value judgements. One cannot point to ‘good’ and say that ‘this is good’, or that ‘what I mean by good is this.’ It might be argued that instead of ostensive definitions one could employ descriptions, but again, it appears that one has to depend on the child’s comprehension of the language; for, apparently, the child must know the meaning of the other words one would have use in such descriptions.

Can one describe a word by using other words? This could work in some situations but not in all. Let us look at the particular circumstances in which the word ‘good’ is used. The main difference in how we learn the words of judgement of value and other words seem to be in the gestures, the voice, behaviour of encouragement or discouragement followed by the action to be corrected or approved of.

Indeed, in a child’s learning process, one’s behaviour could be more effective than words. Wittgenstein says that it is possible to interpret an ostensive definition differently in every case (*PI*, 28). Consider the following example: “No, no more sugar.” This sentence might have been uttered while taking the sugar away or while giving it. In *Philosophical Grammar* (*PG*) Wittgenstein says “In this way he has learnt to use the word, but also associate a particular feeling with it, to experience it in a particular way” (*PG*, p.64).

When a child demonstrates a behaviour that one does not approve of, one says “No!” “Don’t!” “That is bad”. This may even be followed by a punishment. It seems that the child understands by the gesture and the tone of one’s

voice that the one it confronts is upset, unhappy, disapproving its behaviour. The word ‘bad’ then could be associated by the child with something painful.

This seems to be a process of learning by experience of pleasure and pain.¹ Does not “yes” mean that something, a certain act, a certain claim, some reasoning or some judgement is permissible, useful, of consequence, of utility? One’s memory should suggest that in all such cases one has received an answer, a “yes” or “no” that has directly or mediately been associated with some pleasure or pain. If my expectation fails or my claim is rejected, I am frustrated: I feel pain. It appears that learning through constructing similar rule systems and associating these rules with pain and pleasure or with punishment and reward could provide a model for learning value judgements.

What Wittgenstein suggests in *PI* is that we learn the use and the meaning of the word ‘good’ in particular circumstances in particular language-games. In order to play a game we must know its rules. It is, therefore within the rules of the game one will determine what ‘good’ is. Here, let us ask whether a conception of learning by experience of pleasure and pain’ could, in a way, bind the expression of ‘good’ to the expression of pleasure or that of ‘bad’ to pain. In other words, do we use the word ‘good’ in a language-game in the way we use the word ‘pleasure’ in a language-game? Are there resemblances between expressions of feeling (e.g. pain) and expressions of judgements of value (e.g. good)? Are they instances of the same kind of language-games?

Criteria for playing language games are interpreted in various ways. The most common one is that for someone to play a language game there must be public criteria. Arguing that there are public criteria for playing language games implies that judgements of value are the work of the society. Such dependence on a particular society, for Wittgenstein, could only justify judgement of value in relative sense.

As public criteria are necessary to make language-games possible, ethical value judgements and in general norms seem also to be determined by people who play related language games. Wittgenstein says that “...obeying a rule’ is a practice” (*PI*, 202). Cannot one obey a rule privately? For Wittgenstein “it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it” (*PI*, 202).

This leads us to the Wittgensteinian ‘private language argument’ which is mostly based on discussions concerning sensations. What does Wittgenstein mean by saying that we cannot obey a rule privately? It appears that inner expressions are conceivable for praising or blaming oneself, or for inducing one to a particular action or plan; one commonly asks oneself questions about oneself and answers them.

¹ See for the discussion in the wider context in Turan, Halil 2005 “The Existence of Other Egos and the Philosophy of Moral Sentiments” *Analecta Husserliana* LXXXIV, 177-191.

For Wittgenstein, one needs another person in order to be able to report legitimately one's sensations. When one says "I am in pain" or "I believe in God" the others are supposed to understand him, as well as one understands them when they make similar utterances. However, Wittgenstein questions this sort of understanding. In *Culture and Value (CV)* he asks: "How do I know that two people mean the same thing when each says he believes in God?" (CV, p.97)

Do we need a presupposition of a community view in order to understand others' value judgements? Wittgenstein says that "a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom" (PI, 198). It appears that, for Wittgenstein, one needs a pre-determined standard for one's judgements and choices. But, does the objective measure of our behaviour come from the members of our community? Wittgenstein says that "[i]f language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgements" (PI, 242). Then, to decide whether we mean the same thing when we utter a judgement of value we must be depending on the judgements of others. Thus, following a rule has a social nature (Baker, Hacker 1988, p.170).

For Wittgenstein, "*Practice* gives the words their sense" (CV, p.97). Following Wittgenstein in this assertion, we will further say that words acquire their meanings through bodily signs. In fact, a smile, a gesture, a certain tone of voice or a certain pattern of behaviour are sometimes more useful in one's effort to understand (even verify) the sincerity of the expressions concerning the experiences of others. Hence, one may argue that what value words ultimately refer to are memories of "inner" experiences accompanied and marked by primitive signs, elements of inarticulate language, of certain bodily movements. An intricate feeling like remorse, for example, can be recognized from bodily signs, and indeed one continues to make use of these signs in one's actual experience in order to verify the sincerity of linguistic expressions people use to describe their emotions.

How can one conceive a child's learning the word 'pain'? In *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (RPP)* Wittgenstein seems to offer a generally accepted view:

When a child behaves in such-and-such a way on particular occasions, I think it feels what I feel in such cases; and if I am not mistaken in this, then the child associates the word with the feeling and uses the word when the feeling reappears (RPP, 146).

If we see the child holding its stomach and doubled up and see tears in its eyes then we associate it with our experience of stomach ache and we say "you have pain". This does not mean that the word pain means crying, instead "the verbal expression of pain replaces crying but does not describe it" (PI, 244).

Hence, it may be that one recognizes others' feelings by looking for similarities between the signs by means of which one judges that they have those feelings and those signs in exemplary cases of experience in which oneself must have come to recognize these feelings, and have learned to call them as such.

There may always be cases where one might misinterpret behaviour of others and associate it with different feelings. Someone may hold her stomach and double up with tears in his eyes out of laughter, not pain. Also, there is always a possibility that someone could 'simulate pain'. Such simulation and really having pain "might have the

same expressions in behaviour" (RPP, 144). Could we distinguish them? If I think I can, what kind of evidence do I have to verify my judgement? "How do I know that the child I teach the use of the word 'pain' does not misunderstand me and so always call "pain" what I call "sham pain"?" (RPP, 145) It seems that the only one certain thing in the expression of feelings is that one does not doubt that one has that feeling. I know that "I have pain". But, most of the time I am in pain other people also know that I am in pain. Wittgenstein states that the other person can only guess that I am in pain and cannot know that I am in pain with the certainty I know. It makes sense for one to doubt other people's pain but not one's own. Can we say that we really understand others expressions of sensations and value judgements?

For Wittgenstein, we can express our private sensations, but "another person cannot understand the language" (PI, 243). One needs an objective standard to confirm that his judgement that such-and-such behaviour is the sign of 'pain' to be able to say that someone is really in pain. For Wittgenstein, the only objective standard is the agreement in the language we use. This is not to say that "human agreement decides what is true and what is false" as Wittgenstein's interlocutor suggests. Rather, "it is what human beings say that is true or false; and they agree in the *language* they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life" (PI, 241). And our private language does not conform to this criterion. We can follow this criterion only if we agree with others that from now on when we see such-and-such a behaviour we will use the word 'pain'. And this set of agreements is valid only for a specific language-game and a specific form of life. When we step out that language game, the agreement loses its sense; we cannot apply it to another language game.

The rules of a language-game, the agreement on the use of language and the agreement of forms of life determine the correctness of the use of value judgements. That is to say, forms of life determine the way we look at things. But, if we are to agree with Wittgenstein and say that forms of life play a major role in shaping our attitude towards the world, then we must presuppose the existence of others. Hence, "Can there be any ethics if there is no living being but myself?" appears to be a crucial question. Here Wittgenstein seems to be questioning the common attitude of taking the existence of others for granted to justify the possibility of discourse on value. A similar question arises related to the notion of 'private language'. If I cannot obey a rule privately, even if I may speak of an ethics without the existence of others, this must only be captured by my private language. Since I cannot express my private sensations, ethical discourse appears to be impossible. The issue is not whether we can express our feelings, but whether others could understand us as we express them.

It is safe to assume that our attitudes, ethical conduct and ethical utterances find their meanings within a community and that what is seen as universal are the rules that are approved and accepted by a group of people. But this assumption concerns "ethics in the relative sense". However, it does not seem to be necessary to regard the discourse on higher values to be referring to the absolute sense of ethics. What makes 'good' seem to be 'higher' is that everyone in the language-game shares a form of life and uses the word 'good' as agreed. Wittgenstein allows the possibility of discourse on ethics in a language-game.

MacIntyre and Malcolm on the Continuity Between the Animal and the Human

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Cartesian doubt about the thoughts and feelings of humans as well as intelligent animals is unintelligible for MacIntyre – since our knowledge of “other minds” is based on the interpretative knowledge that we share with many animals, knowledge that depends on action and interaction. He is critical of the idea that our beliefs about the thoughts, feelings and decisions of others are wholly founded on inferences from their overt behaviour and utterances. “It is of course true that on occasion we do have to ‘work out’ by inference what someone else must be thinking or feeling. But even in these special types of case we are still relying on a primary and more fundamental interpretative knowledge of the thoughts and feelings of others which *does not have and does not need inferential justification.*” (MacIntyre: 24, my italics.)

In order to show that there is continuity between animal and human rationality MacIntyre points to a continuity between the prelinguistic and the linguistic. For him, identifying the thoughts and feelings of others is a prelinguistic capacity, as is distinguishing between the true and the false. This is important for him because he thinks that if we couldn’t distinguish truth and falsity prelinguistically, it would be difficult to understand how we are able to use the words “true” and “false” as we do. And we have to make sense of this prelinguistic distinction between truth and falsity in order to ascribe beliefs to animals, in order to ascribe to non-language users changes in belief that arise from their perceptions of changes in the world and issue in a change in their activity. It is important because it enables us to say, for instance, that the dolphin can see that its previous belief was false, and change its belief accordingly. (Or, we can say of the dog that “it notices that the cat isn’t up that tree after all”.) We can therefore say that the dolphin, like the child, possesses certain concepts and the ability to apply them, for example, the concepts of “true” and “false”, “pain”. (This is also true of cats and dogs, but it is perhaps most easily demonstrated, he says, with dolphins, gorillas and chimpanzees.) So the continuity between animal and human behaviour, which is to illuminate the nature of human rationality, lies in a similarity in natural capacities. These capacities, in turn, are described as a kind of identification and classification of objects prior to any understanding of language, including a knowledge of the thoughts and feelings of others (MacIntyre: 36, 27, 40).

MacIntyre criticises philosophers such as Davidson for denying that animals have minds. But he agrees with the assumption that leads Davidson to this denial: that ascribing intentions, beliefs and thoughts to a person or an animal is to ascribe to it certain conceptual capacities. The disagreement between the two then, is over whether creatures without language have those capacities, whether they “possess concepts” or not (MacIntyre: 37). Norman Malcolm on the other hand questions the basic assumption at play here, which he calls “identifying thoughts with their linguistic expression”. Malcolm formulates this in terms of the difference between “having a thought” and “thinking”: we would naturally say of a dog, “it thinks the cat is up the tree”, if it stands underneath barking, but we wouldn’t say: “it has the thought that...” since this implies the framing of a proposition (Malcolm 1977: 49). Now, since MacIntyre

(rightly) notes that Malcolm doesn’t deny that animals have minds, he concludes that Malcolm must allow for animals having beliefs:

Malcolm’s dog, it might perhaps be said, believes that the cat is up the tree. It does not need language to express this belief. And of course we humans do not need language to express many of our beliefs either. Moreover the dog then acts on its belief. So it may seem as if we may at least raise the question of whether the belief is not only a cause of the dog’s behaviour, but provides the dog with a reason for acting as it does. Yet here some larger difficulties arise. For we cannot even frame this question, unless we are entitled to ascribe beliefs to the dog. (MacIntyre: 32-33)

But what kind of question is it that MacIntyre wants to frame? Why would we be tempted to say that the belief is the cause or the reason for the dog’s behaviour? It seems that MacIntyre hasn’t understood what Malcolm means by saying that “[g]rammatical form is no index of psychological reality” (Malcolm 1977: 51). I suspect that it doesn’t really matter for Malcolm whether we use the phrase “the dog thinks” or “the dog has a thought” or whether we say it “believes” or “has a belief”. His point, I take it, is rather that when we describe the dog as believing the cat is up the tree (or having the belief that the cat is up the tree, if you will) we are not supplying additional information about the dog’s behaviour, such as, what caused it – we are simply describing what we see, what the dog does. The problem with talking about “having” beliefs or thoughts is that this wording implies that the belief or thought is independent of the action, and so easily misleads us into taking the relationship between the intention and the action in the wrong way. Even if MacIntyre would not argue that having a belief presupposes that one consciously (or subconsciously) frames the relevant proposition (what he is arguing for, I take it, is not the existence of a psychological process), he sees the beliefs and intentions as something preceding the action, separate from it and (at least in some instances) as causing it. In taking beliefs to be characterizable independently of the actions that express them, the dichotomy between the mental and the physical remains. Thus it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the mental is to be inferred or surmised from the overt behaviour of the agent, even if this is something that MacIntyre explicitly denies as being a Cartesian misconception. He therefore ends up saying something quite similar (although in a moderated form since his notion of “behaviour” is broader than merely “bodily movement”, and includes seeing actions undertaken for particular reasons), and he ends up with a circular argument: we infer someone’s reasoning abilities from his actions, reasoning which is exhibited in that very action. So, because MacIntyre argues that behaviour justifies ascribing psychological states to animals, we are left with the image that what we are doing is hypothesizing invisible mental states “behind” the behaviour.

Contrast this to what Malcolm says:

A cat watches a mouse hole. It would be natural to say that the cat knows, or believes, that a mouse may come out of the hole. But what does this come to? Are we attributing the propositional thought, 'A mouse may appear'? No. We are only placing this behaviour in the larger pattern of cat-seeking-mouse behaviour. An infant reaches for its milk bottle. Does it 'believe' that what is in the bottle is milk? One could say this. But what does it mean? Just that there is this behaviour of reaching for the bottle from which it has been fed in the past; plus, perhaps, the fact that it will reject the bottle if what it tastes is chalk water. This is *just doing*. In order to understand it we do not have to suppose that this doing rests on some *underlying* belief. The belief is here nothing other than this behaviour in these circumstances; not a *source* of the behavior. In the case of the infant, words and sentences will gradually emerge from such behavior. Not so with the cat. (Malcolm 1995: 71)

What is brought out above is that in these types of situations we would normally without hesitation talk about "knowing" or "believing." This is how we use these mental predicates. And there is on MacIntyre's view nothing wrong with this language use. Also, as pointed out, he would agree that in saying this we are not attributing to the cat or the baby the ability to frame propositions. But to MacIntyre, in attributing beliefs or thoughts to someone we do presuppose that they have certain conceptual capacities or reasoning abilities. Malcolm again wants to question the idea that in making these ascriptions, we are assuming *anything at all* about the intellectual abilities or natural characteristics of the cat: we are simply describing what we see, what it does. This is not to say that what the cat does isn't dependent on it having a certain biological constitution, certain nutritional needs, sensory capacities etc., as well as a certain bodily form and flexibility. If it's injured, its movements will be restricted, if it's senile it might not be clear to us what we should say of its behaviour. But when we say what the cat is doing, we aren't speaking about or assuming what happens out of view, what causes the behaviour we see. When we say that the cat or baby believes, thinks or feels this or that, typically we see the feelings as well as the intentions in the actions, "on the surface." To behave like this is *what it is* to "believe there is a mouse in the mouse hole," the behaviour isn't something that we can separate from the belief: the behaviour makes sense only as an expression of that belief. Or, as McGinn puts it, when we see a cat stalking a bird, the intention is not merely "associated" with the intent look of the cat, its cautious movements and its readiness to spring, but is the *meaning* of all these things (McGinn: 155). This is what the stalking, or the "intention of catching a bird" consists in, the intention is not something that explains the behaviour. Note that this is not to propose a behaviouristic view of mental phenomena, since nothing above suggests that we reduce the mental - the intentions, beliefs or thoughts - to the outer, to the bodily expressions. It is rather to say that the mental and the bodily phenomena cannot be separated from each other in our description of behaviour. Psychological words such as "nervously," "intelligently," "happily" describe behaviour, they are not *interpretations* of behaviour that properly should be described in other non-psychological terms.

Malcolm follows Wittgenstein in describing our response to the cat a "primitive reaction" (Cf. Wittgenstein, Zettel §545, where he calls our language-game a continuation of primitive behaviour, for example when we are certain that someone is in pain.) It seems to me that this notion of primitive reactions is more basic and less intellec-

tualist than MacIntyre's notion of a "primary knowledge" of others. If we accept MacIntyre's characterization, it seems quite natural to call into question (as does Davidson) whether sharing activities and practices really is necessary for gaining this knowledge. Why would interaction be necessary, couldn't we assume that we could know the other's intentions or thoughts by other means? (For example, through comparing their reactions to our own and incorporating the sounds they make into a meaning theory.) On the other hand, what I take to be Malcolm's view is not described in terms of knowledge: this is part of the point in calling it "primitive" and "reaction". This could be seen as the form of interaction itself, not something that the interaction is instrumental in gaining or achieving. What is important is the fact that both the trainer and the dog *respond* to one another, the dog's reactions will depend on the trainer's: its response will be quite different depending on the trainer's behaviour and comportment - gestures, movements, how he breathes and in which tone of voice he speaks will affect the dog, as the dog's comportment will affect the trainer. They both seek contact through looking into each others' eyes, or they purposely avoid eye contact. This is a form of interplay which is itself a kind of communication. It is not merely a delivery of information about their respective interests and intentions, but a forming of new interests, new ways of behaving in a mutual relationship which develops and changes over time. Again, it is of course true that how well we communicate with an animal depends on its natural characteristics: we can teach a dog to sit, but less often a cat. But in order to recognize this, we don't need to draw conclusions about the similarity on an intellectual level (a similarity in classifications and in primitive concepts). We might as well say that similarities like *wanting* to cooperate, looking into each other's eyes, seeking bodily contact, is what in the end is decisive for our ability to do things together and therefore of understanding each other. What makes cooperation possible is perhaps something in the larger pattern of our life and that of the dog, rather than any identifiable cognitive trait.

Instead of, with MacIntyre, describing a continuity in intellectual capacities between animals and humans, the concept of primitive reactions reminds us of the similarity in our responses to human and animal behaviour. So to point to a continuity between the human and the animal does not then need to be an empirical point about the development of language, but rather an elucidation of what we mean by the mental terms we use, i.e., what we mean by ascribing thoughts, beliefs or feelings to someone.

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The Thought (*Gedanke*): the Early Wittgenstein

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1. Introduction:

The aphoristic *Tractatus* does not dwell much on the concept of thought in the Tractarian picture of language, thought and reality. The available literature also does not give a detailed commentary on the *Gedanke*. This paper will attempt to analyse the definitions of thought given at *TLP 3* and *TLP 4* (Henceforth I shall use *TLP* for the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*). *TLP 3* defines thought as a logical picture of facts while *TLP4* redefines thought as a proposition with a sense. The question is are these two conflicting definitions, one being ontological and the other being linguistic, related to each other and if so how.

Apparently the two definitions of thought are devoid of any psychological element. This is in agreement with the spirit of the *Tractatus* where the divorce of philosophy from psychology is explicit at *TLP 4.1121*. Here the author warns against getting entangled in unnecessary psychological investigations. An evidence to this can also be cited from the *Notebooks* where he has implied that the study of thought processes is not psychological but logical (*NB 10.11.1914*). Yet in sharp contrast to this there is a letter that Wittgenstein wrote to Russell in 1919. In it Wittgenstein explicitly mentions that a *gedanke* consists of psychical elements. The closest evidence of thought being psychological in the *Tractatus* is at *TLP 5.541* where Wittgenstein writes that propositions of the form such as 'A believes that p is the case' and 'A has the thought p' are propositions of psychology. Unlike *TLP3* and *TLP4*, 'A has the thought p' is not an objective reference to thought but here thought is spoken of as being subjective to A. The psychical element can be clearly spotted and this is more closer to Wittgenstein's letter.

2. *TLP 3*:

TLP 3 may be analysed as –

- i) Thought is a picture.
- ii) Thought is not only a picture but a logical picture.
- iii) Thought is a picture of facts.

A picture is a model of reality (*TLP 2.12*) representing a possible situation in logical space (*TLP 2.11* and *TLP 2.2002*). It is comprised of elements (*TLP 2.13*). Thought being a picture we can thus deduce that thought is a model of reality being comprised of elements and presenting a possible situation in logical space. The elements of thought also must have a determinate relation among them and must stand for objects.

Thought is not only a picture but a logical picture. We are told that a logical picture is a picture whose pictorial form is logical form (*TLP 2.181*). Pictorial form is the common element between picture and reality (*TLP 2.17*) and logical form is the minimum of common element between a picture and reality (*TLP 2.18*). Therefore a picture may have more than logical form in common with what it depicts but every picture must at least have logical form in common. To be a picture of what it depicts, a picture must have logical form. In this sense every picture is a logical picture (*TLP 2.182*).

Therefore, thought must be a logical picture. It is a kind of picture whose pictorial form is logical form. There is something in common between thought and of what it is a picture. Thought may be said to be a logical picture par excellence because it is the only kind of picture whose pictorial form and logical form coincide.

Thought is a logical picture of facts. Facts are groups of things arranged in a particular manner. A *sachverhalt* is a fact which is not comprised of other facts while a *tatsache* is a fact consisting of two or more component facts. Facts exist in the world and their components are objects. Thought being a picture of facts, thoughts must be a picture of the world. Or in other words, thought is a model of reality (from *TLP 2.12*).

3. *TLP 4*:

TLP 4 defines thought as a proposition with a sense. It can be rewritten as a thought is a picture of reality with a sense. (A proposition is a picture of reality *TLP 4.01*). For Wittgenstein the sense of a proposition, firstly, is that it represents such and such a situation (*TLP 4.031*). Secondly, he says that we grasp the sense of a proposition when we know what must be the case if it is true and what must be the case if it is false. These two definitions of sense are not opposed to each other but rather imply that the truth value of a proposition can be determined only in its relation to a situation.

TLP 4.03 states that the connection between a proposition and a situation is that the proposition is its logical picture. Or in other words a proposition is a logical picture of a situation or facts. We already have a thought is a logical picture of facts (*TLP 3*). Therefore we can conclude that a thought is a proposition (which is a logical picture of facts). *TLP 4* which states that thought is a proposition with a sense can be restated as : thought is a logical picture of facts with a sense. The linguistic element in the definition of thought thus disappears and therefore *TLP 4* is reducible to *TLP 3* with only an adage 'with a sense'.

4. Relation between *TLP 3* and *TLP 4*:

It may be observed that the early Wittgenstein was considering thought and language to be the same and considered its relation to the world as a logical picture. *TLP 3* and *TLP 4* in spite of their apparently different formulations are at bottom the same. Ofcourse the two definitions cannot be reduced to identical ones but they try to define thought from the same perspective, i.e., as a logical picture of reality.

5. Thinking and Speaking:

The Preface to the *Tractatus* sums up the complete intention of the book which is to draw a limit to thought. Since this cannot be done because to do it we would have to think the unthinkable, the task must be accomplished in the field of language. For in language we can distinguish the sensible from the nonsense and thus draw the limit.

Thus limiting thought can only be made by limiting language. From this it appears that the realms of thought and language coincide. So whether there can be thoughts apart from their expressions, from the Tractarian point is hardly possible. All thoughts must at least be capable of being expressed. Each thought is a potential propositional sign. Or in other words what is thinkable is possible too. In the *Notebooks* he writes that a situation is thinkable means that we can picture it to ourselves (*N.B.* 1.11.1914). Thus every thought can picture a possible situation and hence is capable of being expressed in language. We have further evidence to the fact that Wittgenstein in his early days held that thinking and language are the same. (And obviously then they must be coextensive). Firstly, he held that thinking is a kind of language; secondly, a thought is a logical picture of a proposition and thirdly, thought is a kind of proposition (*NB* 12.9.1916). He also says that what cannot be imagined cannot be spoken about also (*NB* 15.10.1916). Moreover at *TLP* 5.61, Wittgenstein writes in unequivocal terms that we cannot think what we *cannot* think and therefore what we cannot think we cannot say either. It means what cannot be thought cannot possibly be spoken about either. These entries suggest that thinking and language (speaking) are coextensive.

Yet the early Wittgenstein makes a distinction between sense and nonsense. Propositions according to the *Tractatus* are of two main kinds, sensible and nonsensible. Under the former are included empirical propositions and scientific propositions. Nonsensible propositions are of three kinds, gibberish, senseless propositions (*Sinnlos*) which include the propositions of logic and mathematics and nonsense propositions (*Unsinn*) which attempt to say the unsayable. Under this last category come ethics, aesthetic, metaphysics as well as the *Tractatus* itself. They attempt to represent something which can never be stated in descriptive language because they are attempts to say the unsayable. Thus they become nonsense when expressed in language because they can never be expressed but must be “passed over in silence”²³. This seems to suggest that there are things (thoughts) which cannot be expressed in language. Therefore we cannot reach a definite conclusion as to whether the early Wittgenstein believed that thinking without speaking is possible or not. We have proof that thinking without speaking is not possible as well as on a deeper analysis the *Tractatus* seems to suggest that thinking without speaking is a possible case.

I would like to mention an entry in the *Notebooks* which says that behind thoughts true or false there always lies a dark background which can only be later expressed as a thought (*NB* 8.12.1914). This implies that truth value of thoughts can be determined. Obviously this is done by comparing it with facts or states of affairs and this is the thought of which we are aware of. Behind it there is a background which we do not know and can be expressed only later. Now when this background is expressed as a thought, does not this corresponding thought also have a background? And if yes, there will be regress ad infinitum.

6. Conclusion:

Therefore, we see that the Tractarian thought is not a psychic entity, but a propositional sign projected onto reality. The thought of *TLP* 3 is the same as that of *TLP* 4 because thought as a logical picture of facts is identified with sign language. As far as the *Tractatus* is concerned the constituents of thought are unknown. The *Tractatus* mentions ‘objects’ of thought only once at *TLP* 3.2. It is not clear whether these ‘objects’ are the constituents of thought or that to which thought is directed. The author

only writes that a thought can be expressed in such a way that the elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought. Apart from this, apparently, the *Tractatus* implies that the realms of thought and language coincide. Further consider two remarks from the *Tractatus*. *TLP* 3.001 states that a state of affairs is thinkable means that we can picture it to ourselves and *TLP* 3.03 which states that thoughts cannot be illogical because if it were then we should have to think illogically. These two propositions imply that it is ‘we’ who do the thinking. Thus thought as a model of facts originates in ‘us’. Thoughts must always represent a possible state of affairs and thus we cannot describe an illogical world or say what it would be like (*Prototractatus*). There is a remark occurring only in the *Prototractatus* where Wittgenstein writes that if I can imagine a thing in a situation then I cannot imagine it outside the situation (*PT* 2.031). It implies that in thinking, objects or things cannot occur by themselves but in a situation and misfitting objects in a situation can never be imagined. So even in the language of thoughts illogical thinking is not possible. And finally it may be pointed out that Wittgenstein poses the question without answering clearly whether thought is a kind of experience and goes on to say that experience is world without the need of a subject (*NB* 9.11.1916). Assuming the answer is affirmative, we can say thought is world and does not need a subject.

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Searle on Representation: a Relation between Language and Consciousness

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I

The central concept of Searle's philosophy of language and mind is intentionality. According to him, "Intentionality is that property of mental states and events by which they are directed at or about, or of object and states of affairs in the world" (Searle 1983: 1). Intentionality is an intrinsic feature of the mind or consciousness. The intentional representation unfolds the directedness of the mental states. Not all mental states are representational states. For instance, in the case of sudden feeling of joy and fear do not refer to anything beyond themselves, whereas, belief, desire and intention are genuine intentional states. They represent something about the world. The intentional mental states are expressed in language. Whenever, let's say, I utter a sentence that 'it is raining outside'. This utterance represents a fact as an intentional state of belief. The act I perform (illocutionary act) involves the intentional state of meaning. Intentionality is present in mind and is represented in the linguistic act of stating the fact that 'it is raining outside.'

Representation at the state of thought can be called mental representation, whereas at the state of expression or communication of thought it can be called linguistic representation. These two levels of representations are isomorphic in structure with same *representational content*.

[Intentional state (intentional content)]→Representation
→object & state of affairs in the world

[Speech acts (Propositional content)]→Representation→
Objects & state of affairs in the world

The logical relationship between the two structures of representation shows the *flow* of intentional content of mental representation to the propositional content and illocutionary force of linguistic representation (speech acts). Emphasizing the continuity of the content, Searle writes, "If I am right in thinking that intentional states consist of representative contents in various psychological modes, then it is at least misleading, if not simply mistake, to say that a belief, for example, is a two term relation between a speaker and a proposition. One should say, rather a proposition is not the object of a statement or belief but rather its content" (Searle 1983:18). The content is the essence of intentional states, is concealed to the conscious thought processes, till it is revealed in the expression. Moreover, the expression also reveals the psychological mode and condition of satisfaction in the very act of representation. They are logically correlated with each other. For Searle, content is realized in its manifestation of linguistic representation, but it is not identical with it. Rather, the content is the intentional property of mental states, which in essence embodies intentionality.

Representation being common to thought and expression shows how the *content* is mental and, is also externalized in language. The linguistic representation of content does not make the intentionality linguistic. Rather, language has evolved from the more basic and complex intentional states to represent the object or states of affairs. The structural similarity between speech act and

intentional states is important for two reasons. Firstly, it avoids one of the misunderstandings that philosophy of mind is branch of philosophy of language. Secondly, it helps in explaining the various forms of intentionality.

Searle's naturalistic approach shows intentionality and language as being developed through an evolutionary process of linguistic representation where meaning we associate comes later than the development of mental states or intentionality *per se* (Searle 1983: 160). In this regard, human linguistic activities can be explicated through intentionality. The content of speech act or linguistic expressions is derived from the intentional content of mental states or thoughts. Nevertheless, the naturalistic grounding of the mental is derived from the thesis that "mental states are *caused by* the operation of the brain and *realized in* the structure of the brain" (Searle 1983: 265). This raises the question about the representation and its causal relationship with the neurophysiology of the brain.

II

The naturalistic approach advocated by Noam Chomsky and Jerry Fodor upholds the causal relation between mind and language. Defining the role of language, Chomsky writes, "Language serves as an instrument for free expression of thought, unbound in scope, uncontrolled by stimulus condition though appropriate to situations, available for use in whatever contingencies our thought process can comprehend" (Chomsky 1980: 222). This 'creative aspect' of language use is specific property of humans biological designed to acquire language. Language acquisition explains two things, firstly the innate capacities of the organism and, secondly, the constant interaction with a linguistic community. Chomsky defines the innateness of language referring to his notion of 'generative grammar'.

Generative grammar operates at two levels: surface structure and deep structure. The surface structure is about the linguistic representation, whereas the deep structure refers to the regulation and grammatical transformations. The function of grammatical transformation at the deep structure helps in both having linguistic experiences as well as human intelligence. It has some specific properties, like phonological rules, principles of rule ordering, etc which correlate with deep structure.

Chomsky relates deep structure of the language with the mental states. The mental states are linguistically identified by just being characterized by syntax which are causally related with the neural states of the brain. Thus, there is no division between language, mind and the brain processes. According to Chomsky, "We conceive of mind as a system of 'mental organs', the language faculty being one, each of this organs has specific structure and function, determined by the general outlined by our genetic endowment, interacting in ways that are also biologically determined in large measure to provide the basis of our mental life"(Chomsky 1980: 241). Language formulation or

the emergence of linguistic states depends upon the function of various specific aspects of mental organism.

Jerry Fodor's conception of mental representation comes closer to Chomsky's conception of generative grammar. The mental representations, according to Fodor, have two basic concerns, firstly, it must specify the intentional content of mental states, and secondly, the symbolic structure of mental states must define the functions of the mental process. The specification of intentional content of mental states describes its relationship that holds between the propositional attitudes and intentional content. Now the question arises, how the intentional semantic content of the propositional attitudes is incorporated in the mental state or the network of mental states? For Fodor, mental states are token neural states which are syntactically characterized. Semantics is not undermined in Fodorian schema, rather the very function of the brain organism and the characterization of syntactic mental states are such that it has a specific mechanism which transforms the mental representation without affecting the content of propositional attitude. This process is carried out by *qua language or language of thought* (Fodor 1981: 200).

The language of thought is a formula of having only the syntactic structure, meant for evaluating the semantic properties of the representation. He further states that "Language of thought want to construe propositional attitude tokens as relation to symbol tokens. (Token of symbol in question is neural object). Now symbols have intentional contents and the tokens are physical in all the known cases. And qua-physical-symbol-tokens are right sort of things to exhibit causal roles. Language of thought claims that mental states – and not just their propositional objects – typically have constituted structure" (Fodor 1987: 135-136). Causal connections among the cognitive states are fundamental because they determine the content of propositional attitudes.

Thus, in brief, Fodor's notion of mental representation not only tries to relate the mind with the world through the language of thought but also uses it for the 'evaluation of semantic content'. Both Chomsky and Fodor strongly hold that language processing or the thought processing is a cognitive activity but not a conscious activity. We are not aware of how *qua language* and *generative syntax* function in the brain. This is a higher order physical activity of the complex neural structures of the brain organism. The complete explanation of neurophysiology of the brain will explain the emergence of linguistic structure which constitutes the essence of language. It not only rules out the role of consciousness in thought process but also discards the other semantic features like intentionality as an intrinsic property of language.

III

The Searlean notion of mental representation rejects the primacy of syntax. Showing the significance of syntax and semantics, Searle writes, "The Chinese room argument showed that semantics is not intrinsic to syntax. I am now making the separate and different point that syntax is not intrinsic to physics" (Searle 1992: 210). Mental representations are not like computational states in the computer; rather they are associated with thinking, experience, feeling, and understanding. While processing the data the computer does not *understand* the cognitive states, because it lacks *semantic content* which is essential for understanding. Emphasizing the semantic aspect of representation, he writes, "...the generative component of linguistic theory is not syntax ... but semantics... the grammar starts with the description of meaning of a sentence

and then generates the syntactical structures through the introduction of syntactical rules and indexical rules" (Searle 1994: 19). The syntax in the computational process is 'observer relative.' And the observer can interpret the symbols with a syntax and semantics (Searle 1992: 223). Thus, in the Searlean naturalistic framework there is not causal reduction of symbols to the neural states and processes. Though Searle believes that symbol tokens are always physical tokens still they are not defined in terms of physical features (Searle 1992: 225).

Moreover, the intentionality of the content as an intrinsic feature of representation brings out the compatible relationship between (mind and language [*intentional content*] → [the world] and vice-versa. This logical compatibility unfolds the two essential components of intentional states called *propositional content* and *psychological mode*. Whenever someone is representing something he also expects that there would be change in the state of affairs according to the representation of belief. That shows the directedness of intentional content from *mind-to-world*. And if changes occur favourably to their belief then directedness is *world-to-mind*. Thus, intentional relationship between the mind and the world becomes more concrete through the intentional content.

IV

The content of representation is revealed in different modes of intentionality working simultaneously, such as seeing, experiencing, believing, desiring, hoping, etc. They are logically connected to each other and intrinsic to the consciousness. When I wish to do better in the game, I must believe in myself, my performance, I must desire to learn different tactics to do well and finally not to repeat the mistakes, etc. This tiny expression involves so many intentional states. Their correlation is based on intentionality and the experience of various levels of intentionality. Intentionality working as conscious mode of representation is about the experience of the content of representation, rather than the object of representation (Searle 1983:18).

The content is not an object of observation, rather is experienced in intentional mode of consciousness. While seeing a flower, my experience of the flower unfolds to me being conscious of the content of the object of perception; the content is formed in visual experience. The very act of experience and realization are not only conscious activities but also linguistic activities. Linguistic activity is grounded on intentional content. Intentional content is intrinsic to consciousness and thus it discloses the notion of being as language-centric-conscious being. Searle says, "The essential thing about human beings is that language gives them the capacity to represent" (Searle 2008: 35). The intrinsicness of being language centric is revealed in the being's feature of expressibility. They can manipulate their expressions.

Expressibility makes the being transparent by expressing the inner mental states. Thus Searle move away from the Cartesian tradition of interiority (Mohanty 1985:131). The intrinsicness of language to the human being or human life reveals the autonomy of human existence with relation to the world. The linguistic being has two important dimensions: the verbal and syntactic. As Pradhan illustrates; "Life, seen in the empirical way, is positioned state of human existence, it is conditioned, limited, and finite. It has verbal dimension and it is thoroughly structured with rules of the symbolic organization. Yet, it has a dimension of givenness which is not dictated by a priori logical machinery" (Pradhan 1993: 42-43). The verbal dimension of conscious being signifies the necessary

link between consciousness, language and the world. This link is established not because of the being's inherent consciousness but because of its inherent linguistic feature. It is due to the fact that intentional content is present in the very act of expression and realization. And it is also extended to the realm of the functional domain of language. That is, language with reference to the exercise of meaning and truth is embedded in language games and forms of life.

To conclude, the representational feature of intentionality is not causally reduced to the biological origin, rather maintains its functional autonomy at the realm of the network of the mental states. In this way, mental states are biologically prior to their linguistic representation which is the representational states stands in continuation with the linguistic counterpart. The semantic rules and socio-cultural background construe meaning of representation. So far as linguistic activities are concerned, semantic rules determine the very function of the performative expressions. Whereas, the language use in general is embedded in the socio-cultural background of human beings. And, 'representation as an institutional fact would require language' (Searle 2008). Intentionality works in both the levels connecting the constitutive and regulative features of speech acts and forming as well as developing the socio-cultural etiquettes. In this regard, intentionality helps in explicating different levels of relationship from the biological to the mental and from the mental to the social.

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Language and World in Wittgenstein: the True Social Bonding

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Section – I: Social Nature of Meanings

By discarding the notion of privacy of language, Wittgenstein brought language from the isolated regions of a speaker's mind to the realm of social reality. In this social reality, these meanings are continually generated and discarded by the community of speakers. Meanings are not constructed in the mind of the speakers in isolation to every thing in the world, or every other speaker of the world. Neither are they constructed just by referencing to outside reality. Because there could be cases where no objective reference is there and still the words are meaningful. For example, the words like Cindrella and Santa Clause. Language is, thus, for Wittgenstein social in nature and meanings are constructed because of the social interactions of the people. In these interactions, the context needs to be considered to chalk out the meaning of the word. For this reason, the meanings, according to Wittgenstein, are not to be located in the words themselves, but rather in the different uses to which they are put.

According to Wittgenstein, language and life are internally related. Life provides the foundation to language. Language reflects all the aspects of life – mental, moral, ethical and religious. It mirrors the deep structures of human thought and experience. Life is a public space in which all language users co-habit and communicate in an interrelated linguistic network. This space cannot be divided into individual (private) spaces. Wittgenstein uncovers this public space by denying the possibility of private language first and then by making language use a social phenomenon. This saved language from being disintegrated into fragments. Thereby Wittgenstein saves meaning from disappearing. The rejection of private language gives an important role to rule-following in such a way that private rule following is totally abandoned and the rule following activity is taken completely as a social practice. This leads to the emergence of a social theory of language.

Since language is fundamental in forging and encouraging social interaction among the people, society becomes the base of any such linguistic practice by its members. For a man to grow into a normal human being, he has to be continually on the road of different learning aspects of life throughout his life. This learning process thus elevates language develops from a simple system of symbols to a complex system. From the society, a human being not only learns his/her linguistic ability but also develops his/her self as an ethical and moral being, i.e., acquires the capacity of judging him/her self and knows which action is right or wrong. But this is not possible for a private linguist since, it has the danger of entering into a Solipsistic tendency where whatever one chooses to be correct will be correct for him i.e., whatever he thinks to be right is right only for him. If we see language in that perspective, then teaching, learning and practice are possible only in a society. So, in order to say something is right, we need training in what Wittgenstein calls a "technique"; and the exercise of technique is practice. But in case of private practice, one cannot distinguish between having a rule and actually obeying it. As "obeying rule" is a practice, therefore, thinking that one is obeying a rule is not obeying a rule. It is the society which provides the context of all linguistic practices. But

this is not possible in case of a private language. The private language user, thus, does not have criterion of rightness and wrongness in his language. The rejection of private rule-following brings out the idea that rule-following is not one man's private practice rather it's a social practice. The rejection of private language brings into view the social character of meaning. Meaning, like rule-following, is not a private mental process. The idea of a private meaning is, therefore, unintelligible.

Language is thus primarily a social phenomenon. All aspects of life are learned and taught through language only. Since man cannot live in isolation to other members of the community or society that he belongs to, and since language is the very basis of his communication, language also becomes a bridging link between him and the world. Language is therefore essentially embedded in the world. How this embedding is carried out is illustrated by Wittgenstein by the idea of language games and forms of life.

Section – II: Language Games: Depicting Social Reality in Language

On the one hand, there are language-games a method of making context differentiation between various linguistic activities which are necessary for the construction of meanings, and on the other hand, these are ways through various aspects of life and world are captured in the language. Wittgenstein illustrates the point of meaning construction through following example of simple primitive language game:

...A is building with building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words "block," "pillars," "slab," "beam." A calls them out; –B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. – Conceive this as a complete primitive language.¹

In this language-game, the assistant B understands what "slab" means. Here, B understands how to participate in the language-game of naming things and B knows which the name "slab" stands for. Here, both A and B are carrying on a linguistic activity while performing the action of building. So, in order to do the building activities both have to participate in such a common language-game, which would enable them to understand each other. Otherwise, it would be very difficult for both of them to carry on the activity. Here, both A and B are able to perform the linguistic activity because both of them have been trained in the same language-game. Such training enables B to understand the linguistic signs issued by A. When A utters the word 'slab', B understands and acts accordingly to perform the linguistic activity in which he has already been trained. A will understand B, if and only if he knows how to participate in the naming of things. Because, in order to understand A, B should have the proper understanding of what A says. Therefore, B should know to what objects the

¹ Wittgenstein Ludwig, 1953, *Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford, Sec. 2.

name "slab" could be given. One has to look for the context, the use of a word, in order to understand its meaning.

According to Wittgenstein, language is system of language-games and a system of activities carried on in languages. It includes everything from the most primitive language to the language of the most sophisticated kind. It is not a *single* system of symbol but is conceived of as consisting in *many* language-games. It is a network of linguistic activities i.e., linguistic practices which human beings undertake amongst themselves, and wherein they also interact with world. Thus, each language-game is an activity, a *form of life*. Speaking of language is a part of an activity or a form of life. To talk of form of life is nothing but to talk of a linguistic activity. Each language-game is an activity, a "form of life" which is closely associated with the way human beings live as linguistic beings. So, language is not considered here from a narrow logical point of view, but as it is closely embedded in human life. Each language-game is a form of life and is an expression of human action. So language is not one man's language rather it is the language of the human community. Here, language is not only the medium of communication but also a tool that allows a person to express himself. In *Blue and Brown Books* Wittgenstein writes:

... I shall in future again and again draw your attention to what I shall call language-games. These are ways of using signs simpler than those in which we use the signs of our highly complicated everyday language. Language-games are the forms of language with which a child begins to make use of words. The study of language-games is the study of the primitive forms of language or primitive languages. If we want to study the problems of truth or falsehood, of the agreement and disagreement of propositions with reality, of the nature of assertion, assumption, and question, we shall with great advantage look at primitive forms of language in which these forms of thinking appear without the confusing background of highly complicated process of thought.²

Language-games have many functions. They display different kinds of human activities. Each language-game is a complete system of activity.

Wittgenstein emphasizes the fact that there is no limited number of such language games in language. There are as many language games as there are activities of the human beings. There are thus multiple language-games. Wittgenstein gives a few examples. According to the particular linguistic activity, or form of life, there could be many language games like giving orders, and obeying them; describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements; constructing an object from a description (a drawing); reporting an event; speculating about an event; forming and testing a hypothesis; presenting the results of an experiment in the tables and diagrams; making up a story; and reading it; play-acting; singing catches; guessing riddles;³ Each of the above activities may be seen as a language-game. And each of them has its own way to carry an activity in the language. Each is distinct from the other as no two of them stand for the same activity.

Language-games, as described above, consist of particular activities, e.g., intending, hoping, pretending, believing, etc., which include both language-use and thought. Language-games thus consist of linguistic as well

as non-linguistic activities. That is, language-games are the expressions of thoughts or feelings and also the use of words in a proper context. In other words, language-games explain how words function in a context, and how they express the thoughts and feelings of the speaker.

By carrying out various linguistic and non-linguistic activities, these language games serve an important function of explaining how words and sentences are related to the world. In this regard, Wittgenstein maintains that language-games do not share a one-to-one relation with the world. The relations are multifarious and complicated like the language-games themselves. The word-object relationship is *shown* in the language in which the word is used, rather than *said* in words. According to Jaako Hintikka in this regard, the relationship between language and reality takes place in the way the language-games hold their semantic links with the world. These links run from the linguistic expressions, i.e., words and sentences in various ways. The statements of facts are only one variety of language-game where the semantic links are clear-cut. But there are other ways of talking about the world, e.g., making a prediction, or guessing or just imagining certain possible occurrence of an event which do establish a link with the world. In these cases, there is no either/or relation with the world. Determination of the truth or falsity of these sentences is no easy task.

Each language game thus depicts a distinct form of life through which it depicts the world or the social reality in turn. The concept of form of life has many implications in Wittgenstein's philosophy such as the following:

1. There are many forms of life which have family resemblances among them. There is no essence of forms of life which we can call "the form of life."
2. However, in spite of the differences among the forms of life, there is a broader unity among them in the sense that they are the *human* forms of life.
3. Language-games and forms of life are two faces of the same reality. What is called a language-game is itself a form of life. Language in that sense embodies life and this life is not just added to language externally.
4. Language and life constitute one original whole. There is, therefore, one and only one system-the system of language-use.
5. Language-games are public activities. They are played in the open social space ruling out privacy in language-use

The link between language games and forms of life is that language-games are the mirror through which different forms of life depicted by the language. Since these forms of life are nothing but different aspects of life and social reality of the world, language emerges as the medium through which life and world can be presented. This link is not arbitrary one or different for different languages. It is an essential link and is the same for all the languages of the world. It is essential because without language, world cannot be accessed at all. It is through language only that we apprehend our world and make it meaningful. Language and world are thus in essential relationship with each other. Thus, we see, that life and language, stands intricately woven up into each other in Wittgenstein. Life with all its subtleties and privacies gets expressed in language and language is that which connects a subject to his world.

² Wittgenstein Ludwig, 1978, *The Blue and Brown Books*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p. 17.

³ *Ibid.* Sec. 23

Language and Reality: a Wittgensteinian Reading of Bhartrhari

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Notwithstanding differences in the metaphysical presumptions, approaches and philosophical aims of Wittgenstein and Bhartrhari there are points where their thoughts converge on Language and Reality. The crux of the problem is this: whether words (sentences) in order to become meaningful necessarily denote something external or not? In other words, is there one-to-one relationship between word and object as its meaning? The problem is not whether any word signifies an object as its meaning but actually as to whether this signification could be taken as the exclusive criterion for judging the meaningfulness of a word? The problem gets murkier when there is an acceptance that there is a realm about which nothing can be said. Although Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein have expressed very similar thoughts on this issue which will be discussed in this talk, it is pertinent to point out that here I'm neither looking for Wittgenstein in Bhartrhari nor Bhartrhari in Wittgenstein, but trying to present a perspective which presents them in similar garb while not ignoring their differences. The broader outline of the discussion, with which we are concerned with, has to do with the reception of picture theory, language-game, and the inexpressible in Bhartrhari.

Bhartrhari holds the *Tractarian* thesis that the language and reality (world) share the same logical structure as he maintains that language is the only way to know and express reality. There is no possibility of knowledge except as accompanied by language (VP I §123). That is, "No object which is not expressed in words exists" (Bhate 1993: 67). The world of objects and the world of words cannot be cognized independent from each other (Patnaik 1994: 37) as there is a fusion between language and reality (Matilal *Perception*: 397).

But the question arises: how does the fusion between language and reality take place? One way is to maintain reality as an indivisible whole which corresponds to language as an indivisible unity. The other way is to keep analyzing language and world till the simplest is achieved which is further unanalysable. Bhartrhari seems to endorse the former method as compared to the latter which operates in earlier Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's Picture Theory emphasises on actual or possible correspondence between elementary propositions and elementary facts for derivation of meaning. Bhartrhari unlike Wittgenstein holds that neither propositions are analyzable into atomic propositions and proper names nor world consists of facts which are further analyzable into atomic facts and objects. Nonetheless, Bhartrhari seems to endorse 'propositions as pictures' since for him, "In life the word functions by becoming identified with the thing denoted by it" (VP II §130a). And he maintains that word is the sign for external as well as internal objects (VP I §126). For Bhartrhari a proper name like Devadatta conveys its complete meaning as an expression because here the word-meaning relationship is permanent (VP II §§363-366). Thus we see that in Bhartrhari the picture theory is endorsed even before its inception!

Bhartrhari concedes that his identification between word and its meaning has its limitation as the word does not signify all the qualities ascribed to the object. Bhartrhari holds that the word 'pot' does not denote the shape (and

such other attributes) of objects like pots, because it denotes merely the object divested of its attributes. The attributes are conveyed incidentally (VP II §123). That is to say, although a word functions as denoting an object which is associated with shape, colour and parts, it does not denote these as parts of its meaning. The words merely indicate objects as they cannot express their essential nature (VP II §§434-436). So language on the one hand is fused with reality and on the other fails to provide its complete picture. In Bhartrhari language is like a lamp which merely reveals object and, unlike pictures, has its own limitation in its one to one relationship with reality.

Bhartrhari moves forward from what may be called limited picture theory and adapts, to a certain extent, 'use' and 'context' as determinant factors of meaning. For Bhartrhari a word does not denote at one and the same time every existent which can be named by it (VP II §68). For example, the sentence 'bring five apples' could be understood as a compound of five sentences: one apple as an object of each sentence. This shows that there may be difference in the forms of a sentence at the time of utterance and at the time of its comprehension. That is to say that the apparent verbal form is not the ultimate form of a sentence. Here lies the need to look for an alternate interpretation of meaning which is different from picture theory. The alternate interpretation is language-game through use theory of meaning.

For Bhartrhari the same word can convey a principal meaning, a secondary meaning and an incidental meaning (VP II §§301-307). So when a word is capable of expressing several meanings, the decision as to whether a particular meaning is primary or secondary depends on the context. So a word moves through a group of meanings although in a particular context a particular meaning reigns as primary. That is why Bhartrhari holds that the distinction must be drawn between possible and intended meaning, usual and contextually appropriate meaning, meaning that prompts the use of a word (*prayojaka artha*), secondary meaning (*upalakshna artha*) and primary meaning (*pradhana artha*).

As a word can convey different meanings, its form is not sufficient to express its meaning in a particular use. So the question is as to what are the determinant factors of the meaning of a word? For Bhartrhari the determinant factors are: syntactical connection of words in the sentence, situation/context, the meaning of other words in the sentence, propriety, place and time. Among these determinant factors Bhartrhari seems to emphasise on 'use' as well as 'context' (language-game): "A word withdraws from functioning when separated from that meaning linked to which it has been used" (VP II §160). Bhartrhari holds that the practice of grammar helps to create understanding of the meaning of words (VP II §§235a and b). So, meaning is understood from our repeated observation and usage.

One would be amazed to find Wittgenstein speaking in the following thoughts of Bhartrhari on Contextual meaning: "The meaning of a word depends on the words with which it is collocated syntactically by association or contrast. In the phrase 'Rama and Lakshmana' 'Rama' means the son of Dashratha; in 'Rama and Keshava', 'Rama'

means Balarama; and in 'Rama and Arjuna' Rama means Parashurama..." (Raja 1990: 174). Here Bhartrhari's thought that a word's meaning is decided in the context of its association with the meaning of other words, seems to be nothing but language-game theory.

Use of a word in a particular context includes speaker's intention as well. A sentence is uttered to express the speaker's intention and when it conveys some other meaning, that is called incidental meaning. The intention is regarded as the essential condition for a sentence to convey its meaning (VP II §§399-402). So, "When several meanings may be conveyed by one word and several words may convey one meaning, a word operates on that meaning towards which the speaker directs it" (VP II §402). For Bhartrhari, speaker's intention and meaning of an expression are causally connected with each other as the former is the cause of the latter.

It is pertinent for an intervention into Bhartrhari's analysis of intention to take into account his notion of 'language in mind' which for him is inexpressible. Bhartrhari distinguishes three layers of language, viz. *pashyanti*, *madhyama* and *vaikhari*. The first and second layers reside in the mind whereas the third layer is the spoken word. There is continuity between these three stages and language is an integral entity. Language in the mind is *sphota* (bursts forth), i.e. one through which meaning is manifested. It is defined as the linguistic potency which is indivisible, partless, sequenceless whole, and manifested by sound.

So, in Bhartrhari there are two aspects of language: internal which is inexpressible, i.e. language in the mind, and external, i.e. expressed language. The expressed language (*vaikhari*) refers on the one hand to language in the mind (*pashyanti* and *madhyama*) and on the other to the external object as meaning. It has been regarded that just as rubbing of the fire-sticks causes further fire likewise language in the mind of the speaker is cause of the audible language expressing it (VP I §46). The language in the mind is not connected with any object or state of affairs, but action. There is an identification between word-form and meaning (object)-form in it. The two aspects of the identification are indivisible in mind.

But the question arises: Is Bhartrhari's notion of language, as a composite reality of internal and external, present language as a private entity? The mental factor plays different roles in these thinkers as for Bhartrhari it plays a significant role in determination of meaning whereas Wittgenstein, although accepts the inexpressible realm which 'we must pass over in silence' (TLP 7), does not agree with this view point. It is the basic idea of Wittgenstein's "A Lecture on Ethics" that any attempt to describe the inexpressible is as futile as 'Running against the boundaries of language'.

This is to be understood in the context of Bhartrhari's concept of 'a flash of insight' (*pratibha*) which causes meaning of a sentence in the mind (VP II §143). It is an instinctive flash of intelligence which is described to be arising from nature, action, practice, meditation, invisible causes, and gift of the wise (VP II §§144-152). The flash of insight is not perception which reveals various things as meaning of words on the basis of picture theory.

It is seeing of world as a whole and therefore is indescribable. Unlike spoken language and empirical reality which gives rise to practical knowledge, it is not merely a piece of knowledge. It's a wisdom which leads to right conduct (*itikartyatata*). That is, it is 'not a body of doctrines but an activity' (TLP 4.112). For Wittgenstein mental processes or states do not constitute understanding of meaning of an expression. The understanding of meaning of an expression does not come through a flash of insight but through mastery of technique (PI §§197&199). Wittgenstein argues this with the example of understanding (learning) of playing-chess which does not consist in a flash of insight but in mastery of the rules of the game.

Wittgenstein's denial of the role of internal in deciding meaning can also be seen in his rejection of private language. Bhartrhari, while disagreeing with Wittgenstein on the nature and role of language in the mind, seems to be with Wittgenstein on the point that there is no private language. He says: "The burnt man understands burning in a certain way from his (direct) contact with fire; but the meaning 'burning' is conveyed by the word (burning) in a different way." (VP II §418). Here the 'different way' seems to explain that because there is no private language, the meaning of 'burning' is understood even by those who are not undergoing that particular sensation. The internal aspect of language is also public as it leads to right conduct. Actually, "There is also an agreement between Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein, that the meaning of the word even when it refers to a mental object has a public component" (Shah 2004:11). Moreover, 'clarification of thought' is the motto of both Bhartrhari ((VP II §484) and Wittgenstein (TLP 4.111). However, the conclusion that meaning is a public phenomenon does not interfere with Bhartrhari's thesis that language in the mind is inexpressible.

In brief, Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein both, in different ways, hold that the fusion between language and reality does not take place in the case of transcendental reality. The two levels of reality in Bhartrhari, i.e. secondary reality and present reality and Wittgenstein's sayable and showable resemble to a great extent with each other. The reason for this is that on the one hand 'sayable'/secondary reality is an umbrella concept for all psycho-physical realities and on the other 'present reality' and 'showable' are nomenclatures for the inexpressible realm. Like Wittgenstein's realm of sayable, Bhartrhari's empirical reality (*padartha*) stands for the meaning of words which is derived on the basis of one to one relationship, usage, and context among other things. And like Wittgenstein's showable, Bhartrhari's transcendental reality (*Shabdadvaita*) is beyond any expression. Moreover, both hold that meaning is public and not a private reality.

Some thinkers view it as very intriguing that Bhartrhari begins with a declaration that there is no world beyond language whereas concludes with a note of disharmony between the two and declares that reality transcends language (Bhate 1993: 67). However, there seems to be nothing intriguing if we interpret it from *Tractarian* perspective which shows that propositions cannot express that which is 'higher'(TLP 6.42) through the first premise that the world consists of facts which are expressible through language.

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Abbr.

VP: *Vakyapadiya*

PI: *Philosophical Investigations*

TLP: *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*

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Wittgenstein on the Self-Identity of Objects

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Wittgenstein, in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, states that we do not require a sign for identity in an ideal logical notation. (TLP 5.533) His intention is not to do away with the notion of identity, but rather to show that we may do without the sign for identity as an expression of our notion of identity. Instead of using an identity sign, we are to express sameness of object by way of a sameness of sign; difference of object would then be expressed by way of a difference of sign. A motivation for this change in conventions is that, according to Wittgenstein, the use of the identity sign can lead to philosophical confusion. One of the confusions Wittgenstein endeavours to dispel is the view that identity can be a relation between an object and itself. If self-identity is to present a genuine relation, such that it is universally and trivially true of any object that it is self-identical, then self-identity may be used as a universal necessary condition for objecthood. The use of such a criterion would allow us to refer to objects *qua* objects, in disregard of their specific properties. This criterion is used by Russell in his Axiom of Infinity, and Frege in his definition of the number zero. Moreover, the use of a criterion of self-identity to refer to the totality of objects, *qua* objects, stands opposed to Wittgenstein's claim that the world is a totality of facts, not objects, presented at the outset of the *Tractatus*. In the following, I will show why, for Wittgenstein, identity is not a genuine relation between an object and itself. This will involve showing that assertions of self-identity are nonsense. These assertions are neither true nor false, and *a fortiori*, not trivially or universally true.

In question is whether assertions of identity between an object and itself are simply without sense, or whether they are nonsense. If these statements are senseless, as all mathematical propositions are for the early Wittgenstein, then they are true but trivially true. That is, it is trivially true that an object is identical to itself, and so it is universally true as well. These statements are senseless for being trivial and uninformative, but they are nonetheless true statements. If they are nonsense, however, then they are neither true nor false; they are meaningless assertions. Thus, if these assertions of self-identity are nonsense, then it is not true, and hence not trivially and universally true, that an object is identical with itself. The difference between whether statements of self-identity are senseless versus nonsense is a difference between whether self-identity is true of all objects (and thus provides a criterion of objecthood that allows us to refer to objects *qua* objects, in disregard of any other properties) or not true of any object (in which case self-identity is not a criterion for objecthood).

At first sight, Wittgenstein seems to be ambiguous on this point. On the one hand, he seems to conclude that such alleged identity statements are nonsense when, in referring to the identity of objects, he states: "So all problems disappear which are connected with such pseudo-propositions." (TLP 5.535) It does not seem that the philosophical problems associated with self-identity would disappear if the assertion of self-identity was merely senseless for this still upholds that the assertion is true (albeit trivially true, just as with mathematical propositions). Indeed, it is, and was during Wittgenstein's early period, the accepted view that the assertion of the self-identity of an object is trivially and universally true (and thus senseless under Wittgenstein's ren-

dering). Thus, when Wittgenstein concludes that the problems associated with self-identity will "disappear", it seems this should be on finding assertions of self-identity to be nonsense rather than senseless. On the other hand, Wittgenstein suggests otherwise, also in the *Tractatus*: "...to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing." (TLP 5.5303). In this remark, the assertion of the self-identity of an object is not upheld as nonsense, but rather as saying "nothing". This passage suggests that the assertion of self-identity is something different from nonsense, and thus that "nothing" should be read here as uninformative or trivial (i.e., senseless).

Turning to the *Philosophical Investigations* does not help much. Wittgenstein herein states, "A thing is identical with itself" - There is no finer example of a useless proposition." (PI §216). "Useless" may be interpreted as trivial or uninformative, and hence senseless. However, if we interpret "useless" as meaningless (as per the statement of "meaning is use" in PI §43) then an assertion of self-identity is meaningless, and hence presumably nonsense. In the least, the matter is ambiguous if we are left to these remarks on self-identity from the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*.

A correspondence between Wittgenstein and Ramsey provides some clarification. Ramsey interpreted identity in a way he thought consonant with the *Tractatus*: He upheld true identity statements to be tautologies and false ones to be contradictions. "In reply", Hans-Johann Glock conveys, "Wittgenstein insisted that a false identity statement involving logically proper names is nonsensical rather than contradictory, and that the same holds for true identity statements, since the negation of nonsense is itself a nonsense." (Glock 1996, 167) Thus, despite the noted ambiguity in the *Tractatus*, the early Wittgenstein did affirm that an assertion of self-identity is nonsense. I will now explain this.

Consider this passage from Friederich Waismann (the content of which, he remarks, is largely drawn from Wittgenstein):

If it makes sense to ask whether the [two] armchairs can be distinguished, then they are two armchairs; if this question makes no sense, then it is one chair. In other words, the question whether two things are identical is not the question whether they can be distinguished, but whether it makes sense to ask whether they can be distinguished. (Waismann 1977, 26)

According to Waismann, the question to consider concerning the identity of objects is not whether the objects can be distinguished, but whether it even makes sense to ask whether they can be distinguished. On Waisman's reading, if we affirm that an object is identical with itself, it is not because we cannot in fact distinguish an object from itself, but rather because we cannot conceive or make sense of what it would be to distinguish an object from itself. The truth of asserting the self-identity of an object is a result, not of the impossibility of denying self-identity, but rather the nonsensibility of denying self-identity. That is, Waismann conveys it is correct to assert that an object is self-identical, and this truth is the result of nonsense: the nonsense of distinguishing an object from itself.

Waismann provides a step in the right direction in interpreting Wittgenstein, but only a step. Consider that, according to Waismann, it makes no sense to even ask whether a chair can be distinguished from itself. The point is not that it is impossible *in fact* for me to distinguish a chair from itself but rather, as Waismann conveys, it is impossible for me to even conceive of what it would be to do so. That is, it is not that the question of the negation of self-identity lacks a positive answer, rather it is that the question cannot be properly understood (such that we can even begin to consider an answer). Waismann is right about this much, but wrong to convey that this implies the truth of the self-identity of objects. If it is simply the case that it is universally false to distinguish an object from itself, then we may affirm that self-identity is universally true. However, if it is nonsense to assert that an object can be distinguished from itself – if the question of distinguishing an object from itself does not make sense as a question – then it is also nonsense to assert that an object is identical with itself; it is nonsense because, as Glock summarizes above, the negation of nonsense is still nonsense. In contrast, the negation of an arithmetical truth is a mistake, and not nonsense (for people do make intelligible arithmetical mistakes, and these can be understood and corrected). Asking whether $1+1=3$ is not a nonsense question, even if it is not a bright question. But with the self-identity of objects, the question of negation cannot be sensibly considered; it is nonsense, according to Wittgenstein, and thus so is its assertion.

This same conclusion may be arrived at a little differently. Consider that a proposition that expresses a genuine relation is a molecular proposition. It is a proposition with constituent parts that are atomic, and these should be able to be conceived independently. That is, each item related – each relata – should be able to stand independently; each expression related should have its own sense. Roger White affirms, "...if the identity sign were a relational expression, each of these propositions or phrases would have to make sense, even if they merely expressed obvious logical truths or logical falsehoods." (White 1977-8, 169) To explain further, if " $a=b$ " expresses a relation of identity between a and b (presuming these are names of objects), then " $a=a$ " should likewise express a relation of identity (for it follows by way of substitution). However, " $a=a$ " is not a similar case. As Glock observes, "The 'partners' of the apparent relationship are not independent." (Glock 1996, 168) That is to say, a does not stand apart from itself as it may from b , which is to say the sense of a does not stand separate from itself as it may from b . Thus, " $a=a$ " is not a molecular proposition, and hence, does not present a genuine relation. (Glock 1996, 165) In an expression of self-identity, the items on either side of the identity sign do not stand independently; they do not carry independent sense and hence, do not express a genuine relation according to this analysis. However, it is precisely because the items related cannot stand separately, or express independent sense, that the relation of self-identity of an object is presumed to be trivially and necessarily true. But this analysis implies that this is mistaken for it cannot be a trivially true relation if it is not a genuine (molecular) relation. Once again we see that the assertion of self-identity is not a meaningful assertion. When Wittgenstein says in the *Tractatus* that the assertion of self-identity says "nothing" (see *TLP* 5.5303 above), we may now interpret this to mean it says nothing meaningful, as opposed to saying nothing in the sense of saying something trivial.

With the repudiation of self-identity as a genuine relation between an object and itself, certain philosophical confusions – confusions in Wittgenstein's view at least – can be cleared. For instance, if self-identity is not true of all objects, then we cannot use self-identity as a universal criterion of objecthood. If there is no other criterion we may apply to an

object *qua* object, and there does not appear to be one, then we cannot speak of an object in disregard of any properties and we cannot refer to or identify the universe of objects *qua* objects. Russell's Axiom of Infinity, for instance, does just this in asserting the infinity of objects in the universe. This is an assertion about how many objects there are rather than an assertion about how many objects of a particular kind there are. (Glock 1996, 167) Again, the repudiation of identity as a genuine relation between an object and itself means that we cannot use self-identity as a way of speaking of an object *qua* object. To speak of or refer to an object we must do so in terms of some property or other. This is a reason why Wittgenstein states, at the outset of the *Tractatus*, that the world is a totality of facts, not objects (*TLP* 1.1). In addition, if the assertion of self-identity is not a basis for speaking of a universe of objects *qua* objects (by reason of nonsense), then the denial of self-identity is not a basis for speaking of a universe or set that is empty of objects *qua* objects (again by reason of nonsense). This means that the negation of self-identity cannot be used to define the empty or null set or, as Frege does, to define the number zero. In short, Frege's logical derivation of the numbers is put in jeopardy if the null class of objects cannot be defined as the group of objects that are not self-identical.

The presumption that identity constitutes a genuine relation between an object and itself is a tenet of more than one philosophical position. These positions are undermined by Wittgenstein's case for the nonsense, as opposed to senselessness, of assertions of self-identity. While the interpretive case seems clear, despite the initial ambiguity raised, the following observations can also be made in favour of reading Wittgenstein as upholding that assertions of self-identity are nonsense (and so neither true nor false), rather than merely senseless (and so trivially true): Wittgenstein admonished Russell's Axiom of Infinity; in addition, at the outset of the *Tractatus*, he denied that the world was a totality of objects. These positions are supported if assertions of self-identity are deemed nonsense, but are belied if deemed senseless and trivially true. As noted at the beginning, according to Wittgenstein, in an ideal logical notation identity would be conveyed or *shown* by sameness of sign, rather than asserted or *said* through a special sign for identity. That is, an identity sign is an attempt to express what is better shown through sameness of sign. Showing that the aforementioned philosophical positions are built on a philosophical confusion is at least one motivation, for Wittgenstein, for adopting this ideal notation.

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Husserl, Wittgenstein, Apel: Communicative *Expectations* and Communicative *Reality*

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I. Communicative expectations

Ludwig Wittgenstein's "*Philosophical Investigations*" and his concept of "language-games"¹ was a kind of natural response to the program of logical positivism striving to build a universal and logically strict scientific language. This logically "strict" field – the artificially constructed languages of various semantics – seemed to have lost its essential difference from the "nonrigorous" humanities and arts. Could have that really been so? Karl-Otto Apel believes it could, and Wittgenstein backed it up with sound conceptual grounds.

Wittgenstein's favourite illustration repeated throughout his "*Philosophical Investigations*" – the reasoning on "colours" – is strongly allusive of Edmond Husserl's argumentation in his "*Logische Untersuchungen*" [Husserl, 1922], as he aimed at justifying the "semantic unity of notion" and the "identity of propositions content". What propositions? Those about "colours" ("what is green, is not red") and those about the Euclidean geometry ("the total of a triangle angles is equal to 180°" etc). Of course, Husserl meant the *ideal* semantic unity and the *ideal* identity of content. The thing is that the truth, according to Husserl, has an ideal nature and reveals itself "as an idea grasping the essence of empirically random acts, or as the idea of absolute adequacy as such" [Husserl, 1922, S.123]. But this ideal nature itself needed justifying. What could have served for this? In Husserl's eyes, it might have been provided by the "intersubjective program" designed to bring to light the ideal nature of notions and assertions; he describes it in his work "*Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*" [Husserl, 1973]. Yet, this ideal nature is seen only if we admit the existence of the transcendental subject (Ego), and in such a way that it could be proliferated: seen as a multitude of subjects – the "intersubject". "To reveal methodically the transcendental intersubjectivity and its turning into the transcendental community, - Husserl says, - is possible only proceeding from the concept of Ego and the system of its transcendental functions and actions" [Husserl, 1973, S.189].

However, Husserl's intersubjective program itself had to face some serious difficulties. Thus, we can construct a model of "one single subject" who, as «*one – éνας*» and as having his «*foundation – αρχή*» in himself can be differentiated as and be given the name of *Enarch*. We have already shown [Pavlenko, 2004] that, in this case, it is *not necessary* to turn to a *multitude of subjects* for justification of the ideal unity of notion or of the propositions about colours and Euclidean geometry.

Apel points out another difficulty. He proceeds from the fact that a program based upon the "obviousness of consciousness", represented, in his opinion, by Descartes, Kant and even Husserl, has exhausted itself and proved insufficient for "justifying the significance of 'cognition' – which is manifest, for example, in the a priori significance of the Euclidean geometry in a Kantian mood, or the so-

called *Farbsätze* in the mood of Husserl. Why is this so? In Apel's opinion, such "phenomenological and cognitive-anthropological stating is based on the ordinary visual obviousness of individual phenomena" [Apel, 1972, S.2]. In other wording, each one, *compos mentis*, contemplates the world as Euclidean and as having appropriate colours. We can think of non-Euclidean metric, or of some principally different combinations of colours, but we cannot visualise such things!

This shortcoming of the aprioristic and phenomenological approaches should be overcome: "It is exactly because of this that the justification of the Euclidean geometry or the *Farbsätze* intersubjective significance is insufficient here" [Apel, 1972, S.2]. Such justification, Apel believes, demands that obvious visualization should go together with a kind of "language-game". This means that ordinary individual visualization should be "raised" above the individual to the transcendental level. How can this be achieved? Only in a special "communicative-semantic field" where "my personal obviousness" is combined with the "common significance for us". Thus, Apel corrects Kant and Husserl as his follower, replacing the "apperception synthesis" by the "*communicative interpretation synthesis*". This was the turning point from the "consciousness analysis" to the "communication analysis".

The thing is that, within the scope of reasoning, – however doubtful and sceptical the polemist himself might be – it is he who sets the "transcendental premises" and at the same time acknowledges them: both for epistemology and for a science *on the lines of a transcendental language-game* of an unlimited communicative society. Wittgenstein, too, speaks on the common (communicative) linguistic "behaviour" in his "*Philosophical Investigations*": «206. The common behavior of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language» [Wittgenstein, 1958].

Apel supposes that the path should be leading from Kant's "transcendental idealism" and Husserl's phenomenology – through the synthesis of later Wittgenstein's "language-games" and Charles Peirce's "indefinite community of investigators" – to his own "transcendental pragmatics". In such "transcendental communicative society", the truth is understood like this: "*any obviousness of consideration* is stated due to the linguistic understanding of a proposition *a priori significant for us*, and may further retain its meaning in the conventional theory of truth (in Sinne Konsens-Theorie der Wahrheit) as an *a priori* bound knowledge" [Apel, 1972, S.3]. It is so because, in communication, the transcendental core of any individual *ego* coincides with the transcendental core of the *entire society of the communication participants*, both real and possible.

What does Apel need this synthesis for? He sees it as the only way to overcome, on the one hand, the centuries-old chasm between the "sciences about the spiritual matters" and "sciences about the nature", and on the other hand, to transcend the Cartesian and Kantian tradition of the "subject-object" dissection of the world when describing. He considers it possible in a special field that he calls

¹ See: Wittgenstein, 1958, §7.

“transcendental pragmatics”. What does it actually mean? It means that in both spiritual and natural kinds of sciences we have to deal with the same absolutely unavoidable procedures – “interpreting” and “understanding” in the frames of a “transcendental communicative society”. And he adds: after all claims of the “language of propositional calculus” for the role of the unique language of science have failed, that is, after there have emerged new constructive semantic systems – this “strict” field does no longer differ essentially from the “non-rigorous” spiritual sciences.

So, we can see that certain “communicative expectations” were invariably inherent in Husserl’s philosophy, and in Wittgenstein’s, and in Apel’s. This provokes a question: is really the “communicative program of knowledge justification” so substantial?

To answer this question I am going to examine this program only in one its bearing: for example, how *validity of judgements* can be made good in its frames? It has been shown above that Husserl associates validity with the identity of a notion’s semantic unity for different transcendental subjects. Wittgenstein doubts the very status of “identity” as such, preferring to it the “comparison of equality”²: “254. The substitution of “identical” for “the same” (for instance) is another typical expedient in philosophy” [Wittgenstein,1958].

For Apel it is the “statements *a priori* significant for us”, based, in the final analysis, upon the *conventional theory of truth*. In other words, for the CP representatives, the sign of a statement trustworthiness is its validity. Here, as I see it, communicative expectations encounter a grave difficulty.

II. Communicative reality.

2.1. A distinction between logical and epistemological validity.

To analyse the “intersubjectivity” reached in communication, let us introduce some designations, to help us make clear its logical and epistemological structure.

Step 1. The variables $x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n$ are introduced to designate certain classes of theoretical models.

Step 2. A set of subjects of epistemology is introduced, designated by the symbols $A_1, A_2, A_3, \dots, A_m$.

As we presuppose that different subjects, like $A_1, A_2, A_3, \dots, A_m$, understand propositions of theoretical models $x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n$ in an identical way, that is, that the *meanings* inherent in the objects described by propositions $x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n$ fully coincide, let us agree that

Step 3. there is a “one-to-one corresponding” (OOC) of meanings of the propositions $x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n$ for all subjects $A_1, A_2, A_3, \dots, A_m$. Let us describe this correspondence as an equivalence, which will result in the following expression:

$$[I] A_1(x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n) \leftrightarrow A_2(x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n) \leftrightarrow A_3(x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n), \dots \leftrightarrow A_m(x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n).$$

where symbol « \leftrightarrow » means logical equivalency.

Step 4. Satisfiability of such OOC is what we shall call the “intersubjective justification” of the propositions $x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n$.

In other words, when there is a OOC in understanding of the propositions meanings in all explanatory models – then we can speak of achieving the “intersubjective justification” for these models.

Step 5. On the grounds of our conclusions to steps 3 and 4 let us agree preliminary to call the correspondence [I] the *epistemological* definition of validity.

An important reservation should be made here: the *epistemological definition* of validity should not be mixed with its *logical definition* as a tautology (an identically true formula).

Having made all these assumptions, we still have to admit that the answer is not yet clear for a most important question: can we consider such OOC to be identical to *epistemological validity*? Most likely, we cannot! For, e.g., OOC may be applied only to the variables *already* available for the researchers $A_1, A_2, A_3, \dots, A_m$. But there are scientific propositions not included into their scope at the discussed moment, and some more from merely theoretical sphere (e.g., mathematics) having no direct relation to natural sciences. Hence, we can conclude that it is necessary to differentiate between the two types of *epistemological validity*. Let us call them:

1) *Factual epistemological validity (FEV)*. It takes place when validity is applied for a finite set of propositions $x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n$ and a finite quantity of subjects $A_1, A_2, A_3, \dots, A_m$ in the sense [I].

2) *Analytical epistemological validity (AEV)*. In this case validity is applied for any preset proposition $x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n, \dots$ and for any possible subjects of discussion $A_1, A_2, A_3, \dots, A_m, \dots$. Then we have an equivalence of another kind:

$$[II] A_1(x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n, \dots) \leftrightarrow A_2(x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n, \dots) \leftrightarrow A_3(x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n, \dots) \dots \leftrightarrow A_m(x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n, \dots) \leftrightarrow \dots$$

Let’s take an example of FEV. Think of “phlogiston” as a special state of matter able to transfer heat. Its existence had validity for S.Carnot and his contemporaries in the sense [I], but then it lost its explanatory meaning. In other words, the notion “phlogiston” gets out of use in the scientific language of thermodynamics. So, it had validity for the 18th–early19th-century physicists and chemists, but does not have such for today representatives of the same branches of learning.

This means, it can never have validity in the sense [II], as being not valid for any preset researcher. Wittgenstein would have simply explained this by different “language-games”. But – think of the both principles of thermodynamics, formulated by Carnot on the assumption of phlogiston existence and retaining their scientific meaning up to now, notwithstanding the linguistic unit “phlogiston” has lost it. So, the nature of validity of the thermodynamics principles is rooted somewhere else. As a matter of fact, AEV can be reached solely by *deduction*. It is simply proved analytically – a thing Carnot did with the use of “the ideal thermal machine” model.

This is why tautologies (laws, identically true formulae) from mathematics, logic, theoretical physics and other analytical spheres of knowledge also belong here.

² «216. “A thing is identical with itself.” –There is no finer example of a useless proposition, which yet is connected with a certain play of the imagination. It is as if in imagination we put a thing into its own shape and saw that it fitted». [Wittgenstein,1958]

2.2. The vicious circle in justifying FEV

Having ascertained the existence of epistemological validity of two different types, let's ask a question: *On what grounds we call a proposition justified intersubjectively (communicatively)?* The answer that follows from the above says: *On the grounds of its FEV.* Indeed, the validity of a statement – let it be a proposition from the model x_1 – is made manifest because the statement is used by all participants of the discussion, or simply by the inductive opinion examination of all participants in order to establish the fact of validity:

$$A_1(x_1) \leftrightarrow A_2(x_1) \leftrightarrow A_3(x_1) \dots \leftrightarrow \dots A_m(x_1)$$

Having examined opinions of all participants we give the following answer: the proposition from the model x_1 is *justified intersubjectively (communicatively) because it has FEV.* Of course, we speak here of the enumerating induction. FEV includes the number of subjects of communication (A) as large as it is wished but finite, and the similarly finite number of models (x) (statements).

If this is really so, we can ask the following question: on what grounds we say that a statement *has FEV*?

The answer we are going to hear is: on the grounds of the fact that the statement is justified intersubjectively (literally – that all participants of the discussion understand the discussed propositions (their “meanings”) identically, that is, an equivalence takes place. So, we cannot help having it this way: epistemological validity is proved through intersubjectivity (communicativeness), whereas the status of the latter is proved through epistemological validity.

We cannot escape a certain vicious circle in any “intersubjectivity” justification. In my opinion, this is due to the fact that, *seeking to prove the intersubjectively interpreted validity* we, actually, deal with the *inductive way of conclusion*. Its main shortcoming – the *non demonstrative character of conclusions* is extended to the *communicative justification of knowledge*.

As I see it, the problem is rooted in the fact that, within the frames of intersubjective approach, epistemological validity can never be justified because *the very process of intersubjective justifying of formal-contentual (such as physical ones) and contentual (e.g., sociological ones) theories is based on the inductive generalisation instead of deductive conclusion*: an example here may be – getting *the intersubjective proof* for a registered supernova outburst *in different observatories of the world, etc.*

If that is the way it is, AEV as including an open class of subjects and statements, cannot be inductively proved in principle. The only way to ground it properly is deduction – for example, for a certain class of formulae in propositional logic, tautological as they are, etc.

So, we have to state serious difficulties in justification of the CP. Of course, the enormous contribution to the communicative strategy development made by Husserl, Wittgenstein and Apel can hardly be overestimated. Yet, the *expectations* placed by the mentioned philosophers and their followers in *communication*, have proved to be unreasonably overestimated as compared to the *communicative reality* – where the vicious circle described here is only one in a whole number of serious flaws.

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Aussage und Bedeutung. Skizze einer postanalytischen Bedeutungstheorie

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1. Form und Prinzipien der analytischen Bedeutungstheorie

„Das Universum (das andere die Bibliothek nennen) setzt sich aus einer unbestimmten, vielleicht unendlichen Zahl sechseckiger Galerien zusammen, mit weiten Lüftungsschächten in der Mitte, eingefasst von sehr niedrigen Geländern. Von jedem Sechseck kann man die unteren und oberen Stockwerke sehen: ohne ein Ende. Die Anordnung der Galerien ist immer gleich.“ (Borges 2000: 151)

Mit diesen Worten beginnt die berühmte kurze Erzählung „Die Bibliothek von Babel“ des argentinischen Autors Jorge Luis Borges. Nicht nur in der literarischen Fiktion Borges', sondern auch in einem der nachhaltigsten Paradigmata der modernen Sprachphilosophie begegnet einem die darin ausgedrückte Faszination für eine präexistente, regelmäßige Ordnung. Klassische Ansätze der analytisch-philosophischen Sprachtheorie sind zumeist dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass sie die Gesamtheit der als relevant für eine semantische Theorie erachteten sprachlichen Komponenten drastisch einschränken. In der theoretischen Untersuchung (und damit implizit auch in der Bestimmung des für die Bedeutung sprachlicher Ausdrücke Relevanten) wurde seit Freges grundlegenden Ausführungen (Frege 1892) ein dreigliedriges Schema zum Allgemeingut, das folgende Komponenten unterscheidet: den sprachlichen Ausdruck selbst, dessen Bedeutung sowie dessen Bezugsgegenstand. Diese Unterscheidung wird nicht von allen Autoren in dieser speziellen Ausprägung als gültig akzeptiert, trägt jedoch eine Grundüberzeugung in sich, nämlich die Legitimität eines semantischen Schemas überhaupt: Das Betreiben einer philosophischen Semantik bestehe demnach in der Beschreibung einer formalen Struktur bzw. einer paradigmatischen Konstellation bestimmter semantischer Komponenten.

„Die beste Methode, die philosophischen Probleme um den Begriff der Bedeutung und damit zusammenhängende Begriffe zu formulieren, ist nach einer wohlbekanntesten Auffassung die Fragestellung, welche Form eine sogenannte ‚Bedeutungstheorie‘ für eine vollständige Sprache annehmen sollte, d.h. eine detaillierte Angabe der Bedeutungen aller Wörter und satzbildenden Operationen dieser Sprache, aus der sich dann eine Angabe der Bedeutung jedes Ausdrucks und Satzes dieser Sprache ergibt. Damit wird die Konstruktion einer Bedeutungstheorie in diesem Sinn nicht als praktisches Projekt für irgendeine Sprache ins Auge gefaßt, doch man meint, daß wir, wenn wir die allgemeinen Prinzipien, nach denen sich eine derartige Konstruktion durchführen ließe, erst einmal darlegen können, zu einer Lösung der die Philosophen beunruhigenden Probleme bezüglich Bedeutung gelangt sind.“ (Dummett 1982: 94)

Ausgangspunkt einer derartigen Betrachtung sind meist die sprachlichen Ausdrücke (Wörter oder Sätze), deren Bedeutung mittels allgemeiner Kategorien zu beschreiben unternommen wird. Den Sprachphilosophen interessiert in erster Linie nicht die konkrete Bedeutung eines konkreten Ausdrucks, sondern eine Definition jener

semantischen Komponenten, die einer bestimmten Klasse von Ausdrücken im Allgemeinen zukommen. Hierzu ist es nötig, die sprachlichen Ausdrücke in Klassen zusammenzufassen, um letztlich das erstellen zu können, was wir im Weiteren als deren „semantisches Profil“ bezeichnen wollen. Die Klassifikation erweist sich dabei als reduktionistisch, wie die idealsprachliche Orientierung der frühen sprachanalytischen Tradition belegt, und weiters bereits durch semantische Gesichtspunkte geprägt: Das Kriterium der Zugehörigkeit von Ausdrücken zu einer bestimmten Klasse ist selbst eine semantische Eigenart, die in ihr semantisches Profil Eingang findet (für singuläre Termini beispielsweise der Bezug auf genau einen Referenzgegenstand, für Sätze etwa ihre Wahrheits-, Verifikations- oder Rechtfertigungsbedingungen).

Ein semantisches Profil in unserem Sinn umfasst eine Liste der semantischen Komponenten, die eine Ausdrucksklasse aufweist, und deren (falls angenommen) strukturelle Relation; neben Freges Programm der Zuordnung von Ausdruck, Sinn und Bedeutung stellt etwa Putnams Liste in „Die Bedeutung von Bedeutung“ (Putnam 1979: 94) einen Parade Fall eines semantischen Profils (von Termini für natürliche Arten) dar. Differenzen innerhalb der analytischen Sprachphilosophie treten meist in Bezug auf die jeweils veranschlagten semantischen Komponenten und deren strukturelles Verhältnis auf, berühren jedoch nicht die Legitimität und prinzipielle Applizierbarkeit eines semantischen Profils. Das dahinterstehende Verständnis von analytischer Sprachphilosophie stellt also folgende Aufgaben für eine Bedeutungstheorie:

1. die Bestimmung derjenigen Ausdrücke, von denen legitimer Weise angenommen werden kann, dass sie über eine Bedeutung verfügen;
2. die Klassifikation solcherart semantisch relevanter Ausdrücke (worunter die Diskussion um deren Rückführbarkeit auf grundlegendere Klassen oder das Freilegen ihrer semantischen Tiefenstruktur fällt);
3. die Erstellung eines semantischen Profils, d.h. eine Aufstellung desjenigen, was als Bedeutung der jeweiligen Klasse von Ausdrücken firmiert.

Die drei genannten Schritte werden in der Literatur unterschiedlich vollzogen; wir möchten angesichts der Kontroversen um semantische Profile jedenfalls festhalten, dass hingegen die Hintergrundidee konstant bleibt, die das sprachanalytische Bemühen einer Bedeutungstheorie motiviert – dass nämlich die Konstellation dieser Komponenten mittels eines allgemeinen Schemas generalisierbar und als zeitlose strukturelle Charakteristik festzulegen ist. Die Zielvorstellung des sprachanalytischen Philosophierens besteht also in der argumentativen Freisetzung jener semantischen Ordnung, die der Sprache zugrunde liegt und mittels semantischer Profile beschrieben werden kann. Diese Grundidee motiviert noch die skeptischen Richtungen in der analytischen Philosophie, die (wie etwa bei Quine) durch generelle Unbestimmtheitsthesen und Widerlegung von Dogmen die Form des analytischen Argumentierens, nämlich das Auffinden von generalisierbaren Patentrezepten und semantischen Prinzipien, fest-

schreiben. Verdeckt wird dieser Umstand durch die gängige Praxis, sich an den Prämissen und Vorarbeiten anderer Autoren zu orientieren und sich auf sprachphilosophische Teilaspekte bzw. spezielle Problemstellungen zu konzentrieren, was zur Folge hat, dass die Ergebnisse der analytischen Bemühungen oftmals in neuen Definitions- und Systematisierungsvorschlägen bestehen. Durch eine sich darin bekundende Tendenz zur sprachphilosophischen Generalisierung oder Extrapolation von (in Einzeluntersuchungen identifizierten) Merkmalen ergeben sich allgemeine semantische Rezepte (das semantische Profil einer Ausdrucksart *a* besteht in den Komponenten *x*, *y* und *z* sowie deren strukturellem Verhältnis), die als implizites Ziel der analytischen Sprachphilosophie fungieren.

Aus der Vielzahl von Ideen, die mit dieser Auffassung von Bedeutungstheorie einhergehen, möchten wir deren marginalisierende Einstellung zur Pragmatik hervorheben. Im Bemühen um eine systematische „reine“ Semantik, die die Gesamtheit der semantischen Profile von Ausdrücken umfasst, sind empirische und pragmatische Faktoren in erster Linie Anlass für Korrekturen und Modifikationen inadäquater semantischer Profile, die sich aus den verschiedenen Verwendungsweisen und -zusammenhängen von bestimmten Ausdrücken ergeben und eine Modifikation bzw. Neuausrichtung vorgängiger, semantisch definierter Parameter erzwingen. Diese Sichtweise klammert pragmatische Komponenten nicht nur aus der Erörterung der Bedeutung eines Ausdrucks aus, sondern reduziert die „Pragmatik“ implizit auf Fähigkeiten und Fertigkeiten von Sprechern oder Sprachgemeinschaften.

2. Wittgensteins Einschränkung des Analysebegriffs und Kritik des Essentialismus

Die Erarbeitung einer „konventionalistischen Bedeutungstheorie“, wie sie Ludwig Wittgenstein im Spätwerk entwickelt hat, weist durch ihre Abkehr von solch einem Analyseideal hin zu lokalen Beschreibungen auf einen internen Bruch in der Geschichte der analytischen Sprachphilosophie hin. Zahlreiche Passagen der „Philosophischen Untersuchungen“ bergen eine Lektüreversion, welche über eine bloße Selbstkritik von Wittgensteins noch im „Tractatus“ vertretener Position hinausweist. Dabei verschwindet insbesondere das zentrale Fundament analytischer Sprachphilosophien – die zuvor als solche identifizierte Grundüberzeugung der Legitimität eines universellen semantischen Schemas. Wittgenstein entzieht diesem Unternehmen durch die Zurückweisung des (einst auch von ihm als allgemeingültig betrachteten) Begriffs der Analyse als Erklärung den Boden. In §496 stellt er der sprachphilosophischen Erklärung die Beschreibung der „Grammatik“ gegenüber und schließt diese Zurückweisung der Analyse mit seiner Essentialismuskritik kurz (Wittgenstein 1984: §90-92). Wittgensteins Alternative zur einheitlichen und exklusiven Struktur des universalen Begriffsschemas findet sich in dem, über Familienähnlichkeiten lose verbundenen Komplex des ein jedes Sprachspiel bestimmenden Regelvorgangs. Deren zentrale, jeglichen apriorischen Ausdruck der Regel ablehnende Pointe liegt im in lakonisch formulierten (Wittgenstein 1984: §202), auf Gepflogenheiten (§198) fußenden Praxischarakter. Diese anti-kognitivistische Pragmatik und die jegliche Universalitätsansprüche vermeidende, zu lokalen Topographien tendierende Verbindung der Sprachspiele über lose Familienähnlichkeiten bieten – auch aufgrund der Polyvalenz des Wittgensteinschen Regelbegriffs – einiges Potential für eine neue Bedeutungstheorie.

Welche Bedingungen und Kritikpunkte Wittgensteins muss eine solche Theorie berücksichtigen, will sie nicht

bloß in eine neue, nur auf ganz bestimmte Formen von Ausdrücken anwendbare semantische Theorie münden?

Man kann mindestens vier derartige Anforderungen in den „Philosophischen Untersuchungen“ isolieren: Aus der Vielzahl der möglichen Sprachspiele (Wittgenstein 1984: §23) folgt, dass eine derartige Theorie eine lokale und kontextuelle Anwendbarkeit erlauben muss, nicht jedoch eine allgemeingültige semantische Charakteristik postulieren darf, wie dies beim eingangs skizzierten Vorschlag der Fall ist. Die Vielfalt der Sprachspiele und deren Berücksichtigung ermöglicht ihr jedoch im Gegenzug, die ganze Sprache und nicht nur einzelne Elemente oder Ausdrucksklassen zu beschreiben. Weitere zentrale Bedingungen für eine semantische Theorie werden in ihrer anti-kognitivistischen und anti-essentialistischen Praxisorientiertheit (Wittgenstein 1984: §85, §201 und §202) sowie in ihrem historischen, nicht überzeitlichen bzw. nicht dem historischen Wandel entthobenen Charakter (Wittgenstein 1984: §108) liegen.

3. Eklektizistischer Entwurf einer postanalytischen Bedeutungstheorie

Will man nun diese Wittgensteinschen Forderungen – entgegen deren prinzipieller Tendenz zum Asystematischen und Wittgensteins teils theoriefeindlichen Bemerkungen – zum Ausgangspunkt einer Systematik machen, so benötigt man zuallererst eine begriffliche Instanz, die zwischen der abgelehnten Allgemeinheit einer universellen semantischen Struktur einerseits und der Besonderheit einer aktuellen sprachlich-praktischen Äußerung angesiedelt ist. Einen hierfür tauglichen Begriffsapparat findet man etwa in der (bislang vorwiegend in historisch-semantischen Kontexten angewandten) Aussagenanalyse Michel Foucaults.

Mittels einer kritischen Zusammenführung dieser beiden Denkansätze soll im Folgenden versucht werden, eine postanalytische Bedeutungstheorie zu skizzieren. Dabei bedarf es insbesondere der Schließung jener durch die verschiedenen theoretischen und philosophischen Positionen von Wittgenstein und Foucault bedingten Lücken und Inkongruenzen. Von Vorteil ist hierfür die von zahlreichen Kritikern monierte Offenheit des Foucaultschen Konzepts der Aussage (*énoncé*). Dieses ist vor allem charakterisiert durch seine Betonung der Individualität, womit es der ersten der oben angeführten vier Forderungen Wittgensteins entspricht: Das Foucaultsche Konzept der Aussage durchbricht in seiner Betonung der Individualität den starren strukturellen Rahmen reduktionistischer sprachphilosophischer Modelle, welche ihre einzelnen Äußerungen als (besondere) Realisierungen einer (allgemeinen) systembestimmten Struktur verstehen. So unterscheidet Foucault die Aussage von der Proposition der Logik dadurch, dass sie sich nicht in ihrem propositionalen Gehalt erfüllt bzw. manchmal einen solchen gar nicht aufweist. Ebenso differiert sie vom Satz der klassischen Grammatik, da nicht alle Aussagen deren inhärentes, syntaktisches Konzept vollständig realisieren. Die Unterschiede zum Sprechakt hat Foucault später teilweise revidiert. Diese drei negativen Charakteristika korrelieren in besagter Individualisierung der Aussage: „Individualisiert“: das will in diesem Zusammenhang heißen: nicht vorhersehbar von Seiten der Struktur, kontingent hinsichtlich ihres So-Seins.“ (Frank 1984: 228)

Bevor wir zur eigentlichen adaptiven Synthetisierung dieses Konzepts mit dem Wittgensteinschen Sprachspiel schreiten, bedarf es noch eines Referats der positiven Charakteristika der Aussage, wie sie Michel Foucault in der Archäologie des Wissens (Foucault 1986) präsentiert.

Foucault unterscheidet dabei vier zentrale Merkmale: Die Aussage bildet eine Funktion des Modus eines sich öffnenden Gegenstandsbereiches, d.h. dass innerhalb eines aus einem Aussagenkomplex gebildeten „Korrelationsraum[es]“ (Foucault 1986: 133) die Möglichkeiten potentieller Referenz abgesteckt werden. Zweitens bildet sie eine Funktion der möglichen Positionen eines Subjektes; drittens umgibt sie ein komplementärer Raum, der ihr Verhältnis zu anderen Aussagenformationen bestimmt. Als letzten Punkt verweist Foucault auf deren „materielle Existenz“ (Foucault 1986: 154). Gilles Deleuze fasst die Eigenart der Foucaultschen Aussage prägnant zusammen: „Im Bereich der Aussage gibt es weder Mögliches noch Virtuelles; alles ist hier real und jede Realität manifest: nur das zählt, was gesagt wurde, hier, in diesem Augenblick, mit diesen Lücken und Auslassungen.“ (Deleuze 1986: 11).

Im Sinne einer (hier nicht im Detail ausgeführten) Anwendung des Aussagebegriffs auf die Frage nach einer den Wittgensteinschen Anforderungen genügenden Bedeutungstheorie möchten wir als Synthese die folgende These vorbringen:

Die Bedeutung eines Ausdrucks (= das semantische Profil, die semantischen Merkmale eines Ausdrucks) ist nur im Rahmen des durch den Aussagekontext bestimmten Gebrauchs dieses Ausdrucks bestimmbar. Der Aussagekontext ist notwendige Bedingung für die „Semantizität“ von Ausdrücken (= für die Bedeutung bzw. die Existenz eines semantischen Profils / semantischer Merkmale des Ausdrucks).

Die Berücksichtigung der Aussage fügt dem vertikalen, sprachlich-systemischen Instantiierungsschema eine horizontale, pragmatische Achse hinzu: Ausdrücke sind nicht nur Instanzen einer abstrakten sprachlichen Struktur, die vom Sprachsystem geregelt wird und vom ihm vordefinierte (abstrakte) grammatische, logische und semantische Merkmale – ein semantisches Profil – vererbt bekommt, sondern jeweils auch in einen Aussagekontext eingebunden, der von einer postanalytischen Bedeutungstheorie zu analysieren ist, um die konkreten grammatischen, logischen und semantischen Merkmale des Ausdrucks zu bestimmen. Das grammatische, logische und semantische Möglichkeitsfeld wird somit vom Aussagekontext parametrisiert bzw. durch die pragmatisch zu verstehende Aktualisierungsbewegung determiniert; daraus resultiert eine konkrete semantische Charakteristik des Ausdrucks, die sich nicht darauf reduzieren lässt, nur eine vom System vorgesehene Möglichkeit darzustellen, sondern darüber hinaus vom praktischen Kontext festgelegt wird. Ein solcherart verstandener Ausdruck ist somit nicht nur ein besonderes Abbild einer abstrakten Allgemeinheit, sondern zugleich ein individueller „Fall“ in einem konkreten Aussagekontext. Seiner vom Sprachsystem vorgegebenen Charakteristik wird dadurch, dass er eine Aussage verkörpert, ein pragmatischer Index hinzugefügt, und dieser Index gestattet es, eine semantische Bestimmung des Ausdrucks durchzuführen.

Nur im Kontext einer Aussage ist es folglich legitim, vom semantischen Profil eines Ausdrucks zu sprechen, woraus sich auch die prinzipielle Möglichkeit von empirischen Gegenbeispielen in der analytischen Philosophie (die sich aus verschiedenen pragmatischen Situationen, d.h. aktualisierten Aussagekontexten, ergeben) zu semantischen Profilen erklärt. Das Ausgesagtsein ist somit die zwingende, aber leicht zu übersehende Bedingung der Möglichkeit von Semantizität und deren Analyse, wie auch Foucault hervorhebt:

„Der letzte Grund für diese Quasi-Unsichtbarkeit der Aussage ist der, daß die Aussage von allen anderen Ana-

lysen der Sprache angenommen wird, ohne daß sie sie je ans Licht bringen müßte. Damit die Sprache als Objekt aufgefaßt, in verschiedene Schichten zerlegt, beschrieben und analysiert werden kann, muß eine ‚Aussagegegebenheit‘ existieren, die stets determiniert und nicht unendlich ist: die Analyse einer Sprache vollzieht sich stets an einem Korpus von Worten und Texten; die Interpretation und das Hervorbringen der impliziten Bedeutung beruhen stets auf einer begrenzten Gruppe von Sätzen; die logische Analyse eines Systems impliziert in der erneuten Schreibung, in einer formalen Sprache, eine gegebene Menge von Propositionen.[...] Daß sie [die Aussage, die Verf.] jedesmal unerlässlich dafür ist, daß die Analyse vorgenommen werden kann, nimmt ihr jede Pertinenz für die Analyse selbst.“ (Foucault 1986: 163)

Daraus folgt sowohl eine Dynamisierung als auch eine Multiplizierung der semantischen Profile: Nicht nur sind semantische Profile einer historisch-pragmatischen Entwicklung unterworfen, die sich in verschieden gearteten Aussagesystemen manifestiert, sondern ein konkreter Ausdruck kann je nach Aussagekontext auch verschiedene semantische Profile einnehmen. Unser Vorschlag geht davon aus, dass eine im Nachhinein erfolgende Beschreibung und Definition sowohl von Aussagekontext als auch semantischem Profil prinzipiell möglich ist, wobei diese Beschreibung über das Wittgensteinsche Zeigen hinausgehen kann; aufzugeben ist jedoch der Universalitäts- und Vollständigkeitsanspruch, wie er mit der Idee einer systematischen reinen Semantik verknüpft ist; das semantische Profil wird schließlich im Rahmen einer pragmatischen Semiologie zur „Post-Struktur“.

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Life and Death of Signs and Pictures: Wittgenstein on Living Pictures and Forms of Life

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Even after his renouncement to the Tractarian picture-theory of propositions, Wittgenstein kept on assuming the similarity of words and pictures. I will support this idea by stressing how both words and pictures, in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, need to interact with their surroundings in order to stay alive. I will regard this common condition as a key to the unity of words and pictures in Wittgenstein's philosophy after the 30's.

1. Wittgenstein's picture-theory of language: before and after the 30's

That there should be a connection between language and pictures is quite obvious in the philosophy of the early Wittgenstein: for his overall account of language rests on a "picture-theory" of propositions, whose motto is that "[t]he proposition is a picture of reality./ The proposition is a model of reality as we think it is"¹. Such a claim is doubtlessly paradoxical, since signs and pictures are usually opposed to one another as two very different varieties of symbolism. Yet, this claim has a lot of advantages, mostly because it supports an explanation of the representational capacity of language, by assuming that a proposition *mimics* the internal organization of the fact it is supposed to express:

The essential nature of the propositional sign becomes very clear when we imagine it made up of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, books) instead of written signs. The mutual spatial position of these things expresses the sense of the proposition².

In other words, the proposition is something like a "living picture", where "[o]ne name stands for one thing, and another for another sign, and they are connected together"³.

Yet, although being quite convenient, such a pictorial account of propositional signs is not utterly satisfactory: the later Wittgenstein was therefore to reject it, mostly because of its rigidity. In his *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein observes that "[a] picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language"⁴. The target of this remark might be the very picture-theory of language, understood as a picture of language embedded in language itself. Such a picture of language creates a distorting effect on what propositions really are, by leading one to the false belief that all propositions are of one kind⁵. The Tractarian picture-theory of propositions thus fails to do justice to the great variety of propositional devices⁶, and should therefore be left aside.

Now, does this renouncement to the picture-theory in its early formulation involve a complete withdrawal of the commitment to the pictoriality of language? My claim is that it does not. Quite the contrary: even after the 30's,

Wittgenstein maintains that "[t]o say that a proposition is a picture gives prominence to certain features of the grammar of the word 'proposition' ", and that "thinking is quite comparable to the drawing of pictures"⁷. There is more: not only does Wittgenstein, after the 30's, keep on comparing propositions and pictures, but he even seems to grant pictures a priority when it comes to express meanings; to assume that propositions are all the more significant as they are more akin to pictures. In other words, Wittgenstein seems to be taking seriously this hint formulated in the *Philosophical Grammar*:

So for the picture to tell me something it isn't essential that words should occur to me while I look at it; because the picture should be the more direct language⁸.

There is, of course, something wrong with the Tractarian account of propositions: but its defect does not lie in the assumption of a connection between words and pictures. Its inadequacy rather depends on a reductive point of view, demanding that all pictures should work on the same manner. One needn't reject the overall idea of propositions as pictures in order to recover from such a dogmatic attitude. The therapy rather lies in the consideration of the diversity of possible pictures, and consequently of the diversity of possible propositions:

The proposition as a *picture*. This is not false: but there are still-lives, portraits, landscapes, geographic maps, diagrams, etc., etc.⁹.

In other words, both the early and the later Wittgenstein recognize a similarity between words and pictures. But whereas the early Wittgenstein would regard this similarity as a key to the unity of all propositions, the later Wittgenstein regards it as a key to their variety. I will now focus on one given feature that pictures and words have in common, namely their conditions of life.

2. "Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life?"

One thing that brings signs and pictures together, in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, is the fact that both live a life of their own. In the *Big Typescript*, we may read that "[m]aking pictures for ourselves is part of our lives"¹⁰. But there is more: pictures are not only *part* of our lives, they also *live* their own life. The same goes for verbal signs: that's why I will now emphasize the analogy between Wittgenstein's respective accounts of linguistic and pictorial life.

In his *Blue Book*, Wittgenstein examines Frege's suggestion that a succession of written signs has to be animated in order to compose a genuine and meaningful proposition. Deprived of such a principle of life, signs would remain desperately mute and dead:

¹ (Wittgenstein 1922), 4.01.

² *Id.*, 3.1431.

³ *Ibid.*, 4.1311.

⁴ (Wittgenstein 1953a), §215.

⁵ Cf. (Wittgenstein 1967), §444.

⁶ Cf. (Wittgenstein 1953a), §23.

⁷ (Wittgenstein 1974), I, IX, §113.

⁸ *Id.*, I, IX, §114 (translation modified).

⁹ (Wittgenstein 2000), Ms 120: 48 r-v.

¹⁰ (Wittgenstein 2005), §83, p. 389v.

Frege's idea could be expressed thus: the propositions of mathematics, if they were just complexes of dashes, would be dead and utterly uninteresting, whereas they obviously have a kind of life. And the same, of course, could be said of any proposition: Without a sense, or without the thought, a proposition would be an utterly dead and trivial thing¹¹.

Such a suggestion is not irrelevant in itself. Yet, it would be seriously misleading to conclude that "what must be added to the dead signs in order to make a live proposition is something immaterial"¹²: to conceive of such a principle of life as a mysterious and immaterial "soul" insufflating words their meaning. As observed by Wittgenstein in the *Philosophical Grammar*, "[t]he sense of a proposition (or a thought) isn't anything spiritual [...]. The sense of a proposition is not a soul"¹³. That's why, if signs are to be given a principle of life, the latter won't rest anywhere but in the system of language as a whole. Signs are not born to life until they integrate a whole system, a language:

To understand a proposition is to understand a language.

A proposition is a sign in a system of signs¹⁴.

Hence Wittgenstein's conclusion, in the passage of the *Blue Book* mentioned above:

The sign (the sentence) gets its significance from the system of signs, from the language to which it belongs¹⁵.

I shall take seriously those Wittgensteinian references to a life of words or propositions. As observed in the *Philosophical Investigations*, "[e]very sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? – In use it is alive"¹⁶. Now, for a sign to be used is to participate in a determinate language-game. This language-game is, so to say, the natural surroundings of signs, and those surroundings are what enables them to flourish. As a result, signs can be viewed as certain kinds of organisms, demanding an interaction with their environment in order to stay alive.

This connection between linguistic and natural systems is, in fact, very strong: Wittgenstein's tenet is not only that signs are unable to live outside a system, but that the system in question has to be a *natural* one. See, for instance, what happens to so-called "artificial languages" such as Esperanto, where some signs are of course fitted into a system, but in an *artificial* rather than a natural one. Such languages are unable to match Wittgenstein's requirements, their words are unable to gain a life of their own:

Esperanto. The feeling of disgust we get if we utter an *invented* word with invented derivative syllables. The world is cold, lacking in associations, and yet it plays at being 'language'¹⁷.

Such are the reasons why Wittgenstein, in his *Dictations to Schlick*, compares the business of philosophy, when investigating the life of signs, to the business of a naturalist such as Goethe. The upshot of Goethe's efforts, in the realm of botany, is the presentation of a natural organism "in its natural surroundings of forms". Now, "this is exactly what we are doing [in philosophy]: we situate a linguistic form in

its surroundings [...], and that banishes disquiet"¹⁸. I will now show how the same conclusions apply to the life of pictures.

3. Living pictures and forms of life

An isolated sign, claims Wittgenstein, would lose any kind of vitality. What about an isolated picture? *Prima facie*, it might seem easier to ascribe isolated pictures a genuine meaning, for pictures convey their meaning immediately: they show it directly to the eye. In those conditions, a picture could be said to speak for itself, regardless of its context. But this is not Wittgenstein's conviction. His idea, on the contrary, is that the meaning of a picture is underdetermined by the picture as such. This point is made in the *Philosophical Investigations*, when it is observed that "[f]rom [the picture] alone it would mostly be impossible to conclude anything at all"¹⁹. A picture, in other words, is never autonomous: it cannot be significant outside a context. Let us, for instance, examine the picture of an old man on a mountain path. How should I know whether the old man is walking up rather than sliding downhill? "Perhaps a Martian would describe the picture so"²⁰: the only reason why I *don't* describe the picture so is that I am acquainted with a cultural context, that I know what hiking is like. The interpretation of the picture does not lie in the picture itself.

Hence a parallelism between words and pictures: to hold that pictures do not speak for themselves is to assume that, no less than in the case of words, their meaning (or their life) depends on their surroundings. Wittgenstein's remarks on the life of pictures are, in this respect, strikingly similar to his remarks on the life of verbal signs. The claim that "without a sense, or without the thought, a proposition would be an utterly dead and trivial thing" is echoed by the following one:

When one has the picture in view by itself it is suddenly dead, and it is as if something had been taken away from it, which had given it life before²¹.

In the case of words, it has turned out that the relevant surroundings likely to give them life was the system of language as a whole. What about pictures? In their particular case, the natural environment they derive their significance from is what Wittgenstein describes as "forms of life". A "form of life" is in fact the broad cultural and inherited background of our beliefs and agreements: it is "[w]hat has to be accepted, the given"²². Now, it is precisely because it is embedded in a given form a life that a picture can make sense to those who see it. That was clearly the conclusion of the "old-man-on-the-hill" example mentioned above, and it is equally clear in the following one. When I see the picture of a radio-receiver, the picture cannot *speak* to me unless I am acquainted with a given cultural background. The picture cannot *live* to me unless I integrate it in my own form of life:

For someone who has no knowledge of such things a diagram representing the inside of a radio receiver will be a jumble of meaningless lines. But if he is acquainted with the apparatus and its function, that drawing will be a significant picture to him²³.

¹¹ (Wittgenstein 1953), p. 4.

¹² *id.*

¹³ (Wittgenstein 1974), I, VI, §84.

¹⁴ *id.*

¹⁵ (Wittgenstein 1953), p. 5.

¹⁶ (Wittgenstein 1953a), §432.

¹⁷ (Wittgenstein 1980), p. 52.

¹⁸ (Wittgenstein 2003), p. 309.

¹⁹ (Wittgenstein 1953a), §663.

²⁰ *id.*, §133.

²¹ (Wittgenstein 1967), §236. See also *id.*, §233.

²² (Wittgenstein 1953a), II, xi, p. 192.

²³ (Wittgenstein 197), I, IX, §127.

We may thus briefly summarize the parallelism Wittgenstein suggests between words and pictures. In both cases, pictures and words cannot live in isolation, but need to be integrated in a natural environment. As observed in the *Philosophical Grammar*, “[i]t is only in a language that something is a proposition”²⁴. The situation of pictures is by no means different: for Wittgenstein’s claim is that “[s]omething is a picture only in a picture-language”²⁵. The parallelism between words and pictures then extends to the nature of the natural system they need to participate in. In the case of pictures, such an environment lies in the form of life they are embedded in. In the case of words, their “natural surroundings” is the linguistic system to which they belong. In both cases, the reference to forms of life is a key to the life of symbols. In Wittgenstein’s idea, “to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life”²⁶; and this is true whether the language in question should be a language of words or a language of pictures.

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Maps vs. Aspects: Notes on a Radical Interpretation

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Even though Rom Harré had declared “the issue between the Bakerians and Hackerites [...] already a tad out of date” (Harré 2008) the debate between elucidatory and therapeutic interpretations of Wittgenstein’s later thought continues to demand attention. One of the central venues of this discussion is what is sometimes referred to as the ‘Theory vs. Therapy debate’. In the radical wing of the ‘therapy’ side one mostly finds interpreters belonging to the group of so-called ‘Resolute Readers’ or ‘New Wittgensteinians’ although there are some notable exceptions (Schroeder 2006). Resolute readers argue that if we take seriously Wittgenstein’s remarks, instructions etc. on philosophy we will see that it makes little sense to speak of a “decisive break in his mode of philosophizing between the *Tractatus* and his later writings” (Crary and Read 2000, p.2). More specifically we will discover an underlying continuity in the entire *oeuvre* constituted largely by Wittgenstein’s ‘main aim’ which is “to get us to see that the point of view on language we aspire to or think we need to assume when philosophizing – a point of view on language as if outside from which we imagine we can get a clear view of the relation between language and the world – is no more than the *illusion* of a point of view.” (*Ibid.* p.6)

In a recent paper ‘A Perspicuous Presentation of “Perspicuous Presentation”’ two prominent authors from the resolute camp Phil Hutchinson and Rupert Read argue that the so-called ‘elucidatory’ reading of *Philosophical Investigations* “ignores Wittgenstein’s phrasing (i.e. it ignores Wittgenstein’s words) and commits Wittgenstein to some (deeply problematic) philosophical views” (Hutchinson and Read, p.152). Their argument consists of two complementary lines of thought: the first one attempts to show how the elucidatory reading fails to do justice to Wittgenstein’s real intentions mainly by questioning the adequacy of the comparison drawn between ‘perspicuous representations’ and maps, while the second line introduces Gordon Baker’s interpretation of the term, relying heavily on the analogy with aspects¹. In what follows I will present my reasons for thinking that neither the arguments given by Hutchinson and Read against one analogy nor their arguments for the other are convincing.

Hutchinson and Read begin their paper by distinguishing, on the basis of the amount of attention paid to Wittgenstein’s modal terms, between three strategies of interpretation: doctrinal, elucidatory, and therapeutic. Despite the nominal distinction however, doctrinal and elucidatory interpretations share the basic assumption that “one can take up a position ‘outside of language’ so as to view that language” (Hutchinson and Read, p.144) and indeed this seems to go against most of what Wittgenstein appears to say in the *Investigations*. The authors remind us of Wittgenstein’s warning at the beginning of the Blue Book against thinking that a substantive must refer to a thing,

¹ It is interesting to note that Hutchinson and Read do not (in fact, by their own lights admittedly *cannot*) suggest that we replace the elucidatory conception with the one proposed by Baker: they merely attempt “literally to place the two pictures of the grammar of perspicuous presentation side-by-side, in hope that our readers will no longer be held in thrall by the standard – elucidatory – picture” (Hutchinson and Read, p.150). That is to say, correctness and adequacy clearly do not come into the picture as criteria for choosing one over the other.

and ask what a “thing” such as language could possibly look like. Now, it is fairly simple to see why a doctrinal reader, attributing to Wittgenstein a ‘use-theory of meaning’ for instance, would have to accept this implication but I don’t see why elucidation of a *particular* region of grammar would presuppose the above mentioned extra-linguistic vantage point. As a matter of fact, even the passage Hutchinson and Read quote from P.M.S. Hacker claims nothing more than that Wittgenstein “gives us numerous overviews of the logical grammar of *problematic* concepts” (Hacker 2001, p.37, italics mine) the obvious reason for this being that in the great majority of cases our language functions perfectly well. This misconception on the authors’ part, that elucidation *has to be* universal is, as I will try to show, what underlies most of Hutchinson and Read’s objections to elucidatory interpretations.

The next point where the cartography analogy fails to hold up to full scrutiny, according to Hutchinson and Read, is the insight that, as opposed to terrains, language has some sort of ‘flexibility’ and ‘open-texturedness’ resulting from the fact that “our language is *our* language, and not separable from our open-ended lives with it” (Hutchinson and Read 2008, p.147). If I understand this observation correctly it, first, reinforces the point made in the previous section and, second, attributes to language the above mentioned special properties (never mind for the moment whether language is a thing that can have properties etc.). But it seems to me that ‘flexibility’ and ‘open-texturedness’ are not at all specific to language: as a matter of fact, they characterise *all* our social practices. But surely, it would be quite unwarranted to infer from this that all systematic attempts at surveying (that is, mapping) such practices (e.g. sociology, cultural anthropology etc.) are stillborn enterprises. It is closely connected to this point that, according to Hutchinson and Read, language possesses a sort of ‘reflexivity’ and a ‘possibility for creative change’ which are simply missing from landscapes. Again, we may remind ourselves that it is not ‘language’ *per se* that possesses these features but, rather, *our* social-linguistic practices. However, this does not fully restore the analogy which is why it may prove useful to ask whether maps, on the other end of the analogy, really represent “objective” states of affairs in an “objective” way. I think that if we take a closer look at actual maps we find that – even beyond the obvious fact that all maps are *simplified* representations – the way they represent the ‘external world’ is in fact tailored to our manifold political, economic, infrastructural, touristic etc. needs.² Finally, the dehumanizing tendency apparently present in the wish to survey particular areas of grammar points in the same direction. Again, I can only repeat that once we have given up the absurd idea of an “objective” map (drawn, as it were, from the point of view of nowhere) and recognize cartography as a *human* practice, this worry disappears.

Hutchinson and Read’s final attack against the analogy with maps concerns the question of background knowledge apparently required for drawing maps. The

² Note that this is equally valid for *what* is represented by a particular map: even a ‘map of the world’ is, in most cases, merely a map of our planet.

claim is that “geographers know which sections of coastline are more prone to erosion than others, and which rivers more likely to change course – for instance, a porous limestone riverbed is liable to relatively rapid erosion (or ‘sinkage’), while a basalt riverbed is much less so; and shale coastlines can retreat or move on a relatively regular basis” (Hutchinson and Read 2008, p.147). The alleged asymmetry in this case results from the fact that, according to the authors, there is no way of telling which parts of language are liable to rapid erosion and which aren’t. Apart from the fact that such background knowledge is obviously not necessary for *all* maps (consider maps of towns or public transport, for example), this claim, once again, makes clear that Hutchinson and Read are in the grip of a picture of language (and maps) they intend to criticize, as it seems obvious that if we conceive of language as a set of social-linguistic practices, i.e. hooked into particular forms of life, than it becomes perfectly possible to observe as well as forecast the probability or unlikelihood of rapid change.³

In the constructive part of their argument Hutchinson and Read recapitulate Gordon Baker’s ‘radically therapeutic’ interpretation of Wittgenstein’s method. It is not the task of the present paper to investigate the details of that interpretation which is why I’m going to concentrate exclusively on one crucial point of Baker’s conception, namely the emphasis on aspect-perception. According to Hutchinson and Read “Baker suggests that when Wittgenstein writes in *PI* §122 that a perspicuous presentation of fundamental significance for us, what he means by perspicuous presentation is a presentation which effects in us an aspect change, or dawn” (Hutchinson and Read 2008, p.150). They illustrate this by the help of the famous example of the duck-rabbit and claim that the work done by a perspicuous presentation is similar to the affect of making someone recognize the picture-rabbit in the picture-duck.⁴ According to Baker then, the only criterion for something to qualify as a perspicuous presentation is the capacity to achieve this aspect-switch in a particular person at a particular time, and he bases this interpretation on textual evidence from TS 220, §99: “We then change the aspect by placing side-by-side with one system of expression other systems of expression. – The bondage in which one analogy holds us can be broken by placing another alongside which we acknowledge to be equally well justified.”

It might be important to note that in this passage Wittgenstein uses the verb ‘*ändern*’ (which is closer to the English ‘modify’ or ‘alter’) as opposed to ‘*wechseln*’. Without wanting to make too much of a difference in words, I

believe there are significant dissimilarities between the kind of aspect-perception mentioned in TS 220 and the one discussed in the relevant sections of Part II of *Philosophical Investigations*. If we accept the duck-rabbit scenario as a paradigm case of aspect change (and Hutchinson and Read clearly do), then it is plain to see that there is a fundamental difference between the phenomenal character of this experience and the one described in TS 220, namely the fact that while in the case of the duck-rabbit we have a genuine switch of aspects (i.e. we see either this one or that) this would make little sense in the case of philosophical pictures. That is to say, in the scenario introduced in TS 220 Wittgenstein is talking about *widening* our perspective by *juxtaposing* alternative pictures, while in cases like that of the duck-rabbit we *replace* an aspect with another. Furthermore, the asymmetry can be grasped in the subject’s reaction as well: while widening my perspective by juxtaposing alternative philosophical pictures, if successful, removes my disquietude, it seems difficult to make sense of anything similar going on upon being told that a picture has a further aspect so far unknown to me. If anything, in the latter case I am likely to feel puzzled by being presented with a source of new problems.

Hutchinson and Read conclude their paper by observing how unfortunate and ironic it is that elucidatory readers fail to see how “*their rendering of perspicuous presentation renders philosophy as (closely akin to) science*” (Hutchinson and Read, p.158). If what I have said is correct then I may have convinced you that, on the one hand, an elucidatory interpretation need not do any such thing and, on the other, a therapeutic reading – construed along Hutchinson and Read’s lines – would relocate philosophy to the realm of magic.

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³ Compare for example religious language-games with slang.

⁴ One possible objection to assigning such a central methodological role to aspect perception, not to be discussed here, would argue that while the issue of aspect-perception occupied Wittgenstein’s attention mainly during the late 1940s, the meta-philosophical remark in TS 220 (similarly to most meta-philosophical sections in the *Investigations*) dates back to the early 1930s.

Meaning without Rules: Language as Experiential Identity

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Introduction

Wittgenstein's conception of language supposes, "I meant this by that word' is a statement which is differently used from one about an affection of the mind." (Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, nt. 676, 170^e) This is because,

The meaning of a word is not the experience one has in hearing or saying it, and the sense of a sentence is not a complex of such experiences ... The sentence is composed of the words, and that is enough. (Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Part II, vi, 181^e)

How is it known "the words" form a sentence, though, same words imaginable doing or not doing so? In response,

What is the content of the experience of imagining? The answer is a picture, or a description. And what is the content of the experience of meaning? I don't know what I am supposed to say to this.—If there is any sense in the above remark, it is that the two concepts are related like those of 'red' and 'blue'; and that is wrong. (Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Part II, ii, 176^e)

It "is wrong" because meaning *is* "an affection of the mind" in form of identity. Wittgenstein assumes meaning undistinguished within consciousness. Occurring are encapsulated qualia determining logical atomism. Inconstant within constant experience, however, qualia are derivative, not primitive, determined by abstract sense of identity immanent within all consciousness.

Imaginable, "Whereof one cannot speak" (Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, nt. 7, 108) is speakable with content. After all, although "to say something about the ultimate ... does not add to our knowledge in any sense ... it is ... a tendency in the human mind." (Wittgenstein, "Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics," 12) Both being experiential, speakable and unspeakable are distinguishable only by abstract identity.

Use

Wittgenstein's "what is meant by 'the meaning of a word'" (Ambrose 48) arises because mapping set to metaset. Difficulty occurs considering meaning of a word's meaning is understandably an extension of an initial meaning contained within subsequent meaning of the word. Now set and metaset are integrated into a common set.

Approached thus, "what is meant" cannot be "about" "the meaning of [the] word." Operant is Russell's hierarchy of types whereby, "all of which must also belong to the range of significance of $N(x)$, however N may be varied; and the range of significance is always either a single type or a sum of several whole types." (Russell 523) "[W]hat is meant by" and "the meaning of a word" together composing "a sum of several whole types" commits "a category mistake" representing "facts ... as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another." (Ryle 16)

Additionally, assuming a meaning of the meaning of every word assumes a meaning of the meaning of the words, "the set of all meanings." So proceeding, asserting "A sign is what can be perceived of a symbol," (Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, nt. 3.32, 15) when "No proposition can make a statement about itself, because a propositional sign cannot be contained in itself (that is the whole of the 'theory of types')," (Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, nt. 3.332, 16) Wittgenstein concludes, "the sign for a function already contains the prototype for its argument, and it cannot contain itself." (Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, nt. 3.333, 17) Thus, as the sign of the function identifying its meaning, if the set of all meanings does not contain itself, it has no meaning because it does not contain "the prototype of its argument," itself. Alternatively, as the sign for the function identifying its meaning, if the set of all meanings does contain itself, it has no meaning because it cannot contain "the prototype of its argument," itself.

Responded might be the set of all meanings is portrayed as limited and finite, when unlimited and infinite. Now the set of all meanings succumbs to Kant's first antinomy. Composing an infinity of constituents, an infinity is incomplete. The set of all meanings can be unlimited and infinite without suffering Kant's antinomy if recursive, however, such a set being unlimited because unambiguous.

False, then, is,

use of a word comprises a large part of what is meant by "the meaning of a word". Understanding a word will thus come to knowing its use, its applications. The use of a word is what is defined by the rules, . . . The meaning of a word is explained by describing its use. (Ambrose 48)

Assertion is inconsistent since "*use of a word* comprises a large part of what is meant by 'the meaning of a word'" when "The meaning of a word *is explained by* describing its use" identifies use as both part and whole of meaning.

However resolved, use is not meaning. Just as "justified, true, belief" does not determine knowledge only when content determining it is extended, "the meaning of a word" has meaning only when content determining it is extended. Any two things becoming one by conjunction, extended to its limit, the meaning of the meaning of a word becomes the set of all meanings. This occurring, although the set of all meanings can be bound by a rule, its being so does not impute meaning to it without contradiction. "The meaning of a word" can be used in sequential location, but not meaningfully, meaning not being use.

Meaning

To have being is to have meaning, to be meaningful, it not being odd to assert, "I am, I have meaning!" And, in reply to the query, "What meaning do you have?" not unexpected is, "That I am!" Different meaning identifies different states of being. "I am" asserts being qua being, something as nothing else. "I am human" asserts being qua kind, something as something else. Because separation and integration are observationally indistinguishable, identity as

something else is as primitive as identity as nothing else. Neither being qua being nor being qua kind is more basic.

As being, meaning is emergent in any form. Assuming conservation of energy, to have being is to be distinguishable, whether a dense simple or commutative complex. Distinction occurs within Ferdinand de Saussure's "swirling cloud" of William James' "stream of consciousness" by "a somewhat mysterious process" of "segmentation" where "appears . . . a kind of jointing and separateness among the parts, of which . . . I refer to the breaks . . . produced by sudden *contrasts in the quality* of the successive segments." (Saussure 110-111; Thayer 142)

Meaning so conceived has nothing necessarily to do with communication. Neither does it have anything to do with rule governed use. Meaning can be wholly subjective, spontaneous, and unique. Its being so is indicated by the ability of something to come to have meaning for someone in an instance and never again. Spontaneous in appearance, there is no repetition. Immediate as such, meaning is not determined by some rule. And even if it were, judgment of the application of the rule in any instance must still be particular. Meaning is irreducibly subjective, contained in the awareness of consciousness. Both meaning and language must arise in the individual, understanding among individuals occurring by some subsequent natural commonality.

As consciousness meaning is a mental state, its nature a function of mental character. This latter might be understood as material, in which case meaning as a condition of mind may be behavioral or neural. Consideration in either of these ways, however, presents a difficulty in identifying what aspect of such kinds of events is meaning. Whether simple or complex, a material state is an abstraction identifiable only by interpretation distinguishing it from all else. Experience is understandable in different ways, so what is observed is constituted by how experience is considered. Something may or may not be recognized for this reason, depending on how one understands.

Being simple identity, abstraction is non-observational awareness. Experience composes quality and abstraction, quality known by sensation, and abstraction by sense. There is a sense of abstraction, but not a sensation, although there can be a sensation of a qualitative representation of abstraction such as a word or picture or sound. Abstract identity coheres over the whole, not accumulates over the parts. Cumulative, each identity must be linked by another identity infinitely, there being no whole.

Not self-evident, determination might be sought by appeal to a standard where identification might be thought to be provided an objective basis by a constitutive standard. Conditions in which indicated elements are to be understood in one way or another are specifiable in this manner. Here a problem appears in how correspondence between rule and occurrence is determinable. A rule of correspondence can be appealed to, but this requires a rule of its own correspondence, and this another in an infinite regress. There being no ultimate standard of interpretation, meaning is unknowable in this way.

Unable to distinguish a physical condition by a rule because of the problem of infinite regress, some other criterion of meaning is necessary. Such a criterion is provided in an act of awareness, meaning only knowable in a simple phenomenal experience. Solely in this way can it be identified independently of any standard, avoiding all attendant difficulties.

Illustrating this is my recently deceased father's hammer can have a great deal of meaning for me. Wholly personal, this is not something I can expect anyone else to understand. And in what sense is the meaning of my father's hammer to me a use of that hammer or anything else? It is unclear how this meaning incorporates a rule. Meaning here is spontaneous, not controlled. "At that moment it had a great deal of meaning for me, but it has never been like that again." Not only is such meaning inadvertent, it cannot be replicated. Being uncontrolled, it does not always occur (my father's hammer does not always have meaning for me). Evoked rather than controlled, this meaning is undetermined by a rule.

Here meaning is an immediate phenomenal event, escaping the problem of an infinite regress in the identification of rules. Basic as such, it is fundamental to the identification of any material state. Consciousness is not reducible to physical characteristics because of this, these characteristics being determined by phenomenal awareness. Such experience itself is understandable as material, certainly, but this requires a phenomenal identification in turn, and so on. No material state of meaning can be certain as a result.

Language

Language is combining these elements to form new meaning. Although not inherent to consciousness, language occurs as a form of awareness, when awareness is identity, identity is being, and being is meaning. As such, language is not an enumerative linkage of elements alone, specifying one after another in a listing. Necessary is identifying the nature of the linkage of linguistic elements, the relationship by which meaning is constructed in language, an insensate abstraction. What joins its elements cannot be itself an element without introducing its relationship to the other elements.

Linkage depends on understanding linguistic components as simple or complex. Complexes or a complex and simple can be joined intrinsically, and simples or complexes can be joined extrinsically. Complexes are intrinsically joined when sharing a common member. A complex and simple are intrinsically joined when the simple is constituent of the complex. Simples and complexes with no common member are explicitly joined when members of an encompassing complex. Conjunction is implicit when knowable by identifying what is meant by its components. It is explicit when knowable only by a rule.

Judgment is fundamental in linguistic constitution, and depends on the nature of the archetypal and autotypal cases. There are two forms of identity, contingent on whether the analogical archetype is essential or criterial. A constant referent is essential identity, and an inconstant referent is accidental identity. An archetype and its recursion are distinguished as "equal." An archetype and its iteration are distinguished as "equivalent." This is manifest in analogical identity.

Such occurs by likeness to an archetype. Although ambiguous members of a language are identifiable by this means, a wholly ambiguous language is impossible. A wholly ambiguous language is self-contradictory because an analogical archetype by which its ambiguous membership is identifiable is itself unidentifiable, making it impossible to identify its membership as ambiguous. Without a criterion of linguistic membership, it is impossible to know if there is linguistic membership, so it cannot be known linguistic membership is wholly ambiguous. For there to be a language at all, there must be some unambiguous linguistics.

tic membership. Dismissing this dismisses possibility of qualitative language, which dismisses possibility of empirical language.

Recursive language contains no dialect(s), constituting language with only the relational property of similarity to the constant archetype. Every constituent being like every other, any one can be the analogical membership criterion for every other, linguistic constituents being the same whichever is intensional. Thus, a recursive language is indefinable because propertyless, a property being an ambiguous member, concurrently component of domain and co-domain.

Propertyless, there is no intensional criterion by which constituents of a recursive language can be ordered. There cannot be an order to the content of a recursive language, whether limited or unlimited. There can be an order to the content of an iterative language. Properly tied, there can be an intensional criterion by which constituents of an iterative language can be ordered. Only an iterative language is definable.

Constituent as a dialect, contradiction can be contained within a well-ordered language. Self-contained as a dialect, like the Euclidean parallels postulate, it can be eliminated without affecting the other constituents of the language. Constituted is the dialect of ambiguous constituents of the language, of which Wittgenstein concludes,

No *single* ideal of exactness has been laid down; we do not know what we should be supposed to imagine under this head—unless you yourself lay down what is to be so called. But you will find it difficult to hit upon such a convention; at least any that satisfies you. (Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, nt. 88, 42^e)

Conclusion

Being an axiomatic system, a language is elements in relation (sequence). Elements in and not in relation being indistinguishable, false is “In fact what solipsism *means*, is quite correct, only it cannot be *said*, but it shows itself.” (Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, nt. 5.62, 89) Rather than shown, it is ascribed by abstract identity in the resolution of ambiguity. Metaphor being linguistic, language is not rule governed, for “in a metaphorical sense,—... I could not express what I want to say in any other way.” (Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 216^e) Not rule governed axiom system, language is identity combining elements forming meaning. Arbitrary, constituted is ethics, dispelling determinism.

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Action, Morality and Language

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Actions, situations and reasons

In an ordinary language a *reason for action* is any consideration of an agent that counts for his or her undertaking a given action. In philosophical analyses, however, some additional conditions are introduced making the meaning of the term more precise. The description of human actions in terms of their reasons has some important advantages, and particularly for moral philosophy, in which not explanatory but *normative reasons* are the primary focus of attention. Firstly, reasons for actions can be derived from (or generalized into) some rules of increasingly general character, and finally they can be placed within a theory of practical rationality. Secondly, if morality provides us with special kinds of reasons for actions, their importance can be understood and evaluated against the background of practical rationality in general. Thirdly, if there is no grounding of morality and rationality in the external world, the foundation for them can be found within the internal procedures of the acting subject or can be achieved by an agreement of different persons.

Another important advantage is closely related to XX century metaethics. As its history has clearly shown, moral judgments have proved to be too difficult to allow for one dominant and convincing analysis. According to the compelling argument of M. Smith, this is so because moral judgments have two important characteristics that are very difficult to square: 'objectivity' and 'practicality' (Smith 1997). 'Objectivity' means that in our everyday moral arguments moral terms are used as referring to some objective 'moral facts'. The 'practical' character means that if an agent sincerely formulates a moral judgment, he is also motivated to act in accordance with it. Subjectivism, emotivism and other forms of non-cognitivism have correctly described the 'practical' character but they have overlooked the 'objective' character of moral judgments. Intuitionism and other forms of cognitivism, in turn, have correctly recognized the 'objective' character but they have lacked the explanation of their 'practical' character.

There has been an interesting debate on the concept of a reason for action over the last few decades. The stage for the debate is set by three main problems (Cullity et al. 1997). One of them concerns the relation between a reason and the agent's prior motivation. Are reasons for action dependent on a prior set of desires and emotions of the agent or not? The second issue concerns the nature of a reason for action. Does a reason recognize some external normative entities or is it constructed by the agent in accordance with its internal criteria and procedures? The third issue refers to the level of generality that can be ascribed to the reasons: are reasons of a particular or of universal character?

The contribution I would like to make to the debate in this paper is mainly related to the opposition between particular and universal reasons. I hope that it will throw some more light and bring some more order into this part of the debate. The starting point for my consideration will be the following questions: Is there an order within the sphere of the reasons for action? And if there is, what kind of order is that?

Let us outline an analysis of human action at the beginning. Any such an analysis should contain at least the following elements: an agent, a situation in which the action takes place, the intention of the action, the act itself, and the results that it brings about. Of course this description can be extended by introducing more detailed elements but this outline will be sufficient for our present purposes. One more point is only necessary: we assume that the intention of an agent is captured by his or her reason for action.

Now can there be a unique, purely particular reason for action, as some authors hold? The hidden assumptions underlying any possible answer to this question refers to the concept of the situation in which the action takes place. These assumptions almost never have been formulated explicitly. I shall attempt to show how these hidden assumptions affect the concept of the reason of action, and, on a more general level, the whole debate between different moral theories.

A situation can have some unique morally relevant properties but it can also have some other properties that, though rare, are not exceptional. And of course a situation can have many properties that are quite common and shared with lots of other situations of the same type. There are probably all these types of situations in our lives but the exponents of different ethical theories usually focus their attention on one of them. Exponents of moral particularism implicitly assume that there is no regular order among the situations of our action and, consequently, that no generalization of the particular reasons of action is possible. Of course this does not mean that an agent does not use its reason in its deliberation as to what to do. What it means is that an agent does it in such a way that it does not allow for any generalization. Moral particularism is an extreme position. In some more moderate positions it is assumed that there is much more order in the situations of our actions and that some typical situations can be distinguished. As a result of this strategy a normative content can be formulated with regard to each type of situation. A paradigm example of this strategy can be found in the works of Aristotle, and among the authors of XX century it can be traced in W. D. Ross and Thomas Nagel. Virtues, duties and reasons for action are of a general character but their generality is limited to a given type of situation. Of course within the framework of contemporary deontology insoluble conflicts between duties and reasons for actions are possible.

A different aspect of the order within the realm of the reasons for actions can be related to the question as to whether there are general rules or principles under which our reasons fall, which resembles the regularity described by the laws of nature. This is apparently a higher form of order than that introduced by the existence of general reasons for action or duties. Deriving his reasoning from Wittgenstein writings on following the rule, John McDowell argues that our reasons for action do not fall under a system of laws that resembles the laws of nature (McDowell 1994). Some other authors from the communitarian camp argue that there is an order in the domain of our reasons for action but that our reasons should be placed within 'the

narrative stories' of our lives and not in a system resembling the system of the laws of nature.

If we assume that our universal reasons for actions fall under general laws and that these laws constitute a consistent system then we arrive at universalistic positions in ethics, in which the highest possible order of reasons is present. In Kant's classical position, all our reasons for actions falls under 'maxims' and, in the case of moral reasons, 'maxims' have a common logical form, which is the famous 'moral law'. Moral reasons in Kant's system have always overriding force over other, non-moral reasons and no insoluble conflicts among moral reasons are allowed. The assumed order and regularity within the situations of all our action are so high that a logical form of duty – the categorical imperative – is valid for all of them. *Mutatis mutandis*, a different attempt to establish such a high order can be found in the position of rule utilitarianism. All those underlying assumptions can be traced in the ways of the conceptualization of the situations of actions.

Moral particularism versus a hybrid theory

In the last part of this paper I shall illustrate my ideas very briefly by applying it to the position of J. Dancy and T. Nagel. Dancy is a distinguished exponent of recent moral particularism and the detailed and careful discussion of the concept of the situation of action appears explicitly in his writing (Dancy 1993). He vigorously argues that every situation of our actions is of particular character but at the same time it has some objective moral properties. The ontological relation between natural and moral properties is a 'holistic' relation of 'resultance'. There are no simple correlations between natural and moral properties as any moral value has a 'resultance base' of individual 'shape'. A strong pain – to take an example – usually counts as the reason against an action that is its cause, but there are some situations, in which it does not. Dancy defends a clear form of relation between moral values and reasons for actions: he is a moral realist (a strong cognitivist) both with regard to values and reasons for action. There are non-natural moral values that supervene over natural properties of situations and they generate moral reasons for actions. What we do in our judgments is we recognize these values and our reasons and morality are based on them. As they always are of a particular character no generalization is possible.

Two questions at this point seem natural. Does not the rationality of our action demand some more regularity? Is it enough to state that an act is done for a reason? But Dancy has an answer to these questions. He argues that his position fulfills the condition of rationality in judgment, that is the condition of logical consistency. Yet this condition does not consist in a subsumption of a given reason under a general rule. Deriving from Wittgenstein's writings he argues that the condition at issue is of a different character: it is based on the judgment "that the new case is relevantly similar to the previous one" (Dancy 1993, 83).

Much more ordering in the sphere of reasons (and situations as a consequence) has been assumed in the position of Thomas Nagel (Nagel 1970 and 1986). In his thinking any reasons for action must be of a general character, which by implication means that there must be some general types of situation. (Nagel himself does not discuss explicitly the situation in which an action takes place). Here, the condition of minimal rationality clearly consists in an identification of given reason as an example of a general type.

The idea of a reason for action that Nagel consequently defends is general in two senses. In one sense, it is general with regard to a person: if something is a reason for one person then it also must be a reason for any other person. In another sense it is general in respect to what counts as a reason for an action: if a property counts as a reason then any other property of the same type must also count. Let us take an example: someone has some bodily sensations and is afraid of serious illness. They can, of course, motivate the person to visit her doctor, but do they count as the reason to do it? In Nagel's thinking they do, but only if they are general: they count in the same way for every agent and any other sensation of the same type counts in the same way. It is clear that the order in the realm of our actions (and the situations) that is implied by Nagel's idea of practical rationality is higher than it appeared on the surface. It is worth observing that it is higher than that stipulated by Hare's idea of universalizability, as the latter makes allowances for some differences of agents' characters.

Although all reasons are general in a double sense, Nagel does not require that they must fall under general laws, neither is the order in the realm of reasons sufficient to ground morality. In Nagel's thinking, for a grounding of morality one more condition is required, that is one referring to the idea of objectivity with regard to reasons for action. Finally, morality is grounded in the sphere of 'objective' reasons, and these are reasons that can be recognized and endorsed from the 'impartial', objective point of view. The tendency to reach such an objective point of view is one of the important features of the human mind. There can be no doubts that the recognizing of 'objective' reasons depends on the rational nature of our agency. But it is not clear whether an agent discovers the 'objective' reasons or construes them, in other words, is Nagel's stance a kind of moral realism (strong cognitivism) or just a kind of metaethical constructivism (weak cognitivism)? On the one hand, Nagel apparently does not consider the 'objective' reasons and values as a part of an external world, on the other he does not explicitly, offer any constructivist procedure either.

Ethical theory in Nagel's thinking is a theory on how to generalize all valid reasons for action. What Nagel tries to achieve is a complex, 'hybrid' theory which accommodates both the reasons for action coming from consequentialism (valid for all agents) and the reasons coming from deontic constrains and personal commitments (valid for particular agents) (Thomas 2009). What is more he also attempts to find a space for 'subjective' reasons coming from our personal projects and choices. One can obviously have some serious doubts as to whether such a synthesis can ever be achieved but one can be sure that Nagel is trying to do justice to the complexities of our lives as far as possible.

Although much work still remains to be done, the idea of grounding morality in the domain of our practical rationality seems both interesting and promising. J. Mackie argued that all our moral judgments are false. Should there be objective values they would have to be very strange entities, different from everything in the universe and motivating us at the same time (Mackie 1977). A normative theory of reasons for action has resources to answer Mackie's objections: reasons are built into the nature of our action and they do motivate us if we rationally recognize them.

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Structured Language Meanings and Structured Possible Worlds

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World of facts. An excellent but neglected paper by Clarence Irving Lewis (1923) opens by an important question: Is our world a sum of individuals or a sum of facts? My answer is in some sense a refinement of that of Lewis. The *material world* is nothing but a “chunk of matter”. Within our system of explication, it (or rather its parts) is reasonably explicated by a collection of *individuals* (the universe of discourse). But there is also a strong pre-theoretical intuition that the world is not exhausted by individuals, but that it consists of facts. Thus the *world as conceptually grasped* involves facts (state of affairs). Indeed, what counts as a fact (actual or merely possible) depends on our conceptual construal of the material world. Unfortunately, we are not omniscient beings and thus we do not know all facts that obtain. Rather, we face a plenitude of possible facts, only some of them actually obtaining. Maximal collections of mutually non-exclusive facts which can obtain are known as *possible worlds*. The set of all possible worlds is known as *logical space* and it is natural to consider it as homogeneous. One of the possible worlds happens to be the *actual world* and the ultimate aim of empirical investigations is to determine it.

Language and facts. When investigating the material world a human subject recognizes some basic items, *individuals*, and realizes (discovers) that they happen to feature various traits. The range of basic *attributes* on the part of a subject, the fundamental core of his conceptual equipment, forms an *intensional basis*. There are sundry possibilities how the attributes can be distributed through the universe of discourse. The collections of these possibilities are (*pre-theoretical*) *possible worlds*.¹ It is natural to consider language as a tool enabling us the remarkable service to *communicate actual facts* (“messages”), i.e. which individual instantiates which attribute (etc.). It seems very probable that this is the main purpose of language, since it is capable to name individuals as well as attributes and combine names with predicates into sentences whereby declarative sentences can be aptly viewed as *records* of facts. To give an example, by a sentence ‘A is an F’ one records that the individual A possesses the attribute F. A human subject can capture in this way that the empirically executed test on A’s being an F comes out positively. To *verify* a sentence thus amounts to carrying out the *procedure* prescribed by it; for example, to test A on its being an F.² Of course, one has to *understand* the sentence first, i.e. to find out which procedure is coded by it in a particular language. A *language* is fundamentally a vehicle coding extra-linguistic items which are often called *meanings* (and we know that distinct languages are capable to code the same entities-meanings because transla-

tion is in principle possible). (Some ideas presented in this paragraph are adapted from Tichý 1969.)

Language and concepts. As pointed out by many (most notably by Alonzo Church), expressions express *concepts* (in the objective sense; but not all of them are “predicative” in Frege’s sense). The concepts expressed by sentences are sometimes called *thoughts* (or “propositions”). Many concepts are structured – they are complexes built from other, more basic concepts. The ultimately simplest concepts will be called *simple concepts*, all other *compound concepts*. Let us add that rational thinking (in the objective sense) proceeds within frames of particular *conceptual systems* involving simple and compound concepts. Our pre-theoretical intuition that concepts are structured (as no set-theoretic entity can be) leads us to the adoption of *procedural conception of concepts*.³ Note also that concepts determine objects other than themselves (the most single concepts determine objects in a quite trivial, immediate manner). Concepts determining the same object are *equivalent*. By the addition of *deduction rules* – enabling us to go from some concept to another concept – to a particular conceptual system we get *derivation system*.

Structured meanings. The enterprise of logical explication of meanings of natural language expressions is often provided within some *intensional logic*. Intensional logics distinguish extensions and intensions; *intensions* are functions from possible worlds. Following Pavel Tichý (e.g., 1988), one can suggest that each “*non-empirical*” expression denotes an extension while each “*empirical*” expression (always) denotes an intension (an empirical expression is such that its reference thinkably varies dependently on logically conceivable circumstances, i.e. possible worlds). For instance, the denotation of a sentence is a proposition, i.e. an intension having truth-values as values; the denotation of monadic predicate applicable to individuals is a property of individuals, i.e. an intension having classes of individuals as values. Unfortunately, intensions are too coarse-grained to be proper explications of meanings. Consider the only proposition true in all possible worlds; this single proposition is denoted by infinitely many analytic sentences which, however, speak about various distinct items – yet that proposition embodies no hints to these items. The same problem from another side: when one believes that two is two we cannot correctly infer that they believe Fermat’s Last Theorem. Thus to adequately explicate language meanings one needs *hyperintensional entities*. They have to be different from set-theoretical objects such as sets (or *n*-tuples, or even ordered sets), since set-theoretical entities lack a genuine procedural character. Presumably, *Tichý’s constructions* are the desired entities. Constructions are akin to algorithmic computations and one can imagine them as objectual counterparts of lambda terms. Constructions are entities as sufficiently fine-grained as expressions are; yet constructions are not expressions (of some formal lan-

¹ As Tichý remarked (1988, §36), only some of combinatorially possible distributions of attributes count as possible worlds, for attributes are often not mutually independent. For instance, the distribution of “white” and “black” having overlapping extensions is not reasonably a possible world (it is “impossible”).

² Let us add that not all sentences of some language are records of ascertained facts. Many sentences are hypotheses. Collections of hypotheses as regards to some matter are known as scientific theories. By means of extrapolation we can view possible worlds as the contents of the largest theories. In other words, there is an important connection of the discussed topic with the problem of *verisimilitude*, i.e. the likeness of theories to so-called “truth”. Cf. e.g., (Oddie 1987).

³ It was convincingly stressed by Pavel Materna (1998). Though I diverge from his conception of conceptual systems, I fully accept his modelling of concepts by means of Tichý’s logic. Certain differences between meanings and concepts, both explicated in a procedural way, will be omitted.

guage). Clearly, structures of (disambiguated) expressions are faithfully reflected by the structure of a construction, each subexpression of a compound expression has thus its meaning correlate (we are in fact speaking about *structural isomorphism* here). For one known example, so-called “structured propositions” are perhaps best modelled as Tichý’s propositional constructions. As for the procedural character of propositional constructions, the construction expressed by ‘A is an F’ is a procedure consisting in taking F and applying it to *w* (possible world) to obtain a class of individuals which is applied to A, getting thus T or F. For more related details and also arguments in favour of his theory of “structured meanings” see (Tichý 1988).

Facts as propositions. According to our pre-theoretical intuition, a fact is something that obtains or not. This feature is shared also by propositions in the sense that they are true or not (in this or that possible world). Thus a proposition can be the explicans of fact as many theoreticians (e.g., Alvin Plantinga 1970) explicitly suggested. There is, however, a problem arising from the definitions of a possible world as a set of propositions and a proposition as a set of worlds. To avoid the explanatory circle one has to take one of the two entities as more primitive. Tichý (1988, §38) proposed to treat possible worlds as primitive; let me explain. When explicating pre-theoretical notions by some theoretical notions (functions, etc.) it is inevitable to link some of the latter entities to the former ones. For instance, the theoretical object T is linked with our “Yes”, the affirmative quality. Analogously for worlds: W_1, W_2, \dots, W_n are *trivial explications* of our pre-theoretical possible worlds. Within this system of explication these “proto-worlds” (Oddie’s term) W_1, W_2, \dots, W_n serve as a *modal index*. Within the system of explication there is, of course, also *non-trivial explication* of the pre-theoretical possible world as a collection of propositions (those functions from proto-worlds).

Double aRb fact. The individual A is taller than B. B is shorter than A. Do we have here two facts or one fact of a comparative height? Some theoreticians, in particular Tichý, incline to the opinion that this is a case of *one* and the same fact. This squares with the explication of facts as propositions because propositions entirely lack any structure. Propositions are flat mappings – they bear no trace of the way how they are constructible. Note that this *intensional theory of facts* is endowed with the following *indirect correspondence*: a sentence depicts a structured propositional construction which constructs a structureless proposition-fact. The sentence is *not a picture* of the fact; it corresponds to the fact only indirectly (*via* that construction). I am not satisfied with this theory and I have several arguments against it. The first important argument concerns *mathematical facts*: we do have, intuitively, more than one mathematical fact. However, the intensional theory of facts implies a collapse of all mathematical facts into one Big Mathematical Fact (remember the *slingshot argument*). A dualistic account offers a separate treatment of empirical and non-empirical (mathematical) sentences; the former sentences are about facts *qua* propositions, the latter ones are about facts *qua* propositional constructions. Nevertheless, this does not help for ‘It rains in London’ and ‘It rains in London and FLT’ (FLT being some wording of Fermat’s Last Theorem) are intuitively about two distinct facts, not one (to ascertain whether these facts obtain one has to execute two distinct investigations). My second main argument against the intensional theory of facts deploys an appeal to our pre-theoretic intuition that *facts are structured*. For instance, the fact that A is an F consists of (the concepts of) A and F which are somehow related to each

other. Indeed, it is also natural to think about single or general facts (“all individuals are F’s”), conjunctive facts, etc. Propositional constructions are conveniently structured entities and as such they are capable to satisfy our intuitions; hence I suggest them as explicans for facts.

Procedural conception of facts and possible worlds.

First notice that we reach a remarkable congruence with the opinions of Gottlob Frege (1959; a fact is a thought which is true; Frege’s thought can be conveniently explicated as propositional construction), George Edward Moore (1899; a fact is a proposition which is true; a proposition consists of concepts; analogously for C.I. Lewis) and many other theoreticians (e.g., Plantinga 1970) who view propositions as structured. But let us return to the puzzling aRb fact. When accepting that there is only one fact there we were led to put facts into real world. Yet the material world was reasonably explicated as a collection of individuals, not of facts (or individuals plus facts). The material world is a chunk of mass upon which we recognize, by means of our *conceptual prism*, facts. Though our conceptual division of the world corresponds somehow to the furrows of the continuous matter, this correspondence is essentially indirect. “Being taller” and “being shorter” are two concepts which are, and that is very important, *interdefinable*. Conceptual systems – or more precisely, derivation systems – differ as to which concepts are basic and which are derived in them. Derived concepts are introduced by definitions, i.e. a certain kind of derivation rules which guarantees the equivalence of concepts, their being “the same”. Thus “A is not a non-philosopher” is a *fact derived* from the *basic fact* “A is a philosopher” due to easily graspable definitions. Analogously for conjunctive, ..., general facts. As for “being taller” and “being shorter”, there are in principle two different derivation systems – one has the former concept as basic, but the latter is based on a converse relationship between the two. Therefore, a possible world (as non-trivially explicated) with respect to derivation system is uniquely determined by a maximal collection of mutually compatible basic facts (i.e. mutually non-contradictory propositional constructions), basic with respect to particular derivation system. The consequences for foundations issues of truthlikeness (*cf.*, e.g., Oddie 1987) or theories of truth are postponed to another occasion.

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On the Explanatory Power of Davidson's Triangulation

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1. Abstract

The aim of this paper is to highlight the explanatory power of Davidson's triangulation. In a coherent and easily graspable notion triangulation can answer the following questions: How do thought and conceptual language emerge? There is a relation between the three varieties of knowledge. How can this relation be described in a profound manner? What is the origin of the concepts of objectivity and truth? Can triangulation also provide an interpretation of the concept of rationality? Since all these fundamental questions of epistemology can be answered in a comprehensible way by Davidson's triangulation, one cannot deny the explanatory power of triangulation. This paper will concentrate only on the very important issues because a concise and extensive presentation of the different subject matters would go beyond its scope. However, the explanations should suffice to highlight the explanatory power of Davidson's triangulation.

2. Davidson's Triangulation

One of Donald Davidson's (1917-2003) well known aims was the formulation of a theory of meaning for natural languages. In a programmatic way he developed his theory of *radical interpretation* [RI] [cf. Davidson 1986, 183-203] inspired by Alfred Tarski's (1901-1983) semantic theory of truth [cf. Tarski 1935, 1936]. Davidson's theory includes the *model of triangulation* [T] which is the structural groundwork of RI, because RI would not be comprehensible without T. He defines the concept of triangulation as follows:

[Th]is basic situation is one that involves two or more living beings simultaneously in interaction with each other and with the world they share; it is what I call *triangulation*. [...] each living being learns to correlate the reactions of the other with changes or objects in the world to which it also reacts. [Davidson 1999, 12]

Graphically, one can illustrate the model of triangulation according to figure 1:




Fig. 1

The functionality of T is best shown by the situation of language acquisition. A child, who is learning a particular language, and an adult or juvenile, who is already a competent speaker of that particular language, are surrounded by objects and events of the external world. Both, the child and the competent speaker, therefore, are exposed to stimuli which cause certain verbal reactions in the competent speaker. The competent speaker can observe the

focus of the child, for example, when the child looks at a nearby cat. She or he will then utter the sentence 'This is a cat' or the one word sentence 'Cat'. By and by the child learns to correlate the incoming stimuli, in this case the stimuli of seeing a cat, with the utterance 'This is a cat' or 'Cat' so that it is able to utter one of these sentences by her- or himself. If one examines the structure of this situation, one has a triangle consisting of the vertexes child, competent speaker and an object or event of the external world. According to Davidson T is also applied if a competent speaker of the language A tries to understand a competent speaker of the language B. In that case, the first one would be the interpreter and the second one the speaker. Both share the same external world including events and objects. Again a triangle emerges, but now with the vertexes interpreter, speaker and an object or event of the external world. Based on these situations Davidson develops RI.

Certainly, T has been criticised by some philosophers, however, their arguments result from an imprecise knowledge of T; in particular, the critics ignore the situation of language acquisition and thus argue for the thesis that no other person is needed in order to distinguish between the incoming stimuli. [cf. Sinclair 2005, 719-725]

3. The Emergence of Thought and Conceptual Language

These days it is assumed that a living being in possession of a conceptual language has the ability to think in a conceptual manner. In other words, if one is proficient in speaking a natural language, one has thoughts. Conceptual language and conceptual thinking develop parallel to each other. If one is willing to accept this thesis, one cannot ascribe thoughts to an infant, since she or he is not able to speak or understand a certain natural language before she or he has acquired it. This is supported by the fact that a child cannot remember situations in general before language acquisition has taken place. Prima facie this seems to be strictly anthropomorphic; however, Davidson does not exclude the possibility that there are other, non-human living beings that are in the possession of a particular conceptual language, even though humans do not have evidence for their existence so far. Nevertheless, Davidson argues against the assumption that even highly developed creatures like chimpanzees have thoughts. [cf. Davidson 2004, 167-185]

Although Sinclair [2005] responds rather simply to the critics of T, his arguments indirectly refer to a more theoretical explanation showing that T is responsible for the emergence of thought and language. Due to evolution living beings have acquired the capability of stimuli discrimination; the resemblance of certain stimuli results in a categorisation, for example, all objects with a stem and branches are classified by humans as a tree or subsumed under the concept of tree. "The criterion for such a classifying behaviour is the resemblance of the reactions" [Davidson 2004, 350]. But how is one able to recognise that a living being has carried out such a categorisation? Davidson answers:

This criterion can no longer be derived from the reactions of the respective living being, but it can only arise from the reactions of an observer to the reactions of that living being. And only if the observer can consciously establish a relation between the reactions of another living being and the objects and events of the world of the observer, there is a basis for the statement that the respective living being reacts to these objects and events (and not to other objects and events). [Davidson 2004, 350]

Davidson says that at least two living beings must be involved in order to establish the desired criterion. T builds the groundwork for the categorisation scheme and thus for a successful conceptual communication and conceptual thinking respectively. In the situation of language acquisition the categorisation scheme is imposed on the infant during this process the infant will be praised or corrected so that it will finally react in the same way to the objects and events as the trainer.

An example might be helpful at this point. It is assumed that two chimpanzees are sitting in the jungle. Suddenly, one recognises the approach of a tiger. Chimpanzee 1 screams while chimpanzee 2 now also sees the tiger. For safety reasons both of them clamber up the nearest tree. From now on this special scream will have the meaning of something like 'Attention: A tiger is approaching' in the mode of the chimpanzees' communication. Whenever one of the two utters this special scream, the other knows about the dangerous situation even if it does not see the tiger; nevertheless, it can react accordingly. By and by a complete mode of communication will emerge due to the reactions to events and objects of the world. At this point the following question might arise: Animals communicate with each other, so why does Davidson still assume that animals do not speak a language and do not have thoughts? Davidson's answer is simple: Humans are not able to communicate with animals, although some animal lovers might reject this statement ignoring the fact that they cannot understand their pets in a strict sense; RI and T are not applicable because they rely on the concept of truth. [cf. Rainer 2008] Davidson states:

A living being, which does not comprehend the concept of objective truth – which does not even have a nebulously articulated consciousness of the fact that what it thinks can be true or false –, could impossibly have thoughts. But a comprehension of the concept of truth is at the same time a sufficient condition for thinking. [Davidson 2006, 25-26]

This may actually be the case, because it is not thinkable that when chimpanzee 1 utters this special scream, chimpanzee 2 might be that sceptical that it is willing to verify the situation by itself. However, as far as human nature is concerned, one has to approve that doubt is reasonable, because humans are aware of the fact that they might be wrong in their beliefs; beliefs and as a consequence sentences are true or false and they have to be verified or falsified.

4. The Interconnectedness of the three Varieties of Propositional Knowledge

One can distinguish between three varieties of propositional knowledge: the knowledge of one's own mind, the knowledge of other minds and the knowledge of the external world. In view of T these varieties of knowledge are interconnected as illustrated in figure 1; additionally, one variety of knowledge can neither be cognized nor emerge without the respective other two varieties of knowledge.

As far as the knowledge of one's own mind is concerned, the emergence was already illustrated by the example of language acquisition. The trainer needs her or his knowledge, from the infant's point of view the knowledge of other minds, and the knowledge of the external world to instil the infant in the categorisation scheme. The trainer observes the objects and events which attract the infant's interest while she or he utters the respective sentences so that the infant can, over a certain period of time, correlate the verbal reactions of the trainer with the objects and events of the external world. If the infant starts to grasp the categorisation scheme, the knowledge of its own mind will emerge parallel to the development of the self or ego. This process normally is completed by the age of four.

In order to identify the content of the consciousness of other minds the interpreter has to use the knowledge of her or his mind and the knowledge of the external world to understand the speaker in the diction of RI. Again the interpreter observes both the verbal reactions and the focus of the speaker to discover the beliefs and as a result the meaning of the uttered sentences. However, the interpreter has to assume that she or he is not tricked, in other words that the speaker in general tries to utter true sentences. Without this assumption RI could not be applied since the interpreter assumes that a speaker of a natural language is talking to her or him, which in turn means that the speaker has comprehended the objective concept of truth. [cf. Davidson 1986, 183-203]

The knowledge of the external world can only be made accessible by the interaction of two people. If the reader remembers the example with the chimpanzees, one can describe the basic structure in the following way: Observer 1 perceives an object or event; she or he is exposed to certain stimuli, as a consequence, a verbal reaction follows. From the observer 2's point of view this is an expression of the knowledge of another mind. Now observer 2 will equalise the knowledge of her or his mind with the knowledge of the other mind with regard to the observer 2's perceived object or events. By and by observer 1 and 2 will jointly construct the knowledge of the external world.

5. The Origin of the Concepts of Objectivity and Truth

Davidson speaks of objectivity and truth, but it seems that T can only account for intersubjectivity; observer 1 and observer 2 or speaker and interpreter determine what is objective and true. At first sight this is a criterion for intersubjectivity and Davidson's usage of the term objective truth is excessively overstated. However, Davidson refuses the scheme-content-dichotomy, the third and last dogma of empiricism, and this refusal casts a different light on the concepts of truth and objectivity. [cf. Picardi and Schulte 1990, 13-19; Davidson 2004, 360] Davidson writes:

The community of minds is the foundation of knowledge; it provides the measure of all things. It is absurd to question the adequateness of this measure or to search for a more profound justified measure. [Davidson 2004, 360-361]

Even though RI and T form an intersubjective foundation of knowledge, they shelter the key to objectivity and truth. Human interaction builds the basis for communication which teaches the concept of truth and with it the idea of objectivity. Humans cannot step out of their network of coherent beliefs; they cannot take a godlike position in order to prove whether their beliefs agree with objective reality. This in turn is a clear counter-argument against the realistic conception of truth. However, according to David-

son the anti-realistic conception of truth has to be neglected likewise, because it presupposes the scheme-content-dichotomy.

If the third dogma of empiricism is dismissed, R1 and T form the standards of objectivity and truth. By means of human interaction and language respectively the measure of objectivity and truth is established and since T is responsible for the emergence of thought and language, the origin of objectivity and truth is to be found in T. [cf. Rainer 2008]

6. Davidson's Interpretation of Rationality

According to Davidson the key to rationality is language. A living being, who is able to speak and understand natural language, is rational, since language provides the access to the concept of truth. And if one knows about the concept of truth, one is rational and one is rational if one knows about the concept of truth. Consequently, the comprehension of the concept of truth and being rational are just two sides of the same coin. Language, the concept of truth and objectivity emerge through T, which in turn means that also the concept of rationality has its foundation in T.

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Vom Bildspiel zum Sprachspiel – Wieviel Kompositphotographie steckt in der Logik der Familienähnlichkeit?

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1.

Im folgenden Beitrag soll gezeigt werden, dass Wittgensteins Begriff der Familienähnlichkeit direkt der Bildlogik von Galtons Kompositphotographie folgt. Er wiederholt demnach die bildlogische Struktur, nach der Einzelexemplare unter einer Verallgemeinerungsabsicht in der Kompositphotographie arrangiert werden. Eine Analyse des Kompositbildes demonstriert entsprechend, dass und wie sich in ihm zwei kategorial verschiedene Bild-Merkmale überlagern. Daraus ergibt sich ein Modell jener spezifischen Simultanität von Unterschieden und Gemeinsamkeiten, die Wittgenstein dann zwischen den Objekten der Familienähnlichkeit thematisiert. Auch das von Frege und Russel tradierte Thema einer spezifischen Vagheit verschwommener Grenzen hat Wittgenstein anhand der optischen Überlagerungen im Kompositbild präzisiert und in den von Galton statistisch marginalisierten Bildrändern ein methodisch wertvolles „Netz von Ähnlichkeiten“ konstatiert.

Wird die bildlogische Analyse der Kompositphotographie so zum Ausgangspunkt einer Neuinterpretation des Begriffs der Familienähnlichkeit, müssen auch alle vier Standardmerkmale des Begriffs entsprechend korrigiert werden.

2.

Wittgenstein hat den vorrangig sprachphilosophisch rezipierten Begriff der Familienähnlichkeit aus seiner Beschäftigung mit Galtons Kompositphotographie entwickelt. Sie ist keineswegs bloß Inspirationsquelle des Begriffs, wie es etwa in den wissenschaftsgeschichtlichen (Stegmüller 1973), begriffsgeschichtlichen (Gabriel 1995, Goeres 2003), physiognomischen (Macho 2004), analogen (Kunzmann 1998), bildtheoretischen (Reichle et.a. 2007) Anknüpfungen den Anschein hat. Vielmehr thematisiert die Kompositphotographie zwischenbildliche Relationen, die von Wittgenstein dann auf das Problem jeder Verallgemeinerung – auch der begrifflichen – bezogen werden.

Wittgenstein, der das photographische Verfahren nicht nur kannte, sondern selbst auch praktisch erkundet hatte, erwähnt es oft im Zusammenhang mit den Themen der Allgemeinheit von Bildern oder Begriffen.

„Nach einer anderen Auffassung des *allgemeinen Begriffs* ist er so etwas wie ein *allgemeines Bild* bzw. eine *zusammengesetzte Photographie mit unscharfen Umrissen*.“ [V 243] Als „andere Auffassung“ wird hier die statistische Erwartung Galtons zitiert, allerdings bereits verwiesen auf jene Bildbereiche, in denen die Differenzen zwischen den porträtierten Individuen sichtbar werden. Diese „unscharfen Umrisse“ eines „allgemeinen Bildes“ zeigen damit auch, wie Geltungsansprüche und -zuschreibungen an Bildqualitäten scheitern.

So erkennt Wittgenstein, dass die spezifische Unschärfe des Kompositbildes dessen Allgemeinheitsanspruch notwendig destruiert. Demnach handelt das Komposit nicht mehr von den Personen, die auf den Bildern zu sehen sind, sondern von den Beziehungen zwischen den

Bildern, wie sie im Kompositbild zur Darstellung kommen. Diese Beobachtung wird ihm zum Anlass, über eine Korrektur jeglicher Allgemeinheitsbegriffe nachzudenken. Die Qualitäten des Kompositbildes generieren so eine philosophische Methode, die auf die Simultanität von Unterschieden und Gemeinsamkeiten abzielt, insofern das Komposit zwar immer eine *Gruppe* von Objekten thematisiert, aber nur deren *Differenzen* wiedergeben kann.

„Die Vorstellung, dass man, um sich über die Bedeutung einer allgemeinen Bezeichnung klar zu werden, das gemeinsame Element in all ihren Anwendungen finden muß, hat [...] den Philosophen veranlaßt, über konkrete Fälle als irrelevant hinwegzugehen; Fälle, die allein ihm hätten helfen können, den Gebrauch der allgemeinen Bezeichnung zu verstehen.“ [BIB 40f.]

Die allgemeinen Bezeichnungen verstehen wir demnach nur über konkrete Einzelfälle, so wie wir das eine allgemeine Bezeichnung sein wollende Kompositbild nur verstehen, wenn wir es – zumindest gedanklich – in seine jeweiligen Komponenten zerlegen, denn erst so lassen sich seine zwischenbildlichen Relationen wahrnehmen. Wittgenstein möchte deshalb durch die „Aufzählung“ „eine[r] Reihe mehr oder weniger synonyme Ausdrücke“ „einen Effekt der gleichen Art erzielen wie Galton, als er dieselbe Platte mit den Aufnahmen verschiedener Gesichter belichtete, um so das Bild der typischen, allen gemeinsamen Merkmale zu erhalten.“ [Vortrag über Ethik 10]

Daraus ergibt sich jedoch eine prinzipiell unabgeschlossene Aufzählung von Einzelfällen, die nach einem adäquaten Modus der Ordnung verlangen, den Wittgenstein ebenfalls aus den Qualitäten des Kompositbildes bezieht.

So „wünsch[t]“ er sich im *Blauen Buch* „ein *Bezeichnungssystem, das einen Unterschied stärker hervorhebt* oder ihn offensichtlicher macht, [aber auch] Ausdrucksformen gebraucht, die *mehr Ähnlichkeit* miteinander haben.“ [BIB 95] Gefordert wird damit also ein neuer Modus der Unterscheidung, der Unterschiede und Ähnlichkeiten zwischen konkreten Einzelfällen oder ihren Bildern zugleich berücksichtigt.

Noch der „völlig fließende Gebrauch der Wörter“ läßt den Philosophen daher „zehn oder zwölf Bilder zeichnen, die in einigen Hinsichten dem tatsächlichen Gebrauch dieser Wörter gleichen. Dass ich diese Bilder zeichnen kann, ist nicht darauf zurückzuführen, dass ihnen allen etwas gemeinsam ist; es mag sein, daß sie in recht *komplizierten Beziehungen zueinander* stehen.“ [V 206] Diese komplizierten Bild-Beziehungen finden ihren adäquaten Ausdruck in einer Bildproduktion, die offensichtlich die Logik der Familienähnlichkeit vorweg nimmt, entsprechend bezeichnet Wittgenstein sogar den Bildbegriff der Philosophie als „eine Familie von Vorstellungen“ [VPP 55].

Wittgenstein gelangt damit zu „Erweiterungen des Gebrauchs des Wortes ‚Bild‘“, die deshalb „äußerst nützlich sein [können, weil] sie Übergänge zwischen den Beispielen aufzeigen, denn *die Beispiele bilden eine Familie*, die in ihren äußersten Gliedern höchst verschieden aus-

sieht.“ [V 235] Mit der äußersten Position wird hier wiederum auf den Randbereich des Kompositbildes verwiesen und damit seine zweite wesentliche Eigenschaft, seine spezifische Unschärfe betont, die auch für begriffliche Verallgemeinerungen fruchtbar gemacht werden soll.


„Man kann sagen, der Begriff ‚Spiel‘ ist ein *Begriff mit verschwommenen Rändern*. – ‚Aber ist ein verschwommener Begriff überhaupt ein *Begriff*? – *Ist eine unscharfe Photographie überhaupt ein Bild eines Menschen*? Ja, kann man ein unscharfes Bild immer mit Vorteil durch ein scharfes ersetzen? Ist das unscharfe nicht oft gerade das, was wir brauchen?“ [PU § 71] Appelliert wird hier wieder an die spezifische Unschärfe bildlicher Verallgemeinerungen, die nicht mit künstlerischen Stilisierungen der Photographie oder der physiologischen Wahrnehmungsunschärfe identisch ist. Denn nur in den unscharfen Rändern oder Umrissen der Kompositphotographie, die einen allgemeinen Begriff demonstrieren möchte, werden Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen verglichenen Objekten simultan präsent.

Es sind also zwei Qualitäten, die Wittgenstein als Korrektiv der Allgemeinheit anbietet. Sie zeichnen die Familienähnlichkeit und die Kompositphotographie gleichermaßen aus: die Simultanität von Unterschieden und Gemeinsamkeiten und die spezifische Unschärfe der Ränder.

3.

Ob die Kompositphotographie wirklich die begrifflichen Verhältnisse der Familienähnlichkeit „veranschaulicht“ [Goeres 2003: 354], ist auch davon abhängig, welche Logik beiden zugeschrieben wird.

Legt man nach der Methode der optisch / photographischen Überlagerung folgende zwei (reduzierten) Bilder übereinander, so gibt das Kompositbild eine Überschneidung wieder, die offenbar kein gemeinsames Merkmal der porträtierten Figuren zeigt, weil der hervorgehobene Linienabschnitt (schwarze Punkte) in jeder der ursprünglichen Konfigurationen eine andere Position hatte, für sie also ein jeweils anderes Merkmal darstellt.




Gleichwohl führt das Kompositbild doch offensichtlich auch eine Gemeinsamkeit zwischen den beiden montierten Bildern vor, insofern es partiell übereinstimmende Farbaufträge wiedergibt.

Diese optischen Überlagerungen heben allerdings Bildpositionen hervor, die keinerlei wesentliche Beziehung zum bildlich Dargestellten haben. Es handelt sich um Bildbestandteile, die pauschal und unabhängig von bildinternen Beziehungen bilanziert werden können. Sie folgen direkt aus der formalisierten Montage eines Kompositbil-

des, weil es sich um Bildpunkte handelt, die entweder über den gleichen Abstand zum Rahmen oder – wie beim digitalen Komposit – über die Pixelposition bestimmt werden. Ich werde sie pictoriale Konvergenzen nennen.

Konfigurative Bildmerkmale sind dahingegen ausgewählte Bildpartien, die sich in Form von Linien, geometrischen Körpern, Konturen oder Physiognomien aufeinander beziehen. Damit ist zugleich ausgedrückt, warum die vom Kompositverfahren gesuchten Gemeinsamkeiten nie in einem rein technisch objektiven Prozess generiert werden können. Denn um festzustellen, was sich hier wie aufeinander bezieht, bedarf es der Entscheidung von Monteuren, die besondere bildimmanente Arrangements eigen auswählen und bewerten.

Die schwarzen Punkte des Kompositbildes sind in konfigurativer Hinsicht also völlig willkürlich, sie greifen aus den überlagerten Konfigurationen beliebige Punkte heraus, denn sie können die graphischen Merkmale der Einzelbilder, in denen jeder Punkt in seinem jeweiligen Bezugssystem eine einmalige Position einnimmt, nicht verallgemeinern. Zwar ist es durchaus möglich, dass in den pictorialen Konvergenzen auch partielle konfigurative Überlagerungen vorkommen. Allerdings bleibt diese Verbindung ununterscheidbar.



Es lassen sich rein pictoriale von den zugleich pictorialen und konfigurativen Gemeinsamkeiten nicht trennen und dass es beide Arten in den überlagerten (schwarzen) Partien des Bildes geben kann, liegt an der notwendigen und erwünschten Verschiedenheit der montierten Bilder. Denn systematisch betrachtet können pictoriale und konfigurative Bildmerkmale nur dann entscheidbar übereinstimmen, wenn identische Bilder montiert werden. Das widerspricht jedoch dem heuristischen Anliegen des Verfahrens, weil so ja rein tautologisch argumentiert würde.

Das Kompositbild verallgemeinert, indem es erstens pictoriale Gemeinsamkeiten in den schwarzen Flächen zeigt, in denen sich partiell und ununterscheidbar auch konfigurative Gemeinsamkeiten befinden können. Zweitens zeigt es konfigurative Unterschiede in seinen grauen Partien, die zugleich unvermeidbar und vollständig pictoriale Unterschiede sind. In diesen „unscharfen Rändern“, die Francis Galton noch als marginale Details verstanden hatte [Sekula 2003:316], realisieren sich damit negativ die Verallgemeinerungsansprüche der Kompositphotographie.

Das Kompositbild ist so ein komplexer Ausdruck zwischenbildlicher Beziehungen, der genau der Logik der Familienähnlichkeit entspricht. Denn wesentlich ist ihm, dass pictoriale Gemeinsamkeiten und konfigurative Unterschiede zwischen den montierten Bildern zugleich präsentiert werden, und dass sich in seinen grauen „Rändern“ diverse Unschärfen konzentrieren und ein „Netz von Ähnlichkeiten“ schaffen, „die einander übergreifen und kreuz-

zen“ [PU § 66]. Damit verlangt die Kompositphotographie bereits nach jenem Prozess einer vielschichtigen Deutung, in dem letztlich jede Zuspache von Familienähnlichkeit resultiert.

4.

Diese Analyse wirkt sich auch auf die Bewertung der vier Standardmerkmale der Logik der Familienähnlichkeit aus, wie sie bereits von Bambrough (1960) vorgetragen wurden (vgl. Gabriel 1995): Demnach ordnet die Familienähnlichkeit ihre Exemplare so, dass erstens jedem eine feste, genealogisch fixierte Position innerhalb einer „Entwicklungslinie“ [Gabriel 1995:632] zugewiesen wird. Zweitens muss daher eine Gruppe von mehr als zwei Exemplaren vorliegen, damit überhaupt eine familienähnliche Situation konstatiert werden kann. Drittens kann so eine völlige Merkmalsdivergenz zwischen Exemplaren nur als seltene Ausnahme und besondere Beziehung zwischen den äußersten Exemplaren, nicht zwischen Nachbargliedern der Reihe bestehen, und viertens wird die Qualität der verglichenen Merkmale monokategorial als klassisch attributive aufgefasst. Geht man jedoch, wie hier vorgestellt, von einer Analyse der Beziehungen von Einzelbildern in der Kompositphotographie aus, so müssen alle vier Merkmale revidiert werden.

Eine „Entwicklungslinie“ setzt unverrückbare Positionen zwischen familienähnlichen Objekten voraus. Nur dadurch tritt aber überhaupt erst die Frage auf, ob und wenn ja warum Wittgenstein auch unähnliche Elemente familienähnlich nennen kann, denn erst die Reihung der Entwicklungslinie exponiert entsprechend randständige Exemplare.

Die Kompositphotographie verhält sich hier gänzlich anders, weil sie keines der montierten Bilder genealogisch positioniert. Die Reihenfolge der Montage ist für das jeweils produzierte allgemeine Bild irrelevant.

Hier schließt sich unmittelbar die Frage nach der Merkmalsqualität an, die den randständigen Elementen fehlt. Wenn man es mit Wittgenstein für möglich hält, dass auch extrem verschiedene Elemente familienähnlich sein können, so stellt sich die Frage, welche Qualitäten dann im Unterschied zu den nur nachbarschaftlich ähnlichen Elementen für die Familienähnlichkeit entscheidend sind. Die Kompositphotographie macht hier keine Unterschiede. Macht Wittgenstein überhaupt welche? Oder zielt sein Hinweis, dass überhaupt keine Übereinstimmung zwischen familienähnlichen Elementen bestehen muss, nicht eigentlich darauf ab, die formale Gleichwertigkeit der Elemente hervorzuheben, wie sie für die pictorialen Gemeinsamkeiten im Kompositbild galt. Die fehlende Übereinstimmung zwischen den randständigen Elementen betrifft dann stellvertretend alle Glieder der Kette, weil es auf die Ähnlichkeiten zwischen Nachbargliedern zumindest hinsichtlich der strukturierenden Logik der Familienähnlichkeit nicht ankommt. Die vielen möglichen Assoziationen zwischen Nachbargliedern sind zwar ein höchst interessanter semantischer Beifang, der Familienähnlichkeiten nebenbei auch noch auszeichnet, aber das logische Verhältnis zwischen ihnen gründet bereits auf dieser prinzipiellen (keineswegs hermeneutisch erzeugten) Gleichheit, die auch den Konnex zwischen den randständigen Elementen ausmacht und bereits sie in die Gruppe familienähnlicher Fälle einreihet.

Diese Zugehörigkeit ist keineswegs beliebig, denn es gehört trotz Offenheit einer jeden familienähnlichen Gruppe gleichwohl nicht jeder Gegenstand hinzu. Und sie stellt in dieser Perspektive die grundsätzliche Verbindung

aller Elemente einer Gruppe bereit, weniger Zusammenhang geht nicht, alles was dazu kommt ist extra und, wie ich zeigen möchte, auch kategorial verschieden. Will man nun wissen, was die Familienähnlichkeit ausmacht, muss man also verstehen, was die randständigen, vermeintlichen Ausnahmen mit allen anderen Elementen der familienähnlichen Gruppe gemeinsam haben. Dieser basale Konnex ist kategorial verschieden von anschaulich konnotativen Übereinstimmungen wie „Wuchs, Gesichtszüge, Augenfarbe“ [PU § 67], bei denen es sich offensichtlich um konfigurative (interpretative) Binnenkriterien des Vergleichs handelt.

Geht man vom Vorbild der Kompositphotographie aus, so besteht die bindende Konvergenz zwischen allen montierten Elementen im gemeinsamen medialen Format. Diese formale Gemeinsamkeit ist dann aber nicht mehr auf feste Positionen in einer Aufzählung angewiesen, weshalb auch bereits zwei Elemente familienähnlich sein können.

Familienähnliche Objekte sind prinzipiell unähnlich, allerdings kommt dabei Unähnlichkeit in zwei verschiedenen Kategorien vor. In der Kategorie der Pictorialität, wahlweise der Medialität und Sprachlichkeit der Sprachspiele, muss eine grundsätzliche Übereinstimmung bestehen, damit überhaupt eine Familienzugehörigkeit von Elementen erwartet werden kann. Weil sie eine konstruktive Vorannahme mit Verallgemeinerungstendenz ist, besteht sie für alle Elemente in gleicher Weise. In der Kategorie der konfigurativen Bildmerkmale, der Semantik, sind alle Elemente singular und dieses zugleich von pictorialen Gemeinsamkeiten und konfigurativen Unterschieden stellt das grundsätzliche Modell der Familienähnlichkeit bereit.

Diese mediale Konvergenz besteht aber unabhängig von der detaillierten Zuspache konfigurativer Gemeinsamkeiten. Das „Netz von Ähnlichkeiten, die einander übergreifen und kreuzen“ entwickelt sich erst auf der Basis einer Familienähnlichkeit, die wie die Kompositphotographie zunächst durch den medialen Fokus der Konstruktion eine formale / pictoriale Gemeinsamkeit schafft. Alle Elemente, die durch eine konstruktive Voreinstellung einem komplexen System zugesprochen werden, bilden demnach die Menge familienähnlicher Objekte. Die Voreinstellung „Faden“ [PU § 67] impliziert so die Zugehörigkeit aller jeweils verwendeten Fäden, der Fokus auf das Wort „Spiel“, alle sprachlichen Ereignisse, die diese Buchstaben- oder Lautfolge verwenden.

Zu dieser formalen Konvergenz der konstruktiv vereinten Elemente tritt noch ihre grundsätzliche semantische Verschiedenheit hinzu. Darin besteht die Eignung der Familienähnlichkeit für das von Wittgenstein gesuchte „neue Bezeichnungssystem“, das Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten gleichzeitig präsentiert. Entscheidend ist jedoch, dass sie in dieser Gegenüberstellung kategorial verschieden sind, während sich in den so entstandenen Unterschieden die verwendeten Kategorien deckungsgleich überschneiden.

Auf dieser Basis wird jedoch auch die von Wittgenstein eingeforderte heuristische Relevanz unscharfer Bilder / Begriffe plausibel. Die grauen Flächen und unscharfen Ränder der Kompositphotographie entsprechen bildlogisch einer Summierung von Unterschieden, die zudem noch die kategorial beteiligten Merkmale umfasst. Das Netz von sich übergreifenden und kreuzenden Ähnlichkeiten liegt in diesem Pool verallgemeinerter Differenzen aus. Diverse semantische Binnenbeziehungen sind hierauf abbildbar und stellen mit der Nivellierung der Kategorien innerhalb der Unterschiede fortwährend auch die kategoriale Spezifik der Gemeinsamkeiten infrage, durch die sie überhaupt erst in einen Prozess der Unterscheidungen

gelangen konnten, weil nur die formale und konstruierte Konvergenz graue Flächen und unscharfe Ränder sichtbar werden lässt.

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Zur Beschreibung der Funktion von Wahrheitsbedingungen

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I.

„Wie beziehen sich Sätze auf die Welt?“ Dies ist etwas, was nicht leicht verständlich ist, auch wenn es nicht schwer ist, Sätze zu verstehen, die etwas über die Welt behaupten. Die Schwierigkeit, über diese Leistung von Sprache etwas zu sagen, beginnt da, wo danach gefragt wird, was genau für die Erfüllung dieser Leistung notwendig ist. Denn welche Eigenschaft eines Satzes ist es, die dafür ausschlaggebend ist, dass „mit einem Satz ein Faktum ausgedrückt wird“? Denn betrachtet man Äußerungen wie „EIN AUTO FÄHRT SCHNELL“, „DIE KATZE FLÜCHTET AUF DEN BAUM“, „DAS KIND SCHREIT“, dann wird damit auch ein Anspruch erhoben; nämlich derjenige, dass dasjenige auch der Fall ist, was der Satz behauptet. Der Schritt weg von einer naiven Korrespondenztheorie ortet den Grund für die Übereinstimmung von dem, was wir sagen, mit dem, wie die Welt ist, in der Möglichkeit, etwas Wahres oder Falsches über die Welt zu sagen.

Der Zusammenhang zwischen der Wahrheit und der Bedeutung eines Satzes zeigt sich auch daran, dass die Wahrheit eines Satzes nicht bloß davon abhängt, wie dasjenige ist, worüber ein Satz etwas aussagt, sondern auch davon, was die verwendeten Ausdrücke in einem Satz bedeuten. Dieser Zusammenhang wurde kaum in Frage gestellt und auch nicht, ob das Verstehen einer Äußerung bedeutet, zu wissen, was der Fall ist, wenn die Äußerung wahr ist. Eher wurde einer Semantik *ohne* Bezug auf Wahrheitsbedingungen die Berechtigung abgesprochen, etwa von David Lewis, wenn er meint, „*semantics with no treatment of truth conditions is not semantics*“ (Lewis 1969).

Dennoch gibt es große Auffassungsunterschiede, wie Wahrheitsbedingungen einer Äußerung anzugeben sind. Eine verbreitete Form, die Bedingungen unter denen ein Satz wahr ist, anzugeben, ist jene Alfred Tarskis und lautet: „*p* ist wahr (in *L*) genau dann, wenn *x*, wobei *x* durch einen beliebigen Satz ersetzt wird und *p*) durch den Namen des Satzes.“ Diese Art von Wahrheitsbedingungen wird „materielles Bikonditional“ genannt und es ist gültig, wenn beide Glieder, i.e. sowohl rechts als auch links von „genau dann wenn“, den gleichen Wahrheitswert haben. Donald Davidson hat bekannterweise Tarskis Ansatz weiterentwickelt und darauf aufbauend eine Theorie des Verstehens formuliert.²

Michael Dummett entgegnet in „What is a Theory of Meaning?“ (Dummett 1974) dass „*the theory would be intelligible only to someone who had already grasped the concept*“ mit der Konsequenz „*that such* [Davidsons, Anm. SR] *a theory of meaning does not fully display in what an understanding of the object-language consists*“ (Dummett 1974).

Ich werde mich daher hier dieser Frage widmen, und zwar wie sind Wahrheitsbedingungen zur Erklärung des Verstehens eines Satzes aufzufassen? Denn wenn Wahrheitsbedingungen nicht bloß eine Wiederholung oder Übersetzung des Satzes *p* sind, dann stellt sich die Frage, wie Wahrheitsbedingungen zu verstehen sind respektive wie ihre Gültigkeit festgestellt wird. Hängt die Wahrheit eines

Satzes nicht nur davon ab, was die verwendeten Ausdrücke bedeuten, sondern auch davon, wie die Welt ist, bedeutet eine Auseinandersetzung mit der rechten Seite des Bikonditionals scheinbar auch eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem, wie die Welt ist und die Frage liegt nahe, wie wir zu Wissen über das, wie die Welt ist, gelangen können. Ich werde daher diesen Gedanken weiterverfolgen und auf zwei Ansätze eingehen, die für eine *erkenntnistheoretische* Verankerung von Wahrheitsbedingungen plädieren.

II.

Der bekannteste Versuch einer erkenntnistheoretischen Fundierung von Wahrheitsbedingungen stellen *verifikationalistische Theorien der Bedeutung* dar, die hauptsächlich von Vertretern des „Wiener Kreises“ formuliert wurden. Demnach versteht man einen Satz, wenn man weiß, wie seine Wahrheit festgestellt werden kann. Obwohl mehrere Ausprägungen dieses Ansatzes bekannt sind, liegt ihnen die Idee zugrunde, die Verifikation eines Satzes mit Verweis auf Beobachtung respektive Erfahrung zu klären.

Rudolf Carnap bezieht sich auf einen durch Schlick berühmt gewordenen „Slogan“, wonach die Bedeutung einer Proposition die Methode ihrer Verifikation sei:

„Wir haben uns früher überlegt, daß der Sinn eines Satzes in der Methode seiner Verifikation liegt. Ein Satz besagt nur das, was an ihm verifizierbar ist. Daher kann ein Satz, wenn er überhaupt etwas besagt, nur eine empirische Tatsache besagen.“ (Carnap 1931)

Verifiziert werden soll ein Satz durch die Zuordnung von Protokollsätzen. Auf die Besonderheiten der Protokollsatzdebatte des „Wiener Kreises“, vor allem jene zwischen Rudolf Carnap und Otto Neurath auf der einen und Moritz Schlick auf der anderen Seite werde ich nicht eingehen. Ich möchte allerdings in Erinnerung rufen, dass durch die Zuordnung von Protokollsätzen zu singulären Konsequenzen ein Satz nicht verifiziert werden kann. Friedrich Waismann nennt als Grund dafür „*the essential incompleteness*“ einer empirischen Beschreibung:

„But there is a deeper reason for all that, and this consists in what I venture to call the *essential incompleteness* of an empirical description. To explain more fully: If I had to describe the right hand of mine which I am now holding up, I may say different things of it: I may state its size, its shape, its colour, its tissue, the chemical compound of its bones, its cells, and perhaps add some more particulars; but however far I go, I shall never reach a point where my description will be completed: logically speaking, it is always possible to extend the description by adding some detail or other.“ (Waismann 1945)

Der wesentliche Mangel zur Erklärung von Verstehen eines Satzes durch die Angabe von Verifikationsbedingungen besteht jedoch darin, dass ein Satz gar nicht verifizierbar ist, wenn man ihn noch nicht verstanden hat. Das heißt, man würde genau das voraussetzen, was man erst erklären will. Das „noch nicht verstanden“ kann nun auch derart aufgefasst werden, dass dem, was den Satz verifizieren soll, keine begriffliche Struktur zukommt. Carnaps ursprüngliche

¹ Vergleiche dazu Tarski 1944.

² Vergleiche dazu Davidson 1967.

Beschreibung von Protokollsätzen respektive der Protokollsprache scheint dies nahezulegen:

„Die einfachsten Sätze der *Protokollsprache* beziehen sich auf das Gegebene; sie beschreiben die unmittelbaren Erlebnisinhalte oder Phänomene, also die einfachsten erkennbaren Sachverhalte.“ (Carnap 1931/32)

III.

Um diesen Mangel und die zu erfüllenden Anforderungen noch einmal besonders hervorzuheben, bietet sich ein direkter Vergleich mit der bereits erwähnten Auffassung von Wahrheitsbedingungen an, die auf Tarski zurückzuführen ist und die Davidson für natürliche Sprachen weiterentwickelt hat. Tarski und Davidson verzichten auf eine erkenntnistheoretische Untermauerung von Wahrheitsbedingungen durch Beobachtung. Die Wahrheit eines Satzes wird mit dem Begriff der „Erfüllung“ definiert, der eine Beziehung zwischen den Gegendständen, die zum Wertebereich der Variablen eines offenen Satzes gehören und einem offenen Satz, herstellt. Damit wird auf die innere Struktur eines Satzes als bestimmender Faktor über die Wahr- oder Falschheit eines Satzes verwiesen. Wesentlich an dieser Auffassung ist, dass der Beitrag der Teilausdrücke eines Satzes die Bedeutung des ganzen Satzes erklärt und man mit der Erfüllungsrelation der Anforderung der Erklärung der prädikativen Struktur eines Satzes gerecht wird.

Auch wenn man der Meinung ist, dass diese Auffassung von Wahrheitsbedingungen den Anforderungen, die an eine Semantik berechtigterweise zu stellen sind, nicht genügen kann, so bleibt dennoch die Frage offen, wie durch Erfahrung die „spezielle“ Einheit eines Satzes, das heißt, der Beitrag der einzelnen Ausdrücke und deren Einheit zu einem Satz, erklärt werden kann. Verweist man dafür auf „unmittelbare“, also unbegriffliche Erfahrung (siehe Zitat von Carnap), ist nicht verständlich, wie *überhaupt* auf etwas Bezug genommen werden kann, was zur Erklärung von Strukturen in einer natürlichen Sprache beitragen könnte. Denn Wahrheitsbedingungen eines Satzes sollen genau dies leisten: Strukturen in natürlichen Sprachen aufzuzeigen, die als „Vehikel“ für die Erklärung der Einheit eines Satzes fungieren und den Beitrag der einzelnen Teile bestimmen. Die Verbindung zwischen Subjekt und Prädikat ist auch nichts, was empirisch verifiziert werden könnte. Denn wäre dies der Fall, wäre die Relation durch einen empirischen Satz erklärt, von dem die Relation der Teile wiederum erst erklärt werden müsste.

Da diese Art der erkenntnistheoretischen Verankerung von Wahrheitsbedingungen auf einen äußerst reduzierten Begriff von Erfahrung verweist, werde ich dem eine andere Konzeption von Erfahrung entgegenstellen, die ohne besagte Unmittelbarkeit auskommt. Die Frage lautet dann aber wiederum, ob sich dadurch eine Konzeption von Wahrheitsbedingungen entwickeln lässt, in der diese nicht bloß den ursprünglichen Satz wiederholen.

IV.

John McDowell hat in der nachträglich hinzugefügten Einleitung zu den Buch gewordenen John-Locke-Lectures mit dem Titel „Geist und Welt“ geschrieben, dass ein Urteil „in einen normativen Kontext zu stellen“ ist, dass „unser Denken gegenüber der empirischen Welt verantwortlich ist“ und wie können wir – so McDowell – diese Verantwortlichkeit gegenüber der empirischen Welt „anders verstehen als so, daß unser Denken gegenüber der Erfahrung verantwortlich ist“. (McDowell 2001: 12) Der Erfahrung kommt demnach jene Rolle zu, mittels derer wir zwischen wahren und falschen Sätzen unterscheiden. McDowell beginnt auch die

erste Vorlesung mit der Feststellung, dass es ihm um die Art und Weise geht, mit „*der Begriffe zwischen Geist und Welt vermitteln*“ (McDowell 2001: 27). Dass Begriffe die Funktion der *Vermittlung* zwischen Geist und Welt haben, steht also für McDowell gar nicht in Frage, vielmehr soll bloß die *Art und Weise* geklärt werden, wie sie es tun. Der Verweis auf die Vermittlungsfunktion von Begriffen mutet aber erstaunlich an: denn McDowell verweist wiederholt auf Hegel und will „Geist und Welt“ als Einführung in die *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Hegel: 1970) verstanden wissen. Erstaunlich mutet dies deswegen an, da Hegel selbst in der Einleitung zur *Phänomenologie* zeigt, dass die Idee, das Erkennen als Medium oder Mittel aufzufassen, zu verwerfen ist. Auf die Frage nach einer Fundierung von Wahrheitsbedingungen umgemünzt bedeutet dies: *Entweder* fügt der Verweis auf die Erfahrung den Bestimmungen von Wahrheitsbedingungen nichts hinzu *oder* das, was erfahren wird, wenn eine Äußerung als wahr ausgewiesen werden soll, soll unterschieden von einer bloßen Wiederholung sein. Um auf diese Alternativen einzugehen: wenn der Verweis auf die Erfahrung nichts hinzufügt, weil es bloß wiederholt, was auf der linken Seite des Bikonditionals steht, dann ist nicht klar, wie Erfahrung das leisten kann, was Wahrheitsbedingungen leisten sollen, nämlich Strukturen in einer Sprache aufzuzeigen. Es stellt sich dann die Frage, warum überhaupt auf Wahrheitsbedingungen verwiesen wird. Wenn aber Erfahrung unterschieden sein soll von einer bloßen Wiederholung – wie es die zweite Alternative nahelegt –, dann stellt sich aber die Frage, wie der Vermittlungsgedanke gefasst werden soll. Diese Frage ist aber wiederum eine nicht mehr zu beantwortende, denn für sie gilt das, was schon für den „Wiener Kreis“ gegolten hat: das Reden über Erfahrung ist immer schon ein Standpunkt, der über die Erfahrung hinausgeht, diesen also nicht wiedergegeben kann.³

Wenn beide Alternativen, die sich durch den Verweis auf Erfahrung ergeben, unbefriedigend sind, dann sollte der Versuch einer Untermauerung von Wahrheitsbedingungen fallen gelassen werden. Vielmehr sollten Wahrheitsbedingungen bloß nach ihrer Funktion beurteilt werden.

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³ Vergleiche dazu Mras 2001: 56.

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Methods in *On Certainty*

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While a significant number of commentators have described the late Wittgenstein's overall philosophical objectives as therapeutic or anti-theoretical, recent proponents of the 'third Wittgenstein' movement have argued that Wittgenstein changed his approach to philosophy in his final years, particularly in the notes published as *On Certainty*. Frongia and McGuinness have suggested that in *On Certainty* there is "a pronounced change in Wittgenstein's attitude towards constructive and systematic ways of doing philosophy. Certainly there seems to be a loss of interest in the 'therapeutic' aim of removing 'mental cramps'" (1990, 35). Moyal-Sharrock endorses such a reading, claiming that "Wittgenstein...somehow lost interest in the therapeutic enterprise in his last years...Wittgenstein's third phase is characterized by a more accessible, readable style, and this stylistic change goes hand in hand with a change in method" (2004, 5).

Although Wittgenstein is sometimes engaged in theoretical tasks in the earlier sections of *On Certainty*, I argue that he ultimately reverts back to his therapeutic and deflationary impulses in the second half of the work, and that he favored this later material over the earlier sections. The reasons for Wittgenstein's shift in approach around the middle of *On Certainty* become clearer from a biographical investigation into the conditions in which *On Certainty* was composed.

After discussions with Normal Malcolm at Cornell University during a visit in 1949, Wittgenstein wrote a series of remarks concerning Moore's claim to know that "here is a hand." These notes now form Part I of *On Certainty*, consisting of sections 1-65. For the next year and a half, up until his death, Wittgenstein composed remarks on a variety of topics, including certainty, color concepts, psychological terms, and Moore's arguments. However, throughout most of this time he consistently complained that his work was of poor quality. Only in his final two months was he able to produce work that he could find satisfactory. This long decline and short ascent of Wittgenstein's attitude towards his writing correlates with the medical treatments he received for prostate cancer, a condition that kept him in a physically weak and mentally dull condition until just before his death.

After being diagnosed with prostate cancer in late 1949, Wittgenstein was quickly prescribed hormone and X-ray therapies. These occasionally lessened the symptoms, but also had side effects themselves, including depression and clouded cognition. In Wittgenstein's many letters to Malcolm during the last years of his life, he claimed that his mind was dead and that he could no longer do any good work. In January 1950, soon after beginning treatment, he complained:

[I am] pretty slow & stupid; I've only got very few lucid moments. I'm not writing at all because my thoughts never sufficiently crystallize. (1.16.50) (Malcolm 1984)

Wittgenstein set aside the notes on Moore, and in the spring of 1950 completed a notebook of remarks concerning color and psychology. A week later he expressed dissatisfaction with the work he had produced:

I have not been able to do any sustained good work since the beginning of March 1949...it seems to me likely that my mind will never again work as vigorously as it did, say, 14 months ago. (4.17.50)

In late summer 1950 Wittgenstein attempted to revisit the topic of Moore and certainty once again. Part II (sections 66-192) and Part III (sections 193-299) of *On Certainty* were penned at this time. In late July, around the time he began writing Part II, he held his philosophical abilities in low esteem:

I'm working but not particularly well. I get tired soon...I have hardly any philosophical discussions...I've got all sorts of unclear thoughts in my old head which will perhaps remain there for ever in this unsatisfactory state. (7.30.50)

And in December 1950, two months after completing Part III, he did not appear to be satisfied with his prior effort:

...it's possible that I'm no longer able to do any decent research...My health is not too bad but I am very dull & stupid indeed. (12.1.50)

A month later Wittgenstein was nearly resigned to the thought that he would never again be able to do any good work:

...in my present state of health & intellectual dullness...[it is] against all probability & hope, [that] I should one day find that I could again do worthwhile work in philosophy...My mind's completely dead. (1.12.51)

Wittgenstein's condition continued to decline, and he put aside the notes on Moore for another six months.

Aware that the end of his life was soon approaching, Wittgenstein moved into the home of his doctor in Cambridge in February 1951. The cancer treatments were quickly terminated, and Wittgenstein began to finally achieve clarity in his thoughts soon afterwards. Between March 10th and April 27th, Part IV (sections 300-676) was composed.

Wittgenstein communicated the good news about his change in health to Norman Malcolm on April 16th:

An extraordinary thing has happened to me. About a month ago I suddenly found myself in the right frame of mind for doing philosophy. I had been *absolutely* certain that I'd never again be able to do it. It's the first time after more than 2 years that the curtain in my brain has gone up. Of course, so far I've only worked for about 5 weeks & it may be all over by tomorrow, but it bucks me up a lot now. (4.16.51)

This was his final letter to Malcolm. Wittgenstein died two weeks later on April 29th, 1951.

These selections from Wittgenstein's correspondence show that while he was generally dissatisfied with Parts 1-3 of *On Certainty*, he considered Part 4 some of his best work in years. This change in Wittgenstein's perception of his work should prompt us to consider what features Part 4 has that Parts 1-3 lack, and why Wittgenstein valued these features so much. We find a clue in the

note above, where Wittgenstein says that he is now finally able to approach philosophy "in the right frame of mind."

I suggest that one distinguishing feature between Part 4 and Parts 1-3 of *On Certainty* is a shift in method. In the early parts, Wittgenstein often appears to be engaged in straightforward theory building, responding to Moore and the skeptic with a general theory of language games. In these sections Wittgenstein less frequently uses his signature philosophical devices, such as imaging quite different uses of language than our own, leaving rhetorical questions unanswered, examining the multiple uses of certain propositions, or placing multiple voices in dialogue. Instead, these sections often appear to contain assertions and arguments. However, in Part 4 Wittgenstein seems to shift back to a therapeutic approach, once again utilizing his dialectical tools associated with the *Philosophical Investigations*. Thus, Wittgenstein achieved the "right frame of mind" in Part 4 by returning to the therapeutic methodology previously espoused in the second phase of his career.

One example of this shift in approach can be found in a comparison between the way Wittgenstein reacts to Moore's knowledge claims in Parts 1-3 and Part 4. The early parts appear to contain an attempt to deal with Moore (and the skeptic) by providing a theory of language games. In Part 2 Wittgenstein says that his project is meant to show that Moore's knowledge-claims are in fact nonsense:

Naturally, my aim must be to say what statements one would like to make here, but cannot make meaningfully [*sinnvoll*]. (OC 76)

The project Wittgenstein describes thus seems to be theoretical in nature; it involves delimiting a certain class of propositions and determining their semantic status. Towards this end, Wittgenstein introduces the idea of 'hinge' propositions, which we do not doubt in our investigations:

It may be for example that *all enquiry on our part* is set so as to exempt certain propositions from doubt, if they are ever formulated. They lie apart from the route travelled by enquiry. (OC 88)

The collection of our hinge propositions forms a world picture that constitutes the ground of judgment:

But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false. (OC 94)

Moore's problem is then diagnosed as claiming to know certain hinge propositions, which – because they constitute the framework in which knowledge claims can be made – cannot themselves be the subjects of knowledge claims:

When Moore says he *knows* such and such, he is really enumerating a lot of empirical propositions which we affirm without special testing; propositions, that is, which have a peculiar logical role in the system of our empirical propositions. (OC 136)

This analysis also then applies to the skeptic, who attempts to doubt hinge propositions which themselves form the conditions that make doubting possible.

Wittgenstein again revisits the unusual sorts of knowledge claims that Moore tends to make in Part 4, but this time his disposition seems to have changed. Instead of characterizing the type of propositions Moore utters by constructing a theory of sensible knowledge claims, Wittgenstein simply asks Moore to further clarify what exactly

he is talking about. His conversational and dialectical tone here is more fitting for the therapeutic treatment of a philosopher than the solution of a philosophical problem.

In Part 4, rather than dealing with an entire class of propositions Moore wants to assert, Wittgenstein especially focuses on one particular claim - "I know that that's a tree." Wittgenstein's initial response to Moore's claim is confusion; he isn't sure if he understands what Moore is trying to say:

"I know that that's a tree." Why does it strike me as if I did not understand the sentence? though it is after all an extremely simple sentence of the most ordinary kind? It is as if I could not focus my mind on any meaning. (OC 347)

He is puzzled in part because the claim seems so unmotivated; he is not sure of the point of the utterance:

If someone says, "I know that that's a tree" I may answer: "Yes, that is a sentence. An English sentence. And what is it supposed to be doing?" (OC 352)

Wittgenstein invites Moore to make his claim more understandable by describing the way he is trying to use the proposition. In Part 4 Moore's claim is not declared nonsense at the outset. For all Wittgenstein knows, Moore may successfully clarify what he is trying to say and end up making sense.

Wittgenstein attempts to show Moore examples of how an unclear statement could be given a more determinate meaning. He imagines several different circumstances in which, when claiming to know that something is a tree, the meaning and purpose of this statement would be understood:

"I know that that's a tree"--this may mean all sorts of things: I look at a plant that I take for a young beech and that someone else thinks is a black-currant. He says "that is a shrub"; I say it is a tree.--We see something in the mist which one of us takes for a man, and the other says "I know that that's a tree". Someone wants to test my eyes etc. (OC 349)

By providing these examples, Wittgenstein is implicitly encouraging Moore to continue in the same way and to flesh out the context of his own utterance. Moore is not being set to an impossible task, for Wittgenstein shows that he is certainly capable of being convinced by a reasonable explanation of the point behind an initially unclear utterance:

In the middle of a conversation, someone says to me out of the blue: "I wish you luck." I am astonished; but later I realize that these words connect up with his thoughts about me. And now they do not strike me as meaningless any more. (OC 469)

If Moore can provide such an explanation, then he will give his utterance a clear meaning and resolve Wittgenstein's confusion.

Wittgenstein hopes that Moore will notice that the meaning of his unusual utterances tend to get clear only once they are taken out of a philosophical context and given an everyday use:

It is queer: if I say, without any special occasion, "I know"--for example, "I know that I am now sitting in a chair", this statement seems to me unjustified and presumptuous. But if I make the same statement where there is some need for it, then, although I am not a jot

more certain of its truth, it seems to me to be perfectly justified and everyday. (OC 553)

As soon as I think of an everyday use of the sentence instead of a philosophical one, its meaning becomes clear and ordinary. (OC 347)

Of course, Moore is not attempting to give the phrase "I know this is a tree" an everyday use; he is trying to generate substantive philosophical conclusions from this proposition. Yet every successful attempt Moore might make at explaining himself, i.e., making his utterance "clear" and "justified" by explicating its context and use, ends up resulting in an "ordinary" and "everyday" sentence that lacks the philosophical punch he is seeking.

Wittgenstein intends for his interaction with Moore to have a therapeutic result. After constantly being frustrated by his attempts to clarify the sense of his claim, "I know that that's a tree," because all such attempts end up missing what he 'really means,' it is hoped that at some point Moore will come to question whether even *he* actually

knows what he is trying to get across with this phrase, or whether it is doing any work at all. In the wake of this it is hoped that Moore will let go of his desire to make this claim in the first place. So, rather than instructing Moore to no longer claim that he knows that this is a tree because of the status of that statement in some theory of meaningful utterances, Wittgenstein's goal in Part 4 of *On Certainty* is much more deflationary. He hopes that their interaction will help Moore adopt a perspective in which he simply has no desire to make such a claim.

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Cubes, Clouds & Reading the *Philosophical Investigations*

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When someone says the word 'cube' to me,
for example, I know what it means (Wittgenstein 46).

The *Philosophical Investigations* (*PI*) is filled with gestures of pulling-apart: word from meaning, meaning from object, object from identity, picture from use. From the start, the sustainability of the scenario in which every word has a meaning—the object for which the word stands—is surely in great trouble, as Wittgenstein threatens to snip the flimsy cord tying the object to its apparent companions. Though the tirelessness of these acts of pulling us away from the temptations of meaning-as-object seems point to the inevitability of total disintegration, the equally forceful gestures of bringing-back to use land us instead in the zone of reconfiguration. The acts of separation in the *PI* are neither complete nor final: Wittgenstein's terrain is not marked by discrete forms whose livelihoods are dependent on supreme boundaries, but rather by newly formed connections, collisions between former bedfellows.

The *PI* is difficult to speak and write back to, owing to its style and to the particular density of what Wittgenstein himself calls a "landscape." As Stanley Cavell observes, Wittgenstein doesn't report on his findings about language ("he writes...he does not write up results") (70). Nor is it likely that we as his readers want to report. Perhaps, instead, one can find a speaking place *after* "discipleship" (where, as Cavell notes, the reader becomes student to Wittgenstein as master, a paradoxical position given the anti-authoritarian spirit of the text) or, alternately, after integration and *before* discipleship (71). Further, it seems desirable to play with the tensions that arise as one searches for a readerly mobility that's distinct from the motions of the text—for instance between the desire to jump out to patches of more familiar content and discourse (such as psychoanalysis, values and the spirit) and the fear that one is leading oneself astray with these excursions.

For these reasons and others, I want to investigate the *PI* by means of two words, two concepts, two pictures: cube and cloud. They emerged in response to the pointed need for holding mechanisms given the challenges and the irregular rhythms of picture-use collisions as they reveal themselves across an unwieldy landscape. The invocation of "cube" and "cloud" allows me to both temporarily pin down a passing sense without the burden of betrayal (of the spirit of the *PI*) that might accompany more conventional acts of naming and fixing and to let attention to use be tinged by a willingness to harness the intuitability of words that Wittgenstein recognizes. Further, a strong aura of potential picture-use collision hovers around each.

'Cube' and 'cloud' are approachable from numerous angles in the "labyrinth" of language ("You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about") (Wittgenstein 69). A cube might function as or conjure perfection, an ongoing present, something solid or two rhombi (depending on one's vantage vis-à-vis a schematic drawing), an emblem of the perfection of identity that results from sameness in angle and length, a picture of meaning as discrete and handle-able, a form with clear boundaries, a goal and destination, the ultimate object.

Clouds hover between earth and heaven; they seem to get in the way of clear vision; they block the sun; they filter the sunlight; they disappear over time; they disappear on approach; they are not still; they cannot be contained; they are not solid—and yet their profiles can appear so distinct that we are inclined to compare them to unlike things. Perhaps they are emblems of confusion, or the fact of their insecure borders reminds us of something archaic—a hazy state of ego-affairs between self and other.

But this *variety* of uses and connotations does not justify my approach. It is instead the possibility of their relationships to the following that lends 'cube' and 'cloud' such a great range of movement:

The evolution of...man, and the awakening of consciousness...The picture is something like this: Though the ether is filled with vibrations the world is dark. But one day man opens his seeing eye, and there is light.

What this language primarily describes is a picture. What is to be done with this picture, how it is to be used, is still obscure. Quite clearly, however, it must be explored if we want to understand the sense of what we are saying. But the picture seems to spare us this work: it already points to a particular use. This is how it takes us in (Wittgenstein 157).

A picture-fantasy of blindness giving way to vision rears its head without name, prematurely and forcefully, in many forms of philosophical inquiry. Given an apparent closeness, we can see why concepts of clarity and cloudiness can be so difficult to extricate from association with this ubiquitous schema. But this difficulty does *not* dissolve the possibility that Wittgenstein is authentically invested in clearing away confusion and promoting the resulting clarity, in "resolv[ing] philosophical paradoxes"; indeed, the urgency of these activities is undeniable in the *PI* (63). Hence we must try to know when *pictures* of cloudiness and clarity collide with their livelihoods.

Clouds and cubes stand in pseudo-opposition to each other, not perfectly polarized nor crystallized with connotations of "good" and "bad" but capable of taking on roles associated with the other. As certainty is dislodged from its old haunts in the *PI*, it does not simply die; rather, it gets dispersed. Following this dispersal via a mobile constellation of clouds and cubes will, I hope, help chart the paths where un-doing is not total, where needs remain, where identity is not lost but spread out among a new set of connections, where independence unfolds irregularly with respect to authority, and where the value of self-knowledge does not stand in paralyzing opposition to the tricks played by pictorial phantoms of clarity and confusion.

"Cloud" and "cube" are not absent from Wittgenstein's own language, and I neither want to proceed as if their presence were simply my contribution nor concentrate exclusively on their literal appearances in Wittgenstein's text. "Cloud" (in addition to a number of words that play pictorial foil to forms of clarity such as "haze," "gaseous medium," "fog," and "atmosphere") appears less frequently than

"cube," but makes a number of striking appearances, including as early as Wittgenstein's reference in his introductory remarks to the entire work itself as "precipitate," suggesting cloudy origins (ix). Borrowing from his own *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, he describes the requirements of orderly logic as follows, rhetorically positioning himself as observing the function of an ideal: "...no empirical cloudiness or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it.—It must rather be of the purest crystal...as the most concrete, as it were the *hardest* thing there is" (38).

However, this opposition undergoes a reversal when Wittgenstein describes the effects of blind allegiance to "meaning" in its one-to-one correspondence sense:

...this general notion of the meaning of a word surrounds the working of language with a haze which makes clear vision impossible. It disperses the fog to study the phenomenon of language in primitive kinds of application in which one can command a clear view of the aim and functioning of the words (3).

A desire for something definite—the attempt to externalize and concretize an ideal of thought and meaning—in fact generates quite the opposite: fog. I think of Wittgenstein's "slab" as the ambassador of this repeating notion: the object whose undoing we witness first in the *PI*: a hard, simple, utilitarian form which both easily embodies the dream of one-to-one correspondence and then gets split from its meaning-companion. As Wittgenstein articulates a vision of Augustinian training—a child's attention is directed to a slab as an adult points to it and simultaneously utters "slab"—he introduces the fragility of this education. "But if the ostensive teaching has this effect,—am I to say that it effects an understanding of the word?" (4). "[I]s the call "Slab!" a sentence or a word?" (7).

This introduction to the formation of clouds in the path of dispersal of objects comes in the first pages of the *PI*. As reading continues, how does the rhetorical angle of these processes shift? What kind of responsibility do we as readers take for them? To clarify, I'll turn to an example involving William James, whose presence by name is striking in a work so devoid of proper names. In remarks 412-420, a stretch of text turning over the notion of perceiving one's own consciousness, Wittgenstein tours us across divergent planes of this multi-faceted quandary, letting each one find favor with the light before shifting positions. Owing to the tension between piece and continuity that runs throughout the entire work, I had turned to James and his "stream of thought" for help before the name "William James" finally appeared in the text. My initial delight—I had been on the right track!—came from treating "William James" as what in my reading short-hand I'd call a "cube"—a resting place, an affirming point of orientation, and a name of familiarity sufficient enough to produce some atmospheric that might carry me for a spell. The carrying was short-lived, however, as James is quickly followed by a picture of the empty loom ("You think that...you must be weaving a piece of cloth: because you are sitting at a loom") and a picture of announcing one's consciousness ("Is it identical with being conscious? To whom might we state this fact?") and then a picture of authority ("Surely we can't have a chief without consciousness!") (106). The morphology of change here—where landing points turn to air and fuzziness gives way to a picture of authority—is a back and forth not only between *pictures* of solidity and lostness but among readerly perches and falls.

When Wittgenstein warns against the refusal to let function and role lead us through grammar, he's saying: do

not transport circumstance or a range of possible uses to an imagined halo around a word:

"You understand this expression, don't you? Well then—I am using it in the sense you are familiar with."—As if the sense were an atmosphere accompanying the word, which it carried with it into every kind of application (41).

Surely we can imagine such a halo, but can we handle the pressure this remark places on the rest of our reading? Must we reject each gesture (such as pushing to materialize something we can't recall or letting atmospheres left-over from our previous investigations lead us) that reminds us of ones whose undoing Wittgenstein has called for? Can we afford to forget about pictures when the call of intuition sounds?

On several occasions, Wittgenstein makes use of the flexibility of a two-dimensional representation of a cube:

You could imagine the illustration appearing in several places in a book...something different is in question every time: here a glass cube, there an inverted open box, there a wire frame of that shape, there three boards forming a solid angle (165).

In describing the effect of different interpretations of a schematic drawing on carrying out an order, the key distinction is between seeing the drawing as representing two- or three-dimensional space. The slanted lines that allow a possible reading of a drawn form as three-dimensional come from the convention of perspectival drawing; they mark the achievement of overcoming the confines of two-dimensional space. When Wittgenstein asks, "Whence comes the idea that the beginning of a series is a visible section of rails laid to infinity?" he pushes potential expectations about the forward motion of reading, thought and comprehension up against a picture of thrusting forward into space (72). After all, the slanted parallel lines of the schematic cube would go on infinitely if it weren't for the stopping action of the cube's back plane, serving to turn lines that suggest direction into a reassuring and discrete form.

Elsewhere, Wittgenstein uses "cube" to pose questions about the promise of an identifiable present and what he calls a "flash":

When someone says the word cube to me, for example, I know what it means. But can the whole use of the word come before my mind, when I *understand* it in this way? ... Can what we grasp *in a flash* accord with a use, fit or fail to fit in? ... What really comes before our mind when we *understand* a word?—Isn't it something like a picture? (46-7)

Such questions about the temporal and spatial limits of cube-comprehension must be asked about "picture" itself. Wittgenstein grounds us in part by his own use of picture-words—slabs, chess pieces, photographs, drawings, color samples—forcing us both to confront the ease with which we want meaning and object to slide into partnership at the very moment he's prying them apart, and to acknowledge that a "photograph" is not necessarily a "picture." For in order to quell the unproductive function of pictures, Wittgenstein increases their presence in the *PI*. Paintings, portraits, sketches, schematic drawings: all serve to dramatize our dependence, to draw us into a unfamiliar space where our attachment to meaning-as-object is harnessed as it is undone.

Pictures come in all sizes here: the entire work, he tells us in his introduction, is a “landscape,” a “series of sketches”—a reminder, it seems, that Wittgenstein *means it* when he says: “And the best that I can propose is that we should yield to the temptation to use this picture, but then investigate how the application of the picture goes” (99). And between the “slab” and the entire *PI*-as-sketch, are, of course, the many medium-sized acts of drawing-up pictures to firm up a developing sense:

Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a “beetle” (85).

If someone were to draw up a sharp boundary, I could not acknowledge it as the one that I too always wanted to draw...His concept may then be said to be...akin [to mine]. The kinship is that of two pictures, one of which consists of colour patches with vague contours, and the other of patches similarly shaped...but with clear contours (31).

On many occasions, as I followed a given picture-as-bait deeper and deeper into its sense, relieved for the aid of a visual schema, I would suddenly find myself jerked awake by a question: am I in the midst of a figurative space? And if I’m not, what do I call this understanding-language-by-way-of-a-beetle box?

The pictures play roles of temptation too: that of quick access to the finish line. Wittgenstein often poses questions revolving around overlap, boundary and separation, buoying them up urgently to the surface by way of the law of identity, the knot of conflation between existence and sameness:

To say “This combination of words makes no sense” excludes it from the sphere of language and thereby bounds the domain of language...If I surround an area with a fence of a line or otherwise, the purpose may be to prevent someone from getting in or out; but it may also be part of a game and the players be supposed, say, to jump over the boundary...So if I draw a boundary line that is not yet to say what I am drawing it for (117-8).

What to do with the auras or clouds of association that begin to circulate for the reader, the ones that point to a correlation between shared grammatical terrain and psychic boundaries or identity itself? Where did this idea *come from*? Will it be detrimental, against-the-grain, to hope to tease it out as reading continues?

For me, a tension develops between the drives to articulate two kinds of notions about my reading of the *PI*. I could say I gathered the following:

- Meaning in language must be followed along paths of use
- Various uses of the same word can be seen to connect via “family resemblance”
- The rules of language games can be definite, indefinite and can change

And I could also say these things:

- The absence of an explicit discourse on metaphor in the *PI* comes from a tacit challenge to place seeing-as before figuration—to see figuration before we name it that
- A question about likeness to the human body is quietly fueling our figurative uses of language, and an unac-

knowledged search to match up body and mind serves to determine the directions we point to with language

- Broadening the notion of tension away from the gathering place of *libido* and toward a larger body of spatial relationships to language forms is worthwhile
- Questions attempted to be resolved though attention to innerness are not to be disregarded but re-focused on grammar; sensitivity to excess material, or atmosphere, will re-pose the questions in healthier forms

This second kind of list, one that admits findings larger than one might be able to rationally argue out from the text, could be the result of the dreaded “imaginative misunderstandings” that David Pears discusses (4). But they may also constitute one piece of a way to articulate what *it’s like* to read the *PI*.

In the spirit of this uncertainty about handling the clouds that can structure an encounter with the *PI*—for that’s one way I see fruitful readerly interaction occurring: by bringing auras to the text, and letting them flourish, harden, disintegrate, etc.—I’m struck by the ease with which remarks on the *PI*’s kinship to psychoanalysis have been folded into critical thinking on Wittgenstein. For Pears,

[the] treatment of the mistakes...of other philosophers is often called ‘therapeutic.’ For there is an obvious analogy between the origin and correction of these involuntary misunderstandings and the origin of emotional disorders and their cure by psycho-therapy (4).

According to Cavell:

Wittgenstein[’s] writing is deeply practical and negative, the way Freud’s is. And like Freud’s therapy, it wishes to prevent understanding which is unaccompanied by inner change. Both of them are intent upon unmasking the defeat of our real need in the face of...fantasies (“pictures”) which we cannot escape (72).

My point is not that psychoanalysis is absent from the *PI* nor that I did not struggle with an “irresistib[le] inclin[ation]” to shuttle over to Freud during my reading (Wittgenstein 86). It’s to ask whether we can admit to the difficulty of simultaneously holding our desire for something primitive and our need to use certain discursive forms to guide us along the path that first desire irregularly carves. Psychoanalysis can play a cubic role; outside of the therapeutic space it *can’t help* but play such a role, and is thus almost always bound up with the dawning light/out-of-the-cave picture.

For me, quiet cries inhabit the *PI*—living not *in* the text but through it—cries such as:

- I want an identity
- The fantasy of one-to-one correspondence is powerful
- I want my body and my mind to know each other
- It is difficult to know one’s own objects
- I want to imagine physical objects in the place of other ones
- I don’t know what direction I’m pointing toward
- I want to find health via language
- I miss God

Despite their apparent kinship to those we associate with the generic analysand, I don’t hear these cries as Oedipal

ones. Are they *like* Oedipal cries? Surely, but doesn't Wittgenstein show us that we often don't know the difference between pictorial and figurative space?

Wittgenstein opens his *PI* with Augustine's narration of the acquisition of language. It's a familiar tale of point-and-learn, object and meaning. But equally important, it's a tale of the development of identity and the articulation of desire: "I gradually learned to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires" (2). It's a classic instance of the running-together of 'identity' as sameness and particular being, and a reminder that fantasies of correspondence and consolidation have as much to do with the unity of meaning and object as with individual identity itself.

I agree with Stanley Cavell that 'self-knowledge' is an imperative in this work. However, I see this self-knowledge as primarily related to the ability to *expect and hold forms* rather than as the result of therapeutic intervention. I think we would do well to consider ourselves the creators as well as the receivers of the darkness-giving-way-to-light picture of the arrival of wakefulness and vision, and to slightly dim the bright lights of consciousness, and quietly lighten a corner of the cave. This might allow us to spend more time where we know life exists, and to begin to speak about the shapes that float in the middle of language, between the oppressive and imagined extremes. Our language has a being beyond us; it will not submit to our searches, and I see the *PI* as knowing and enacting that.

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History and Objects: Antonio Gramsci and Social Ontology

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1 Introductory remark

A weighty part of the worldwide increase of ontological research is to be found in investigations dealing with the notion of social object. Especially after the publication of John Searle's *The Construction of Social Reality* in 1995 social ontology became one leading issue within the philosophical landscape, so that in the last years we can even recognize an inflation of use of the term "social ontology". This, however, does not mean that the concept of social object must be considered as an autonomous discovery of modern ontological debates. Obviously enough, several and quite different philosophers in the past centuries dealt with social objects and much of their thoughts and writings on these issues are still important today. In this paper I would like to depict the social ontology of the Italian philosopher and politician Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), who – though representing a unique authority within other fields of the humanities (especially within cultural studies) – remained almost unknown within the analytical train of thought. Even if, in the present text, I am primarily concerned with an historical reconstruction of Gramsci's ontology, I am confident that his position is of systematic relevance and that it could be used in order to criticize, to enrich and to treat modern debates within this discipline more organically.

Gramsci developed his reflections in the monumental work *The Prison Notebooks* (*Quaderni del Carcere*) in the twenties and thirties of the 20th century. The difficulties his thoughts present for the interpreters are well known in the secondary literature and they almost exclusively are due to the fact that the *Notebooks* are an assemblage of notes that Gramsci wrote during his imprisonment with the purpose of future publication. This was a purpose which Gramsci could never realize (under the fascist regime, Gramsci – as the leader of the Communist Party of Italy – was arrested in 1926 and he died in 1937 due to a long exhausting detention). Furthermore, his writing was not carried out in complete intellectual freedom, since in jail his texts were subjected to fascist censorship. Concerning the philosophical point of view, I must underline the fact that Gramsci himself did not use the expressions "social ontology" or "social object". But this circumstance should not mislead the reader over the fact that his researches do actually deal with these concepts and with cognate notions. In fact, within the discussion concerning the characterization of Marxism as "historical materialism" almost all orthodox Marxists focused their attention on the term "materialism", whereas Gramsci placed emphasis on the adjective "historical" in order to concentrate his efforts for demonstrating that the social, i.e. the historical dimension of reality must not (since can not) be reduced to the material one.

2 The reality of external world and social reality

I introduce Gramsci's social ontology with his discussion of questions concerning the existence of the external world. On this issue, at least in one sense, Gramsci adopts the view that such a question is, for the most part, «futile and idle» (QC XI, §17, 1411, my trans.) since, of course, the external world *exists*. However, this is far from being

Gramsci's conclusion within his analysis of the problem, it is rather the point of departure for a series of investigations. First of all, Gramsci stresses that the objective existence of the world is not an empirical fact. In reality, it is an object of belief and as such requires justification (QC VIII, §215, 1076). He criticizes all justifications that implicitly are to be found in what he calls «common sense» which is a form of naïve ideology rooted in Aristotelianism and Christianity (QC XI, §20, 1419). From these sources, common sense inherits the idea of a reality created by a supreme entity and also the idea of a well-structured world regulated by necessary and eternal laws (QC VIII, §215, 1076). In other words, for common sense, *whatever* exists is independent from humankind *and* it has been created by a supreme entity. Apart from the creationist part of the thesis, Gramsci – as a communist – could not agree with this idea since it implies that even social structures as well as social categories eternally exist in their own right and since it furthermore assumes the validity of natural law.

Interestingly enough, Gramsci recognizes that the theoretical strategy of the Italian Neothomists,¹ arguing in favour of such an ontological paradigm, converges with the arguments of materialism (of course, once freed from atheism, cf. QC XVII, §18, 1921). Here again, since materialism reduces all existence to matter, any reality is independent from humankind, which exactly is the premise in whose favour the Neothomists plead. More precisely, even materialism – if it is understood as such (what Gramsci calls «vulgar materialism») – is a form of naïve ideology. Here we face one of Gramsci's main criticisms – originally innovating Marxism – of the works of authors defending such forms of materialism within a Marxist framework. Gramsci's attacks are mainly directed towards and against the work of Georgi Plechanov *Fundamental Problems of Marxism* of 1908 and, in particular, against Nicolai Bucharin's *Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology* of 1921. Gramsci's vehement criticism divided into two aspects embedded within a political and within an ontological dimension.

On the political side, Gramsci highlights the fact that, if everything that exists is material, then it can be explained by laws of physics, i.e. social dynamics too, being material, can be thoroughly explained by natural science. Exactly in this sense Bucharin argued that scientific Marxism is nothing other than an empirically founded sociology. Against this conclusion, Gramsci claims that, if that were true, (a) politics would play no role at all within societies, and that (b) social groups can not be reduced to material aggregates. Concrete historical events in which politics do play a significant role provide evidence for argument (a): especially after the point where organized parties substituted individuals as political leaders (cf. QC VII, §6, 856f), «collective organisms» (i.e. social groups) became active subjects operating with «active co-partnership and consciousness» so that their behaviour can not be described by any kind of naturalistic law (cf. QC XI, §25, 1430). Needless to

¹ By "Neothomists" Gramsci denotes those Italian intellectuals who gathered around the Catholic journal *Civiltà Cattolica* and by the second half of the 19th century were attempting to reform the Italian philosophical landscape with thomist theses (cf. QC, V, §120, 639f, QC, X, §5, 1218).

say, here Gramsci is thinking of the October Revolution and of the role the Bolshevik Fraction played in it. Argument (b) is based on the fact that, even though they show some regularity, social phenomena are not confined to materiality and, therefore, they can not be explored and explained (at least exclusively) using the principle of causality (QC XI, §52, 1479). Even statistics is not able to give a reliable description of social phenomena, since its method falsely presupposes that social groups are nothing other than the sums of their constituents. Critically following an assumption in Friedrich Engels' *Antidürring* (cf. [1878] 1962: 116ff), according to which the quantity «dialectically» is transformed in quality (QC XI, §26, 1432), Gramsci argues that social aggregates differ from natural ones qualitatively («every social aggregate, in fact, is something more than the sum of its components» cf. QC IV, §32, 451, my trans.) and that, therefore, they do not obey the «law of large numbers» of positivist sociology (cf. QC XI, §32, 1446f). Social phenomena are rather regulated by dialectic relations. Gramsci did not develop an explicit theory of dialectics of its own, but it is interesting that he describes a kind of hierarchy of social groups: (1) primitive groups, where the unifying element is the similar productive/economic goal every single member wants to achieve, (2) groups, where a solidarity between all members of the group arises beyond their productive interests, (3) political groups, where the groups' interests exceed the mere corporative form (as in the two previous cases) and aspire to be imposed on other social groups (cf. QC 4, §38, 457).

Coming to ontology, we already now can identify a first species of objects, i.e. social groups, which objectively exist and which are even efficiently causative (for instance, they can bring about revolutions!), although they are not reducible to matter. But, as we will see, they are not the sole type of social objects. In fact, within his critique of vulgar materialism, Gramsci believes that the problem of the existence of the external world should be treated from a «historicist» perspective. (As with «dialectic», «historicist» is a term with a spurious derivation in Gramsci and, maybe, within his entire opus one of the most difficult to deal with, since the different influences of his cardinal thinkers – i.e. Hegel, Marx and Croce – converge in one and the same expression, complicating all attempts at a detailed definition; cf. Frosini 2004.) Concerning the current problem, respecting a historicist perspective means that it is impossible to justify the objectivity of reality from any point of view that abstracts from humankind and also, a *potiori*, from the historic dimension in which humankind is immersed. Gramsci writes: «Objective means always «humanly objective» which can exactly correspond to «historically subjective», i.e. objective would mean «universal subjective»» (QC XI, §17, 1415f, my trans.). In this citation it seems (and I add: it *only* seems) that the epistemic and the ontological sense of the adjective «objective» coincide and we could interpret such a term as «objectively knowable»; in fact, in the quoted passage, Gramsci states further that «man knows objectively insofar as knowledge is real for all humankind *historically* unified in a cultural, unitary system» (QC, l.c., my trans.). In other words, objective knowledge is a knowledge which is shared by the entire humankind: if humankind shares the same knowledge about an object, then such knowledge implies the (objective) existence of the object itself. Should we say that Gramsci does not recognize the difference, as John Searle puts it, between epistemic objective judgements and ontological objective facts? Well, here we should pay particular attention to Gramsci's own argumentation for not describing his thought as a simple form of idealism.

First of all, it is important to state that the existence of material objects is considered as being independent from human knowledge. Gramsci writes: «As an abstract natural force, electricity existed even before its reduction to a productive force, but it did not operate in history and it was an object of hypothesis in natural history (and before it was the historical «nothing» since no one cared about it and everyone actually ignored it)» (QC 11, §30, 1443f, my trans.). Material objects exist independent of human beings and, in a wider sense, they are independent of the history of humankind: something can be a historical «nothing», even if objectively (in an ontological sense) it has its place in the world. This means that, of course, there are objective facts – though their existence does not have a place within history until humans do not start to be (theoretically or practically) interested in them. Right now thousands of stars explode in the universe but they are not part of history until, so to say, they do not catch our attention. At the same time, Gramsci states that what made a knowledge objective (i.e. the ideal of epistemic objectivity) is again depending on history: Gramsci recognizes that in modern times this ideal has been defined by natural sciences, but the knowledge that we consider as objective today, may be described tomorrow as inaccurate or defective – as we could develop more precise research methods and instruments. Now, although our knowledge of material objects does not influence their objective existence, if the theme of our research is (human) history (i.e., for Gramsci, social reality), then it is a canon for a correct historical methodology, not to discharge the concept of existence from the concept of knowledge or thought. *Within the history* (but even only within the history) only those objects, whose existence is recognized by humankind, «do matter». That is the reason why «[...] historical materialism [...] of course considers the physical (chemical, mechanical, etc.) properties of matter, but only as they become «economic element» of production. Therefore, matter is not considered as such, but as socially and historically organized, as a *human rapport*» (QC 4, §25, 443, my trans.).

This position has important consequences: on the one side, material objects exist independently from humankind but they play an historical role only if humans possess corresponding beliefs about them or if they practically deal with them. On the other side, there are objects that, even if they are not material, play an historical role as humans have beliefs about them or as they practically deal with them. As an example of this specifically social objects, Gramsci discusses a passage of Bertrand Russell's *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912), in which Russell examines the nature of relations such as North and South. Gramsci's example is unhappy since it overlaps the question concerning the existence of universals which was Russell's original concern in that passage and from which we have here to prescind. Gramsci, against Russell, argues that the concepts of North and South are nothing other than historical «fixations» or «constructions» which do not have any material «support» and which exist only for (and in relation to) humans (QC VII, §25, 874). But, they are objective and, in this sense, they are real relations, having a function imposed to them by humankind: with these tools we can travel through the world, we can reach our destination etc. We can summarize this position stating that an object exists objectively *within history* (i.e. it is a part of social reality), not if it is material, but if the «historically unified humankind» considers it as existing (QC IV, §41, 466; on the contrary, the «subjectivist» conception, connecting the existence of social reality to individuality, is nothing other than a «mere philosophical novel» QC XI, §17, 1415). Materiality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for (historical) objectivity. This leads to the

conclusion that something can exist objectively (under the assumption that it is considered as such by humankind), even though it is not material (thus, in a social dimension, «to destroy» is as difficult as «to create», since the point is not to destroy material things, but «invisible and impalpable» relations, cf. QC VI, §30, 708).

Now we can see Gramsci's strategy clearly: against vulgar materialism, he claims that not all objects are material objects, since there are social, immaterial objects. On the other side, Gramsci claims against Neothomism that there are some objects whose existence depends on human beings, and especially on human beliefs: these objects are social objects. As we said, Gramsci does not use this term, but he recognizes a synonymy between the words "conventional", "historical", "artificial", "social" and even "rational" (QC 8, §159, 1037; QC 14, §67, 1726f).

Concluding, I would like to concisely expose three further points of Gramsci's theory that I consider particularly important for systematic debates:

1) Gramsci accepts a kind of gradation of (historical) objectivity: the more persons believe in the existence of an object, the more objectively is its existence within history. This leads to the idea that there are objects existing "subjectively" for (or relatively to) some social groups, but not for other.

2) The existence of social objects is related to beliefs and to systems of beliefs (so called "ideologies") and ideologies are the proper political and cultural battle fields, where different social groups try to achieve a hegemonial position.

3) Ultimately we can say that social objects are for Gramsci (material or immaterial) artefacts, whose existence legitimacy is justified as long as they satisfy the historical function they are "created for". As far as they can not satisfy their function anymore or as far as social groups do not request anymore the satisfaction of their function, they disappear.

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Peirce on Colour (with Reference to Wittgenstein)

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Introduction

In my work on colour naming with the indigenous people of North-west Coast Canada - the *Kwakwaka'wakw* - I found an emphasis on the *sfumato* of smoke, mist, sea-sky interactions, shifting in-betweenness, luminosity, flickering, brilliance, transformation and constantly changing illumination – but no notion of 'colour.' Requesting 'colour terms,' I encountered a 'strange weave of space and time, of distance and proximity, with a form of 'perception' that 'gazed back at me' (Bratu Hansen 2008:339).

Clearly, an 'active vocabulary of 'colour terms', was not part of their world.

In 1990, with members of the *Kwakwaka'wakw*, on islands, off Vancouver Island, I carried out mainstream Cognitive Science's colour naming experiments; I applied Berlin and Kay's (1969) experimental procedure, thereby establishing the 'evolutionary level' of their 'colour naming' tactics, namely their inability to produce 'any 'recognisable colour names.' B&K concluded that this is empirical 'evidence' of the low evolutionary level of colorimetric mentation of the *Kwakwaka'wakw*. This theory (resonating with Spencer 1857 and Darwin 1871 both on evolution) propounds a universalist theory of seven evolutionary stages of 'colour naming,' found the world-over. Deficiencies in colour-naming in the realms of so-called '3rd and 4th World' peoples, confirm their position at the lowest echelon of evolution. The Anglo-American world in contrast, 'correctly' names the Munsell Color Chart (a major definition of 'colour'), thereby confirming its apical evolutionary status.

In carrying out B&K 'experiments,' I merely confirmed their theory – as it is, of course, circular and self-referential in all its presuppositions¹. My conclusions, however, were different: I had encountered a powerful instance of 'imperialist scientism' (Dupré 2001), which reduced my own 'empirical work' to mere casuistry.²

To explain this further, I turn to Peirce, and thereafter, offer fleeting comments on Wittgenstein on 'colour,' both giving new ground for my rejection of B&K's work.

Peirce

'Colour' for Peirce is is *not* deterministic, but fluid and variant, in the flux of perpetual change. He contrasts mainstream empiricism, for which 'colour' is *sentience*, with *sapience* (Brandom 2000 :5). Emphasising *sapience*, Peirce explains it as a dialectics, exploring the relation of colour to science and metaphysics, to epistemology, to the physical sciences, to a model in framing theories of value, to the development of sociocultural institutions and to intersubjective behaviour (Kevelson, 1996).

In the realm of 'colour,' Peirce is concerned with the phenomenology of ideas, as *possibly* evolving into the actual – *but not necessarily*. He abandons the *either/or* formula of mainstream empiricism, offering a *third way* -

¹ Knowledge of 'facts' presupposes knowledge of interpretations. Knowledge of interpretations presupposes knowledge of facts. (Putnam 2000 (1995):18).

² Casuistry – clever but false reasoning.

later to become 'Pragmatism.'³ Peirce rejects Kant's *a priori* empirical determinism, proposing that organism and environment define one another, a position later asserted by Lewontin (1995:132):

... just as the information needed to specify an organism is not contained entirely in its genes, but also in its environment, so the environmental problems of the organism are a consequence of its genes.

Peirce's approach to 'color' is later reinforced by Dewey,⁴ James, Mead;⁵ more recently, Putnam, Brandom, and Davidson - especially the latter's 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' (1973).⁶ Hacking (2002:35) too asserts:

A concept is no more than a word or words *in the sites in which it is used*.⁷

Similarly Peirce argues that perceptual judgment of 'colour' is inferred 'abductively;' for, in physiological terms, the same stimulus may, depending on the prevailing conditions, give rise to *any number* of responses.

Amongst the indigenous peoples of North West Canada, 'colour' was first encountered in the C18th by the shipment of intense red-dye pigment imported by traders from China. For indigenous use, this was de-saturated and darkened. Such an instance supports Peirce's assertion that 'colour naming' is no autonomous, empirical process - but a person acting abductively, acquiring further *habits* by chance.

'Abduction' in this sense, is the acceptance of a hypothesis, although only probational, and always fallible.⁸ Following Peirce, Gibson's version of 'abduction' - 'education of attention'⁹ - is taken-up in Anthropology by Ingold (2000: 108), stressing 'no observation without participation.' And contra B&K's *stasis*, Ingold says: 'movements' and 'interactions' are crucial aspects of 'habits.'

Bourdieu's *habitus* too presents a version of Peirce. In (1977:87) he says

... if people from different backgrounds orient themselves in different ways, this is not because they are interpreting the same sensory experience in terms of alternative cultural models or cognitive schemata, but because, due to their previous bodily training, they are differentially attuned to the environment.¹

'Differential attuning' of the *habitus*, is, as Bourdieu (1999:5; 1988:87) says, a theory of the internalisation of

³ See also Vygotsky and Husserl.

⁴ Vygotsky was possibly influenced by Boas via their joint colleague Dewey at New York University.

⁵ James (1890/1950:104-127) on Habit. Also Lewis (1883-1964) in Rosenthal (2007:75)

⁶ Conceptual schemes ... are systems of categories that give form to the data of sensation ... (Davidson1984:183-198)

⁷ Peirce too (in 1886) claims 'My language is the sum total of myself.'

⁸ Its 'major principles' being perspectives of theory as 'explanation,' and praxis as 'culture' (Heelan and Schulkin 1998). It is a basic insight that Pragmatism can be both fallibilistic and anti-sceptical (Putnam 2000:21).

⁹ For Gibson, this is inseparable from a person's life in the world. He rejects mechanical and mental causality, treating perception as a unified functional activity of observers (Reed 1988:3).

exteriority, and the externalisation of interiority whereby objectivity becomes rooted in unconscious experience, by means of practice.

These theorists question the empirical notion of 'conceptuality/categorisation' - criticising rigid, single-track logicity (logocentrism) and its *a priori* empiricism. In contrast, in Anthropology, Ingold (2001:243) has posited 'relational fields' of which:

... we need nothing less than a new approach to ... the self-organising dynamics and form-generating potentials of relational fields.¹⁰

And Palsson (2007: 219) proposes 'genome rhizomics,' with temporary 'splits,' creating the fleeting and variable nature of the cultural world.

Peirce himself sees 'the habit-making tendency' to be part of our response to the 'complex things that happen to us,' which impel us to action. Re-casting mainstream empiricism, he asserts that 'cognition' arises by a process of becoming - the 'flow of action and reaction' - as change comes to pass, in which no 'first premises' need be assumed. He says:

... our very percepts or presentations are the results of cognitive *elaboration* (5.41).

This infers percepts emerge from our own complexity, with no pure, unanalysable 'visuality' in the background. It implies the inseparability of fact and value, fact and theory and fact and interpretation. Consequently there are no first impressions of sense, no first cognitions, and no individual judgments originating a series of inferred judgments (Brandom 1998). 'Perceptual judgment' in the Cartesian, Kantian and Mainstream Empiricist Tradition - the 'intuitive judgments of experience' - is what Peirce *rejects*.¹¹

This form of argumentation resonates with Peirce's¹ reaction to the C19th theorist and scientist, Helmholtz, asserting that his theory of colour and the materiality of the world, is the *pet petitio principii* of our time. Peirce is scathing in his criticism of Helmholtz's adaptation of the theory of the 'mixture of colours' 'borrowed' from Thomas Young (Kvelson 1996: 116-7). Yet, Peirce's criticism has generally been ignored, as Helmholtz remains the Father-figure in mainstream 'colour-science.'

In contradistinction to Helmholtz, Peirce regards 'percept' and 'perceptual judgment' as inseparable, blurring distinctions between them. In this way his notion of the 'intentional multiplicity of meaning' threatens the credibility of the empirical method, and modes of systematic investigation.

Peirce on 'colour,' is prelude to Einstein, who says:

As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain they do not refer to reality' (Feigl & Brodbeck, eds 1953).

Peirce also counters mainstream notions of 'rigorous determination' of the 'sensory core,' arguing it's inappropriateness involves 'the truth' of statements, that involve 'the truth' of others, and so on *ad infinitum*. In contrast, he proposes *the structuring of 'habit'*, since the character of the sensory core is determined by the generative functioning of habit. Thus practice itself forms the 'skill' or 'mastery' of colour perception. Peirce's arguments thereby assert 'colour, colour naming and categorisation' to be *socially gen-*

erated historical prostheses - the production of an *exosomatic organ*. Thus colour has no 'immediacy' or pre-determined givenness, as colour science asserts, but evolves as part of a historic, dynamic, complex 'sign-system.'

II. Wittgenstein

Having pursued the presentiments of Peirce on 'colour,' I now turn briefly to Wittgenstein.'

Wittgenstein's friend Frank Ramsey (Nubiolo 2009), introduced him to the work of Peirce - especially his work on sign and meaning (or token and type) - a variant terminology of 'category.' Ramsey refers to induction as 'habit' requiring no formal or logical justification, being more concerned with methods of thought, 'its reasonableness being pragmatic' (ibid:7). Especially in *On Certainty* Wittgenstein approaches Pragmatism and practical dimensions of thought along these lines. As Nubiolo (2008:10) says:

Peirce's habits and Wittgenstein's language games turn out to be alternative expressions for a common strategy of resisting the abstract theorising of much traditional philosophy.

Wittgenstein confirms this with his *Remarks on Colour* (1977) where he itemises 'colour-language-games' as follows:

4e 14 There is, after all, no commonly accepted criterion of what is a colour, unless it is one of *our* colours (my emphasis).

9e I-58 The difficulties we encounter when we reflect about the nature of colours ... are embedded in the indeterminateness of our concept of sameness of colour.

26e 73 There is no such thing as *the* pure colour concept.'

35e 142 The various 'colours' do not all have the same connexion with three-dimensional vision.

36e 154 Can't we imagine that people do *not* have our colour concepts and that they *have* concepts which are related to ours in such a way that we would also want to call them 'colour concepts'?

(59e III-32 'Practices give words their meaning').

It's clear that both Peirce's and Wittgenstein's approach to 'colour' are complementary - they both contest the notion of eternal 'categories.' Yet while Peirce presents a radical challenge to the ontology of colour, questioning the very notion of 'innateness,' Wittgenstein proposes 'indefinability' but does not challenge the ontology of 'colour,' as Peirce does.

Conclusion

Kay (1999) - and more recently on the Internet - ratifies a fecund theory of colour perception, naming, and categorisation, defined by domain-specificity, modularity and innateness. The models used, deriving from Descartes, Newton and Kant, inherited by Mainstream Cognitive Science, make 'colour' a highly artificial, seriously oversimplified and blatantly false situation (as the consequences of the *World Color Survey* (2005) show). I therefore suggest that B&K's theory of Basic Color Terms is a scopic regime, that melds together the military, cinematic and technoscientific logistics of perception. Thus 'colour' has become a diffuse mechanism with a network of permanent power, forming a new determinant of 'Reality.'

¹⁰ Rabinow (2004: 9) 'even 'ethics is a question of power and rhetorical skills.'

¹¹ Cf. Gibson's 'ecological optics' (Reed 1988:241).

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Many-Valued Approach to Illocutionary Logic

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Illocutionary logic plays an important role in modern analytical philosophy of language and in logical models of speech acts: its aim is to explain how context can affect the meaning of certain special kinds of performative utterances. Recall that performative utterances are understood as follows: a speaker performs the illocutionary act (e.g. act of assertion, of conjecture, of promise) with the illocutionary force (resp. assertion, conjecture, promise) named by the performative verb by way of representing himself as performing that act.

Whenever a speaker utters a sentence in an appropriate context with certain intentions, he performs one or more illocutionary acts. We will denote the simple illocutionary act by $F(\varphi)$. This denoting means that each simple illocutionary act can be regarded as one consisting of an illocutionary force F and a propositional content. For example, the utterance "I promise you (F) to come (φ)" has such a structure. Usually the illocutionary force is expressed by performative sentences which consist of a performative verb used in the first or third person present tense of the indicative mood with an appropriate complement clause. In our case we used the example of illocutionary act with the performative verb "promise". However the illocutionary force is not totally reduced to an appropriate performative verb. It also indicates moods of performance (e.g., moods of order are distinguished in two following sentences: "Will you leave the room?", "If only you would leave the room"). Notice that an illocutionary force of performative verb can be expressed nonverbally too, e.g. by means of intonations or gestures.

Traditionally, the illocutionary force is classified into five groups that are called illocutionary points. In short, they are distinguished as follows: "One can say how things are (assertives), one can try to get other people to do things (directives), one can commit oneself to doing things (commissives), one can bring about changes in the world through one's utterances (declarations), and one can express one's feelings and attitudes (expressives)" [4, 52].

1. The assertive illocutionary point. A speaker succeeds in achieving the assertive illocutionary point on a proposition in a context of utterance iff in that context he represents the state of affairs that φ as actual in the world of utterance. In other words, in utterances with the assertive point a speaker presents as representing an actual state of affairs in the world of utterance. Some English performative verbs with the assertive point are: "assert", "predict", "report", "claim", "argue", "assure", "inform", "remind", "testify", "guess", "state", "hypothesize", "swear", and "insist".

2. The commissive illocutionary point. In utterances with this point a speaker commits himself to carrying out the course of action represented by a proposition φ . Also, a speaker succeeds in achieving the commissive point on φ in a context of utterance iff in that context he commits himself to carrying out the future course of action represented by φ . Some English performative verbs with the commissive point are: "promise", "commit", "threaten", "accept", "consent", "covenant", "pledge", "vow", and "guarantee".

3. The directive illocutionary point. In utterances with this point a speaker attempts to get a hearer to carry out the course of action represented by a proposition φ . Therefore a speaker succeeds in achieving the directive illocutionary point on in a context of utterance iff in that context he makes an attempt to get a hearer to carry out the future course of action represented by φ . Some English performative verbs with this point are: "request", "invite", "beg", "ask", "order", "command", "solicit", "incite", "suggest", "pray", "recommend", "entreat", and "advise".

4. The declarative illocutionary point. In utterances with this point a speaker brings about the state of affairs represented by a proposition φ solely in virtue of his successful performance of the speech act. A speaker succeeds in achieving the declarative illocutionary point on φ in a context of utterance iff in that context he brings about by his utterance in the world of utterance the state of affairs that φ . Some English performative verbs with this point are: "declare", "christen", "resign", "endorse", "excommunicate", "name", "approve", "abbreviate", and "bless".

5. The expressive illocutionary point. In utterances with this point the speaker expresses some psychological attitude about the state of affairs represented by a proposition φ . Consequently, a speaker achieves the expressive illocutionary point on a proposition in a context of utterance iff in that context he expresses his attitudes about the state of affairs represented by φ . Some English performative verbs with the expressive point are: "thank", "congratulate", "compliment", "deplore", "welcome", and "condole".

The illocutionary points are used in the setting of simple illocutionary acts. When a simple illocutionary act is successfully and nondefectively performed there will always be effects produced in the hearer, the effect of understanding the utterance and an appropriate perlocutionary effect (for instance, the further effect on the feeling, attitude, and subsequent behavior of the hearer). Also, an illocutionary act must be both successful and nondefective. Recall that the well formed proposition is evaluated as either true or false. But as we see the nondefective simple illocutionary act is evaluated as either successful or unsuccessful in the given context of utterance.

If logical superpositions of simple illocutionary acts can be also evaluated as successful or unsuccessful, they are said to be complex illocutionary acts. If they can be considered as true or false, then these logical superpositions are said to be illocutionary sentences. Logical connectives (\neg , \wedge , \vee , \Rightarrow) which we use in the building of complex acts or sentences we will call illocutionary connectives.

They differ from usual ones. As an example, the illocutionary disjunction in the utterance "I order to leave the room or I order to not leave the room" differs from the usual propositional disjunction, because it doesn't express here the law of excluded middle and a hearer can reject it as an unsuccessful illocutionary act.

Sometimes a logical superposition of simple illocutionary acts with propositions sets also a complex illocutionary act. Some examples are as follows: “If it rains, I promise you I’ll take my umbrella” (the illocutionary implication of the form $\psi \Rightarrow F(\varphi)$), “It rains and I assert that I’ll take my umbrella” (the illocutionary conjunction of the form $\psi \wedge F(\varphi)$). But we can consider cases when a logical superposition of simple illocutionary acts with propositions doesn’t get a complex illocutionary act. As an example, “If I think so, then it is so” (the illocutionary implication of the form $F(\varphi) \Rightarrow \varphi$). Indeed, it is a true illocutionary sentence.

Thus, I distinguish illocutionary sentences from illocutionary acts. Just as illocutionary acts express appropriate performances, so illocutionary sentences say about logical properties of illocutionary acts. Existence of illocutionary sentences allows to set a special logic that is called illocutionary logic. It studies logical and semantic properties of illocutionary acts and illocutionary sentences.

Therefore “just as propositional logic studies the properties of all truth functions ..., so illocutionary logic studies the properties of illocutionary forces without worrying about the various ways that these are realized in the syntax of English” [4]. Illocutionary logic plays an important role in modern analytical philosophy of language and in logical models of speech acts: its aim is to explain how context can affect the meaning of certain special kinds of illocutionary acts.

The first formalization of illocutionary logic was created by J.R. Searle and D. Vanderveken in [4]. In that work, a semantic-phenomenological approach was proposed and in the framework of this approach all the conditions of success and nondefection of illocutionary acts were precisely investigated.

In this paper I propose a logical-syntactic approach to illocutionary logic, according to that I consider illocutionary forces as modal operators which have a many-valued interpretation. This approach can supplement the approach of J.R. Searle and D. Vanderveken.

Consider a propositional language L that is built in the standard way with the additional unary operator F (it is called performance). We will say that the illocutionary act $F(\varphi)$ is a performance of a proposition φ . From a point of view of social constructivism (see [1]), the content of social acts and the content of performances of any propositions are not physical facts. Therefore performances cannot be evaluated as either true or false.

The performance of φ that we obtain by using of the performative verb “think” can be either successful or unsuccessful. It is successful if $F(\varphi)$ represents a true propositional content of φ (i.e., if φ is true) and it is not successful if $F(\varphi)$ represents a false propositional content of φ (i.e., if φ is false). The success and unsuccess of a performance will be denoted by $1/2$ and $-1/2$ respectively.

The atomic propositions ($\text{Var} := \{p, p_1, p_2, \dots\}$) can have only one of two truth values: 1 and 0. These truth values (for various illocutionary points) have various interpretations, and we consequently have various interpretations of performance.

1. Assertive illocutionary point: 1 is an abbreviation for “satisfiability in reality” (true), 0 is an abbreviation for “unsatisfiability in reality” (false). 2. Commissive illocutionary point: 1 is an abbreviation for “satisfiability by an action of a speaker”, 0 is an abbreviation for “unsatisfiability by an action of a speaker”. 3. Directive illocutionary point: 1 is an abbreviation for “satisfiability by an action of a hearer”, 0 is

an abbreviation for “unsatisfiability by an action of a hearer”. 4. Declarative illocutionary point: 1 is an abbreviation for “satisfiability by a state of affairs”, 0 is “unsatisfiability by a state of affairs”. 5. Expressive illocutionary point: 1 is an abbreviation for “expressibility by an attitude”, 0 is an abbreviation for “inexpressibility by an attitude”.

The language L is associated with some matrix $M = \langle \{1, 1/2, 0, -1/2\}, \{1\}, \neg, \wedge, \vee, \Rightarrow, F \rangle$ in that (1) $\{1, 1/2, 0, -1/2\}$ is the set of truth values and 1 is the designated truth value, (2) \neg and F are unary operators for negation and performance, respectively:

$$\neg x = 1 - x \text{ if } x \in \{1, 0\} \text{ and } \neg x = -x \text{ if } x \in \{1/2, -1/2\}.$$

$$F x = x - 1/2 \text{ if } x \in \{1, 0\} \text{ and } F x = x \text{ if } x \in \{1/2, -1/2\}.$$

(3) $\wedge, \vee, \Rightarrow$ are binary operations for conjunction, disjunction, and implication, respectively:

$$x \wedge y = \max(x, y) \text{ if } x, y \in \{1/2, -1/2\} \text{ and } x \wedge y = \min(x, y) \text{ in other cases.}$$

$$x \vee y = \min(x, y) \text{ if } x, y \in \{1/2, -1/2\} \text{ and } x \vee y = \max(x, y) \text{ in other cases.}$$

$$x \Rightarrow y = \max(y, \min(\neg(x \vee 0), \neg y), \min(\neg(x \vee 0), \neg(\neg y \vee 0))).$$

From various interpretations of the truth values 1 and 0 and interpretation of F it follows corresponding interpretations of truth values $1/2$ and $-1/2$. The value $1/2$ (resp. $-1/2$) is for performance of propositions with 1 (resp. 0).

Then it can easily be proved that the unary operator F satisfies the following conditions:

$$(1) \forall a \in M (a \geq F(a)),$$

$$(2) \forall a \in M (\neg a \geq \neg F(a)),$$

$$(3) \forall a, b \in M ((F(a) \wedge F(b)) \geq F(a \wedge b)),$$

$$(4) \forall a, b \in M ((F(a) \vee F(b)) \geq F(a \vee b)),$$

$$(5) \forall a, b \in M ((F(a) \Rightarrow F(b)) \geq F(a \Rightarrow b)),$$

$$(6) \forall a \in M (F(F(a)) = F(a)).$$

$$(7) \forall a \in M (\neg F(a) = F(\neg a)).$$

Let e be an evaluation of atomic propositions, i.e., $e : \text{Var} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$. We can extend of e to $\text{Ve} : L \rightarrow \{1, 0, 1/2, -1/2\}$ by the operations in the matrix M .

Let $\varphi \in L$ and $e : \text{Var} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$. The performance of φ , i.e. $F(\varphi)$, is called defective for e if $\text{Ve}(F(\varphi)) = -1/2$, i.e. $\text{Ve}(\varphi) \in \{0, -1/2\}$.

On the base of the language L , we can build a new language in the Montague style with the additional modal operators $F^*\sigma$ for $\sigma \in \{s, s_1, s_2, \dots\}$. The objects s, s_1 , etc. are “situations”. For the operator F^* ’s we have the following interpretation:

$F^*s(\varphi)$ = in the situation s , the performance of φ is not defective.

The modal operators $F^*\sigma$ are called a successful illocutionary force.

In our theory we can analyze the performative verbs (e.g. ‘order’ and ‘ask’). For any performative verb A and for any proposition p we put $S(A.p) := \{s : F^*s(p)\}$. Moreover, for any performative verbs A and B , we will say that A is stranger than B if for every proposition p :

$$S(A.p) \subset S(B.p).$$

As Searle wrote, in our theory we can prove that 'order' is stronger than 'ask'.

Let $\varphi \in L$. The performance of φ , i.e. $F(\varphi)$, is called unsuccessful for e if $Ve(F(\varphi)) = -1/2$, i.e. $Ve(\varphi) \in \{0, -1/2\}$. The formula $F(\varphi)$ is called successful performance for e if $Ve(F(\varphi)) = 1/2$, i.e. $Ve(\varphi) \in \{1, 1/2\}$. Further, the formula is called true sentence for e if $Ve(\varphi) = 1$ and false sentence for e if $Ve(\varphi) = 0$.

Notice that the element $a \wedge \neg a$ is not minimal in M , because $a \wedge \neg a \geq F(a \wedge \neg a)$ and $(F(a) \wedge \neg F(a)) \geq F(a \wedge \neg a)$. Consequently, the minimal element of M (that is called 'illocutionary contradiction' or 'unsuccess of performance') is assigned to a sentence of the form $F(\varphi \wedge \neg \varphi)$ when somebody utters a propositional contradiction.

Let us show that the illocutionary valuation satisfies the informal understanding of the concept 'illocutionary act'. Indeed, the performative verb "think" gets a curvature of space of propositional relations. For instance, suppose that there are two successful illocutionary acts: "I think that if it is harmful for my health, then I will not make it" and "I think that the smoking is harmful for my health". Both don't imply that the illocutionary act "I think that I will not smoke" is successful. However we can make this inference if the illocutionary force of the verb "think" will be removed.

Inequality (1) means that the implication $F(\varphi) \Rightarrow \varphi$ is a true sentence of illocutionary logic. For example, "If I think that he is God, then he is God" (but not vice versa) is an example of tautology. Formula (2) means that the implication $\neg F(\varphi) \Rightarrow \neg \varphi$ is also a true illocutionary sentence. Indeed, something exists if I think so and something doesn't exist if I don't think so.

Inequality (3) means that the implication $F(\psi \wedge \varphi) \Rightarrow (F(\psi) \wedge F(\varphi))$ is a tautology of illocutionary logic. For instance, the following illocutionary sentence is true: "If she affirms that weather is good and world is fine, then she affirms that weather is good and she think that world is fine" (but no vice versa).

Continuing in the same way we can see that formulas (4) – (6) have an intuitive sense too. Notice that the verb like "think" is different from other ones in formula (7). The illocutionary act "I think that it is not white" is equivalent to "I don't think that it is white". In the meantime, an illocutionary act with the negation of an illocutionary force that we obtain using other performative verbs can differ from the same illocutionary act with a positive illocutionary force, but with the negative propositional content. An example of illocutionary negation: "I do not promise to come", an example of an illocutionary act with a negative propositional content: "I promise not to come". As we see these acts are different. It can be expressed by using an additional modal operators $F^* \sigma$ described above.

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External Reference and Residual Magic

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1. Old versus New

In one of the more seminal papers of late 20th century philosophy, Hilary Putnam (1975) argues against the traditional theory of meaning and reference, and advocates the now widely held view that ‘meanings ain’t in the head’. According to this view, no mere internal configuration of a cognitive system, be it computational, neurophysiological or conscious/phenomenal, is able to capture the intended objects of linguistic reference. Hence the representational capacities of internal states are, in the general case, too weak to carry the referential burdens of natural language.

When criticizing the traditional theory, Putnam makes a number of amusing allusions to its underlying ‘magical’ properties. For example, in (1981) he compares it to the belief held by various “primitive people” that “to know the ‘true name’ of someone or something gives one power over it. This power comes from the *magical connection* between the name and the bearer of the name” (p. 3, his italics). And again in (1989) he observes that the traditional theory of reference seemingly requires a ‘noetic ray’ that emanates from the mind and pinpoints the object of reference.

To replace the ‘superstitious’ belief that meanings are some type of psychological entity or rely on occult mental powers, Putnam supplies an alternative ‘externalist’ account based on direct appeal to the environment, and on the communal division of linguistic labor. The reference of natural kind terms such as ‘water’ is not determined by internal states and images, nor by qualitative identifying properties that the individual speaker may associate with the term. Instead, the extension is based on the actual microstructure of the environmental liquid, the stuff in the world jointly accessed by members of one’s sociolinguistic clan.

However, I argue that Putnam does not carry the exorcism far enough, and that his own externalist theory still places crucial reliance on covert ‘magical’ powers. Putnam assumes a very robust and substantive interpretation of the relation of linguistic reference, and I argue that such an interpretation tacitly depends on strong internalist assumptions which are at odds with his own critique of the traditional theory. Hence if Putnam’s critique is followed to its natural conclusion, then the robust and traditional view of reference must itself be relinquished in favour of a much more modest prescriptive account.

2. Brains in Skulls

In (1981) Putnam argues that a community of envatted brains might undergo internal states qualitatively identical to members of some normal English speaking community, but they would still fail to refer to real physical objects such as brains and vats with their words ‘brain’ and ‘vat’. Brains in a vat are deprived of the right kind of causal links to their actual surroundings. Their phenomenal and linguistic episodes are not suitably related to the normal environment of spatially located macroscopic objects and direct physical interactions, and this cuts off their referential access to items that we can successfully talk about.

So a key aspect of Putnam’s critique of the traditional theory relies on drawing a sharp distinction between our case and that of a community of envatted brains. In contrast to the hapless brains in a vat, *our* phenomenal and linguistic episodes are underwritten by direct and robust patterns of interaction with other human organisms and the surrounding physical world. For example, unlike disembodied brains, we have eyes, and H₂O is the salient source of reflected light that actually stimulates our retinas when we have experiences of ‘seeing water’. In English speaking communities, these causal interactions are accompanied by assorted linguistic behaviours involving tokens of the term ‘water’, and these events take place in a shared spatial context. All of this is central to the overarching circumstances in which our natural language practices are embedded.

Thus when it comes to the nature of our causal interactions with the environment and our fellow language users, it’s obvious that we differ markedly from the unfortunate inhabitants of Putnam’s vat. And Putnam takes this difference in causal circumstances to have profound *semantical* effects. Unlike the referentially disabled vat dwellers, our words such as ‘brain’ and ‘vat’ *really do refer* to actual brains and vats in the external world. Putnam holds that there is a substantive fact of the matter regarding the intended interpretation of English expressions, and he uses a variety of traditional locutions to convey this realist view of the relation of reference. So, in the case of a community of normal human agents, properly situated in their physical context, it is now variously said that reference is ‘brought about’, ‘occurs’, ‘takes place’ and is ‘successful’.

On such a view, reference is successful in our case precisely because the theoretical stipulations of externalism are satisfied. ‘Water’ refers to H₂O in Earthian English because the appropriate causal ties to the environment, history of word use in the English speaking community, dispositions of native speakers, etc., actually obtain. H₂O has exactly the right kind of spatial proximity and interactive ties required. Reference to real water ‘occurs’ in our case, but not in the case of the transplanted grey matter, because of a fortuitous pattern in which internal states and external factors satisfy the stipulated conditions. We enjoy the appropriate kind of alignment between mind, language and world.

But contrary to Putnam’s story, I would maintain that there’s nothing about a *brain in a skull* that could legitimately exploit the external factors which distinguish our environmental context from that of an envatted brain. Putnam’s critique of the traditional theory assumes the standard narrow interpretation of psychological states, and if this interpretation is maintained, then there’s nothing special about an embodied brain that could give the expression ‘water’ the power to refer to the environmental liquid to which it bears all of the appropriate causal relations. How could a brain in a body have the power to reach out and utilize the external factors upon which the relation of reference is said to depend? How could it access any of these outside influences, or have the ability to semantically hook-up to the ‘right’ set of environmental circumstances?

Contrary to mentalistic renditions of meaning, Putnam persuasively argues that nothing in the head and no mere intentional state is able to underwrite reference to natural kinds such as water - we need to appeal to the environment itself and our causal relations to the kinds in question. But the same line of reasoning equally implies that nothing in the head is able to underwrite cognitive access to the environmental factors that support our 'successful' reference to water, brains, vats, etc. Invoking causal connections and the intended external relations does not expunge 'occult' forces from the picture, but instead it merely postpones their deployment. Rather than solving the fundamental problem it simply pushes it one level further away.

3. Cause versus History

Putnam eschews the 'magical' presuppositions of traditional accounts, but in the new 'causal' theories of reference, it is *indexicality* and *ostension* that tacitly preserve the old magical ties between mind and world. For example, consider the 'initial baptisms' which supply the spatio-temporal origins of the use of proper names. These baptismal events are fundamental to the new theories of singular reference, and they rely on a direct ostensive tie between sound and thing. But it is crucial to note that there is no physical or properly causal link formed by such baptisms. There is merely a ceremony in which a sound is produced in some local context consisting of a myriad of different particles and aggregates, the intended object of reference being some fluctuating and loosely-defined collection of molecules off of which these sound waves presumably bounce. But the sound waves don't stick to the person as some kind of physical tag for future reference (perhaps *branding* would be a ceremony more conducive to the needs of a causal theory of naming).

There is no physical trace, imprint or strictly causal connection established by the baptismal act. From a naturalistic point of view, the effects of this ritual are more or less intangible. Indeed, it bears a rather uncanny resemblance to a magical rite. This elusive and momentary rite is then supposed to provide the naturalistic cornerstone of singular reference. It is said to allow contemporary speakers to reach back thousands of years into the past and 'refer' to various individuals in antiquity. But surely this requires an inescapably *intentional* correlation between sound and thing - initial baptisms and chains of use may form vital elements in the intended correlation, but purely mental factors still play an essential role.

As another example of covert magic, consider the role of *indexicality* in the semantics of natural kind terms such as 'water'. Putnam relies on the idea that we have 'direct access' to this liquid in our surroundings, and thus ostensive appeal to the actual stuff in the world underpins our ability to refer. But what is the precise nature of the causal chain between human language users and H₂O? I would argue that 'direct access' via such chains is doubly ambiguous in this type of naturalistic scenario. First it's ambiguous as to exactly *where* in the long and complex causal sequence the object of reference is located. Mere gesturing to perceived water is supposed to indicate a unique *liquid*, rather than, say, the retinal images produced by observing this liquid, or the ambient light that produces these images, or the shimmering surface that reflects the light.

And it's ambiguous as to exactly *what* at this point in the causal chain is the intended object of ostension. The earthly realm contains a host of chemically impure liquids in which normal H₂O (along with its various isotopes)

serves as the primary solvent, and in which any number of other chemicals abound in both solution and suspension. The term 'water' is supposed to pick out the equivalence class supported by the same unique molecular category in all these complex and chemically impure liquids. Via mere ostension we are granted miraculous access to the *universal* molecular category H₂O, rather than just to some huge disjunction of environmental liquids in which H₂O is the primary solvent, or to only those particular samples of liquid that have been directly perceived and pointed at. In order for the story to work, there has to be something very special about brains in skulls, something that enables us to pick out the correct causal circumstances and the *imperceptible* microstructures underlying macroscopic regularities in the external world. And surely this purported access to generalized microstructural *types* cannot be accounted for as a natural effect of encountered instances of H₂O. Something spooky is still going on.

Perhaps an externalist would reply that it is the *intention to refer* on the part of the language user that hooks us up to the relevant causal connections and thereby gives us direct access to the environment. But what is this 'intention to refer', other than a special type of qualitative feeling, a purely subjective internal state which, according to Putnam's own critique, should have no semantical power. By hypothesis, the envatted brains have internal states identical to our own in narrow terms. So brains in skulls should not have the psychic power to reach out and connect with the salient *causal chains*, any more than brains in a vat have the power to reach out and connect with real brains and real vats.

In the former case the gap separating internal states from external factors may seem smaller, but it is no less unbridgeable. And it doesn't help to add some internal monologue attempting to express one's intentions, e.g. 'I intend to pick out the natural kind sharing the same_L relation to *this* stuff in the environment'. Such an incantation is just a pattern of sounds pronounced internally - it doesn't have the power to reach outside the head and fix upon external microstructures. And indeed, this intention is far more rigorous and sophisticated than those possessed by average English speakers who presumably refer without it. Rather than aiding reference, such articulations are part of a subtle and very specialized language game (Wittgenstein, 1953) played by professional philosophers.

4. Conclusion

In the original Twin Earth thought experiment, doppelgängers Oscar₁ on Earth and Oscar₂ on Twin Earth are in identical psychological states with regard to the environmental liquid they refer to with the term 'water', but it refers to H₂O on Earth and XYZ on Twin Earth. The scenario is strategically set in 1750, when knowledge of the molecular structure of the respective liquids could not be used to differentiate their psychological states. Internalism is taken to be refuted because all salient internal factors remain constant while extension varies. For this type of argument to go through, we must agree that natural kind terms such as 'water' are rigid. Thus we must accept Putnam's semantical principle

(i) (For every world W) (for every x in W) (x is water ↔ x bears same_L to the entity referred to as 'this' in the actual world W₁)

as opposed to the alternative principle

(ii) (For every world W) (for every x in W) (x is water ↔ x bears same_L to the entity referred to as 'this' in W)

Putnam takes (i) to properly characterize the reference relation in English, yet this principle does not supervene upon any *external* factors or circumstances. It is a prescriptive principle which characterizes what externalists hold to be the correct *intentional attitude* regarding the meaning of 'reference' in English. Hence even on Putnam's account, when fully purged of the covert magical forces assumed by the traditional view, the analysis of reference ultimately boils down to the prescriptive characterization of an internal phenomenon. If the externalist nonetheless wants to maintain a traditionally robust and substantive interpretation of reference, in which it literally 'takes place', 'occurs' or is 'brought about' under the correct circumstances and 'fails to occur' in others, then residual magic is still at work.

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The Linguistic Optimism: On Metaphysical Roots of Logic in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*

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Introduction

The philosophy exposed systematically in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* is an attempt to determine the semantic limits of every possible language. This is done by a logical investigation of the propositional symbolism *i.e.* by an analysis of our capacity for representation using statements or sentences (Sätze) which describes states of affairs (*Sachverhalte*). As Wittgenstein (1979¹) states just in the beginning of his preface: "this book intends to determine the limits of what can be expressed by our thoughts". As a result of this approach to language, the totality of philosophy as a domain of metaphysical thesis are taken by Wittgenstein as nonsense, because it intends to describe necessarily and meaningfully the essence of things and facts in the world. Wittgenstein aims to show that the traditional philosophy articulates nonsensically what the symbolism or logic of our language does not allow: necessity and sense. One of the famous claims in *Tractatus* is that no sentence that is meaningful is necessary, because only propositions that can also be false are meaningful. In this way, the formulation of the philosophical problems lays on the misunderstandings in the use of our language. The traditional metaphysical philosophers demand from our language what it cannot give. The essence of our language excludes meaningful necessary statements. Wittgenstein's task in *Tractatus* is to show this pictorial essence that makes the traditional philosophy nonsense.

Wittgenstein argues that the essence of language is descriptive. As a result, all other possible use of language should be analyzed in terms of descriptive use done by descriptive sentences. Every proposition is a logical picture from a fact, because the names in an all-analyzed proposition are symbols to the objects which compound the represented fact. The name and the named object must have the same logical form. Consequently, an essential harmony or isomorphism between world and language is assumed as the ground that supports the pictorial theory of propositional meaning. The possible articulation of names in proposition has to be necessarily suitable to the possible articulation of objects in facts. The syntax of language, *i.e.* all meaningful linguistic structures, has to match the "syntax" of world. In Wittgenstein's point of view in *Tractatus*, this fact is a demand to the fully significance of our most trivial daily sentences and also to the most sophisticated scientific statements. In order to convey meaning our sentences shows that the world and language has a unique net of possible articulation between their constituents (*der logische Raum*). As Baker says (1988) "The fundamental thought of the *Tractatus* is that the essential nature of symbolism must exactly match the essential nature of what is symbolized. Internal properties of symbols represent internal relations among what is symbolized. It is from this philosophical standpoint that there seems to be an identity

(of form) between linguistic expressions, the thoughts expressed and the states of affair described." (p.96)

Logic plays a relevant role in the tractatian philosophical structure because it is the sound way to grasp the claimed metaphysical harmony between world and language. Logic is the great linguistic mirror of world, it shows the world scaffolding. (*TLP* 5.6). Different from Frege's and Russell's realism that assumes logic as a theory of logical and real objects, Wittgenstein thinks that logic does not states a thing about any kind of logical domain, but instead of this logic shows through language and symbols the essence of world. To say and to show are essentially different to Wittgenstein (*TLP* 4.022). Trying to say something meaningful and necessary is wrong according to this account. To say is to say something contingent. However necessity can be shown silently through a correct approach of logic statements. As a matter of fact, there is here a clear possibility for a regenerated metaphysics, represented by logic, which shows the essential structure of world.

Nevertheless, the positivist interpretation of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* tries to affirm through its arguments that all kind of metaphysics is nonsense, not only the traditional one. Moreover, positivist usually claims that, according to tractatian philosophy, only the natural science has the possibility to give us a sound and consistent account of world. This position is questionable because it overlooks the metaphysical importance of isomorphism, *i.e.*, the claim of a strong formal relationship between reality and language, in the interpretation of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. According to this view, the Vienna Circle philosophers, representatives of the positivist interpretation of Wittgenstein early philosophy, have been restricted to the surface of the status of language and logic problem. They shed light on the tractatian criticism to the traditional metaphysics, but neglect to consider the fact that Wittgenstein replaced the old-fashioned metaphysics by a silent one. This new account holds that the legitimated and regenerated metaphysics represented by logic *shows* the inner structure of world by the structure of language instead of trying to say it in the old fashioned way, *i.e.*, by necessary meaningful statements.

Methods

In order to give a correct account of the metaphysical status of logic in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, the current positivist investigation was analyzed and compared with the wittgensteinian text itself. The investigated texts belong to the traditional literature about this issue. Accordingly, we have read and summarized the main pieces of work of Wittgenstein's early philosophy and also the positivist account represented by the components of the Vienna Circle. The concepts and main arguments of both were contrasted and also organized in a way that the differences of approaches could be highlighted. Clearly, this strategy was sufficient to determine that the positivist interpretation is not suitable to the Wittgenstein's main statements.

¹ From now on, I use *TLP* followed by the respective passage number to quote *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*. I use here the Suhrkamp standart edition. All translation to English is mine.

Results

Tractatus' account of philosophy of logic comes from his so-called theory of symbolism or representation. It means the preconditions that any system or complex has to follow in order to be hold as symbolic. The best way to grasp the meaning of logic as it is conceived in *Tractatus* is by contrasting it to the previous account from Frege and Russell. Both were determinant to the process of writing *Tractatus*, as can be seen in its preface "I just wish to mention that I owe Frege's great works and my friend Russell's work part of the encouragement for my ideas."

Frege and Russell establish their philosophy of logic by the assumption that logic is a normative science of logical and abstract objects realm. It is not different in form from any natural science. They do not share the same investigated objects. While natural sciences investigate concrete objects and facts, logic is a general science of abstract object. According to them, logic is a positive science which studies special functions like negation, material implication and generalization. Therefore, this interpretation of logic gives a strong metaphysical and realist connotation to logic since it holds that logic deals with real object independent from our minds and constructions. Wittgenstein does not agree with this scientific and realist point of view. It is worth to say that the emphasis here in the disagreement with *this* particular realist perspective and not with *all* realist points of view.

By contrast, the positivist account as Baker (1988) claims assumes that Wittgenstein make a decisive, but restricted contribution to logic. "Wittgenstein's purpose, on the conventionalist interpretation, was to free the philosophy of logic from Frege's (and Russell's) Platonism, or to replace a theory grounding the propositions of logic as a consequence of arbitrary stipulations of meaning. In doing this the positivists turned their backs on the metaphysical components of the *Tractatus'* theory of symbolism (on its alleged mysticism)" (pp. 70-1). By the positivist assumption, we lose the tractatian metaphysical roots. Thereby, it makes Wittgenstein totally vulnerable to a formal refutation by Church's Theorem. "While logicians credit Wittgenstein a major technical innovation in using truth-tables to exhibit some logical proposition as tautologies, they typically claim that the demonstrable impossibility of a decision procedure for logical truth in the predicate calculus vitiates Wittgenstein's basic claim that whether a proposition is a proposition of logic can be calculated from the symbol alone."(Baker, 1988, p. 3)

Wittgenstein holds that the logical propositions are extreme cases of symbolism. They share a common feature with the philosophical propositions: they do not convey meaning. However, different from philosophy, logical propositions are not nonsense. Logic does not violate the syntax or essence of our language, philosophy does. While descriptive propositions like our trivial sentences and the sophisticated sentences used in natural science can be either true or false. Logic is compounded by tautologies, syntactically legitimate propositions that are true and cannot be false. The impossibility of logical propositions to be false shows, as Wittgenstein claims, "essential features of symbolism" (cf. *TLP* 6.1-6.13). Moreover, if we assume the essential harmony between world and language claimed by Wittgenstein (cf. *TLP* 5.4711), which seems to justify a transitivity of results between language and world, we have therefore that logic also shows essential features of world. The point here is to highlight that against the positivist interpretation, logic does have a metaphysical and realist root. It *shows* the essential features of world. It mirrors logical space inner structure shared by language and

world. It does not say by a theory or by scientific propositions the features of world. The fact that logical propositions are always true shows, in a silent way, the essential articulation between the facts of world. Wittgenstein points out that when we understand logic we understand world without making a theory about it. As Baker (1988) holds, this is another point that shows Wittgenstein's criticism to the fregean and russelian realism.

"The corollary of this revised conception of the role of proofs in logic is a criticism of the philosophical significance attached to the axiomatization of logic by Frege. It was held that axioms are primitive propositions whose unconditional truth must be ascertained by apprehending the primitive logical concepts out of which they are built up. They were self-evident truths certified by our 'logical faculty'. The truth of all other propositions of logic is guaranteed by their following as theorems from the axioms and possession of a derivation from the axioms is the sole warrant for claiming knowledge of the truths of logic. The *Tractatus* attacked this whole conception. The truth of a proposition of logic can be ascertained by calculating the logical properties of this symbol alone. That isolates the delineation of the propositions of logic from the deliverances of intuition." (p.105)

In clear opposition to Frege, the complex logical forms are guaranteed by the names in proposition that have the same possible articulations of objects that constitute the facts in the world. And there is no possibility of lack of truth value or non-denotative names. All legitimate propositions have a truth value because all names have its own referenced object. (*TLP* 5.4733). J. Hintikka and M. Hintikka (1994) argue that logical forms, to Wittgenstein, are not given by complex propositions as Frege thought but by the existence of objects denoted by the names in a proposition (p.140). This account shows that Wittgenstein's point of view in logic, against the positivist interpretation, is realist because it deals with independent objects and not with conventions in language.

Conclusion

The status of logic in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* is metaphysical and realist. The distinction between *to say* and *to show* something plays an important role in this account (*TLP* 4.022). As Wittgenstein holds, logical propositions are tautologies, hence they are always true. No fact in the world can negate or refute the truth of a tautology or logical proposition. They do not say facts of the world, because nothing can be described by proposition that cannot be false. However, logical proposition shows the essential articulation between the facts of world by showing the essential features of language. This conclusion is given by the assumption of isomorphism or essential harmony between world and language. As Wittgenstein (1979) states "the language in which facts are expressed can say everything that can be said" (p.109). Consequently, the essential feature of Wittgenstein account to logic is supported by the possibility of descriptive language in saying everything that can exist. This assumption can show a more general philosophical thesis in the roots of Wittgenstein's early philosophy: a linguistic optimism. Everything that exists can be said by propositions. Or even stronger, a precondition to existence is the possibility to be said. Rewriting berkeley's main claim in a tractatian spirit we could say that *to be is to be able to be said*.

By the propositions of logic the essence of world is revealed silently, but explicitly. Hence, in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, logic is a kind of regenerated and realistic metaphysics. It is different from the realism of Frege and Russell and it is also different from what the positivists from the Vienna Circle held. Assuming what Wittgenstein has written in his Notebooks 14-16, in 12.10.14, as paradigmatic – “The trivial fact that a completely analyzed proposition contains just as many names as there are things contained in its reference; this fact is an example of the all-embracing representation of the world through language” – I think it is suitable to hold that logic, in tractatian account, is another example from this linguistic optimism phenomenon.

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Wittgenstein, Scepticism and Contextualism

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One of the most important aspects of Wittgenstein's later work is the critique of scepticism. Although radical scepticism is not taken seriously by non-philosophers, many philosophers believe that an adequate account of human knowledge must offer a convincing answer to the sceptical challenge. There are dissenting voices, philosophers who dismiss at the outset the idea of a refutation of scepticism, but there is at least one reason to address the sceptical problem: by responding to radical objections against the possibility of knowledge, the epistemologist is forced to clarify the nature of knowledge and epistemic justification. In fact, facing the sceptical challenge may involve the two basic tasks of traditional epistemology: to clarify and validate human knowledge. In what follows, I will outline the main points of Wittgenstein's analysis of scepticism (1); show the crucial role that a contextualist account of justification plays in his rejection of scepticism (2); point out the significance of Wittgenstein's thought for the contemporary debate on scepticism (3) and epistemological contextualism (4).

1. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein proposed a therapeutic approach to philosophy, according to which we should "bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (Wittgenstein 1958: §116). As a result, philosophy is conceived as a purely descriptive activity aiming at conceptual clarity, as a grammatical investigation whose object is language in its use: "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is" (*ibid.*, §124). This conception of philosophy leads him to a sort of "linguistic phenomenology" (to use Austin's phrase), which is well illustrated in the analysis that Wittgenstein presents in *On Certainty* regarding the linguistic use of "to know" and "to doubt". It is precisely in the light of these linguistic descriptions that Wittgenstein develops a critical analysis of scepticism.

Let us, first, evaluate the significance of the Wittgensteinian analysis of the grammar (in his sense) of doubt. His description of the game of doubting undermines the sceptical idea of a universal doubt. If we observe linguistic uses, we notice that doubt requires reasons and must be relevant in practice. As a result, we are entitled, by ordinary standards, to ignore many possible doubts (including, above all, sceptical doubts). Moreover, "the game of doubting itself presupposes certainty" (Wittgenstein 1975: §115). Three reasons may be invoked in defence of such a claim. First, doubt would be inexpressible if we were not certain of any linguistic meaning. Second, semantic certainties presuppose that we are certain of at least some facts: to question the truth of some particular sentences (e.g., "This [my hand] is a hand") denotes semantic ignorance. As Wittgenstein puts it: "If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meanings of your words either" (*ibid.*, §114). Third, doubt involves the possibility of tests, but tests are possible only if we take something for granted.

From the standpoint of everyday linguistic practices, there are, accordingly, propositions beyond doubt; "our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those

turn" (*ibid.*, §341). May we conclude that these propositions are object of knowledge? Wittgenstein answers this question by analysing the grammar of the verb 'to know', its real use in everyday or practical contexts. It is easy to show that, in such contexts, we only use the verb 'to know' when it makes sense to ask for and give reasons or justifications, when mistakes and doubts are possible and when we are conveying relevant information to our interlocutors. But our most fundamental beliefs or propositions do not fulfil these conditions. They are beyond doubt and justification. This suggests the existence of a fundamental difference between certainty and knowledge.

Moore, in the context of his refutation of scepticism, had famously given some examples of propositions that he claimed to know with certainty or, as he called them, "obvious truisms", propositions like "Here is one hand". Wittgenstein agrees that such propositions (common sense certainties as well as biographical truisms) are indeed certain, but he denies that they are instances of knowledge. He remarks, for instance, that it would be inappropriate to say: "I know that I have two hands" (*ibid.*, §414). It is, in fact, quite difficult to find contexts where the utterance of such a sentence makes sense. This sentence and similar ones belong to the foundations of our practices and language games, and this status sets them apart from the game of asking for and giving reasons. The most distinctive aspect of Wittgenstein's account of certainty consists in the idea that our certainties cannot be explained in purely epistemic terms; on the contrary, what ultimately explains the fundamental role of certain propositions or beliefs is their intimate connection with our practices. It is the form of life that determines what must be taken for granted. In Wittgenstein's words: "Giving grounds [...] comes to an end; - but the end [...] is our acting, which lies at bottom of the language-game" (*ibid.*, §204).

2. Wittgenstein's analysis of scepticism is committed to a contextualist account of justification. We can clarify such an account by contrasting it with two classical theories of justification: foundationalism, the view that there is a privileged class of beliefs or propositions that provide a solid and unshakable foundation for knowledge; and coherentism, the view that denies the existence of such foundational beliefs and asserts that beliefs are justified if integrated in a coherent belief system. Wittgenstein offers a viable alternative to both foundationalist and coherentist theories of knowledge. He is not a foundationalist, because he rejects the idea of *intrinsically* basic beliefs. There are basic beliefs, but their privileged status cannot be explained in epistemic terms; they are not selfjustifying and cannot be justified on the basis of sense experience. Basic beliefs owe their privileged status to pragmatic and social factors that may vary with the context. On the other hand, coherentism is also incorrect. Even if it can explain the privileged status of certain propositions (by appealing, for instance, to the centrality of some beliefs in our belief system), traditional coherentism remains at an epistemic level and neglects the pragmatic dimension of certainty. But the foundations of knowledge are, as we have seen, non-epistemic: they lie in our practices, in our form of life.

Wittgenstein's contextualism plays a central role in his rejection of scepticism, because it undermines a fun-

damental principle that is shared both by traditional epistemologists like Descartes and radical sceptics: the principle that one must eliminate all error-possibilities in order to hold legitimately a belief. In fact, contextualism and scepticism disagree on the burden of proof: the sceptic claims that a believer has the burden of providing reasons for all her beliefs, whereas the Wittgensteinian contextualist, following the ordinary uses of “to doubt”, claims that the real burden consists in providing reasons for doubts. The following passage clearly expresses the gist of Wittgenstein’s contextualism: “But what about such a proposition as ‘I know I have a brain’? Can I doubt it? Grounds for *doubt* are lacking! Everything speaks in its favour, nothing against it. Nevertheless it is imaginable that my skull should turn out empty when it was operated on” (*ibid.*, §4). In this case, a doubt is logically possible, but pragmatically absurd; “a reasonable man does not have certain doubts” (*ibid.*, §220). In a clear opposition to foundationalism, Wittgenstein claims, therefore, that “at the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded” (*ibid.*, §253).

The preceding considerations make it clear that Wittgenstein’s contextualism is compatible with a recent model of the structure of justification; the Default-and-Challenge model. The idea can be found in Robert Brandom’s *Making It Explicit* and was developed by Michael Williams. According to this model, I do not need to present justifying reasons for all my beliefs, but only for those beliefs that are challenged on the basis of relevant objections. In the absence of such objections, I am entitled (by default) to hold my current beliefs.

3. I will now argue that the Wittgensteinian analysis of scepticism contains valuable insights for contemporary discussions on scepticism. We may say that there are two basic types of sceptical arguments (cf. Cohen 1998) or, more precisely, two basic principles that can be used in sceptical arguments: the closure principle and the underdetermination principle. We can shed some light on these principles through an analysis of the so-called Argument from Ignorance, which follows the following scheme (O stands for an ordinary proposition, like “I have two hands”, and SH stands for a sceptical hypothesis, like the hypothesis of the brain-in-a-vat):

1. I do not know that not-SH.
2. If I do not know that not-SH, then I do not know that O.
- C. I do not know that O.

One tempting response to this argument consists in denying the second premise, but the task is difficult. The premise is supported by the so-called closure principle, according to which knowledge is “closed” under known entailment. In more explicit terms, if I know that *p* and if I also know that *p* implies *q*, then I know that *q*. Accordingly, if I claim to know that I have two hands, I must also know, among other propositions, that I am not a brain-in-a-vat, because this proposition is entailed by my claim. The closure principle seems intuitive, but Dretske challenged it in an influential paper published in 1970 (“Epistemic Operators”). He claimed that epistemic operators like “S knows that...” are “semi-penetrating” in the sense that our knowledge of a proposition is not transmitted across all its entailments. Dretske distinguished between relevant and irrelevant alternatives to a knowledge claim, and argued that knowledge requires only the exclusion of relevant alternatives. Because sceptical scenarios are, in everyday contexts, irrelevant alternatives, we can possess knowledge even being unable to refute sceptical counterpossibilities.

Wittgenstein also seems to reject the closure principle (cf. Williams 1996: 187), but, in comparison with Dretske, he has a more acute awareness of the pragmatic dimension of knowledge. In fact, by stressing that some propositions owe their privileged status to non-epistemic factors, he makes a crucial distinction between certainty and knowledge, a distinction that makes it easier to reject the closure principle. Many philosophers are understandably reluctant to abandon the principle, because it really seems contradictory to assert simultaneously “I know that I have two hands” and “I do not know that I am a brain-in-a-vat”. However, seen from a Wittgensteinian perspective, the contradiction tends to disappear. Suffice it to say that, according to Wittgenstein, the first sentence contains an inappropriate use of the verb “to know”. Because certainty has a pragmatic, non-epistemic dimension, the requirement to *know* all the entailments of a claim may be rejected.

Another basis for radical scepticism is the underdetermination principle. According to it, the available evidence underdetermines the truth of O and SH (in the Argument from Ignorance), in the sense that it is compatible with the truth of both of them. The following passage of *On Certainty* indicates clearly what is wrong with such an appeal to the notion of evidence: “My having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as anything that I could produce in evidence for it. That is why I am not in a position to take the sight of my hand as evidence for it” (Wittgenstein 1958: §250). In other words, the evidence is relevant only at the level of knowledge, not at the level of the basic certainties of our language games.

4. The publication in 1970 of Dretske’s influential paper “Epistemic Operators” caused a significant interest in contextualism, but some of its developments are not in tune with Wittgenstein’s thought. In fact, philosophers like Cohen, Lewis and DeRose, working in the framework of the Relevant Alternatives model of knowledge, came to the conclusion that abandoning the closure principle is an artificial way to meet the sceptical challenge. Instead of sacrificing an intuitive and plausible principle, they argue that knowledge ascriptions are context-sensitive in the sense that the standards presupposed by those ascriptions vary with the conversational context. At one end of the spectrum, in ordinary contexts, we have low standards and access to knowledge; at the other end, in the context of epistemological reflections, characterized by stringent epistemic standards, it is impossible to refute sceptical hypotheses and to possess knowledge. This form of contextualism is called conversational contextualism because a participant in a conversation can, by making reference to new epistemic possibilities, suddenly raise the epistemic standards. An ascription of the same knowledge claim to the same subject on the basis of the same evidence may be true at an initial stage of a conversation and be false at a later stage...

Wittgenstein would reject this form of contextualism. First of all, it concedes too much to the sceptic, because in philosophical contexts, where sceptical hypotheses are salient, the sceptic wins. For Wittgenstein, however, there is not a special philosophical context where the sceptical wins. His aim is to bring words from their metaphysical to everyday use; by doing that, he dissolves these special contexts. Moreover, some remarks of *On Certainty* anticipate a compelling objection that contextualists like Michael Williams direct against conversational contextualism; the objection that the radical sceptic does not raise the standards of knowledge, but simply changes the subject. If a scientist, for instance, during an empirical research, considers the hypothesis that she is a brain-in-a-vat, this is not

a normal raising of standards on the basis of a pertinent doubt or objection motivated by the research; when she considers far-fetched sceptical hypotheses she ceases to be a scientist and becomes a philosopher.

In sum, we may conclude that Wittgenstein's later work still maintains its relevance to epistemology.

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Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge: Revisiting Searlean Notion of Brute and Institutional Facts

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I

What is meant by saying scientific knowledge is a social construct? In order to delve into this question it would be most appropriate to begin with what we do not mean here by it.

1. It is not an attempt to reduce scientific conceptions like objectivity, experimental character and explanatory and predictive achievements as just socially construed.
2. It is also not a denial of the existence of an external reality. Rather, we look for establishing meaningful associations between the epistemic concerns of philosophers of science and the ontological prerequisite proposed by practicing scientists.
3. Also, we are not claiming like 'earlier Kuhn' that truth is only a term with 'inter-theoretic application' (Kuhn, 1970: 266).

I would use Searle's conception of brute and institutional facts and the distinction made between the two to elaborate on the nature of social construction of scientific knowledge. The emphasis is on the dependence of scientific enterprise on institutional facts. But the goal of scientific enterprise is guided by the collective sensitivity to the 'truth'. It is attainable only by establishing epistemic access to the brute facts of the external reality. Though brute facts, according to Searle, are available to us through human intentionality and experiential aspect of reality, the experiential access to the brute facts does not beget comprehension or understanding of them. Mere touch, seeing, or sensation caused by the objects of the world would not result into 'knowing them'. Knowledge, particularly scientific, emerges when the reality is reached through theory laden apparatus or a theoretical construction, a conceptual scheme or conceptual box to 'know' what reality is – what is touched, seen etc. However, this construal may lead to a misrepresentation of reality and there is no sure shot way to avoid it too. But this is the only way to know, scientifically or otherwise, what reality is.

II

Scientific enterprise has been generally seen as proposing theories which divulge the reality to us. It is a reality which is socially and ideologically constructed and serves as a subject matter for the discourses and narratives in which people choose to participate. Also, the method in science is viewed as being richer in its details and less dogmatic in its outline.

Keeping this in mind, some central questions I am concerned with are: Can epistemic inquiry in science proceed independent of theoretical commitments? How much of the claims made and conclusions reached in science are determined by reason and how much of it is influenced by the social, political and economic environment within which the methods in science are adopted and legitimized. Are scientific facts, constructed for science or are discovered to explain the observable phenomena? What would be called a good reasoning in science?

Much of the knowledge, scientific or otherwise, which we possess, has been possible because of a *complex web of epistemic dependence-relations*. It would be quite an audacious claim to make that any one of us can be separately self-sufficient in knowledge. Much of the knowledge which each of us possess has been obtained from the collective. The very engagement in imparting knowledge is made possible because of being in agreement with (on the concerned aspects) and belongingness to a community. Imparting of knowledge succeeds only when the participants in such exchange are able to make common assumptions- articulated or unarticulated. Knowledge cannot be entirely solitary. Knowledge necessarily involves "understanding" which is transmissible. The whole of scientific knowledge is being constructed and its progress is being accounted for by legitimizing the collective knowledge.

There have been attempts to view science as being concerned with a subject matter which is free from human consciousness and history. Even, the general world view is created in confirmation with this belief that science deals only with the constants of human knowledge and rationality. The culture of science too promotes this understanding and adds in dehistoricizing and impersonalizing scientific vocation. Scientific knowledge, in this way, seems to be attained without taking into consideration human environment and without giving an account of interpersonal realities.

Kuhn's contribution lies in questioning science viewed as an enterprise which is completely objective and impersonal. It would be inappropriate to accept the concept of science as a fully cumulative, impersonal mass of knowledge. It is important to locate its socio-cultural and psychological roots. Denial of these roots "creates an abstract, reified structure of scientific knowledge" (Nandi 2001: P.11) which can often act as a "defensive shield against both the outside world and the alien aspects of the scientist's own self." It becomes imperative for those who would like to see science in an "image of an affectless, pure science" in order to create or search for at least one area of life which deals with impersonal rational knowledge. As Kuhn has said, this is part of the world culture of science and the search for a pure, scientific science is a characteristic of scientists as a group.

Kuhn's formulation of social construction of science in his master piece *The Structure of scientific Revolution* is primarily based on: (Kuhn 1962)

1. *Scientific community* begins with some set of *received beliefs* (p. 4).
2. *Normal science* "is predicated on the assumption that the scientific community knows what the world is like." (p. 5).
3. *Research* is "a strenuous and devoted attempt to force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by professional education" (p. 5)

4. A *Paradigm shift* in professional commitments to shared assumptions takes place when an *anomaly* "subverts the existing tradition of scientific practice". These *Gestalt Shifts* leads to *scientific revolutions* (p. 6).

Kuhn claims that there is no theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like 'really there'. He says "the notion of a match between the ontology of a theory and its 'real' counterpart in nature now seems to me illusive in principle." (Kuhn 1962). His argument, what we may call, "trapped in a box argument" has some truth in it. In principle the only information accessible to the subject is contained within the box. In that case transcendence is impossible.

But Kuhn has stretched the social constructionist understanding of science to its extreme. Limiting scientific progress only as "normal science" de-links this interpretation from the very progress made by the modern sciences. Predictive and explanatory success in science, the approximation towards the understanding of natural phenomena would not be more than, in Putnam's word, a 'miracle' if normal science is true.

III

John Searle in his book, *The Construction of Social Reality* (1995: 2) made a distinction between brute reality and institutional reality. *Brute reality* consists of non-institutional facts or brute facts and is independent of human agency. Hydrogen atoms have one electron or Earth is more hot near equator etc. are not dependent on human institution. On the other hand *institutional reality* is dependent of human agency and on facts dependent on human agreements. Institutional facts require human institutions for their existence. A hundred rupee bill is nothing more than a piece of paper without a institution of money. An institutional fact is a constituent of social reality in an institutional context. Institutional facts are generally created by speech acts, utterances by authorized people in specific context which change social reality. The institutional fact came into being when the brute fact occurred in a particular institutional context. Searle's indicative shorthand is "*brute fact X counts as institutional fact Y in context C*". So the coming into existence of our institutional fact was partly a physical phenomenon. The proposed move is *from physics to collective acceptance* of a status of function.

These distinctions would be useful in appreciating the social nature of scientific knowledge. In agreement with Searle, I deny the claim that all of reality is somehow a human creation; there are no brute facts, but only facts dependent on the human agency; hence whole of scientific knowledge is construed socially. I also acknowledge Searle's External Realism which would hold significance for a scientist. I agree that there are facts in the world. But it is not agreeable that correspondence with them make our statements true. Such correspondence can never be attained with certainty. However, this doesn't mean that epistemic inquires of these facts are futile. Such investigations in science enhance our understanding of the given reality. Though again it wouldn't be appropriate to claim reaching at final theory which proposes a corresponding relation with the reality.

Epistemic inquiry in science is importantly related with the ontological investigation of the world. How the existence of brute facts relate with the institutional facts that exist in the world? In order to respond to this question we need to give an account of the features of larger ontology. Searle claims that institutional facts depend on brute

facts. Institutional facts are possible only in the light of brute facts. There are two theses here:

1. The view that there are facts those are language-dependent. There are propositions which are representing state-of-affairs. That would still exist even if the proposition expressing them did not. For example, 'sea water is salty', 'dog has fleas' etc.
2. The view that institutional facts require a world of non-institutional items that get understood in a particular manner.

But, appropriate analysis of scientific knowledge reveals that there are things which cannot be so constructed. They exist independent of individual intentionality. The facts stated in science are based on the proposed and accepted theories which constitutes number of theoretical entities like electrons, gravitons, force, energy etc. These theoretical entities would loose their existence outside the human institution of science. Hence they represent institutional reality and the facts like 'photons are light particles' are not brute but institutional facts. Even to know a particular colour in terms of the spectrum would require a particular system to give it a status of a fact. Hence, epistemic access to the brute facts is possible only through institutional facts which are constituted in a human institution- science, in this case.

One may object that it opens the possibility of constructing a distorted picture of reality and may create a *consensuous paradigmatic dominance* depending on the system of description adapted to reach out the brute reality. In other words, the content of any so called brute fact, in that case, would depend on the dominant institutional system. As Berger and Luckmann explain "Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things...The reified world is, by definition, a dehumanized word. It is experienced by man as a strange facticity, an *opus alienum*, over which he has no control rather than as the *opus proprium* of his own productive activity (1966: 89). We do not subscribe to this account. Though, one may not rule out the possibility of disjuncture or likely distortion but the collective intentionality of the community doesn't aim at it. Moreover, explanatory and predictive success in science is a reliable way to know where it is headed for.

Further, Searle's explanation of this distinction between brute and institutional facts in terms of constitutive rules (Searle 2000: 123) would also have similar problem, when applied to comprehend the social nature of scientific knowledge. He proposes a distinction between two different kinds of rules: regulative and constitutive. Some rules regulate antecedently existing forms of behaviour. These are the regulative rules which govern the already existing activity. One may walk or drive on any side of the road. But rules formulated to regulate walking or driving only on a particular side of a road would be regulative rules. Constitutive rules on the other hand, are those which not only regulate an activity but also constitute the very activity which is regulated by these rules. Rules of any developed game, cricket, chess, baseball etc. would fall into this category of rules. According to him institutional facts only exist within the system of constitutive rules.

In this framework, what would be the status of natural laws? It appears that they play some kind of regulative role in making the pre-existing reality comprehensible to us. Moreover, all the laws of nature are discovered. They seem to be pre-existing in nature independent of human institution. But on a closer examination we would find that the laws of nature are not really discovered but con-

structured. They cannot be called having the regulative rules as they do not regulate the pre-existing nature like traffic on road being regulated by traffic rules. Instead, natural laws are being constructed by us in order to make sense of the phenomena of nature. Their applicability is not always universal i.e. scientists often encounters instances of violation of such laws in nature which forces them even to reject some of them or construct newer once for more comprehensive understanding of the phenomena. Also, the scientific facts based on such laws are not independent of the collective intentionality of the scientific community.

To sum up, Searle's concepts of brute and institutional facts, when submitted for application in scientific enterprise, seem to reverse the dependence relation Searle has proposed, between the two. In case of observational or experimental investigation in science we call some facts brute and attempt to have an epistemic access only because of certain entrenched institutional facts. Without denying the existence of an external reality and brute facts, scientific knowledge is construed as entrenched in institutional life.

Interestingly, Searle seems to have realized this complexity of relation between brute and institutional facts. So little later in the book he writes that 'we do not have separate and mutually exclusive classes of brute and institutional facts. The whole point or at least much of the point, of having institutional facts is to create and gain social control of the brute facts.' This is precisely what I would like to subscribe to. But I do not see how Searle would still retain the correspondence theory of truth when we have accepted to be trapped in the box – social, institutional, conceptual. Also the move is not anymore from the physics to collective acceptance of a status of function. It rather gets reversed if institutional facts are meant to create and gain social control of the brute reality.

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Wittgenstein versus Hilbert

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The basic problem with the meta-mathematical tradition is that it has never investigated the forms of speech that enable one to talk about the *content* of sentences, even though it is well known that Frege wanted Hilbert's formulae to express thoughts (see, e.g. McGuinness 1980, p48). Frege's 'horizontal', which was a kind of content stroke, has not been copied in later developments of his logic, and only more recently has any other comparable symbol been promoted, for example the angle brackets for propositions in (Horwich 1998).

The abandonment of Fregean thoughts was not helped by the attack on propositions by Quine. But Hilbert's meta-mathematical programme was more fundamental, since that held, first of all, that it was all and only axiomatic structures that were the proper subject of foundational study. It is this study that has had the widest impact, not only in Mathematics but also in Logic. As Hilbert developed it, though, it had a singular difference in character from earlier studies of axiomatic structures. For Hilbert's approach was explicitly *meta-linguistic*, i.e. concerned just with the language, and formulae that appeared in the axioms.

Hilbert established the plausibility of his line of research with his axiomatisation of Geometry, which dispensed with Euclidean figures, and proceeded entirely by means of logic from completely explicit geometrical postulates. The removal of diagrams took foundational studies away from 'intuition' in the philosophical sense. More plainly, it takes one away from what the language in the axioms is about. As a result, despite wanting to say he had provided a foundation for 'Geometry' Hilbert had nothing to say about the lines and points in Euclid. Certainly the words 'line' and 'point' appear in Hilbert's axioms, but they were taken to apply simply to anything that satisfied the axioms. So the fact that those axioms *did* apply to Euclid's elements was quite incidental to Hilbert's interests, and remained something Hilbert did not attempt to provide any foundation for (see, e.g. McGuinness 1980, pp40-41).

The basic error in Hilbert's programme was therefore that it gave no account *at all* of what is true in a model of some formulae, being deliberately concerned entirely with the formulae themselves. Hilbert considered the consistency of his formal systems to be very important, but it would require more than consistency to establish results about numbers from proofs in the kind of arithmetical formal system he was concerned with. There would need to be some proof of the *soundness* of that formal system, on the standard interpretation, before one could show even that $2+3=5$, for instance. This follows from the character of Hilbert's Meta-mathematics just in itself, it is important to note: there was no need to wait on Gödel, for instance, to point it out. Gödel's Theorems do not show, that is to say, that while some standard arithmetical truths are provable meta-mathematically, others are not. In fact *none* are, since any derivation within a formal arithmetical system must be supplemented with a demonstration of its soundness, on the standard interpretation, before any standard arithmetical facts can be proved on its basis.

A grammatical point about the difference between sentences and propositions is crucial to seeing the detail

of the needed correction to Hilbert. Sentences are mentioned using quotes, but when used (on the standard interpretation) they express propositions which are designated by the associated 'that'-clauses (c.f. McGuinness 1980, p164). The turnstile symbol in systems of formal logic and arithmetic is therefore mistakenly read, if it is read 'it is deducible that'. For the turnstile symbol is a meta-level predicate of sentences, whereas the reading then given involves an object-level operator. The contrast can be made even more sharp once one remembers the fact that 'it is deducible that p' is equivalent to 'that p is deducible'. For the latter is of a subject-predicate form, and so the predicate 'is deducible' in it is an object-level predicate expressing a property of propositions. To get from the meta-level predicate of sentences to the object-level property of propositions one needs a proof of the soundness of the formal system involved, on the standard interpretation, and the processes involved in this additional matter of soundness have to be of quite a different character from any involved in the system in question. Indeed they cannot be formalistic at all.

Unlike a proposition about a sentence, a proposition about a proposition is not about a purely syntactic form, i.e. some symbols independently of their meaning. But propositions about sentences have dominated the Philosophy of Mathematics since Hilbert's Meta-mathematics got its grip. So, clearly they have done so illicitly, because of the above points. Certainly meta-linguistic remarks about sentences have, quite properly, entered into the theory of computing, since a computer, of course, cannot take account of the meaning of any of the symbols fed into it. But the bulk of mathematics is not a meta-linguistic study of symbols, and is instead concerned with propositions about other things: proving $\langle 2+3=5 \rangle$, for example, rather than deriving '2+3=5'. Moreover, it is concerned with proving $\langle 2+3=5 \rangle$ *absolutely*, whereas derivations in a formal system are always relative to the axioms and rules that define that system. One might derive '2+3=5' from axioms 'A₁', ..., 'A_n', using rules R₁, ..., R_n, but when proving $\langle 2+3=5 \rangle$ there is no such relativity. Of course a proof *is* involved in the formal case, since $\langle 2+3=5 \rangle$ is derivable from axioms 'A₁', ..., 'A_n', using rules R₁, ..., R_n is proved. But what is then proved is not $\langle 2+3=5 \rangle$.

The point shows that it is probably not an accident that most working mathematicians to this day (like Wittgenstein), give so little time to Gödel's Theorems. For, specifically, they are not relevant to the Foundations of Mathematics, if that is concerned, amongst other things, with the basis for what is true in the standard model of axiomatic arithmetics. Hence these results are not relevant to *Arithmetic*, as it was conceived before axiomatic studies of uninterpreted formal systems came into vogue, and, with them, non-standard models of such structures. In addition, a full proof of the fact that $2+3=5$, for instance, is not available from within them. Instead it can be drawn from such illustrations as the stick figure with five lines that Wittgenstein considers (Wittgenstein 1978, p58f). Only in a practical case like that, where the numerical terms are applied (and so are used and not just mentioned), does one get beyond numerals, and other symbols, and begin to work with their meanings. For geometrical examples see

Wittgenstein's remarks on the tangram-like puzzle picture (Wittgenstein 1978 p55, and Diamond 1976 p53), those on the proof that a hand and a pentagram have the same number of vertices (Wittgenstein 1978 p53-4, Diamond 1976 pp71, 115), and those on generating a vertical column from a series of rectangles or parallelograms (Wittgenstein 1978 pp57, 58, and Diamond 1976 p128). In such geometrical cases it is particularly clear that no string of sentences in a formal proof can get to anything in the right category, and so no symbolic computer can do so either, since no such computer can give an interpretation to the symbols it processes. But the same point holds even in the arithmetical case.

The common convention of not showing quotation marks around formulae does not help people remember what it is that is 'provable' — one should really say 'derivable' — in a formal system. Only formulae are derivable, and, clearly, there is no 'proof', involving just a series of formulae, that Peano's postulates are true on the standard interpretation, for instance. For the expression 'that Peano's Postulates are true on the standard interpretation' is a noun phrase, and not a sentence, and so, *a fortiori*, it is not the last sentence of any rule-governed series of sentences. Neither, of course, can any arithmetical fact be in this position, since the noun phrase 'that $2+3=5$ ', for instance, is equally not a sentence. So the proof of the arithmetical fact this noun phrase refers to has to be non-formal, at least at some stage, and can even proceed entirely in this way, as Wittgenstein has illustrated in cases such as those above.

The use of physical objects is one thing that is distinctive about Wittgenstein's proof that $2+3=5$ using a picture of five sticks grouped into a pair and a trio at one end, while all are collected together at the other end. But what is also significant is that Wittgenstein's discussion does not go into any further details, or more complex cases such as are found in (Parsons 1979-80), for example. It is consequently utterly basic and fundamental, being concerned merely with the *foundations* of mathematics — in the proper sense of 'foundations'. Wittgenstein's discussion principally concerns the use of sticks, and the like, as *paradigms* — paradigms of countable things, for a start, and then of two things, of three things, of five things, etc. in the particular case above. Such paradigms help fix the normative criteria associated with the types of thing represented by the physical tokens in question. Books on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics have not dwelt on these matters overmuch. But Frascolla is one commentator who addresses the required issues closely: he discusses in this connection Wittgenstein's diagrammatic proof that the fingers of a hand and the vertices of a pentacle are the same in number (Frascolla 1994, p133). The incorporation of such physical paradigms into the language, in other cases, such as The Standard Metre, and colour samples, is a well-known part of Wittgenstein's later analysis of 'simples' (Fogelin 1976, p108f, see also Baker and Hacker 1980).

It is ironic in this connection that Gödel believed in 'intuition', even though he was so much a Platonist that he believed there was another world of abstract objects accessible to a specifically mathematical intuition. For the traditional philosophical description for the particular use of ostension in diagrammatic proofs, was that it was a matter of applying one's 'intuition' — although that far more in the Kantian sense, which involved intuitions just of the spatio-

temporal world, leading to synthetic *a priori* truths rather than trivially verbal, analytically *a priori* ones. What is also highly ironic is that the philosophical problems Hilbert overlooked in his meta-mathematical programme have a formal resolution in the improved predicate logic he himself introduced — the Epsilon Calculus — through its representation of Wittgensteinian simples (Slater 2007). The place of such simples in Mathematics, it then becomes clear, substantiates Wittgenstein's later, more sympathetic view of the synthetic *a priori*, the possibility of which had been ruled out in the Tractatus.

The more general moral to be drawn from this concerns the *extent* of the synthetic *a priori*. Euclid's use of diagrams in his geometrical proofs, and similar uses of physical figures in connection with the calculus, for example, were criticised on a number of grounds, particularly after the development of Analytical Geometry, by Descartes, and rigorous Analysis by Cauchy and Weierstrass. Hilbert's diagram-less presentation of traditional Geometry, which was a prelude to his promotion of Meta-mathematics, was, as we have seen, one outcome of this kind of attitude to the use of what Kant would have called 'intuition'. Nevertheless, it is clear that Meta-mathematics is still 'synthetic' in Kant's sense. For the results about symbols that have been favoured more recently in Logic, and Meta-mathematics still have an 'intuitive' basis. The point not only illuminates the more recent tradition, of course, but also reflects back on the more ancient one, where the use of diagrams was more prominent, and more trusted.

How does the synthetic *a priori* arise in Meta-mathematics? Here one may remember that computers necessarily operate on physical elements of various kinds — elements that are carefully controlled to be correct tokens of certain types of symbol. The quality control that guarantees that the tokens in question, in any particular case, do have the necessary representative properties — and so can be taken to be paradigmatic in Wittgenstein's sense — is hidden from the generality of users. But large departments in hardware producers, like IBM and Apple for instance, have to be involved in ensuring this. The processes in doing addition and multiplication by means of an electronic calculator, therefore, are in principle no different from the processes involved in doing the same sums with the aid of an abacus, for example, or with paper and pencil. Certainly one thinks of computers as being more reliable than humans at repetitive tasks, but that is only a matter of degree, and there is no doubt that some humans have developed very trustworthy skills with other physical processes.

The more general consequence is, therefore, that Hilbert's attempt to escape from Kantian 'intuition' and dispense with the synthetic *a priori* did no such thing. The very processes that Hilbert promoted generated knowledge of necessary truths by means of certain physical items — simply symbols in place of diagrams. But that undermines the principle behind the motivation for Hilbert's formal presentation of traditional Geometry. There is no difference *in principle* between a visual proof of a Euclidean geometric fact about circles, for instance, and a symbolic proof of the related, meta-mathematical fact about the word 'circle' in Hilbert's Formal Geometry. So the ultimate point is that Kant was entirely right about Mathematics being derived from the forms of human intuition.

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The World as States of Affairs in Wittgenstein and Armstrong

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In this paper it will be presented two points of view on states of affairs: Wittgenstein's one in time of the *Tractatus* and one of David Malet Armstrong in his book *A World of States of Affairs*. The first section of the article is dedicated to analyzing 'facts' in Wittgenstein. The general form of proposition determines a logical model of the world linguistically reflected. The second section is devoted to Armstrong's point of view on the way of considering states of affairs. It presupposes involving relations as elements of this world. In the third section it will be offered a possible conjunction of their standpoints.

The *Tractatus*' scheme of the world impacts an idea of its universality. Without any pernicious holism it was affirmed that there were states of affairs. The case was that not every state of affairs has corresponded ontologically the world. Also, it was doubt to build up the world of states of affairs as of bricks. But there is no doubt it was made to structure the very world. Grammatically or ontologically, it was made by means of polishing of its hard stones. The structure of the world is to be represented in propositions. There were broken so many lances over these questions.

1. Mainly it was an ontological problem of Wittgenstein's interest that made him construct and construe the model of the world as facts. A well-known passage about a state of affairs as a combination of objects is considered in the light of his logicism. The *Tractatus*' things are logical ones. They form the world that is presented in sets.

As the question of relations is a logical one, it is to analyse the correlation between sets of things and their relations in a state of affairs. Earlier thoughts of the author of the *Notebooks* were inquiring into the very expression about relations:

"Are we misled into assuming "relations between relations" merely through the apparent analogy between the expressions: "relations between things" and "relations between relations"?" (Wittgenstein 1998)

The problem of relations between things has quite a long history. Probably, it originates more systematically from the materialist tradition. But it has nothing common with the question of facts that are only significant when relations are observed. As Wittgenstein assumes in 4.122

...It is impossible, however, to assert by means of propositions that such internal properties and relations obtain: rather, this makes itself manifest in the propositions that represent the relevant states of affairs and are concerned with the relevant objects. (Wittgenstein 1971)

The facts have structural properties and structural relations that make them facts. Relations in turn are conditions of their being facts. But it is not in a proposition where facts (states of affairs) are observed. As they are shown in propositions it is possible to analyze them in order to investigate what is the case, and what is not. Internal relations are equally unclear as external ones. A thing to be considered here is the question how to treat them in the way of inquiring of the world as a conjunction of states of affairs.

Being irrelevant to some situation, things are not making any state of affairs. As words of a mentally ill person make no sense, a conjunction of things that are *out of place* does not. In the *Tractatus* it was found an analytical method of observation of propositions that was showing the world's logical framework. It was a picturing property of propositions.

Regarding the later in the course of an analysis as limits of a description of the world one should consider the propositions and the whole language as a set of relations. In this case a description of the world is possible in a definite and cleared-up theory expressed in propositions.

2. What Armstrong is accepting in Wittgenstein consists in the notion of states of affairs, as he manifests himself:

The hypothesis of this work is that the world, all that there is, is a world of states of affairs. Others, Wittgenstein in particular, have said that the world is a world of facts and not a world of things. These theses are substantially the same, though differently expressed. (Armstrong 1997)

And that the world is a world of facts is considered as a system of ontological relations that are problematized. The later is a question of the Independence of states of affairs in the *Tractatus*. If we agree with the world proposed by Wittgenstein it is only possible to consider different facts in different conditions independent one from other. These then will constitute a kind of a closed system that would present a possible world. But relations between states of affairs tie them in. The author of *A World of States of Affairs* gives an elucidative passage:

A state of affairs exists if and only if a particular (at a later point to be dubbed a *thin* particular) has a property or, instead, a relation holds between two or more particulars. Each state of affairs, and each constituent of each state of affairs, meaning by their constituents the particulars, properties, relations and, in the case of higher-order states of affairs, is a contingent existent. The properties and the relations are universals, not particulars. The relations are all external relations. (Armstrong 1997)

The question is what ontological status can a state of affairs obtain? As a state of affairs is facts in certain conditions that are relation between them, not even a possible world that they compose is questioned. To explain what kind of entity is relation it is necessary to consider its universality. It should seem a matter of metaphysics. But relations are not metaphysical entities. They are real ones. Another question that rises here is if they structure the world or are just isomorphic to it? If there is a kind of isomorphism then each state of affairs consists in a proper dimension that repeats the world. If so, then relations double the world. A thing to be considered here is what kind of distinction is in question. Armstrong emphasizes the point:

What *should* be done is to interpret the substance / attribute distinction as the recognition of monadic states of affairs. That would clear the way to recognize relations as constituents of polyadic states of affairs. (Armstrong 1997)

Regarding this complicated theme it is important to notice that mentioned distinction is directly related to a great amount of philosophical tradition investigating the subject. It is interesting here to appeal to facts as the matter concerns things that take a place in space and time. A location of a state of affairs in the spacetime system is defined by some coordinates that get things together. Corresponding relations have no place. They are reduced to connections supporting in the mind, as also was noticed by the author:

Relations are probably in the mind, or, more up to date, they are no more than classes of ordered classes of things. (Armstrong 1997)

On the one hand there is a world composed of states of affairs, and on the other, there is a number of situations in which these could take place. Circumstances that are significant in such a multidimensional world constitute limits within of which relations hold true for this state of affairs. But as the author is doubting of dependence of these and formulates theirs general form it is the question of a possible world of states of affairs. Each state of affairs is a part of a possible world. At least formally it is granted that there are relations structuring it.

3. It is important to notice here that both standpoints presented above were not opposed in the sense of a discussion. The world of the *Tractatus* is defined as a projection of the realm of facts. A world of states of affairs of the same named book was an independent structure of the spacetime however based on the notion of Wittgenstein. This fleeting glance gives no more than a hypothesis of that the relations are only in language in which they are put on things. That does not mean real dependences between things based on the laws of nature. The case is that not every state of affairs can be a real one even it is possible to describe it. A proper description of the world would consist in an analysis of all the possible worlds that are a scope of human imagination as well as of all the things. But as it was rightly noticed by Armstrong it would be a great mistake.

It is interesting to inquire what tool is used to operate on different circumstances in which states of affairs appear. Obviously there are too many problems with the ordinary language. But not less there are with any formal one. Nevertheless a perfect one probably would never be invented a question should be asked in order to clear up a point. Does the world of states of affairs exist only in language if relations are universals?

In Wittgenstein it is clear that only such a world can be. And the general form of proposition makes it possible to see it in language. Or, more correctly, the language shows the world. It seems there is no other way to know its structure but to observe propositions. Whatever is the way of speaking about different conditions that define facts, relations can only be propositions describing dependences between entities.

The Australian philosopher proposes to consider states of affairs as truthmakers for truths, and also assumes their possible character in the way of representing the truth:

To accept the need for a truthmaker is not, of course, to be automatically committed to states of affairs. It is to be formally committed to no more than to finding *something* that will make a truth true. But there seems to be no acceptable candidate for a truthmaker for statements that contingently link particulars to universals other than states of affairs. (Armstrong 1997)

Although there is a question what link is really possible in the matter (fundamental tie or not as it is argued by the author) relations are probably acceptable for the analysis of the very states of affairs. The world as a world of states of affairs is a linguistic construction of things that take places in the physical world. As it was noticed relations are entities with mental characteristics but facts are real ones in the same sense as the laws of nature. These define possible states of affairs that can be properly described by use of relations between them. Wittgenstein supposed independent states of affairs that would make possible worlds. Armstrong offered to take them as truthmakers for truths. To conclude it can be claimed an assumption of verification of trustworthiness of a state of affairs. If a state of affairs verifies its relation (in non-Wittgensteinian sense) with another one then it is true and vice versa. This is based on both accounts of states of affairs presented above: one of a logician and a factualist one.

Thus, there is a disjunction between the points of view of two philosophers. But there is also a conjunction that does not exclude interpreting facts and relations between them. The facts demand relations but these can present states of affairs themselves. Here is a conclusion of this essay: factual and relational (though not by contrast with each other) are double-sided model of the world. Investigation of it is a suitable mean for the investigation of the world as it is. The present paper is to contribute little clarification of the matter.

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Die Kritik der Metaphysik im Werk L. Wittgensteins „Philosophische Untersuchungen“

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Zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts gibt es eine Menge von bedeutenden wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten, die einem solchen Phänomen der Philosophiegeschichte gewidmet sind, wie „Metaphysik“ in ihrem negativen Sinne bzw. „metaphysisches Denken“. Insgesamt wird das „metaphysische Denken“ als ein solches Denken erfasst, das „immer der Grundlage zugewandt ist und sich mit Suche nach dieser Grundlage befasst“ (Kerimow 2007), die Grundlage wird als Existenzursache des Gegenstandes der Sinngebung erfasst, dabei erhält die Grundlage selbst notgedrungen die Züge des Absoluten (des Wesens eines höchsten Grades der Bestimmtheit und Vollendung, die keine Ergänzung, Präzisierung und Erklärung braucht, aber selbst als eine legitimierende Grundlage und ein unmenschliches Mass des Menschlichen auftritt). Woher und warum gewinnt dieses Denken seine Macht und warum ist es den Philosophen nicht recht?

Es wurde mehrmals unterstrichen, dass Metaphysik ihre tiefen Wurzeln wahrscheinlich in der Besonderheit der indogermanischen Sprachen hat. Das Wesen (eine andere objektive Realität) fixierend und hypostasierend, das dazu berufen ist, als Grundlage zu gelten, wobei diese Grundlage äusserst konkret und gleichzeitig universell sein soll, Grundlage der Existenz (und der Erkenntnis) eines anderen Wesens, wird eine gewisse Vollendung, Geschlossenheit und Unveränderbarkeit geschaffen. Eine solche Unveränderbarkeit tritt jedoch ständig in Widerspruch mit dem Streben (oder mit der inneren Notwendigkeit dieser Vollendung) über die Grenzen der Macht der Grundlage, des Zentrums hinauszugehen, die Freiheit zu gewinnen, dem Zwang seitens eines Prinzips oder Gesetzes abzuweichen und das Neue zu sehen. Eine solche Vollendung deckt selbst ihre Unmöglichkeit auf – man denke beispielsweise an das Einheitliche von Plato im Dialog „Parmenides“, das als selbstidentifiziert nicht über die Grenzen dieser Identifizierung hinausgeht und sogar nicht existiert.

Unser klassisches Philosophieren ist vorwiegend dem Wunsch untergeordnet, das fixierte System der Wechselbeziehungen von Ursache und Folge, Basis und Überbau zu bestimmen und aufzudecken, in diesem Zusammenhang wenden wir uns an spekulative Schemas und Modelle. Beim Lesen einer wissenschaftlichen Arbeit stellen wir im Kopf gewöhnlich ein gewisses „Bild“ auf, um Wahrnehmung und Verständnis zu erleichtern. Ohne dies wäre das Textverständnis unmöglich gewesen.

Viele geben vielleicht zu, dass der Gedanke Wittgensteins in „Philosophischen Untersuchungen“ ständig der einheitlichen theoretischen Struktur entgleitet; und bezieht sich bald auf ein bald auf ein anderes philosophisches Problem, zusammenhängend, aber systemlos. Dieses Entgleiten dem System veranschaulicht Vorstellungen Wittgensteins von unseren Erkenntnismöglichkeiten. Er weicht den Untersuchungen der allgemeinen Form des Satzes und der Sprache aus, weil er meint, dass alle gleichen „Erscheinungen keinen gewissen gemeinsamen Zug haben“, deswegen kann man sie nicht mit einem gemeinsamen Wort bezeichnen, aber sie sind miteinander verwandt durch vielfältige Mittel“ (Wittgenstein 1994). „Wir sehen ein kompliziertes Netz der Analogien, die auf einander gelegt und miteinander

verflochten sind, der Ähnlichkeiten im Grossen und Kleinen“ (Wittgenstein 1994) einem Faden gleich, und die Festigkeit des Fadens wird dadurch geschaffen, dass sich in ihm mehrere Fasern zusammen verflochten und nicht dadurch, dass eine Faser die Gesamtlänge des Fadens durchzieht“ (Wittgenstein 1994). Für die Erläuterung dieser Metapher unserer Erkenntnis des „Allgemeinen“ führt Wittgenstein eine ausreichende Menge von Beispielen an.

Er sieht die Lösung der Schwierigkeiten und Probleme der Philosophie (und vor allem ihrer Metaphysik, des „Leerlaufs“ der Sprache der Philosophie) nicht im Versuch eine gewisse Ganzheit aufzudecken (in deren Mittelpunkt eine notwendige Ursache steht) und ihre Ursache zu beseitigen, oder anders gesagt – das Wesen des Problems für seine Lösung aufzudecken, (genauso sieht er das Wesen der Philosophie nicht in der Suche nach Gründen – Ursachen und Erklärung der Phänomene). Auf die Haltlosigkeit der Aussprüche unseres Denkens hinweisend, genauer gesagt, auf illusionäre Vorstellungen von der Universalität des durch Denken gewonnen Wissens, versteht er die Berufung der Philosophie nur als eine phänomenologische Beschreibung der Sprache, die alle Versuche vermeidet, die Wirklichkeit mit den vorhandenen Schemas, Wesen, Ideen, Prinzip und Methode in Einklang zu bringen.

Die Sprache, im weitesten Sinne verstanden – als Realität der Tätigkeit des Menschen, seines Lebens, seiner Kommunikation und Erkenntnis, ist der einzige Bereich seines Seins (Lebensform). Wenn es unmöglich ist, etwas ausserhalb der Realität der Sprache (d. h. einer beliebigen Form der von den anderen zu verstehenden Tätigkeit) zu wissen und zu verstehen, so ist die beliebige Komplikation der Realität (ihre Teilung in die geistige und materielle Welt, in das Innere und Äussere, in Subjektives und Objektives) nur ein Teil der gleichen Realität des Sprachgebrauchs: „dort, wo unsere Sprache die Existenz des Körpers meint, obwohl er nicht vorhanden ist; dort ist man geneigt, über die Existenz des Geistes zu sprechen“ (Wittgenstein 1994), aber nur zu sprechen.

Die Teilung (Schaffung) der Welten hat eigentlich Recht, den Ausgang über die Sprachgrenzen hinaus (sie macht das im Rahmen ihres Sprachspiels und seiner Regeln) zu beanspruchen, aber jeder gleiche Ausgang wird immer ein Ausgang nur in eine andere Sprache und ein Sprachspiel sein, denn ausserhalb der Sprache gibt es keine Welt. Die Sprache ist jetzt nicht nur eine verbale Tätigkeit oder ein Zeichensystem, sondern eine beliebige Tätigkeit des Menschen, eine Form, in der sein Leben verläuft und in dieser Form gibt es Platz für beliebige Phänomene der menschlichen Existenz.

Die Wiedergabe der Sprache in Aktion und Erläuterung ihrer Arbeit hält Wittgenstein für eine wirklich effektive Strategie bei der Lösung der nachhaltigen philosophischen Probleme.

Das Ziel der echten Philosophie besteht jedoch nicht in der Erklärung (durch „authentische“ und verborgene Ursachen) oder Änderung (der objektiven Realität entsprechend dem „objektiv Echten“), sondern in der Erläuterung des Sinns eines uns im Gebrauch gegebenen Wortes und

Heilung des Sprechenden selbst von Illusion, die durch die Verwirklichung der Bedeutungen aus verschiedenen Kontexten, Lebensformen und Sprachspielen entstanden sind. Eben diese Verwirklichung ist die Quelle der Entstellungen im Verständnis, der Probleme und Schwierigkeiten. Die Verwirklichung selbst wird anscheinend aus der unüberlegten Sicherheit geboren, dass das Zeichen eine universelle Bedeutung haben sollte, die in einem beliebigen Sprachspiel richtig sein wird, und nicht nur in jenem, in dem es gewöhnlich gebraucht wird. Eine solche Sicherheit, ihrerseits, ist mit einer gewissen Hypostasierung der Bedeutung oder mit seiner Ontologisierung, Theologisierung verbunden (als ob die Bedeutung objektiv existiere, in einer separaten Welt, unveränderlich), hier tritt auch die Problemhaftigkeit zutage – die Bedeutung und ihren Referenten in Wechselbeziehung zu bringen, hier entsteht eine ernsthafte Frage nach der Möglichkeit des persönlichen – unverkennbar wahren Wissens (und der Sprache) etc.¹

Es geht wahrscheinlich sogar nicht darum, ähnliche Entstellungen (Vermischungen) der Bedeutungen in verschiedenen Sprachspielen oder in den Diskursen (z. B. Vermischung der Bedeutung des Namens und Genannten) zu vermeiden, weil Bestimmtheit und Eindeutigkeit der Bedeutung (seine Nichtentstellung) im Rahmen eines Sprachspiels bedingt ist (und ist ein Teil der Forderungen historisch und sozial bedingter Regeln eines Sprachspiels). Die Zielsetzung – die Vermischung zu vermeiden stellt erneut irgendwelches transzendente Prinzip, universelles apriori dar, die Grundlage bringt erneut den metaphysischen Fundamentalismus oder ein neues ähnliches Sprachspiel. Hier ist Wittgenstein tief und präzise: ein beliebiges existierendes Sprachspiel hat das Recht zu existieren, samt allen seinen Regeln. Oder noch genauer – es ist seltsam zu behaupten, dass das Bestehende Recht hat, zu existieren, es braucht keine Erlaubnis von irgendeiner Behörde für Verantwortung oder Verpflichtung, keinen Grund für seine Existenz: es existieren Sprachspiele – das ist alles, was wir in unserem Sprachspiel sagen können. „Das, was notwendig existierend zu sein scheint, gehört zur Sprache. In unserem Spiel ist es ein Paradigma: etwas, wodurch ein Vergleich verwirklicht wird. Und diese Festlegung kann man für eine wichtige Konstatierung halten, aber eine zu unserem Sprachspiel gehörende Konstatierung...“ (Wittgenstein 1994). In einem Spiel ist die Vermischung notwendig, in einem anderen aber nicht, aber worin besteht die Besonderheit der Position von Wittgenstein? Er beschreibt doch selbst faktisch die Sprache, präzisiert sie: da ist ein Sprachspiel des metaphysischen Denkens, da ist ein Schachspiel und da ist nichtmetaphysisches Denken.² Die Besonderheit besteht in der Fähigkeit, die Regeln seines Spiels zu erkennen, wenn sie eben als Regeln präzisiert werden – historisch und kontextuell im regelmäßigen Gebrauch herausgebildet.

Wittgenstein verzichtet nicht im Rahmen des Erfassens des Problems des Wissens auf seine „Objektivität“ (dies betrifft auch die Möglichkeit der Wahrnehmung der Ganzheit des zu erfassenden aufgrund eines Allgemeinen

(einer Grundlage), denn sonst wären wir gezwungen, sogar auf die Möglichkeit des Begreifens und der Erkenntnis verzichten). Aber diese „Objektivität“ des Wissens trägt einen besonderen Charakter: sie appelliert nicht an das Anderssein, an tief verborgenes Wesen oder an das, was „noch realer“ ist, die dazu berufen sind, die Glaubwürdigkeit des Wissens zu begründen (denn eine solche Grundlage würde eine neue Grundlage fordern und das bekannte Problem des Grundlagenregresses oder die Metaphysik des grundlagenlosen Über-Wesentlichen – die Theologie) zur Welt bringen, sie wendet sich an niemanden, ausser Wissen – Bedeutung selbst: sie ist ein Ergebnis der Regelmässigkeit des Gebrauchs eines Wortes oder eines Zeichens in einem bestimmten Kontext. Das Zeichen oder das Wort, samt ihrer Bedeutung, können an das Göttliche appellieren, sich auf die Tiefe stützen (oder sie brauchen die Eindeutigkeit der Auslegung und Begründung gar nicht), aber sie selbst schaffen nur durch ihren Gebrauch (als Wort Gott oder Stimme des unbewussten ES), durch ihr Vorhandensein in der Tätigkeit des Menschen eine Regel, Richtigkeit ihres Begreifens und ihre „soziale Objektivität“. Das Konzept „Bedeutung des Wortes ist sein Gebrauch in der Sprache“ (Wittgenstein 1994) lehnt also die Stabilität der Bedeutung nicht ab. Sie sichert nicht durch die Finger der Relativität, ihre Lage wird immer fester, sie ist das Ergebnis, das vom Wortgebrauch erwartet wird – ein anderes Wort oder als Zeichen auftretendes Verhalten, die eine Beziehung zwischen den Kommunikanten erscheinen lassen, die nicht notwendig, aber erwünscht und erwartet ist.³

Ohne auf das Denken zu verzichten, das auf die Suche nach den Ursachen und Grundlagen gerichtet ist, entdecken wir, dass eine solche Suche, Intention, Streben und vermutliches Resultat ein Teil des bestimmten Spiels mit seinen Regeln, nicht mehr und nicht weniger ein Teil der Lebensform ist.

Ob man über die Kritik des metaphysischen Denkens unter dem Gesichtswinkel der oben beschriebenen Ideen der „Philosophischen Untersuchungen“ sprechen darf? Die Antwort ist nein. Die Philosophie, vom Standpunkt des späteren Wittgenstein her, soll die „Frage heilen“, ihre Berufung ist, die Sprache eher zu präzisieren und die Metaphysik zu befragen und sie nicht zu kritisieren oder zu verändern. Es ist etwas anderes, dass das metaphysische Denken selbst ein solches Sprachspiel ist, das die Konzeption der Sprachspiele verneint, wozu ist es dann geeignet? Die Überwindung des metaphysischen Denkens soll nach den Regeln dieses Denkens erfolgen, sonst wird es sich selbst reproduzieren und die Kritik wird gerade diese Reproduktion sein, auf der Zuversicht in der objektiven Richtigkeit irgendeiner Position des Forschers gebaut. Die Überwindung besteht in der Akzeptanz der Metaphysik; im Ausgang über die Grenzen ihrer Regeln – Koordinaten hinweg, die einen Vergleich mit dem Muster – Ideal fordern; in der Präzisierung ihrer Sprache.

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¹ Alle in den „Philosophischen Untersuchungen“ zu analysierenden Einzelmente lassen sich durch ein einheitliches Element nicht verbinden, es fehlt ihnen etwas, was die übrigen bestimmen könnte – in diesen Momenten kann man keine Grenze der Erklärung in einer eindeutigen Klarheit und keine Gegebenheit des Öffentlichen finden. Sie alle sind vielfältig verbunden, ergänzen einander als Stützen, wenn wir eine davon wegnehmen, verlieren wir nichts.

² Im konkreten Kontext der Geschichte der Philosophie kann man bestimmte ähnliche Vermischungen entdecken: Vermischung des Symbolischen (Logischen) und des Ontologischen – Wortgebrauch als ontologische Argumentation, Vermischung des Theologischen und Ontologischen – Fundamentalisierung (Behauptung über Begründung und Unerschütterlichkeit) jener Vorstellungen, die kein Fundament besitzen. Vermutlich gewinnen gerade hier Probleme des metaphysischen Philosophierens die Realität, als Probleme vor allem der ganzen Sprache und ihres Gebrauchs.

³ Hier eröffnet die anthropologische und psychologische Dimension der Sprachspiele.

Wittgenstein, Reflexivity and the Social Construction of Reality

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Despite of the complex and changing nature of Wittgenstein's influence on twentieth century philosophy (Hacker 1996), a place even for a minority of contemporary Wittgensteinian scholars seems assured. While Wittgenstein read and criticised many of the main figures in the psychology of his time, including William James, Wolfgang Köhler and Sigmund Freud, Wittgenstein's position in psychology is rather more tenuous and summarized in simplistic narratives (e.g., Hergenhahn 2008). For example, even Bem and Looren de Jong's (2006) nuanced account of central positions in theoretical psychology attributes "Wittgenstein's major force in undermining positivism" to his "change of mind, turning away from his earlier positivist ideas towards a contrasting account of language and meaning" (p. 65). Furthermore, Wittgenstein's philosophical threat to the "positivist ideal of observation language as the (demarcation) criterion for legitimate science" is described as inspiring hermeneutics and social constructionism. Emphasising the latter approach, they note that "it is hardly surprising that some philosophers developed a relativistic viewpoint out of this. For example, the social psychologist Kenneth Gergen interprets this idea that all seeming assessments of facts are forms of social exchange" (p. 65).

A similar theme (and focus on Gergen) is developed in much more detail by Fiona Hibberd (2005). Hibberd's explicit target is social construction, a position which "emphasises the historicity, the context-dependence, and the socio-linguistically constituted character of all matters involving human activity" (p. viii). Using a *picture* of levels which is internal to much of the discourse about psychology and its problems, Hibberd distinguishes between two levels of Wittgenstein-inspired social constructionism. At what could be called the lower, applied *level* of psychology, she describes social constructionism as the view that "the psychological processes of human beings are, it is said, essentially social, and are acquired through the public practice of conversation" (p. viii). Although the issue cannot be addressed here in detail, there are good reasons to think that social constructionism presents a distorted form of the Private Language Argument and misrepresents the impact of the PLA on the human sciences (e.g., to challenge accounts of subjectivity or privacy in any contemporary position which resemble those of Augustine or Descartes). Acknowledging the diversity of social constructionist or discursive psychology writings, Hibberd notes that "some versions of constructionism extend this emphasis to the conceptual and methodological practices of psychologists, and to the epistemological and semantic assumptions which ground these practices; to the "meta-issues" of the discipline" (p. viii).

But does Wittgenstein advocate the social construction of external and internal reality? And would Wittgenstein support the notion of his later work as providing the kind of meta-theory that might either stand-above (as an abstract or second-order reflection) psychology and its practices or, in a nod to the enduring appeal of foundationalism, the lower tier or metatheoretical level "consists of a network of philosophical assumptions, largely about semantics, upon which the social constructionist theories of the upper level may depend" (p. ix)?

Answers to these questions can be provided with support from Wittgenstein's writings and a measure of critical philosophical exegesis. Focusing on the first issue of whether Wittgenstein's philosophy functions as or supports social constructionist meta-theory, it is useful to examine the implications of Wittgenstein's (1953) remarks about the potential for an "entirely analogous" treatment of the problems of mathematics to those of psychology. Reconsidering the detail of these neglected remarks contrasts with the enduring legacy of logical positivist comparisons of psychology with natural sciences such as physics. While Wittgenstein denied that metamathematics has the philosophical significance that some claim, it seems reasonable to think that his alternative metamathematical "game analogy" remarks may usefully inform our understanding of the limits of reflexive work in psychology.

Wittgenstein (1956) was highly critical of problems with accounts of the foundations of mathematics: "The *mathematical* problems of what is called foundations are no more the foundation of mathematics for us than the painted rock is the support of a painted tower" (V, §13). It is reasonable to think that he did not wish to establish or deny contemporary forms of metapsychology or, perhaps better, metatheorizing. For example, Gergen's descriptions of the different methods that metapsychology employs to highlight what cannot be investigated by the use of the discipline's methods seems reasonable. But Wittgenstein would undoubtedly be critical of attempts to claim that the "meta" in "metapsychology" implies that this work provides the foundations for psychological practices. For example, problems identified in a metapsychological position would not undermine the actual practices of psychology. Also while metapsychology could be a complicated combination of theory and Wittgensteinian philosophy, it is only "about" psychology in the sense that it involves different methods, concepts and skills to describe psychology and it is not "below" the discipline in a foundationalist sense.

One useful task here is to extend to psychology the game analogy that Wittgenstein used to understand mathematics (V, §12) and metamathematics. The analogy serves as a simplified "object of comparison" (Wittgenstein 1953) and does not play a foundational role because, for example, the discovery of non-analogous aspects of the game account do not lead the practices of psychology to be undermined. The point of the game analogy of psychology is to clarify the relations between the tasks, skills and resources of philosophers and those of reflective psychologists. The game analogy is, therefore, not a metapsychological theory that is being used to set up a new game for psychology. In fact, the irony of the game analogy is that it is a means of showing the limits of Wittgenstein's philosophical remarks to psychology. What the game view highlights, according to Monk (1990), is that "you cannot gain a fundamental understanding of mathematics by waiting for a theory" (p. 307). This is simply because "the understanding of one game cannot depend upon the construction of another" (p. 307).

A further comparison between mathematics and psychology further undermines the strong links between Wittgenstein's later philosophy and social constructionism. In a point which is directly analogous to arguments in psy-

chology about the objectivity of psychological phenomena in reality (i.e., independent of the languages and theoretical terms used to describe or demarcate those phenomena; Greenwood 1992), Wittgenstein (1953) discussed whether it makes sense to say that mathematical truth is "independent of whether human beings know it or not!" (p. 226). The relevance of Wittgenstein's analysis is obvious when we compare it to the possibility that "psychological truth is independent of whether human beings talk about it or not" and examine Greenwood's (1992) view that theoretical descriptions of psychological reality are "linguistically objective". Greenwood's argument is against social constructionists such as Potter (1992) who deny linguistic objectivity and argue that "the central trope of realism . . . is the constructed distinction between 'the phenomenon' and 'the description'" (p. 132).

In Wittgenstein's treatment of this issue, he quickly shifts the discussion away from confronting the misleading and useless *picture* of an extra-linguistic objective reality. Instead, he imagines the contexts in which metamathematicians argue about the following propositions: "human beings believe that twice two is four" and "twice two is four". Clearly in the context of the debate about the social construction of reality the proposition could be changed to "human beings say with conviction that twice two is four". And to make it more relevant we could change this example to explore the "kind of certainty" involved in a language game where an individual may ask: "Am I less certain that this man is in pain than that twice two is four?" (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 224; i.e., the important reminder that such comparisons are not intended to define different kinds of certainty so much as to reveal similarities and differences where "The kind of certainty is the kind of language-game" (p. 224).

What does Wittgenstein have to say in an analysis that shifts from one about "knowledge of an independent reality" to "human belief in a particular proposition such as that a particular man is in pain"? Wittgenstein's (1953) reply to such metapsychological picture painting is to state that it perhaps means "human beings have *arrived* at the mathematical proposition" (p. 226). This example alone looks very different to what some of the more radical and incoherent social constructionists have been inspired by Wittgenstein to say about the nature of psychology and psychological theories. The main point here is that Wittgenstein writes about such propositions and their meaning without ever suggesting he would endorse a view that they are "social constructions". Moreover, there is no evidence here that Wittgenstein's position in this particular example is similar to a central belief that Hibberd attributes to social constructionists that "the theories and knowledge we have today could be different and, more radically, there is no reason why our current conceptions of theory and knowledge cannot be transformed" (p. 3).

There is no relativist openness to the possibility, which might seem real to realists in this instance, that changes in our "language system" (Gergen and Gergen 1991) might occur in such a way that a prior objective psychological phenomenon no longer seemed to exist in the present. Perhaps a good example with psychology would be an argument based on research that particular individuals who appear to be in pain are in fact "only exhibiting writhing behavior". The point from Wittgenstein is that if such a change occurred and our equivalent of "twice two is five" was part of "a system of internally related propositions, it would be a nonsense to insist it would nevertheless still be four, since we would be talking about a different calculus or technique" (Baker and Hacker 1985, p. 293). In other words, one might want to claim - from the

perspective of the old calculus or game - that "twice two really still is four" and describe "twice two is five" as odd without claiming that the latter proposition was "less objective" or "wrong" (i.e., possible responses to the question "what would it mean to say 'Even though everybody believed that twice two was five it would still be four?'" (Wittgenstein 1953, p. 226).

Such detailed considerations of Wittgenstein's influence which invite new comparisons for psychology that are not acknowledged nor identified by Hibberd and other critics of Wittgenstein's influence on psychology. Instead, her target is claims such as Gergen's "that language acquires meaning through its use in socio-linguistic practices", a claim she says "results from the influence on constructionist thinking of Wittgenstein's *post-Tractatus* view that the meaning of a word is its use" (p. 133). Untangling her analysis in which Wittgenstein's influence on Shlick and Gergen leads to the revelation that many social constructionists are, metatheoretically, logical positivists, cannot be examined in the limited space and time available here. Interestingly, the fact that Hibberd cannot attribute a social constructionist metatheory to leaders in the area such as John Shotter and Jonathan Potter may indicate that they have worked through some of those issues to the point that they are less threatened by criticisms of self-referential inconsistency at psychology's meta-level (or in the foundations). Although the treatment of social constructionism here is necessarily brief, the failure of both social constructionists and realists such as Hibberd to address the details of all of Wittgenstein's philosophy provides some evidence that both approaches contain ideas and arguments that are open to Wittgensteinian criticism.

Similarly, the possibility of other non-constructionist Wittgensteinian projects relevant to psychology is ignored by both sides. For example, Bennett and Hacker's (2003) *Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience* is a clear indication that Wittgensteinian-inspired work could engage empirical and applied psychologists. This work can also be conducted without the confusion of thinking that philosophers are "doing psychological theorizing" or proposing to replace specific forms of experimentation and investigation in psychology with philosophical description. Although such confusions persist about the differences between philosophy and psychology (despite occasionally similar content), the failure of both sides to engage with the detail and breadth of Wittgenstein's conceptual investigations invites a sociohistorical analysis of the sort that Bourdieu (2004) identified as the need for a *science of science*. That is, while Wittgenstein continues to inspire the philosophical working through of issues that appear as ongoing conceptual confusions in the metatheoretical debates between social constructionists *and* realists, *pace* Wittgenstein "it is not sufficient to show or even to demonstrate that a problem is a false problem in order to have done with it" (p. 7).

Conclusion

Contemporary theoretical and empirical psychology continues to provide philosophers with rich material to explore and critique. Psychologists, in contrast, continue to seek support for their existing applied and conceptual work even though most are not reflexive to the degree that they engage actively with philosophers such as Wittgenstein. But regardless of the degree to which Wittgenstein's status as a philosopher is of interest to people in the human sciences, history textbooks reflect that Wittgenstein inspired work on the social construction of external and internal reality which positivists, realists or the increasingly unreflective masses in psychology must take seriously. Hibberd

was presented as one example of an increasingly common story in psychology in which the influence of Wittgenstein's later work is seen as encouraging an indefensible and incoherent relativism. In other words, the virtue of self-critical reflection on the limits of psychological knowledge is revealed as self-referentially inconsistent metatheory. The twist in Hibberd's realist tail is her analysis that most social constructionists actually support a framework that has much in common with logical positivism. In contrast, the twist in my criticism of Hibberd's dismissal of Wittgenstein through being the main inspiration for social constructionist metatheory is that many social constructionists are equally susceptible to Wittgensteinian criticism.

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The Topology of Existential Experience: Wittgenstein and Derrida (Between Reality and Construction)

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The sense of the world must lie outside the world. Since everything that happens and in fact, exists, is accidental. What makes them not accidental cannot lie within the world because then it would be accidental, too. (Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*)

Tractatus on representation

In *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1918) the structure of sentences – the logical image – represents a situation and is sensible (meaningful), regardless whether the state of affairs takes place in reality or not. Synthesizing the structure of an image and of a situation, Wittgenstein tries to synthesize a possible fact and sense made visible within the image that structuralizes reality:

We create images of facts. (2.1) An image presents a situation within logical space – being and non-being of a state of affairs. (2.11) An image is a model of reality. (2.12) An image is a fact. (2.141) A form of mapping is a possibility that things are in such a relation as the elements of an image are. (2.151) (Wittgenstein 1970)

This is especially crucial: “Each sentence must *already* have a certain sense.” (4.064)

Does not therefore the structure fact-image-fact have *already* to project a certain sense and, at the same time, to be marked by the sense?

Thinking of the sense of a sentence endows the words with the sense: this fundamental thesis of *Tractatus* – although being a representational one – is not, in my opinion, reduced to the structure of logical mapping but it indicates the problem of a *priori* synthesis of being and sense closed within a sentence form as a logical image of reality. If a sentence is an image and the image maps the fact and it is itself a fact and if a sentence is endowed with a certain sense, we should ask: What is the difference between meaningful image-fact and pure fact if “the sense of the world must lie outside the world” (6.41) and “the world is my world” (5.641)? If we treat the sense of a sentence as an image-like interpretation which points at the limits of my world, we can trace in Wittgenstein’s early thought signs of perspectivism where the world (linguistically structuralized) acquires a shape of a horizon of possible description and experience. The problem of the being-sense relation becomes not a logical but an ontological problem, and the limits of the world are the limits of logic in the sense of aprioric grounding of the sense within being and of structuralizing being in terms of a possible sense. The problem of the world structuralization means a problem of experiencing the world which was present in Husserl in *Ideen* and *Cartesian Meditations* and later undertaken by Heidegger and Derrida who radicalized, or drew consequences from Wittgenstein’s interpretationism. From this point of view late Wittgenstein’s philosophy is not a rupture in relation to his early thoughts but it is developing and enriching them with a context. The context in Wittgenstein I treat as an ontic metaphor [Derridean *detour*, deviation].

However, on the other hand, the idea of context, as well as of a possible usage of an image, can be understood as a filling the space of possible meanings about which Wittgenstein speaks in *Tractatus*: an image would be then a fact as a possible event, or a possible discursive space bringing together the individuality of a fact (already endowed with sense since “bare” factuality could not become an element of experience) and the iterability of sense (related to a certain fact since a fact not fulfilled would be “empty”). This relationism of fact and sense temporally (contextually, in a later Wittgensteinian idiom) grounded has a paradoxical character resulting from the fact that the primary fact which cannot exist without a possible sense creates the dialectic of existential fact (Derrida). Thus I propose to treat the sentence, sense and the world relation as metaphor (image) of experience within which the passage between incongruent - *ex definitione* - spaces of reality and language has a status of conceptual transposition, impossible however, without *being* this passage. Moreover, *being* of the transposition – torn apart by factual temporality – can be viewed as spacing that opens up the place for metonymic mediation between objects and their possible meaning.

Meaning, or a dissemination of the figure of identity. In a circle of *Philosophische Untersuchungen*

When in *Logical Investigations* (1900/01) Husserl writes about a possibility of capturing meaning which refers to an object and, at the same time, about a possibility of returning to “things themselves”, he perhaps does not anticipate what 35 years after its publication he puts in question: is it not the case that

in every individual life (...) originally evident life, which on the basis of lived experience creates in its activities originally evident images, very quickly and to a greater extent does not submit to the *illusion of language*? (Husserl 1991: 19)

This linguistic mediation or an impossibility of a direct presentation of what is given places Wittgenstein in *Investigations* also on the level of language itself; the language which not only structurally reforms reality, but also – using analogy and identifying the moments of experience - is something supplementary and thus beyond direct, immediate presentation which would be more that pure living. Then, if meaning is a contextual usage, it is already inscribed within a texture of semantic relations with other usages in other possible contexts:

Can one imagine such a situation: someone for the first time in his life recalls something and says: “Yes, now I know what it means ‘to recall’, how one *feels* this.” – How does he know that this feeling is ‘recalling’? Compare: “Yes, now I know what ‘itching’ means!” (He has experienced electric shock for the first time.) – Does he know it is a recollection because it was caused by something passed by? How, still, does he know what the words ‘something passed by’ mean? The idea of things passed by man acquires thanks to the fact that he recalls something.

And how will he know in the future what feeling a recollection gives? (Wittgenstein 1972: 322)

Contextualism widened beyond the linguistic practice and strictly connected with intentionality puts into question a direct presentation of possibility of a meaning of an expression and it also deprives both categorematic and syncategorematic terms of direct referential function. Nominalization or subjectification of the state of affairs within a sentence makes the status of the interpreted and of the presented act equal: instead of saying: "I feel pain", I can point at "this" making a name out of the act. However, this deicticity of the expression does not make the supposed act present since both empirical and semantic indication are mediated and exposed to certain ontological distance which enables this semantic gesture. Indicating "this" does not name any direct quality, but just has a representative function: semantically mediated. As an ostensive term, "this" means a synthetic form of the state of affairs and their objectified meaning, moreover it has a supplementary function in reference to early possible experience.

Syncategorematic terms – being paradoxical terms in which

synthetic meaning (...) is *founded* on the actually interpretative experience only because it is also *founding* for it; synthetic meaning is an effect of interpretation only because it is also what is a ground for semantic interpretations (Lampert 1995: 121)

would have the character of supplements (Derrida) or a kind of a surplus articulated within experience as a *real construction*. The construction without any center or a final referential point, but meaning a discourse as an event in which genesis of sense is a temporal one and is endowed with the features of mythomorphic discourse: the shape of what it says.

At the same time syncategorematic terms require supplementation with synthetic forms that, paradoxically, have been "*already articulated*" (Lampert, *ibid.*: 107) For example, the conjunction "*and*" cannot be grasped in its meaning without earlier reference to some horizon of semantic possibilities, i.e. without mediation in earlier usage. Thus we can state that the meaning of syncategorematic terms (not susceptible to nominalization) is always dialectically interwoven with the factuality of their being given, about which both Wittgenstein and Derrida speak. Wittgensteinian "*usage*" is a moment mediating a meaning in the factuality of experience and expressed by Derrida as aporetic deferral / delay and difference [*differance*]:

Difference is what makes the movement of signification possible only if each element that is to said to be "present", appearing on the stage of presence, is related to something other than itself but it retains the mark of a past element and already lets itself be hollowed out by the mark of its relation to a future element. This trace relates no less to what is called the future than to what is called the past, and it constitutes what is called the present by this very relation to what is not, to what it absolutely is not; that is, not even to a past or future considered as a modified present. In order for it to be, an interval must separate it from what it is not; but the interval that constitutes it in the present must also, and by the same token, divide the present in itself, thus dividing, along with the present, everything that can be conceived on its basis, this is, every being – in particular, for our metaphysical language, the substance or subject. (Derrida 1982: 142-143)

Does the rule of mediation also refer to expressions undergoing nominalization, i.e. categorematic expres-

sions? Obviously, since the moment of using the expression presupposes its placing in a given context that is non-repeatable. Thus, naming does not bring an object to immediate present but presents the object in realms of factual experience:

Had not the whole shape of a sentence been intended, e.g. at the very beginning? Namely, it had already been in my mind before being uttered! If it had been, then – usually – not within another syntactical arrangement. However, here we again create a false image of 'intention', i.e. image of a usage of the word. Intention is placed in a situation, in human habits and institutions. (Wittgenstein 1972: # 337)

What, nevertheless, happens in case of adopting a scholastic rule *suppositio materialis* to which Husserl refers in his analysis of meaning of expressions, according to which every expression, regardless of whether it is categorematic or syncategorematic in its normal meaning, can appear as a name for itself, i.e. it names itself as a certain grammatical phenomenon? When we say "*Snow is a concept of thing*" or "*Snow is downiness*" is a statement, according to Husserl the subjective (re)presentation is not meaning of a given expression but (re)presentation of a statement as such. How then to explain the syncategorema "*to be*" without objective reference, which means without logical analysis of *being*? Is not the directly or – in some languages – silently present verb "*is*" as a copula a semantic supplement that, so to say, mediates within an expression or a proposition? If "*is*" is a concept of a copula in a copular verb, does it not mean only through mediation? Impossibility of direct capture of the designated and alleged concept "*is*" which means a fundamental concept in all discourse denies the possibility of direct access to meaning. Meaning is originarily contextualized and delayed.

What would be then the concept of "*is*" in Wittgenstein's philosophy, if it does not bring any meaning reflecting reality and is always an elementary *function* of every expression and statement either in a direct figure or as an alleged "element without a name" (Derrida)? Where can he place the copular verb taking into account both earlier and later works of Wittgenstein together with a letter and interpretative potentiality of *Investigations*?

In *Notebooks* (1914-1916) we read:

The reality which relates to sense of a sentence cannot be anything but its elements, since we do not know anything else. If reality means something more, it cannot be, nevertheless, named or expressed because in the first case it would be again an element, and in the second case an expression would be a sentence for which there would be the same problem as in the case of the initial sentence. (Wittgenstein 1969: 20.11.14)

If "*to be*" does not mean "*to exist*" but "*to reflect a sentence*" and if giving the essence of the sentence is to give the essence of the world, do we not have here a gesture aiming at synthetical compilation of some statements of *Tractatus*, such as:

1. Every defined sign can be deconstructed by other signs that defines it,
2. What is not expressed in signs, is shown in using them,
3. Logical statements describe the structure of the world and do not represent it,

and the thesis of *Investigations* which refers to a possible meaning of a sign as a sign of a certain activity resulting from its *being* placed in some factuality?

Taking the above statements into consideration we can say that mediation between sign and reality or *signifie* and *signified* replaces the absence of meaning both in case of a nominal or deictic definition and in the world experienced. Therefore the syncategorema "is" cannot define itself but expresses a border space between the empirical and the conceptual. Moreover, if "is" expresses a certain ontological condition and the logical form "S is P" visualizes dependence and contamination of the structural moments, one can adopt the theses of *Tractatus* postulating (logically motivated) sign-oriented reality. The act of representing the content of "is" and the very content of the presentation would relate to reality itself, which allows us to think about Wittgenstein in Derridean terms:

(..) being is not a simple predicate of a being, what more, it is not its subject. The way we treat being – as an essence or existence (as being-such or being-here), or as a copula or foundation of existence, or (deeper and more originarily) as a focus of all those possibilities – does not matter: Being of a being does not belong to the sphere of indication since it is already implied within every indication and makes it possible. It makes possible every synthetic or analytic proposition. It lies beyond a certain description and beyond categories. (Derrida 2004: 230)

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Partizipation in virtuellen Welten

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1. Einführung

Die Partizipation in virtuellen Welten ermöglicht die Teilhabe und aktive Teilnahme an der Produktion und Rezeption imaginärer, computer-basierter Welten. Die in virtuellen Welten geschaffenen Erfahrungsräume bieten Spielräume zum kognitiven und kommunikativen Handeln sowie zur symbolischen Interaktion, also für Fähigkeiten, denen in unserer Epoche ein besonderer Stellenwert eingeräumt wird.

Die Basis dieser Möglichkeitsräume sind Simulationen, die nicht vorgeben, ein bereits vorhandenes System nachzubilden, sondern neue, rein synthetische Welten schaffen und Raum für die subjektive und intersubjektive Aneignung des Imaginären geben. Zentral für die Partizipation in solchen Welten ist die aktive Erforschung und Gestaltung (Agency) sowohl durch Avatare (also digitale Entitäten, die durch die menschlichen Nutzer gesteuert werden) als auch durch Softwareagenten (also digitale Entitäten, die ausschließlich durch Computeralgorithmen gesteuert werden). Die computer-basierte Interaktion und Kooperation der Akteure – Avatare und Softwareagenten – ist i.a. nach dem Vorbild Kooperation lebensweltlichen Handelns modelliert, was exemplarisch am spielerischen Handeln und ökonomischen Handeln aufgezeigt werden kann (s.u.).

Das computervermittelte Handeln ist Sprachhandeln. Analog der Sichtweise des Symbolischen Interaktionismus (Mead 1934) erscheint die These überzeugend, dass (für den menschlichen Nutzer) die Bedeutung von virtuellen Objekten, Situationen und Beziehungen im symbolisch vermittelten Prozess der Interaktion und Kommunikation hervorgebracht wird. Die eigene Persönlichkeit und die eigne(n) virtuelle(n) Identität(en) werden durch die Partizipation in virtuellen Welten geprägt. Mead unterscheidet hier drei Stufen der Rollenübernahme im Prozess der Identitätsbildung: nachahmendes Rollenspiel (*play*), regelgerechte Kooperation (*game*) und universelle Kooperation und Verständigung. Genau diese Stufen können auch in virtuellen Welten unterschieden werden: *play* in der Form von Rollenspielen in sozialen Netzwerken, *game* als Wettkampf mit komplexen Spielregeln in „*gameworlds*“ in der Form von MMORPGs (*massively multiplayer online role-playing games*) wie *World of Warcraft*® und allgemeine Kooperation in juristisch und ökonomisch relevanten Szenarien wie dem Verhandeln in virtuellen Systemen (*eNegotiation*).

2. Fiktive Subjektivität und Teilnahme an virtuellen Welten

Schon Ernst Jünger stellte fest, dass „das Kennzeichen vorahmend-nachahmender Spiele ist, dass sie in spielerischer Weise ein Verhalten, das kein Spiel ist, abbilden“ (Jünger 1953). Die Teilnahme an synthetischen Multiagentensystemen erlaubt, in virtuelle Welten auf Basis einer fiktiven Subjektivität – als Avatar - einzutauchen. So eine digitale Verkörperung basiert i.a. auf einer Menge vordefinierter Charakteristika, insbesondere kinästhetischer Merkmale, die von dem Nutzer in gewisser Weise individualisiert werden können (siehe auch (Klevier 2006)). Mit

(Linderoth 2005) können die wesentlichen Aspekte des Verhältnisses zwischen Nutzer und Avatar wie folgt beschrieben werden:

- Eine fiktiver Charakter, eine Rolle, d.h. eine Maske, eine *persona* im Sinn der Antike.
- Ein Werkzeug, das die Fähigkeiten des Nutzers erweitert oder auch eine Prothese.
- Eine Requisite, die zur Selbstdarstellung des Nutzers dient.

Diese virtuellen Darstellungen sind also ähnlich wie die Körper in der Realität zugleich Handlungsträger wie auch Mittel zur Selbstdarstellung. Sie erlauben es, mit der eigenen Identität zu spielen und Erfahrungen zu machen, wie sie in der Realität z.B. aufgrund körperlicher Einschränkungen oder Spezifika des physikalischen und gesellschaftlichen Umfelds nicht möglich sind. Diese fiktive Subjektivität ist dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass ein subjektiver Blickwinkel, der unterstützt ist durch die persönliche rationale, soziale und emotionale Intelligenz (*1st person conceptual view*), verknüpft wird mit Wahrnehmungen aus der Beobachterperspektive (*3rd person perceptual view*). Das führt zu einer ganz eigenen Art von Präsenz. Selbst- und Fremdwahrnehmung erhalten neue Impulse. Das Spiel mit der eigenen Identität ist eine der Hauptattraktionen der Rollenspiele in virtuellen Welten. Die Dramatisierung erlaubt das Ausleben virtueller Lebensentwürfe. Es zeigt sich, dass Shakespeares Sentenz *all world is a stage and we are merely players* gerade auch für virtuelle Welten gilt.

In *gameworlds* – den Abenteuerspielen, Kämpfen in Fantasiewelten, der Suche nach virtuellen Schätzen und der gemeinsamen Lösung virtueller Rätsel - sind Avatare und Softwareagenten (in der Form von *non player characters*) co-present. Es entwickeln sich dedizierte virtuelle Gemeinschaften in und um diese Spielwelten. Teilhabe und Teilnahme an diesen Gemeinschaften ist für nicht wenige Spieler attraktiver als das Leben in der Realität (Castranova 2005).

Während die Rollenspiele in den sozialen virtuellen Welten eine Form des *games-of-make believe* (Velleman 2008) darstellen, steht die regelgerechte Kooperation im Mittelpunkt *games*: Spielregeln sind hier konstitutiv. Die allgemeine Kooperation und Verständigung auf Basis von Verhaltensregeln, - Verhaltenscodizes - befinden sich derzeit noch im Fluss. Dies entspricht den Überzeugungen von Blumer (Blumer 1973), der in seiner Weiterentwicklung des symbolischen Interaktionismus feststellt, dass Werte und Normen sich erst durch das kontinuierliche Aushandeln von Bedeutungen konstituieren.

Nach Mead (Mead 1934) entsteht die eigene Persönlichkeit im inneren Dialog zwischen Handlungsentwürfen des Individuums, der Stellungnahme aus der Perspektive des generalisierten Anderen und der Stellungnahme und Entscheidung des Individuums. Wenn man davon ausgeht, dass ähnliche Entwicklungsschritte durch das Handeln in virtuellen Welten erfolgen, stellt sich die Frage, in wieweit diese Entwicklung davon beeinflusst wird, dass Avatare, gesteuert von Menschen, auf reine Softwareagenten treffen, ohne dass sichtbar wird, dass diese rein virtuelle

Handlungsträger sind. Derzeit wird dies intensiv daran diskutiert, ob die Gewaltbereitschaft in der Realität durch intensives Spielen von *killergames* herabgesetzt wird.

3. Softwareagenten als rein virtuelle Handlungsträger

Das Konzept Agent wurde in der Informatik erstmalig als *Actor Model* [Hewitt et al. 1973] eingeführt, wo es ein abgeschlossenes, interaktives, parallel ausführbares Objekt beschreibt, das einen internen Zustand und Kommunikationsfähigkeiten besitzt. Heute finden sich eine Vielzahl alternativer Definitionen, wobei sich aber als wesentliche Charakteristika eines Softwareagenten die folgenden Eigenschaften (im informationstechnischen Sinn (!)) herauskristallisiert haben:

- Persistenz, d.h. der Code wird nicht bei Bedarf ausgeführt, sondern läuft fortwährend und das Objekt entscheidet selbst, wann es eine Tätigkeit ausführt
- Autonomie (die Agenten haben die Fähigkeit der Aufgabenauswahl und -priorisierung, sie arbeiten zielorientiert und treffen Entscheidungen ohne menschliche Interaktion)
- soziale Kompetenz (die Agenten können mit anderen digitalen Entitäten kommunizieren und koordiniert kollaborieren)
- Reaktivität (Agenten erkennen den Kontext, in dem sie agieren und reagieren darauf).

Der Blick auf Softwareagenten als virtuelle Handlungsträger wird durch Fragestellungen wie die künstliche Subjektivität von Softwareagenten und Softwareagenten als juristische und schließlich moralische Agenten geschärft: Schon Solum (Solum 1992) stellte die Frage, ob rein virtuelle Handlungsträger die Basis für juristische Personen sein können. Darauf aufbauend wurde das Thema weiter ausdifferenziert. So unterscheiden (Samir/White 2004) abhängig vom Einsatz von Softwareagenten zwischen Softwareagenten als bloße Werkzeugen, der Nutzung als Sklaven – also als völlig weisungsgebunden – und der Anerkennung als eigenständig Handelnden, mit denen man für einen Vertragsabschluss verhandelt. Elmi (Elmi 2004) sieht die Notwendigkeit, in der Zukunft Softwareagenten als juristische Personen mit je eigenen Rechten und Pflichten zu behandeln, wenn sie z.B. als Vormund einsetzbar sein sollen, wenn ihnen Eigentumsrechte zugebilligt werden sollten oder in Szenarien, in denen sie (zivilrechtlich) klagen und verklagt werden können. Der funktionale Zweck bestimmt hier nicht nur die Modellierung und Realisierung, sondern führt auch zu weitreichenden Überlegungen zu dem (potentiellen) juristischen Status von Softwareagenten. Die Frage, ob Softwareagenten so modelliert werden können, dass sie, ontologisch gesehen, zu Subjekten werden, wird von den Autoren i.a. ausgeblendet. Eine Diskussion, die analog zu der strong Artificial Intelligence und weak Artificial Intelligence (wie erstmalig von (Searle 1980) eingeführt) Begriffe von strong agency und weak agency zu definieren sucht, findet nicht statt. Das Ziel ist vielmehr, im Kontext des betrachteten Rechtssystems (BRD, USA ...) zu fragen, unter welchen Umständen Softwareagenten analog zu Objekten wie Firmen als juristische Subjekte, d.h. als juristische Personen zu sehen und zu behandeln sind. Teubner (Teubner 2006) sieht in der Personifizierung aus juristischer Perspektive noch einen weiteren Vorteil: diese Abstraktion erlaubt, sich von dem anthropozentrischen Blickwinkel zu lösen und konstruktiv anzuerkennen, dass i.a. nicht mehr zweifelsfrei erkennbar ist, ob man es in einer virtuellen Welt mit einem reinen Softwareagenten zu tun hat oder mit einem von

einem Menschen gesteuerten Avatar. Die damit einhergehende Verdinglichung aller virtuellen Handlungsträger aus Beobachterperspektive wird billigend in Kauf genommen.

4. Teilhabe an virtuellen Welten: Ludologie trifft auf Narratologie

Partizipation bedeutet für den menschlichen Nutzer sowohl interaktive Teilnahme via Avatar an der Simulation einer virtuellen Welt wie auch (potentielle) Teilhabe an ihrer Erstellung. Im Kontext des spielerischen, computerbasierten Handelns heißt das: Ludologie trifft auf Narratologie ((Laurel 1993), (Aarseth 1997), (Juul 2003)) – d.h. die Kunst, Spiele zu entwerfen, erweitert die Kunst, interaktiv Geschichten zu entwickeln. (Frasca 2003) unterscheidet für die Spielweltautoren zwischen *Narrauthor* und *Simauthor*. Beide steuern den Ablauf durch Ablaufregeln. Diese Regeln erlauben, die Welten innerhalb der von den Autoren gesetzten Grenzen und nach ihrer (oft impliziten) Vorgabe zu verändern (*manipulation rules*). Sie ermöglichen, die Anreizstrukturen (*goal rules*) und die Freiheitsgrade zur Änderung der Regeln selbst (*meta-rules*) zu definieren. In Anlehnung an die Lebenswirklichkeit sieht (Frasca 2003) die *Narrauthors* als die Exekutive, deren Ziel es ist, eine vorhersehbare Performanz zu erzeugen, während die *Simauthors* sich mehr wie die Legislative verhalten, also die Grenzen definieren, innerhalb deren ein Spiel ablaufen kann. (Pearce 2006) sieht diese Unterscheidung als künstlich an: „Spielern wird einfach eine Reihe von Optionen an die Hand gegeben, die ihnen erlauben, spielerisch Geschichten zu entwickeln, so dass Geschichtsproduktion und -rezeption effektiv miteinander vermischt werden.“ Dies mag für einfache Rollenspiele gelten, aber in komplexeren Simulationen kann der Spielende die durch *manipulation rules*, *incentive rules* und *meta-rules* gegebenen Freiheitsgrade ausloten. Eine weitere Achse ist die Spielästhetik, die auch eine bedeutende Rolle im Spannungsfeld zwischen Spielautor, der *code authority*, und den Spielern bei der Erzeugung virtueller Welten und „Geschichten“, auf die jeder Spieler eine je eigene Sicht hat, einnimmt. Nicht zuletzt sind das Improvisieren und die spielerische Auseinandersetzung mit virtuellen Lebensentwürfen, kurz das explorative Sprachhandeln, wesentliche Bestandteile der Attraktion virtueller Welten.

5. Handeln in virtuellen Welten

Es ist festzustellen, dass sich zwar potentiell die Handlungsfähigkeit durch von Menschen gesteuerten Avataren und reinen Softwareagenten immer stärker annähern können, aber ein wesentlicher Unterschied bestehen bleibt: durch den Avatar wird der Nutzer zum hybriden Akteur, der zugleich in der physikalischen und einer virtuellen Welt präsent und situiert ist, während dagegen der Softwareagent nur medial vermittelt in Computersystemen existiert und nur dort Erfahrungen machen kann. Die symbolische Interaktion des hybriden Akteurs greift also auf einen weiter gefassten Erfahrungshorizont zurück, als einem Softwareagenten offen steht. Wenn man wie (Hayles 1999) davon ausgeht, dass es verkörpertes Wissen gibt, das nicht formalisierbar ist und die Möglichkeit, Erkenntnisse zu gewinnen, kontextabhängig ist, ist zwischen einem solchem hybriden Akteur und einem Softwareagenten ein nicht aufhebbarer qualitativer und damit ontologischer Unterschied.

Die Partizipation in virtuellen Welten ist eine (Spiel)variante der subjektiven und intersubjektiven Aneignung des Imaginären. Mit den zweckfreien Spielwelten, in denen meist anonyme Spieler und auch Softwareagenten zu Rollenspielen und regelgerechter Kooperation im Wettkampf aufeinander treffen, und dem ökonomisch und juristisch relevantem Handeln virtueller Personen mit je definierten Cyberidentitäten sind 2 Extreme eines Kontinuums im Blickfeld. Da i.a. nicht mehr zweifelsfrei erkennbar ist, ob man es in einer virtuellen Welt mit einem reinen Softwareagenten zu tun hat oder mit einem von einem Menschen gesteuerten Avatar, muss man sich aus Beobachterperspektive von einem anthropozentrischen Blickwinkel lösen: Objekte und nicht Subjekte bevölkern das Virtuelle als Konsequenz der Privilegierung des Abstrakten gegenüber der physikalischen Welt.

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Wittgenstein, Brandom und der analytische Pragmatismus

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1. Analytischer Pragmatismus als Synthese aus analytischer Philosophie und Pragmatismus

In *„Between Saying and Doing“*¹ unternimmt Brandom den Versuch, das philosophische Projekt der begrifflichen Analyse mit einigen Errungenschaften des Pragmatismus zu verbinden. Ziel ist es, durch die Anbindung semantischer Beziehungen zwischen Begriffssphären an die pragmatische Fundierung von Gehalten, d.h. an die Praktiken des Gebrauchs, das analytische Werkzeug zu neuer Leistungsfähigkeit zu verhelfen. Die Synthese beschreibt er wie folgt:

„If we approach the pragmatist' observations in an analytic spirit, we can understand pragmatics as providing special resources for extending and expanding the analytic semantic project.“ (Brandom 2008: 8).

Wie häufig bei Hochzeiten, so verändert auch diese Beziehung beide Seiten. Der Pragmatismus, man denke an Wittgenstein und Rorty, steht in der Regel für ein unsystematisches, quietistisches und auf den Einzelfall bezogenes Vorgehen. Durch das analytische Korsett sollen die positiven Einsichten des Pragmatismus systematisiert werden². Die analytische Philosophie auf der anderen Seite wird um Abhängigkeiten zwischen begrifflichen Gehalten und deren konstituierende Praktiken ergänzt.

McDowell hat das Ergebnis dieser Hochzeit als ein *Frankenstein-Monster*³ bezeichnet und zielt mit diesem Bild kritisch auf den Beitrag der analytischen Philosophie. Was aber soll im vorliegenden Zusammenhang darunter verstanden werden? Brandom spezifiziert diesen Zweig der Philosophie auf eine sehr allgemeine Weise, in der etwas zum Tragen kommt, was ich den ‚Geist des Empirismus‘ nennen möchte. Dieser Geist handelt von einer Asymmetrie zwischen Begriffen, genauer: zwischen Satzklassen und Diskursen. Die Asymmetrie kann als Erbe Humes bezeichnet werden und führt zu einer Einteilung der Begriffe in *problematische* und *unproblematische*. Erstere sind philosophisch rechtfertigungsbedürftig, letztere dagegen ungefährlich, weil in einem näher zu erläuternden Sinne selbstverständlich. Bekanntermaßen ging es Hume um die Frage, wie wir vom abgesicherten *Ist* zum *Sollen* und *Müssen* kommen. Die drei Schlüsselfragen der analytischen Philosophie lauten demnach: Welche Diskurse sind problematisch, welche unproblematisch und welche Form der semantischen Anschlussfähigkeit wird ins Auge gefasst. Idealerweise erhellt eine solchermaßen aufgebaute analytische Geschichte sowohl das Ziel- als auch das Ausgangsvokabular. Soviel zum Projekt der semantischen Analyse.

Da Brandom den Pragmatismus analytisch färbt, dieser aber wesentlich mit der Philosophie des späten Wittgensteins verbunden ist, kann man auch von einer analytischen Lesart Wittgensteins sprechen. Genau dieses

Unterfangen greift McDowell an, wenn er bezweifelt, dass Wittgensteins Philosophie von der Idee getragen wurde, Satzklassen gemäß ihres philosophischen Wertes unterscheiden zu können.

Ich möchte im Folgenden der Frage nachgehen, in wieweit der analytische Pragmatismus mit der Philosophie Wittgensteins in Einklang gebracht werden kann und wo mögliche Grenzen liegen. Dazu meine These: Brandom markiert durchaus einen wichtigen Gedanken der Philosophie Wittgensteins, den ich unter das Stichwort vom ‚Nachzeichnen einer pragmatischen Stufung von Handlungskompetenzen‘ bringen möchte. Gleichzeitig sollte dieser Gedanke aber weniger ‚analytisch‘ ausbuchstabiert werden als es Brandom tut. Bevor ich diese Andeutungen ausbuchstabiere, soll zunächst das formale Rüstzeug des analytischen Pragmatismus vorgestellt werden.

2. Das formale Rüstzeug des analytischen Pragmatismus

Zu den semantischen Beziehungen auf der Ebene von Vokabularen (VV-Relationen) tritt der pragmatische Unterbau prinzipiell in zweierlei Form hinzu. Erstens werden Relationen zwischen Vokabularen und Praktiken, zweitens aber auch solche innerhalb des Bereichs praktischer Vollzüge analysiert. Dieser Unterbau bestimmt dann die VV-Relationen auf eine interessante Weise neu, nämlich so, dass die pragmatische Geschichte unterhalb der Sphäre des Begrifflichen zu *pragmatisch vermittelten semantischen Relationen* führt. Schauen wir uns etwas genauer an, wie die pragmatische Erweiterung der semantischen Analyse aussieht.

Auf der zuerst erwähnten Ausbaustufe der Beziehung zwischen Vokabularen und Praktiken unterscheidet Brandom PV- von VP-Relationen. Die Abkürzung ‚PV‘ soll anzeigen, dass die Bestimmungsrichtung von der Praxis zum Gehalt verläuft. Eine Praxis P1 kann entweder hinreichend oder notwendig für das Verfügen über einen bestimmten begrifflichen Gehalt (V1) sein. Auf der anderen Seite fragt die VP-Relation danach, wie die V1-konstituierende Praxis P1 zu spezifizieren sei. Wie können wir in Worte fassen, was jemand tun muss, um bestimmte Bedeutungen (V1) ausdrücken zu können? In der Regel führen die sprachlichen Ressourcen einer solchen Spezifikation in eine Begriffssphäre V2. Die so sichtbar werdende Relation zwischen V1 und V2 beschreibt Brandom wie folgt: V2 ist ein pragmatisches Metavokabular für V1.

Gehen wir einen Schritt weiter und werfen einen Blick auf die Relationen zwischen Praktiken (P1, P2). Diese Zusammenhänge sind für die vorliegende Arbeit von besonderer Bedeutung.

Die leitende Frage lautet: Gibt es zwischen einer Praxis P1 und einer Praxis P2 philosophisch relevante Formen der Abhängigkeit? Brandom nennt zwei Optionen: P1 kann für P2 entweder hinreichend oder aber notwendig sein. Ich will mit wenigen Worten verdeutlichen, was die Rede von Beziehungen auf der Ebene von Fähigkeiten bedeuten soll. Eine Praxis P1 ist eine notwendige Voraussetzung für P2, wenn die Kompetenzen der zweiten Praxis nur dann erworben oder manifestiert werden können,

¹ Robert B. Brandom (2008).

² Zu Wittgensteins Pragmatismus schreibt Brandom: „I want to show how pragmatism can be turned from a pessimistic, even nihilistic, counsel of theoretical despair into a definite, substantive, progressive, and promising program in the philosophy of language.“ (Brandom 2008: 31f.)

³ John McDowell (im Erscheinen).

wenn der Akteur bereits die Praxis P1 beherrscht. So gilt beispielsweise, dass der Gebrauch von ‚Es erscheint mir so und so‘ sinnlogisch an Praktiken gebunden ist, in denen wir gelernt haben zu sagen, wie die Dinge sind.

Im Zentrum des analytischen Pragmatismus stehen jedoch hinreichende Beziehungen zwischen Kompetenzen. Was kann es bedeuten, dass eine Praxis P1 für eine Praxis P2 hinreicht? Genau genommen geht es Brandom um Fälle, in denen das Verfügen über P1 *im Prinzip* das Verfügen über P2 sicherstellt. So können wir sagen, dass, wer über die Multiplikation und die Subtraktion verfügt, der kann im Prinzip bereits alles, was man können muss, um schriftlich dividieren zu können. Brandom greift in diesem Zusammenhang immer wieder auf bildhafte Ausdrücke zurück, wenn er sagt, dass P1 mit P2 schwanger ist oder P1 das pragmatische Potential für P2 in sich trägt. Die Bildhaftigkeit geht mit einer Mehrdeutigkeit der Rede vom Impliziten einher. Um den bildhaften Ausdrücken einen präzisen Sinn zu geben, muss Brandom bestimmen, was die Einschränkung ‚*im Prinzip*‘ bedeuten soll. Seine Antwort lautet:

→ P1 reicht für P2 im Prinzip hin, wenn P1 algorithmisch zu P2 weiterentwickelt werden kann.

D.h.: Was wir zu P1 hinzunehmen müssen, um P2 zu erhalten sind einzig algorithmisch-formale Kompetenzen. Was der Schüler lernen muss, so können wir bezogen auf den Fall der Rechenoperationen sagen, ist die Anordnung und Reihenfolge der bereits bekannten Operationen. Werden Multiplikation und Subtraktion in die richtige Anordnung gebracht, dann entsteht die Division.

Eine Bedingung dafür, dass die *pp-sufficiency-relation* erfüllt ist, besteht also in der algorithmischen Elaboration. Die philosophische Brisanz dieser These ist erkennbar, wenn wir den mathematischen Fall gegen andere Kompetenzen eintauschen. Eine der Hauptthesen Brandoms lautet dementsprechend, dass das Verfügen über empirisch-deskriptive diskursive Fähigkeiten bereits das Verfügen über logische, modale und normative Praktiken und Begriffe impliziert. So ist zum Beispiel zu lesen:

„The ability to use ordinary empirical descriptive terms such as ‚green‘, ‚rigid‘, and ‚mass‘ already presupposes grasp of the kinds of properties and relations made explicit by modal vocabulary.“ (Brandom 2008: 96f.)

Im Zuge dieser These kann Brandom dann behaupten, dass logische, modale und normative Begriffe wesentlich *explikativ* sind, was soviel heißt wie: sie machen eine inferentielle Struktur der Ausgangspraxis explizit. Auf die Plausibilität dieser Sicht komme ich später zurück. Einige Bedenken seien hier jedoch erwähnt. Für Brandom gilt: Liegt eine normativ strukturierte Praxis des Gebens und Verlangens von Gründen vor dann haben wir damit in einem gewissen Sinne auch schon alle weiteren Früchte sprachlicher Kompetenz. Zu fragen ist aber gerade, ob wir, geht es um das Erzählen pragmatischer Geschichten, auf einer so hohen Stufe der Diskursivität anfangen sollten? Plausibler erscheint mir dagegen die Idee Wittgensteins:

„Glauben, dass der Andere Schmerzen hat, zweifeln, ob er sie hat, sind so viele natürliche Arten des Verhaltens zu den andern Menschen; und unsere Sprache ist nur ein Hilfsmittel und ein weiterer Ausbau dieses Verhaltens. Ich meine: unser Sprachspiel ist ein Ausbau des primitiven Benehmens.“ (Wittgenstein 1999b: 151, S.37).

Sollten höherstufige inferentielle Zusammenhänge nicht selbst Gegenstand (und nicht Anfang) einer pragmatischen Konstruktion sein?

3. Analytischer Pragmatismus und die Darstellung pragmatischer Handlungszusammenhänge

Der letzte Abschnitt hatte unter anderem das Ziel, die algorithmische Elaboration als das Wesen des analytischen Verstehens herauszustellen. Bevor ich diesen Gedanken kritisch erörtere, soll zuvor festgehalten werden, was am analytischen Pragmatismus überzeugt. Meine These lautet: Die durch das formale Rüstzeug ins Bild gesetzten Abhängigkeiten zwischen Praktiken und Begriffen können pragmatische Geschichten unseres Könnens und Wissens erzählen. Was wir hier vorfinden, ist dem Vorgehen Wittgensteins verwandt, Übergänge zwischen Sprachspielen zu skizzieren.

Wittgensteins Philosophie war stets von der Überzeugung getragen, dass hinter dem scheinbaren ‚philosophischen Rätsel‘ eine begriffliche Verwirrung steckt. Der Ursprung der Verwirrung hat etwas damit zu tun, dass wir unsere Sprachformen nicht immer überschauen. Entscheidend ist für mich nun, dass dem grammatischen Missverständnis durch das ‚Erzählen einer Geschichte‘ vorgebeugt werden kann. Was ist damit gemeint? Unser Verstehen höherstufiger sprachlicher Kompetenzen kommt in Schritten daher. Einfache Sprachspiele werden schrittweise modifiziert und erweitert. Die Schritte des Verstehens werden in einer pragmatisch-genealogischen Geschichte sichtbar, da diese die Stufen des Könnens nachzeichnet. Verstehen wir die Übergänge, dann kann uns die grammatische Oberfläche nicht so leicht in die Irre führen.

Ich lese den analytischen Pragmatismus Brandoms in seiner generellen Ausrichtung nun so, dass er uns Dank der Ausweitung der Analyse von einer Logik der Gehalte zu einer Logik des Könnens führt:

„Algorithmic elaboration is a kind of logic of practical abilities.“ (Brandom 2008: 33).

An dieser Ausrichtung will ich festhalten, wenngleich die Fokussierung auf algorithmische Weiterentwicklungen später aufgehoben wird.

Eine Gemeinsamkeit zwischen Brandom und Wittgenstein sehe ich demnach im Bestreben, eine *konstruktive, diachrone* und *bottom-up* vorgehende Sprachphilosophie darzustellen. *Bottom-up* bezeichne ich ein Vorgehen, welches versucht zu zeigen, wie höherstufige Kompetenzen logisch von einfacheren abhängen.⁴ *Diachron* wird eine solche Darstellung dann, wenn zusätzlich gezeigt wird, wie der Erwerb des Komplexen durch Modifikation und Erweiterung des Einfachen zu denken ist. Die diachrone Perspektive deutet an, wo sich Genese und pragmatische Logik treffen. *Konstruktiv* will ich darüber hinaus nicht nur im Sinne der *Rekonstruktion* verstanden wissen, sondern so gebrauchen, dass es für einen systematischen Umgang mit philosophischen Fragen und Verwirrungen steht. In den Abschnitten 4.2 und 4.3 soll skizziert werden, wie die drei Begriffe aufeinander bezogen sind, nämlich so, dass wir den begrifflichen Verwirrungen konstruktiv-systematisch entgegen treten können, *indem* diachron und bottom-up vorgegangen wird. Das Aufdecken der Diskrepanz zwischen grammatischer und logischer Form ist der philosophische Wert des Erzählens genealogischer Geschichten.

Fazit: Woran ich beim analytischen Pragmatismus festhalten will, ist neben der logischen Rekonstruktion praktischer Fähigkeiten, der Versuch, Wittgenstein in ge-

⁴ In Abschnitt 4.1 werden zwei Bedeutungen eines solchen Vorgehens unterschieden und so eine Differenz zwischen Brandom und Wittgenstein markiert.

wisser Hinsicht analytisch zu lesen. Wobei ich ‚analytisch‘ ganz allgemein als ‚systematisch‘ deute und so einen Unterschied zur speziellen Interpretation im Sinne des Algorithmischen aufmache.

4. Die Engführung des analytischen Pragmatismus auf algorithmische Zusammenhänge

4.1 Bottom-up jenseits von Naturalismus und Propositionalismus

Ich möchte im vorliegenden Abschnitt für eine Öffnung des Argumentationsfeldes plädieren. Genau genommen besteht die Öffnung darin, das skizzierte Bild vom analytischen Pragmatismus um einige Striche zu ergänzen, um so wichtige Differenzierungen ins Spiel zu bringen. Einleitend seien diese Striche wie folgt angedeutet: Ich vertrete die These, dass Brandoms Position über zwei miteinander zusammenhängende blinde Flecken verfügt. Der erste Fleck zeigt sich darin, dass Brandom glaubt, wir müssten uns beim Erzählen konstruktiver Geschichten entscheiden zwischen Naturalismus auf der einen und Propositionalismus auf der anderen Seite. Der zweite kommt dagegen in der These zum Ausdruck, analytisch-algorithmisches Vorgehen und unsystematischer Quietismus seien erschöpfende Alternativen.

Meines Erachtens besteht zwischen diesen Gegenüberstellungen durchaus ein philosophischer Spielraum. Wittgenstein kann so gelesen werden, dass er eine *systematische* Form des Philosophierens verteidigt, die jenseits von Naturalismus und Propositionalismus angesiedelt ist. Eine solche Interpretation versucht die blinden Flecke dadurch zu beseitigen, dass zwischen zwei unterschiedlichen Verständnissen eines ‚bottom-up‘-Vorgehens unterschieden wird. Brandom lehnt einerseits völlig zu Recht Vorgehen ab, die den Anspruch haben, „aus nicht-intentionalen Knochen eine intentionale Suppe zu kochen“ (Brandom 2002: 383). Naturalistische Projekte dieser Art verzichten an der Basis ihres Stufenmodells gezielt auf intentionale Begriffe.

Wer solche Geschichten ablehnt, der ist jedoch nicht darauf festgelegt, mit propositional-inferentiellen Zuständen anzufangen.

Die Wurzel des Propositionalismus liegt jedoch dort, wo Brandom gegen Wittgenstein für die These eintritt, die Sprache habe ein Zentrum. Zu lesen ist:

„The core case of *saying* something is making a *claim*, *asserting* something. The practices I will call ‚linguistic‘ or ‚discursive‘ are those in which it is possible to make assertions or claims.“ (Brandom 2008: 42f.)

Im Zentrum sprachlicher Vollzüge verortet Brandom also assertorische Akte, welche über die pragmatischen Signifikanzen des Gebens und Verlangens von Gründen bestimmt werden.

Die Rede vom Zentrum der Sprache ist kritisch zu beurteilen, weil dadurch die propositionalen Vollzüge im luftleeren Raum konstruiert werden. Die These, dass das Verfügen über Sinn an Vollzüge in einem inferentiell gegliederten Raum der Gründe gebunden ist, versperrt den Weg, jene Stufen des Könnens selbst als Errungenschaft aus der Perspektive des Handelnden verständlich zu machen. Etwas als Grund für etwas anderes zu betrachten ist selbst eine höherstufige und damit zu erklärende Kompetenz. Die Rede vom basalen Verständnis eines ‚bottom-up‘-Vorgehens ist demnach so zu deuten, dass bei einem solchen *Formen des Sinns* unterschieden werden und zwischen diesen, d.h. zwischen basalen und primitiven

Sinnzusammenhängen auf der einen und höherstufigen Kompetenzen auf der anderen Seite, pragmatische-genealogische Abhängigkeiten dargestellt werden. Die dabei erzählten Geschichten sind im Gegensatz zum Naturalismus, handlungsbasierte bzw. handlungsartige Geschichten. Brandom nimmt auf diese *sinnhaften* Übergänge und Zwischenglieder keinen Bezug.

In ‚*Articulating Reasons*‘ (deutsch Brandom 2000: 41) verweist er stattdessen auf Klassifikationsmechanismen, genauer: auf „bloß unterscheidend reagierende Wesen“, die im Fortlauf der Geschichte in eine normative Praxis eingewiesen werden können. Dazu möchte ich anmerken: Die Notwendigkeit von Formen des Sinns auszugehen, besteht nun aber gerade darin, dass wir streng genommen gar nicht wissen, was es bedeuten soll, ein ‚bloß unterscheidend reagierendes Wesen‘ in eine *soziale Praxis einzuweisen*. Ich will damit sagen, dass die Klassifikationen um die es uns geht *als sinngetränkte Klassifikationshandlungen* zu beschreiben sind.

4.2 Wittgensteins primitive Sprachspiele

Wenn gesagt wird, dass die pragmatische Geschichte basaler ansetzen muss als es Brandom tut, dann kann die Erweiterung in zwei Stufen erfolgen. Ein erster Schritt ist getan, wenn die propositionalen Sprachformen an ihre vorpropositionalen Vorgänger angebunden werden. Wittgenstein vollzieht diesen Schritt zu Beginn der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*. Der Sprachkompetenz, sagen zu können, dass 5 große Platten zerbrochen sind, gehen einfachere sprachliche Fähigkeiten voraus, die zu der komplexeren in einer *pp-sufficiency*-Relation stehen. Der Sprecher muss gelernt haben, wie das Sprachspiel ‚Platte‘ um Zahlwörter, Adjektive und Prädikate erweitert wird. Dabei erscheint es mir überaus plausibel, die einfachen Formen wie ‚Platte‘, ‚3 Platten‘, etc. weder propositional, noch als verortet in einem inferentiellen Raum der Gründe (des Begründens) zu beschreiben. Gleichwohl sind die vorpropositionalen Voraussetzungen gehaltvolle Züge, weil ihre Äußerung Teil eines größeren Handlungszusammenhangs ist. Auch wenn die Sprecher eines solchen Sprachspiels nicht wissen, was es heißt, Sätze in Folgebeziehungen zu bringen und sie ihr Tun nicht explizit begründen, so gibt es doch bereits normative Vorläufer dieser Kategorien. Die Äußerung ‚Platte‘ ist an nichtsprachliche Aus- und Eingänge gebunden, die es uns erlauben, von adäquaten Vorgänger- und Anschlusshandlungen des jeweiligen Zuges im Sprachspiel zu sprechen. Damit hängt zusammen: Natürlich wissen die PU 2-Bauarbeiter nicht, was es heißt, einen Satz durch einen anderen zu rechtfertigen, aber wir können uns leicht ausmalen, wie ein zweifelnder Blick von B dadurch dialogisch beantwortet wird, dass A den B an die Hand nimmt und ihm voller Zuversicht zeigt, was er gesehen hat, nämlich 3 Platten.

Entscheidend ist nun, dass zu diesem ersten Schritt ein zweiter hinzukommen kann und muss. Denn vorpropositionalen Sprachformen ruhen ihrerseits auf primitive, nichtsprachliche Kommunikations- und Reaktionssituationen auf. Auch an dieser Stelle können wir von einer *pp-sufficiency*-Relation sprechen.

Wittgenstein arbeitet in seiner Spätphilosophie immer wieder mit dem Begriff ‚primitiver Sprachspiele‘.⁵ Schauen wir uns das etwas genauer an.

Erinnert sei an das obige Zitat Wittgensteins:

⁵ Dieser Begriff findet in der Sekundärliteratur wenig Beachtung, vgl. aber die interessante Ausnahme: John V. Canfield (2007).

„...unsere Sprache ist nur ein Hilfsmittel und ein weiterer Ausbau dieses Verhaltens. Ich meine: unser Sprachspiel ist ein Ausbau des primitiven Benehmens.“ (Wittgenstein 1999b: 151, S. 37)

An anderer Stelle führt er weiter aus:

„Was aber will hier das Wort „primitiv“ sagen? Doch wohl, dass die Verhaltensweise *vor-sprachlich* ist: dass ein Sprachspiel auf ihr beruht, dass sie der Prototyp einer Denkweise ist und nicht das Ergebnis des Denkens.“ (Wittgenstein 1999b: 916, S. 168).

Wittgensteins Rede von primitiven Reaktionen und vor-sprachlichen Verhaltensweisen bringt anthropologische Elemente ins Spiel, beispielsweise Phänomene wie Lachen, Weinen, Schmerzen zeigen, Spielen und Wahrnehmen. Diese Phänomene als Voraussetzungen für höherstufige Handlungsformen anzusehen, bedeutet exemplarisch etwa folgendes: Die wahrnehmungsbasierte Klassifikation von Spielsteinen im Kinderzimmer gemäß Farbe, Form oder Wohlgefallen stellt ein pragmatisches Sprungbrett für den Erwerb einfachster sprachlicher Etiketten (‚rot‘, ‚guter Stein‘) dar. Ganz ähnlich deutet Wittgenstein die Rolle des natürlichen Schmerzbehagens im Privatsprachenargument. Weitere Beispiele dieser Art lassen sich leicht anführen. In allen diesen Fällen wird deutlich, dass Sprache aus einem natürlichen Sinnboden erwächst – andernfalls wäre der Erwerb begrifflicher Fähigkeit nicht verständlich zu machen.

Um die hier angedeuteten Übergänge systematisch fassen und fruchtbar machen zu können, hat Canfield das folgende 3-Stufen-Modell vorgeschlagen: Proto-Sprachspiele → Gesten und Gebärden → sprachlich-konventionalisierte Vollzüge (Sprachspiele).⁶ Natürliche Reaktionen (Greifbewegungen des Kindes) werden durch nicht-sprachliche Dialogstrukturen normiert. Es entstehen neue Sinnstrukturen, zum Beispiel eine Zeigegeste. Die Bewegung wird in Handlungsraum zielortiert eingesetzt. Auf der dritten Stufe wird die Geste sprachlich gefasst, was aufgrund des bereits bestehenden normativen Fundaments kaum problematisch sein dürfte. Statt der Zeigegeste verwendet das Kind nun den Ausdruck ‚Das‘.

Zwei inhaltliche Gesichtspunkte soll dieses Stufenmodell deutlich machen: *Erstens* sind die Vorformen der Sprache handlungsartig zu beschreiben. Im Gegensatz zu Brandom finde ich es mehr als befremdlich, den Anfang mit kausalen Dispositionen zu wagen. Wir treten im Gegenteil dazu als menschliche Wesen von Beginn unseres Lebens an in soziale Handlungsräume ein, die uns unweigerlich zum Mitspielen auffordern. Eine solche Aufforderung macht jedoch nur dort Sinn, wo jemand *motivierbar* ist, also einen Drang zum Mitspielen verspüren kann.

Zweitens sind die geschilderten Übergänge vom Vor-Sprachlichen zum Sprachlich-Vor-Propositionalen und weiter zum Propositionalen nicht im Sinne einer algorithmischen Elaboration zu verstehen. Wenn wir sagen, dass Kinder das pragmatische Potential haben, in inferentielle Zusammenhänge einzutreten, dann deutet die Rede vom Impliziten an dieser Stelle auf eine andere Form des Übergangs von P1 zu P2 hin, nämlich jene des Lernens, Eintauchens und hermeneutischen Verstehens.

Eine Grundaussage der Regelfolgendiskussion Wittgensteins besteht darin, dass die Fähigkeit, eine paradigmatische Beispielsreihe selbstständig fortzusetzen, nicht noch einmal philosophisch zerlegt werden kann. Wir

gehen von ‚Diese Blume ist rot‘, ‚Dieser Stift ist rot‘ selbstständig zu neuen Anwendungen des Begriffs ‚... ist rot‘ über. Alles was sich hier sagen lässt, ist, dass Menschen, die in eine Praxis P1 eingeführt werden, unter bestimmten Lernbedingungen sehr wahrscheinlich diese fortsetzen bzw. die Praxis P2 erreichen. In diesem Fällen manifestiert sich ein hermeneutisches Verstehen, bei dem der Akteur eine Situation erfassen muss. Situatives Verstehen geht dem algorithmischen voraus, da das formale Geländer, an dem wir uns später abarbeiten können, allererst kreativ erzeugt werden muss.

4.3 Hermeneutisches Verstehen mit System

Interessanterweise hat Brandom diese Art des Übergangs von einem zum anderen Können im 3. Kapitel von ‚*Between Saying and Doing*‘ explizit in seine Überlegungen miteinbezogen. Dort grenzt er das algorithmische Weiterentwickeln vom ‚practical elaboration by training‘ (Brandom 2008: 86) ab. Was die Differenzierung der Elaborationsarten anbelangt, gibt es kaum Unterschiede zwischen Brandom und dem, was ich im letzten Abschnitt vorgestellt habe. Die Wege trennen sich jedoch dort, wo ich an einer stärker philosophischen Ausbuchstabierung und Systematisierung des hermeneutischen Verstehens interessiert bin. Brandom tendiert zu einer quasi-empirischen, quietistischen Aufzählung hermeneutischer Übergänge. Es wird so der Eindruck vermittelt, wir könnten nicht mehr tun als *festzustellen*, dass Wesen wie wir, unter normalen Bedingungen, von einer Praxis P1 zu P2 übergehen. Meines Erachtens kann an dieser Stelle mehr gesagt werden.

Der konstruktiv-systematische Charakter (nicht-algorithmischer) pragmatischer Geschichten zeigt sich u.a. in folgenden drei Aspekten. Erstens haben die Überlegungen Canfields gezeigt, wie mit Hilfe eines Stufenmodells hermeneutische Übergänge als Transformationen einer bereits beherrschten Kompetenz eingefangen werden können. Diese Transformationen versuchen verständlich zu machen, was uns aus eigener Erfahrung bereits vertraut ist. Zweitens erläutern pragmatische Geschichten den Witz der sprachlichen Darstellungsform im konkreten Sprachspiel. Dieser Gedanke wurde oben schon einmal angesprochen. Wittgenstein erinnert uns in seinen Schriften immer wieder daran, dass es die homogene sprachliche Oberfläche ist, die uns Analogien und Vergleiche sehen lässt, wo die Sprachspiele äußerst heterogen sind. Die Tatsache, dass die Subjekt-Prädikat-Form auf alle möglichen Handlungsbereiche übertragen werden kann und so die Form der Darstellung verallgemeinert wird, impliziert gerade nicht, dass stets auch die gleiche inhaltliche Deutung der Darstellungsform projiziert wird. Genauer gesagt: Die Übertragung der Komplexbildungsweise von einfachen empirisch-deskriptiven Sätzen auf modale, moralische und religiöse Satzklassen heißt nicht, dass in allen diesen Diskursen ein ‚Gegenstand unter einen Begriff‘ fällt. Wittgenstein sagt:

„Können wir denn nicht das Begriffsgebäude ausbauen als Behältnis für welche Anwendung immer daherkommt? Darf denn nicht ... eine Sprachform vorbereiten für mögliche Verwendungen? Ist denn nicht die Subjekt-Prädikat-Form in dieser Weise offen und wartet auf die verschiedensten neuen Anwendungen?“ (Wittgenstein 1999c: S. 295)

Wenn wir also wissen wollen, wie die Art der inneren Zusammengesetztheit eines Satzes zu verstehen ist, zum Beispiel einer moralischen Äußerung, dann empfiehlt uns Wittgenstein, zuerst auf die alten Anwendungen der Darstellungsform zu schauen und von dort eine Geschichte der inhaltlichen Übergänge nachzuvollziehen. Nur so können wir verhindern, durch sprachliche Bilder in die Irre

⁶ John V. Canfield (2007).

geleitet zu werden, wenn sie uns auf die Suche nach modalen und moralischen Gegenständen schicken. Die alten Verwendungsweisen sind Sprungbrett der kreativen Ausweitung der Darstellungsform, jedoch nur dann, wenn sie als bereits verstanden in Anschlag gebracht werden können. An dieser Stelle können wir sehen, dass das Nachvollziehen der Übertragung der Subjekt-Prädikat-Form im konkreten Fall inhaltlich auf andere Bereiche ausstrahlt, da wir ähnliche Übergänge in vielen Bereichen unserer Lebenswelt vollzogen haben und vollziehen.

Drittens wird durch die ersten beiden Aspekte sichtbar, dass das hermeneutische Verstehen in vielen Situationen durch Vergleiche, Analogien und Geschichten auf den Weg gebracht wird. Der Wert dieser Geschichten erschöpft sich jedoch nicht im jeweiligen Einzelfall. Wer einen Vergleich versteht, der gewinnt immer auch eine neue Perspektive hinzu, die ihn andere Vollzüge in einem neuen Licht erscheinen lässt.

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Searle on Construction of Reality: How We Construct Chairmen and Don't Construct Chairs

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The starting point of Searle's theory of institutions, as he posed it in *The Construction of Social Reality*, is the question: how can certain objective facts, that exist only by virtue of the fact that they are recognized by a community of people, exist in the physical world? An example of such a fact would be the fact that there is a philosophical conference happening here in Kirchberg, that since January the unit of currency in Slovakia has been the euro, and that Peter and Mary are married. Searle would answer that the intentionality of human minds is partly constitutive of these facts; that these institutions and institutional facts are constructed in the beliefs, expectations, and other intentional states. Briefly put: the existence of institution is *intentionality-dependent* – unlike facts of the physical world, which are *intentionality-independent*. Institutions and institutional facts are not, however, merely subjective entities – they are objective in the sense that truth or falsity of judgments about them does not depend on attitudes, opinions or values of those who judge.

Searle sketches the overall ontological picture of the world, in which institutions exist, as follows: there is a world that exists independently of intentionality, that is, which exists independently of what anybody believes, hopes, expects, etc. about it. This is the world where there are rivers, mountains, seas, planets, forests, rocks, and so on – Searle calls them “brute” facts. Animals and rational creatures are also examples of these brute facts because their existence neither depends on what somebody thinks about them, or if somebody thinks about them. Some of these animals have the capacity of intentionality – they are capable of perception, recognition, having intentions, beliefs, expectations, and so on. Mainly they are able to have these mental states about the physical world that exist independently of their minds. And if their intentionality is sufficiently evolved, they are also capable of thinking, recognizing, intending, etc. of objects which otherwise don't exist – which don't exist unless they objects of those intentional states. In other words: they are able to construct such objects with their intentionality. These constructed objects are the various institutions and institutional facts.

In his account of the construction of these institutional facts, Searle emphasizes the shift from brute facts to the functions of institutions. We can sum up Searle's explanation of this shift as follows: people (as well as some other animals) have the capacity for collective intentionality, whose main performance is the *assignment of function* to a brute object. This performance is the recognition of the object in the world as bearing certain functions, where “function” is a shorthand for the possibility of an action connected with the object. For example, we recognize an object of a certain shape, size, solidity, etc. as an object that we can sit on, by which we assign the function of “chair” to it. The key step in the construction of institutional facts appears, when a community collectively assigns a function to the object, which the object cannot perform solely in virtue of its physical properties. Searle calls this kind of function a “status function” and he claims that the assignment of status function to an object equates to the shift from brute fact to an institutional fact. (CSR, 41)

But this account also raises some questions: what exactly is the assignment of function, and how should we account for its existence in the physical world? And also: how can we intentionally assign a function to a brute object, if this object should not be intentionally accessible?

The goal of my paper is to offer a reading of Searle's account, which proposes answers to these questions. In my opinion this reading is not in conflict with Searle's account, but represents only a slight shift of emphasis – the construction of institutions, according to my reading, shouldn't be explained as a shift from brute reality to status functions, but as a development from an intentionality that is capable of having beliefs (and other mental states) about non-institutional objects, to an intentionality which is capable of having beliefs (and other mental states) about institutional objects. Which is to say, as a development from beliefs (and other mental states) about chairs, tables, cups of tea, and bicycles, to the beliefs (and other mental states) about conferences, professors, nation-states, and football matches. This reading is, in my opinion, also in agreement with the new explanation which Searle recently offered explaining the ontology of institutions as constructed by language, which is seen as developed from prelinguistic forms of intentionality – and therefore the shift is situated between prelinguistic and linguistic intentionalities, rather than between brute facts and status functions.

My reading is largely influenced by Josef Moural's work and can be seen as a part of his research project declared in (Moural 2002). Moural sees intentionality as the key point in the account of the construction of institutional facts as well as in the clarification of the role of some other aspects of Searle's theory, such as *constitutive rules* or the capacity to symbolize (Moural 2008, 111 and elsewhere).

My reading is also facilitated by CSR, although Searle's emphasis dwells on something else – he repeatedly speaks about the shift from brute facts to institutional facts, consisting in the assignment of status functions to brute facts. All the work in the construction of institutional facts is therefore done by the assignment of status function. The assignment of function to objects in general (at least the assignment of “*agentive*” functions, that is, functions that are relative to the practical interests of conscious agents) is a common feat of intentionality – we usually see objects as having certain functions, for example as chairs, cups, screwdrivers, doors, and so on. Some of those functions have then a non-causal nature, that is, the performance of these functions is not guaranteed by the physical of the object – these are the status functions. Further, some of those intentional states have a collective form (or “we-form”), and the assignment of some functions (namely the assignment of status functions) is done according to a *constitutive rule*. The form of constitutive rules is: “*X counts as Y in the context C*” – for example an object of such and such properties (a bit of paper of such and such color and pattern and origin) counts as a five-dollar bill. Institutional facts are created in the collective assignment of status function, which is always carried out according to the constitutive rule. The formula “*X counts as Y in the context C*”

therefore expresses the *ontology* of institutional facts. The cohesion of this ontology with the physical world is ensured by both the fact, that the assignment of function is a feat of mind whose existence is *intentionality-independent* and thus belongs to the brute world, and the fact that the X-term is (at least on the lowest level) a brute object.

The *ontology* of institutional facts, however – according to Searle – does not describe the content of intentional states in which the institutional facts are constructed; it does not describe the form of what is presented in the minds of people when they have thoughts (beliefs, expectations, etc.) about institutional facts. What is presented in such mental states is, Searle says (CSR 104), the status function. And because “function” is just shorthand for the possibility of actions, they are presented with a content that has the following general form: “*We accept (S has power (S does A))*”. (In *status* function the *possibility* of action gets the character of a *power* to act.)

I agree with Searle's claim here. When we have mental states in which the intentional object is an institutional fact, it is first of all the power to act that we are aware of. And similarly, when we have beliefs (or other mental states) about non-institutional objects: when we see a chair we see it as something we can sit on, when we believe there is a coffee-machine around the corner, we believe we can get a cup of coffee there. But – and this is the point I want to emphasize – the content of intentionality involves the following *two* elements: (1) “*We accept (S has power (S does A))*”, and (2) “*X counts as Y in the context C*”. And (2) is not less important than (1), especially in the case of the institutional facts because in these facts nothing of the properties of the X-term guarantees the possibility of actions described by the Y-term, and therefore there is no fulfillment of the status function unless it is recognized by the conscious agents. For example, the color, and pattern, and chemical composition, and even the origin of the piece of paper do not guarantee that it can be used as money, that is as medium of exchange, store of value, etc. (CSR 45-46). Which is not the case when it comes to the non-institutional objects such as, for example, a chair; the function of chair can be fulfilled by an object solely in virtue of its physical properties – whether anybody recognizes it as such or not. Therefore, in the case of institutional facts, the agent must be capable of these intentional performances: (1) to identify the object X; (2) to comprehend the possibility of actions that goes with the function Y; (3) to recognize that the object X fulfill the function Y. (3) is necessary because there is no fulfillment of the status function beyond that recognition, and (1) is necessary because it is the condition for (3). These three points make the content of intentional states which participate in the construction of institutional reality.

Searle's claims in CSR about this matter seem to be in conflict. On the one hand he emphatically insists that an institutional fact can exist only if it is represented as existing.

“From the fact that the status function specified by the Y term can be fulfilled only if it is recognized, accepted, acknowledged, or otherwise believed in, it follows that the institutional fact in question *can exist only if it is represented as existing*.” (CSR 62)

On the other hand, he says elsewhere that the ontological structure “*X counts as Y in the context C*” is mostly invisible for the participants in the construction of institutional reality (CSR 4, 47, 96, 137, and elsewhere). I would suggest that we should accept this structure to be a part of the intentional content. First, it corresponds to what we are

aware of, and secondly, we don't have any theoretical reason to deny it.

Searle correctly says that it is the possibility of action that is, first of all, in the center of our attention. I would, however, say that at the same time we are aware of the properties of the object X. In the analysis of intentionality we can be confused by the fact that the recognition of the properties of X is something that is very easily come by and therefore doesn't attract our attention. We are always perceiving the physical properties of the world and of the objects in the world, such as colors, shapes, sizes, locations, and so on.

When Searle speaks of the invisibility of the ontological structure, he typically cites language as an example: people usually learn their native language without consciously following the grammatical rules of the language. They don't have in mind “objects of those acoustic or visual properties connected in such and such way count as expressing such and such meaning.” But if we scrutinize this example, we see that to know grammatical rules is one thing, and to consciously recognize the physical features of utterances or texts is another. We do not need to be aware of the grammatical rules to perceive the physical properties of the utterances and texts, and without the perception of the physical properties we would not be able to recognize any meaning of any linguistic expression. It is also true that the physical properties of spoken or written language don't determine the meaning. However it does not follow from this that the physical properties are invisible.

Similarly, it is true that while playing chess, we focus our attention on the possible actions, i.e. both mine and my opponent's moves. At the same time, we are aware of the physical properties of the chess-board, chess-pieces, etc. Actually, without this, we wouldn't be able to play chess at all. The same is true about a basketball player: while his conscious attention is overwhelmed by the intention of scoring points, he is also aware whether he has crossed the 3-point line or not.

The awareness of the physical properties of the world, usually presented through our senses, is always there. Further, we can always shift our attention to the physical properties from the action we are doing. This shift of attention usually happens when the action doesn't perform as expected; if, for example, our understanding of a sentence is disrupted by a misplaced or misspelled word. (These sentiments should be familiar to any reader of Heidegger.)

It is obvious that something very similar can be said about the content of intentional states, the intentional object of which is a non-institutional fact such as a chair: in the conscious experience of a chair, we are aware both of the possibility of action and of the physical properties of the object. However, unlike in the case of institutional facts, while experiencing a chair, we probably don't need any strong conscious recognition of the connection of the action (Y-term) and the physical properties (X-term). This connection is provided causally, and therefore we can afford the luxury of letting it drop from our mind. It may well be that the capacity of being aware of the X–Y connection is one of the capacities that are developed in the evolution of minds (or brains). Once it has the capacity large enough to comprehend physical causality, it can construct the institutional facts.

We can also now sketch how the existence of intentionality can be explained in physical terms: there is a basis to think that, in the “causal” level of intentionality, it will

be possible to translate the intentionalistic description to a physicalistic one because of the causal character of this process. In the higher levels of intentionality, especially in the level of intentionality where institutional facts are constructed, such a reduction will be impossible. First, because the construction of institutions creates desire-independent reasons for action (CSR ...), which can be understood as reasons for action independent of biologically based desires, and secondly, because the fulfillment of the status function has not causal character – it exists only as represented in minds of conscious agents. They represent it in virtue of the same capacities that form the primitive or fundamental level of intentionality.

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In Pursuit of Ordinary: Performativity in Judith Butler and J. L. Austin

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Judith Butler, in her book *Excitable Speech: a Politics of the Performative* adapts Austin's theory of speech act into political contexts. She evaluates Austin's theory and tries to show in what ways it is inadequate. The first point Butler discusses is the conventional character of illocutionary utterances. As is also asserted by Austin, illocutionary utterances are not only conventional, but also "ritual and ceremonial." However, Butler interprets "ritual and ceremonial" differently from Austin. According to Butler, the context of an utterance goes far beyond the moment of the utterance, and ritualization exceeds a single moment in time. Butler says, "[t]he 'moment' in ritual is a condensed historicity: it exceeds itself in past and future directions, an effect of prior and future invocations that constitute and escape the instance of utterance" (Butler 1997 p.3).

This, on the other hand, is in conflict with Austin's characterization of "a total speech situation" required to evaluate speech acts. The "total speech situation" defined by Austin is spatio-temporally or contextually-bounded and it is related to the immediacy of the present moment: I call it immediate contextualism and assert that it is different from Butler's view. Butler does not think that a speech act is evaluated in a simple sort of context that is defined easily by spatial and temporal boundaries; on the contrary, performative utterances are restaged over and over again. This restaging of a performative utterance requires the present use, which is determined by the past use. Although the future use is not determined yet, since our utterances cannot be free from a socio-historical determination, then it is very likely that the future uses will be similar to past uses as well.

Butler thinks that there are similarities between Austin's concept of "ritual" and Althusser's concept of "interpellation." She states that at the first look they do not seem to be related because in Austin the subject who speaks precedes the speech in question; while in Althusser a speech act, which brings the subject into linguistic existence, precedes and forms the subject in question. However, this apparent contrast between Austin's and Althusser's views disappears when we consider that the workings of performatives in Austin's subject-centered speech acts do not depend on the intention of the speaker always. She underlines that Austin rejects psychologism that would require "fictitious inward acts." The similarity between Austin and Althusser appears at this point. "Just as for Austin the convention governing the institution of promise-making is verbally honored even in the case of a promise that no one intends to fulfill, so for Althusser one is entered into the "ritual" of ideology regardless of whether there is a prior and authenticating belief in that ideology" (Butler 1997 p.24). Hence, according to Butler, Austin's view that an illocutionary speech act is conditioned by its conventional, that is, "ritual" or "ceremonial" dimension, finds a counterpart in Althusser's insistence that ideology has a "ritual" form, and that ritual constitutes "the material existence of an ideological apparatus" (Quoted by Butler 1997 p.25).

Butler accepts that both for Austin and Althusser there is not a preexisting mental state determining the cognitive status of subjects¹. However, in the case of Althusser "ideas" have their existence inscribed in the actions of practices governed by rituals, while in the case of Austin subject, speaks *conventionally*, that is, "it"² speaks in a voice that is never fully singular. That subject invokes a formula (which is not quite the same as following a rule), and this may be done with no little reflection on the conventional character of what is being said. The ritual dimension of convention implies that the moment of utterance is informed by the prior and, indeed, future moments that are absorbed by the moment itself. Hence, when "I" speak there are, actually, an inherited set of voices, an echo of others speak (Butler 1997 p.25). Hence, condensed historicity of language precedes and exceeds the history of the speaking subject and his contingent existence in all directions.

Butler further articulates the nature of speech acts by appealing to Derrida's concept of "iteration" and "citationality." "Citational" character of speech exceeds subjects, who utter the term because at the moment of utterance of names they actually cite them and establish a "derivative status of authorship." This transitivity cannot be reduced to a causal or intentional process of a singular subject (Butler 1997 p.49). Because the subject uttering injurious words is mobilized by a long string of injurious interpellations, she achieves a temporary status in citing that utterance.

Butler cites Derrida criticizing Austin for not considering this citational and derivative character of performatives and she endorses Derrida's idea that the power of a subject is not the function of an originating will, but is always derivative. Butler agrees with Derrida saying that a performative utterance succeeds only if it repeats a "coded" or iterable utterance: in other words, only if it is identifiable as a citation. In this case, the category of intention will not disappear, but "will no longer be able to govern the entire scene and system of utterance" (Quoted by Butler 1997 p.51). She thinks that a performative utterance succeeds not because an intention governs the action of speech, but because action echoes prior actions, and accumulates "the force of authority through the repetition or citation of a prior and authoritative set of practices" (Butler 1997 p.51). In this sense, speech act does not take place within a practice, but the act itself is a ritualized practice. A term or statement functions only in the accumulation of historicity of force.

Butler criticizes Austin for not embedding the speech acts within historical contexts. In this sense, the derivative character of speech, associated with concepts such as "sedimentation," "interpellation," "citation," and "iteration," is absent in Austin's theory. Butler implies that

¹ At this point she differs from Habermas saying that Austin restricts himself to the cognitive use of language only.

² Realize that Butler identifies subject with "it," which implies that subject is a mere means in a communicative activity.

"sedimentation" or "calcification" exceeds the contingent immediacy of a context and our job is not simply to analyze how sentences and words have been used, in what contexts, and for what purposes (Butler 1997 p.36), but to consider a greater context requiring political and ethical evaluations of the uses of concepts or words within historical perspective. However, Butler's account has problematic aspects.

In Defense of Ordinary

In a Foucauldian manner, Butler thinks that names, injurious names have a history, and at the moment of an utterance historicity is invoked and reconsolidated. Histories are installed and arrested in names. According to Butler, the history has become internal to a name and to its usages, and these usages become part of the very name, "a sedimentation, a repetition that congeals, that gives the name its force" (Butler 1997 p.36).

Butler's description of uses of names with concepts such as "sedimentation," "condensed historicity," "calcification of meaning," "interpellation," "reiteration," "citation," and "repetition" is problematic in several respects. First, it presupposes that socio-historical or historico-cultural uses are sedimented, entrenched and congealed in such a way as to create a substantial, internal meaning determining the future uses of "names" and concepts. Because these sedimented or congealed entities determine the present uses and potentially determine the future uses, it is almost unimaginable to open up possibilities for new uses.

The second problem is internally connected with the first one. The problem with this "condensed historicity" is that the present staging of performative utterances are always determined by socio-historical background of the uses of performative utterances. In this sense, the present use is determined by the past use and the past is already included in the present uses of performative utterances. The future use is not determined yet, hence it is not a context yet, but since our utterances cannot be free from the socio-historical determination, then it is very likely that the future uses will be similar to the past uses of names as well because they are structured already. She says, "an 'act' is not a momentary happening, but a certain nexus of temporal horizons, the condensation of an iterability that exceeds the moment it occasions" (Butler 1997 p.14). According to Butler's account, a person performing an act or pronouncing a sentence speaks according to unchallenged power and she reiterates or cites a "long string of interpellations" in her utterances. In this case, the power precedes the one speaking as subject, though the subject seems to have that power (Butler 1997 p.49). The one who speaks is not the originator of such speech, but just citing or repeating because the subject is produced in language through a prior performative exercise of speech. In this sense, speech is in "some ways out of our control" (Butler 1997 p.21). I think this is another flaw implied in her view because this "out of control"-ness results in a complete elimination of agency.

Butler seems to accept that the reversal of the process is possible by certain means. Her two remarks seem to defeat the total elimination of agency: one is her idea that speech is not only defined by social context, but has the capacity to break with this context (Butler 1997 p.40). This breaking down is possible by "misappropriation." Butler states, "[t]he political possibility of reworking the force of the speech act against the force of injury consists in misappropriating the force of speech from those prior contexts" (Butler 1997 p.40). The subject is interpellated in language "through a selective process in which the terms

of legible and intelligible subjecthood are regulated. The subject is called a name, but "who" the subject is depends as much on the names that he or she is never called: the possibilities for linguistic life are both inaugurated and foreclosed through the name" (Butler 1997 p.41). Hence, "misappropriation" is possible by legitimating new and future forms, which open up new contexts, and speak in ways that have never yet been legitimated in speech (Butler 1997 p.41). Butler's second remark is implied in the concept of "ambivalence." She doesn't explicitly put forward what she means by the concept, but it may be interpreted as a potential implicit in socio-historical conditions to reverse the process. However, is this "misappropriation" or "ambivalence" possible within Butler's framework?

As is said earlier, since the meaning of the terms or "names" is determined by past uses, which is identified by Butler with concepts such as "calcification of meaning," "sedimentation," and "condensed historicity," then it is almost impossible to break with these socio-historically determined *a priori* meanings. In Butler's framework, subjects are subjecting to the socio-historically determined *a priori* "names" or concepts, rather than acting or uttering performatives by their own will. Because the subject's performative acts are determined in a language in such a way as to exceed and precede subject, then this determination eliminates "its" agency altogether, therefore it is not possible for "it" to be redefined.

There is also a conflict in Butler's interpretation of Austin. On the one hand, Butler asserts that there is a connection between Austin's concept of "ritual" and Althusser's concept of "interpellation," on the other hand, she agrees with Derrida saying that Austin does not consider "citational" and derivative character of speech acts. The concept of "interpellation" and the concept of "citation" complement one another. Therefore, it does not seem reasonable to attribute one without attributing the other to a certain view. Besides, Austin's association of illocutionary acts with "ritual" cannot be correlated with "interpellation" in Althusser for several reasons. First, although Austin talks about "total conditions," they have reference to the conditions implied in the present moment, rather than socio-historical determination. Secondly, because they do not have reference to socio-historical conditions, subject is not interpellated, does not repeat, or iterate, but is an active originator of her speech. This gives superiority to Austin's view. Obviously, Austin emphasizes the conventional aspect of illocutionary acts. However, because subjects are not objectified in Austin, every speech act is actually a new one, complying with a tradition, on the one hand, and diverging from the tradition on the other. This ambivalence opens a possibility for creating a new relationship among human beings. With this respect, Austin's view has superiority over that of Butler presupposing that total conditions exceed and precede contingent immediacy of the present moment of utterance so as to eliminate agency altogether.

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Crispin Wright's Antirealism and Normativity of Truth

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1. Introduction

Crispin Wright's defense of antirealism is based on two things, which both can be traced back to Dummett. First, truth is normative. Truth is something that we aim for. Second, all truths are knowable. This epistemic constraint is essential for dummettian antirealism. For Dummett any account saying that a sentence can be true without *us* knowing that it is true is realistic. The epistemic constraint entails the antirealistic rejection of Bivalence of classical logic. Realism on the other hand retains to Bivalence.

Dummett has also suggested that the dispute between realism and antirealism should be settled on a neutral ground (see Tennant 1997, 305-308). In his *Truth and Objectivity (TaO)* (1992) Wright takes seriously this idea. He sets out to explore the realism - anti-realism debate with a neutral truth predicate. (Wright 1992, 1-12.) However under closer scrutiny Wright's defense reveals a problem concerning the neutrality of truth. My main objective in this paper is to outline a solution to this problem. When the problem is located, I will circumvent the problematic part in Wright's thinking with Huw Price's idea.

2. Deflationism and Wright's minimalism

Wright's first task is to show that truth is not exclusively property of realism. According to him, a promising starting point is deflationism. A central deflationist, Paul Horwich says: "[A] truth predicate is merely a logical device enabling simple formulations of [...] generalization" (Horwich 1996, 878). This conception of truth makes it possible for example to say that everything he or she said at lunch is true without repeating the whole conversation. Horwich claims that two things follow from this. First, the function of truth is captured entirely by the non-pathological instances of the Disquotational Schema:

(DS) "p" is true iff p

and by its analogue for propositional contents, the Equivalence Schema:

(ES) it is true that p iff p.

Secondly, truth is not a substantial property. Wright says that it would be nice if deflationism supplied what we wanted (Wright 1992, 13). To me this sounds just a rhetoric statement. It is actually crucial for Wright that deflationism does not capture the whole story about truth. Although some thinkers (such as Neil Tennant) might disagree, it is rather widely held that the DS entails Bivalence. When "p" is undecidable, the claim that "p" is true will be false and the whole biconditional therefore incorrect. (See Wright 1992, 61 and compare Tennant 2004, 17.) So if the anti-realist accepted deflationism, she would be giving the game straight away to realism and this is exactly what Wright wants to avoid. No wonder Wright warns us soon after the rhetoric statement that deflationism might not be the whole story. According to him, the problem with deflationism is that it says that truth is not a substantial property, but even the DS entails that truth is normative. According to Wright this already conflicts the second thesis of deflationism. Wright says:

Say [...] that a *predicate*, F, is [...] normative just in case participant's selection [or] endorsement [...] of a move is as a matter of fact guided by whether or not they judge that move is F – a judgement whose bare possibility is neutral [...] on the question whether or not the predicate expresses a substantial property (Wright 1992, 16).

On the basis of this it seems that the question is not whether truth is substantial or not, but whether truth is a normative characteristic or not, because Wright's interpretation of the second thesis of deflationism is that truth is not a characteristic at all, normative or any other (Wright 1992, 16). Nevertheless normativity is what the DS entails. Therefore deflationism is unstable. He shows the entailment with an argument, which I call *an Argument from Divergence in Extension*.

3. Wright's argument and realism

Horwich grants that truth and its cognates have something to do with normativity. His strategy for coping with this is to appeal to a well-known distinction between truth and warranted assertion. Horwich claims that normativity is an aspect of warranted assertion. So the elucidation of *truth* does not have to explain it. It is an easy mistake to think that truth is normative, because of the close connection between truth and warranted assertion, but it is still a mistake. Horwich's point is that since normativity is correctly associated with warranted assertability, there is no pressure from normativity to the account of truth. The truth predicate does not mark an *independent* norm. Thus the DS captures whole truth and truth is not substantial.

Wright on the other hand goes out to prove that the explanation of normativity is one of the responsibilities of the theory of truth. Wright also grants that truth and warranted assertability coincide in normative force, but:

Although coincident in normative force [...], [truth] and [warranted assertability] *have* to be regarded as registering distinct norms [...] [A]lthough aiming at one is, necessarily, aiming at the other, success in the one aim need not be success in the other [...] [I]t is also something which any endorsement of the DS, whether in a deflationist spirit or not, entails. (Wright 1992, 19.)

What Wright needs to show is that truth and warranted assertability really register distinct norms and that deflationism entails this. He shows this with his argument. Deflationism is committed to the ES, which guarantees that its instances are contentful. This means that also the negated instances of the ES have to be contentful. So we can form from the ES together with the DS a Negation Equivalence:

(NE) "It is not the case that P" is true iff it is not case "P" is true.

Wright's contention is that the NE might fail, when "is true" is read as "is warrantably assertible". This happens when a state of information is neutral concerning the justification of assertion i.e. the state of information does not justify assertion or its denial. The key point is that assertion might still be true. So the NE holds good for the truth predicate. (Wright 1992, 19-20.) This shows that "is true" and "is war-

rantedly assertible" have different extensions and thus they register distinct norms. This means that not only warranted assertability is normative, but we have to regard truth as normative too.

I see the previous key point problematic. In his commentary on *TaO*, James van Cleve remarks that the truth predicate used in Wright's argument is incompatible with Dummett's antirealism, which makes truth evidentially constrained. He says that the right-to-left reading of the NE needs Law of Excluded Middle (LEM), which is a mark of realistic truth. (van Cleve, 1996, 870; similar point in Engel 2002, 73-74.) Van Cleve admits that later on in his book Wright repudiates LEM when discussing Putnam's view's. Wright responds to this by repeating the passage mentioned by van Cleve (Wright 1996, 916-917). In *TaO* Wright explains that even under putnamian ideal epistemic circumstances it cannot be assumed *a priori* that all statements of any given discourse are decidable and undecidable statements fail to satisfy the NE. (Wright 1992, 39-40.) This demonstrates that his truth predicate has to be *a priori* epistemically constrained. The problem, however, is that to demonstrate this Wright needs the resources of the DS *and* the resources of normativity. Wright says that it is the so-called minimal platitudes (i.e. 'asserting a proposition is claiming that it is true' and 'every proposition has a significant negation') that impose the NE, but these platitudes are already normative (Wright 1992, 40). And the success of his previous argument that truth is normative depends on a realistic conception of truth rather than neutral truth.

4. Price on normativity of truth

I grant that Wright's argument has its appeal in its simplicity, but to show divergence in extension is by no means the only way to show that two concepts or in this case two norms are distinct. I now propose a different way of showing that truth and warranted assertability are distinct, which does not make any assumptions whether truth is realistic or antirealistic. I think Huw Price's idea is helpful in this.

Price argues just like Wright that truth is normative, but his road to this conclusion is different. Price says that there are three normative principles:

Subjectivity: One is incorrect to assert that p if one does not believe that p.

Objectivity: One is incorrect to assert that p if though one believes that p, one does not have adequate grounds for believing that p.

Super-objectivity: If not-p then it is incorrect to assert that p. (Price 1998, 248.)

It is important to stress that Price grants that deflationism can cope with the first two principles, because Wright has given the impression that any account of truth needs to explain the *doxastic* practices in connection with assertion and deflationism has no resources for this explanation (Wright, 2003, 340). As Price remarks, deflationism has no obligation to explain these practices. It is enough to say that we should only *assert* something that we have adequate grounds for believing. Thus the first two principles are jobs of the theories of assertion and belief. It is the third principle that marks a difference between truth and assertion.

Price illustrates this with a thought experiment. Imagine a community where the speakers criticize each other for insincerity (thereby not honoring the subjective

principle) and for lack of objective grounds for assertion. Something is still missing. Price says:

The crucial point is that there is a norm of assertion which a speaker may fail to meet, *even if she does meet the norms of subjective and objective assertability*. We judge a speaker [...] *mistaken*, when we judge her assertion false, even we are in no doubt that she is sincere, and in possession of the kind of evidence that would lead any reasonable person to make the same mistake. (Price 1998, 246.)

If a theory of truth does not recognize the possibility of a mistake in this sense, the theory is inadequate. Price's point is that the *assessment* of the success of reaching truth is not just a project of an individual speaker as the first two norms suggest. Rather it is a matter of wider linguistic community and this is what the third norm suggests. This demonstrates that truth and warranted assertability register distinct norms. Furthermore Price has shown it in a way which Wright should approve, since he has also emphasized that a possibility of a mistake which is independent of any individual opinion is a sign of normativity (Wright 2003, 31).

5. Saving the differences between Wright and Price

Despite the similarities in Price's and Wright's conclusion, I think there is still an important difference. Wright thinks that deflationism is unstable, because it claims that the DS captures all there is to say about truth and truth is not substantial, but Wright says that even the DS entails that truth is normative. Price on the other hand seems to think that his thought experiment shows that while truth is normative, deflationism no longer entails this i.e. the DS does not capture the whole notion of truth.

Although Price thinks otherwise, I do not see any reason why we could not use Price's thought experiment to show that truth is normative while retaining to the DS. In fact Matthew McGrath's comment on Price may suggest just this. McGrath grants the possibility that truth presupposes the correctness of assertion as Price insists, but even in this case the deflationist can explain it. First, if assertion presupposes truth, then let us define the correctness of assertion as

were S to assert P, P would be true

and by negating this we get the super-objective principle. Next, the question is whether the transition from the definition to super-objectivity is available to the deflationist. McGrath says it is. He shows that the ES and the definition entail super-objectivity. So according to the deflationist, it is not an inadequate understanding of truth that accounts for failure to comply with super-objectivity in the imagined community, but rather a failure to recognize that there is a third norm of assertion that presupposes truth. (McGrath 2003 56-59.) In this case, the DS is enough to explain the role of truth. Although McGrath's point is that this vindicates deflationism, it seems to me that by the same token it emphasizes Wright's point that the DS says all about truth and the DS entails normativity.

6. Conclusions

As a concluding remark, I point out that Price aims to show that Wright loses a battle but nevertheless wins a war against deflationism. Contrary to Price I claim that with the Argument from Divergence in Extension Wright wins the battle *and* the war against deflationism. However Wright also has to take into account his disagreement with real-

ism. The bare DS may confirm Bivalence, but the platitude that to assert something is to claim that it is true is perfectly consistent with a doubt about Bivalence (Wright 1992, 61). This is the whole idea in Wright's insistence that deflationism does not tell the whole story about truth. The DS is the whole story in so far as we make room for normativity and for whatever follows from it and as Wright explains, one of its consequences is the doubt about Bivalence. But this war Wright would lose with the Argument from Divergence in Extension, because the argument depends on realistic truth. That is why I chose another tactic to show that truth is normative. I think that with the tactic now at hand the antirealist can first show that truth is normative and after that she can move on to show that truth is epistemically constrained as Wright does, but unlike Wright she can do it with a clear conscience.

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Was Wittgenstein a Normativist about Meaning?

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1. The question whether meaning is normative has been hotly contested ever since Saul Kripke (1982) declared the relation of meaning to action to be normative. Not only is there still no consensus on the answer, an early fierce proponent of semantic normativity, Paul Boghossian, has recently argued that meaning is not normative after all. (See 1989 for the early view and 2005 for the later view.) And Kripke himself has recently been interpreted as firmly rejecting semantic normativity rather than endorsing it. (Kusch 2006, 50) Even though Kripke made it clear that the views he was advancing were inspired in him by Wittgenstein, the question whether Wittgenstein himself was a semantic normativist is rarely addressed by the participants in the debate. This is unfortunate since there is no doubt that it is Wittgenstein's writings which initially prompted the question. One might expect that a return to the sources would shed light on an issue that has only become muddier as the years have gone by. This is what I propose to do in this paper. I shall start with Wittgenstein's sceptical paradox, which brings out what may be considered as a trivial, certainly uncontroversial, yet, as we shall see, crucial sense of normativity. Then I shall distinguish between two more robust senses in which meaning may be thought to be normative, both of which have been the subject of dispute. I shall argue that Wittgenstein was a normativist in one of those senses. For this follows from meaning being normative in the trivial sense underscored by Wittgenstein and, more importantly, from how, according to him, normativity in this sense can be obtained.

2. What the sceptical paradox reminds us of, indeed emphasizes, is that an activity cannot be rule-governed if it can be deemed to be in accord with the rule it allegedly follows, no matter what the activity is like. (Wittgenstein 1958, #201) A fortiori, an activity cannot be a linguistic activity if it can be deemed to be correct, no matter what it is like; more specifically, a linguistic expression cannot be meaningful if it can be deemed to be applied correctly, no matter how it is applied. Linguistic expressions, in order to be meaningful, must be governed by conditions of correct application. These conditions describe the semantic relations between expressions and features of extra-linguistic reality. They tell us what in the world expressions are true of, or warranted by, or what they refer to, stand for or denote. Thus, if 'green' means green, then 'green' is applied correctly to all and only green things. If 'Kirchberg' means Kirchberg, then 'Kirchberg' is applied correctly to Kirchberg and only to Kirchberg. No one doubts the platitude that meaningful expressions must have conditions of correct application. And, if this platitude deserves the label of normativity, then no one doubts that meaning is normative in this sense. Some philosophers think that there is, indeed must be, more to the paradox than a reminder of the platitude. Otherwise, they ask, why would Wittgenstein bother making such a trivial reminder? But he made it because, trivial as this condition on meaningfulness may seem, it is a condition that many traditional theories of meaning could not meet. And his reminder prompts a reexamination of the question, how can linguistic expressions be governed by conditions of correct application, which leads to the first more robust sense in which meaning may be thought to be normative.

3. According to one version of this sense, to say that meaning is normative is to say that the conditions of correctness governing the application of expressions stem from norms or rules that exist independently of any language users and which language users must by and large follow if they are to use expressions meaningfully. These norms may be provided either by abstract entities to be found in some Platonic realm, or by the natural world of essences surrounding us. But appealing to entities of these kinds is precisely what Wittgenstein argues leads to the paradox. For, to put it in a nutshell, it is only once these entities, be they abstract or natural, are regarded -- interpreted, as Wittgenstein would say -- in certain ways that they can provide some norms rather than others. But no particular interpretation is ever forced on us. So these entities can always be interpreted in such ways that the applications they allegedly govern are correct, or incorrect. The same observation is true of other entities Wittgenstein examines, such as mental pictures. Nothing, no thing, considered in itself, can provide a norm for the correct applications of a linguistic expression. Thus Wittgenstein is definitely not a normativist in this sense. (See Wittgenstein 1958, ##28-30 and 139-55) The question remains, though, what then provides linguistic expressions with conditions of correct application?

Kripke's answer is worth mentioning here, for many philosophers have given a similar kind of answer on Wittgenstein's behalf. According to them, what governs the application of expressions are communal norms, uses or conventions. Specifically, for Kripke, which of an individual's applications of her expressions are correct, and thus what her expressions mean, is determined by comparing her applications to those of her linguistic community. If an individual's applications of an expression consistently agree with those of her community fellows, then what she means by the expression is the same as what they mean by it. I do not think, however, that Wittgenstein was a normativist in the sense these remarks suggest either. For, on the one hand, appealing to communal meanings to account for the meanings of an individual's expressions, and leaving it at that, is tantamount to evading the question what provides expressions with conditions of correct application, thereby evading the question whether meaning is normative in the sense that the conditions of correctness governing the application of expressions are themselves determined by norms. On the other hand, appealing to communal uses (as opposed to meanings) is subject to the same problem as appealing to the entities rejected by Wittgenstein. These uses too must be regarded, interpreted, in certain ways before they can provide some norms rather than others. In short, then, I do not think that Wittgenstein was a normativist in the sense that the conditions of correctness governing the application of expressions are determined either by norms that exist independently of language users and which they somehow discover, or by norms that are somehow established by a community of language users. To put it succinctly, I do not think that, for Wittgenstein, there are norms *preceding* meaningfulness. But the more recent debate concerning normativity has focused on what norms, if any, may *follow* from meaningfulness. Thus I turn to the second more robust sense in which meaning may be thought to be normative.

4. Meaning is normative, in this sense, in that statements about the meaning of expressions, in effect, about their conditions of correct application, entail prescriptions or obligations about how to use the expressions. The debate here is two-fold. First, there is the question whether the prescriptions entailed are categorical or hypothetical. Categorical prescriptions tell speakers what to do (what they should or may do) with the expressions regardless of the goals speakers want to achieve by using them. Hypothetical prescriptions tell speakers what to do with the expressions depending on the desires they have in using them. E.g., if I want to tell the truth, I should apply 'green' only to green objects (provided, of course, that I mean green by 'green'). Second, there is the question whether, if those prescriptions are merely hypothetical, the normativity that belongs to meaning is of an interesting or genuine variety, that is, a variety that distinguishes it from that which applies to any fact, including any natural fact.

It is hard to believe that anyone has ever seriously subscribed to the claim that meaning is categorically normative (though see Boghossian 1989, 533), where this means that, in order to mean something by an expression, a speaker ought to use it correctly "quite independently of what she wants to do." (Hattiangadi 2006, 228). If this were the case, it would follow, absurdly, that no one can ever tell a lie. Softening the claim by saying that one has a *prima facie* semantic obligation to use expressions correctly is of no help (contra Whiting 2000). I may have a *prima facie* moral obligation to do so, which could be overridden by mere desires only at the cost of making me immoral. But my alleged semantic obligation surely could be so overridden, at no semantic cost whatsoever (except of course that I would have wrongly described a state of affairs). All that immediately follows from the fact that meaningful expressions have conditions of correct application is that statements about the meaning of expressions imply hypothetical obligations. To repeat, they tell speakers how to apply their expressions given the desires they have. Now no one denies that meaning is normative in this hypothetical sense. The question is, does it follow from this that meaning is genuinely normative? Is everything not potentially normative in this sense? Take the favourite analogy used by those who deny that meaning is genuinely normative. Thus compare the hypothetical obligations implied by statements about the meaning of expressions with other means/end prescriptive statements such as, "If I want to stay dry, I should go outside only if it is not raining". Obviously, that facts about the weather dictate how I should behave, given my desires, does not make these facts genuinely normative. Similarly, it is argued, that statements about the meaning of my expressions dictate how I should use them, given my desires, does not make meaning genuinely normative. (See, e.g., Boghossian 2005, 207) I beg to differ. I think there is an important disanalogy between hypothetical prescriptions involving the weather and those involving meaning.

Facts about the weather do not always dictate how I should behave, say, when planning to go out; they may become irrelevant, as in the case where I no longer care about staying dry. But facts about linguistic expressions, i.e., their conditions of correctness, always dictate how I should behave when intending to produce a meaningful utterance. Indeed, they dictate my linguistic behaviour regardless of what my specific desire is, that is, not independently of my desire, but regardless of whether my desire calls for a correct application or for an incorrect one. Thus, depending on my desires, I should apply expressions in certain ways, correctly or not, and this is obviously dependent on what their conditions of correctness are to begin with. What this brings out is the claim that state-

ments about the meaning of expressions always imply hypothetical prescriptions that, unlike those implied by statements about the weather, speakers *must* take into account. And this, it seems to me, does bring out a sense according to which meaning may be deemed to be genuinely normative. For, according to this sense, if none of the hypothetical prescriptions that flow from statements about the meaning of my expressions has application to me, then I do not mean by them what the statements say they mean; the statements become false. On the other hand, if none of the hypothetical prescriptions that flow from statements about the weather conditions has application to me, this in no way affects the truth-value of those statements. The weather conditions do not change; they just become irrelevant. This suggests that normative implications about how to use expressions are essential to meaning; they indeed follow from expressions having conditions of correct application. They are part of what it is for expressions to mean what they do. As E.H. Gampel has put it, meaning facts are "essentially such as to guide action". (1997, 229) Other facts which are truly only contingently normative are guides only because we happen to take them as guides. But meaning facts are the facts they are because they guide us in certain ways, because they have normative implications.

Was Wittgenstein a normativist in this sense? He ought to have been, since, if I am right, this sense of normativity follows simply from the claim that meaningful expressions have conditions of correct application. What needs to be stressed, though, is that it follows from this because of a lesson Wittgenstein has taught us perhaps better than anyone else. This is that nothing to which meaning could be thought of as reducible, or in terms of which it could be thought of as explainable, could on its own provide the conditions of correctness that govern the application of expressions. Only meaning facts, i.e., meaningful expressions, wear their conditions of correct application, and hence their normativity, on their sleeves. Any other fact has to be regarded, interpreted, in some way or other in order to become normative. But meaning facts cease to be meaning facts if their normativity is not intrinsic to them, and they become different meaning facts if their normative implications change. Thus by returning to the Wittgensteinian sources of the normativity debate, we are reminded that it all started with the "trivial" recognition that meaningful expressions have conditions of correct application. As Wittgenstein laboured to show, there is much difficulty in discovering what will provide those conditions. Indeed it turns out that nothing short of meaning will do. This is why Wittgenstein could not be a normativist in the first robust sense but has to be one in the second sense. What this further suggests to me is that the claim, so often heard, that if meaning is genuinely normative then it cannot be naturalized is mistaken. Rather, it is because meaning cannot be naturalized that its normativity is intrinsic to it.

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Should Essentialism about Laws of Nature Imply Strong Necessity?

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1 Introduction

Dispositional essentialism (DE) is a somewhat special view on laws of nature that is based on the idea that laws should be embedded in dispositional properties that things possess, rather than in Humean regularities that obtain between them (Lewis 1973), nor in the so-called nomic necessities that should govern them (Armstrong 1983). For instance, it is a natural law that ordinary glass is brittle, because anything made of ordinary glass has an essential disposition to break if struck, and not because it just happens that all ordinary glass is brittle (regularism), nor because there were a nomic necessity saying that if something is ordinary glass then it is brittle (nomic necessitarianism). Allegedly the major drawback of DE is that it has to take natural laws to be necessary. This follows from dispositionalist's belief that dispositional nature of properties is essential, and so the analysis of regularities that is based on conditionals linking dispositions and their manifestations (e.g. brittleness and actual breaking upon having been struck) is not merely an analysis of the dispositional concept (e.g. the concept "brittle"), but rather characterizes the nature of the dispositional property (e.g. the property "brittleness"). Hence the conditionals are necessary, and so are laws. (Bird 2004a, page 3)

DE is however not a monolith position concerning necessity. Generally, dispositional essentialists have two versions on offer here – a weaker and a stronger one. The weaker necessity claims that natural laws hold only in those worlds, where there exist nomic properties they involve, whereas the strong one simply claims that natural laws hold in all possible worlds and, consequently, that nomic properties they involve likewise exist in all possible worlds.

In what follows, we shall cast some light on the distinction between weak and strong necessitarianism with a view to clarify some of the assessments of this distinction made by A. Bird, recently the most influential proponent of DE. Bird claims that DE implies weak necessitarianism about laws of nature, but is compatible with the strong necessitarian view as well. (Bird 2004b, pages 256, 263; Bird 2007, pages 48 - 59). I shall argue that weak necessitarianism has to embrace a kind of holistic view on laws claiming that only the totality of laws and nomic properties in a particular possible world determines the lawfulness of that world. Because of such a holism, laws of nature become relative to a given possible world, and so it seems that weak necessitarianism comes dangerously close to contingency views on laws. In view of this fact, we may draw a general conclusion that provided we wish to uphold necessitarianism, we have to go directly for its stronger version.

2 Weak and strong necessitarianism: Necessity about nomic properties, or natural laws, or both?

As mentioned in passing in the introduction, there are at least two types of necessitarianism, a more stringent one called "strong necessitarianism" (SN) and a relatively permissive one called "weak necessitarianism" (WN). In the standard literature (Armstrong 1983, pages 163-169; but

also Swoyer 1995(1982) and Bird 2004b) these two necessitarianisms were typically defined as follows:

(WN): L(P) (a law involving nomic property P) is necessary true if it holds in all possible worlds, where P exists.

(SN): L(P) is necessary true if it holds in all possible worlds with no special demand regarding the nomic property P.

The central tenet of WN is that it tries to put forward the idea that upholding a law in a world, where there are no entities that fall under it, does not really make sense. This idea is intuitively very plausible since we may easily imagine worlds, where some nomic properties do not exist. To make necessitarianism work across such worlds without espousing its less demanding weak version would at least oblige us to relativize the sense of "holding" of laws. For instance, we could say that even at worlds where there are no nomic properties that are involved in some laws these laws still are true, but just do not hold (Bird 2004b, page 258). Such dissociation of truth and holding seems however very unnatural. So it makes sense to say that there may be worlds where L(P) does not hold – those where there is no P. And so WN should supposedly be a more natural alternative to SN.

Unlike WN, SN does not impose any restrictions on the truth of natural laws in terms of existence of nomic properties they involve. For SN natural laws simply are true in all possible worlds. All possible worlds are nomically identical, and so nomic properties exist in all possible worlds, as well (Bird 2004b, page 259).

We may resume then that both SN and WN hold that laws are necessary, i.e. they hold in all possible worlds where there are entities that they involve. So far they are on a pair. Where they really differ is as to the existence of entities they involve. For SN these entities exist in all possible worlds, for WN only in some of them, in some not. So, the division between WN and SN reveals two separate issues concerning necessitarianism about natural lawfulness:

A) Laws of nature are necessary (hold in all possible worlds)

B) Nomic properties are necessary (exist in all possible worlds)

However, although the second issue (B) emerges as a by-product of the traditional division between WN and SN, it has never been extensively tackled in its own right in the past. One of the very probable reasons for this could be that traditionally natural laws were in the limelight, and nomic properties much less so. Nomic properties were traditionally regarded as something that laws of nature govern upon (on nomic necessitarianism perhaps to a much greater extent than on regularism). It is yet with essential dispositionalism that nomic properties are taken to be the very source of lawfulness, and so, as Bird puts it, natural laws become epiphenomenal upon dispositions embedded in nomic properties (Bird 2004b, page 262). But despite its overt interest in dispositional virtues of nomic properties, even DE does not consider this issue at any

length. What is more, it seems that DE alone can not decide whether B is true or not and can only provide a partial decision about the truth of A. Namely, it has been shown that DE entails WN about laws of nature, and that it is consistent with the SN (Bird 2004b, page 263). Put in the context of A and B this means that on DE A is in part true (weak version) and in general logically possible (strong version), and that B is only a logical possibility (contrary to SN about laws of nature, WN alone does not imply B to be true.)

3. How necessitarian is weak necessitarianism?

In the last section we have shown that necessitarianism actually addresses two separate issues: necessity of laws of nature on the one hand, and necessity of nomic properties on the other. Let us first look closer into how separate these two issues really are. It is obvious that in general these two issues interconnect only if we espouse SN about laws of nature since in this case necessity of laws implies necessity of nomic properties. (If all laws hold in every possible world then all possible worlds are nomologically identical, and so all nomological properties have to exist in every possible world as well.) In the particular case, when we take dispositional-essentialist view of laws the vice versa is true as well: necessitarianism about nomic properties implies SN about laws. This is easy to see, for if all nomic properties are to exist in every possible world and if laws are epiphenomena of these properties, then in every possible world we have exactly the same set of laws that are all the laws there are. However, as we have equally seen above, nor SN about laws of nature, neither necessitarianism about nomic properties are implied by DE alone. So for dispositionalists per se the two issues remain separated.

In view of these facts, we may ask how strong a necessitarianism WN about laws of nature really is. Intuitively, asking this question seems to be grist to the dispositional essentialist mill – it seems that whatever the answer, the dispositional essentialist may gladly embrace it. A negative answer could be welcome, because it would disarm the arguments of its traditional opponents that see the necessity of laws of nature as an anomaly in the dispositional essentialist theory. A positive one could bridge the gap between dispositional essentialist WN and SN and perhaps help DE out of the agnosticism concerning B. In this section we shall show that the situation is not as rosy as it seems. In fact, it is much worse.

We shall propose a special negative answer to the above question claiming that in some cases WN may lead to contradictory (non-fundamental) laws of nature. Of course, these laws exist each in its own possible world with a specific set of nomic properties in general, but they do involve at least one identical nomic property, the one they are contradictory about. This is clearly quite unpleasant for DE, since it flies in the face of one of its basic ideas – that laws are epiphenomenally embedded in nomic properties and so identical nomic properties always give identical natural laws.

Let us then elaborate on our claim. Remember that WN only claims that laws of nature are necessary in those worlds in which there exist properties they involve. E.g. in those possible worlds where there is nomic property "colour", we necessarily have such and such laws about colour, in worlds where there is no colour, we need not have any such laws. Of course, worlds that have colour, may also have other nomic properties such as hue, mass, shape, spin, etc. Note that some of these nomic properties are related (e.g. hue and colour), some not (e.g. shape and

colour), and that some are more fundamental than others (e.g. spin). Let us for the sake of the argument consider ordinary non-fundamental nomic properties such as colour. Related properties shall affect each other. Colour that is not related to hue in the same way as in our world, will not be the same colour as the our-world colour. It is generally expected that unrelated should not. Colour may stay the same nomic property in both possible worlds – in the world of classical physics, where objects have a definite shape at a time, and in the world of quantum physics where objects may have several shapes at the same time. But should they really not?

To answer this question, consider the following example. Take some nomic properties: colour, polarization, "being light". Polarization and colour are according to physics two independent properties – a change in colour is completely independent of any change in polarization, and vice versa (colour is about frequency of oscillation of electromagnetic field and polarization is about direction of oscillation which are completely different phenomena). These two properties' only linkage is that they are both nomic properties of light and to call on an analogy, this does not link them any more than the so-called middle-sized objects link colour and shape that are clearly entirely unrelated. The fact that colour and polarization meet in a nomic property "being light" also tells us something else: "being light" is less fundamental than "having a certain colour" or "having a certain polarization", as it is "being a middle-sized object" a less fundamental property than having shape or colour. To keep things simple, let us imagine a world W_1 where we have a law of nature saying that only one polarization is possible, and a world W_2 in which we have a law of nature telling us that we can have up to two polarizations. Let laws of nature about colour be the same in both worlds. Let in both worlds hold that polarizations and colours are not related and so a change in polarization does not affect any change in colour. Further, let us imagine that in both worlds there hold the usual laws about light, and so one of them is that light may have as many colours simultaneously, as it has polarizations. But from this law, we may deduce two contradictory interpretations. The first holds in W_1 and claims that light may have only one colour at a time, since in this world only one polarization is possible, the second holds in W_2 and says that light may have up to two colours, since it may have up to two polarizations. These two interpretations are clearly contradictory.

Such a contradictory conclusion seems quite bewildering. Just remember the facts that presumably led to it: the laws of nature about colour were identical for both possible worlds, so were the laws concerning light, the only change that occurred was the change in a law about polarization. Remember also that polarization and colour are two unrelated nomic properties and so a change in laws in one of them should not affect the laws about the other. So, what went wrong?

Nothing special. On its own level of fundamentality colour and polarization really are independent nomic properties. The changes in laws concerning one do not affect the other. WN may go undisturbed on the level of these two properties, because it is simply not possible to have contradictory interpretations even if in a given possible world one nomic property is missing, or is being replaced by another. But what does happen, when we include a higher, less fundamental level, such as the one of nomic property »being light«? Both more fundamental properties do become connected, and what is more, changes in one affect changes in another. It is here that WN becomes threatened, since it is clear that non-existence of all nomic properties in all possible worlds enables contradictory in-

terpretations of natural laws. The same nomic properties may be related in a given possible world in one way, in another in another way, and what is worse, they may be related or not related at all (imagine that there is a law that in all possible worlds all polarizations are possible – in this case polarization and colour would remain independent).

4. Conclusion

We may conclude then that to prevent WN from allowing for contradictory laws, we would have to admit a sort of general interrelatedness of nomic properties within a given possible world. This however looks as a relatively strong version of holism and undermines WN on another front – it implies that laws are necessary in those worlds where we have the totality of properties, and not in those worlds where we have the particular properties they involve as the original definition of WN tells us. What is more, such a holistic necessity is indeed an extremely weak necessity – if we only change one relation between nomic properties, let alone omit or add a nomic property with all its possible relations, the necessity collapses, because the identity of a property is simply given by a specific possible world.

In spite of this, it might seem that there are still at least two ways out for WN that are backed by DE. The tactics of the first one is in canalizing the general holism by giving it an intrinsic form, however, intrinsicism is basically limited only to one level of fundamentality, and so is not much of an asset. The second one consists in limiting the range of nomic properties to so-called fundamental nomic properties only, but this seems just a too stringent restriction, for such a WN would not say much about the manifested world out there. The general conclusion then is that provided we want to, or even need to (as DE does) uphold necessitarianism, we should uphold its strong version. As we have noted, this fact does not refute DE (DE anyway takes strong necessitarianism to be a viable possibility), it just gives it the incentive to embrace the fully fledged SN instead of satisfying itself with WN alone.

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On the Linguistic Turn, Again: a Rortian Note on the 'Williamson/Hacker-Controversy'

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1. Introduction

Timothy Williamson has recently proclaimed that the linguistic turn in philosophy has come to the end – that “fewer and fewer of those who accepted the label ‘analytic philosophy’ for their work would also claim to take the linguistic turn” (Williamson 2004: 107). Peter Hacker has answered by claiming that what Williamson understands by the phrase ‘linguistic turn’ is misguided, and as far as analytic philosophy has passed the turn, it would be to best to get “back again”, because it is what philosophy is good for (Hacker 2007: 125). Brian Leiter has identified the current American philosophy to be divided into two camps that, we can see, reflects the meta-philosophical tension between Williamson and Hacker. “Quinean naturalists”, Leiter says, are constructive philosophers who believe that the problems of philosophy are “real”, while “Wittgensteinian quietists” dissolve philosophical problems, rather than solve them (Leiter 2004: 2-3). Richard Rorty has commented the issue – in a paper contributed to this very occasion three years ago – by marking, and clearly echoing Leiter’s division, that “people who call themselves “naturalists” typically see little value in Wittgenstein’s work” and “doubt that what Gustav Bergmann dubbed “the linguistic turn” was a good idea” (Rorty 2007: 160-1).

In what follows, I will discuss the ‘Williamson/Hacker-controversy’ over the linguistic turn from the light of Rortian pragmatism. Rorty, as we know, has his own contribution in the history of the linguistic turn – if not more, but editing and naming the book (Rorty 1967) from which the very notion of the ‘linguistic turn’ derived its widespread use. Even it might look that Rorty’s position on this debate is easy to locate, the matter actually is more complicated if a more closer look is taken to it.¹ I will focus on one particular feature in this controversy: the idea of representation; more precisely: (1) how the linguistic turn is related to the issue of representation over-all, and (b) what is the relation between mental and linguistic representation.

In the first part of my paper I will critically discuss Williamson’s views, and there one could see how a Rortian is teamed up with Hacker in this issue. In the second part I will discuss Rorty’s views relation to Hacker’s ideas, and here we, perhaps surprisingly, will find agreements with Williamson. However, it needs to be noted that a Rortian position I here reconstruct is *motivated* by Rorty’s writings – these are views that I think Rorty *should* maintain, but I am not sure if he really did (in the case I got Rorty wrong). Rorty’s own stance towards the linguistic turn, and of its merits, is not easy to grasp, even though it is fair to say that he seemed to hold quite stabile view since the mid-seventies.

¹ It needs to be noted that Rorty’s voice in this matter is still quite well-known; both Williamson (2004) and Hacker (2007), on the relevant papers we use here, start their discussion of the linguistic turn by referring to formulation Rorty made in his introductory essay to *The Linguistic Turn*.

2. The linguistic turn and the quest for representationalism

The central idea that Williamson promotes in his paper “Past Linguistic Turn?” is the idea that if there was any merit in the linguistic turn that was, by taking the theme of language as the *prima* concern of philosophy, helping to recognize the *representational* nature of human thinking and language. More concretely, it would mean that the topic of intentionality and aboutness is to be stressed. However, the gain of this approach was not profoundly seen until the topic of *mental* representation was arisen within the current philosophy of mind. So Williamson concludes:

One might therefore classify both thought and language together under the more general category of representation, and argue that the linguistic turn was just the first phase of the representational turn, on which the goal of philosophy is the analysis (in a generous sense) of ‘representation’. (Williamson 2004: 108)

However, the model of the linguistic turn Williamson has in his mind is quite recent one, famously articulated by Michael Dummett. The central idea of it is “the proper method of analysing of thought consists in the analysis of language” (Dummett 1978: 458). Even though Dummett attributes it to Frege, and thereby reads him as the founder of analytic philosophy, it is highly controversial if the case is more of projection of Dummett’s own position than Frege’s own.

To any person who has read Rorty’s *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979) the point Williamson here addresses, by treating the topic of ‘mental representation’ almost as a novelty in recent philosophy of mind, hits quite hard; it cannot be more in opposition the very moral of Rorty’s book². The whole point of the book is to see the topic of mental representation as the core problem of the modern philosophy, and the linguistic turn is just a fairly recent 20th century move within the scheme of this bigger agenda. In Rorty’s metaphorical terminology, a language is a small ‘Mirror of Nature’ whereas the mind is a big one. Even though Rorty did not thought anymore by the time of writing the book (contra to the optimism of Rorty 1967) that the linguistic turn was a meta-philosophical progress – analysing the language or using linguistic methods would not get the problems solved any better – it was still a turn worth making. Namely, by focusing into language – by seeing the old problems as problems concerning language – they could be more easily to over-come. According to Rorty, the “pragmatization” or “naturalization” of the very notion of *language* within the course of analytic philosophy – by late-Wittgenstein, Quine, Sellars, Davidson, and, finally, Brandom – had the result that the tradition was working for “self-destruction”. To make a long story short, one could say that the very profit of the linguistic turn, as Rorty

² For this reason, I think Rorty does not even bother to mention it in two papers where he discusses Williamson’s paper. Those are “Wittgenstein and the Linguistic Turn” and “Naturalism and Quietism”, to be found in Rorty (2007).

sees the case, was to get rid of the whole idea of *representationalism*.

It should be noted that there is a sense in the notion of representationalism that seems to separate Williamson's discussion from the one Rorty does in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Williamson is not worried, or even motivated, by the existence of epistemological sceptic, but sees representationalism, and the problematic concerning it, in home with "the revival of metaphysical theorizing, realist in spirit" (Williamson 2004: 111). Starting from post-Kripkean philosophy he seems to believe that "throwback to pre-Kantian metaphysics" seems to not just passing the linguistic turn but – to use Rorty's expressive term – whole 'Kantian-epistemologically-centred philosophy'. Williamson remarks that the phase is over and appeals to Kant's authority "ring hollow, for they are unbacked by any argument that has withstood the test of recent time" (*ibid.*: 111). Hacker, on the other hand, accuses Williamson of historical blindness, and offers a 'historical turn' for analytic philosophers like Williamson to take – for example, Kant would have much worthwhile to say about how thinking alone can yield knowledge of the reality – the presupposition Williamson takes for granted, by seeing logic and mathematics offering evidence that it does (see Williamson 2004: 127). However, the latter is debatable as it is based on the account we have of the nature of logical and mathematical knowledge (Hacker 2007: 135). Hacker, like Williamson, does link the linguistic turn with Kantian legacy, but makes a contrary conclusion: it would be a drawback to ignore the legacy of Kantian critical philosophy.

3. Mental vs. linguistic representation

As far as the topic of representation goes, Hacker is keen on showing that the very idea of *mental* representation is an incoherent notion. Here we can hear a pure Wittgensteinian speaking: a thought or a belief does not represent anything because by definition representation is a *medium* that needs non-representational properties in virtue of which it can represent what it does (such as written word has visual properties or a spoken word aural properties). The mental contexts are "all message, and no medium" (*ibid.*: 139). Only language can be representational, and thinking only insofar as it is to be seen as language-like – and even the latter is a mistaken idea.

So it is noteworthy that even though Hacker raises doubts about the representational feature of thinking, this is not at all the case with language. Whereas Rorty sees the gain of the linguistic turn to lead – via the step of transforming the issues concerning thinking into those of language and then changing our account of the latter – into antirepresentationalism, Hacker sees it as straightening out the misguided idea of thoughts as representational into its proper place – the view, as we can see, he shares with Williamson (who, in fact, does not even recognize the theme of representation prior the linguistic turn). What is for Rorty a co-incident shift from Big Mirror into a smaller one, is for Hacker a problem finally properly and thoroughly constructed. As far as thinking was viewed to be representational prior Wittgenstein, that was, one could conclude, a mistake. The point of Hacker's argument against mental representationalism is to stress the relevance of priority of language as far as representation goes, while in the case of Williamson the linguistic feature seems to be a sub-issue in a larger issue of representation, and in the preferable order of the studies, secondary into that of mental representation.

Hacker's meta-philosophical account of the issue of representation is different. For him, it is not a goal of phi-

losophy – the problem of philosophy *an sich* to be solved – as Williamson sees it; the goal is, according to Hacker, that "both the concept of language and the concepts of thought and thinking are sources of confusion and hence fit for subjects of philosophical reflection". So he concludes, by provoking the lasting or re-recognizable value of the linguistic turn:

The aim of philosophy is the clarification of the forms of sense, in one way or another, are conceptually puzzling [...] the charge of philosophy[...] is the extirpation of nonsense. [...] The prize is [...] a proper understanding of the structure and articulations of our conceptual scheme, and disentangling the conceptual confusions. (Hacker 2007: 140).

From a Rortian point of view, what Hacker is trying here to do is to find a difference where there is not one. For Rorty, Williamson is consistent and in a right track by recognizing the similar function of the same phenomenon; the same philosophical *problematic* is to be drawn in respect to both mental and linguistic contexts. It is just the views Williamson and Rorty hold of the matter are in total opposition to each other – it is one's representationalism against other's antirepresentationalism. The problem with Hacker's view, and seemingly with each of "quietist Wittgensteinians", who Rorty (2007: 161) prefers to call "Wittgensteinian therapists"³, contra to "pragmatic Wittgensteinians" like him, is the appeal to the category of "nonsense". The argument to back up this is based on the pragmatic idea that "there is nothing interesting to be said about the distinction between sense and nonsense", because "if we adopt the social-practice view of language, there seems no way to reconstruct the relevant idea of 'confusion'" (Rorty 2007: 170). However, a Hackerian could claim that the problem with a Rortian position is that, even though Rorty personally gives such a light weight into it, it leaves one unarmed to defend oneself against the 'non-critical' movements – there is no such criteria by which we could legalize the status of Post-Kripkean metaphysical school, applauded by Williamson. Rorty recognizes Kantian origin in the talk of nonsense: it was Kant's originality "to erect general theory about proper and improper use of concepts", and thereby, he laid a "general theory of representation" (*ibid.*: 170). The effect of the linguistic turn (being a theory of not of representation in general, but of linguistic representation) is that "nonsense" became "a term of philosophical art" (*ibid.*: 171). As we saw, Hacker is explicit of this continuity between Kantian critical philosophy and the linguistic turn. It is just he and Rorty have opposite views of its outcome.

4. Closing Remarks

Over-all, I think what is noteworthy that, no matter which side we take on the issue, all of the contributions of Williamson, Hacker and Rorty do address in their own particular way the meta-philosophical significance of the linguistic turn (even though one of the participants of the discussion seemingly seem approach it quite lighten-heartedly, absorbing the anti-historical, arrogant style, sometimes typical to best analytic philosophy). The issue in hand is very much the Kantian legacy of critical philosophy. One way is to pretend like the criticism never happened; the whole

³ The target Rorty has in his mind is actually the papers discussing Wittgenstein's use of *Unsinn* (especially by James Conant and Cora Diamond) in Cray and Read (2000), but the point Rorty makes against them and the use of "nonsense" can be addressed toward Hacker as well (who, in this context, is in opposition to the "new interpretation" of the relation between *Tractatus* and the later Wittgenstein).

Kantian phase was a side walk from the traditional 'secure path of science', that is, philosophy-as-metaphysics, but luckily we are now back in a right track. This is very much presupposed in Post-Quinean naturalism with its Post-Kripkean metaphysical spirit. The other way is to keep the Kantian spirit alive and retain the Kantian critical self-image of philosophy. This is to keep the flag of the linguistic turn on. This kind of spirit is to be found among not just Oxfordian 'Wittgensteinians' but Pittsburghian 'Neo-Hegelians' as well. The third is to shift radically the self-image of philosophy, to wholeheartedly forget the pretension of the 'secure path of science'. This, as we know, has been Rorty's explicit theme and which, as we also know, be it good or not, did not gather much applause from his colleagues, at least within the analytic philosophy.

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„Es ist ein Beispiel, bei dem man Gedanken haben kann.“: Wittgenstein liest Hebel

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1. Zusammenfassung

Johann Peter Hebel (1760–1826), deutscher Dichter, evangelischer Theologe und Pädagoge, gilt als einer der „Lieblingsschriftsteller“ Ludwig Wittgensteins (McGuinness 1983, XIII). Die Liste jener, die Peter Hebel bewunderten, ist lang: So finden sich Goethe, die Brüder Grimm, Gottfried Keller und Leo Tolstoi – alles Autoren, die Wittgenstein schätzte und immer wieder las – unter ihnen.

Dieser Beitrag dokumentiert zunächst die Quellenlage zu Wittgensteins Hebel-Lektüre, um anschließend die Funktion von Hebels Erzählungen im Nachlass zu beleuchten.

2. Hebel im Briefwechsel

„Ich bin ganz entzückt von ihm“ schreibt Ludwig Wittgenstein in einem Brief vom 9. Oktober 1920 an seinen Freund Ludwig Hänsel und fügt als Fußnote „Der Hebel ist gemeint“ hinzu. Der Mittelschulprofessor Hänsel, den Wittgenstein aus den gemeinsamen Tagen im Kriegsgefangenenlager bei Cassino kennt, lebt zu diesem Zeitpunkt in Wien, Wittgenstein arbeitet bereits als Volksschullehrer in Trattenbach. Wittgenstein bezieht sich auf eine Sammlung von Erzählungen Johann Peter Hebels, die ihm Ludwig Hänsel geschenkt hat, vermutlich das *Schatzkästlein des Rheinischen Hausfreunds*. Wittgenstein ist so begeistert von den Texten, dass er seinem Onkel Paul eine Hebel-Ausgabe zum Geschenk macht (vgl. ICE 21.10.20) und zunächst beschließt, die Reclam-Ausgabe im Volksschulunterricht einzusetzen. Es sind finanzielle Gründe – die Mittel der Landbevölkerung sind begrenzt –, die ihn schließlich dazu bewegen, die preisgünstigere, wenngleich weniger umfangreiche Auswahl von Texten Hebels in der Reihe von Konegens Kinderbüchern zu bestellen. Statt 18 Kronen für ein Reclam-Büchlein, kommt die Konegens-Ausgabe auf bloß 7,50 Kronen. Erzählungen von Hebel finden sich in den Heftchen Nr. 29 (*Ein Büchlein Fabeln von Lessing, Gellert und Hebel*) und Nr. 58 (*Aus dem Schatzkästlein*). Beide bestellt Wittgenstein bei Hänsel, gemeinsam mit anderen Büchern für den Schulgebrauch zu je 100 Stück, was den Preis auf 5 Kronen reduziert (ICE 30.11.20). Hebel in der Volksschule zu lesen war keine Selbstverständlichkeit, wäre es auch heute nicht, allerdings enthält Wittgensteins Volksschul-Kanon auch Lessing, Tolstoi und Swift, die in Niederösterreichs Volksschulen sicher ebenso selten gelesen wurden (vgl. ICE Einzelstellenkommentar zu „Schatzkästlein“).

Fünf Jahre später, Wittgenstein unterrichtet nun an einer Volksschule in Otterthal, bestellt er bei Hänsel die zweibändige Hebel-Gesamtausgabe aus der Reihe „Goldene Klassiker-Bibliothek“ des Verlags Bong & Co. Wieder sind es finanzielle Gründe, die ihn gegen den Kauf einer schöneren Ausgabe in der Wiener Buchhandlung Reichmann bewegen. Wittgenstein bereut seine Entscheidung sogleich, denn „diese Bong'sche [Ausgabe] giftet mich durch die viechischen Bemerkungen des Herausgebers“ (ICE 20.6.25). Der Herausgeber, Adolf Sütterlin, kommentiert im vierten Teil (zu Ende der zweibändigen Ausgabe)

Hebel auf 84 Seiten. Vor allem Sütterlins Kommentare zu den *Allemannischen Gedichten* sind süßlich-verklärte Interpretationen: Er wird nicht Müde, darauf hinzuweisen, dass das Heimweh Hebels die treibende Kraft hinter dessen dichterischer Leistung darstellt. Im Vorwort schreibt Sütterlin: „Und diese Heimat [i.e. *das Wiesental im Kreis Lörrach*, Anm. D.W.] verklärte sich ihm immer mehr; sie wurde ihm zur Poesie; so dichtete er sich das Heimweh von der Seele in seinen alemannischen Gedichten.“ (Sütterlin, in: Hebel 1911, XXIII) Von den Kommentaren des Herausgebers abgesehen, ist Wittgenstein aber weiterhin von Hebel begeistert. Im selben Brief an Hänsel schreibt er: „In der Ausgabe sind übrigens *ausgezeichnete* Aufsätze von Hebel, die ich Dir zeigen werde, wenn wir uns sehen; sie werden Dir gefallen.“ (ICE 20.6.25)

Im Herbst 1925 ist Wittgenstein zurück in Wien. Einen verstauchten Fuß auskurierend, weil er vorübergehend bei seiner Schwester Margaret Stonborough, die zu diesem Zeitpunkt im Palais Schönborn Quartier bezogen hat. Dort lernt er auch Marguerite Respinger kennen, die sich erinnert, „wie sich die Jugend des Hauses nach dem samstäglichen Mittagessen rund um den bettlägrigen Ludwig scharte und dieser mit hoher Stimme Geschichten von Peter Hebel vorlas, die in ihrer Poesie die Zuhörerschaft bezauberten.“ (Prokop 2003, 155-156) Die „Jugend des Hauses“ umfasst neben Marguerite Wittgensteins Neffe Thomas Stonborough und die beiden Sjögren-Brüder, Talle und Arvid. Der Wittgenstein-Biograf Ray Monk zitiert Marguerite: „I felt again at home and moved by hearing it [i.e. *Hebel*] read with such deep understanding.“ (Monk 1990, 238-239)

1931 wird wieder zu Hebel korrespondiert: Arvid Sjögren schreibt an Ludwig Wittgenstein zunächst, am 28.4.: „Den Hebel habe ich wohl aufgemacht aber viel gelesen habe ich nicht, da ich sehr viel zu tun hatte. Es ist ein gutes Buch, wo immer man es aufschlägt. Nächstens mehr.“ Und dann (vermutlich) am 7.6. desselben Jahres: „Ich habe die Astronomie im Hebel gelesen. *Sehr* schön. Und habe mir gedacht, wie würde heute ein solcher populärer Vortrag zum Beispiel in der Urania aussehen.“ Mit der „Astronomie“ spielt Arvid Sjögren wahrscheinlich auf die Himmelskunde Hebels in den Texten „Allgemeine Betrachtung über das Weltgebäude“, „Die Erde und die Sonne“ und „Die Planeten“ an; sie sind im *Schatzkästlein* enthalten. Ebenfalls 1931 schreibt Marguerite Respinger Wittgenstein einen Brief nach Cambridge: „Ich glaube, wenn Du hier wärst, würde ich Dich bitten mir etwas vorzulesen, aber nicht den Hebel – keine freundliche, gefällige Frömmigkeit. Früher wenn Du mir manchmal daraus vorgelesen hast, so war das beruhigend für mich, und brachte Frieden, Ruhe und Unkompliziertheit, u. ich konnte mich quasi wenn Wirrwarr in mir war dorthin zurückziehen und ruhig werden. Aber jetzt brauche ich eher das Gegenteil.“ (ICE 06.10.31)

Die letzte Erwähnung Hebels in Wittgensteins Briefwechsel stammt aus dem Jahr 1936. Wittgenstein schreibt an seinen Freund und ehemaligen Kollegen, den Volksschullehrer Rudolf Koder, mit der Bitte, er möge zwei Exemplare „der Bong'schen (2 bändigen) Ausgabe von Peter

Hebel's Werken“ kaufen. (ICE [Juli 1936]) Ein Exemplar sei als Geschenk für Betty Gaun bestimmt, die Hausangestellte von Helene Wittgenstein, das zweite für Wittgenstein selbst.

Peter Hebel taucht in Wittgensteins philosophischem Nachlass zweimal explizit auf, im MS 117 (20.3.1940) und MS 133 (11.1.1947). Es lassen sich bei Wittgenstein also Spuren zu Johann Peter Hebel über einen Zeitraum von 27 Jahren nachweisen. Die beiden Erzählungen, auf die sich Wittgenstein bezieht, sind einerseits in MS 117 „Bequeme Schifffahrt, wer's dafür halten will“ (Hebel 1911, Bd. 2, 185), andererseits in MS 133 die letztere der beiden von „Zwei Erzählungen“ (Hebel 1911, Bd. 2, 67f.). Keine der beiden Geschichten ist in Konegens Kinderbüchern enthalten.

3. Wittgensteins „Hausfreund“

„Es ist ein Beispiel, bei dem man Gedanken haben kann“, heißt es in Johann Peter Hebels „Reise nach Paris“ lakonisch. (Hebel 1911, Bd. 2, 172) – Man meint, ein Motto der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* Ludwig Wittgensteins zu lesen. Ist es doch Programm von Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie, mit Hilfe von Beispielen und Beschreibungen den philosophischen Drang zu Verallgemeinerungen und Erklärungen zu therapieren. Schon im *Big Typescript* erklärt er:

Die Überlegungen können viel hausbackener angestellt werden, als ich sie in früherer Zeit angestellt habe. Und darum brauchen in der Philosophie auch keine neuen Wörter angewendet werden, sondern die alten, gewöhnlichen Wörter der Sprache reichen aus. (Wittgenstein WA11, 283)

Und in den Philosophischen Untersuchungen lesen wir:

Das Exemplifizieren ist hier nicht ein *i n d i r e k t e s* Mittel der Erklärung, – in Ermangelung eines Bessern. (PU §71)

Die Hinwendung Wittgensteins zu bestimmten Formen der Literatur – Grimm'schen Märchen, Sagen, auch zu den Kalendergeschichten Hebels – hat innerhalb der 27 Jahre, in denen wir sein Interesse an Hebel nachweisen können, sicher verschiedene Gründe gehabt. Der didaktische Wert kurzer Erzählungen im Volksschulunterricht ist nicht von der Hand zu weisen. Es sind eben „Beispiele“, bei denen man Gedanken haben kann. Wittgenstein, dessen Interesse an Formen religiöser Erfahrung ihm Tolstois Spätwerk und die Schriften von William James lieb gewinnen ließ, wird wohl auch in Hebels Bibelgeschichten und religiösen Aufsätzen fündig geworden sein. Und die populärwissenschaftlichen Texte, in denen Hebel die Astronomie seiner Zeit vermittelt, dürften ihn – wie seinen Freund Arvid Sjögren – gut unterhalten haben. Neben der stilistischen Schlichtheit der Hebelschen Texte und dem Talent, auf engstem Raum erzählerische Dramatik zu erzielen, dem, was Ezra Pound als wesentliches Charakteristikum für Dichtung erkennt – nämlich dem „*Verdichten*“ in der Bedeutung von Komprimieren – ist die Leichtigkeit des Hebelschen Humors noch heute Grund genug, von ihm „entzückt“ zu sein (Pound 1934, 36).

Im März 1940, als Ludwig Wittgenstein in jenes Heft Aufzeichnungen macht, das später als Manuskriptband 117 in den Nachlass eingehen wird, wechseln Überlegungen zu den Grundlagen der Mathematik mit Gedanken zur Mythologie und Psychologie. Das Hebel-Zitat Wittgensteins vom 20. 3. 1940 hat seinen Platz im Spannungsfeld von „Erklärung“ und „Beschreibung“. So interessiert ihn am 18. 3. der wissenschaftliche Impuls, die Entstehung von Fabeln aus Naturmythen zu erklären und diese Mythen

wiederum als ursprüngliche Erklärungsmuster gewisser Naturerscheinungen zu verstehen. Wittgenstein stellt diese Argumentationskette in Frage. Wieso, schreibt er sinngemäß, sollten wir denn alltägliche Phänomene, die eine große Rolle in unserem Leben spielen, so ungewöhnlich finden, dass wir sie mittels mythischer Erzählungen bzw. Fabeln zu *erklären* versuchen? Er zitiert Sir James Jeans: „Primitive man must have found nature singularly puzzling and intricate“ (Jeans 1931, 13), und meint dazu ironisch:

„Must have' besonders, da wir ja wissen, daß sich jeder Bauer den Kopf darüber zerbricht, warum die Sonne auf- und untergeht, und warum der Regen aus den Wolken fällt, etc.! (Wittgenstein MS 117, 18.3.40)

Wittgenstein stellt in Frage, was uns Fabeln lehren. Ihre Interpretation erfolgt ja immer von einem bestimmten Standpunkt aus. Das Vorwissen des Interpreten wird aber nicht explizit thematisiert, so dass die Fabel schwerlich als (objektive) Erklärung dienen kann: sie ist offen für (subjektive) Aspekte.

Die Beschreibung, welche ich geben sollte ist ähnlich dieser: ‚Welche Erfahrungen hätte ein Mensch, der sein Leben unter den und den Umständen (etwa in einem abgeschlossenen Projektil) zubrächte, und wie könnte er diese Erfahrungen darstellen?‘ ‚Es ist hier erstens schwer nicht mit unsern eigenen Augen (d.h., von unserm eigenen Standpunkt) zu sehen, zweitens nicht zu übersehen, daß wir selbst uns ja in einer ähnlichen Lage, relativ zu einem andern Beschauen, befinden.‘ Was er erlebt wird also einerseits äußerst seltsam, andererseits ganz gewöhnlich sein. D.h., es wird auf den ersten Blick abenteuerlich erscheinen, dann aber, von ganz gewöhnlicher Art, nur im Besondern ungewöhnlich. (Wittgenstein MS 117, 20.3.40)

An diesem Punkt erinnert Wittgenstein an jene Erzählung Peter Hebels, in der ein wandernder Handwerksbursche, der seinen schweren Reisesack – sein *Felleisen* – nicht mehr schleppen möchte, ein Schiff erblickt, das flussaufwärts von Mannheim nach Heidelberg gezogen wird. Er fragt den Schiffmeister, wie viel ihn die Fahrt koste, worauf dieser ihm im Scherz antwortet: „Fünfzehn Kreuzer, wenn Ihr ins Schiff wollt sitzen. Wollt ihr aber helfen ziehen, nur sechs. Das Felleisen könnt ihr mir in das Schiff werfen; es hindert Euch sonst nur.“ (Hebel 1911, Bd. 2, 185) Der Bursche entscheidet sich für die günstigere „Schifffahrt“, zahlt sechs Kreuzer und hilft, das Schiff nach Heidelberg zu ziehen. Wittgenstein dazu:

Man möchte sagen: er tut etwas närrisches. Hätte er aber z.B. lieber ziehen, als sein Felleisen tragen wollen, so wäre es vernünftig gewesen. Man kann, was er tut, als Irrtum auffassen, als vernünftig und als unsinnig. (Wittgenstein MS 117, 20.3.40)

Wittgenstein macht darauf aufmerksam, dass die Beschreibung selbst noch keinen Hinweis auf die Motivation des Burschen liefert. Der Beobachter/Leser befindet sich gleichsam in der Situation von Wittgensteins Schwester Hermine, der Wittgenstein auf ihr Unverständnis in Bezug auf seinen Wunsch, Volksschullehrer zu werden, erklärte:

Du erinnerst mich an einen Menschen, der aus dem geschlossenen Fenster schaut und sich die sonderbaren Bewegungen eines Passanten nicht erklären kann; er weiß nicht, welcher Sturm draußen wütet und daß dieser Mensch sich vielleicht nur mit Mühe auf den Beinen hält. (Wittgenstein 1981, 18)

Peter Hebel ist in seinen Kalendergeschichten Kommentator. Er ist der „Hausfreund“, der seine Leser bei der Hand nimmt und ihnen Geschichten mit Pointe garantiert. Liest man seine Erzählungen in Folge, nimmt diese Erwar-

tungshaltung noch zu. Kein unphilosophischer Leser Hebels hielte daher das Verhalten des Handwerksburschen je für „vernünftig“. Diese Lesart nähme der „bequemen Schifffahrt“ ihren Witz. Wittgenstein weiß das natürlich, trotzdem befreit er die Szene von ihrer traditionellen Lesart. Warum tut er das? Wohl um darauf hinzuweisen, dass die reine Situation – die bloße Beschreibung eines Vorkommnisses – selbst noch keine bestimmte Deutung vorgibt. Ohne Erzähler keine Erzählung.

Das Problem des Fremdpsychischen spielt auch im zweiten Hebel-Zitat im Nachlass eine Rolle. Am 11. Jänner 1947 notiert Wittgenstein im Manuskriptband 133, dass wir aus dem, was wir selbst sagen, nicht auf das schließen, was wir wahrscheinlich tun werden. Die Rolle des Interpreten nimmt man nicht zu sich selbst ein, man interpretiert Andere, und schließt für gewöhnlich aus dem, was Andere sagen, auf deren zukünftiges Tun. – In dem 1806 entstandenen Text „Zwei Erzählungen“ beginnt Hebel die zweite Erzählung mit den Worten:

In einer anderen Stadt ging ein Bürger schnell und ernsthaft die Straße hinab. Man sah ihm an, daß er etwas Wichtiges an einem Ort zu tun habe. Da ging der vornehme Stadtrichter an ihm vorbei (...) und der Gerichtsdiener kam hinter ihm drein.

„Wo geht ihr hin so eilig?“, sprach er zu dem Bürger. Dieser erwiderte ganz gelassen: „Gnädiger Herr, das weiß ich selber nicht.“ (Hebel 1911, Bd. 2, 68)

In weiterer Folge kommt es zu einem Wortgemenge, und der Bürger, von dem der Stadtrichter meint, er würde ihm seine Absicht willentlich verschweigen, soll in den Gefängnisturm geworfen werden. Darauf der Bürger:

„Da sehen Sie nun, hochgebietender Herr, daß ich reine, lautere Wahrheit gesagt habe. Wie konnte ich vor einer Minute noch wissen, daß ich in den Turm gehen werde, – und weiß ich denn jetzt gewiß, ob ich drein gehe?“ (Hebel 1911, Bd. 2, 68)

Wittgenstein inspiriert diese Erzählung zu folgender Bemerkung:

Wenn Einer mich auf der Straße trifft und fragt „Wohin gehst Du!“ und ich antworte „Ich weiß es nicht“, so nimmt er an ich habe keine bestimmte Absicht, nicht, ich [sei unsicher darüber ob / wisse nicht ob] ich meine Absicht werde ausführen können. (Siehe eine Hebelsche Erzählung.) (Wittgenstein MS 133, 17.1.47)

Der entscheidende Punkt in Hebels Erzählung ist die Fehlinterpretation: „Man sah ihm an, daß er Wichtiges an einem Ort zu tun habe“, die dem Stadtrichter (und dem Leser der Hebelschen Erzählung) unterläuft.

Im MS 138, zwei Jahre und zahlreiche Überlegungen zum Begriff „Absicht“ später, differenziert Wittgenstein zwischen Absicht (Intention) und gefasstem Entschluss:

Die Absicht hat keinen Ausdruck in Miene, Gebärde, oder Stimme, aber der Entschluß. (Wittgenstein MS 138, 7.2.1949)

... nur, um gleich anschließend festzustellen: „Die Philosophen legen sich für manches Wort eine ideale Verwendung zurecht, die dann aber nichts taugt“, denn: „[w]ie ist z.B. der Gesichtsausdruck dessen, der eine Druckseite liest, zu beschreiben.“ (Wittgenstein MS 138, 8.2.1949)

Wittgensteins Verwendung der beiden Erzählungen Hebels ist kein wissenschaftlicher Kommentar zu Hebel, genau genommen dient Hebels Werkausgabe Wittgenstein als Materialsammlung, aus der er sich einzelner Szenen bedient. Als Leser des *Schatzkästleins* ist es der Zusammenhang der Kalendergeschichten, der uns eine bestimmte Lesart nahelegt, eine Erwartungshaltung in Bezug auf den Witz oder die Moral der Erzählungen einnehmen lässt. Es scheint mir kein Zufall zu sein, dass Wittgenstein die Szenen nicht „nacherzählt“, sondern als Gedankenexperimente aus ihrem Zusammenhang herauslöst. Denn durch diesen Schachzug gelingt es ihm, die den Situationen inhärente Vieldeutigkeit sichtbar zu machen. Je reduzierter die Information, desto freier der Interpret. Eine Erfahrung, die Wittgenstein wohl schon mit den Lesern seines *Tractatus* gemacht haben dürfte. Es mag sein, dass die Philosophie Wittgensteins den „tatsächlichen Gebrauch der Sprache in keiner Weise antaste[t]“ (vgl. PU §124), – eines tut sie gewiss nicht: Alles lassen, wie es ist.

Wie schon andere vor ihm weist Gunter Gebauer in seinem Werk *Wittgensteins anthropologisches Denken* darauf hin, dass ein typischer Zug von Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie darin besteht, dass sie nicht im „luftleeren Raum“ stattfindet, sondern sich als Gegenbewegung zur Kontemplation immer der „Beteiligung des Menschen am Lebensprozeß“ zuwendet (Gebauer 2009, 16). Hebels Erzählungen kreisen um das Alltagsleben von Handwerksburschen, Soldaten, Hausierern, Bettlern und Landläufern jeder Art. Seine Kalendergeschichten, gesammelt im *Schatzkästlein des Rheinischen Hausfreunds* könnten als literarische Beschreibungen der Welt Wittgenstein in mehr als den angeführten Stellen Denkanstöße geliefert haben, eine solche Untersuchung wäre allerdings schwer zu belegen und würde mehr Raum erfordern, als dieser Beitrag zulässt.

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The Interlocutor Equivocation

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The *Investigations*' interlocutor¹ has been portrayed in later Wittgensteinian commentary in a wide number of roles, each resulting in a different account of just what kind of device it represents. To give three examples, it has been seen as: a nascent tendency that, unless addressed, leads into more developed and troublesome philosophical quandaries (Goldfarb, 1-2) the average member of the audience of Wittgenstein's seminars at Cambridge (Baker, 113); or a dialogical, insistent, almost naïve sparring partner, whose essentialist objections and remarks provide the dispensable comments upon which the author can demonstrate his therapeutic methods (Floyd, 143 & 145). I will suggest that these three readings all share a common emphasis upon what it is that the interlocutor represents, methodologically speaking, in Wittgenstein's later work. This emphasis will be critiqued, and an alternate reading suggested. Finally, I will argue that if one accepts this alternate reading, it follows that the use of the term "interlocutor" in secondary literature often equivocates between two discrete meanings – a textual device and a real life subject involved in therapy – to dubious effect.

The starting three examples, despite their different emphases, share a common conception of the interlocutor's role in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. They read Wittgenstein as seeking to bring to life a series of tendencies, confusions or arguments that the reader is likely to encounter when practicing therapeutic philosophy, either on herself or with her own "interlocutor", say, a fellow member of her faculty. Wittgenstein, then, is often taken to be demonstrating a method that might potentially be adopted and used by those who read his work. If the interlocutor does indeed represent an actual dialogist of some form (that differs according to alternate interpretations), as it seems to in our given examples, it is then sensible for his reader to perceive such a voice as the expression of a set of predictions as to the quandaries that Wittgenstein considered us most likely to succumb to.

Adopting any of these readings has an effect upon our conception of what Wittgenstein's later project hoped to achieve, and the methods it employed in pursuit of its goals. Each reading places a different stress upon what problems Wittgenstein was trying to help us resolve, and in so doing, also places a different accent on what therapeutic philosophy – the continuation of his methods, but practiced by other philosophers – might look like.² If by our familiarity with the interlocutorial positions and responses we are able to recognise such quandaries in ourselves or others, then we might hope to roughly 'do as Wittgenstein did' and apply dialogical therapy in a way similar to that found in the *Investigations*. We would essentially employ the interlocutorial voice as a malleable set of templates or guidelines for this undertaking, variegated according to the particular exegetical emphasis one places upon the inter-

locutor's nature; nascent, educated, naïve, essentialist, etc.

There seems to be a common problem with such hopes. That is, by casting the interlocutor in any of these roles, we assign to Wittgenstein a series of interconnected hypotheses by which philosophical quandaries and disquiets can be predicted, diagnosed and relieved. While considering the purpose of the interlocutor as demonstrative does chime well with references to method such as that found in *Investigations* §133, any reading that treats the interlocutor as a demonstration of how to proceed in the therapy of others or oneself seems to lead to a position where it is read as Wittgenstein's uncanny attempt to depict for the would-be therapist the imagined likely responses of those who suffer from philosophical confusion. Imagine – the interlocutor could be a layman with nascent tendencies, a philosopher of science or the therapist herself, and the interlocutorial demonstration might have been authored twenty, forty, or sixty years previous to the event of a particular disquiet or assertion, with the author of course having never met this particular interlocutor, perhaps never even been party to their language or culture. If we really wish to conceive of the interlocutor in this way we are left with the ill-tasting assertion that Wittgenstein's representations of the typical/possible respondents to philosophical quandaries display a kind of timeless, stable quality independent of a particular conceptual confusion's owner.³ For example, Gordon Baker's persuasive account of Wittgenstein's notion of the person-relative nature of philosophical problems does not seem to accord with any assertion of the interlocutor in a predictive or diagnostic way.

From such a position it begins to look as if the success of the *Investigations*, in a rather ironic turn, hangs upon the degree of universality that can be accredited to the remarks and portrayals of such 'predictive' dialogues, thus potentially resulting in the project of conceptual investigation being dependent upon census for its claims of efficacy. It should be quite uncontroversial for us to note at this point that one should strive to avoid unnecessarily asserting any state of affairs of the highest generality in regards to Wittgenstein's later methods. To do so could be seen as incongruous with many of his methodological remarks.

We should perhaps go a little further in this manner, laying against what has been said so far a brief account of some other remarks that also do not sit well alongside this portrayal of the interlocutor. From the frequency of remarks made in writing and conversation by Wittgenstein, we can be fairly certain that his brand of philosophy was not intended as being replicable, but stimulative and heteronomous in effect (Eg PI preface, MS 134 143: 13). Further, the manner of stimulation his writing offered was not intended to be a stable system upon which a school could be founded (*ibid*) but rather to be judged by its varying effects upon those who used it (PI preface). It was sensitive to the time in which it was written, and might indeed

¹ I will, for the sake of simplicity, refer to the interlocutor in the singular. This does not reflect any exegetical assumption on my part.

² A full account of such emphases and their effects upon relevant commentaries would take us too far off track. It is only necessary for my argument for us to acknowledge that how one thinks of the interlocutor will have a strong effect upon one's subsequent interpretation of such texts as the *Philosophical Investigations*.

³ This condition does not seem much of a problem for PMS Hacker, and for this reason, this critique is not directed against his work.

appear to be banal or gibberish to people of a later time (CV 43), or even to those of his own time who did not suffer from the same problems as he (BB 58-9). It was expressly intended to have only the most indirect of influences (MS 134 143: 13), and was diametrically opposed to imitation, of thoughts learnt, not discovered for oneself (Gasking & Jackson, 53 & Heller, 91). Above all, we can say that Wittgenstein's philosophy was intended to exemplify (and incite) a kind of working on one's own conceptions, and what one expects from those conceptions (P §86). In this light, it seems more sensible to understand the interlocutor as a method of expressing such a working on oneself, of making it speak clearly and forcefully (cf. Rhees, 153) of the tendencies and shortcomings that the author found in his own thought, depicted in order to bring about a heteronomous kind of work in its readers; that is, to inspire, not inculcate.

Therefore, when we read his later work it seems entirely possible that we might not be reading Wittgenstein's philosophy, contingently packaged in easily-digested, follow-my-lead dialogues, but rather witnessing Wittgenstein's best attempt at giving voice to the wide scope of grammatical confusions and anxieties that *he himself* struggled to emancipate himself from, using dialogue analogously to give a developing, interactive voice to the character of such problems. From the point of view of this reading we therefore do not witness so much a performance of many characters, some confused, others clear-sighted, but rather a mind diagnosing and confronting its own temptations, generalisations, anxieties, conceptions and unsubstantiated assertions. (Hagberg, 499) It is helpful when considering the worth of this position to remember that Wittgenstein commented that "[n]early all my writings are private conversations with myself. Things that I say to myself *tête-à-tête*." (CV 77) While it is equally true that Wittgenstein also commented of his work that one should not busy oneself with what presumably only applies to oneself (*ibid*, 63), it seems sensible to suppose that the wide-scale applicability/replicability envisaged by many of his interpreters, and thus the accompanying need for positing a method which entails the possibility of such application, is an exegetical theme not native such later works as the *Investigations*. In this way, a self-interrogative reading of the *Investigations'* interlocutor has an effect on how we perceive what it is that Wittgenstein is doing and advocating, bringing it more into line with his many comments regarding his methods' unsuitability for wide-scale replication. If we do choose to perceive the interlocutor as a textual technique, used to play out a series of interlocking thoughts, as a way of recording and developing the 'life' of the tendencies and anxieties Wittgenstein experienced over a sixteen-year period of philosophical investigation, then consequently we find ourselves abruptly limited in regards to the ways we might feel comfortable using the word "interlocutor".

For example, a sense in which the term "interlocutor" is used in some commentaries is to refer to a participant in therapy, a method by which a person is brought to acknowledge and accept new aspects or comparisons which compromise the previous pictures that captivated their way of thinking. Here the word is used to describe an ideal or actual individual, engaged in therapeutic dialogue with the Wittgensteinian philosopher. For example, Hutchinson and Read remark that "perspicuity is accorded to the presentation that achieves the bringing to light of new aspects which are freely accepted by one's philosophical

interlocutor."⁴ In other words, the interlocutor is defined as just that person upon whom therapy is practiced. From here the potential for equivocation becomes clear; namely a bifurcation between a series of specific textual techniques used to sketch out the author's personal disquiets, and the living, breathing philosopher whom one is addressing from the adopted role of philosophical therapist. For if the interlocutor makes sense as a textual technique used by Wittgenstein to record his own temptations and problematic philosophical habits, there is little reason remaining for us to comprehend and interpret a different person through the lens of these records. Why would it be useful to hold up Wittgenstein's "album", and try to discern the manner in which the sketches contained therein allow us to diagnose and treat other philosophers? Even granting that it might well work in *some* cases, (in other words, a method far from universal in effect), this practice still raises a number of concerns.

I would like to suggest that this equivocation is unjust to both Wittgenstein's textual technique and the philosopher who sits before us. As already noted, if one treats Wittgenstein's voice as constituting the author's pre-empting, or characterisation, of the kinds of confusions one is likely to run into in philosophy, his method starts to look suspiciously universal in intent and disrespectful of a person's contingent disquiet – or equally, their lack thereof – that it may be used to try to diagnose and treat. Pre-emption also runs counter to the notion that Wittgenstein sought indirect effects from his work, sought to create no followers or teachers of his work, and intended only the stimulation of his reader's heteronomous thoughts, rather than the imposition of his own, for it suggests a stable mode of resolution for a stable type of problem. The painful struggle to square Wittgenstein's work with his self-professed non-theoretical method runs through a great deal of exegesis in the field, and in the light cast here seems to stem from a particular consideration of the method on display in the *Investigations* as being directly intended for the establishment and training of a cadre of philosophers who practice philosophy upon others as Wittgenstein apparently does, namely 'therapeutically', with the interlocutor acting as the crucial demonstrative element in this practice. When of course, Wittgenstein often recorded his discomfort at the idea of being imitated in any way by those that would come after him.

This equivocation equally seems to usher the "interlocutor" one engages with in discourse into a pre-configured characterisation of a mistake or tendency (one that Wittgenstein experienced and investigated); the therapist apparently exercises her acquired ability to perceive her "interlocutor's" orchestrating picture of language beneath their complex and substantiated arguments, thus allowing the detail, research, explanative force and robustness of their argument to be potentially accounted for as the signature symptoms of a mind in the grip of a picture. The therapist who would employ such a technique is in danger of perceiving their partner in dialogue in a pre-determined way, seeking to map onto their problems a treatment to which they must either willingly undergo, or face a potential diagnosis of captivation, denial or even worse, should the therapy prove ineffective, of lacking philosophical problems⁵. It is telling that this kind of activity would appear to be in direct opposition to a number of

⁴ Hutchinson & Read 2005, 436. See also Hutchinson & Read 2008, 149, for a discussion of "our" interlocutor as "a diverse and dialectically structured range of philosophical impulses."

⁵ Z §456; see Morris 2006, 6 for her strong equation between a philosopher for whom therapy has no benefit and a suffering from a loss of philosophical problems.

frank and direct caveats left by the author. When introducing his work, Wittgenstein often reiterated that the effects of his work were conditional upon a very specific type of reader (TLP preface), in that his philosophy might only prove useful for those already in possession of a similar style or spirit of thought (PR foreword), rare in number (PI preface), who demonstrate a kind of rebellious or dissatisfied relationship to their language (P §90). If this notion of philosophy's condition of suitability is related to its reader's already established instinct for rebellion, and is only likely to be present in a few of his readers, then how can we square Wittgenstein's interlocutorial technique as being predictive or demonstrative of a wide range of stable behaviour?

I have already suggested that the unchartable nature of the effect that taking the *Investigations* seriously might have upon its reader appears to be an active dimension of its author's aims. If we treat this reading of the *Investigations*' style seriously we are obliged to go beyond observing Wittgenstein's self-interrogation and to actively take part in our own non-contiguous work. We do not seem likewise obliged to map a record of the anxieties and struggles of one man onto our dealings with countless of our fellow philosophers. As just one example of where such a method might lead us; it is often asserted (E.g. Morris, 6 and Baker, 146) that, because Wittgenstein suffered acute anxiety in his struggles with philosophical problems, it is a fundamental characteristic of philosophical problems that they are all a form of anxiousness. Yet is not the anxiety on display in the *Investigations* the author's? Why should this necessitate a universal characterisation of philosophical problems as *intrinsically* anxious? And if they must be rooted in such a feeling, why might they not rather intrinsically resemble, say, being unable to scratch an itch in the middle of one's back? Or serially misquoting the punchlines of one's favourite jokes? Do we wish to appeal to or explain this anxiety as being hardwired into thought or language? How could positing anxiety as a fundamental characteristic of all philosophical problems *not* constitute a decisive movement towards a philosophical hypothesis? And how could philosophical disquiets be particular to an individual if they have such universal characteristics? (cf. MS 115.35) In short, at just what point is the reader informed that Wittgenstein wishes to speak universally, of what characteristics philosophical problems must possess?

By adopting a position in which Wittgenstein is not positing unsubstantiated universal characteristics of philosophical problems, it looks likely that we cannot see his interlocutorial dialogues as intended to directly causally trigger a shift in his reader's concepts or notions – the most we should want to say is that they are intended to incite the reader into being able to shift for themselves when they encounter conceptual difficulties (LWPP-I §686), perhaps in a manner unforeseen by their author. It seems even more pressing that we perhaps should not see it as our duty to seek to causally trigger such a shift in *others*, acting as a kind of proxy for Wittgenstein, by employing an equivocation in which a textual technique is taken as a stable divination of what problem will occur and what technique will resolve it. It follows from this that any role of “therapist” (if we feel we must retain this reference to *Investigations* §133) could only be enacted by the reader herself, having been successfully prompted into undertaking the iterative questioning-tasks implied by the *Investigations*' peculiar, unresolved, interlocutorial style.

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Unshadowed Anti-Realism

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1. Introduction

Michael Dummett has claimed that Wittgenstein's *Investigations* view of the linguistic sign is incompatible with a recognition-transcendent notion of truth, which in turn rules out realist metaphysics.

In regard to the linguistic sign, Dummett's argument is, in outline, that recognition-transcendent truth-conditions could attach to our statements only if such conditions could play an active role in language use. The key Wittgensteinian thought that drives the argument is the idea that if we did suppose ourselves to be able to grasp a particular meaning for our words that attached to a recognition-transcendent condition then the whole practice of language use would go on the same *even if we had got it wrong*. But this, the argument goes, is to posit a difference that makes no difference. Consequently, it drops out of consideration as irrelevant (Dummett 1993, pp.312-14).

The principal connection with metaphysics is via the notion of *bivalence*—the semantic principle that every statement is determinately true or false. If the truth of our statements depended on the obtaining of a worldly state of affairs (as the realist maintains), then our statements would have to be determinately true or false, according to whether or not that state of affairs obtained. However, given that we cannot guarantee that every statement is recognisable as true or recognisable as false, we are only entitled to this principle if our notion of truth is recognition-transcendent. By the above argument, it is not, and hence bivalence must be rejected and metaphysical anti-realism follows (Dummett 1963).

Nevertheless, holds Dummett, we ought to maintain the classical principle of *tertium non datur*, the principle that no proposition is neither true nor false. Prominent among the non-technical reasons for this claim is the idea that there is no need for a special convention to decide whether a statement is false, independent of the failure of that statement to be true. This being so, there is no purpose in distinguishing on the one hand between a failure that comes from being neither true nor false and on the other hand a lack of truth that comes from falsehood *simpliciter* (Dummett 1959).

Dummett's anti-realist is therefore committed to two claims. He accepts *tertium non datur*, and he rejects bivalence. Recently, however, the co-tenability of these views has been challenged by Charles Travis, on the grounds that Dummett misunderstands Wittgenstein's view of the linguistic sign. Travis' claim, roughly put, is that anti-realism tries to maintain an incoherent middle position between 'external' and 'internal' perspectives regarding language use (Travis 2008, p.143). From the external perspective, not only bivalence but also *tertium non datur* fails to hold. From the internal perspective, on the other hand, even bivalence holds. Either way, the anti-realist loses; there is no middle ground.¹

¹ Three qualifications are in order. First, Travis himself is cautious over whether it is correct to say that these laws 'hold' or 'fail to hold' in these cases. This depends on one's view of what the role of these laws is. Second, it is

2. Shadows and the external perspective

On the classical view of the linguistic sign, held for example by Frege and by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*, there is a way of manufacturing a representation that is utterly world-independent. Nothing about the way things are, or how people would react to that representation, affects what it represents. The world's role is simply to make that representation true or false. On Travis' view of Wittgenstein's *Investigations* view, there are no such representations or 'shadows'. Whatever is done to manufacture a representation of any kind, the world may always play a further role in determining *what* it represents, not just whether it is true or false. This is because the representative capacity of sentences (and anything else) is grounded in the dispositions of people to take them as correct in certain cases and incorrect in others. There is nothing one can do, when uttering a given sentence, that can legislate for all possibilities of its application and the responses people may make to it. Consequently, something is always left to the world and to other people even in regard to the determination of *truth-conditions*, not just in regard to the determination of truth.

Suppose, for example, that Max utters 'Zoë is at home', in the context where Zoë has, unbeknownst to all (Max included), recently expired in her living room. When confronted with the now ex-Zoë, we may try to use those same words to report what Max said, so we may say 'Max said that Zoë is at home'. But, the thought is, that would be a false report. Max didn't mean there would be a corpse in her living room. Similarly, the thought goes, we cannot report Max correctly by saying 'Max said Zoë is not at home'. Max did not assert that there *would not* be a corpse in the living room. The point, moreover, is not one about indirect disquotational reports. The example is designed to show that Max did not manufacture a semantic entity of which *tertium non datur* could be asserted in the face of this unexpected turn of events. His words, given how things have turned out, do not admit a coherent interpretation that can be either true or false.²

One way of retaining *tertium non datur* would be to claim that on this occasion Max's words didn't express a proposition, i.e. a truth-apt entity, at all. On this line of response, they should be treated like stars, stones and Travis' hat, things of which the question of truth does not properly arise. Travis' response to this relies on the idea that what happened to Max could have happened to any of us. The only reason to claim that his utterance was not truth-apt would be if we could contrast it with a kind of semantic entity that was not subject to the possibility of such misfortune. But the only kind of entity that would be thus immune would be a shadow, and according to Travis we have no right nor need to assume that there could be such things. Indeed, for Travis, it is Wittgenstein's basic insight that there cannot.

important to distinguish the semantic principles of bivalence and *tertium non datur* from logical laws like Excluded Middle. The issues in this paper only concern the former. Third, this paper only deals with Travis' anti-Dummettian argument as presented in Travis 2008, not those to be found elsewhere in his work.

² In Travis' terms, these are cases of 'natural *isostheneia*'.

3. The internal perspective

As stated earlier, Travis contrasts the 'internal' perspective of language use with the 'external' perspective. But matters are no better for the anti-realist from the internal perspective. This is because, Travis claims, "[...] as long as we see statements from an object-level, internal perspective [...] we see them in a way that assumes, or presupposes, bivalence" (Travis 2008, p.143). The idea is that the kind of ineptitude that attends the use of our terms in cases where Zoë has shuffled off this mortal coil are presupposed on any specific occasion not to occur. One would therefore, in any given context, be mistaken to claim something along the following lines:

Internal error: I wonder whether Zoë is at home, but concede that it need not be determinately true or false that she is.

The idea is that when we use our words, even to entertain a supposition, we assume that context will be favourable enough to give us an answer one way or the other. Using a sentence indicates a form of optimism, such that conditions will arrange themselves on this occasion so as to make its use felicitous.

The anti-realist is therefore in a dilemma. From the external perspective, we shouldn't just drop bivalence but also *tertium non datur*, and from the internal perspective we shouldn't even drop bivalence. At no point do we balance Dummett's two views, the acceptance of *tertium non datur* and the rejection of bivalence.

4. Internal anti-realism

That, then, is Travis' argument, on at least one plausible reconstruction of it. It is designed to apply to 'sublunary discourse' i.e. everyday discourse about tables, chairs, and whether people are at home. The question is how the anti-realist, set in Dummett's mould, should respond to it. I am going to argue that the consequences are rather more limited than Travis appears inclined to allow. Specifically, I'm going to argue that even if the anti-realist must reject *tertium non datur* from the external perspective, this doesn't stop him accepting it from the internal perspective, whilst rejecting bivalence. Moreover, I'll suggest that this rescues what is important to the anti-realist position.

To see why, let us first look not at sublunary discourse but instead at mathematical discourse. In mathematics, it might be that we have special reason not to assume that a well-formed assertion, uttered in the right circumstances, is determinately true or false. This might be due to some peculiar feature of mathematical concepts (the peculiarity of which Wittgenstein himself often recognised). It might be because, for example, they do not refer to an independent Platonic realm, but rather are our own logical constructions. Now, we need not here worry about whether this argument is sound; the point is merely that if it is, then we might suspend bivalence even given the usual presuppositions of felicity, or in Travis' terms, even from the 'internal' perspective. In this regard, such a statement might be treated differently to a declaration that 'Zoë is at home'. In mathematics, all the external contingencies might conspire to make our statements *felicitous* (no corpses), and yet still it not be right to assume bivalence.

Once this is accepted, however, we see the potential for a distinction between Travis' reasons for dropping *tertium non datur* from the external perspective and the special reasons for dropping *only* bivalence in regard to the internal perspective. *Ipsa facto*, we see how one might square Dummettian anti-realism with Travis' two perspectives and the bar on shadows. The anti-realist may negotiate his position in regard to the internal perspective alone. This may mean that, *contra* Dummett, he rejects *tertium non datur* from the external perspective, but from the internal perspective, i.e. assuming felicity, he drops bivalence but accepts *tertium non datur*, in the way distinctive of the anti-realist.

There is a question, of course, as to whether this rescues the initial motivations for anti-realism. Abstracted from Travis' distinction between different perspectives, the point is as follows: Travis' argument relies on the anti-realist being unable to draw a good distinction between the ordinary presuppositions of felicity that imperil all language use, and the special reasons that might be adduced by anti-realist arguments. It is on the assumption that no such distinction can be drawn that the reasons for rejecting bivalence that the anti-realist typically adduces might simply be agglomerated with those that might push us towards rejecting *tertium non datur*. Otherwise, it seems the anti-realist may simply make his thesis conditional on the satisfaction of certain conditions of felicity.

Let us now return to matters sublunary. Suppose we consider normal cases, where, for example, Max is not presented with a corpse. The anti-realist's question, then, is whether the notion of truth attaching to the statement that 'Zoë is at home' can be recognition-transcendent. For it to be recognition-transcendent is for it to be possible for all the relevant criteria to be met (we may for example imagine seeing Zoë with our own eyes, reclining on her sofa reading a copy of *The Uses of Sense*) and yet it still be possible that the statement is false.

As outlined in the introduction, Dummett's global anti-realist argument is that recognition-transcendent truth-conditions could attach to our statements only if such conditions could play an active role in language use. The Wittgensteinian thought that Dummett takes to rule this out is that even if we tried to attach such conditions, the whole practice of language use would go on the same if we had assigned them incorrectly. Consequently they wouldn't make the required difference.

It is not clear, from what Travis argues, as to why this argument would be any less applicable after we have factored in considerations pertaining to the felicity of our assertion regarding Zoë. We may suppose that even as the anti-realist sees her alive and well, ensconced on her sofa, he asks himself whether it might nevertheless be false that she is at home. For the reasons given above, he may convince himself that it is not. That would be for there to be a difference which made no difference, and that, he may think, is not how language works. The implication for bivalence follows as usual. Insofar as we cannot guarantee that we'll be in a position to recognise that 'Zoë is at home' is determinately true or false in all (even felicitous) circumstances, the principle is invalid. As it stands, therefore, the arguments offered by Travis are inconclusive. For all that has here been shown, Dummett's anti-realist has no stake in shadows. Travis could be right about Wittgenstein's theory of the linguistic sign and still anti-realism would be as viable as it ever was.

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No Nonsense Wittgenstein

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Some rough theses may help to place myself in the debates that I am addressing:

1. Some philosophers (including Wittgenstein) think it is bound to be difficult for most contemporary philosophers to receive Wittgenstein's work. If we want to understand this idea the question of how, to what extent and with what consequence form and content are connected in Wittgenstein's work is important.

2. When we address that question it is helpful to look at the development of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, especially on how his early ambitions to solve the foundational problems in philosophy by transcendental means, in the so called *Proto-Tractatus*, gets radicalised and transformed as he develops his more original therapeutic, grammatical and, finally, polyphonic method. (See Wallgren 2006.)

3. At the core of the therapeutic (or "resolute") readings of Wittgenstein, as proposed by Cora Diamond, James Conant and others are the ideas that Wittgenstein did not want to advance theses in philosophy, that Wittgenstein's philosophy is designed to dissolve problems rather than to solve them and that, to those ends, Wittgenstein developed a radical conception of nonsense already in the *Tractatus*.

4. The no theses idea (NTI) has proven "sociologically" problematic: scholars who think it is central to philosophy that we argue about and try to solve problems tend to get alienated from Wittgenstein generally and from NTI views especially before any debate about NTI can get off the ground. Hence, therapeutic interpreters tend to become an isolated sect.

5. NTI is also problematic intrinsically because the paradoxes involved in "the thesis that we should have no theses" as also in the notion that there is only one kind of nonsense present real, not merely technical and superficial, problems.

6. More specifically, therapeutic interpretations of Wittgenstein suffer from the following defect: Their claims build on a distinction between sense and nonsense that is similar to the distinction between truth and falsehood in the following sense. According to therapeutic interpretations Wittgensteinian philosophy elucidates (truths about) where sense can and cannot be found. When we comprehend (or know) where (true) sense is, we have dissolved (or solved?) our problems. My contention is that in the end the problem facing the resolute readings is not that they are too radical, they are too conventional. (I cannot here explain my reasons for considering this proposal valid even in the light of e.g. the joint article by Diamond and Conant from 2004 or some of Gordon Baker's last essays.)

In this context I turn to some elements of Cora Diamond's work on Wittgenstein. Arguably, the emphasis on NTI in therapeutic interpretations owes much to Diamond's article "Throwing Away the Ladder" (in Diamond 1991). Another seminal suggestion by Diamond is that central in Wittgenstein's philosophy is the philosophy of logic, in particular

his idea that philosophy of logic and ethics, philosophy of mind and self, are one and the same.

The first idea bears on how we understand the purpose and measure of success in philosophy. The second bears on what we need to understand, where we need to direct our attention in philosophy, in order to get to what is deep and important in it. Together these ideas allow Diamond a fertile ground for developing her notion that the specific form of emancipation through enlightenment that philosophy enables is therapeutic liberation from the spell of illusory problems that are due to misunderstandings about the logic of our concepts.

It is characteristic of Diamond's reading of Wittgenstein that she claims that those two ideas are central to Wittgenstein's work already in the *Tractatus*. This claim is the backdrop of her discussion of continuity and rupture in Wittgenstein's philosophy.

On continuity Diamond maintains that Wittgenstein through his career followed Frege and ultimately Kant in upholding a distinction between "an empirical or psychological approach to the mind and one that is not psychological." (1991: 4.) On her view this distinction is "fundamental." (1991: 1)

This notion of continuity is closely connected to one of Diamond's main ideas about rupture in Wittgenstein's thinking as we pass from the *Tractatus* to his later philosophy. The rupture consists in the later Wittgenstein's rejection of what Diamond in one place calls the mythology of the distinction between a psychological approach to the mind and one that is not psychological. (1991: 4.) The key idea here is that Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* sticks to certain presuppositions of how thought and language are related to logic (or; of how the mind is related to logic). These presuppositions are not metaphysical in the sense that they are concerned with features of reality (as assumed in what has been called the "standard" reading of the *Tractatus*). But they are "metaphysical" in another sense; they lay down, as Diamond puts it, "a requirement of logical analysis" (1991: 19).

Diamond's claim is that Wittgenstein's later work overcomes this early shortcoming by introducing a "dramatic shift" in our notion of "what it is for logic to be rigorous", thereby achieving a new conception of how philosophy can fulfill its promise of liberation. According to Diamond Wittgenstein now "turns around" and invites us to find answers to the questions that bother us about "the rigour of logic, the bindingness of ethics, the necessity of mathematics" not in dazzling ideals the nature of which escape us, but in "our thready, knotty lives", in "what we do." He also invites us to consider this realm, the realm of the "spatial, temporal phenomenon of language" as the realm where we can find logic, *not* as the realm where it would be impossible to find it. (This paragraph builds especially on Diamond 1991: 4-6 and 31-36. Quotes from pages 32, 5, 6, 33 and 36.)

This is, if you like, a therapy of a new kind: a therapy that liberates us from a preconceived idea of method in philosophy, from a preconceived idea of what the results of philosophy ought to look like and from preconceived ideas

about the relation in philosophy between high and low, depth and surface, necessity and contingency.

All this is of deep interest, and yet, not radical enough. Strikingly, the difference between the monological form of presentation in the *Tractatus* and the polyphonic form in the *Philosophical Investigations*, Part 1 plays no role here. (For discussion of the special status of *Philosophical Investigations*, Part 1 in Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* see e.g. Stern 2004, Pichler 2004.) Diamond writes:

D(1): Logic cannot be *there*, in what we do. Well, the argument of 'Realism and the Realistic Spirit' is that it *can* be there. (1991: 6)

What happens here with Diamond's leading idea about Wittgenstein that "it is only through some confusion that one is in about what one is doing that one could take oneself to be putting forward philosophical doctrines or theses at all"? (1991: 179.)

Is there not a claim, a thesis, involved in D(1)? The thesis is that logic can be there, in what we do.

You may say: the only thing that my comment shows is that we need to refine our discussion of NTI, for instance by differentiating between therapeutic results (or theses) and standard results (or theses), or, by saying that liberation from illusion is key while NTI is only an intermediate step on the therapeutic ladder.

Now, this kind of reaction clearly allows for consistency. Nevertheless, it saves the notion of Wittgenstein's philosophy as therapeutic at a high price. First, it becomes difficult to see what could count as a valid criticism of the therapeutic interpretation. Second, the reaction takes a lot of the provocative flair off Diamond's programmatic claim that the "no theses -idea" is fundamental to Wittgenstein's philosophy. More importantly, it makes it hard to see how the emancipatory ideals in Wittgensteinian philosophy are in any interesting way different from those that dominate in contemporary philosophy. In consequence, some of the most pertinent issues concerning the difficulty of receiving Wittgenstein get lost. (Baker 2004 presents a reading of Wittgenstein similar to that of Diamond in some respects without facing the last problem.) Here is a second quote from Diamond:

(D2): The central paper in this collection . . . shows how Wittgenstein's attention to what we do is compatible with respect for Frege's distinction between what empirical psychology might show us of people's minds and what belongs to *the* mind, and in fact enables us to look in a realistic spirit at thought. (1991: 5.)

My point of criticism is that Diamond does not only want compatibility with "respect for Frege's distinction", she *wants to keep* the distinction.

What Diamond says here in a subtle way echoes the more common and more general claim that the idea that a clear distinction can be made between empirical and conceptual investigations belongs to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy.

The question is how this fits her idea that we should not lay down requirements in philosophy. Does Diamond require of us as philosophers that we do not travel down the road suggested by Quine when he wanted to recreate philosophy in the image of science?

It seems to me that she does lay down this requirement, if already because science, as Quine had it and as he proposed as a model for philosophy, is very much involved in the business of establishing and refuting theses.

It appears that the problem in Diamond's reading of Wittgenstein that we have now identified is quite general. The question is how efforts of reading Wittgenstein as a philosopher who has no theses, lays down no requirements and who opposes a metaphysical spirit in philosophy can address the problem that at a "metalevel" such philosophy will put forward theses, lay down requirements and propose a new kind of metaphysical spirit? I turn to a third quote from Diamond:

(D3): If we do not see him /Wittgenstein/ as drawing attention to the face of necessity, the face of life with logic (logic that penetrates all thought just as much as ever it did in the *Tractatus*), we shall see him instead as repudiating the hardness of the logical 'must' and giving up Frege's distinction between logic and psychology. (1991: 6-7.)

Here I wish to focus on Diamond's expression that logic according to the later Wittgenstein penetrates *all* thought just as much as ever it did in the *Tractatus*. How is that — this thesis concerning a remarkable continuity in Wittgenstein's philosophical career — to be understood?

One could say that Diamond wants to have it both ways. She wants to have a Wittgenstein, early and late, who shows us a way of doing philosophy that is not trapped by false ideals about higher knowledge or absolute standards or metaphysical truths that we feel we have to reach but that also seem impossible to reach. She also wants us to maintain "attention" to a logic that is a custodian of ideals and ambitions that are qualitatively distinct from anything that can be studied in an empirical, scientific psychology.

Now, I agree with Diamond that we cannot understand anything important about how Wittgenstein is interesting and radical if we understand him as a philosopher who cares less about rigour, reason and the highest possible standards of clarity and rationality in the philosophy of logic than any philosopher before him.

My concern with Diamond is when she writes as if we can fulfil the highest ambitions in philosophy by *insisting* on (or requiring?) this or that, for instance that we develop a view of logic which is a view of logic as *penetrating* all thought, or, to put the emphasis at a different place, a view of logic as penetrating *all* thought. This, it seems to me, is right about the *Tractatus* but not about the polyphonic Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations*. In the latter case, the focus is on what we can say in favour of this view, how it can be made sense of, but not in order to prove or insist on anything. (I suggest not reading supreme authority into any of the many voices in the *Investigations*, e.g. at 89-109.) Wittgenstein once wrote:

Wir dürfen überhaupt keine Tendenz haben . . . sondern (wir) müssen alles anerkennen, was jeder Mensch darüber je gesagt hat . . .

The first record of this passage is from 16th July 1931 when Wittgenstein had not yet fully developed the polyphonic style characteristic of the *Philosophical Investigations*. When the latter style (or method) gradually is invented it becomes a key feature of Wittgenstein's philosophy that philosophical work consists in exploring different arguments and positions that we are drawn to (or disturbed by), their presuppositions and implications and other such (classical) things. The driving force in these investigations will often be the (moral) interests of the one(s) who is (are) conducting the investigation. The investigation is our investigation of what concepts can mean to us, what role we can assign to them in our lives. In this we are searching for

agreement with ourselves, as Socrates sometimes put it. The important thing is what we may believe ourselves in the sense that we can risk living by the judgement we make. Offering our findings as truths to others is of little help unless we commit ourselves. (Cf. Vlastos 1991.)

Concepts are important to us. Our understanding of them give shape to our lives. But philosophy does not come with a guarantee that concepts are (or that they are not) such that we will come to agreement with ourselves (or others) about their meaning or there lack of meaning – about what to make of them. Nevertheless, we can endeavour to clarify different viewpoints, possibilities and aspects. This work is a form of caring for ourselves and others. It may lead us to take stands. We may accept *this* as a solution and *that* as a dissolution. We may suspend judgement in some case. But these are things we do. Hence, even when we agree on every step in an investigation we may not agree on the result or conclusion.

When Wittgenstein writes that his work is “only an album” (1953, Preface) and gives to it a polyphonic form where there is no clearly identifiable author’s voice, no Olympic narrator and many more questions than answers the advantage of this mode of presentation as compared with the style conducive to the therapy as practised in the *Tractatus* or the grammatical, language-game method pursued in the *Brown Book* is the following. Now there is no longer a suggestion that there is a “point” to be deciphered (cf. Diamond ed. 1976, p. 95) . In this sense there are no theses about sense and nonsense to arrive at in philosophy. But there is also no suggestion that such a “no nonsense Wittgenstein” would not on the basis of his investigations hold views or draw conclusions, for instance about sense and nonsense, that he believes to be true. It would, however, hardly have added to the value of the *Philosophical Investigations* had Wittgenstein written a postscript including his report on what his own views and positions are on various issues he has investigated or on questions concerning sense and nonsense that he has elucidated. Such theses drop out of the picture as irrelevant to the philosophical work (completed text). It does not follow that they drop out of the lives of philosophers.

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Und das Selbst gibt es doch – Versuch der Verteidigung eines umstrittenen Konzepts

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1. Probleme mit dem Selbst

Was ist das Selbst? Gibt es das Selbst? An der Beantwortung dieser Fragen scheiden sich in der philosophischen Debatte die Geister. Während es durchaus Philosophen gibt, die im Rahmen ihrer Theorien auch auf das *Selbst* Bezug nehmen und es als gleichbedeutend mit *Person* und *Subjekt von Erfahrung* ansehen (Vgl. Lowe 1996, 5), vertreten andere wiederum die Auffassung, dass das 'Selbst' als Konzept für die Theoriebildung überflüssig, zuweilen sogar schädlich ist, da es unnötigerweise Verwirrung stiftet – eine Ansicht, die unter anderem von Eric T. Olson vertreten wurde.

In seinem Artikel *There is no problem of the self* gelangt Olson nach eingehender Betrachtung von Fällen der Rede vom Selbst und einer Auswahl von üblicherweise mit dem Selbst verbundenen Problemen zu dem Schluss, dass jene Probleme auch ohne Bezugnahme auf das Selbst thematisiert werden können und das dieser Begriff also bedenkenlos aus dem philosophischen Jargon gestrichen werden könne, da es das Selbst – und somit den oftmals postulierten Bezugspunkt jener Probleme – offensichtlich nicht gibt.

Einen ersten Ansatzpunkt für die Verteidigung dieser Position liefert Olson der Umstand, dass es bisher keine Definition gibt, in der in zufriedenstellender Weise expliziert wäre, was unter dem 'Selbst' zu verstehen sei: „What would the problem of the self be about, if there were such a problem? What is this 'self' whose existence and properties appear to be the subject of so much debate? (...) If there is a genuine problem of the self, there must be some nontrivial answer, however vague or incomplete, to these questions. (...) The most satisfactory would be to give a definition of the term or an analysis of the concept. A definition of 'self' would say, 'x is y's self if and only if ...'." (Olson 1998, 646) Da eine solche Definition aber bisher nicht gegeben sei, müssen andere Wege beschritten werden, um dem 'Selbst' und seinem Gehalt auf den Grund zu gehen.

Abgesehen von der Möglichkeit, den Gehalt mittels einer Definition zu bestimmen, gäbe es noch eine zweite Methode, mit deren Hilfe festgestellt werden könne, was unter dem 'Selbst' zu verstehen ist. Dabei handelt es sich um die Aufstellung einer langen Liste von Eigenschaften, die charakteristischerweise mit dem 'Selbst' in Verbindung gebracht werden. Olson wendet sich infolge acht solcher dem Selbst als charakteristisch zugeschriebenen Eigenschaften zu.

Das Selbst könnte (1.) jene unveränderliche einfache Substanz sein, auf die sich die eigenen Eindrücke und Vorstellungen beziehen. Es könnte (2.) das innere Subjekt der eigenen, bewussten Erfahrungen sein; zu Varianten hiervon zählt Olson folgende Auffassungen: es könnte der Träger der eigenen personalen Identität durch die Zeit sein (2.a); oder es könnte dasjenige sein, das die Welt je durch die eigenen Augen betrachtet (2.b); oder es könnte aber das tautologische Subjekt der eigenen Handlungen sein (2.c); oder die Ursache alles dessen, was einer tut (2.d). Zu den weiteren Zuschreibungen, die oft vernehmbar sei-

en gehöre die Auffassung, dass das Selbst schlicht die Person selbst sei (3) oder jenes unbeschreibbare und nicht identifizierbare private, einem innewohnende Wesen (4). Wieder andere Positionen sehen das Selbst als dasjenige an, das einem eine über alles andere gehende Würde verleiht (5). Es könnte aber auch der unbewusste Mechanismus sein, der für die Einheit des eigenen Bewusstseins verantwortlich ist (6); oder es könnte eine psychologische Eigenschaft oder ein Verhaltensmuster sein (7); oder es könne sich beim Selbst um eine Ansammlung oder eine Konstruktion der eigenen Sinneseindrücke handeln (8) (Vgl. Olson 1998, 648ff. – Übersetzung von mir, P.W.). Diese Ansätze haben in ihrer Verschiedenheit nun auch mit unterschiedlichen Problemen zu kämpfen.

Ansätze (1) und (8) sind Olson zufolge von der Philosophie Humes beeinflusste Positionen, die heutzutage nur noch wenige Anhänger finden würden. Zum einen sei nicht klar, was (in 1) mit der 'Bezugnahme [der Eindrücke und Vorstellungen] auf' das eigene Selbst gemeint sein könnte – und unklar bliebe auch (in 8), was genau die Summe der Sinneseindrücke konstituiert – so fragt Olson: ist es die Summe des mentalen Lebens? Oder ist es viel mehr die Summe der eigenen Gedanken und Erfahrungen? Kann ein solches 'Bündel' überhaupt aus unterschiedlichen Erfahrungen bestehen? Ich möchte die Frage hinzufügen: kann ein solches Bündel allein schon hinreichend sein für die Gewährleistung der Vielfalt des mentalen Lebens von Personen?

Ansatz (1) und (2) scheinen zu implizieren, dass das 'Selbst' und die 'Person' identisch sind – was schnell problematisch werden könne, denn selbst wenn dies impliziert wäre, müsste es nicht zwangsläufig bedeuten, dass es sich dabei auch um untereinander austauschbare Konzepte handelt. So gehört Lowe Olson zufolge in das Lager derjenigen Philosophen, die bestreiten, dass die Konzepte 'Selbst' und 'Person' in diesem Sinn untereinander austauschbar sind (Vgl. Olson 1998, 649). Die Auffassung (3), der zufolge das Selbst schlicht die Person selbst sei, hat wiederum mit mangelnder Anerkennung zu kämpfen. Das aber ist m.E. ein Problem, denn eine Position, die als Lösung eines bestimmten Problems gelten will, muss zuvor bei einer großen Anzahl von Vertretern des Faches als Lösungsmöglichkeit anerkannt sein, so sehr sich deren Ansichten sonst auch unterscheiden mögen. Da die Annahme der Äquivalenz von 'Selbst' und 'Person' aber schon jene Minimalbedingung nicht erfüllt, scheint sie als mögliche Lösung wenig Plausibilität zu besitzen.

Dies liegt Olson zufolge – abgesehen von der fehlenden Anerkennung als Lösungsmöglichkeit – auch an den in dem Ansatz vorkommenden problematischen Ausdrücken: so sei schon nicht klar, was genau 'Personen' sind; es bestehe kein allgemeiner Konsens darüber, welche Kriterien hinreichend dafür sind, um ein Wesen zur Klasse der 'Personen' zählen zu können, – obschon eine Liste grundlegender Eigenschaften schnell aufgestellt ist, der zufolge eine Person (mindestens) ein rationales Wesen sein muss, das für seine Handlungen verantwortlich ist oder dazu fähig sein muss, diese charakteristischen Eigenschaften erwerben zu können (ich möchte ergänzen:

im Fall einer natürlichen, arttypischen Entwicklung zu einem gesunden erwachsenen Individuum seiner Art). Obgleich dies keine abschließende Liste sein kann, scheint die Frage was denn 'Personen' sind, durch die Angabe solcher grundlegenden Charakteristika dennoch eher beantwortbar zu sein als die Frage, was denn die grundlegenden Eigenschaften von 'Selbst' sein könnten. Auch Ansatz (4) bietet keine hinreichenden Kriterien, die in dieser Angelegenheit weiterhelfen könnten: aus ihm geht noch nicht einmal klar hervor, was genau es heißen soll, dass das Selbst 'unbeschreibbar' ist oder das es für die personale Einheit verantwortlich ist – handelt es sich beim Selbst letztlich also nur um eine Eigenschaft oder ein Bündel von Eigenschaften? Natürlich – bemerkt Olson – könne man es einem Konzept nicht ankreiden, wenn es etwas prinzipiell Unbeschreibbares zu benennen versucht (und an diesem Versuch scheitert), doch würde eine solche problematische Eigenschaft des Selbst – insofern sie wirklich eine charakteristische Eigenschaft ist – den Kritikern zugleich zusätzliche Argumente liefern. Ansatz (5) bleibt Olson zufolge am dunkelsten; was genau soll das heißen, das Selbst sei 'dasjenige, das einem eine über alles andere gehende Würde verleiht'? Ansatz (6) suggeriert, dass sich das Selbst letztlich in nichts unterscheidet von einem für die menschlichen vitalen Funktionen wichtigen Organ, das die meiste Zeit über unbewusst bleibt. In (7) ist die Bedeutung des Ausdruck 'Eigenschaft' unklar – so bemerkt Olson: „I suppose Dennett's account of the self as a 'center of narrative gravity' might be something like this, though it is far from clear just what he means by that phrase“ (Olson 1998, 650).

Alle diese Ansätze behaupten nun, sich auf ein und dasselbe Bezugsobjekt, das 'Selbst', zu beziehen, obgleich sie sehr unterschiedlich sind. Olson sieht sein Argument nun gerade durch diese Verschiedenheit gestützt: „It should be equally clear that there is no one thing – no single idea – that all of these accounts could reasonably be seen as trying to capture. (...) I conclude that those who use the word 'self', if they are saying anything coherent at all, must be talking about completely different things. Thus, there is no such idea as the idea of the self, and therefore nothing for the 'problem of the self' to be a problem about.“ (Olson 1998, 651).

Im Fortgang seiner Kritik wendet sich Olson nun einer weiteren Quelle der Verwirrung zu, nämlich dem unbedachten Gebrauch des Wortes 'Selbst' – als Beispiele dienen ihm Passagen aus Texten von Owen Flanagan, Richard Gregory sowie von Galen Strawson – und auch hier ist er wieder darum bemüht, die immanente Widersprüchlichkeit aufzuweisen, die durch Einbeziehung des Begriffs 'Selbst' in den jeweiligen Kontexten erzeugt wird. Da er hierbei aber keine neuen Einsichten eröffnet und in analoger Weise zu den bisher angeführten Beispielen verfährt, will ich seine Argumentation an dieser Stelle nicht mehr eigens ausführen und zu meiner Kritik übergehen.

2. Metakritik

Auf welche Weise kann man Olsons Kritik nun begegnen? Er führt drei mögliche Wege der Erwiderung an. Die erste Strategie wäre, darauf zu insistieren, dass die Liste der Antworten auf die Frage 'Was ist das Selbst?' unvollständig ist. Zweitens könnte man darauf verweisen, dass auch der Umstand der Uneinigkeit hinsichtlich charakteristischer Eigenschaften des Selbst zu dem Problem gehört, dessen Nicht-Existenz er behauptet. Eine dritte Möglichkeit der Erwiderung bestünde darin einzugestehen, dass es zwar nicht das Konzept des Selbst gibt – gleichzeitig aber darauf zu bestehen, dass es viele unterschiedliche Konzepte

gibt, die als Konzepte eines Selbst anzusehen sind (Vgl. Olson 1998, 651f.). Ich möchte mich mit meiner Kritik nicht auf eine dieser Möglichkeiten beschränken, sondern vielmehr einen Weg beschreiten, der Elemente aller drei von Olson in Betracht gezogenen Erwiderungsstrategien enthält.

Im Anschluss an seine Diskussion der Antworten, die üblicherweise auf die Frage 'Was ist das Selbst' gegeben werden, verweist Olson darauf, dass es klarerweise wohl kaum ein einziges 'Ding' gebe, auf das alle diese Charakterisierungen Bezug nehmen (Vgl. Olson 1998, 651). Dem kann ich allerdings nicht zustimmen, denn es ist offensichtlich der Fall, dass die erwähnten Antworten, die auf die Frage nach dem Selbst gegeben werden können, Eigenschaften benennen, die als für das mentale Leben von *Personen* (also *Subjekten von Erfahrung*) charakteristische Aspekte angesehen werden können. Eine Person zeichnet sich dadurch aus, dass sie ein rationales Subjekt ist, dass sich sich als identisch mit sich selbst erlebt und als verschieden von seiner Umwelt erfährt – und sich als solches Subjekt der Erfahrung *erlebt*, zugleich ist eine Person auch verantwortlich für ihre Handlungen, sie selbst ist der Urheber ihrer Handlungen: eine Voraussetzung der Befähigung zu derartiger Verantwortung ist, dass die Person die Welt aus einer (einmaligen subjektiven) Perspektive wahrnimmt (und diese Einmaligkeit ist es auch, die der Person einen Wert verleiht, der über alles andere geht) und infolge dieser Wahrnehmung gemäß handelt.

All jene von Olson aufgeführten Ansätze benennen in der Tat verschiedenste Aspekte des Selbst; doch sollte dies kein Nachteil sein, handelt es sich doch – wie wir gerade gesehen haben – um Aspekte ein und derselben Instanz: nämlich Aspekte des Subjekts und des subjektiven Erlebens der Person, die ihre Umwelt bewusst erlebt und um sich selbst als Subjekt dieser Erfahrung weiß, wie auch im folgenden deutlich werden soll:

Personen erfahren sich als *selbstbewusste Wesen*, sie haben erstpösonliches Wissen von sich *selbst* und nehmen auf sich *selbst* Bezug, wenn sie das Personalpronomen der ersten Person Singular '*Ich*' im Zusammenhang sprachlicher Äußerungen gebrauchen. Die Einheit von Selbst und Selbstwissen liegt in der Einheit des Bewusstseins des Subjekts begründet – dies macht seinen besonderen ontologischen Status aus (Vgl. Searle 2007, 50). Ein Satz wie 'Ich habe Schmerzen', sofern er in dem Moment geäußert wird, in dem die Schmerzen tatsächlich empfunden werden, drückt Selbstwissen *de re* aus, also ein Wissen, das nur das äußernde Subjekt selbst als Subjekt der Erfahrung im unmittelbaren Erlebniskontext hat. Ich habe bereits an früherer Stelle (Vgl. Wallusch 2008, 375f.) unter Berufung auf Lowe dargelegt, dass genau jene beiden Kriterien, die (erstpersönliche) *direkt Bezug nehmende Referenz* und das *Selbstwissen de re*, erfüllt sein müssen, damit von einem *Selbst* oder einer *Person* als Subjekt der Erfahrung überhaupt erst die Rede sein kann. Eine Person ist also in besonderer Weise dadurch ausgezeichnet, dass sie sie *selbst* ist – über Selbstbewusstsein der oben genannten Art verfügen – und sich selbst als sie selbst erfährt und über diese Erfahrung zu reflektieren imstande ist, sowie die Fähigkeit besitzt, dieses Wissen in sprachlicher Form nach Außen mitzuteilen. Allerdings scheint es auch mir ein aussichtsloses Unterfangen zu sein, eine abschließende Liste charakteristischer Eigenschaften des Selbst geben zu wollen.

Olson liegt mit seiner Kritik aber auch nicht völlig falsch. Einzugestehen ist, dass die Problembereiche, die das 'Problem des Selbst' bilden, in der Tat im Kontext unterschiedlicher Teilbereichen der akademischen Philo-

sophie unter Benutzung der jeweiligen *Termini Technici* thematisiert werden: als das Problem personaler Identität in der Metaphysik; in der Semantik als Frage nach der Referenz des Ausdrucks *Ich* (oder der Frage, ob der Ausdruck *Ich* überhaupt referiert); in der Philosophie des Geistes als der Frage danach, was Selbst-Bewusstsein ist; in der Erkenntnistheorie in der Frage nach den Möglichkeiten und Ausprägungen des Selbstwissens – und unter vielen anderen Bezeichnungen (Vgl. Olson 1998, 655 – Übersetzung von mir, P.W.).

Nun erscheint es mir wichtig, abschließend zu betonen, dass dies kein Problem des 'Problems des Selbst' ist. All jene in Teilbereichen thematisierten Probleme sind Aspekte ein und desselben Phänomens. Das Problem mangelnder Verständigung der Fachvertreter ist kein Indiz für die Nicht-Existenz des *Selbst*, sondern ein charakteristisches Problem allgemeiner Art, das überall dort auftreten kann wo Dialog geschieht (und wo es auftritt, diesen verhindert). Deshalb möchte ich auf Olsons Konklusion erwidern, dass gerade auch dieser Mangel an Übereinstimmung hinsichtlich des 'Problems des Selbst' ein Aspekt des Problems ist, dessen Nicht-Existenz er behauptet (Vgl. Olson 1998, 651).

3. Ausblick

Diejenigen Philosophen, die eine ernsthafte philosophische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Selbst anstreben scheinen zunächst in einem Dilemma zu stecken. Das Fehlen einer Definition des Selbst halte auch ich in der Tat für eine Quelle vieler Probleme, die sich oftmals erst im Fortgang der philosophischen Reflexion offenbaren. Am besten fundiert schiene mir also eine Untersuchung des Selbst, die mit (dem Versuch) einer Definition beginnt – vielleicht in der von Olson vorgeschlagenen Form 'x ist y's Selbst dann und nur dann, wenn...'. Ausgehend von einer solchen Definition ließe sich sicherlich manche Unklarheit (sprachlicher Art) gleich zu Beginn vermeiden.

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Cognition in the World? Functionalism and Extended Cognition

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1. Extended Cognition

According to what has been dubbed the ‘sandwich model’ of cognition, cognition is that which mediates between an agent’s perceptual input and her behavioral output. On that account, cognitive processes are those processes (in an agent’s brain) that help generate motor output in response to a given sensory stimulation. Such a view of cognition squares nicely with the so-called ‘computational model of the mind’ that dominated the ‘rules and representation’ approach of early AI. Central to this approach was the idea that cognition is essentially *representational* and *computational*: an agent’s mental states are symbolic states that *represent* features of the world, and mental processes are *computational processes* operating over these inner symbols, transforming and manipulating them, eventually leading to motor output.

During the past decades, the representational/computational approach to cognition, and with it the sandwich model of cognition, has come under considerable pressure. Philosophers and other cognitive scientists have started to realize that intelligent behavior may be based not so much on computational operations upon internal representations, but rather on a continuous and reciprocal causal interaction between an embodied agent and the environment in which she is situated. This idea can be traced at least to Merleau-Ponty’s *The Phenomenology of Perception*, and probably also to Heidegger, Husserl, and Dewey, but it was incorporated into cognitive science in earnest only after the MIT roboticist Rodney Brooks published his famous paper ‘Intelligence without Representation’ in 1991. In this paper, Brooks was criticizing the orthodox approach to robotics that was based on the sandwich model of cognition and tried to construct perceptual input systems and action output systems which were linked by a central cognitive system performing the computations over representations. Brooks realized that such an approach could not do justice to the full breadth of cognitive phenomena and that instead we must seek to understand how real, physically embodied agents engage in ‘online cognition’, i.e., how they achieve sensorimotor control in real-time interactions with the worldly environments into which they are embedded. By now an embodied, embedded, and situated approach to cognition is the received view in cognitive science.

However, a view of cognition according to which cognition is ‘distributed’ over and extends into an agent’s (extracranial) body and, maybe, her environment, sounds strikingly counterintuitive to most traditional-minded philosophers. What goes on in an agent cognitive-wise may (causally) depend upon what is ‘out there’, in her (extracranial) body and environment, but whatever it is that is going on cognitively, it is still going on ‘in here’, within the bounds of the agent’s mind/brain. Thus, a natural question to ask is: *What is cognition?* Are cognitive processes necessarily such that they can occur only in biological brains, or are they such that they can span the brains, bodies, and environments of agents? Are they ‘*brainbound*’ or ‘*extended*’? We start by considering two possible arguments for the hypothesis that cognition is, or may possibly be, extended. Both arguments, although quite prominent in the debate about extended cognition, fail (section 2). We then

consider a recent attempt due to Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa to show that cognitive processes cannot be extended, but must rather be brainbound. Their argument, we argue, also fails; and seeing why it fails allows us to identify the outlines of a positive argument for the hypothesis of extended cognition that—given that the arguments usually advanced in its favor don’t work—is needed (section 3).

2. Arguments for Extended Cognition: The Parity Principle and Functionalism

In their classical 1998 paper ‘The extended mind’ Andy Clark and David Chalmers argued that an external object in the world surrounding an agent may be *part of* (the vehicles of) that agent’s cognitive processes if it fulfills the following ‘*Parity Principle*’: “If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is ... part of the cognitive process” (Clark and Chalmers, 1998, p. 8). Ever since the publication of Clark and Chalmers’ paper, the Parity Principle and its role in the argument for extended cognition has been subject of much debate. To our knowledge, however, it has never been noticed that the Parity Principle can do next to nothing to support the hypothesis of extended cognition because it is entirely silent about the exact conditions under which we would grant that a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, would be called ‘cognitive’ and about whether these conditions are ever fulfilled. In other words, all the Parity Principle says is that if there is a process that we would not hesitate to count as cognitive if it were an internal process, then the mere fact that the process actually is an external one should not make us count it as non-cognitive. What we still need to know, however, is when, i.e., under which conditions, we would judge a process to be a cognitive process to begin with.

It seems to us that what is doing the real work in arguments for extended cognition is a more implicit than explicit commitment to a functionalist conception of cognition. Unfortunately, resting ones case for extended cognition on a functionalist approach to cognition makes ones position vulnerable to a bunch of classical arguments designed to show that functionalism cannot be an adequate account of the mind-body relationship.

In his 2008 book *Supersizing the Mind*, Clark defends the hypothesis of extended cognition against a range of objections. In the course of his defense, he argues that what makes an external object to which an agent is coupled in a very intimate way a part of the agent’s cognitive routine is “the way it [the coupling; L.K. and S.W.] poises ... information for a certain kind of use within a specific kind of problem-solving routine” (p. 87). The argument for the hypothesis of extended cognition, Clark argues, is best “viewed as a simple argumentative extension ... of what Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson ... describe, and endorse, as ‘commonsense functionalism’ concerning mental states” according to which “normal human agents already command a rich (albeit largely implicit) theory of the coarse functional roles distinctive of various familiar mental states”

(p. 88). Clark's point is that if cognitive processes are individuated functionally, and all that matters is the "achieved functional poise" (p. 88), then it doesn't matter whether what does the job definitive of a cognitive process is some process inside an agent's head or rather a hybrid process involving both intracranial and extracranial processes, possibly not just extending into the agent's body but also into her environment.

Unfortunately, Clark does nothing to justify his commitment to commonsense functionalism (CSF). Given the pivotal role CSF plays within Clark's overall argumentative scheme, this is a pity. The pros and cons of CSF have been discussed intensively in philosophy, and the debate about the hypothesis of extended cognition might obviously benefit from recognizing this philosophical discussion. For instance, Block (1978) already quarreled with CSF's attempt to define mental states in terms of our *folk psychological platitudes*. He argued that CSF cannot be correct because (1.) a brain in a vat would continue to have a mind although it would exhibit none of the usual platitudinous connections between behavior and clusters of inputs and mental states; (2.) two mental states that are intuitively different might be folk psychologically indistinguishable; (3.) many of the widely held platitudes may turn out to be false. Obviously, all three objections are pertinent to the debate concerning extended cognition, and have to be met if the hypothesis of extended cognition is to be based upon a general functionalism.

More importantly, Block's (1978) Homunculi-Head and Chinese-Nation examples were explicitly designed to show that CSF is *too liberal* because it attributes mental states to things which, intuitively, have no mental life, and is exactly the kind of criticism often leveled against putative cases (real or imagined) of extended cognition: even if an external process plays the right functional role, that does not entail, or so it seems, that the resulting agent-cum-environment system is a cognitive system in its own right. The problem faced by the appeal to functionalism in support of extended cognition is the same that already plagued early functionalists. In the philosophy of mind, the causal role definitive of a mental or cognitive state had to be defined liberal enough to avoid the species chauvinism characteristic of the early identity theory, but at the same time not so liberal as to force one to count the (appropriately configured) nation of China as a subject with mental states. Likewise, advocates of extended cognition have to specify the functional role characteristic of a cognitive state liberal enough to allow worldly objects to be the fillers of these roles, but at the same time not so liberal as to make the status of a cognitive process too easily achievable. Whether that can be done, we seriously doubt. And that dashes the hope that the appeal to functionalism can support the hypothesis of extended cognition.

Since neither the Parity Principle nor functionalism can do the job for the advocate of extended cognition, the question is what else can. We will return to this issue at the end of the next section.

3. Extended Cognition: The Negative Case

In their 2008 book *The Bounds of Cognition* Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa have attacked the extended approach to cognition. Their argument has two parts. First, they argue that the most plausible account of cognition is one according to which cognitive processes are implemented by certain kinds of *mechanisms* working over *non-derived representations* (i.e., representations of the kind ostensibly captured by naturalistic accounts of mental content like those offered by Jerry Fodor, Fred Dretske, Robert Cummins

and others). Since non-derived representations of this kind happen to occur only in biological brains, they hold, the most plausible account of cognition dictates that cognitive processes be brainbound. Second, they argue that an extended approach to cognition would require a positive account of the nature of the cognitive that shows that the conditions that a process has to fulfill in order for it to count as cognitive can actually be fulfilled by processes spanning brain, body, and environment. Since no such account has yet been offered, they maintain, it is safe to assume cognition to be brainbound.

We find Adams and Aizawa's argumentation against an extended perspective on cognition unsatisfying for two reasons. (1.) The account of cognition that is most plausible according to Adams and Aizawa—that cognitive processes are processes implemented by certain kinds of mechanisms working over non-derived representations—is clearly inadequate. (2.) It is unwise to ask for a pre-formed theory of the cognitive in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.

(1.) The brainbound account of the cognitive offered by Adams and Aizawa is inadequate. First, although the assumption of non-derived representations is central to most of philosophy of mind and cognitive science, the theoretical situation regarding the nature of such representations is rather embarrassing. While there are a couple of standard accounts in the offing, there is simply no received theory of how physical states come to have non-derived content. And unless we have such a theory, we will not, if we follow Adams and Aizawa, be able to recognize a cognitive process if we come across one for we will be unable to say whether it is a process that involves non-derived representations. Second, unless there is a received view on the nature of non-derived content, it is hard to substantiate the (in our eyes rather bold) claim that non-derived representations are (currently) only grounded in the brain and not in the brain *cum* body *cum* environment. Third, the defender of an extended approach to cognition can accept the indispensability of the kind of representations found in the brain and allegedly only in the brain—all she insists on is that other states (states with derived content or with no representational content at all) can also be (a non-negligible part of the) vehicles of cognitive processes (cognitive processes, although not *brainbound*, may be *braincentered*).

(2.) Regarding Adams and Aizawa's call for a 'mark of the cognitive', it seems to us that we should not prematurely foreclose fruitful future discoveries by insisting on an overly restrictive notion of the cognitive. Most sciences invoke concepts that lack crisp and clear definitions. Often the content of central concepts—'gene' or 'species' in biology, say, 'wave' in physics, 'language' in linguistics, or 'computation' in cognitive science—is not fixed prior to and independently of its theoretical and empirical fertility. Rather, the decision to adopt a particular account is strategic and depends upon the theoretical and empirical pay-offs one hopes to thereby achieve. If treating something as, say, a gene significantly enhances our understanding of the world in a way otherwise unattainable, then scientists will, *ceteris paribus*, go along with it. The same should apply to the term 'cognitive': if treating a process spanning brain, body, and environment as a cognitive process proves empirically and theoretically fertile, then it is legitimate to do so; and if not, then not.

This leads to two consequences. First, the terms 'cognition' or 'cognitive process' may not pick out a well-defined

natural kind. The history of both the philosophy of mind and cognitive science has seen various attempts at capturing the 'essence' of the mental or the cognitive: perceptual states, behavioral dispositions, neurophysiological states, functional states, information processing states or states (or state transitions) of a dynamical system have all been thought to be what cognitive states 'really' are, but neither of these suggestions seems adequate: mental states are multiply realizable, not only by neurophysiological states but also by other kinds of (physical) states, not every kind of information processing is *ipso facto* a cognitive process, not all dynamical systems are cognitive systems, and functional duplicates of cognitive agents may fail to exhibit mentality. What this suggests is that maybe 'cognition' and 'cognitive processes' are terms that fail to pick out a scientifically discoverable essence, but rather work like Wittgen-

steinian 'family concepts' whose referents need not have anything significant in common.

Second, the question whether cognition is brain-bound or extended is one that can only be answered *empirically*. In order to see whether the hypothesis of extended cognition turns out as superior to classical cognitivist approaches we will have to wait and see what empirical pay-offs one can achieve by treating the cognitive as something stretching beyond the boundaries of a cognitive agent into the world surrounding her. If this is on the right track the question "brainbound or 'extended'?" is not one that can be answered by philosophers (alone). Hence, there is not going to be a philosophical knock-down argument for (or against) the hypothesis of extended cognition. The proof is, as so often, in the empirical pudding.

Kein Denken ohne Reden? Anmerkungen zu einigen Argumenten für den begrifflichen Zusammenhang von Intentionalität und Sprachfähigkeit

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Die Mehrzahl analytischer Autoren geht davon aus, dass folgende verwandte Fragestellungen, (1.) die Frage nach der Bedeutung sprachlicher Ausdrücke und (2.) die Frage nach dem Inhalt intentionaler Zustände, in einer bestimmten Reihenfolge beantwortet werden müssen. Zuerst müssen wir herausfinden, welche Mechanismen dafür verantwortlich sind, dass intentionale Zustände von der Art des Glaubens, Beabsichtigens oder Wünschens Inhalt haben, d.h. ihre Erfüllungsbedingungen repräsentieren. Nachdem wir das wissen, können wir auch die andere Frage beantworten, wie nicht-natürliche (sprachliche) Zeichen ihre Bedeutung erhalten. Die "abgeleitete Intentionalität" (Searle 1993, 98) konventioneller Zeichen wurzelt in der Fähigkeit der Individuen, mit ihren Äußerungen etwas zu "meinen", d.h. Sätze in der Absicht zu erzeugen, dass sie von den Adressaten oder Hörern in bestimmter Weise verstanden werden (vgl. Schiffer 1987, Kap. 9, Searle 1991, Kap. 6). Es ist nicht zwingend, die für das "Meinen" wichtigen Absichten mit der Absicht gleichzusetzen, in den Hörern gewisse Wirkungen zu erzielen. Es genügt, beim Sprechen die Absicht zu haben, die Ausdrücke *wörtlich* verwenden. Um zu wissen, was ein Satz S in einer Sprache L bedeutet, genügt es zu wissen, welche Art von Sprechakt mit welcher Art von propositionalem Inhalt jemand vollzieht, der S wörtlich äußert (vgl. Schiffer 2003, 111). Ausdrucksbedeutungen erläutern wir mit Hilfe von Sprecherbedeutungen und nicht umgekehrt, wobei wir Sprecherbedeutungen als nichtsprachliche Relationen von Individuen zu Propositionen auffassen können (Schiffer 2003, 103). In der Semantik verläuft die Erklärungsrichtung offensichtlich vom Denken zum Reden (Ausdrücken, Mitteilen), nicht umgekehrt. Die Semantik natürlicher Sprachen verhält sich parasitär zur Semantik intentionaler Zustände. Wer sich dieser Strategie anschließt, muss zugeben, dass es begrifflich möglich ist, dass jemand Gedanken haben kann, ohne jemals auch nur einen seiner Gedanken ausgedrückt oder mitgeteilt zu haben.

Ich möchte die Erklärungsrichtung nicht einfach umdrehen, vielmehr mit Davidson die Gleichursprünglichkeit von Denken und Reden vertreten. Weder das Denken noch das Reden besitzt eine begriffliche Vorrangstellung vor dem jeweils anderen. "Die beiden sind zwar tatsächlich miteinander verbunden, und zwar in dem Sinn, dass jedes des anderen bedarf, um verstanden zu werden; doch diese Verbindung ist nicht so vollständig, dass eines von beiden - selbst bei ziemlicher Verstärkung - ausreicht, um das andere zu explizieren." (Davidson 1986, 225). Die Abhängigkeit des Redens vom Denken steht außer Frage. Um die umgekehrte Behauptung zu untermauern, hat Davidson ein Argument vorgelegt, dass inzwischen als klassisch gelten kann. Ich werde sein Argument kurz Revue passieren lassen, um dann zu sagen, was an dem Argument verwirrend ist.

1. Davidson über Denken und Reden

Um einen Inhalt *p* glauben zu können, muss eine Denkerin im Prinzip auch Interpretin der sprachlichen Äußerungen Anderer sein können. Die Begründung lautet wie folgt: Niemand kann einen Inhalt glauben, der nicht über den Begriff des Glaubens verfügt. Der Begriff des Glaubens hängt mit den Begriffen der Wahrheit und des Irrtums zusammen. "Glauben kann man nur dann etwas, wenn man die Möglichkeit versteht, sich zu irren, und dazu ist es nötig, dass man den Gegensatz zwischen Wahrheit und Irrtum - zwischen wahren Glauben und falschem Glauben - begreift." (Davidson 1986, 246) Der Gegensatz von Wahrheit und Irrtum begegnet uns wieder im Kontext der Interpretation. Grundlage der Interpretation ist die auf Satzäußerungen gerichtete Einstellung des Fürwahrhaltens. Wir interpretieren die Äußerungen der Anderen im Licht ihrer mutmaßlichen Überzeugungen, ihrer nicht-sprachlichen Handlungen und ihrer Umgebung, d.h. wir halten die Wahrheitswerte ihrer Sätze konstant und versuchen mit Hilfe der übrigen Belege herauszubekommen, welche Überzeugungen sie mit ihren Sätzen ausdrücken oder - was auf das Gleiche hinausläuft - was ihre Sätze bedeuten. Wir gehen dabei von der methodischen Maxime aus, dass die meisten ihrer Überzeugungen wahr sind. Würden wir diesen Grundsatz preisgeben, könnten wir eine Überzeugung nicht mehr durch ihren Ort im Rahmen eines Musters von Überzeugungen identifizieren. Man sieht leicht, dass die Praxis der Interpretation, um von der Stelle zu kommen, keine gemeinsame Sprache voraussetzt, lediglich das Vorhandensein vieler wahrer Überzeugungen und die Einstellung des Fürwahrhaltens auf beiden Seiten, der Interpreten und der zu Interpretierenden.

Die Begriffe des Glaubens, der Wahrheit und des Irrtums haben im Kontext der Interpretation ihren systematischen Ort. "Unser Begriff des Glaubens rührt ausschließlich von der Rolle her, die das Glauben bei der Interpretation der Sprache spielt, denn als private Einstellung ist das Glauben nicht verständlich, es sei denn, als Anpassung an die durch die Sprache gelieferte öffentliche Norm." (Davidson 1986, 246) "Unser" Begriff des Glaubens ist der öffentliche, soziale Begriff, kein privater Begriff. Davidson argumentiert nicht explizit für diese Weichenstellung, aber ein Argument für den öffentlichen Charakter des Begriffs des Glaubens läge sicher auf der Linie von Wittgensteins Privatsprachenargument. Nur ein Wesen, das einer Sprachgemeinschaft angehört und Andere interpretieren kann, verfügt über den Begriff des Glaubens. Um einen Inhalt zu glauben, so lautete eine Prämisse in dem Argument, muss aber jemand über den Begriff des Glaubens verfügen. Die übrigen propositionalen Einstellungen sind zwar nicht auf den Glauben rückführbar, aber der Glaube ist insofern zentral, als jede der Einstellungen zur Voraussetzung hat, dass jemand auch ein paar Dinge glaubt. Daraus folgt, dass nur ein Wesen, das sprachlich kommuniziert, denkt, sofern wir unter "Denken" das Haben von Einstellungen jeglicher Art verstehen wollen.

Nun zu den verwirrenden Aspekten in Davidsons Argument. Die Praxis des Interpretierens setzt zwar Reziprozität der Einstellung des Fürwahrhaltens beim Interpretieren und dem zu Interpretierenden voraus, aber keine gemeinsame Sprache - vor allem nicht, dass der Interpret spricht. Kein Interpret würde einem Wesen, das nicht spricht, einen Glauben oder eine andere Einstellung zuschreiben, denn die einzige Evidenz dafür, dass dieses Wesen über den Begriff des Glaubens verfügt, ist dass es an der Kommunikation teilnimmt, also tatsächlich spricht. Um die Äußerungen Anderer interpretieren können, muss der Interpret selber keine Sprache sprechen. Er muss lediglich eine Vielzahl kohärenter Überzeugungen über den Anderen, über dessen Überzeugungen, Absichten und Wünsche und dessen Einbettung in die natürliche und soziale Umwelt ausgebildet haben. Er kann diese Dinge glauben, weil er über den Begriff des Glaubens verfügt. Zu diesem Begriff ist er über die Praxis des Interpretierens, nicht des Sprechens einer Sprache gelangt. Es ist begrifflich möglich, dass jemand Inhalte glauben kann und insofern Gedanken haben kann, ohne jemals selbst einen seiner Gedanken geäußert oder mitgeteilt zu haben, und das heißt doch, ohne interpretiert worden zu sein. Die Rolle des stummen Teilnehmers an der Kommunikation ist hinreichend, um über den Begriff des Glaubens und damit über Einstellungen zu verfügen.

Wir haben bisher nur zeigen können, dass der Besitz intentionaler Zustände die Fähigkeit zur Interpretation der Sprache Anderer voraussetzt. Wie könnte gezeigt werden, dass jemand nur Gedanken haben kann, wenn er auch spricht?

2. Brandom über den begrifflichen Zusammenhang von Glauben und Behaupten

Der Schritt von der stummen zur aktiven Teilnahme an der Kommunikation ist vollzogen, wenn man der sozialen Praxis des Behauptens und Argumentierens explanatorisch einen Vorrang einräumt vor der latent monologischen Tätigkeit des Interpretierens. Glaubenszustände sind für Brandom nicht bloß zufällig, sondern wesentlich an die sprachliche Performanz des Behauptens geknüpft (vgl. Brandom 2000, 235). Etwas kann nicht Inhalt eines Glaubens sein, wenn es nicht im Prinzip im behauptenden Modus ausgedrückt und zu Begründungen herangezogen werden kann. "Ausdrücken" ist für Brandom ein "Explizit-machen des Impliziten" (Brandom 2001, 18). Über den begrifflichen Gehalt verfügen heißt, ihn explizit machen zu können, das heißt, ihn in eine Form bringen, in der er sowohl als Begründung als auch etwas der Begründung Bedürftiges fungieren kann. Es ist also die pragmatische Signifikanz einer bestimmten Klasse von Sprechakten, nämlich von Behauptungen, die den Inhalten, die mit Behauptungen zum Ausdruck gebracht werden, ihren spezifischen begrifflichen Gehalt verleihen.

Mit jeder Behauptung geht eine Sprecherin S spezifische Festlegungen ein. Mit ihnen *autorisiert* S weitere Behauptungen und eo ipso weitere Festlegungen, und zwar sowohl auf ihrer Seite als auch auf der Seite ihrer Adressaten, sofern diese zu S' Behauptungen in Form weiterer Behauptungen Stellung nehmen können. Diskursive Festlegungen haben immer auch kommunikative Folgen. Sofern S ihre anfängliche Behauptung durch weitere Behauptungen rechtfertigen kann, werden ihr die Partner in der Kommunikation den Status des Berechtigtheits zubilligen. S' Berechtigtheits werden sie als Grund auffassen, S' Überzeugung zu den ihren zu machen. Damit gehen sie ihrerseits spezifische Festlegungen ein, usw.

Dass propositionale Gehalte in inferentielle Beziehungen eingebettet sind - und zwar *intra-* und *interpersonal* -, lässt sich semantisch ausbeuten. Der semantische Gehalt der durch die Behauptung ausgedrückten Festlegung besteht laut Brandom in seiner spezifischen "inferentiellen Gliederung": (1.) der Inhalt p legt einen Sprecher S auf weitere Festlegungen bestimmten Inhalts fest; (2.) der Inhalt p berechtigt den Adressaten A zu weiteren Festlegungen bestimmten Inhalts; (3.) der Inhalt p legt fest, was als Grund (Rechtfertigung) oder Folge (Konklusion) für die Behauptung, dass p, akzeptiert würde. Der Inhalt bestimmt sich, mit anderen Worten, von seiner Rolle her, sowohl als Prämisse als auch als Konklusion in *Inferenzen* fungieren zu können. Dass ein Inhalt diese Doppelrolle spielen kann, macht ihn überhaupt erst zu einem "spezifisch propositionalen", d.h. "glaubbaren und behauptbaren" Gehalt, und dass er "spezielle inferentielle Gründe und Folgen" herausstellt, macht ihn zu dem "speziellen wohlbestimmten Gehalt, der er ist." (Brandom 2000, 263).

Propositionale Gehalte sind nur Wesen zugänglich, die sich an sprachlichen Praktiken beteiligen, deren Herzstück das Ziehen von Schlüssen und das Vorbringen von Rechtfertigungen ist. Wir können eine menschliche Person dazu abrichten, auf eine Rotwahrnehmung mit dem Ausruf "rot" zu reagieren. Der Mensch wäre wie ein Messinstrument, das "rot" anzeigt, oder wie ein Papagei, der "rot" schreit, d.h. er besäße eine verlässliche unterscheidende Reaktions-Disposition in Bezug auf Rotwahrnehmungen. Die Reaktion des menschlichen Berichterstatters ist bedeutungsvoll, - nicht nur für potentielle Beobachter wie im Falle des Messinstruments oder des Papageis, sondern für ihn selbst. Das Messinstrument und der Papagei verstehen ihre Reaktionen nicht. Sie bedeuten für sie nichts, obgleich sie etwas für uns bedeuten können. Der menschliche Berichterstatter versteht seine Reaktion; sie hat für ihn eine Signifikanz, für die das Messinstrument und der Papagei blind sind. Die Tradition hätte gesagt: der menschliche Berichterstatter hat Bewusstsein. Das Entscheidende, das dem Messinstrument und dem Papagei fehlt und über das menschliche Berichterstatter verfügen, ist die Fähigkeit, Gründe dafür zu liefern, warum man selbst so und gerade so reagiert hat. Es ist der Unterschied zwischen bloß "responsiver" und "begrifflicher" Klassifikation. Einen Begriff verstehen oder begreifen heißt, "die *Inferenzen* praktisch zu beherrschen, in denen er vorkommt" (Brandom 2000, 152). Der Papagei behandelt weder "das ist rot" als inkompatibel mit "das ist grün", noch folgert er daraus: "das ist farbig". Dem Papagei und dem Messinstrument fehlen das Verständnis für die Signifikanz ihrer Reaktionen als Grund, weitere Überzeugungen auszubilden und andere auszuschließen.

3. Einwände

Ich möchte zwei Einwände formulieren, die den Wert der bisherigen Überlegungen für eine Begründung des begrifflichen Zusammenhangs von Denken und Reden ein wenig in Zweifel ziehen. Mein erster Einwand richtet sich gegen eine zentrale Prämisse in Davidsons Argument, wonach nur jemand, der über den Begriff des Glaubens verfügt, in intentionalen Zuständen sein kann. Jemand kann einen bewussten Glauben haben, ohne zu glauben, dass er diesen Glauben hat (vgl. Peacocke 1992, 152f). Bewusster Glaube sollte daher nicht mit höherstufigem Glauben gleichgesetzt werden. Höherstufiger Glaube ist nicht möglich, ohne dass das Subjekt über den Begriff des Glaubens verfügt. Bewusster Glaube ist ein Glaube, der die Aufmerksamkeit eines Denkers beansprucht. Die Bewusstheit eines Glaubens besteht darin, dass es für das Subjekt "irgendwie ist", diesen Glauben zu haben, wobei es von

entscheidender Bedeutung ist, dass der intentionale Inhalt mit dazu beiträgt, wie es für das Subjekt zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt ist, in diesem Zustand zu sein bzw. dieses Subjekt zu sein (Peacocke 1999, 493). Die wesentliche Bedingung für Glauben ist nicht, dass das Subjekt über den Begriff des Glaubens verfügt, sondern dass der Inhalt seines Glaubens ein "beurteilbarer" Inhalt ist, d.h. dass das Subjekt zu seinem Glauben auf rationalem Weg, d.h. in der Weise des Urteilens gelangen kann. Glaubenszustände sind "vernunftgeleitete Zustände" (Peacocke 1999, 520), d.h. dass diese Zustände im Hinblick darauf individualisiert werden, was gute Gründe dafür sind, in diesen Zuständen zu sein, oder ihre Individualisierung hat Folgen für das, was gute Gründe sind, in diesen Zuständen zu sein. Damit bin ich bei meinem zweiten Einwand angelangt.

Gemäß der reinen inferentialistischen Lehre (Brandom) zählt als Grund für einen Glauben ausschließlich das, was sich in die Form einer Behauptung bringen lässt, also ein weiterer Glaube. Aus Gründen, die Fragen der Epistemologie berühren, bin ich der Auffassung, dass unter den Zuständen, die eine Denkerin zu einem bestimmten Glauben berechtigen, auch Zustände vorkommen können, die einen nicht-begrifflichen (nicht-propositionalen Inhalt) haben. Auch eine Wahrnehmung kann ein Grund sein, einen Glauben bestimmten Inhalts zu haben. Basale empirische Begriffe haben wir nur, weil wir bestimmte Wahrnehmungen machen können. Würden wir unsere Überzeugungen ausschließlich auf inferentiellem Weg rechtfertigen, wäre dem empirischen Wissen die Basis entzogen, und Begründungsketten kämen an kein Ende.

Der reine Inferentialismus (Brandom) ist ebenso unhaltbar wie die Gleichsetzung von bewusstem Glauben mit höherstufigem Glauben (Davidson). Damit haben zwei prominente Argumente für den Zusammenhang von Denken und Reden prima facie an Plausibilität eingebüßt.

4. Apparat der Bezugnahme und Sprachfähigkeit

Vielleicht lässt sich der gesuchte begriffliche Zusammenhang auf andere Weise plausibel machen. Überzeugungen, Absichten, Wünsche legen nur dann Erfüllungsbedingungen fest, wenn die Subjekte einen komplizierten Apparat der Bezugnahme zusammen mit einem begrifflichen Schema beherrschen (vgl. Quine 1980, Kap. III). Das Bezugnehmen und Identifizieren kann aber nicht ohne sprachliche Mittel gelernt werden, - das ist eines der zentralen Themen in den ersten Paragraphen der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*. In §33 setzt sich Wittgenstein mit

dem Einwand auseinander, dass sich Wörter hinweisend definieren lassen und dass solche Definitionen verstanden werden können, bevor der Hintergrund einer Sprache gegeben ist, indem man sich beispielsweise auf die Form des Gegenstands im Unterschied zur Farbe, zur Anzahl, etc. "konzentriert" und eben dieses und nicht das andere "meint". Der Apparat der Bezugnahme und das begriffliche Schema werden in diesem Bild menschlicher Intentionalität vollständig in den Geist der Protagonisten verlegt. Nachdem dies geschehen ist, macht das Benennen keine besonderen Schwierigkeiten mehr. So kann der Eindruck entstehen, der Spracherwerb bestehe aus einer sukzessiven Zuordnung von Namen und Dingen - das "Augustinische Bild der Sprache" von §1. Tatsächlich haben wir uns das Bezugnehmen und Identifizieren in einem mühseligen Training, das von Wittgenstein euphemistisch "das Sprachspiel" genannt wird, aneignen müssen (§7). Das Sprachspiel bleibt immer im Hintergrund, auch wenn wir uns in Gedanken auf entfernteste Orte oder abstrakteste Entitäten beziehen.

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Should the Language of Logic Dictate Reality?

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The purpose of the paper is to show (1) that Classical Logic (CL) does and (2) why it does and (3) that therefore some suitable restrictions have to be put on CL in order to still be widely applicable.

1. That and how CL dictates reality

By 'CL' I mean First Order Predicate Logic with Identity which includes two-valued Classical Propositional Calculus (abbreviated as CPC). Since most problems of application occur already at the propositional level I shall restrict myself in this paper – for reasons of simplicity – to CPC. Problems of application of CPC (or CL) arise as follows:

- (i) CPC dictates reality
- (ii) Reality will not be dictated to
- (iii) Therefore: CPC is not applicable. Or: a conflict (problem) arises in the application.

That and how CL dictates reality I shall show now by examples E1 – E5 of valid principles (or the respective rules) of CPC:

E1: To any valid inference or principle one may add premises: $A \Rightarrow B \vdash ((A \wedge C) \Rightarrow B)$. This property of CL is called monotonicity. The main point here is that CL dictates that any valid implication has to be invariant whatever the new knowledge (symbolised here as premise C) might be. Should this also be true if we replace ' \Rightarrow ' by ' \rightarrow '? What if $A \rightarrow B$ represents an empirical hypothesis?

E2: From separated premises one may always infer the conjunction of them: $A, B \vdash A \wedge B$. Or: If under a special condition C it holds that $A, C \rightarrow A$, and under the same special condition C it holds that $B, C \rightarrow B$, then it always holds that $C \rightarrow (A \wedge B)$. The first principle is suggested already by the formation rules of CPC: If A and B are wffs, then so are $A \wedge B, A \vee B$ and $A \rightarrow B$. The second principle is also harmless if you represent the propositional variables just by truth-values. But difficulties arise if we apply the principles to empirical situations like the following three:

- (i) If A represents (describes) an observable action and B represents (describes) an observable action, then it does not follow that $A \wedge B$ represents (describes) an observable action, too.
- (ii) If under (measurement) condition C, A represents a sharp (measurement) result A^* (say of position) and under condition C, B represents a sharp (measurement) result B^* (say of momentum), then (in QM) $A \wedge B$ does not represent any useful measurement result at all.
- (iii) Assume that A represents (describes) the observable state that sexual excitement (in higher animals) obtains, B represents (describes) the observable state that aggression obtains and C represents (describes) the observable state that fear obtains. Then research about animal behaviour shows the following facts: $A \wedge C$ does not represent (describe) an observable state in male

animals, but does so in female animals. And $A \wedge B$ does not represent (describe) an observable state in female animals, but does so in male animals.¹

E3: The usual definitions for commensurability (when expressed for states of affairs represented by propositions) are these three (where ' $A \sim B$ ' stands for 'A is commensurable with B'):

$$A \sim B \leftrightarrow \text{df } [A \leftrightarrow ((A \wedge B) \vee (A \wedge \neg B))]$$

$$A \sim B \leftrightarrow \text{df } A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow A)$$

$$A \sim B \leftrightarrow \text{df } B \rightarrow (A \rightarrow B)$$

Since all three definitia (right parts of the definition) are valid principles of CPC, Classical Logic dictates that commensurability has to be universally satisfied by reality. But as is well-known it is not satisfied generally in Quantum Physics.

E4: In CL (CPC) the laws of distribution hold as equivalences:

$$((A \wedge B) \vee (A \wedge C)) \Leftrightarrow (A \wedge (B \vee C))$$

$$(A \vee (B \wedge C)) \Leftrightarrow ((A \vee B) \wedge (A \vee C))$$

However the direction from right to left (from conjuncts to disjuncts) is violated in the application to Quantum Physics. This has been already discovered by Birkoff and v. Neumann in their famous paper of 1936. Thus reality accepts only the direction from left to right (from disjuncts to conjuncts), whereas CL (CPC) dictates both directions.

E5: The following valid principle of Set Theory is one form of Bell's Inequalities:²

$$a \cap b \subseteq [(a \cap c) \cup (b \cap \neg c)]$$

A lucid example for the above set theoretical principle underlying Bell's inequalities is due to D'Espagnat³:

The number of young (b) women (a) is less than or equal to the number of women (a) smokers (c) plus the number of young (b) non-smokers ($\neg c$).

As is well-known, this principle is violated for some experiments in Quantum Physics.

The analogon of this set theoretical theorem is as follows in propositional logic (CPC):

$$(A \wedge B) \rightarrow [(A \wedge C) \vee (B \wedge \neg C)]$$

It is also a (valid) theorem of CPC.

2. Why CL (and CPC) dictates reality

Conjecture: "Reality" seems not to allow arbitrary redundancies, irrelevancies, fusions and independencies in the

¹ For further examples of this type see Weingartner (2004, RSL), p. 234f.

² See Bell (1987, SUQ), p. 147.

³ D'Espagnat (1979, RdR), p. 27.

conclusion of an inference (or in the consequent of a valid implication). What this means is shown subsequently:

First Observation:

Observe that in the principle of *E1* one may replace the variable *C* by any other (propositional) variable salva validitate of the inference; since *C* is replaceable by any other variable, it is also replaceable by $\neg C$ without making the inference invalid.

Variables in the conclusion or in the consequent which can be replaced by an arbitrary other (propositional) variable we may call redundant or irrelevant or independent with respect to the variable in the premises or the antecedent.

In a similar way there are redundant variables in the definiens of each of the three definitions of commensurability (*E3*). First of all observe that every definiens (right part of the definition) is a valid theorem of *CPC*; secondly observe that all three definiens contain redundant variables as follows: in the first the two occurrences of the variable *B* can be replaced uniformly by an arbitrary variable. In the second the variable *B* and in the third the variable *A* can be replaced like this, i.e. is the redundant (irrelevant or independent) variable.

Finally observe that both principles of *E5* behave in the same way: in the first set theoretical principle the variable *c* can be replaced on both occurrences uniformly by any other variable salva validitate and in the second propositional logical analogon the variable *C* can be replaced on both occurrences uniformly salva validitate.

Second Observation:

Both principles of *E2* permit to make a fusion with the help of a conjunction of any two arbitrary propositions, in the second principle implied by some condition. But if these propositions represent quite different states of affairs (of reality) why should the latter fit to each other as states of reality? This is a presupposition from *CL* (*CPC*) which is too strong; it is not generally "acceptable" by reality.

Third Observation:

A closer look on both principles of distribution of *E4* shows that the direction left to right leads from disjuncts (the main connective of the left parts of the equivalences is a disjunction) to conjuncts (the main connective of the right parts of the equivalences is a conjunction). On the other hand the direction right to left leads from conjuncts to disjuncts. This direction is violated in the application to Quantum Physics. In other words *CL* (*CPC*) makes too strong assumptions since it dictates the equivalence as a universally valid principle, whatever the application may be.

3. A suitable restriction for *CL* and *CPC*

The difficulties which come up when *CL* (and *CPC*) are applied to empirical sciences are not only those described by the examples *E1* – *E5*. Many others in different areas have been discussed in research papers since decades.⁴

In most of the cases the difficulties can be avoided by the application of the so-called Replacement Criterion (*RC*) developed in Schurz/Weingartner (1987, VDR). This criterion forbids such propositional variables or predicates in the conclusion (consequent) of an inference (or valid

implication) which can be replaced on one or more of its occurrences by an arbitrary propositional variable or predicate (of same arity, i.e. one place by one place, two place by two place,... etc.) salva classical validitate of the inference or implication.

In some special cases *RC* does not help to avoid all the difficulties: this is so in explications of verisimilitude (especially if two false theories are compared w.r.t. which is closer to the truth) or in applications described by the examples *E2* and *E4* above. Here an additional criterion of reduction (*RD*) which reduces consequences to most informative consequence elements is needed.

Both criteria – *RC* and *RD* – together avoid most of the difficulties and paradoxes known in the area of explanation and confirmation of scientific theories of law statements, of approximation to truth, of application to physics, of application to ethics (especially Deontic Logic).⁵ However, the universal application of these two criteria has features which render it difficult to be applicable in a transparent way. This is so because *RC* and *RD* together do not satisfy the usual closure conditions concerning substitution, transitivity and modus ponens. However, it can be shown that a basic logic can be constructed which approximates *RC* and *RD*, but possesses the most important closure conditions. This has been achieved by a matrix-based logic *RMQ* which has the following properties:⁶

- (1) *RMQ* is based on finite matrices and it is decidable.
- (2) *RMQ* distinguishes two types of validity: theorems are either strictly or materially valid.
- (3) All theorems of classical two-valued Propositional Calculus (*CPC*) are at least materially valid in *RMQ*.
- (4) Theorems of *CPC* which lead to difficulties when applied to empirical sciences are only materially valid in *RMQ* but strictly invalid (in *RMQ*). Those theorems which do not lead to such difficulties are strictly valid, so are also traditional argument forms like modus ponens, modus tollens, transitivity of implication, contraposition, double negation, principle of non-contradiction and others.
- (5) *RMQ* satisfies *RC* with a few exceptions; for example inferences from contradictory premises behave like in *CPC*. On the other hand ex falso quodlibet principles are only materially valid but strictly invalid in *RMQ*.
- (6) *RMQ* satisfies *RD* with a few harmless exceptions concerning repetitions.
- (7) *RMQ* contains a modal system with 14 modalities which is similar to the system *T* (of Feys and v. Wright).

RMQ has the finite model property.

⁴ For a discussion see Weingartner/Schurz (1986, PSS) and Weingartner (2001, ALO).

⁵ Cf. Schurz (1991, RDd) and (1998, RDR); Weingartner (2000, BQT), ch. 9, (2004, RSL).

⁶ This matrix-based logic is described in detail in Weingartner (2009, MBL).

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***Bedeutungserlebnis* and *Lebensgefühl* in Kant and Wittgenstein: Responsibility and the Future.**

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Wittgenstein keeps drawing our attention to the fact that inner mental states are something very different from what is happening outside, in the visible world of time and space, and that we should be most careful when talking about both the inner and the outer in grammatically similar ways. He finds it peculiar and “remarkable” that we do in fact talk this way: “Don’t look at it as a matter of course, but as a most remarkable thing [*etwas sehr Merkwürdiges*], that the verbs ‘believe’, ‘wish’, ‘will’ display all the inflexions [*alle die grammatischen Formen*] possessed by ‘cut’, ‘chew’, ‘run’” (PI IIx 190). Cutting, chewing, and running are events happening in physical, measurable time and space. They have parts, such as your hand, a knife, and a piece of wood with its peculiar shape and grain; or your legs, feet, shoes, and the path you run on. Events such as running and cutting can be described in terms of their parts and their relative positions and changes of position, similar to the way we describe, and thereby explain, the workings of a sewing machine. But believing, wishing, and willing (*wollen*) cannot be described in this way, because mental states are not processes like that. Although we talk of “workings” of the mind (*innere Vorgänge*), those workings don’t have parts the way cutting, chewing, and running do. Usual “surface grammar” does not distinguish between these two groups of verbs, and we should therefore pay attention to “depth grammar” (*Tiefengrammatik*, PI 664), which is sensitive to uses and situations. Linguistic “surface grammar” can be misleading. It can suggest wrong parallels of understanding. “No wonder we find it difficult to find our way about” (PI 664). Wittgenstein therefore points out fine differences in our everyday use of words. He wants to dissuade us, and himself, from making overgeneralizations and drawing false parallels. This is the therapeutic aspect of his philosophy.

But I do not think that this is all. It is not only therapy. Wittgenstein keeps returning to our inner mental states, sensations, hopes, wishes, beliefs, thoughts, fears, feelings, attitudes, opinions, memories, expectations, and intentions, and he looks closely at the ways we express them in words and gestures. He describes and (together with the psychologist, PI 571) “observes” them. And he does more than that. He also introduces speculative notions of his own, such as “meaning blindness” and “aspect blindness” (PI IIxi 213-4). Someone who cannot see something as something, who cannot make and suddenly feel the duck-rabbit switch, and who has no feeling for words, is called “aspect blind” or “meaning blind”. Such a person lacks something, and Wittgenstein wonders whether we can really imagine such a “person”, or if it must not be a soulless machine. These are idiosyncratic Wittgensteinian conceptions, not wrong ideas other philosophers have and that he, Wittgenstein, wants to cure them of. You might say that he wants to cure himself. But I think he makes these considerations in order to say something positive that goes beyond mere therapy. Wittgenstein, especially the late Wittgenstein, is not just a therapist.

But what exactly is he after when he thinks about the experience we have when uttering a word (*Bedeutungserlebnis*), or, even more strangely, when he thinks about the experience we have when trying to have the

wrong experience when uttering a word in a sentence? What is the point of such introspective mental gymnastics? (Kripke and Rees think that Wittgenstein’s investigation is introspective here and that the issue whether a meaning-blind person is possible or not is not entirely resolved. Schulte argues against this reading: It is not introspection that is going on, and a meaning-blind person is no doubt impossible for Wittgenstein (Schulte 66-74). See also Wenzel (to appear).)

It is ethical and aesthetic aspects that come into play here and that matter to Wittgenstein. The inner and the outer, our inner feelings and outer expressions, are intertwined. You can *immediately* see someone’s feeling on his or her face and you react to this. The word “Schubert” and the ring and atmosphere it has for us, are *interlaced* with his work and our ideas of it. Our feeling and reaction is not mediated through some inner representation or picture that we might somehow have, floating in front of our inner eye. Rather, the reaction is immediate. It is for this reason, I think, that the fine aesthetic differences matter to Wittgenstein, and that he thinks they should matter to us as well. The words and expressions we use are carried and sustained by society, and we are part of this society by using them. Those words, gestures, and facial expressions live in that society, and our using them comes with a certain responsibility, namely that of keeping and maintaining their use in a meaningful way. This, I suggest, is a positive aspect in Wittgenstein’s work. I will come back to this.

The interwovenness of feeling and expression and the immediacy of our reaction are reflected in our attitudes towards others. Wittgenstein writes: “I always presuppose that the one who smiles is a human being and not just that what smiles is a human body. ... I react immediately to someone else’s behavior. I presuppose the *inner* in so far as I presuppose a *human* being” (LW II 84). Even pretense of feeling is possible only on this basis, and, as John Canfield rightly suggests, instead of worrying that we might never know another person’s mind, we could as well realize that we usually do, and that “the other’s soul is, often, just plain visible” (Canfield 157).

Wittgenstein is skeptical of introspection and the explanations given by philosophers – and not only philosophers – about the inner states and workings of the mind. Many of the explanations Freud gave, for instance, Wittgenstein thinks are completely wrong. But he does not speak disrespectfully of the soul and our mental states and feelings themselves. He does not try to explain them away, and I don’t think he wants to objectify everything. His is not a behaviorist. Thus I do not fully agree with Goldstein’s reading, that Wittgenstein “had just what he needed” when he “got hold of the concepts of *seeing-as* and *aspect-blindness*” to explain things in *objective* terms. Goldstein writes: “For, when looking at a picture of a duck-rabbit, although different subjects may flip at different times, they flip only between duck and rabbit; this is the objective phenomenon which is quite distinct from any ‘mood, fragrance, illumination’” (Goldstein 115). On the one hand, I agree that this gives some objective ground to the experience.

On the other, I do not think Wittgenstein wanted to explain away the subjective side. Of course this depends on what exactly we mean by "subjective".

Just before introducing the notion of aspect blindness, Wittgenstein talks of spatial perception, mental representation (*Vorstellung*), imagination (*Phantasie*), and will (*Wille*) (PI IIxi 213). These involve creative human abilities, and I think there will always be a subjective side to what perception, representation, imagination, and the will are. (For a detailed discussion of these passages and the subjective and objective aspects involved, see Wenzel (to appear).) Wittgenstein does not avoid talking of such subjective aspects and experiences. To the contrary, he introduces them in preparation for his introducing the notions of aspect blindness and meaning blindness. Many of his examples even have aesthetic aspects to them: a variation of a theme, absolute pitch, a musical ear, the sound (*Klang*) of a word, intonation, illustration, imagination, a painting in words (*Wortgemälde*), and Schubert (PI IIxi). I would therefore like to contrast his views with Kant's on aesthetics. And there is a further reason for doing this. The English translation of "*Bedeutungserlebnis*" as "meaning experience" loses some of the flavor of the German original. The word "*Erlebnis*" does not just mean "experience". It also means life: *Leben*. An *Erlebnis* is something you "live" and go through, something that touches your inner feelings and emotions. Kant's aesthetics also involves the notions of feelings and life, as we shall see.

Kant does not operate with the notions of the inner and the outer. He does not look closely at individual cases, nor does he observe fine differences in the "deep grammar" of words. He does not make any empirical statements about the inner workings of the mind, and this, one might say, saves him from Wittgenstein's criticisms. But, from another perspective, he makes a distinction that we cannot find in Wittgenstein, namely between "subject" and "object", and he makes much use of this distinction. Thus he begins his aesthetics by saying: "In order to decide whether or not something is beautiful, we do not relate [*beziehen*] the representation by means of understanding to the *object* for cognition, but rather relate it by means of the imagination (perhaps combined with the understanding) to the *subject* and its feeling of pleasure or displeasure." (CJ par. 1, italics mine)

We can contrast Kant's explicit and transcendental subject-object distinction with Wittgenstein's worry about our overlooking the inner-outer differences in empirical phenomena and in deep grammar. Kant is very simple here: Transcendentally, there is only one subject and only one object. His "faculty talk", which could be seen as a way of explaining what is going on in the mind, involving imagination, understanding, and the categories, is not meant to explain any particular empirical features, but only general ones – even universal ones, as Kant would insist from his transcendental idealist perspective. Nevertheless, there are some aspects in Kant that we can, by way of contrast, bring to our reading and understanding of Wittgenstein's fine-tuned analyses.

According to Kant, in judgments of taste, we "relate" the representation not to the object but to the judging subject. The representation "does not serve for any cognition at all, not even that by which the subject cognizes itself" (CJ par. 3). This might please Wittgenstein and appease his worries that we look at the mental too much in a physicalist way. Kant's radical distinction between subject and object thus invites a Kantian therapy of Wittgenstein. But this makes use only of the negative side of Kant, that we do *not* cognize ourselves in judgments of taste. There is a

positive side to him as well. According to Kant, we claim a certain subjective universality in our judgments of taste that can only be justified by our cognitive abilities being involved in the "free play of our cognitive faculties". We can apply this to Wittgenstein's observing "fine aesthetic differences" (PI IIxi 219) and his notion of "experiences of meaning": We have learned from Wittgenstein that our subjective feelings are interwoven with the objective and inter-subjective linguistic meanings of the words that we have learned to use. From Kant we learn how the subjective "free play of imagination and understanding" involves those very cognitive faculties that are also applied in objective judgments (see Wenzel 2005, 27-53). We see the duck and the rabbit objectively, but play with possibilities subjectively. A word has an objective meaning, but a subjective ring. In each case, the free play leaves its traces regarding cognition, in our choice of what to focus on and what to associate it with. This is more than mere connotation. Imagination is always more or less free from conceptual constraints. It creates and recalls memories and expectations that we experience anew, thereby affecting ourselves in aesthetic reflection. In both views, Kant's and Wittgenstein's, there are thin lines between the subjective aesthetic and the objective epistemic.

Returning to the notion of *Bedeutungserlebnis*, we can contrast it with Kant's claim that the subject "feels itself" (*sich selbst fühlt*) when making a judgment of taste, and that the subject relates a given representation to the "entire faculty of representation" (*das ganze Vermögen der Vorstellungen*) and that it experiences a "feeling of life" (*Lebensgefühl*) (CJ par. 1). It is no coincidence that Kant follows his aesthetics with his discussion of teleology in biology, and it is also no coincidence that Wittgenstein refers to organic life. He talks of the view that it is the "mental act of meaning that gives the sentence life [*den Satz belebt*]" (this is his interlocutor's voice, PI 592) and he says that words are germs (*Keime*) (PI IIxi 217).

In this context, inter-subjectivity is relevant in both Kant and Wittgenstein. In judgments of taste we claim inter-subjective universality (Kant), and in the experience of meaning we rely on others who have taught us the words we use and made it possible for us to develop our feelings for them by their recognizing our expressions (Wittgenstein). But Kant has more to offer than this. His theory of *a priori* purposiveness for judgments of taste and his theory of symbolism, relating beauty to morality, open new perspectives towards the future. It seems to me that such a move and motivation is missing in Wittgenstein. Kant addresses himself to our hopes for a better future. He develops his ideas of freedom and humanity under moral laws in his works such as his *Metaphysics of Morals* and *Towards Perpetual Peace*. Kant had a vision, and in response to it he wrote. Wittgenstein did not. Although he had a fine-tuned aesthetic concern for the actual use of particular words, and, as I have explained, there is a certain sense of responsibility that might come with this, there is, at least as far as I can see, less of a vision for a future (if at all) in Wittgenstein than in Kant.

¹ I would like to thank Phil Hutchinson and Joel Schickel for their comments.

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Wittgenstein's Activity: The *Tractatus* as an "Esoteric" Defense of Poetry

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In Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, there is a complex relationship between names, objects, signs, symbols, and propositions. For my purposes, a highly sophisticated interpretation of this complex relationship is not needed; only *how* these relationships are supposed to function is of importance to this essay. Wittgenstein writes that objects are simple (2.02), that "Objects can only be *named*," and that "Signs are their representatives" (3.23). "Names," Wittgenstein writes, "are like points"; the "point" is the *object*, and the *name* denotes the object. "In a proposition a name is the representative of an object": in a proposition, a name stands in lieu of the object (3.22). Since objects can only be named, and since signs are their representatives, then it follows that names are the simplest of signs. A name *directly* refers to its object. A proposition, then, composed solely of names expresses a thought *directly*.

Propositions are a form of direct communication: what propositions *say* is direct, but what they *show* is indirect. Now Wittgenstein's distinction between "saying" and "showing" comes to the surface. What a proposition *shows* is not direct; and what Wittgenstein writes that they show is their sense; and their sense is how things stand if they are true. Consider the proposition "It is raining outside." So long as the language is unambiguous, etc., the state of affairs it pictures is grasped directly. "It is raining outside" asserts something about the world, the truth or falsity of which has to be ascertained. "What *can* be shown," however, "*cannot* be said" (4.1213). As John Passmore writes, no proposition "can represent what it has in common with the world – that form in virtue of which it is an accurate picture. To do this, it would have to include within itself a portion of the world in a non-pictured form – so as to be able to make the comparison between the world and the picture" (359). On Wittgenstein's framework, that any proposition could achieve this is impossible. The *sense* of a proposition can only be shown, not said – for if it could be said, it would have to be said in a proposition, and *this* proposition would have to *show* that *this* state of affairs it says is true is how things stand.

Commonly understood, propositions are either "true" or "false." There is, however, an oft-forgotten third "category": some propositions are *non-sensical*. Strictly speaking, they need not be false; rather, in Wittgenstein's usage, they simply lack sense. If this can, indeed, be the case, then some propositions can be true and lack sense. Wittgenstein writes that "Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works *are not false but nonsensical*. Consequently we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can only establish that they are nonsensical" (4.003) (my italics). Immediately, the inherent paradoxical nature of the *Tractatus* is before the reader. As Passmore writes, "[The *Tractatus*] tells us what, it says, cannot be said, and tells us obscurely, in *metaphor and epigram*, that what can be said at all can be said clearly. *The very form of the Tractatus reflects this paradox*" (351) (my italics). With propositions, the sense of a proposition cannot be within the proposition itself (its sense cannot be *said*, only *shown*). Similarly, the sense of the world cannot lie within the world; the world must *show* its sense. The sense of a proposition is its truth-value; the sense of the

world is value. On the *Tractatus*' account, no value can ever exist within the world. For this reason, no proposition can *say* the value; this is what I take Wittgenstein to be getting at when he writes that there can be no ethical propositions, for *no proposition can say what can only be shown*. From this, it follows that ethics, religion, logic and aesthetics – anything that expresses value – lie "outside" the world; they are *transcendental* and can only be *shown*, never said. For this reason, there can be no ethical *facts*, and no ethical *propositions*.

According to Wittgenstein, since there are no ethical facts, an ethical *proposition* cannot show *anything* because it lacks sense; but that need not mean what it attempts to express is *false*. Rather, it means that the truth cannot be *expressed* – at least not in the form of propositions. The emphasis is that no *proposition*, in the sense conveyed by the *Tractatus*, can ever *show* the sense of an ethical value. It does not follow from this that there are no ethical values or that they cannot be expressed at all – only that they cannot be expressed via *propositions*. Indeed, I take some ethical maxims to be true; perhaps, Wittgenstein would too, with this *caveat*: the truth that it is supposed to express is not (*cannot* on the *Tractatus*'s account) expressible by propositions, but must be expressed by some other means. If philosophy is primarily concerned with truth values as expressed by propositions, or if propositions are the vehicle of communication for the truths with which a philosopher is concerned, then the transcendental values of the *Tractatus* cannot be expressed by the philosopher.

Whatever the means of expression for these transcendental values, it cannot be direct communication for that is the *modus operandi* of propositions, and they fail to express these values. Nonetheless, perhaps something by way of an answer to this paradoxical situation may be offered. Contrary to what it may look like on first glance (or the second, or the third, or the...), the *Tractatus* offers no doctrine, no theory and is not composed of propositions. There is no *argument* for indirect communication expressed in directly communicated propositions in the book – no such argument could be given. *The book is the "argument."* While this may seem like the wildest of claims, perhaps some textual evidence can help support it. Take, for example, the inherent paradoxical nature of the *Tractatus*; it's *only* paradoxical if it is *propositions* that say what cannot be said. That Wittgenstein did, indeed, use propositions to say this *cannot* be the case. If propositions were the only means of conveying truth, then Wittgenstein has *shown us* that there *must* be another way of conveying truth since he did, indeed, convey *that* truth. This is to say that the *value* of the book lies "outside" the book.

To be less coy, Wittgenstein is not *saying* something with the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, but *showing* something. That there *are* other means of expressing the truth is what is *shown* by the *Tractatus*. How do I know? Wittgenstein conveyed it; I got it. So did everyone else who saw the "paradoxical" nature of the work. Only it is not paradoxical; or it need not be.

I take it that when Wittgenstein said that Russell did not understand the *Tractatus*, he was (in some sense) correct.¹ For Wittgenstein, philosophy was "not a body of doctrine but an activity" (4.112), and this activity that philosophy engaged in was a "critique of language" – both of which also support this reading of the *Tractatus*. It was the "proposition" that philosophy is an activity that was misunderstood by Russell: *Wittgenstein was doing this very activity in writing the book.*² Some of the last "propositions" of the book hint at this:

There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They *make themselves manifest*. They are what is mystical. (6.522)

and

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. (6.54)

I take it that to see that the paradox is no paradox, and to understand that there are other forms of legitimately communicating the truth is, at the very least, part of what Wittgenstein meant by throwing away the ladder. The book *manifests* its truth by conspicuously being silent about it; and once one sees this – sees the world aright – one sees that there is no paradox in the *Tractatus*.³

I would like to bring together a curious set of traits about the *Tractatus*. According to this reading, it isn't a set of propositions, but a form of poetry, of indirect communication. It was Wittgenstein's *activity*. There is no value "in" the book; rather, it points to a value "outside" of what it can express directly. But what is of utmost importance is that it *has* expressed something that is higher, something propositions could not express. That it has expressed a truth indicates it must be a form of indirect communication, and its *form* reflects its *content*. If it is a poetical work and achieves the goal that I have ascribed to it, then it does, in the same stroke, make indirect communication a legitimate form of expressing the transcendental truths concerning ethics, aesthetics, religion, and logic – *all of which the Tractatus includes*. It follows from the argument I offer that poetry (*poesis*) becomes a legitimate form of "expressing" some truths – but what counts as poetry? In answering this question, I think it would be fruitful to turn to the *Philosophical Investigations*.⁴

In this last section, I propose to offer another important implication of the reading I have offered on the *Tractatus*. This implication is drawn directly from what I have

argued is "the truth" of the book, what it has *shown*: that there are other legitimate forms of communicating some truths, such as indirect communication, of which the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is an example.

If one takes the sentence "there is a soul" as expressing a proposition, then, on the account of propositions developed in the *Tractatus*, that proposition is nonsense. What does "soul" signify? Is it a *name* of some object? And if the soul is incorporeal, what could count as evidence for or against its existence? As Wittgenstein writes in the *Tractatus* (6.53), "Whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, [we must] demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions." "Soul" is just one of those signs that fails to have any meaning in the proposition "There is a soul." This does not indicate that the proposition is *false*, but only that the *proposition* is nonsense.⁵

The term "soul" fails to have any meaning in a *proposition*. It very well may have meaning in some other form of expression which would not result in nonsense (*this* is something that philosophy often forgets – that there are other ways of coming to know other than the truth values of propositions). The *Tractatus* shows that other forms of communication are legitimate forms of expressing the truth. Indirect discourse, then, might offer the appropriate expression to *show* the truth (or falsity) of the existence of the human soul. This is again to highlight that not all truths are known by propositions; or that in order to know something, I *must* offer an argument for it. At times, and depending on the truth concerned, it may be more appropriate for the truth to be *shown* rather than *said* (i.e., argued for, strictly speaking). And if a person fails to see such a truth? Well, all one can do is *show* (as I take Wittgenstein to be doing in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* – offering an opportunity to see); one cannot give sight.

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¹ See Monk, Ray. *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* for Wittgenstein's correspondence with Russell on this point. pp. 159-166.

² So why didn't Wittgenstein just say that? Well, why don't I just tell you what the fifth symphony sounds like: it sounds like such-and-such. Can you get what I'm saying? Can you get what it sounds like *now*? Perhaps it's best *if you just hear it yourself*.

³ I take it that Wittgenstein has also *shown* that arguments based upon propositions are not the only way in which to arrive at truth. I don't always have to argue: I can, at times, *show* you (perhaps footnote six does just this). And *that* is precisely what I think Wittgenstein has achieved in the *Tractatus*.

⁴ I won't offer any argument or analysis here, but I think it would be interesting to see what occurs if the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* are read side-by-side. Given the reading I offer of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* in this paper, I think the following remark of Wittgenstein's will prove interesting: "—It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools of language and of the ways they are used, *the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence*, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the author of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.)" (§23) (my italics).

⁵ One only need to recall to mind what Wittgenstein has to "say" regarding the human soul: "Not only is there no guarantee of the temporal immortality of the human soul, that is to say of its eternal survival after death; but, in any case, this assumption completely fails to accomplish the purpose for which it has always been intended. Or is some riddle solved by my surviving for ever? Is not this eternal life itself as much of a riddle as our present life? The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time. (It is certainly not the solution of any problems of natural science that is required.)" (6.4312).

A Note on Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and Tolstoy's *Gospel in Brief*

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Introduction

Ever since its publication, the form and numbering system of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922) has been the subject of comment, reflection and speculation. Reviewing the work in 1923, F.P. Ramsey noted his reservations about the book's terse sentences and "systematic" organization. The following year, T. de Laguna, having pointed out inconsistencies in the book's numbering system, concluded, "it is to be hoped that Mr Wittgenstein's example will find few imitators". On reviewing an Italian translation of the work some thirty years later, P.T. Geach expressed unreserved admiration, claiming that "there has hardly ever been written a philosophical work with a greater degree of organic unity".

These reactions anticipate later assessments of the *Tractatus*' form and not least its numbering system. At the one extreme we have Max Black's sceptical assessment, that the book's numbering system (its "system and order") "is so misleading here as to suggest a private joke at the reader's expense". At the other extreme (and most recently) we have L. Bazzocchi's unreserved approval of the numbering system, which he describes as "the fundamental key [...] to the deep structure of the book". Between these two extremes we find several judgements and interpretations that vary in their appraisal. Joachim Schulte, for example, feels that "the *Tractatus*' numbering is useful in gaining an overview of themes; otherwise it is to be regarded with suspicion", a view that G. Pitcher foreshadowed in saying that the numbering system is neither as rigorous nor as consistently applied as first impressions suggest ("it is only a rough guide to the structure of the *Tractatus*"). A classic representative of these intermediate positions is Brian McGuinness, who says that, superficially, the *Tractatus* gives the impression of a meticulously worked-out structure, yet "in detail, it retains many of the features of the *Zibaldone*". In this context, McGuinness hypothesizes that the book's fourth section is of central significance, in that the work can be regarded as "a kind of systole and diastole around proposition 4". At the same time, McGuinness reconsiders D. Favrholt's suggestion that the book's use of the numbering system is justified by the practical advantages it brought during the work of selecting and ordering remarks from earlier manuscripts. McGuinness writes "For composition this method of numbering [...] has the merit that a number, an afterthought, can always be inserted between any two existing numbers". V. Mayer has examined this "genetic explanation" and finds that "the numbering system of the *Tractatus* reflects primarily a method of composition". Numerous other assessments could be adduced (K. Gibson, C.-A. Scheier, E. Stenius, ...). But the above are sufficient to make the point.

What many of the cited authors have in common is that, in hinting at a presumed point of connection behind the *Tractatus*' form and its numbering system, they allude to A.N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell's *Principia Mathematica* from 1910. Black points out that the organization of the *Tractatus* is reminiscent of "the similar system of reference in *Principia Mathematica*". McGuinness is of the same opinion: "It will be remembered that Russell wanted Wittgenstein to rewrite the first chapters of that

work". R. Goldstein, on the other hand, believes that the numbering system is borrowed from G. Peano, while E.M. Lange argues that the real place to start when seeking to understand the *Tractatus*' form and numbering system is Schopenhauer's ideas concerning an "organic" philosophy and the difficulties of communicating the like.

But might there not be other possible influences?

1. "... a magnificent work"

The abovementioned attempts to explain the *Tractatus*' form and numbering system ignore what is supposedly one of the work's essential sources of inspiration, namely L. Tolstoy's *Gospel in Brief* (*Kurze Darlegung des Evangelium* = KD) from 1892. It is well known that Wittgenstein's early thought was influenced by Tolstoy. We are all familiar with Russell's account of the book that Wittgenstein bought in a partially abandoned bookshop in Tarnow in August-September 1914. We all remember that his fellow soldiers referred to him as the man with the Gospel. And we have all read his diary notes from October 1914 in which he writes that he has been carrying "the 'Gospel in Brief' by Tolstoy around with me constantly, like a talisman". Tolstoy's "magnificent work" features prominently both in Wittgenstein's efforts to come to terms with himself and in his work on the *Tractatus*.

The *Gospel in Brief* (like the *Tractatus*) is a book compiled from a selection of texts. Based on the four Gospels and the first epistle of John in the New Testament, Tolstoy seeks to (re)construct Jesus' message. In this work, Jesus proclaims the vision of a universal philosophy of life, Tolstoy's alternative to the theology of the established Russian Orthodox church. In his preface, Tolstoy describes the theme of the book and explains its composition, progression and inherent structure. It is these "structural" considerations that I wish to focus on and to tentatively propose as a key to understanding the *Tractatus*' form and numbering system. But to begin with we should recall the introductory "catalogue" of the *Prototractatus* (PT 3), which contains a list of fifteen numbered statements. This list consists of the "system's" first six "main propositions", sentences with single-place numbers, together with a selection of sentences to which two-place numbers are ascribed. These numbered propositions form "the scaffolding of the *Prototractatus* system", constituting what Wittgenstein would later call "a perspicuous representation" of the manuscript's content.

Turning now to Tolstoy, in his preface to the *Gospel in Brief* we find three similar "catalogues" or "perspicuous representations". Firstly, Tolstoy mentions that the overall structure of his work "came about spontaneously" through working with the book's content. There are twelve chapters, and the content of the book, namely the essential elements of Jesus' teaching, is summarized as a list of propositions numbered from 1 to 12. Each numbered proposition corresponds to one chapter and announces in succinct form the content thereof. Tolstoy goes on to state in more precise terms that the twelve chapters are linked in pairs, the elements of which are related "as cause and effect"(KD 7). He then details the content and function of

this first list in two subsequent twelve-part "catalogues". Concerning the chapter titles he explains (with regard to the second "perspicuous representation"): "At the beginning of each chapter, besides a brief description of the content, I had put words from the prayer [...] such as corresponded with the content of the chapter"(KD 8). The justification for introducing the words of the Lord's Prayer is that: "At the conclusion of my work I found, to my astonishment and joy, that the Lord's Prayer is nothing less than Christ's whole teaching, stated in most concise form, and in that same order in which I had already arranged the chapters, each phrase of the prayer corresponding to the [...] sequence of the chapters"(KD 8). Accordingly, Tolstoy arranges and cites the text of the Lord's Prayer divided into twelve numbered sections, which, he maintains, correspond to the preceding twelve numbered statements (which essentially reiterate Jesus' teaching). Thus what the preface's first and second "catalogues", each consisting of twelve numbered statements, present us with are two parallel and, in Tolstoy's view, corresponding lists of the contents of the book's twelve chapters: 12 main propositions concerning Jesus' teaching = 12 sections of the Lord's Prayer. - Allow me to point out that, by adducing the words of the Lord's Prayer in the headings of the *Gospel in Brief*, Tolstoy is asserting a relationship *between* the statements of the prayer (between their potential to bring to light *questions* to which they themselves provide the correct *answers*) and a reading of his *Gospel in Brief*. This reading constitutes both a clarification of the questions about the meaning of life and an imparting of answers to those same questions. And here we can ask, is it not the case that the *Tractatus* seeks to apply and achieve a similar "rhetorical" objective or "invocative" aspect? I shall leave this question as it stands!

All considered, what we can conclude from the foregoing, namely Tolstoy's assertion in the preface to his *Gospel in Brief* that in terms of its content (and despite its compilatory nature) his book constitutes a unified and coherent whole, is that the book's fundamental ideas are capable of being summarized in the form of twelve numbered "brief descriptions of the content", or chapter headings. Accordingly, Tolstoy sets up two "perspicuous representations" in his preface, in which he supplements each content description with two parallel formulations, which in principle merely restate the content description in greater detail. In other words, what we have is, first, the "content description", or heading of the respective chapter, followed by an elaboration of the description concerning Jesus' teaching, and finally a section of the Lord's Prayer. The concluding and final "catalogue" of the *Gospel in Brief*, which is likewise reminiscent of the *Prototractatus'* introductory "catalogue", reiterates the three-part headings of the twelve chapters in summary form. The first four items read:

- I. Chap. The son of God. Man, the son of God, is powerless in the flesh, and free in the spirit. (Our Father!)
- II. Chap. Therefore man must work, not for the flesh, but for the spirit. (Which are in Heaven.)
- III. Chap. The life of all men has proceeded from the spirit of the Father. (Hallowed by Thy name!)
- IV. Chap. God's Kingdom. Therefore the will of the Father is the life and welfare of all men. (Thy Kingdom come.)(KD 203)

Within the book, the three-part heading of each chapter is followed by the actual text, which consists, firstly, of Tolstoy's own paraphrased interpretation of a selection of Gospel texts, secondly of a full citation of the selected

texts (with chapter and verse references), albeit in Tolstoy's own translation. In other words, Tolstoy's recurrent structural principle is such that it encompasses, to begin with, a movement *from* an introduction in a gnomic title of the main content, *to* a short subheading, *to* a section of the Lord's Prayer, *to* the increasingly explicit descriptions and explanations in each chapter's two-part elucidation. Thus there is a movement from a laconic introductory formulation to a progressively more detailed description. Moreover, this structural principle encompasses an organization of the book's linear development as "cause and effect".

Linked to this general structural principle, which seems to correspond in various ways to the text of the *Tractatus*, is a notion of "form as evidence of the content's validity". Tolstoy says that the structure of the *Gospel in Brief* is a consequence of the distinct and inherent logical structure of Jesus' teaching. And for Tolstoy, this structure (the book's coherent arrangement) amounts to nothing less than a powerful indicator and corroboration of the validity of the teaching he presents. Tolstoy writes that he has omitted text-critical, philological, historical and dogmatic arguments precisely so as to allow the distinct and inherent validity of his subject matter to be heard. The arguments to which he refers are "omitted; because [...] they cannot carry conviction as to the true understanding of the teaching". Because "The main evidence for the truth of this teaching is its uniformity, clarity, simplicity and unity"(KD 10).

It is tempting to infer that Wittgenstein's organization of the (*Proto*)*Tractatus* amounts to an endorsement of Tolstoy's idea of "form as evidence of the content's validity". This assumption could form the first step in explaining why neither work offers much argumentation or reasoning in support of central tenets; clarificatory remarks would only weaken the impression of unity, in other words, they would counteract the logical, architectural form at which the authors aim – and thus undermine the content's claim to validity. In his 1923 review, Ramsey may well have been thinking along these lines when he remarked that the *Tractatus'* "attractive epigrammatic flavour [...] seems to have prevented him [Wittgenstein] from giving adequate explanations of many of his technical terms and theories".

2. "... as the heading of a chapter"

With these comments in mind we can now ask whether Tolstoy's introductory remarks to the *Gospel in Brief* and his thoughts concerning the composition, progression and inherent structure of the "Gospel's harmony" are of any relevance in seeking to understand the form and numbering system of the *Tractatus*. Maybe. Maybe not. But despite this uncertainty, I shall briefly indicate a few of the "perspectives" that might result from this approach to the *Tractatus*. Here the overall working hypothesis (in a more rigorous formulation) will be this: the composition of the *Tractatus*, its form and numbering system, constitute a modified version (a more formalized implementation) of Tolstoy's compositional strategy in the *Gospel in Brief*. Or put another way: when, after his initial reading of the *Gospel in Brief*, Wittgenstein describes it as "a magnificent work", is he also thinking about the abovementioned "structural" considerations described in the work's preface?

If we answer in the affirmative, then a number of implications would appear to follow. Firstly, we have the *generic* implication, to the effect that Wittgenstein's idea for the *Prototractatus'* introductory and text-structuring "catalogue" is attributable to his familiarity with the three synoptic and numbered "perspicuous representations" of the *Gospel in Brief*. Secondly, we have the implication of *tex-*

tual economy, to the effect that Wittgenstein's choice of remarks in compiling and laying out the (*Proto*)*Tractatus* is indebted to Tolstoy's idea of "form as evidence of the content's validity". Some of the remarks in the *Tractatus* can indeed be read as (meta) comments on this theme, remarks in which Wittgenstein indicates his support for the idea, as for example when he writes: "If a sign is *not necessary* then it is meaningless" (TLP 3.328). On top of this there is a third implication concerning *detailed structure*, to the effect that, to the extent that the numbering system in the (*Proto*)*Tractatus* is indebted to and to be understood in light of the numbered "catalogues" of the *Gospel in Brief* (and possibly the last of them in particular), we have to conclude that the *Prototractatus*' "catalogue" does indeed constitute a sketch for a table of contents. More precisely, the implication is that the list in the *Prototractatus* presents, first, the title of the individual chapter in terms of a brief content description (marked by the single-place numbers (1, 2, 3, 4, ...)), followed by supplementary subheading(s) (indicated by two-place numbers (1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, ...)), which (as in the *Gospel in Brief*) repeat the substance of the content descriptions, albeit in greater detail. According to this pattern, the text sections that follow these subheadings (marked with three-place numbers in the *Prototractatus* and the *Tractatus*) have to be regarded as the actual chapters (distributed among the individual subheadings), whereby the content descriptions and the supplementary subheadings are elaborated to make them explicit. In brief, what we have is, first, the content descriptions, in other words the chapter headings (e.g. PT 3), then the supplementary subheadings (e.g. PT 3.1 and 3.2), and finally the text of the actual chapters (e.g. PT 3.11-3.164 and 3.210-3.2531). Accordingly, there is the content description / chapter heading: "A logical picture of facts is a thought" (PT 3), followed by the supplementary subheadings: "The perceptible expression of a thought is a propositional sign" (PT 3.1) and "A propositional sign with its mode of depiction is a proposition" (PT 3.2), followed by the actual text of the chapter (distributed among the individual subheadings) (PT 3.11-3.164 and 3.201-3.2531). Some two decades after completing the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein remarked to M.O'C. Drury that C.D. Broad "was quite right when he said of *Tractatus* that it was highly syncopated", to which Wittgenstein added that each proposition in the *Tractatus* "should be seen as the heading of a chapter, needing further exposition".

In adhering to the proposed juxtaposition of the *Gospel in Brief* and the (*Proto*)*Tractatus*, several other questions arise concerning the actual chapters of the *Tractatus*. For example, why does Wittgenstein ascribe numbers to these text sections / chapters? Tolstoy does not do the equivalent in the chapters of his *Gospel in Brief*. One answer might be that Wittgenstein didn't actually need this expansion of the numbering system, an answer which would imply (and can be justified by referring to the chapters' numerous "internal inter-textual" comments and elaborations (see TLP 3.201, 3.312, 3.313, 3.325, 3.331, 3.341, 3.3411)) that the chapters of the *Tractatus* do in fact meet the criterion for a form of presentation that Wittgenstein wanted (but failed) to achieve in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Namely, a form of presentation in which "the thoughts [...] proceed from one subject to another in a natural order and without breaks", with words and remarks "hang[ing] one in another, like the links of a chain" (TLP 2.03) in a straightforward and self-evident manner. – In

order to count as reasonably plausible, this reading must of course be able to answer the following obvious question: if the arrangement and wording of the chapters render the guidance of the numbering system superfluous, then why is it used? Here the answer might be that the numbering system is merely intended to mark the inherent structure of the "teaching"; the use of the system does no more than emphasize the logical connections of the "teaching", thus reinforcing the convincingness / validity that the "teaching" itself is assumed to possess in virtue of its coherence. Seen from this angle, the introduction and use of the numbering system in the chapters of the (*Proto*)*Tractatus* is motivated by the idea of "form as evidence of the content's validity" elucidated in the *Gospel in Brief*. Tolstoy writes: "The main evidence for the truth of this teaching is its uniformity, clarity, simplicity and unity".

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Wittgenstein and the Unwritten Part of the *Tractatus*

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1. Problematic

Any attempt to link Wittgenstein's philosophy to ethics seems odd. First of all, it is an open question whether Wittgenstein cares about ethics (as a serious branch of philosophy) at all. It is true that Wittgenstein seldom talks about ethics, except 6.4 through 6.54 of the *Tractatus* and his "Lecture on Ethics"; as for his *Philosophical Investigations*, ethics seems to be out of the picture. It seems legitimate to question any attempt to link his ideas to ethics if he himself does not deal with ethics *directly* in the core of his philosophical work. Secondly, even if he has some scattered comments on ethics, it does not imply that he has *an* ethics of his own. According to a former pupil's recollection, Wittgenstein seems to consider moral problems case by case. (Rhees 1965:17-26) It seems true that Wittgenstein does not think that we can formulate any systematic guidance on our moral behaviors.

Even so, I believe it is wrong to overlook Wittgenstein's relation to ethics, which should be clear if we read his *Tractatus* carefully. In a well-known letter to Ludwig Ficker, Wittgenstein claims that the *Tractatus* is basically an ethical one, and he also mentions that there are two parts of his *Tractatus*, the written part and the unwritten part, and it is the unwritten part that actually matters. (Luckhardt 1979: 94) In this paper, I shall answer the following questions: What is this unwritten part? What does Wittgenstein try to convey in this unwritten part? Why is it unwritten? I argue that this unwritten part is his view on ethics. If we read the *Tractatus* carefully, it would become crystal clear that Wittgenstein does take ethics seriously. But Wittgenstein does hold the view that ethics is ineffable, for our language is limited in nature. I also argue that, to Wittgenstein, it is actually its being unwritten that ethics could be meaningfully being talked about by us.

2. Ethics and the limits of language

The early Wittgenstein has long been regarded having tremendous influence on the logical positivist movement and especially its rejection of metaphysics and nonsensical language, such as ethics, religion and aesthetics. The publication of Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic* in 1936 epitomizes how the early Wittgenstein was interpreted in that vein. Ayer claims that a metaphysician is a kind of "misplaced poet" and statements of value are not literally significant and are simply "expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor false." (Ayer 1952: 136) In a logical positivist's mindset, ethics is marginalized and is thrust to the periphery of philosophical enterprise, which adds to the impression of Wittgenstein's seemingly indifference to ethics. This interpretation is definitely contrary to the early Wittgenstein's intention. Even Ayer himself later on recognizes his misinterpretation of the early Wittgenstein's intention. (Ayer 1985: 31-33) The early Wittgenstein certainly does not look down on ethics as misplaced poetry or even marginalize its significance. Wittgenstein's intention is made clear in his "Lecture on Ethics." In this lecture, he holds the human tendency to think ethical problems in high esteem and says: "I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it." (Wittgenstein

1965: 12) This is a clear proof that Wittgenstein does not endorse moral indifferentism.

In the letter to Ficker, Wittgenstein claims that there are two parts in his *Tractatus*, the written one and the unwritten one. What is striking is that he says that the unwritten one is the important one. In understanding Wittgenstein's intention, we should read his early writings carefully, especially the *Tractatus*, mostly from 6.4 through the end of the book as well as his "Lecture on Ethics." These two works demonstrate the influence of his early philosophy of language on his understanding of ethics. It should be noted that Wittgenstein has a broad concept of ethics throughout his life, which is closely related to the ideas of religion, the will, a good life, qualities of an action and even aesthetics. In his mind, ethics is certainly not a fantasy like a unicorn, but he does not think that we can talk meaningfully about ethics, such as the existence of God. There are two reasons for that. First, according to his picture theory of language, we cannot formulate propositions of ethics, for we cannot picture those things to ourselves. When we say the words God or good, our expressions do not correspond to any facts or simple objects. The ethical language we use in our everyday life has no sense at all. It is nonsensical, for it does not picture anything to us. This is what he means by nonsensical, nothing more. In his early years, Wittgenstein holds a very strict correspondence theory of language, and he believes that our language corresponds to simple objects.

Being nonsensical in a Wittgensteinian sense is not the same as being trivial or lacking in significance. This point is quite clear in his "Lecture on Ethics." In his analysis of our ordinary use of the word ethics, it contains two different concepts of ethics: one is in a trivial or relative sense, such as the way that we talk about a "good" pianist and the "right" road to our destination, for they are only "good" or "right" in a relative sense, and this trivial or relative sense of ethics is not what Wittgenstein cares about; and the other concept of ethics is in an ethical or absolute sense, which is what Wittgenstein really means by ethics. Wittgenstein gives us two examples to clarify his point:

Supposing that I could play tennis and one of you saw me playing and said "Well, you play pretty badly" and suppose I answered "I know, I'm playing badly but I don't want to play any better," all the other man could say would be "Ah then that's all right." But suppose I had told one of you a preposterous lie and he came up to me and said "You're behaving like a beast" and then I were to say "I know I behave badly, but then I don't want to behave any better," could he then say "Ah, then that's all right"? Certainly not; he would say "Well, you *ought* to want to behave better." (Wittgenstein 1965: 5)

In the first example, poor tennis skill is "bad" in a trivial or relative sense, which has nothing to do with morality at all, but in the second example, telling someone a lie is "bad" in an ethical or absolute sense. In the case of my telling a lie, I am not going to get away with a simple response, and other people would demand me to behave better. This paragraph shows us that ethics is definitely neither trivial nor insignificant in Wittgenstein's mind. It is unlikely for Wittgenstein to endorse moral indifferentism.

The second reason that we cannot talk meaningfully about ethics is that it goes beyond the limits of our language and therefore we cannot put it into words. In Wittgenstein's mind, value is absolute, not relative or trivial. If we try to put a value judgment in a form of a statement of facts, it will immediately lose its status as a value statement in its absolute sense. He describes this situation with a metaphor: "if a man could write a book on ethics which really was a book on ethics, this book would, with an explosion, destroy all the other books in the world," for "[e]thics is supernatural and our words will only express facts; as a teacup will only hold a teacup full of water and if I were to pour out a gallon over it." (Wittgenstein 1965: 7) The metaphor of an ethics book that makes other ordinary books explode and the comparison between a teacup and a gallon once again makes Wittgenstein's point very clear: ethics is absolute and is beyond the limits of our language. Hence it is not ethics' failure for being nonsensical, and on the contrary, it is the problem of our language's impotence to contain ethics.

Having this in mind, we can now adequately understand what Wittgenstein means by "[a]ll propositions are of equal value," for they are equal in the sense that they do not contain any value in its absolute sense, and in other word, we can say that propositions of facts have no value (in an absolute sense); and if we talk about a value in its absolute sense, "it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case." (§6.4) Hence Wittgenstein argues that we cannot have propositions of ethics, for "[p]ropositions can express nothing that is higher" (§6.42), and "[i]t is clear that ethics cannot be put into words." (§6.421) This is another proof that Wittgenstein does not view ethics as insignificant or trivial; and much to the contrary, he thinks that ethics is higher and that is exactly the reason why propositions cannot contain it.

3. Ethics and thinking

In order to answer the riddle of the unwritten part of the *Tractatus*, let's follow Wittgenstein's suggestion and start with its preface and conclusion. In the preface, he claims the sense of the book is: "what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence," which is exactly what he concludes in 7. But he points out further:

Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thinking (*Denken*), or rather—not to thinking (*Denken*), but to the expression of thoughts (*Gedanken*): for in order to be able to draw a limit to thinking (*Denken*), we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought). (Wittgenstein 1961:3)

In this passage, I add the original German words *Denken* and *Gedanke* to show the nuance between "thinking" and "thought." In Wittgenstein's original text of this passage, "thinking" is different from "thought." So he claims that the aim of the *Tractatus* is trying to draw a limit, "not to thinking" but "to the expression of thoughts." As we know, a thought is a logical picture of facts, a picture of the world as well as a proposition. In this passage, Wittgenstein seems to claim that we should think beyond the limits of thoughts and language as he says that "we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought." It seems that Wittgenstein does not think that our job should stop at the limit of our language, and "we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable." In other word, one should not just think inside the limit of language but also think outside the limit (although it might lead us nowhere, for what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense).

This call for thinking the unthinkable echoes with the famous conclusion of 6.54, the so-called Wittgenstein's ladder: "[m]y propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical (*unsinnig*), when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright."

If we climb up the ladder, we will be able to see the world aright. That is to say: when we are able to see the limit of our language and thoughts, we will be able to think beyond the limit and see the world in a right way. I believe this is the answer to Wittgenstein's riddle. The unwritten part of his *Tractatus* is ethics. It is unwritten because it is not possible to put it in words. *Its being unwritten is actually its being written*. If it is the case, the ladder that Wittgenstein asks us to throw away in the end is not ethics itself but propositions of ethics, not thinking but the expression of thoughts. If it is the way we can see the world aright, the aim of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* is not merely the elimination of metaphysics but also the urge to make room for ethics that is beyond the limit of our language. If that is the case, there is a very interesting similarity with Kant's "making room for faith" in his first *Critique*.

4. Conclusion

Based on these interpretations, I believe I have made Wittgenstein's relation to ethics manifest. The unwritten half of his *Tractatus* and its ambition show how remote it is from the understanding of logical positivists, such as Ayer's. Wittgenstein certainly does not endorse emotivism and moral indifferentism. He seems to believe in a higher order, though the order is ineffable and cannot be put into words. But this does not mean that he endorses cognitivism in its objectivism strain. To be fair, he does not endorse any metaphysical position beyond our ordinary use of language, and this kind of quietism is rather consistent throughout his academic life. He indeed suggests us to think as clearly as we can, and we must pass over in silence regarding things that we cannot talk about; but he does not suggest that our intellect should simply stop at the limits of language, for our thinking always compels us to think the unthinkable and to go beyond the limit of our thoughts. As mentioned earlier, this paper does not attempt to constitute a systematic picture of Wittgensteinian ethics. I only attempt to reveal his profound relation to ethical thinking and his implication to ethics.

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Though This Be Language, yet There Is Reality in't: Prichard and Wittgenstein on Ethics.

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Introduction

Moore's moral philosophy received, at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, two major criticisms, both quite decisive. Despite their importance, they entered into the mainstream of moral philosophy only recently, and without much ado. The first came from H. A. Prichard, the philosopher interestingly called "Oxford Moore" by C. D. Broad, one of his students (cf. Dancy 2003). In 1912, Prichard wrote quite a surprising paper, that looked like a radical refutation of Moore's *Principia Ethica*, yet, it did not even quote the name of the Cambridge philosopher. The second came from L. Wittgenstein. In 1929, the Austrian philosopher tried to show that Moore's conception of "good" as the basic concept one can reduce the whole ethics to is highly problematic. Then, in *On Certainty*, he left some hints about what one is supposed to look for in order to justify his beliefs and when one can do without proofs for his statements. Both Prichard's and Wittgenstein's positions are somewhat forgotten within contemporary epistemology and contemporary moral philosophy, even though they are implicitly present in, e.g., moral particularism. This seems to be regrettable, since not only they both advance several new ideas about morality, but also their works show that there is a fundamental link between moral sphere and epistemology, and it seems that some of the mistakes proper to this second domain are even more striking when repeated within the first. It is interesting to make explicit some of their main converging points and show that the analytic philosophy was, from its very beginnings, divided on major issues, concerning both the relationship with the world and the one with language.

1. Moore's challenge.

Ethics, if it can ever "pretend to be scientific", should be able to follow a deductive-like schema, *i.e.* be susceptible to be reduced to some simple, fundamental elements. Moore had this scientific ambition from the very beginnings of his work in moral philosophy, even if they seemed to diminish with time. Yet, this science would not be by any means natural, since any commitment to naturalism leads, in moral sphere, to the "naturalistic fallacy" (for a criticism of this notion see Frankena 1939). Ethics would be then autonomous and its basic terms are not to be explained by those of any other sciences. Having said (roughly) that, Moore introduced the notion of "good" as a fundamental object of his discipline, and defined ethics as "the general enquiry into what is good" (Moore 1903, ch. 1., § 2). This term – good – is indefinable (and thus irreducible), since no other can be substituted for it.

Moore's position changed through time, but what is really interesting is the fact that in his opposition to Kantian, utilitarian and naturalistic framework, he remained convinced that moral philosopher, in order to pursue any kind of research, must in the first place find the common feature to all right or good actions. The general schema of his conception of morality was thus the same as those he criticised, namely the research of foundational elements to build one's moral system on. In what follows, I will try to

show that both Wittgenstein and Prichard made it clear that we do not need to look for the foundations, because what we thought we have to build carefully is already with all needed strength.

2. Prichard's response

H. A. Prichard responded to Moore's challenge in 1912. It was certainly his most important paper on moral philosophy, yet, he has already published a book criticising Kant's epistemology where he claims that a general theory of knowledge is impossible. Now, an analogous procedure was adopted within moral philosophy – a general and exhaustive theory of ethics seems to be even hard to think of. Yet, Kant should not be seen here as the only target, since this type of problems present in both epistemology and, by analogy, in moral philosophy, is quite well known since Descartes. This understanding of Prichard's criticisms makes us able to see how close his ideas were to Wittgenstein's. It is remarkable that both Wittgenstein 1929 "Lecture on Ethics" and Prichard 1912 paper are motivated by a profound disagreement with Moore's approach, and it should also be noted that it is only in late fifties and sixties that this latter was ultimately rejected.

Prichard's article tries to show that moral philosophy in its contemporary form has been guided by a major false idea, the one that is implicitly expressed in what follows:

"Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act? May I not have been all the time under an illusion in so thinking? Should not I really be justified in simply trying to have a good time?" (Prichard 1912, 21)

What is being sought by a person who asks this kind of questions is a *proof* of the validity of what guides her righteous actions. The philosopher is then supposed to reconstruct for us the exact itinerary of our decision procedure, to grasp what has really allowed us to recognize given duty. This procedure is understood as being imperceptible for an ordinary observer, yet it *must* somehow take place, and, just like in sciences, we are going to be one day able to analyse all his stages. Here, in moral sphere, the basic requirement is analogous to the one from Descartes: to find context-independent explanations by eliminating the "human factor" from studied processes. From intuitionist perspective – H. A. Prichard was clearly a moral intuitionist, and I will try to show that this label also fits to Wittgenstein – the roots of philosophical mistakes are to be found precisely in the ambitions quoted above. For indeed morality is an essentially embodied phenomenon, and one has to take seriously the living creature with all his contingencies in order to try to understand and ameliorate this sphere.

Prichard then tries to deal with this mysterious "why" we should do what we ought to. He first rejects the instrumental conception of the good – which he attributes also to Plato – which opposes him to all forms of utilitarianism. The intrinsic good is not a satisfying ground for what ought to be done either, since the desire for something does not provoke an obligation to do it: "we cannot feel that we

ought to do that the doing of which is *ex hypothesi* prompted solely by the desire to do it" (1912, 26). It must be noted that Prichard does not claim that no action guided by the desire of its consequences or by the desire of the action itself can ever be good. What is crucial here is his hostility toward the idea of a unique principle that would be able to give an explanation to all morally relevant actions. This principle, albeit under diverse formulations, is present both in ethics of duty and in properly consequentialist moral framework. Certainly, we do sometimes act guided by what we think of possible consequences of our actions, just as well as we act in virtue of some "intrinsic goodness". Yet, there is no reason to think that there is one genuine reason underlying every moral action. Prichard notes that "our approval and our use of the term 'good' is always in respect of the motive and refers to actions which have been actually done and of which we think we know the motive". What is "good" then is not something that bears an irreducible quality postulated by Moore, but something that designates a relevant feature in a given context¹; this very feature might be – but not necessary is – reducible to some others, and remains, once again, context-dependent. There is no basic, *ground-like*, goodness.

The very fact that that we are confronted to certain difficulties in trying to understand what a moral action really is, is due, according to Prichard, to an incorrect conception of action itself. This latter notion is taken in a very broad sense that includes motivation, whereas in ordinary language we tend to distinguish those two terms. The problem of motivation is not to be excluded though, it keeps its relevancy in a number of contexts. But Prichard rightly notes that "[e]ven if we knew what our motive would be if we did the act, we should not be any nearer an answer to the question" of why we ought to do certain things. It is the whole context that makes us act in a given way, and our doing what we ought to do is not about motivations but about what we do. *Duty* seems here to be a social phenomenon whose grounds are essentially public, submitted to shared criteria of success or of failure. The psychological sphere is then a secondary one, and is not helpful to analyse the moral one from the point of view of its basic social function, given that "the sense of obligation to do, or of the rightness of, an action of a particular kind is absolutely underivative or immediate" (Prichard 1912, 27). The nature of the duty consist in a public engagement to do something, it belongs to the interpersonal fabric of the world. This "I ought to" is simply a part of a particular type of interactions we implicitly subscribe to. Prichard adds that "[t]he attempt to bring in the motive involves a mistake similar to that involved in supposing that we can will to will", which constitutes quite an extraordinary use of the term "will", at best metaphorical, at worst nonsensical. We cannot want to want things, just like we are not able, in ordinary sense, to want to doubt things – think of the question: "can I be in doubt at *will*?" (Wittgenstein 1969, § 221). All that constitutes only a general schema and exceptions and criticisms within it are perfectly possible. There is a context where the phrase "Why I ought to do it?" is meaningful, but this concerns only a relatively small number of *problematic* duties, when *e.g.* someone wants to make us feel like we have an obligation towards him (since questions legitimately arise only when there is a *problem*). According to Prichard, the study of morality, just like the one of knowledge, should start at looking closely at the way they both function. Only then we will clearly see that the former research of external foundations was mislead.

¹ Our use of the term "relevant" aims at being analogous to the one in Dancy 1983.

3. Wittgenstein as moral intuitionist

Wittgenstein, in his epistemology and in what he thought of moral philosophy, seems to be extremely close to Prichard in his refusal to try to find foundations of knowledge and of morality beyond knowledge and morality themselves. In Wittgenstein's "Lecture on Ethics" one finds a number of suggestions that, as it seems, allow us to qualify the Austrian philosopher as moral intuitionist in a substantial sense. In what precedes, I tried to introduce some elements of Prichard's moral epistemology from a perspective that would be relevant from the point of view of Wittgenstein's scholar. Now, I shall try to make Wittgenstein relevant to a Prichardian by putting forward two essential features of the quoted Lecture.

The first point, a simple one, is the criticism of Moore's reduction of every morally positive feature to goodness. We have seen that Prichard rejected this reduction by postulating the irreducibility of what is right to what is good. Analogously (yet not identically), Wittgenstein underlines that there is a number of features relevant in moral context, and ethics, if there is such a thing, should give an equal treatment to all of them. Things that are important may be valuable, important, making life worth living. Properly moral terms, like "good" or "right" do not have a meaning that would be independent from the circumstances there are announced in. Yet, it does not mean that there is no shared reality behind them, people did learn to use them in a way that is definitely binding. Wittgenstein enters here on the unsafe grounds of realism/relativism debate; the relativism is nevertheless unambiguously rejected.² The second major point is the immediacy of good or right actions and the realism supporting them, both features are illustrated by an example from the 1929 Lecture:

Supposing that I could play tennis and one of you saw me playing and said "Well, you play pretty badly" and suppose I answered "I know, I'm playing badly but I don't want to play any better," all the other man could say would be "Ah then that's all right." But suppose I had told one of you a preposterous lie and he came up to me and said "You're behaving like a beast" and then I were to say "I know I behave badly, but then I don't want to behave any better," could he then say "Ah, then that's all right"? Certainly not; he would say "Well, you ought to want to behave better. Here you have an absolute judgment of value, whereas the first instance was one of a relative judgment" (Wittgenstein 1965, 5)

For Wittgenstein, there seems to be a language game, the passage shows, where the words like "better" have a very particular, both motivating and binding meaning, that should be clear for all users of a given language. The uneasiness about this meaning arise usually when someone does not recognize it immediately, and only at that moment the justification question might arise. The existence of this particular, common ground, was also, as we have seen, an essential feature of Prichard philosophy.

4. Conclusion

Moral sphere, as it is presented both in Prichard's and Wittgenstein's, texts becomes an essential part of human life, of the way we apprehend the relationships of all kinds. It is not, as Moore in might have said, a quasi science having as its major aim the research of its fundamental

² His "realism" is indeed a very particular one, and is sometimes called "anti-anti-realism" by John McDowell, or even "irrealism" by John Skorupski, if we follow his criticism of a correspondence theory of truth.

element. Indeed, Wittgenstein did not explicitly deal with the question of right, but his conception of language as public in the first place, might make of him a Prichard's ally. It looks like the public rightness, and not intrinsic goodness, that is what constitutes the most crucial part of morality or of a decent life. And from historical point of view, it might be true that, at the end of the day, the genuine beginning of metaethics in the 20th Century is not to be associated with Moore's *Principia Ethica*, but with Prichard's and Wittgenstein's responses to it.

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