Abstracts
Due to modernization our civilization has become global, highly diverse, and rapidly changing. As a result of diversity and globalization, the intercultural relations have become also intrincultural. Thus intercultural dialog is just a dialog between various parts of the diverse world, which are separated by some kind of gaps. According to a certain interpretation of works of Richard Rorty, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and Józef Niźnik, the very function of philosophy consists in stimulating inner/intercultural dialog. In my text I point out some of the cultural areas that mostly need starting and keeping up the dialog. I use some general oppositions for that purpose: fast – slow; writing – electricity; network – community; science – its surroundings.

One of the ways to characterise the human condition is to say that we have a strong tendency towards egoism. Human coexistence is possible to the extent egoist strategies complement each other to attain their goals. In this sense, it is difficult to define pure altruism, and we need to make a distinction between weak and strong altruism. Both arise as a moral demand – not as something which flows freely – and need a certain degree of abstraction that, contrary to what Rorty says, show the existence of the concept "human being", a being with a specific nature.

A NATURALISTIC METHOD FOR THERAPY NOT FOR SCIENCE
Marilena Andronico, University of Ferrara, Italy

Wittgenstein’s interest in the connection of language games and forms of life as has often been rightly interpreted as "anthropologism". However, this characterization doesn’t help us understand the goal of his philosophical analysis. On the contrary, it seems to make such an understanding harder, for we expect his philosophical work to bring forth anthropological statements. But, as it is well known, this is not the case. Wittgenstein rejects all confusion of philosophy with empirical or philosophical anthropology. What then is anthropologism for? I would like to show that Wittgenstein's anthropologism can be put in the proper perspective if it is seen as an attempt to deal with the complex phenomenon of language from a naturalistic viewpoint. For Wittgenstein, our ways of classifying things or languages have become “become [second] nature to us” (BPP II 678) so that the method which makes it possible for us to represent or describe them will itself be naturalistic.

ABOUT WITTGENSTEIN’S MATHEMATICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
Olga Antonova, St. Petersburg State University, Russia and Sergei Soloviev, University Paul Sabatier, France

Wittgenstein’s contributions to philosophy have often been considered as a form of solipsism. Such a position is motivated by Wittgenstein’s idea that the limits of our thinking are the limits of our language. Wittgenstein denies that thought is prior to language. So certain mathematicians (Dummett, Bernays) have considered Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics as an extreme form of constructivism. We defend the opposite opinion and argue that Wittgenstein was not advancing any form of solipsism and constructivism.

DER VORRANG DER LOGIK VOR DER METAPHYSIK BEI WITTGENSTEIN
Thiago Aquino, University of Munich, Germany, Stipendiat von Capes-Brasilia, Brazil


MORAL JUDGMENTS OF FOREIGN CULTURES AND BYGONE EPOCHS
Eckhart Arnold, University of Düsseldorf, Germany

In this paper the ethical problem will be discussed how moral judgments of foreign cultures and bygone epochs can be justified. After ruling out the extremes of moral absolutism (judging without any reservations by the standards of one’s own culture and epoch) and moral relativism (judging only by the respective standards of the time and culture in question) the following solution to the dilemma is sought: A distinction has to be made between judging the norms and institutions in power at a certain place and time and judging people acting within the social institutions of their time and culture. While the former may be judged rigorously, only taking into account the objective possibilities for having other institutions at a certain development stage, the latter should be judged against the background of the common sense morals of the respective time and culture.
JENSEITS DES NICHTZWEIHELNDEN
BENEHMENS: VERTRAUEN ALS
EINLADUNG ZU EINEM FREMDEN BLICK
AUF DEN ABENDLÄNDISCHEN GEIST
José María Ariso, University of Leipzig, Germany

In dieser Arbeit erläutere ich, dass, um den Geist mit dem Wittgenstein schrieb treu zu sein, der Begriff „Vertrauen“ überwunden werden sollte, um unsere unbegründeten Handlungsweisen sub specie aeterni zu betrachten.

INTERCULTURAL DIALOG AND
MATHEMATICS EDUCATION: A CONTRIBUTION FROM ANCIENT CHINESE ALGEBRA
Giorgio T. Bagni, University of Udine, Italy

In this paper we discuss the educational possibilities connected to the use of an ancient Chinese artifact. In a recent educational experiment we confronted a group of 10-11 year-old pupils with a problem (taken from the Jiuzhang Suanshu, 1st cent. BC), which can be solved by means of a couple of simultaneous linear equations. Empirical data suggest that the use of the primary artifact, taking into account the secondary artifacts referred to the modes of action, can be important in approaching some mathematical contents in the context of a new game making reference to a very different cultural tradition.

NATURALISM AND THE FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE
Lynne Rudder Baker, University of Massachusetts, USA

The first-person perspective poses a challenge to naturalism. Thomas Metzinger has recently proposed an intriguing account of the first-person perspective that takes up that challenge—an account that has the consequence that there are no selves (i.e., no genuine subjects of experience), only self-models. My plan is to use Metzinger’s account as a case study for naturalism. First, I present my own view of the first-person perspective and point out its naturalistic and nonnaturalistic aspects; then I give a brief survey of Metzinger’s naturalistic account (which explicitly discusses my view). After challenging some aspects of Metzinger’s account of the first-person perspective, I consider some of the consequences of his naturalistic account. Metzinger’s account leads to the question: Could there be a well-confirmed naturalistic theory that is rationally untenable and/or self-defeating?

WITTGENSTEIN, LANGUAGE AND CHESS
Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera, University of Atlántico, Colombia

For the philosophy of language, the chess analogy to explain language has been more than a mere occasional comparison. It appears very frequently used in Wittgenstein’s works. This paper seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of the analogy and to mark its importance, which hasn’t been adequately appreciated to this day with respect to the extent to which it was successfully used by the Viennese philosopher.

WITTGENSTEIN ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY
Chantal Bax, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Wittgenstein clearly emphasizes the collective instead of the individual in his later writings. This may seem to undermine, among other things, our concept of personal responsibility. Wittgenstein’s emphasis is however only irreconcilable with this concept if individual and community are taken to be diametrically opposed. I argue that Wittgenstein does not take them to be so. On my reading, nothing could be farther from a Wittgensteinian picture of community than the image of a larger whole into which individuals are absorbed and to which they transfer all accountability.

ABOUT “DIE LETZTE ZUSAMMENFASSUNG”
Luciano Bazzocchi, University of Pisa, Italy

The Tractatus composition takes advantage of a loose sheet support (format?), referred to by Russell as “die letzte Zusammenfassung”. Only by its employment does the numeration system have the extraordinary ability to architectonic modelling that today Tractatus hypertextual version shows. It can be assumed that the technique of representation on melted sheets covers the entire period of the elaboration of the Tractatus, from 1915 to 1918, with the function of (proto)hypertext virtual pages.

ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY AS A PROJECT OF EMANCIPATION FROM SUFFERING
Ondoej Beran, Karls-University Prag, Czech Republic

This paper aims at a certain inter-traditional comparison of Wittgenstein’s and Schopenhauer’s work, namely in identifying the “Indian” aspect of the latter’s philosophy: its self-interpretation as a form of emancipation from suffering by means of breaking through the veil of illusion to the knowledge of “will”. Tractarian Wittgenstein tries to liquidate all the so-called philosophical problems through analysis of language, and then to throw overboard his own philosophy, as a result of which all problems, both philosophical ones and problems of life, vanish. The late Wittgenstein’s project has a structure similar to Schopenhauer’s: he wants to break through language’s captivity of reason by means of a description. Attaining the knowledge of the functioning of language and establishing philosophical clarity, he manages to heal philosophical discomfort, which may coincide with the unease one feels throughout one’s entire life. It is then possible to stop the philosophical activity, which was just a therapeutic reaction to disease.
WITTGENSTEIN AND KRIPKE’S SKEPTIC
P. R. Bhat, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, India

Language and other cultural aspects are made possible by humans by formulating rules and thereby exercising their freedom. All cultural rules are normative and even science would be so. Rules are arbitrary to begin with and become necessary once we formulate them. Adhering to the rules and their practices makes them necessary. A word might have several rules for its use or only one. Interpretations of rules are possible for two reasons. If there are many rules, in a context, interpretation becomes necessary. If the phenomenon is such that we must have to perspectivise, interpretation becomes necessary. When we grasp the rule, we grasp its infinite applications. Kripke’s skeptic mistakes the logic of rules. He assumes that rules remain arbitrary all along and hence interpretation of the rule has to be done at every instance of its application. He also fails to note the general nature of rules. This contention is contrary to what Wittgenstein believes.

LANGUAGE IN ARCHAIC, PRE-REFERENTIAL CULTURES. THE EMERGENCE OF DUALISM
Ewa Biniczky, Nicolas Copernicus University, Torun, Poland

The main subject of concern in the paper are very exotic kinds of cultures: arcaic, magical or preliterate cultures of the past. The exotism of the archaic world can be to some degree reconstructed by anthropology and the text presents such reconstruction, mainly on the basis of some Polish anthropological conceptions.

But the inspiration of the paper was Josef Mitterer’s hypothesis that the so-called dualizing mode of speaking has its historical roots. The dualizing mode of speaking is comprehended as a set of argumentative techniques that assume the ontological difference between the object and its description. Moreover, it creates the other side of discourse which plays an important role of the independent instance that can settle any argument. The other side of discourse can possess many faces, like the only God in monotheistic religion or objective reality in scientific arguments.

The fascinating picture of arcaic, superperformative and pre-referential use of language suggests that the assumptions of dualism can really have its history and institutional background. They can be seen as simple side-effects, arbitrary to some degree, of some techniques and rules of building argumentations. Consequently, we can also ask about possible cultural reasons and necessary conditions of the emergence of dualism. The paper tries to indicate selected factors in this process, underlying mainly the role of literacy and scientific revolution from the XVIIIth century.

WITTGENSTEIN ON COLORS AND INTERNAL RELATIONS, 1930–1932
Andreas Blank, Cohn Institute for the History of Science and Ideas, Tel Aviv, Israel

Colors play a major role in Wittgenstein’s notebooks of his transitional period, roughly between 1930 and 1932. While his views on color in the last years of his life have found widespread attention among his commentators, little work has been done on his views on color in the early 30s. The present paper has the aim of bringing some light into both the details and the overall strategy of what Wittgenstein, in the early 30s, has to say about color. In particular, I will highlight the connection between the concepts of color, color representation, and internal relation. According to Wittgenstein, whereas external relations such as causal relations may or may not hold between given relata, internal relations are such that, once their relata are given, it is unthinkable that they do not hold. The concept of internal relation plays a crucial role in Wittgenstein’s early views on meaning. In the early 30s, Wittgenstein applies this concept to the relation between color representations and colors, as well as to the relations of mixture, sameness, and dissimilarity holding between colors.

CONFLICTS, LANGUAGE, AND RATIONALITY
Alcino Eduardo Bonella, Federal University of Uberlandia, Brazil

This paper will discuss some aspects of a descriptivist interpretation of moral divergences and convergences. The idea that subjectivism is, in certain aspects, less open to the maintenance of conflicts than objectivism, at least if the logic of the value words is well clarified, will be explored.

DAVIDSON ON INTERCULTURAL DIALOG
Cristina Borgoni, University of Granada, Spain

An important conclusion drawn by Donald Davidson on language and interpretation is that for an activity of interpretation to succeed and, consequently, for language to be possible at all, it is necessary that beliefs are being shared between those involved. My main aim in this paper is to examine what Davidson, through this kind of conception, has to say about intercultural dialog and its issues.
IST MEINE EIGENE WELTANSCHAUUNG NOT THIRD-PERSONAL ENOUGH?

Gerson Brea and Hilan Bensusan, University of Brasilia, Brazil


WHAT CAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRIBUTE TO THE EXPLANATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS?
A PLEA FOR NATURALISM

Johannes L. Brandl, University of Salzburg, Austria

Consciousness is a difficult topic and philosophers have done an impressive amount of work in illuminating this subject matter. But how much of this work is of lasting importance? What are the results of centuries of philosophical investigation that are not already superseded by empirical research or that will soon be superseded?

Anti-naturalists can offer here the following response: It is due to philosophy that we know about the limits of any possible empirical research into the nature of consciousness. This is the point, for instance, of arguments intended to show that no neurophysiological or cognitive theory will do justice to the phenomenology and subjectivity of consciousness. For anti-naturalists there are important things that science cannot explain, and it is the task of philosophy to remind us of these boundaries.

Naturalists find themselves here in a more difficult position. First of all, they have to make plausible how the subjectivity of consciousness can be adequately accounted for in a neurophysiological or cognitive theory. And secondly, they have to tell us what substantial contribution philosophy can make to the study of consciousness if it is not by demarcating the boundaries of empirical research.

The aim of my talk will be to help the naturalist out of this predicament.

AN ECONOMISTS REFLECTIONS ON SOME RECENT TRENDS IN EUROPEAN CULTURE.

Y.S. Brenner, Utrecht University, The Netherlands

The paper discusses the equivocal character of the free-market. It tries to elucidate the systems inherently progressive and reprobat economic and social mechanisms. It illustrates how the system tends to transform individualism into socially and economically debilitating crude materialist self-interest, and analyses the successes and failures of the Welfare States intended remedial role of providing the market system with direction, stability, and a human-face. It elaborates the

consequences of the increasing separation of the ownership from the control of capital, the subjugation of truth to expediency, and the loss of a moral compass, to illustrate the risks involved in post-modern attitudes and in the present days rush to privatisation. The paper concludes with the observation that the west is in a process of social and economic reorganisation the outcome of which is unpredictable, but that our decisions may influence its future.

HOW TO MAKE OPPOSITE ENDS MEET?

Aysegul Cakal, Bogazici University, Turkey

As we all know, there is no consensus on dividing Wittgenstein’s philosophy into periods. Here, I will endorse the view that his philosophy consists of two opposite periods such as early and late, at least as far as the notion of meaning is concerned. I will try to show this by means of two opposite approaches on meaning in analytic philosophy, absolute objective approach and pragmatic approach. To this aim, I will correlate the views expressed in Tractatus with the absolute objective approach and the views expressed in Philosophical Investigations with the pragmatic approach. In doing this, I will try to compare and contrast both views on the basis of the notion of meaning.

Then I will further claim that this claim does not imply that his philosophy consists of opposite and incompatible (two) periods. I will come to the conclusion that these two opposite approaches put forward by Wittgenstein are opposing but not incompatible.

INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE IN PHILOSOPHY: JULIO ENRIQUE BLANCO, HANS LINDEMANN, WITTGENSTEIN AND AUSTRIAN TRADITION

René J. Campis C. and Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera, University of Atlántico, Colombia

In La filosofía en América (Barranquilla, 1945), J. E. Blanco (JEB) provides a general description and some criticisms of the Vienna Circle. The essay is a lengthy commentary to Hans Lindemann’s El Círculo de Viena y la filosofía científica (Buenos Aires, 1944). The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the resonation of “scientific philosophy” in Latin America by means of these authors, a good example of contemporary intercultural dialogue between European and Latin-American tradition by the mid-20th century. We would like to concentrate here on the Blanco-Lindemann dialogue. We sustain that given his background, Blanco was well informed about the influences on the Vienna Circle, but regarding Wittgenstein, he failed to recognize his importance for philosophy, although he did acknowledge his genius; considering that Wittgenstein’s works were not published until later, Blanco and Lindemann only got to see the tip of the iceberg with respect to him.
In this paper, I give a new and simplified reading of Wittgenstein’s ‘private language argument.’ I present the argument as consisting in two basic stages, the second of which pertains to the possibility of a private sensation language, and which addresses concerns which emerge naturally out of the first stage, which pertains to identity statements. In §253, I argue, Wittgenstein develops a critique of Leibniz’s principles of identity in an effort to provide support for a characterization of sensations as qualitatively discernable identicals, states of a living human body which ‘show up’ in qualitatively distinct ways depending upon whether one is in the state in question, or merely observes it. The argument against a ‘private sensation language’ can then be seen as responding to an attempt, by the interlocutor, to identify the various phenomena referred to in our sensation talk with phenomenal items which, existing independently of the ‘natural expressions’ or outward signs of sensation, it is impossible for others to know.

WITTGENSTEIN ON FREGE ON CONNECTIVES
Joao Vergilio Gallerani Cuter, University of Sao Paolo, Brazil

Wittgenstein gives us good reasons to regard Frege’s treatment of negation as an untenable one. His criticism is not based on the acceptance of the Tractarian conception of language.

WHERE TO SEEK FOR THE ‘UNIQUELY INDIVIDUAL’ IN HUMAN EXPERIENCE: IN THE TWILIGHT ZONE OF CONSCIOUSNESS OR SOMEWHERE MORE ACCESSIBLE?
Fulya Ozlem Dashan, Bosphorus University, Turkey

As technology advances and becomes an indispensable part of our daily lives, we are beginning to experience certain side effects of it such as a mass depersonalization in the sense that our identity is increasingly being transformed into numbers on our credit cards, genetic codes on our chromosomes, etc. In such an era, more and more people are resorting to ‘inwardly destined’ practices to restore their selfhood and the question whether there is such an essentially private, inner aspect of one’s experiences to which only the individual can have access is becoming an ever more important issue.

In this paper, my aim is to show that Wittgenstein’s private language argument does not pose a threat to the authenticity of the individual nor does it annihilate the uniqueness of his experiences. I will argue that what secures the authenticity and uniqueness of a person is not the existence of a private language only the individual can make sense of, but, rather the personally chosen combination of concepts in a public language composed uniquely by the speaker each time s/he makes an utterance.

SEARLES NATURALISMUS: EINE SEINER SCHWIERIGKEITEN IN BEZUG AUF DAS GEISTIGE UND DAS SOZIALE
Târik de Athayde Prata, University of Heidelberg, Germany*

In der vorliegenden Arbeit geht es darum, auf gewisse Schwierigkeiten hinzuweisen, die aus der Art entstehen, wie Searle seine naturalistische Auffassung des Geistes und der Gesellschaft artikuliert hat. Searle versucht die sozialen Phänomene in unsere allgemeine naturwissenschaftliche Weltanschauung zu integrieren, indem er die Entstehung solcher Phänomene auf den Geist zurückführt. Der menschliche Geist, der laut ihm eine biologische Natur hat, mache die Verbindung zwischen der sozialen Wirklichkeit und der Biologie, so dass sich die soziale Wirklichkeit als Manifestation unserer biologischen Fähigkeiten verstehen lasse. Das Problem ist, dass sich Searles Auffassung des Geistes als problematisch herausstellt, insofern die kausale Erklärbarkeit, die zur Auflösung des Körper-Geist Problems führen sollte, mit der These der ontologischen Irreduzibilität des Geistigen unverträglich zu sein scheint. Aber wenn Searles Naturalisierung des Geistigen vor Schwierigkeiten steht, muss seine Naturalisierung der Gesellschaft vor Schwierigkeiten stehen.

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CONCEPTS, PROTOTYPES, PERSON. DOES COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOLVE CULTURAL PROBLEMS OR DOES IT MERELY DISSOLVE THEIR SPECIFICITY?
Sara Dellantonio, University of Trento, Italy and Luigi Pastore, University of Bari, Italy

In Alvin Goldman’s opinion cognitive researches on concepts may help to find a universal foundation for moral concepts. This paper deals with some problems of this thesis, discussing Goldman’s position according to which prototype theories show that the instance ‘foetus’ is included in the concept ‘person’. Firstly, the paper discusses why prototype theories do not supply any necessary criterion for determining the inclusion of ‘foetus’ in ‘person’ and why, on the contrary, there are reasons for hypothesizing that they support the opposite conclusion. Secondly, it shows that the classical theory, which has been abandoned by the cognitive research, still keep a central role into moral theories. Finally, it investigates the contribution of cognitive research to ethics.
LEBENSFORM AS A WITTGENSTEINIAN WAY OF UNDERSTANDING CULTURE: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES FOR THE (INTERCULTURAL) DIALOGUE

Alessandra Derra, University of Torun, Poland

The question which I want to raise in my article is, Can we develop a perspective for the (intercultural) dialogue following Wittgensteinian idea of culture as 'Lebensform'? I present the category of a form of life and I point out the most plausible interpretations which can be found in the literature. Particularly, I analyse proposals in which it is seen either as something purely biological or as something purely cultural (conventional, social). I am arguing that such interpretations narrow the original Wittgensteinian approach and one cannot use them to explain the phenomenon of culture and human language in full. I will make use of Wittgenstein’s philosophical claims in order to describe the notion of a form of life which can play explanatory role in philosophy. Summing up I will also mention some theoretical conditions, which are essential for the intercultural dialogue to function, supporting the assumption with Mitterer’s theory which exemplifies possible solutions.

PROBLEME DER INTERKulturellen Philosophie (Unter Besonderer Berücksichtigung Indiens)

Kiran Desai-Breun, Erfurt, Germany

Eine Grundfrage, mit welcher sich die interkulturelle Philosophie immer wieder beschäftigt, lautet: Wo fängt die Geschichte der Philosophie an, und warum fängt sie dort an, wo sie anfängt? Diese Frage lässt sich nicht ohne weiteres eindeutig beantworten, denn ihre Antwort beinhaltet immer schon sowohl das Selbstverständnis der Philosophie als auch das philosophische Selbstverständnis derer, die sie stellen. Sollen interkulturelle Studien Erfolg haben, so muss man sich zunächst darüber verständigen, was der Gegenstand des Vergleichs sei. Man steht unumgänglich vor der Frage: Was ist Philosophie? Daraus ergeben sich Probleme, welche die interkulturelle Philosophie, indem sie fortschreitet, sich bewusst machen muss. Im Folgenden werden einige Probleme erörtert, mit welchen sich die interkulturelle Philosophie konfrontiert sieht. Selbstverständlich kann sie nicht alle Probleme lösen, aber sie kann immerhin das Feld vorbereiten, auf dem sie allерerst möglich wird.

THE RATIONAL STRUCTURE OF NON-VIOLENT WORLDVIEW

Antoni, Drago, University of Florence and University of Pisa, Italy

The non-violent worldview born as an alternative to the Western civilization as applied to Indian people. The innumerable writings by his leader, Gandhi, and also the several analyses of them have been unsuccessful in producing a commonly accepted theory of non-violence. The present paper introduces a new viewpoint, obtained from a comparative analysis of some past scientific theories which are alternative theories to the dominant one, i.e. Newton’s mechanics. As a consequence, the alternative theories are characterised through a list of basic features which applies in a similar way to the non-violent worldview, which is then qualified as a well-defined theory of conflict resolution.

RADICAL INTERPRETATION AND INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION

Eli Dresner, Tel Aviv University, Israel

The term radical interpretation is used by Donald Davidson to refer to the following hypothetical situation: Two persons who do not share a common language or culture interact with each other and come to understand each other’s language. Davidson’s objective in examining this situation is not to analyze intercultural communication. Rather, his aim, following Quine, is to capture by this scenario what linguistic meaning amounts to. In this paper I propose to reverse this explanatory order, and show how Davidson’s view of language, as encapsulated in the notion of radical interpretation, bears upon intercultural dialogue. In particular, I shall argue that Davidson’s outlook undermines the very use of the notion inter-cultural dialogue (or communication): According to his perspective linguistic communication is essentially interpersonal, always taking place between individuals and not between convention-governed cultural or social systems.

WITTGENSTEIN ON HOW TO UNTANGLE CULTURAL BIASES

Christoph Durt, Munich, Germany

The lively discourse that followed my presentation last year regarding cultural influences on our thinking and understanding led to new insights, some of which I will discuss here. First I explain that – like myths – pictures provide potentially misleading cultural influences. This confirms that Wittgenstein did not work on Frazer’s ethnological explanations for over 20 years to refute a by now antiquated ethnological method, but also to question his own philosophical views and to develop a better, intercultural approach to language and culture. I will then further clarify why Wittgenstein’s intercultural approach is more objective, and give an example of how it can stand between the viewpoints of different cultures.

MULLA SADRA’S THEORY OF SUBSTANTIVE MOTION

Mohammad Fanaei Eshkevari, University of Qom, Iran

Motion as traditionally defined is the gradual emergence of something from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality. A more simple definition is to say that motion is “gradual change.” Before Mulla Sadra philosophers used to think that only some accidents are subject of motion, but motion cannot occur in substance; change in substance always takes the form of sudden generation and corruption. However, according to Mulla Sadra’s theory of substantive
motion, all corporeal beings whether substance or accident are in motion. Motion is not an accident that occurs in things; rather it is the mode of existence of material world. Motion and matter are not separable. Contrary to traditional philosophers who think that motion requires a subject in which it occurs, Mulla Sadra thinks that what is necessary for motion is continuous existence, not a stable subject.

In his view, time is neither an illusion or mere imagination, nor an independent existent which exists on its own; rather it is the measure of motion and the fourth non-stable dimension of a corporeal being. A corporeal being has two extensions: spatial and temporal. The spatial extension is stable whose parts exist together in the state of existence, and the temporal extension is non-stable whose parts are passing and progressive and cannot exist simultaneously.

WHY NOTHING SOCIAL EXISTS OUTSIDE THE TEXT
Maurizio Ferraris, University of Turin, Italy

When Searle enters a Paris café and pronounces the sentence “Un demi, Munich, à pression, s’il vous plaît” he becomes embroiled in a huge invisible ontology of norms, prices, codes, rules; a universe of such complexity that it would have had Kant shivering in his bones, if only Kant had ever thought about it. It is clear that documents play a special role in this huge invisible ontology, and the importance of such objects has for too long been underestimated in the history of philosophy.

In Searle’s own social ontology, social objects are still regarded as mere higher order objects founded on physical objects, in line with the formula X counts as Y in context C. In contradiction to Searle, I shall advance the hypothesis that social objects are defined by the law Object = Inscribed Act: social objects are social acts (involving at least two individuals) that have the distinctive feature of being inscribed on paper, on a computer file, or also in peoples’ minds. In the social world, therefore, it turns out to be true what, in the physical and ideal worlds is obviously false, namely: nothing exists beyond the text.

INDETERMINISMUS FREIER WILLENSENTSCHEIDUNGEN: ONTISCH, EPISTEMISCH ODER LOGISCH?
Helmut Fink, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany


IS NATURALISM PROGRESSIVE? A NATURALISTIC APPROACH TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Ulrich Frey, Technical University of Braunschweig, Germany

In current debates in philosophy one important division is between naturalistic and non-naturalistic approaches. I will try to explore some consequences of a naturalistic perspective in philosophy of science and discuss explanation power and shortcomings of both perspectives.

It is argued that every investigation into scientific enterprises needs to consider the cognitive abilities of human beings, which includes scientists. Next to historical and sociological factors, cognitive abilities are at the center of decision-making and problem-solving of individuals and therefore of paramount importance. An empirically based cognitive philosophy of science has often been called for, but has almost never been implemented. There are hardly any attempts to link empirical results from, say psychology, to scientific case studies. I will try to undertake such an approach as described above.

The main tenets of a naturalistic approach to the philosophy of science are summed up and a very short example will demonstrate how this theoretical framework can be put into practise.

TWO SENSES OF COMMON SENSE.
Zacharoula Gasparatou, University of Patras, Greece

Analytic philosophy often appeals to a conceptual consensus of mankind in order to justify its analyses. This appeal could be interpreted as a plea for some kind of “common sense”. I would like to suggest that analytic philosophy’s call for common sense can be of at least two kinds. The first one suggests an appeal to everyday intuitions of plain men and is best represented historically in the writings of G. E. Moore and J. L. Austin. The second invites an ideal common sense of a “second nature”. It is the one found in the grammatical investigation performed by L. Wittgenstein. I will conclude that Wittgenstein’s approach invites an ‘enlightened’ common sense, an ideal that is more becoming a philosophical criterion.
AGAInst THEIr Own Intention: Problematic Consequences of Ontological Emergence
Georg Gasser and Joseph Wang, University of Innsbruck, Austria

In this paper we examine ontological emergence (OE). We will not discuss OE in general, but in philosophy of mind. According to our opinion the main motivation for philosophers to look for an emergentist theory is a commitment to a naturalistic understanding of reality on the one hand and a realistic attitude towards the mental on the other. Tim O’Connor et al. made several proposals how an emergentist theory of mind might work. Analysing these proposals we come to a negative conclusion: O’Connor’s et al.’s version of emergentism cannot keep its promises. Additionally there lurk some counter-intuitive conclusions which better should be avoided.

Recognising Beauty: On the Intercultural Dialogue in Philosophy
Mahlete-Tsige Getachew, University of York, UK

In her novel The Bluest Eye, Toni Morrison gives us a story of how two young black girls struggle to be valued in a culture where beauty can only have blue eyes and blonde hair. One of the protagonists chooses a reciprocatory and absolute rejection of this paradigm of beauty, the other chooses self-abnegation so that she can emulate this paradigm and be accepted. I interpret Morrison’s novel as a story about the struggle for recognition and the interim loss of beauty, and use The Bluest Eye as a lens to examine intercultural philosophy. I argue that intercultural dialogue in philosophy cannot take place while philosophy’s different cultures are facing crises of recognition and a damaging refusal to acknowledge their different beauties. Moreover, I suggest that when philosophy’s various cultures and beauties are properly recognised, it would be better to characterise dialogue as intra-cultural, and I suggest that we should adjust our present aims accordingly.

Wittgensteins Theorie der Sprache aus der Perspektive von Athen und Jerusalem
Eveline Goodman-Thau, Jerusalem, Israel

„Identifizierung der eigenen Götter mit Göttern der anderen Völker. Man überzeugt sich davon, daß die Namen die gleiche Bedeutung haben.“ (Ludwig Wittgenstein)


In unsere Ausführungen wollen wir in den Spuren von Wittgensteins kulturkritischem Weg die Wurzeln des abendländischen Denkens im Vergleich zwischen Hellenismus und Hebraismus, Athen und Jerusalem aufzeigen, wie auch ihren Einfluss auf die Philosophie der Moderne, besonders bei jüdischen Denkern. Zum Schluss sollen die Bedeutung von Wittgensteins Einsichten und ihrer Rezeptionsgeschichte für die Gegenwart reflektiert werden als mögliche Basis einer kulturellen Hermeneutik für Europa, welche nicht nur die Verschiedenheit der Sprachen, sondern mehr als alles andere die kontextuelle Gebundenheit der Bedeutung als Paradigma von Tradition und Moderne miteinbezieht, wobei die Sprache und nicht der Begriff Garant der Differenz in der Einheit ist.

Rainer Gottlob, Vienna, Austria

Der Zeitgeist bedingte Relativismus ignoriert wesentliche Fragen, die für das Überleben der Menschheit relevant sind. Die Menschheit muss ihre geistige Evolution selber in die Hand nehmen. Einige Erziehungsmethoden, auf die näher eingegangen wird, können dazu beitragen.

Postmodernismus als Argumentationstechnik
Marek Graszewicz and Dominik Lewiński, Wroclaw University, Poland

FREUD-JUNG CONTROVERSY: A FAILED INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE.

Ora Gruengard, Shenkar College for Engineering and Design, Israel

Psychologists like to present the dispute between Freud and Jung as a psychological issue, and analyze it in terms of “emotionally immature” father-son relationship. But whether any of them was or was not “immature” in that sense, it is “cognitively immature” to ignore the philosophical differences between their views, and, in particular, their ideological disagreement about father-son relationships. That disagreement not only reflects their cultural dissimilarities, it also expresses discrepancies between their personal attitudes to their respective cultural backgrounds, and is involved with a mutual awareness to those differences. Over and above all that, it exemplifies a reciprocal attempt to use psychological tools in order to criticize the other’s culture and de-legitimate and de-validate the other’s attitude to culture. Those attempts, rather than their interpersonal “father-son” tensions, are responsible for their failure to come into terms. Their disrupted dialogue is, therefore, not a case of a simple failure to be aware of one’s own cultural “conditioning” or accept the “cultural otherness” of the other. It failed because of divergent attitudes to culture itself. As such it is a better representative of intercultural failed dialogues than simple-minded models that are nowadays fashionable in some culturally-minded circles.

CULTURAL DIALOGUE AND HUMAN SOLIDARITY: R. RORTY – J. HABERMAS DEBATE REVISITED IN THE LIGHT OF L. WITTEGENSTEIN’S PHILOSOPHY

Boris Gubman, Tver State University, Russia

R. Rorty-J. Habermas debate on the issues of cultural dialogue and horizons of human solidarity is largely based on L. Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Despite their disagreement in interpretation of the subject, both thinkers appeal to Wittgenstein’s understanding of language, communication and culture. However, Rorty’s radical postmodernist stance of neo-pragmatist philosopher is totally opposite to the strategy developed within the neo-Marxism of Habermas. The contingency and incommensurability of the non-similar cultural contexts constituted by language games is one of the basic claims of Rorty’s philosophy. Following D. Davidson, he believes that the uniqueness of this or that culture means its non-translatability into the language of the alien cultural context. Habermas is, on the contrary, persuaded that language constitutes the milieu of universally expanding communication bringing about the opportunity of ideal pattern of human understanding. Deeply rooted in the Enlightenment reflexive pattern, his theory of communicative action culminates in the claim that I. Kant’s categorical imperative is still of vital importance providing the universal foundation of human relations irrespective of cultural and social diversity. As a liberal ironist, Rorty declares his indebtedness to the Romantic pattern of cultural reflection. However, his emphasis on the uniqueness of cultural phenomena appears to be reconcilable with the quite universalistic view permitting to accept the value of fellow-humans on the basis of compassion and the need for human solidarity combating cruelty and violence.

GROUND ACTION: WITTGENSTEIN AGAINST SKEPTICISM

Edward Guetti, Seton Hall University, USA

In this paper I respond to recent skeptical claims made against the possibility of certainty of knowing what we mean when we use language. A large part of the philosophical response is based on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and some of the works of Quine. I argue that these responses of contemporary skeptics (Thomas Nagel and Peter Unger to be precise) is based on a false understanding of language. Once we understand how to use language, doubting what we mean becomes a strange game to play and rather superfluous.

HUMAN BEINGS: THE MIND AND THE BODY - WITTGENSTEINIAN-ARISTOTELIAN REFLECTIONS

Peter M.S. Hacker, University of Oxford, UK

"Und wie kann ein Körper eine Seele haben?" (Wittgenstein)

We conceive of ourselves as having a mind, and also as having a body. The question of how the body one has is related to the mind one has puzzled philosophers since the dawn of philosophy. In order to dissolve the problem, the concepts of mind and of having a mind, as well as the concepts of the body and of having a body, need to be scrutinized. The concept of mind is best characterized not by reference to the concept of consciousness – as the Cartesian tradition has it, but by reference to the concepts of intellect and will (rational desire) -- as the Aristotelian tradition argued. Having a mind is thus linked to rationality and the ability to reason and to act for reasons. Rationality is in turn linked to mastery of a language.

Having a body is to be distinguished from being a body. In one sense of the polysemic term ‘body’, human beings are bodies; in another sense of ‘body’, they have a body. But the body they have is not identical with the body they are. The question of what has to be true of a creature for it to be said to have a body is examined, and the concept of having a body is clarified. Human beings have a mind and also a body. But it is misleading to suggest that the mind a human being has stands in a RELATION to the body he has.

PASSING BY THE NATURALISTIC TURN: ON QUINE’S CUL-DE-SAC

Peter M.S. Hacker, University of Oxford, UK

Naturalism, it has been said, is the distinctive development in philosophy over the last thirty years. There has been a naturalistic turn away from the a priori methods of traditional philosophy to a conception of philosophy as continuous with natural science. The doctrine has been extensively discussed and has won considerable following in the USA. This is, on the whole, not true of Britain and continental Europe, where the pragmatist tradition never took root, and the temptations of scientism in philosophy were less alluring.

* See, for example, Brian Leiter, ‘Naturalism and Naturalized Jurisprudence’, in Objectivity in Law and Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 79.
One of the main targets of Al-Ghazālī’s *Incoherence of the Philosophers* is the Aristotelian doctrine that every change requires an underlying substratum, which seems to entail that the material universe and each human soul are either not substances or else eternal. Since a substance does not inhere in any further substratum, it seems that there can be no change by which a substance comes into existence. I will argue that despite his merely critical intent, Al-Ghazālī points out two distinctions that are still of crucial importance for contemporary metaphysics: the distinctions between potentialities vs. possibilities, and the distinction between receptacles vs. substrata. Whereas the potential for being A must inhere in a receptacle that may eventually become A, the possibility for being A need only inhere in a substratum that need not possibly become A. This will be shown to have important consequences for the notion of a substance.

**WITTGENSTEIN AND THE LANGUAGE OF RELIGION IN SECULAR AGE**

Zora Hesová, University of Potsdam and University of Frankfurt Oder, Germany

The topic of this paper is Wittgenstein’s starling statement, in which he declares ethical speech hopelessly meaningless and yet expresses his deep respect for religious and ethical talk. The tension between the declared impossibility to speak on religious and ethical topics and the avowed tendency to do so is a paradox with which Wittgenstein has struggled. If Wittgenstein’s writings on religion have been given a substantial attention in the past decade, very often, though, his religious or even mystical leanings were uncritically presupposed.

The purpose of this paper is to argue that the topos of religion (and ethics) is definitely present, yet in a purely negative way: religion and ethics have no positive place in Wittgenstein’s secularised language. On the other hand, Wittgenstein’s efforts to delimit meaningful language also allow to mark en essential difference between religious and ethical speech and the discursive one, thus attempt to restore a proper, even if paradoxical, space for religion.

**UNCERTAINTY AS A CHALLENGE FOR ETHICAL REASONING**

Rafaela Hillerbrand, Westfälische Wilhelms-University, Germany

Moral philosophy has for the most part referred to a world in which morally relevant properties of human actions are certain in the sense that they are both well-determined and knowable. In general, any action and decision making however takes place under conditions of ‘uncertainty’. We therefore want to ask to what extent the results obtained from decision theory, which typically treats problems of ‘uncertainty’, can be of use for ethical reasoning. It becomes clear that ‘uncertainty’ as it challenges moral philosophy cannot be reduced to the problem of uncertainty treated in decision theory. Taking the man-made greenhouse effect as a paradigm for morally relevant decision under ‘uncertainty’, a classification of different types of ‘uncertainties’ is established which are relevant for ethical reasoning. A possible way for treating these problems is adumbrated.

**ES GIBT KEINEN DISSENS, ES GIBT NUR SCHLECHTE INTERPRETATION. INTERKULTURELLER DIALOG UND DISSENS**

Kathrin Hönig, University of Zurich, Switzerland


**KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITIES**

Jennifer Hornsby, University of London, UK

According to the dominant (‘standard’) story of action, beliefs are the cognitive states of mind to be credited to those who act for reasons. But I suggest that in a full account of reason-explanation, agents have to be treated as knowing things. Agent’s knowledge of how to do this or that is continuous with their capacities for so-called basic acts. And one crucial notion of ability, which belongs in an account of agency, can only be correctly elucidated in terms of knowledge.

When the fact that agents are knowledgeable is brought to bear, there is a new way to think about the various conceptions there are of what an agent is able to do. And one can enquire which of these conceptions is relevant to a certain debate about freedom of action.

**WITTGENSTEIN IM IRAN**

Malek Hosseini, Munich, Germany

Die Rezeption Wittgensteins im Iran erfolgte verhältnismäßig spät, hat aber in den letzten 15 Jahren eine bemerkenswerte Intensität erreicht. Der erste Teil der vorliegenden Arbeit untersucht den Beginn dieser Rezeption und die ersten Werke der ersten Phase der Beschäftigung mit Wittgenstein im Iran. Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit wird die zweite Phase dieser Rezeption dargestellt. Dabei wird zuerst der Hintergrund für die spätere Beschäftigung mit Wittgenstein im Iran aufgezeigt und ein Überblick bis in die Gegenwart gegeben; anschließend werden einige aus dieser Zeit stammende persische Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein vorgestellt. Schließlich

WITTGENSTEIN’S PAPERWORK. AN EXAMPLE FROM THE “BIG TYPESCRIPT”
Herbert Hrachovec, University of Vienna, Austria

This paper is an attempt to show that close attention to Wittgenstein’s workflow as he dissects and re-composes his typescripts reveals a hitherto largely unexplored stratum of his philosophy. The textual basis of this presentation is one of the initial sub-chapters of the “Big Typescript” (BT). It is shown how Wittgenstein, in these pages, constructs a three step argument by recomposing material taken from different contexts.

WITTGENSTEIN ON ACTION AND THE WILL
John Hyman, Oxford University, UK

Three closely related mistakes have affected philosophical theories of action and the will since the seventeenth century: (1) Confusing the distinction between active and passive and the distinction between voluntary and involuntary; (2) Confusing action and motion, e.g. the action of moving something and the motion of the thing one moves; (3) A one-sided diet of examples, i.e. thinking almost exclusively about movements of parts of the agent’s body. I shall discuss these three mistakes—especially, but not exclusively, in relation to the treatment of these topics in §§611-632 and Part II section 8 of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations.

THE DEFINITION AND ATTRIBUTES OF SUBSTANCE IN MUSLIM PERIPATETIC PHILOSOPHY: OLD ANSWERS TO NEW QUESTIONS
Mohsen Javadi, University of Qom, Iran

Reviewing contemporary questions about Aristotle’s definition of substance, we try to find some answers for them in the light of the explanation and comments of Muslim peripatetic philosophers in this regard.

What is the nature and how is the existence of the individual substance (primary substance according to Aristotle) and also the other substances such as species and genus (secondary substances in Aristotle)? Individual substance can be a subject for species and genus in the one hand and for accidents on the other hand, so what is the exact difference between the predication of a substance and an accident to a being? Is it the predicating of some substance to a being coherent with the basic character of it namely not being present in a thing?

Secondary substance can be an attribute for an individual being such as being a man for Ali and also can be an attribute for some other secondary substance for example being an animal for a man. (In these cases the attribute is called essential or substantial) but in the case of the accidents we find some perplexities. Some of the attributes taken from the accidents are called accidental, such as being coloured for this table. But the same accident may be an essential property for another accident such as red or green. So we can conclude that the correlate concept of the secondary substance is accident and not attribute as suggested by the name of this workshop.

What roles can be played by the dichotomy of substance and accident in metaphysics?

This paper will pay attention particularly to the works of such commentators of Aristotle’s Categories as Farabi and Avicenna (representatives of the Eastern Muslim world) and Ibn Bajiah and Ibn Rushd on the other hand (representatives of the Western Muslim world).

SUBSTANCE AND ATTRIBUTE IN THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE TWO GREATEST WESTERN PHILOSOPHERS (LEIBNIZ AND SPINOZA): LEIBNIZ’S CRITIQUE OF SPINOZA’S ARGUMENT FOR PANTHEISM (ETHICS, TH. 14) IN HIS REMARKS ON BENEDICT DE SPINOZA’S ETHICS (PART I, OF GOD)
Tomasz Kakol, Nicholas Copernicus University, Poland

In the current article I present and comment on fragments of Leibniz’s Remarks on Benedict de Spinoza’s Ethics (part I, Of God). Emphasis is put on Spinoza’s and Leibniz’s remarks on substance and attribute. I guide the reader through Leibniz’s reconstruction of the proof for theorem 2 from the first part of his Ethics and Leibniz’s criticism concerning it. The importance of theorem 2 lies in that it is used by Spinoza in the proof for pantheism (expressed in theorem 14). Another thing worth considering is Leibniz’s critical remarks related to Spinoza’s argument for the existence of a substance (theorem 7). I reconstruct part of both Spinoza’s and Leibniz’s reasoning using modalities. I also reconstruct Spinoza’s proof for the uniqueness of a substance presented by theorem 8. Finally, I recall main features of the Leibnizian concept of substance pointing at the disagreement between both philosophers concerning extension.
ON FREEDOM TO PREDICT
Laurian Kertész, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

I discuss the problem of the conflict between foreknowledge and free will, according to Wittgenstein. I suggest that Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Freedom of the Will may improve both our understanding of the problem of free will, and of Wittgenstein’s general philosophy. Freedom is rooted in the First Person Authority and co-belongingness to a form of life – which renders fatalism meaningless as a theory but dangerous as an attitude of life.

REFLECTIONS ON ETHICS AND CULTURAL CLASH
Peter P. Kirschenmann, Vrije University, The Netherlands

I discuss ethical questions of the recent Danish cartoon clash. While the substantial issue is free speech and its limitations, the decision to publish the cartoons and the Islamic reactions to them raise further questions about religious freedom, free press, and the strategies followed in the conflict. I emphasize the decisive influence of moral motives. Nevertheless, we should strive for morally acceptable local and global forms of orders, according with human rights, even though the conditions of the therefore required intercultural dialogue may still be hard to bring about.

ANDERSSEIN UND/ODER DIE MACHT DER DIFFERENZ
Endre Kiss, University Eötvös, Hungary

Der umfassende Prozess der Individualisation, selbst ein Motiv und ein Resultat der Verwandlung der Identitätslogik in die Differenzlogik, als unsichtbare, nichtdestoweniger aber umfassende Voraussetzung, verändert jede grundsätzliche Relation, wie die zwischen Gesellschaft und Gemeinschaft, Gemeinschaft und Gemeinschaft, Gemeinschaft und Individualität, Individualität und Individualität. Es ist unvermeidlich, dass diese umfassenden Transformationen die ganze Problematik des Anderen, des Andersseins, sowie der Interkulturalität ebenfalls grundsätzlich verändern.

Die neue Individualität, die wir mit vollem Recht als globalen Individualismus bezeichnen könnten, ist eine eine vollkommene Verkörperung einer Differenzlogik, die jede Begründung in Gattungswerten abgeht. Diese neue Individualität ist einerseits die Manifestierung einer Differenzlogik, die von einer gewissen Distanz der Abstraktion aus gesehen als die historische Siegerin über einer im Totalitarismusverdacht stehenden Identitätslogik fungiert. Diese Differenzlogik des globalen Individualismus erzeugt aber auf einen Schlag eine ganze Reihe kritischer neuen Probleme, denn ihr geht jegliche Gattungsdimension ab. Die Siegerin wird dadurch noch nicht unbedingt zu einer Verliererin, die Logik der Differenz ohne Gattungs-

"SOCIAL ACTION, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DIFFICULTIES OF SOCIAL DECISION MAKING"
Michael Kober, University of Freiburg, Germany

To begin with, an account of social action that includes we-intentions, roles, attributions of rights and commitments, and a common conception of the ongoing practice will be outlined and motivated. Then, it will be shown that responsibility for the consequences of a particular common action will be distributed over the partaking members according to the role they played in the respective practice. Unfortunately, this distribution of responsibility cannot be used as a model of how a group is or should be developing decisions. Single individuals come up with decisions according to a mixed bag of internal and external motivators that may even change while the individual is carrying out the respective action. On this basis, it will finally be shown why certain groups that are differently organized in paradigmatic fashions (e.g. in strictly hierarchical, somehow democratic and totally anarchistic ways) may develop different and sometimes unpredictable decisions.

ROOTS OF RECOGNITION: CULTURAL IDENTITY AND THE ETHOS OF HERMENEUTIC DIALOGUE
Hans-Herbert Kögler, University of North Florida, USA

The point of this paper is to make social-philosophical insights regarding subjective identity-formation fruitful for a normative and empirically grounded conception of intercultural understanding. Recent critical social theory has shown individual identity to emerge from intersubjective processes of recognition. Personal identity thus becomes inseparable from cultural identity, which is always bound by concrete contexts. However, by reconstructing that the social sources of identity are essentially mediated by linguistic forms of self-understanding, we can argue for an ethos of hermeneutic dialogue that makes a situated transcendence of the contextual boundaries of understanding possible. Normatively, the linguistic mediation of identity allows us to reconstruct (a) the general respect for another speaker, (b) the hermeneutic sensitivity for another’s context, and (c) the reflexive analysis of structural component’s of the other’s objective context as value-orientations of intersubjective understanding. Empirically, this means that those attitudes including respect, context-sensitivity, and critical reflexivity can be seen as grounded in a universally available linguistic competence. The social roots of recognition that make identity possible thus reveal the potential for a hermeneutic dialogue that can challenge power-based and ethnocentric forms of cultural encounters.
NACHDENKEN ÜBER GEWISSHEIT – ZUR ARTIKULIERBARKEIT UND VERHANDELBARKEIT UNSERES KULTURELLEN HINTERGRUNDKÖNNENS- UND WISSENS
Beatrice Kobow, University of California, USA


RESHAPING THE CONCEPT OF SUBSTANCE: THE RENEGADE OCKHAM
Hans Kraml, University of Innsbruck, Austria

The aim of medieval epistemology had been to find the adequation between the general substantial form that makes a thing what it is, and the form that is accepted in human reason. The first and decisive general theory of this adequation is to be found in Al-Farabi's treatise on the intellect (Fi l-aqil). This theory had been elaborated in a somewhat naturalistic manner by Roger Bacon's theory of the multiplication of species, which as a by-product founded the modern theory of perspective and optics in line with another muslim philosopher, Ibn al-Haitham. In turn, this theory was challenged by several medieval thinkers and finally rejected in its entirety by William of Ockham. For Ockham the question is not whether and how we can grasp the general form that constitutes the essence of a thing, and the forms that convey their attributes, but rather how we can get enough knowledge of a thing by acquaintance in order to be able to think about that thing abstractly in its absence. This move is followed by sceptical attitudes and a different development in the question of the nature of things that finally leads to a basically technical orientation in the general attitude towards nature.

ZAR'A-JACOB UND WALDA-HEIWAT ÜBER DIE RATIONALITÄT RELIGIÖSER AUSSAGEN – EIN BEITRAG ZUR ÄTHIOPISCHEN RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHIE DES 17. JAHRHUNDERTS
Andrzej Krause, University Halle-Wittenberg, Germany


WITTGENSTEIN ON CONSCIOUSNESS IN “PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS”
Kristijan Krkač and Josip Lukin, University of Zagreb, Croatia

In this paper the authors present (1) Wittgenstein's understanding of the problem of consciousness, (2) his objections to Cartesian and behaviourist theories, (3) and his solution in terms of his "theory" or "overview" of human nature, sentient beings, and life. Central texts used are taken from PI and Z.

WITTGENSTEIN LIEST FREUD
Matthias Kross, University of Potsdam, Germany


**GELTUNG UND NATURALISMUS**
Tomasz Kubalica, Jagiellonian University, Poland

Can epistemology be naturalized? That cannot be achieved as it seeks to legitimate the results of cognition. To assess the results, however, we need to presuppose the distinction between norms and fact. Windelband's transcendental philosophy provides the foundations of the division.

**DID YOU DO SOMETHING WRONG IF YOU COULDN'T HAVE DONE OTHERWISE? – DEONTIC ACT EVALUATION AND SOME DOUBTS CONCERNING “OUGHT IMPLIES CAN”**
Michael Kühl er, University of Konstanz, Germany

It seems to be plausible that if you can't do otherwise than what you actually do, it would be unfair to charge you with wrongdoing. Despite the familiar ringing of the “Frankfurt-type-examples”-bell, wrongdoing should not be confused with blameworthiness. In this paper I will solely be concerned with the question whether the ability to do otherwise, in conjunction with the principle “ought implies can” (OIC), might function as a necessary condition for deontic act evaluation, i.e. judging acts as wrong.

Firstly, I will present some short examples along with contradictory intuitions concerning the deontic evaluation of the acts involved. To solve this contradiction, bringing in next OIC (including "can refrain") will, however, lead to some general doubts concerning the validity of the principle itself. A concluding example eventually gives rise to an alternative view, resting on normative standards as the basis of deontic act evaluations, while abandoning OIC.

**WITTGENSTEIN UND PYRRHONISMUS**
Rosario La Sala, Erlangen, Germany


**WITTGENSTEIN’S “NOTORIOUS PARAGRAPH” ABOUT THE GÖDEL THEOREM**
Timm Lampert, University of Bern, Switzerland

Recently a number of papers have taken up the debate on Wittgenstein’s remarks on Gödel. In the focus of the discussion is the question what Wittgenstein’s argument is for his claim that “the interpretation ‘P is not provable’ of the Gödel formula P has to be given up if one assumes that either P or ¬P is provable in Principia Mathematica (PM). In this paper it is shown that the given interpretations are not satisfactory, and a detailed reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s argument is offered. Furthermore, it will be put forward that according to all interpretations Wittgenstein’s remarks on Gödel cannot be understood as an expression of “remarkable insight”.

**FOLK PSYCHOLOGY AND PROVERB KNOWLEDGE AS COMMON KNOWLEDGE IN DECISION-MAKING**
Marion Ledwig, Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden

Different kinds of common knowledge, like folk psychology and proverb knowledge, can be used for decision-making in decision and game theory.

**AVICENNA’S ARGUMENT AGAINST GOD’S BEING A SUBSTANCE**
Haji Muhammad Legenhausen, University of Qom, Iran

In this paper I will provide an analysis of Avicenna’s argument for the thesis that God is not a substance, and compare it with an argument for the same conclusion in Aquinas. In order to understand the argument, it will be necessary to examine Avicenna’s concept of substance and how he distinguishes existence and quiddity (whatness). Avicenna begins with the two part Aristotelian definition of a substance as that which is neither in a subject nor predicated of a subject. It is the first part that is the focus of attention in Avicenna’s argument, according to which this condition requires contingency. The argument is interesting for at least three reasons: (1) its significance in Islamic philosophical theology; (2) its similarities and differences with a Thomistic argument for the same conclusion; (3) the need for a logic of singular terms that refer to non-existents.

**WHAT NATURALISTS ALWAYS KNEW ABOUT FREEDOM: A CASE-STUDY IN THE NARRATIVE SOURCES OF “SCIENTIFIC FACTS”**
Winfried Löffler, University of Innsbruck, Austria

“We don’t do what we want, but we want what we do” – slogans like this are a sort of naturalist mantra in the debate about human freedom going on in German (but not only German) popular science over the last years. As
an empirical justification of this claim, it is suggested as a commonplace that actions (i.e. behavior with an accompanying “inner side” like wishes, plans, explanations etc.) could be triggered by external stimulation of the brain. This again is often justified by sloppy references to early pioneers of brain research like Penfield, Rasmussen and Delgado, and some more recent research by Wegner, Brasil-Neto and others. In my paper, I will simply trace back this chain of references and citations as close as possible to well-documented empirical results. The surprising result is that they don’t exist. Instead, it turns out that a cascade of sloppy citations, confidence to hearsay, over-interpretations, slight mistranslations, confusions of probabilistic and strict correlations and other mistakes has created a narrative tradition dense enough to substitute empirical findings. Some naturalists obviously have always known what empirical research could only convey. – Nota bene: I neither want to promote postmodern ideas, nor do I aim to defend any theory about human freedom, especially not an incompatibilist one. I just want to illustrate the claim that the debate between naturalism and antinaturalism is not an incompatibilist one. I only want to illustrate the claim.

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**WITTGENSTEIN ÜBER DAS VERSTÄNDNIS VON KUNSTWERKEN**

Stefan Majetschak, University of Kassel, Germany

Ebenso wie auf anderen Gebieten der Philosophie versuchte der späte Wittgenstein auch auf dem Gebiet der Ästhetik, das Denken aus den Zangen gewisser Begriffe [zu] befreien, die „ganze Zeiten“ zu immer wieder gleichen Denkwegwehungen zwangen. Im Falle der Ästhetik waren die auf diesem Feld seit je dominanten Begriffe „schön“ und „Schönheit“ für ihn solche Zangen, von denen er glaubte, daß sie eine angemessene Auffassung davon, was es heißt, ein Kunstwerk zu verstehen und zu beurteilen, in die Irrleiteten. Denn weit mehr als mit Schönheit habe das, was „Verständnis von Kunstwerken“ heißt, mit – teils expliziten, teils impliziten – Regeln und Paradigmata zu tun, die das Kunsturteil leiten. Der Vortrag wird versuchen, einige Aspekte dessen herauszuarbeiten, was für Wittgenstein im Spätwerk Verständnis von Kunstwerken heißt.

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**THE PROBLEM OF SIMPLE OBJECTS**

Eric Lemaire, University Paris VII, Archives Poincaré (Nancy), France

The aim of the paper is to show the importance of the problem of simple objects for the relation between conception and practice of philosophy in Wittgenstein’s works by means of a new formulation of the problem of the status of Tractarian propositions. The question “What does Wittgenstein’s tractarian ontology really mean when speaking about simple objects?” is still undecided. Many answers were given, but there is no real consensus regarding it. Solving this problem is of the utmost importance to draw a limit to the expression of thought and identifying nonsense via the analysis of ordinary language. The theme of nonsense is at the heart of our difficulties to understand the baffling 6.54 section. Moreover, after he turned back to philosophy, Wittgenstein sought to escape from the 6.54 baffling remark.

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**DESIGNATION AND ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENT IN SELLARS AND PRASANGIKA MADHYAMIKA**

Eric J. Loomis, University of South Alabama, USA

The Prasangika Madhyamika system of Buddhist philosophy claims that the basis upon which we designate an object is never the object designated, even in cases in which the designation is truly made. This claim leads to their doctrine of “two truths”: ultimate truth and conventional truth. Both the claim and the doctrine have interesting similarities to views advanced by Wilfrid Sellars, particularly his distinction between the scientific and the manifest image. I explore some of these.

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**"SUBSTANCE, NATURE, AND IMMANENCE: FORM IN ARISTOTLE’S CONSTITUENT ONTOLOGY"**

Michael Loux, University of Notre Dame, USA

In this paper, I try to display Aristotle’s account of familiar sensible individuals as an instance of the constituent strategy in ontology. On that strategy, a familiar particular is a mereologically complex object that derives its essential character from the things that count as its components or constituents. In Aristotle’s version of the strategy, an individual substance falls under its proper kind in virtue of being a composite of the appropriate form and a parcel of matter of the appropriate sort. Now, constituent ontologists typically present us with reductive accounts of familiar particulars. They tell us that familiar particulars are mere aggregates of their constituents rather genuinely unified objects, and they tell us that the form of being exhibited by a familiar particular is a mere construction out of the more basic forms of being associated with its constituents. Aristotle, however, is notoriously not a reductionist about individual substances. While endorsing the constituent strategy, he wants to claim that things like the individual man and individual horse of the "Categories" are thorough going unities whose characteristic forms of being are irreducibly basic or autonomous. I try to show how his distinctively unique account of form allows him to develop a constituent theory of individual substances that does justice to both their unity and their autonomy.

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**LANGUAGE, WORLD, AND STRUCTURE**

Pentti Määttänen, University of Helsinki, Finland

The principle that meaning is use can be applied not only to linguistic expressions. Generally this amounts to a wide notion of meaning according to which objects of perception are interpreted to be meaningful entities by virtue of habitual activities associated with them. From the viewpoint of a soft version of naturalism the world is experienced as distinct meaningful entities also independently the ability to use natural language. This is based on non-linguistic meanings that are cannot be conventional in the same sense as linguistic expressions.
ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF SOLITARY PERSONS
Tuomas Manninen, University of Iowa, USA

Lynne Baker outlines an application of the material constitution view to personhood (in Baker 2000) on which (human) persons are constituted by (human) organisms so that the two are not identical and yet they are not distinct entities. Something is a person by virtue of having a first-person perspective. Although Baker’s proposal has received a fair share of criticism, virtually none has been directed at what Baker identifies as one of her most controversial claims, that the first-person perspective is relational. Despite being sympathetic to Baker’s constitution view of personhood, I take this controversial claim to be flawed. I will demonstrate how Baker’s claim connects with the discussion of Wittgenstein’s private language argument, and argue that the impossibility of solitary speakers entails the impossibility of solitary persons.

(WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHEREN FÜR DEN MENSCHEN – DENKEN SUB SPECIE HOMINIS ALS MTHODE
Sandra Markewitz, Bielefeld, Germany


(DERIVATIVENESS, PRODUCTION AND REACTING TO THE CAUSE
Rosja Mastop, Utrecht University, The Netherlands

Both Anscombe’s and von Wright’s views continue to play an important role in the debates on the concept of causation. There views are commonly held to be conflicting and their supporters oppose each other. In this paper I hope to show that when we read Anscombe and von Wright in the light of Wittgenstein’s manuscript on this topic, we find that their views are, on the whole, not at all incompatible.

(NON-)COMPOSITIONALITY AND WITTGENSTEIN’S NON-NE-GAME
Ingolf Max, University of Leipzig, Germany

Usually researchers try to make the concept “compositionality” as precise as possible. Then they discuss whether systems of formal or natural languages are compositional or not. Against this mainstream it will be shown that the concept “non-compositionality” can be made precise within non-classical logics, e.g. in a 4-valued logic. Wittgenstein’s non-ne-game is an inspiring paradigmatic case of (non-)compositionality. Formal explications of the negations “non” and “ne” are offered showing that “ne” can be interpreted as a function which behaves non-compositionally with respect to well-defined contexts. The non-ne-game allows us to show that the rule of replacement of logically equivalent expressions is the crucial point if we go bottom-up. But it also shows that the rule of substitution becomes relevant in the opposite direction. The basic expressions of such substitutions can be molecular ones. If we are successful in formalizing cases of non-compositionality then the borderline between semantics and pragmatics runs through the sciences.

PATAMOU” ODER „EL PODER DE LA PALABRA“?
Annelore Mayer, Baden, Austria


INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE – EITHER TOLERANCE OR TRUTH?
Elisabeth Meilhammer, Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, Germany

An important key to intercultural dialogue is to reject ethnocentrism and to embrace tolerance. Since value systems constitute cultures to a large degree, the rejection of ethnocentrism is often taken to consist in acknowledging that no value system is intrinsically superior to any other value system. This would mean that either there is no objective standard of comparison for the different cultural
value systems, or that, from an objective point of view, they are all of equal value. In any case, as far as culture is concerned, it seems that we cannot make any objectively true distinctions of value. Moreover, it seems that only this absence of objectivity can be the source of tolerance.

The aim of this paper is to take a close look at this view, and to draw attention to some of its consequences, regarding, for example, the problems of knowledge, human communication, democracy, and intercultural education. It is asked whether there is a way to reconcile tolerance and truth.

ON THE LIMITS OF INTERCULTURAL ARGUMENTATION
Guido Melchior, University of Graz, Austria

I will argue for the thesis that intercultural argumentation can only succeed if the same views about rational argumentation dominate in the two cultures. Hence, I will show that the possibilities of successful intercultural argumentation are limited. I will proceed in the following way: Firstly, I will define arguments and argumentation situations. Secondly, I will investigate the general cases of persons, who in fact are rational in argumentation situations on the one hand and persons, who believe to be rational on the other hand. Thirdly, I will illustrate the consequences for both cases. Fourthly, I will apply these general cases to representatives of different cultures i.e. to intercultural argumentation.

AGENTS IN DISCORD. COLLECTIVE CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY
Ulrich Metschl, University of Innsbruck, Austria, and University of Munich, Germany

Harsanyi’s Aggregation Theorem states that, under some modest assumptions, it is possible to aggregate individual preferences into an collective preference ordering by a utilitarian rule. For many, this restored some of the confidence in collective decision-making that was challenged by Arrow’s result on the impossibility of preference aggregation under weak, though minimally desirable constraints.

However, recent results indicate that Harsanyi’s theorem does not extend to situations of collective choice under uncertainty, where agents simultaneously disagree on their preferences and their probability assessments. Besides their technical interest, these results seem to be pertinent for any account of public decision-making that accepts that in pluralistic societies public deliberation on vital issues is subject to conflict and uncertainty.

Our contribution will present the difficulties of Bayesian aggregation and the available options to bypass these difficulties. Special consideration is given to proposals which separate the requirements for collective rationality from those for individual decision-making.

WITTGENSTEIN, CAVELL, AND THE FALL OF PHILOSOPHY
Thomas Meyer, Temple University, USA

Stanley Cavell, as recently as Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, has argued for an understanding of Wittgenstein’s engagement with the empty assertiveness of philosophy along distinctively Emersonian lines. That both Emerson and Wittgenstein offer their readers a prospect of return to the common drives this line of interpretation for Cavell; yet the common for both figures involves an openness to the varying laws of our intellect, and pictures of the world, that our participation may alternately manifest. This paper therefore argues that interpretive examination of On Certainty contributes to a richer conception of what is lost in the fall of philosophy, as well as what reemerges in our return to the ordinary, as including the Weltbild that is enacted in our practice. The attitudes and commitments our practices display provide Wittgenstein’s treatment of the common with a layer of immanence not yet fully articulated in Cavell’s interpretation.

RORTY, WITTGENSTEIN, AND THE ‘DIALOGUE AMONG CIVILIZATIONS
Karel Mom, Vrije University Amsterdam, The Netherlands

This paper constructs a Rortian and a Wittgensteinian position towards the ‘dialogue among civilizations’ and provides an evaluative comparison of them.

RESERVATIONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES – TRIBUTE TO RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY OR UNDERMINING OF UNIVERSALITY?
Andreas Th. Müller, University of Innsbruck, Austria

At first sight, the paper deals with a highly juridical subject without any manifest philosophical relevance, namely the question of reservations to human rights treaties. It will be argued, however, that the current debate in international law on global reservations to human rights instruments aiming at preserving particular (cultural or religious) normative systems is symptomatic and representative for general features of intercultural dialog.

Taking the nearly universally ratified Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 as an example, the paper examines the “Shari’a reservations” made by a number of Muslim states when acceding to the convention and the pertinent reactions of other states. This constitutes a remarkable instance of “dialog of civilizations” widely discussed at present, with regard to its potential as well as its limits. Hence, the handling of reservations to human rights treaties might teach noteworthy lessons and offer ways and strategies beyond the deplorable dichotomy of universality of human rights and cultural/religious diversity.
TRUTH?
DO WE REALLY NEED RELATIVISM ABOUT COMPETING TRADITIONS

Julien Murzi, University of Rome “La Sapienza”, Italy and University of Saint Andrews, UK

Analytic philosophers have often regarded with suspicion the idea that truth can be relative in some respect. Fregean orthodoxy has it that the truth of thoughts is absolute, eternal and objective. Such an absolutist view has been challenged in recent years. Many authors have claimed that truth has to be relative to some non-classical parameter. The paper focuses on John MacFarlane’s and Max Köbel recent work on relative truth. Both accounts, it is argued, face serious objections and fail to provide a satisfactory relativistic framework.

ON LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY

Ohad Nachtomy, Bar-Ilan University, Israel

My aim in this paper is to draw some analogies between language and identity, which could provide a concrete form to the discussion about the relations between different identities and the possibility of dialogue between them. I first sketch Charles Taylor’s approach to identity and Wittgenstein’s approach to language and then draw some analogies between them.

DIE RELATIVITÄT VON GEWISSHEITEN

Karl Nähr, Vienna, Austria


NATURAL LANGUAGE AND ITS SPEAKERS: DAVIDSON’S COMPOSITIONALITY REQUIREMENT

Isaac Neo, Ben-Gurion University, Israel

The purpose of this paper is to point out an ambiguity in the standard interpretation of the principle of compositionality, a principle endorsed by Davidson as a fundamental condition for an adequate theory of meaning. There are two possible readings of the principle that are not equivalent, depending on how the order of the quantifiers is to be interpreted within it, and these different readings suggest very different interpretations of the relation between speakers and their languages, and very different accounts of what a theory of meaning is and what it has to contribute to the theory of inter-personal understanding. On the weaker version of the principle (WCP) every sentence is to be composed from a finite
basis of primitives and rules (one such basis or another). On the stronger version (SCP), a finite basis is postulated from which every sentence is to be composed. The ambiguity, so I wish to argue, affects much of Davidson’s work in the philosophy of language, and renders many of Davidson’s subsequent arguments equivocal or otherwise invalid. In particular, Davidson’s conclusions with respect to the finite resources of language, the radical interpretability of (all) meaningful speech, the obscurity of ‘alternative conceptual schemes,’ the redundancy of reference, the place of conventions in language, and the possibility of shared languages, should all be questioned in these terms.

DER BEITRAG EINER „LOGIK DER PHILOSOPHIE“ ZUM VERSTÄNDNIS DES DIALOGS DER KULTUREN

Peter Oberhofer, University of Vienna, Austria


The title ‘first philosophy’ is traditionally reserved for the elaboration of the ontological question of being. Following Eric Weil’s logic of philosophy, I accomplish a reinvestigation of the concept of being in order to argue that first philosophy should be understood as philosophical logic of sense, which comprehends an irreducible plurality of meanings of being. Such a renewed first philosophy can be taken as a basis for a better understanding of the meaning of dialogue between cultures, for the core of historically and culturally anchored worldviews doesn’t obey the logic of truth, but the logic of sense.

DAS GEHIRN, DAS ICH UND DIE STRAßENVERKEHRSORDNUNG

Hermann Oetjens, Freiburg, Germany


WITTGENSTEIN, WAISMANN AND NON-EUCLIDEAN GEOMETRIES

Martin Ohmacht, Klagenfurt and Vienna, Austria

Waismann co-operated very closely with Wittgenstein and the historiography of this co-operation is important for Wittgenstein research. It must have been difficult for Waismann to separate his own authentic thoughts from those he received from Wittgenstein. In the discussions recorded by Waismann and published by Brian McGuinness, the issue of contradiction is one of the topics most frequently touched upon. There is a close connection between this issue and the question of non-Euclidean geometries, for which only a relative consistency proof can be found.

Wittgenstein must have been fascinated by the fact that mathematicians were initially shocked by the discovery that the axiom of parallels cannot be proved based on the axioms of absolute geometry, but as the years went by they learned to accept this negative result as a definite answer to a complicated question. Wittgenstein compares the impossibility of proving the axiom of parallels with the geometrical impossibility of trisecting the general angle. Eventually, around 1938, Wittgenstein was well informed about Gödel’s results, which render two more impossibilities.

CULTURAL ALTERITY AND UNILATERALISM: THE DIALOGUE OF PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

Jerome Ikechukwu Okonkwo, Imo State University, Nigeria

The concept of unilateralism in the modern exercise of philosophy is born out of the unfortunate situation of the imports of Eurocentricism. The consequences of imperialism, colonialism and the exports of European languages into their colonies seem to have always left the traces of philosophical and linguistic hierarchies and undue scientism. This paper opts for a dialogue with a vision of a better openness to ‘other cultures and philosophies’ and cross-pollination of ideas as the best yardstick towards globalization.
A PERSPECTIVE OF DIALOGICAL ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN SELF AND CULTURE

Ranjan K. Panda, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, India

This paper is intended to discuss the dialogical relationship between the self and the culture. Culture here is referred to as the other of human self as it stands in the mode of a dialogical relationship with the self. The self in its dialogical relationship with the other develops meaningful relationship with regard to the values of life. Accordingly self and the culture participate in intentional-dialogical framework and thereby reveal a new dimension of reality and thus unify the values of life in the realm of meaning and eventually open up new paths toward infinity.

FROM ARISTOTLE’S OUSIA TO IBN SINA’S JAWHAR

Shahram Pazouki, Institute for Interreligious Dialogue, Iran

There is a shift in the meaning of substance from ousia in Aristotle to jawhar in Ibn Sina. This change of meaning is not just something linguistic. It is due to two different views concerning substance in two different worlds, i.e., the Greek and the Muslim worlds.

The Greek Aristotelian world is a world of ousias that are actually existent. For Aristotle, to be is to be existent. But the Qur’anic doctrine of creatio ex nihilo led Farabi, and Ibn Sina following him, to interpret the Aristotle’s prime mover as God, the Creator and Necessary Being, in relation to which other beings were interpreted as contingent beings. Thus the famous thesis of the distinction of essence and existence appeared in a definite form in Farabi and was elaborated in detail in Ibn Sina.

Based on this view, unprecedented philosophical ideas appeared among the Muslim Aristotelian philosophers. The dichotomy of essence and existence in each jawhar led Ibn Rushd to conclude (wrongly) that in Ibn Sina’s view existence is an accident added to essence in the way an ordinary accident like whiteness qualifies a substance. Ibn Rushd’s understanding of Ibn Sina’s thesis is a misunderstanding that influenced the medieval philosophers, such as Thomas Aquinas, and modern philosophers, such as Descartes and Kant, as well. This paper deals with the origin and the later development of this thesis and its developed articulation by Ibn Sina.

Deliberation in the context of collective acting out / beratung und Entscheidung im Kontext Kollektiven Ausagierens

Alice Pechriggl, University of Klagenfurt, Austria

The paper is dealing with the philosophical implications of psychoanalytical work with and about groups. As a central psychoanalytical category, conflict emerges where the integration of dissident parts of the soul fails. In this general acceptance conflict is acting out or at least is conflict (or the oppressed part) tending to be acted out. As Freud’s model for the topic was a socio-cultural one (Instanzen, Zensor, Es, Ich, Über-Ich, Ideallich, Widerstand etc.) it can be revisited from a group analytical perspective in view of a reconceptualization of cultural and political conflict. In such a perspective the collective acting out of dissident parts is not the opposite of reasonable and deliberative action (Handeln), but part and parcel of such an action. It can even be seen as the motor for democratic participation not only as instituting power of movements but also as explicit figuration of the political “city” through deliberation of the citizens.

“DOUBLE MEANT IS NOT DOUBLE GOOD: A PROBLEM FOR KANE’S RESPONSE TO THE CHANCE OBJECTION”

James Petrik, Ohio University, USA

This paper concerns Robert Kane’s recent attempt to answer the charge that libertarian free choices are nothing more than chance events. His response draws upon work by J.L. Austin and Philippa Foot concerning instances in which indeterminism between an agent and her intended outcome does not block the assignment of moral responsibility. Kane’s specific strategy is to double up the Austin/Foot scenarios in order to identify a possible class of free choices immune to the chance objection. Though impressive in its ingenuity, I argue that Kane’s response succumbs to the following dilemma: If his SFAs are a straightforward doubling up of the Austin/Foot strategy, it leads to an incoherent account of the situation of choice; however, if his theory is interpreted in a way that avoids this incoherence, it deviates from the Austin/Foot strategy in a respect crucial to the intuitive case they make for the compatibility of moral responsibility and indeterminacy of outcome.
THE ANALYTIC THEORY OF THE A PRIORI: AYER'S ARGUMENT
Tommaso Piazza, University of Salzburg, Austria

In this paper I scrutinize Ayer’s argument to the effect that all a priori knowledge is not knowledge of reality. Firstly, I present an argument against the very notion of analyticity defended by Ayer. Secondly, I show that the argument can be evaded only at the cost of interpreting Ayer’s definition in a way insufficient to grant the conclusion that analytic statements are not about reality. I conclude that no clear case has been presented by Ayer to show that a priori knowledge is not about reality.

WHAT WILL THE NEXT BERGEN ELECTRONIC EDITION(S) LOOK LIKE?
Alois Pichler, University of Bergen, Norway

This paper begins by giving a short background for the current Bergen Electronic Edition (BEE). It explains and emphasizes the distinction between the machine-readable version of the Wittgenstein Nachlass produced by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB) in the period 1990-1999 and BEE which was produced from this machine-readable version and published in 2000. Awareness of this distinction is crucial for forming an adequate understanding of both the issues involved and the methods and tools to be employed in the maintenance and further development of BEE. Building on this background, the paper then maps out a short-term and a long-term plan for maintenance and further revision of BEE. Revision issues relate to the following topics: (1) inclusion of manuscript description and library classification, (2) correction of transcription, conversion and file format mistakes, (3) handling of special Nachlass elements, including notation and drawings, (4) supplementation and improvement of facsimile files, (5) supplementation and addition of Nachlass items, (6) interlinking with previously published works, (7) interlinking with supplementary resources, including translations, (8) migration from MECS&MECS-WIT to XML&TEI, (9) file format, platform and technical carrier, and (10) publishing and copyright model. Which of these issues are to be handled within a short-term versus a long-term perspective is a topic of discussion in which the research community already participates.

EXPERIENCE AND SOCIAL NORMS IN FOLK PSYCHOLOGY – WITTGENSTEIN MEETS NEUROSCIENCE
Pim Klaassen, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

The friction between individualist and communal views on folk psychology is investigated by way of juxtaposing a view on folk psychology that emphasizes experience and its correlated brain dynamics and a view that emphasizes the normative and social dimensions of folk psychology. It is concluded that these two perspectives do not exclude one another, although the latter implies that individualism as a reductive strategy will fail, and hence that the ambitions of the former can only be restricted. Although the individualist perspective leaves out the meaningful aspects of folk psychology – which can only be fully captured if one takes in their social dimension – it can add to our understanding of individuals’ enaction of folk psychology, and of how individuals become members of a community.

CAN THERE BE SUCH THING AS A “HOPELESS” LANGUAGE USER?
Marcos Paiva Pinheiro, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil

Hope is a feeling – unlike pain, fear or desire – only to be found among subjects who already master a language. It seems fair to ask, therefore, whether people who speak languages much different from our own can also feel hope: perhaps we shall find that the mental repertoire of human beings happens to be differently shaped according to differences in their native languages. In this paper I will try to approach the question of conceptual relativity drawing on some of Wittgenstein’s remarks about mental concepts and Davidson’s radical interpretation.

REGAINING THE SENSE OF THE TRACTATUS: WITTGENSTEIN’S LOGICAL MYSTICISM
Paul Poenicke, Adrian, USA

Despite the growth of scholarship concerning Wittgenstein and religion, the claim that the Tractatus is an ethical document, an idea forwarded by the author himself in a letter to Ludwig von Ficker, still never fails to confound and confuse. This shock occurs because scholars reject the importance of Tractarian mysticism, the link between the work’s logic and spirituality. I will analyze Tractarian mysticism to show why mystical revelations in proposition 6.41 and elsewhere are necessary rungs of the Tractarian ladder. Beginning in proposition 6 and progressing to the end of the work, the foundations of Tractarian mysticism will be traced through to its particular temporal character, an essential connection between language and the ineffable. Appropriately, this temporality will end with Tolstoy’s The Gospel In Brief, the chief influence on Wittgenstein’s religious views and the final piece to appreciating the Tractatus, an epic of both ethics and logic.
WAHRHEITSGEWISSHEIT ALS DIALOGBLOCKADE
Bernhard Pörksen, University of Hamburg, Germany


BRANDON ON HOLISM, COMMUNICATION, AND REFERENCE
Bernd Prien, Westfälische Wilhelms-University Münster, Germany

In ‘Making It Explicit’ (MIE), Brandom claims that communication should not be understood as transmission of content, but rather as cooperation. Brandom’s account of communication plays a double role in the overall argument of MIE: On the one hand, Brandom defends a strong semantic holism with the consequence that no two speakers ever mean the same thing by their words. Since this makes the possibility of communication as transmission questionable, Brandom develops an alternative account of communication. The alternative he proposes, in terms of cooperation, on the other hand, serves to explain the presence of a referential dimension of our discursive practices. This shows, according to Brandom, that reference is an essentially social phenomenon. My paper analyzes both of these roles of Brandom, that reference is an essentially social of our discursive practices. This shows, according to

ACTION AND MORALITY: A REFLECTION ON THOMAS NAGEL’S AND CHRISTINE KORSGAARD’S MORAL THINKING
Marek Pyka, Cracow University of Technology, Poland

Both Thomas Nagel and Christine Korsgaard represent the ethical theory of practical reasoning of a broadly Kantian type. What for them is constitutive of human agency is acting for a reason. Focusing on the normative reasons of an agent, they attempt to ground morality within the nature of human agency. Central for Nagel’s argument is the distinction between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ reasons for action but his position tends towards a kind of moral realism. Korsgaard, in turn, attempts to explain normativity in terms of the ‘practical identity’ of an agent, arguing that all reasons for action must be grounded in the laws that are constitutive for this ‘identity’.

PETER SINGER’S UTILITARIANISM VERSUS TOM REGAN’S RIGHTS VIEW. A COMPARATIVE STUDY
Leszek Pyra, University of Krakow, Poland

This paper refers to the Australian-American confrontation regarding the man-animal relation. Singer condemns specieism and points to sentience as the only non-arbitrary category regulating man’s behaviour with regard to animals. He introduces the principle of equal consideration of interests, and claims that such principle should be generally observed.

Regan in turn constructs his theory by referring to deontological theories. The author assumes that both moral subjects and moral patients possess inherent value to a similar degree. This determines that a given living being is a subject of life and has certain rights. As a result Regan constructs the theory of rights referring to mammals.

The comparison of the two theories shows that they are, for the time being, utopian. They disregard the world of plants and the problem of endangered species. They postulate far-reaching practical changes as far as the man-animal relationship is concerned. Singer postulates general vegetarianism, whereas Regan opts for changing legislation in such a way as to grant animals some fundamental rights.

NORMATIVITY, EXPERIENCE AND CONCRETE CASE
Regina Queiroz, New University of Lisbon, Portugal

In Philosophical Investigations, the relation between rules and concrete cases in the process of following a rule implies a synthetic relationship where experience plays a decisive role. Thus, I reject the internalist interpretation of the relationship between rules and concrete cases, the separation of the philosophy of experience – since it excludes forms of life as sources of the rule’s normativity – and Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s paradox.

NATURALISTIC COMMITMENTS IN CONFLICT: SCIENTIFIC WORLD VIEW AND EVENT ONTOLOGY
Josef Quitterer, University of Innsbruck, Austria

There are two central commitments which are shared by nearly all naturalistic minded scholars. The first commitment might be characterized as the view that real entities can be described and explained in scientific terms. The second commitment of naturalism is event-ontology - everything that exists is spread out in time like an event, i.e. composed of temporal stages or parts (Quine). As a matter of fact the second commitment is generally justified
by referring to the first commitment: Naturalists assume that for the purposes of positive science ontology is more adequate than substance ontology. In my paper I argue against this assumption. There are cases where substance ontology fits better to scientific data. In these cases naturalists regard the second commitment as more fundamental than the first commitment. This leads to a distorted interpretation of scientific data. As a paradigm example I take the naturalistic account of the human self.

HOW SUCCESSFUL IS NATURALISM?
Michael C. Rea, University of Notre Dame, USA

The theme for this workshop is “How successful is naturalism?” The question presupposes that we already know what naturalism is and what counts as success. But, as anyone familiar with the literature on naturalism knows, both suppositions are suspect. In this paper, I’ll begin by recounting my own characterization of naturalism—according to which naturalism is a "research program" rather than a philosophical position—and then I’ll identify two dimensions along which a research program might be assessed for success. I’ll argue briefly for the conclusion that naturalism succeeds along one of these dimensions but (with some qualifications later to be added) not along the other.

SPIEL DER SPRACHE UND SPRACHSPIEL – GADAMER UND WITTGENSTEIN IM VERGLEICH
Juliane Reichel, Oldenburg, Germany


‘THE RIDDLE DOES NOT EXIST’: WITTGENSTEIN’S PHILOSOPHY REVISITED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE IGNORABIMUS-DISPUTE
Andrea Reichenberger, University of Paderborn, Germany

Wittgenstein’s philosophy is notorious for its interpretative difficulties and diversities. Beyond exegetical and hermeneutical issues that revolve around particular sections (such as the world/reality distinction, the Frége/Russell connection to the Tractatus, or the influence on Wittgenstein by existentialism and phenomenology) there are a few fundamental disagreements of interpretation. One of these disagreements relates to the continuity and discontinuity of Wittgenstein’s early and later thought. I will try to give an answer to this question by focusing on Wittgenstein’s philosophy in the context of the so-called Ignorabimus-Dispute. To be more precise, I will look at one of its most controversial issues, the demarcation problem, i.e. the problem of how and where to demarcate science from non-science, e.g. from ethics or religion.

‘WORLD-VIEWS CLASHING? THE POSSIBILITIES OF DIALOGUE’
Patrick Riordan, Heythrop College, London, UK

Inter-religious dialogue, specifically the engagement between Shi’a Islam and Catholic Christianity, is an example in practice of the encounter between different world-views. The dialogue explores difficulties in interpretation of the fundamental tenets of the religions since the existence of common language conceals divergence of meaning. What possibilities of argument exist in this context, if any? Help is found in the related field of political philosophy. John Rawls in his late essay ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ (1997, ‘99) discusses three forms of argument outside of public reason which might be useful in the encounter of comprehensive doctrines seeking an overlapping consensus. He calls these Declaration, Conjecture and Witnessing. This paper will explore the possible usefulness of these argument forms in the dialogue between religious world-views. In particular, conjecture is found to be particularly fruitful for the self-correcting dynamic of a world-view.

WITTGENSTEIN AND THE LINGUISTIC TURN
Richard Rorty, Stanford University, USA

There are profound differences of opinion among contemporary philosophers both about whether Wittgenstein is worth reading and about what one can learn from him. They parallel disagreements about whether, and in what sense, philosophical problems are problems of language. In this paper, I shall describe three views of Wittgenstein, corresponding to three ways of thinking about the so-called “linguistic turn in philosophy”. Doing so will help me defend two claims for which I have
argued in the past. First: there is no interesting sense in which philosophical problems are problems of language. Second: the linguistic turn was useful nevertheless, for it turned philosophers’ attention from the topic of experience towards that of linguistic behaviour. That shift helped break the hold of empiricism—and, more broadly, of representationalism.

ZUR DRINGEND NOTWENDIGEN REVISION DES „STANDARD VIEW“ DER GENESSE DER PHILOSOPHISCHEN UNTERSUCHUNGEN
Josef G. F. Rothhaupt, Munich, Germany


WHAT D’YA MEAN? DISAGREEMENT AND MISUNDERSTANDING
Hans Rott, University of Regensburg, Germany

Members of different cultures speak different languages. When communication problems arise, they may be due to disagreement or misunderstanding. It appears crucial to separate “genuine” disagreement from “mere” misunderstanding. Sometimes it is said that disagreements are so fundamental that they are best represented as cultural disagreements about the logical validity of certain inference patterns.

In a sense, it is harder for members of different cultures to disagree than for members of the same culture. Within a language, there are markers - negation signs, for instance - serving as devices for the direct expression of disagreements. In order to identify a disagreement between speakers of different languages, however, we need some sort of translation between them before we can speak of any disagreement. It is only relative to a given translation scheme that one can talk of a member of one culture denying what a member of another culture affirms.

In my talk I attempt to find out what kinds of considerations might help us to determine whether two persons of different cultures “really” disagree. Looking at a few anthropological examples, I argue that it is in fact difficult to tell whether people of a different culture are wrong about a particular question, and much harder still to show that they make use of a different (“wrong”?) logic. Any kind of disagreement must be based on some more basic agreement. It turns out that this non-trivial problem transfers to speakers of the same language (or, at least, what looks as the same language). Translation across subcultures may be just as hard as translation across cultures: Radical translation begins at home, as Quine used to say.

WELTSICHTKOHÄRENZ – UM WELCHEN PREIS?
Eckart Ruschmann, Innsbruck, Austria

Die Frage, auf welche Weise es möglich ist, an individuelle Weltansichten einen Beurteilungsmaßstab zu legen, wird vor einem erkenntnistheoretischen Hintergrund behandelt. Im Anschluss an die Schleiermachersche Hermeneutik werden Erkennen und Verstehen als komplementäre Hälften des Wissensprozesses verstanden.


DEUTEN – MISSVERSTEHEN – „BLASPHEMIE“: GRENZE UND POTENTIAL EINES OFFENEN ÜBERSETZUNGSBEGRIFFS
Britta Saal, Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Germany

As a central problem of intercultural philosophy one can regard the question of the possibility and the way of intercultural dialogue/polylogue. Therein one very important aspect is that of translating. Especially in the intercultural context, facing the global situation of migration and postcoloniality as well as the emerging of “translocal identities”, it seems more and more necessary to reconsider the conventional concept of translation. Therefore in this paper I like to focus on translation by relating to Wittgenstein’s thinking of language in the Philosophical Investigations and by looking at the postcolonial debate. My leading questions are: Can translation be seen as ‘language’ – maybe as the “language of interculturality”, like the Cuban philosopher Raúl Fornet-Betancourt suggests? And if so, which form of life is that of translation?
RULE FOLLOWING AND INTERCULTURAL PERSPECTIVE
Michal Sala, Warsaw University, Poland

Following Christoph Durt’s 2005 paper on intercultural approach to philosophy, this paper sheds light on how a possibility of creating connecting links (Zwischenglieder) is possible in Wittgensteinian framework. The roots of such a possibility are seen in his considerations of rule following problem. His explanation of learning a language or understanding mathematical calculus require assumption, that we are able to ‘grasp’ rules of language games. Given that, this paper argues, these links are available as foundations for Wittgenstein’s “ethnological” perspective in philosophy that Durt presented.

KULTURELLE GEGENSTÄNDE UND INTENTIONALE ERLEBNISSE
Alessandro Salice, Graz, Austria and Torino, Italy


LIFE’S INFINITE VARIATIONS: WITTGENSTEIN AND CULTURAL GENERALIZATION
Patricia Sayre, Saint Mary’s College, USA

Generalizations about cultures are generally wrong—yet this doesn’t stop us from making them. Although any generalization we make about a culture is likely to be met with a flood of counter-examples, what fails as a literal description can succeed magnificently as a tool for helping us find our feet in culturally perplexing situations. It can also, alas, be an all too useful tool for trampling others underfoot. The legitimacy of our cultural generalizations is thus an issue with moral ramifications, a matter of will and not simply intellect. In my paper I contrast two different approaches to thinking about cultural generalizations and their moral ramifications, the first referencing Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, and the second his later.

Although the two approaches appear contradictory, timely insights from the earlier view carry over into the later.

AGAINST CULTURAL IDENTITY: A FAMILY RESEMBLANCE PERSPECTIVE ON INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS
Marina Sbisà, University of Trieste, Italy

This paper claims that current, widespread troubles with intercultural relations depend on the belief that there are such things as cultural identities, and argues that Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance, under a radical reading according to which it deconstructs the very notion of a concept, can help us deconstructing cultural identities too. In a family resemblance perspective - which debunks the search for pure cultural identities, while saving or even sharpening the sensitivity to differences - troubles with intercultural relations can be managed and even prevented from arising.

KANN EINE PERSON ALS URHEBER IHRER HANDLUNGEN VERSTANDEN WERDEN, WENN SIE KEINE ALTERNATIVEN MÖGLICHKEITEN HAT?
Benedikt Schick, University of Innsbruck, Austria

**SUBSTANZ, KAUSALITÄT UND FREIHEIT**
Pedro Schmechtig, Technische Universität Dresden, Germany


**FREMVERSTEHEN ALS DIALOGISCHE HERMENEUTIK**
Karsten Schmidt, University of Bonn, Germany

The biggest danger in the task of intercultural hermeneutics lies in using one’s own way of thinking as a model to understand a foreign culture. Reductionism is the consequence of such a monological approach. To avoid this and to do justice to the self-understanding of that foreign thinking one has to look for a dialogical approach, trying to be enriched by the other rather than reducing it. Wittgensteins concept of „language-games“ is a useful starting point here, focussing on rules, but needs to be expanded by further differentiation of the kinds of rules we are dealing with. In conceptualising the hermeneutical situation that way we are able to keep a critical distance to the thinking we try to understand. At the same time the insight in an external position via the other self-understanding enables us to have a critical look at ourselves.

**SUBSTANZ UND DEPENDENZ**
Benjamin Schnieder, University of Hamburg, Germany

There is a long philosophical tradition according to which substances can be defined as ontologically independent entities. Ontological independence is in turn understood as a modal notion, such that dependence is basically a necessary link between the existence of two entities. But I will firstly argue that in order to understand substances as independent entities, it would be desirable to have a stronger notion of dependence, and I will secondly present such a notion of dependence which is defined in terms of the explanatory connective ‘because’.

**CLASH OF CIVILISATIONS? AN EVOLUTION-THEORETIC INVESTIGATION OF HUNTINGTON’S THESIS**
Gerhard Schurz, University of Düsseldorf, Germany

Huntington has argued that the world of the present time is characterized by a clash between global culturally different civilizations, such as the western-christian, the ex-communist-orthodox, the islamic, the chinese and the indian-hinduist societies.

In the first part I will analyse this claim from an empirical point of view, based on the findings of the World Value Survey project under the leadership of Ronald Inglehart. These findings are based on extensive questionnaires in more than sixty societies, and they give a significantly different picture than the picture Huntington draws. However, some major claims of Huntington are confirmed by these findings, for example, the existence of more-or-less technically modern but yet culturally divergent societies, which contradicts the modernization thesis.

In the second part I analyse these empirical facts from an evolution-theoretic point of view. In particular, I point out that Huntington’s cultures are not entities which have a stable historical identity: our own western culture two or three hundred years ago is much closer to some of the present-time non-western cultures than to the present time western cultures. Huntington’s cultures are synchronic snapshot of a pattern of evolutionary trends which stand under the influence of several selective forces which draw in opposite directions.

**TOWARDS AN INTERCULTURAL PHENOMENOLOGY? – OBJECTIVITY, SUBJECTIVITY AND THE CONSTITUTION OF OTHERNESS**
Eva Schwarz, University of Graz, Austria

This essay aims at portraying Husserlian phenomenology as an adequate theory of intersubjectivity. I want to argue that transcendental phenomenology falls prey neither to quasi-solipsism nor to a far too abstract account of intersubjectivity. A phenomenological investigation of the concrete encounter with an Other can be fruitful for a better understanding of subjectivity in general and of interculturality in particular. I will contrast the phenomenological viewpoint with a widespread theoretical conception of intersubjectivity, namely the „simulation theory“. In doing this, I want to discuss some serious problems arising from this approach. Problems – as I want to show – which can be avoided if the phenomenological account of the phenomenon of “otherness” is taken seriously. Only in recognising the basic structures of intersubjective encounters are we able to construe higher-order theories (e.g. theories of translation) which do not miss the phenomenon they want to investigate right from the beginning.
A COMPLICATED FORM OF LIFE
Murilo Rocha Seabra, Universidade de Sao Paulo and Marcos Paiva Pinheiro, Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil

This paper explores Wittgenstein’s remark at the beginning of the second part of the Investigations that an animal such as a dog cannot hope, nor feel grief. Here Wittgenstein presents a cogent argument against the idea that these feelings are essentially ineffable, since they can only be felt by those who can talk, by those who engage in a rather complicated form of life that can only be set up through language.

PSYCHIC SUBSTANCES: A MEETING POINT BETWEEN METAPHYSICS & SPIRITUALITY
Mohammad Ali Shomali, University of Qom, Iran

Referring to different types of substance, discussed in Islamic Philosophy, this paper focuses on psychic substance or soul. Despite some controversy about other types of substance, there seems to be no dispute among Muslim philosophers over the existence of psychic substances. Of course, there are aspects other than mere existence that distinguish the philosophical positions that have been taken on this issue.

The paper tries to study the nature and faculties of soul and highlights the main characteristics of psychic substances and what distinguishes them from the rest.

Finally, the paper elaborates the key role that belief in psychic substances plays in Islamic spirituality. Indeed, the author argues, without recognition of an immaterial soul no serious spirituality would be possible. The spiritual journey starts with the realization of the fact that a human being is not just matter or a physical body, and that the human soul is what constitutes our identity. The wayfarer can move forward by reducing his dependence on the body and can finally achieve happiness by detaching himself from the control and demands of the body.

TOWARDS COSMOPOLITAN PHILOSOPHY
Arto Siitonen, University of Helsinki, Finland

Cosmos and polis, or nature and social relations furnish the framework of human culture. Philosophy became a part of that culture, when questions arose as to the structure of reality and the place of human beings in it. Philosophical quest emerged from religious myths and nourished scientific research.

Philosophical discourse was originally expressed in Greek, Chinese, and Sanskrit; later in Latin, Hebrew, Arabic, Italian, etc. This draws attention to the problems of language. Which conditions are imposed on the translation of philosophical texts, e.g. from Chinese to English? How adequately can symbolic logic account for natural language and for the differences between various languages? Is there any waterproof means of settling disputes (cf. Leibniz)?

One may also wonder which features and issues guarantee the continuity of philosophical research and establish its cosmopolitan character. Problems, arguments and theories are such invariables, as well as the branches to which these belong (logic, metaphysics, ethics). The issue of human rights deserves a special mention. These rights present a universal claim; and our world is not a really civilized cosmopolis before they will be safeguarded for all of its citizens.

SPRACHE IM INTERKULTURELLEN DIALOG
Kirsti Siitonen, University of Turku, Finland

Den interkulturellen Dialog kann man als einen abstrakten Begriff verstehen, der Beziehungen zwischen Kulturen, Völkern und Religionen bezeichnet. Dieser Dialog kann aber auch als Austausch der Äußerungen zwischen zwei Personen aus verschiedenen Kulturen gesehen werden. In den letzterwähnten Dialogen gibt es zwei Gesprächstypen:

1. Einen Dialog in einer Fremdsprache für beide beteiligten Personen;
2. Einen Dialog in der Muttersprache von genau einem der beiden.

Eine ungewohnte aber immer üblicher werdende Situation ist die des zweiten Typs, dass die Gesprächssprache eine wenig bekannte, sog. kleine Sprache ist. Die Person, deren Muttersprache hierbei nicht gesprochen wird, muss die Gesprächssprache ursprünglich als eine Fremdsprache gelernt haben. Eine prinzipielle Frage hebt sich hervor: Wann sind die gegebenen Äußerungen des letztgenannten Sprechers echte Instanzen der gemeinten Sprache?

Es wird anhand einiger Beispiele geklärt, was diese Frage bedeutet. Darüber hinaus dürfte die Kenntnis gewisser logischer Prinzipien der Spracherlernung vorteilhaft sein.

In dem Beitrag verwende ich als Ausgangssituation diejenige, in welcher ein Sprecher a mit einem Sprecher b in einer Sprache S spricht, die nur die Muttersprache von a und keine der sog. Weltsprachen ist.

Ich versuche folgende Fragen zu beantworten:
(i) Wann spricht b eigentlich echtes S?
(ii) Was soll a beachten, wenn er mit b versucht zu sprechen?
WITTGENSTEIN AND THE PROBLEM OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM

Rui Silva, University of the Azores, Portugal

This paper discusses Wittgenstein’s stance on the problem of cultural relativism and is divided into three parts. First, I try to clarify the concept of cultural relativism. Second, I point out those themes of Wittgenstein’s thought that apparently license a relativistic reading of his work. Third, I argue that his putative relativism is but an expression of epistemological contextualism and that we should not confuse relativism with contextualism. Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the plurality of worldviews does not endanger cross-cultural communication, because it is compensated by the claim that we can, in principle, understand different cultures on the basis of shared practices or social training. As opposed to the permissiveness that characterizes relativism, Wittgenstein does criticize and reject alternative belief systems.

SOCIAL CRITICISM THROUGH INTERNAL AND INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUES

Vikram Singh Sirola, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, India

This paper is an attempt to provide a philosophical framework for understanding social criticism as a social practice aimed at realizing cultural creativity. Taking a clue from Michael Walzer’s questions, I have reformulated them in light of the pluralist Indian socio-cultural fabric. The focal point is the analysis of different patterns and structures that can be found in culture and society, primarily with respect to their normative status and contents. Social criticism allows this emphasis to be developed in different directions by engaging into a dialogue with the internal tradition of a society. At the same time it takes seriously the edifying influence of intercultural dialogues. In this way social criticism can be seen as a collective reflection on the conditions of collective life made significant by an authentic social critic.

SPEECH ACTS

Barry Smith, University of Buffalo, USA and Saarland University, Germany

At the heart of speech act theory is a thesis to the effect that when we perform a speech act then the world itself changes: a new entity comes into being: a claim, a debt, a permission, a right, which survives for an extended period of time and plays a role in coordinating the actions of the persons involved. But there is a problem with this thesis. A speech act exists only for as long as the speaking event through which it is executed. What, then, is the physical basis for the temporarily extended existence of its products and for their enduring power to serve coordination? In small societies we might reasonably identify this physical basis with the memories of those involved. In large societies, however, we turn instead to documents.

Through the performance of document acts (acts of filling in, signing, registering, conveying, validating, attaching) we change the world by bringing into being ownership relations, legal accountability, business organizations, and a variety of other institutional artefacts of modern societies. Documents thereby create and sustain permanent and reusable deontic powers, and they thereby create and sustain those complex forms of social interaction which we have learned to call ‘civilization’.

WAYS OF WORLDMARKING

Barry Smith, University of Buffalo, USA and Saarland University, Germany

In 1992 the Orthodox Jewish community of Barnet submitted a request for planning permission to erect forty pairs of metal poles. Ten years later, after many protests, permission was granted, allowing the creation of the Barnet eruv, a six-and-a-half square mile area of North London, in which strands of nylon fishing line stretched between the poles at a height of 10 meters from the ground close off gaps in a boundary otherwise composed of telephone lines, portions of railway fencing and walls of terraced housing. Through the creation of the eruv, public land comes to count as a private space within which Orthodox Jews can carry out certain tasks (carrying, pushing prams and wheelchairs) otherwise forbidden on the Sabbath. Protesters argued that the creation of the eruv impinges on their “human rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion”. “Eruv-believers would happily pass through their symbolic gateways in the streets, but everyone else would be compelled to do so without such a benefit, even if the compulsory passage through the Eruv structures is offensive to a person’s beliefs.”

We will investigate the Huge Invisible Ontology that is traced out by the above, an ontology which stretches from Barnet in North London to the European Court of Human Rights (inside the Strasbourg eruv), to Berkeley (which also has its own eruv), and from there to the White House (inside the eruv of Washington DC).

INTERKULTURKELLE PHILOSOPHIE IN RUSSLAND: TRADITION UND NEUORIENTIERUNGEN

Maja Soboleva, Philipps-University Marburg, Germany

Interkulturalität ist heutzutage ein konjunkturelles Thema. Es ist jedoch kein neues Thema, was u. a. das russische philosophische Denken demonstriert. Im 19. Jahrhundert existierte die interkulturelle Philosophie in Form einer Methode vergleichender Kulturforschung, die die Gestalt der Geschichtsphilosophie annahm. Den Ausgangspunkt der kulturtheoretischen Überlegungen bildete die sogenannte «russische Idee» – ein spezifisches Geschichtsverständnis, das Russland als Zentrum «der religiösen und kulturellen Ökumene» betrachtete.


Der Werdegang des russischen interkulturellen Denkens wird im Vortrag analysiert.

WITTGENSTEIN – EIN PLATONISCHER IDEALIST UND KULTURPESSIMIST?
Ilse Somavilla, Innsbruck, Austria


A REPORT ON GRADUATE WORK IN QOM ON THE PROBLEMS OF ESSENCE/ATTRIBUTE AND SUBSTANCE/ACCIDENT
Narjess Javandel Soumeahsaraie, University of Qom, Iran

Graduate work at the University of Qom in philosophy, Islamic theology, Islamic Studies, and Qur’an Studies, is done at the University campus (UQ) and at its off-campus graduate center which was formerly the Teacher Training College of Qom (Tarbiyat Modarres, TB). From 1990 to 2005, 565 M.A. and Ph.D. dissertations have been successfully defended in the above-mentioned fields. Of these dissertations, forty-six pertain to the essence/attribute distinction (focusing on the divine essence and attributes), and related issues about what are referred to in Islamic theology as "the divine names." Another seven dissertations were written about substance/accident, all of which focus on the issue of “substantial motion,” which has been prominent in Islamic philosophy since the seventeenth century. In what follows, I will briefly introduce the discussions and topics of some of these dissertations. Although the number of dissertations on essence/attribute is greater than those on substance/accident, I will provide brief summaries of each of the substance/accident dissertations because of pertinence to this workshop. This follows a general discussion of the essence/attribute distinction in Shi‘ite theology, and a categorized list of the dissertations on this topic.

DEAD ENDS FOR NATURALISM
Matthias Stefan and Georg Gasser, University of Innsbruck, Austria

Naturalism is the most prevalent contemporary philosophical tenet among analytic philosophers. Nevertheless, it is split into many different positions, which are merely loosely connected. In our paper, we focus mainly on ontological naturalism. Ontological naturalism is a thesis about what there is (not). Roughly speaking it claims that only natural entities exist, that is entities which are described by natural science. There are three promising possibilities to understand this claim, namely (i) physicalism, (ii) scientism and (iii) conciliable naturalism. We will show that these approaches are far from being elaborated in a satisfactory form so far: Most versions of ontological naturalism currently at hand are either something like a construction site (physicalism), or -even worse- self defeating (scientism) or inconsistent (conciliable naturalism). In the final section we argue that any promising ontological naturalistic position has no alternative to eliminativism or reductionism. However, the burden of proof for accepting such a revisionary understanding of reality as the adequate one lies on the naturalist’s shoulders.

DIE ROLLE GEMEINSAMEN HANDELNS FÜR PERSONALE AUTONOMIE
Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, University of Leipzig, Germany

Die Idee, wir seien schon als einzelne Individuen autonom handelnde Person, ist darin naiv, dass sie die sozialen Bedingungen freien Handelns in der Teilnahme an kommunikativen Handlungen einfach übersieht. Man siedelt auch die ‘moralischen’ Normen schon zu hoch an, wenn man sie nur im Kontext freier kooperativer Handlungen betrachtet und nicht auch als konstitutiv für eine viel basalere Handlungs- und Sprachkompetenz erkennt. Allerdings ist dann zu klären, wie sich Personen auch noch gegen eine bloß implizite oder empraktische Sittlichkeit als Einzelne autonom verhalten können, welche Anerkennungen von Traditionen dazu voraussetzen sind, wie autonome Normänderungsvorschläge möglich werden und wie sie zu bewerten sind.
KONVERGENZEN IN GRUNDLEGENDEN PRINZIPIEN ZWISCHEN DEM KRITISCHEN RATIONALISMUS UND DER INTERKULTURELLEN PHILOSOPHIE
Harald Stelzer, University of Graz, Austria


OUTLINE OF ARGUMENTS AGAINST NATURALISMS: LEVELS AND CLASSIFICATIONS
Thomas Sukopp, Technical University of Braunschweig, Germany

I suggest to order arguments against (epistemological) naturalism in ascending strength to see more clearly when debates turn fundamentally. Arguments attack naturalism on different levels which are helpful to evaluate naturalistic claims. Main arguments attack primarily naturalistic premises which are notoriously controversial (e. g. realism, scientism and an exclusion of a priori). Exponents of opposing views about naturalism should benefit from the proposed classification though it surely simplifies complex debates.

TWO VIEWPOINTS ON PERCEPTION: POSSIBILITY OF DIALOG
Anna Storozhuk, University of Novosibirsk, Russia

In the article two viewpoints on the mind’s influence on perception are considered. One of them goes back to Bacon who thought that we cannot completely liberate ourselves from the idols besetting the mind. Another viewpoint originates from Descartes’ philosophy who, following his mind-body dualism, suggested considering thinking and perception as absolutely independent processes. Some philosophically significant corollaries from both positions are shown.

THE FRAISSÈ THEOREM AND GOODMAN’S PARADOX
Tiziano Stradoni, Galleria d’Arte Moderna Verona, Italy

Having introduced the concept of monadic languages in first-order logic, we will show how, given a monadic structure, it is in general always possible to define another elementarily equivalent to the first but not finitely isomorphic to it, in contrast with what has been asserted for all first-order logic by Fraissé’s theorem. So non-standard models also exist in finite or countable monadic structures. These conclusions are applied to a simplified formulation of Goodman’s Paradox in order to demonstrate how it derives from intuitively plausible but logically incompatible requirements of the adequacy of inductive systems regarding elementally equivalent structures. In the conclusion we suggest possible generalisations about these results in the field of theoretical informatics.

REASON, RED IN TOOTH AND CLAW: NATURALISING REASON
Konrad Talmont-Kaminski, Marie Curie-Sklodowska University, Poland

At the beginning of the twenty first century naturalism is flourishing and affecting all of the major fields of philosophy; its influence being felt from epistemology, through metaphysics, philosophy of mind and ethics all the way to philosophy of language and philosophy of logic. Rather than try to characterise naturalism as it appears in all of those different areas I will focus upon what I consider to be the seminal aspect of naturalism – its role in our understanding of what it means for us humans to be rational. Appropriately enough, my examination will take in both the historical development of naturalised theories of rationality and the implications that such a view of reason has. The main aim, however, will be to present a sketch of a naturalist account of reason that is informed by Peirce’s pragmatism.

IBN SINA AND AQUINAS ON SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT
Erwin Tegtmeier, University of Mannheim, Germany

The Christian Metaphysicians of the Middle Ages, particularly Aquinas learnt a lot about Aristotle’s metaphysics from Islamic philosophers such as Ibn Sina (latinised as Avicenna). However, Ibn Sina (or Alfarabi) did not merely reproduce Aristotle but introduced far-reaching innovations to Aristotelian metaphysics. They deviated more from Aristotle than they were aware of since the Aristotle they knew was Neoplatonically dyed.

Avicenna’s major innovation was the concept of existence which is lacking in Aristotle’s metaphysics. Therefore it is Ibn Sina who does ontology as Aristotle defined it, namely the science of being as being. Aristotle’s ontology is actually the science of the model being (ousia), and thus not ontology but osiology. Because of the Neoplatonic influence Ibn Sina tended to essentialism which is then to be found also in Aquinas. Both countenance universals in a certain way and both draw on the concept of existence to distinguish substances and accidents. However, Aquinas
returns with respect to the nature of a substance to a certain extent to Aristotle.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERCULTURALITY FOR THE PROBLEM OF (IN)TRANSPARENCY

James M. Thompson, Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, Germany

Clearly, the relationship I have to my thoughts and feelings is quite different to the one another person has to them. This paper is an attempt to investigate this asymmetry by examining a key passage in Part II of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. In this passage, a parallel is drawn between the possibility of the other’s (in)transparency and intercultural encounter. In both cases, the status of understanding shows itself to be of fundamental importance, and provokes the question of how I can situate myself in relation to the cultural other, on the one hand, and to my thoughts and feelings as mine, on the other.

WITTGENSTEIN, THE ARTISTIC WAY OF SEEING, AND THE SENSE OF THE WORLD

Gabriele Tomasi, University of Padua, Italy

There are passages in the Notebooks and the Tractatus in which Wittgenstein refers to the unity of ethics and aesthetics. In this paper I propose a commentary on this idea, juxtaposing Wittgenstein’s concept of art with Hegel’s (and Todorov’s) interpretation of seventeenth-century Dutch painting. The comparison is useful in order to highlight what seems to me to be the point of Wittgenstein’s thesis: what characterises the artistic way of seeing is not a response to properties that things may possess, but rather an attention full of wonder at what is there. Now, wonder corresponds to a sort of gestaltic change in our acceptance of facts, in the position we take with respect to the world, in which the world is no longer assumed as something merely accidental, and this is precisely what reveals its value.

A NEO-PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE: AN ETHICS OF SELF-REFLEXIVITY

Fabrizio Trifirò, University of Dublin, Ireland

This paper presents an argument for the desirability of an anti-foundationalist approach to cultural difference and intercultural dialogue. It will be formulated in terms of the normative requirements for the fullest realization of a genuine cosmopolitan liberal democracy. It will argue that an anti-foundationalist awareness is particularly suitable to bring about the enabling conditions for deliberative democratic and liberal social relations capable to mediate the tensions between the universalistic aspirations of human rights and democratic principles and cultural particularism.

Before illustrating the virtuous relationships between an anti-foundationalist conception of normativity and the deliberative normative core of a genuine liberal democracy, however, it will be necessary to present the main tenets of what I regard as a viable anti-foundationalist account of normative validity. In this task I will be guided by the works of the two contemporary philosophers that I see as best developing the anti-metaphysical and anti-sceptical arguments first advanced by the founders of American pragmatism and by Ludwig Wittgenstein, i.e. Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam.

WARUM ICH IMMER NOCH NATURALIST BIN

Gerhard Vollmer, University of Braunschweig, Germany


Einige Forderungen halte ich für unverzichtbar: (a) Nur so viel Metaphysik wie nötig! (b) Ein Mindestrealismus, zum Beispiel der hypothetische Realismus. (c) Alles, was es gibt, ist primär materiell-energetisch. (d) Es gibt keine erfahrungstranszendenten Instanzen. (e) Es gibt keine Wunder. (f) Auch die geistigen Leistungen des Menschen führen nicht über die Natur hinaus.

Dieser Naturalismus ist anderen Positionen in mehrfacher Hinsicht überlegen: Er ist rational, konsistent, kritisierbar, sparsam in seinen Mitteln und hat angesichts dieser Mittelbeschränkung hohen Erklärungswert.

GOD AS SUBSTANCE WITHOUT SUBSTANCE ONTOLOGY

Daniel von Wachter, University of Munich, Germany

I shall argue that one can reject substance ontology and still affirm the Christian doctrine that God is three persons in one substance. Substance ontology for the material world claims that it is subdivided ontologically into units which are exemplifications of kind universals. One has to reject this if one does not believe that there is a unique ontologically correct way of carving up the material world and that every thing belongs fundamentally to one kind, its substantial form. There is a good sense of “substance” in which one can still affirm that the three divine persons constitute a substance even if one rejects this. I shall spell out various features of God which, according to what philosophers usually mean by a substance, make it right to call God a substance.
ABER DER LÖWE SPRICHT EBEN NICHT! ANMERKUNGEN ZU EINER KONTOVERSE

Thomas Wachtendorf, Oldenburg, Germany


FROM ANTI-METAPHYSICS TO NON-PYRRHONIAN POLYPHONY - REMARKS ON THE DIFFICULTY OF RECEIVING WITTGENSTEIN

Thomas Wallgren, University of Helsinki, Finland

The difficulty of receiving Wittgenstein is renown. What is this difficulty? I suggest a distinction between two ways of looking at the issue. I argue that the distinction can serve to bring certain issues pertaining, for short, to the Socratic dimension in Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy into focus. The polyphonic interpretations of Wittgenstein proposed by Stern, Pichler and others, are seen as improving on therapeutic interpretations but their Pyrrhonism is judged problematic.

RESPECTIVE JUSTICE THROUGH THICK AND THIN: A CRITIQUE OF RAWLSEAN JUSTICE

Trevor Wedman, University of San Diego, USA

John Rawls’ notion of justice is based on the idea of discursive reason within a law of peoples. This law provides the unifying background for decision making processes among peoples of otherwise differing ‘local’ backgrounds; at the very least, this law implements a process of moral learning approximating a unifying understanding of thin morality. Michael Walzer’s critique on the Rawlsian ideal takes in the analysis of the societal status quo: Walzer points out that there are ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ moralities which concurrently form the basis of societal decision making. To disregard the one or the other is to misunderstand how moral consensus can actually be achieved. Walzer makes clear the need for a ‘Moral Federalism’ resting on the self-determination of peoples.

This solution might be applicable, though it might be resisted by Western societies which fail to see their implementation of morality only as token of a partially universal type.

CHINESE LANGUAGE – WESTERN MIND

Christian Helmut Wenzel, National Chi Nan University, Taiwan

Shall East and West never meet? Of course they do. But do they “really” understand each other? And what role does language play in this? Chinese is different from English, so is Classical Chinese from Classical Greek or Latin. But does this account for cultural differences? Do Chinese think differently from Westerners, because they speak a different language? It has often been said that the Chinese did not develop abstract sciences or formal logic, because their language was not suitable for this, because it lacked a formal grammar with inflection, and because the script was pictographic or ideographic and not phonetic. There are at least two questions in all of this: First, does language determine thought? Second, is Chinese different from Western languages in ways that play a role regarding the first question? It is on these two questions that we will focus.

NORMATIVITY AND NOVELTY

Tine Wilde, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

In this paper I argue that the notion of aspect seeing is a substantial tool to shed light on the question whether rule-following is something necessary individual or social and on how this issue is connected to novelty. Bloor’s (1997) insights will be used as representative of the social primacy of rule-following and Luntley (2003) will be taken up in order to examine an example of the individual stance. Weighing pros and cons and taking the notion of aspect seeing into account, these insights will lead us to the conclusion not only that the individual and the social are merely constructs, created by us for practical purposes, but also that we tend to overlook our most basic ties with the world, exactly because of these constructs and conventions. If we adopt an artistic meta-view and make use of the philosopher’s reflection, Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the importance of ‘everyday life’, also in philosophy, takes on a new meaning.

TOWARDS AN INTERCULTURAL PHENOMENOLOGY – THE PROBLEM OF INTERCULTURALITY FROM A METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Harald A. Wiltsche, University of Graz, Austria

In the following essay I want to ask for the relevance of Husserlian phenomenology with regard to questions of interculturality. I will restrict myself to the methodical operation of the phenomenological reduction which is the precondition for phenomenological inquiry. The encounter with a culturally different Other will be portrayed as a
mundane motivation for philosophical reflection on the very possibility of objectivity, intersubjectivity and intercultural understanding. After the phenomenological reduction has been performed one is able to recognize that our relations to the world and to Others are always mediated by different scientific and non-scientific "attitudes". Phenomenology has to be regarded as a method which allows critical reflection upon the presuppositions entailed in every world-involvement. In putting these presuppositions out of order, phenomenology is able to gain access to the sphere of the transcendental, i.e., the very structure of human (inter-)subjectivity. My thesis is that this structure can be regarded as the bedrock for further reflection on interculturality.

**TRUTH AND DIALOGUE**

Kwasi Wiredu, University of South Florida, USA

Philosophy is a critical inquiry into the fundamental ideas and principles of human thought and action. We live now in times when there is a great need for inter-cultural dialogue about just such matters. It might have been thought that philosophy would be fully dedicated to this project. Unfortunately, there are philosophical doctrines that are incompatible with the possibility of dialogue. An example is the doctrine of faith as a kind of access to truth that is inaccessible to rational probing. Another is the notion that the truth value of a belief is relative to the criteria that happen to be operative in a culture or even lesser grouping. In this discussion I shall suggest that certain theories of the concept of truth itself are antagonistic to dialogue, and that a judicious and dialogue-friendly theory of truth must align theory with the conditions of human life and practice.

**DAS PROBLEM DES METAPHYSISCHEN SUBJEKTS IN WITTGENSTEINS „TRACTATUS“**

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In diesem Vortrag wurden zwei Wege dargestellt, auf denen die Analyse des Subjektbegriffes im Tractatus Wittgensteins durchgeführt wurde: (1). Der erkenntnistheoretische Weg, auf dem Subjekt als Grenze der Welt und als Konsequenz des Transzendentalismus und Solipsismus dargestellt wird. Und (2). Der ontologische Weg, auf dem der Zusammenhang zwischen der Problematik des Subjekts und der Frage nach den Gegenständen und der logischen Form deutlich wird. Die Überlegungen dieser zwei Wege führen den Autor zu einer Interpretation, die auf die Philosophie Schopenhauers und Kants zurückführt. Das Subjekt des Willens und die transzendentale Vorstellung können als das absolute Subjekt verstanden werden. Solche eine Interpretation lässt, wie es scheint, die Bemerkungen/Aussagen Wittgensteins bezüglich des Mystizismus und des Unaussprechbaren besser versteht.

**ON POWER, CONVENTION AND THE VARIETIES OF NORMATIVITY**

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The fundamental unifying notion in Searle’s *The Construction of Social Reality* is that of power. As he himself admits, the resultant framework is incapable of dealing adequately with those "purely honorific" institutional phenomena in which no power is transferred or modified in any way. Searle refers to such phenomena both as constituting a "huge exception" to his views and also as simple "degenerate cases" of other institutional phenomena to which his theory does apply (so that chess, for example, would be a degenerate case of war).

Searle’s treatment is problematic also in that he conceives the normativity embodied in institutional power-relations by analogy with the conventional rule-governed normativity of
games. Just as in chess bishops are empowered to move diagonally, so in the social world, according to Searle, creditors are empowered to demand restitution from debtors, and citizens are empowered to vote. How then are we to deal with a purely honorific phenomenon such as the awarding of medals? It is appropriate (in a normative sense) that a hero receives a medal, and this appropriateness is independent of any powers that may accrue to the recipient. The same holds too in regard to a host of other normative phenomena: it is appropriate that we respect our elders; that we do not betray our friends; that we avoid cruelty; that we help those in need, etc. How are phenomena of these sorts to be explained within the conventionalist framework of a social ontology like Searle’s?